Integrated Security And Development Simulation Assessment For Counterinsurgency Operations: Is Urbansim An Effective Training Tool For Junior U.S. Army Officers?

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ABSTRACT

Based on the current and recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a strong need to train junior officers on COIN operations, to include security and development. This involves training to increase knowledge as well as to develop critical decision-making and analytical skills. UrbanSim is a serious game that has been developed recently to meet this need. UrbanSim’s original intent was to train Battalion commanders; however, it can also be of great benefit to train junior officers. UrbanSim trains users by utilizing specific training scenarios based on real-world situations faced by military leaders deployed to COIN environments. Research and experimental results from this study show that UrbanSim can improve the COIN knowledge and decision-making and analytical skills of junior Army officers beyond what is currently being taught at the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC). In addition, the junior officers in this study recommended that UrbanSim be implemented Army-wide to train junior officers at the company and battalion level. If this is done, it will help junior officers in the U.S. Army to be better prepared for current and future conflicts in COIN environments.

The following hypothesis was developed, tested, and accepted as a result of the research for this thesis:

H:O = The use of UrbanSim does not improve company grade officers’ application of counterinsurgency skills, to include security and development, above that of the standard Program of Instruction (POI) currently being used at the U.S. Army Maneuver Captain’s Career Course.

To conduct this experiment, forty participants from the Maneuver Captains Career Course were selected to test UrbanSim. A Situational Judgment Test was used to test for improvements in COIN application and results were tested with a Students T-Test and ANOVA. Additionally a short answer questionnaires and After Action Reviews were conducted to measure qualitative input.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Currently there is little to no effective use of a simulation training system that teaches the proper balance of security and developmental operations in COIN environments for junior and mid-level military officers and U.S. State Department personnel.

Proposed Solution

The proposed solution is the use of UrbanSim, which is a “game-based learning solution that is designed to train leaders in the execution of the “Art of Battle Command” in complex environments where counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations predominate” (Wansbury, Hart, Gordon, & Wilkinson, 2010). UrbanSim is the only software available on the market that attempts to integrate security and development into a single comprehensive operation rather than divided into two separate spheres. UrbanSim has shown its effectiveness in the ability to train Soldiers in multiple institutional and operational unit settings. (Wansbury, Hart, Gordon, & Wilkinson, 2010).

Hypothesis

The use of UrbanSim improves company grade officers’ application of counterinsurgency skills, to include security and development, above that of the standard Program of Instruction (POI) currently being used at the US Army Maneuver Captain’s Career Course.

Targeted Audience

The target audience consists of Second Lieutenants to Lieutenant Colonels in command or leadership positions, such as platoon leader, company commander, battalion operations or executive officer, and battalion commanders. These are the leaders who or are in charge of those personnel considered to be “at the tip of the spear.” These front line leaders are the individuals who are making the daily decisions on the ground in deployed areas. Their actions can have strategic consequences. These leaders are in contact with locals on a daily basis and are in charge of these front-line leaders. In order for change to happen, it must be learned and then understood by the individuals who implement the execution phase of the military’s strategy.

The ability to apply COIN principles is typically exercised by units prior to deployment. However, this is rarely done in a virtual environment before the Pre-Command Course for future Battalion Commanders. The use of a turn-based simulation for exercising COIN tools would benefit Battalion Commanders and below because they have the largest direct impact in today’s conflicts.
The Use of UrbanSim to Train Junior Officers

In order to win counterinsurgency operations, there needs to be joint Lines of Effort (LOE’s) from both the development and security side. To solve this problem, we propose a computer training simulation, or a current Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) game, UrbanSim, to help train US Army leaders in COIN operations, ranging from development to security. The focus of the simulation is on teaching concepts rather than details, the “what” rather than the **“how.”** The future goal for this simulation is to implement the use in all junior to mid-level Professional Military Education (PME) and eventually to small unit leaders in non-TDA units.

The key aspect of the simulation is to stress the interdependence of the lines of effort. Trainees must develop a full-scale plan of action and execute it. The trainee must also do this while paying attention to all aspects of COIN operations, ranging from development to security. The trainees must be able to fully understand the dependency of these different aspects on one another. Only by adopting a holistic approach will the trainee be able to successfully complete the training program.

Implementing UrbanSim into the Basic Officer Leadership Course II (BOLC II), Basic Officer Leadership Course III (BOLC III), the Captains Career Course (CCC), and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) which trains officers prior to assuming leadership roles; BOLC=platoon leader, CCC=company command, ILE=S3 (operations), and battalion Executive Officer (XO). This would benefit the education they currently receive and better prepare them for the roles they are bound to hold in the near future. Once leaders at this level have developed an appreciation for the game and understand its potential, it can then be pushed to the units that will execute the concepts of COIN that the game emphasizes.

Initially the training will be conducted at the Armies Centers of Excellence (COE) such as Ft. Benning, Ft. Sill, Ft. Leonard Wood, Ft. Leavenworth, etc. At the COEs, these junior to mid-level leaders are conducting their PME respective to their military occupational specialty (MOS)/branch. At Ft. Leavenworth, the branches are integrated for ILE. Upon successful rotations with positive feedback, the training can then be pushed to military installations that have deployable units as well as the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA, typically has the ability to run individual training prior to a unit moving into the training area to which UrbanSim could be implemented. During this timeframe, one day would be established for leaders to work through a COIN simulation, preparing them for situation they will soon encounter “in the box” and in theater.

**Use of Serious Gaming**

The Prussian General Staff pioneered serious gaming in the early 19th century. These serious games were developed out of need to control forces across large geographical areas, prior to the invention of the radio. The Prussians, who later evolved into the Germans, relied heavily on war games to predict future conflicts and also to help train their own staff (Gudarian, 1952). The use of war games allowed the Prussians to train their commanding staff in improved decision-making, coordination across branches of their armed forces, and in testing new theories and concepts before committing them to action. Many historians attribute the early successes of the Prussian armies during the Wars of Unification, in large part, due to the professionalism of their general staffs (Elliot-Wright, 1993). In fact, this staff-training model was
so successful that many of the world’s greatest military forces adopted it within a short time span, to include the British Royal Navy (Massie R. K., 1991).

It was due to this long, successful history in the use of war-gaming to develop decision-making skills that we have chosen to develop and use a serious game model to train the future generation of U.S. Army officers and state department personnel.

In addition the use of UrbanSim is in line with the adaptable model proposed by Army Learning Model 2015 as a mode for training the force. As described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, *The Army Learning Concept for 2015. The Army Learning Model 2015* “seeks to improve our learning model by leveraging technology without sacrificing standards so we can provide credible, rigorous, and relevant training and education for our force of combat seasoned Soldiers and leaders.” (US Army, 2011)
CHAPTER 2: Problem Statement for Coordination of Development and Security Operations in a COIN Environment

Introduction

In the last two decades, Western nations have been pulled into many counterinsurgency (COIN) and nation-building conflicts such as Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan (Soviet and U.S.), East Timur, Haiti, Palestine, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The results have been less than encouraging. Western nations have failed to impose peace and stability in many of these countries. In addition, even in places where active fighting no longer claims hundreds of lives daily, crime, corruption, political violence, and a lack of economic growth continue to depress the hope of a brighter future. War has not been resolved in many of these conflict countries. One can compare these situations to a fire. War has only been temporarily smothered, and is ready to flare up again with the smallest gust of wind. The cost of these COIN conflicts in terms of resources and lives for Western nations has been prohibitive. Afghanistan alone has received $73,255,000,000 between FY2001-FY2010 from the U.S. alone. (Katzman, May 3, 2012). That is just the cost of economic aid, and does not take into account the money spent to maintain U.S. forces in theater. Despite a massive influx of foreign aid there has been very little improvement in the economy and infrastructure of Afghanistan in the last ten years. The crop yield per acre has not drastically improved, nor have the major highways. The "Ring Road" or Highway 1, is the main artery in Afghanistan that connects the key cities. It was originally built by the Soviets in the 1980’s. Unfortunately, this highway has not yet been completed. In many parts of the country Highway 1 lies in disrepair due to war and the elements.

COIN is a relatively simple concept. Governments want to draw insurgents into open battle where their forces usually enjoy superiority in training, organization, firepower, and often numbers. Government forces must first separate the insurgents from the civilian population to do this. The insurgents use the civilian population to hide in, to obtain logistical support, to recruit new members, and to gain legitimacy. Once insurgents are physically and politically separated from the populace, their destruction is assured. This can only be achieved by a combination of security and development operations. Security operations provide the physical separation while development operations provide the political separation. The latter is done through a series of economic and governance actions to improve the lives of the civilian populace. This is combined with political and social actions such as reconciliations and information campaigns, all aimed at changing the populace’s perceptions. It is important to understand that counterinsurgency campaigns are rarely won by kinetic operations alone. Unless government forces are willing to conduct whole-scale genocide, they will not kill their way to victory. Few historical examples demonstrate this better the German efforts in the Balkans during World War II. Despite the use of unrestricted barbarity and disregard for human life, the Germans not only failed to halt the spread of partisans in the area, but also lost whole sections of the country to partisan forces in the end (Greentree, 2012).

Historical Background

Guerrilla warfare is not a new phenomenon. Even as far back as ancient times there are records of weaker forces fighting back against superior foes. These weaker guerilla forces used hit and run tactics then melted back into the civilian population. One of the oldest recorded
examples of guerrilla warfare were Jewish Macabeans fighting against the ancient Assyrians. This example is also a rarity in that it actually succeeded. However, more often than not, opposing armies crushed these guerrilla forces. Even though brutal tactics were often used to defeat these guerrilla or insurgent forces, they were not the preferred methods. Development methods were often used in conjunction with military force.

The following section is divided into three parts. The first section discusses successful COIN operations throughout history. The second section deals with cultural and economic changes that occurred after World War II. The last section deals with the string of failed COIN operations that followed after those post WWII changes, with emphasis on the coordination of development and security operations.

**Historical Examples of Effective Combination of Development and Security Operations**

One of the preeminent early examples of successful COIN operations is the Roman campaign against the Mediterranean pirates. The conflict started in 67 B.C. after pirate attacks on Roman supply ships began to cause food shortages in Rome. Some of the pirate formations were even capable of conducting conventional combat operations and formed a fleet capable of overwhelming smaller city-states. Gnius Pompeys' campaign against these pirates lasted only three months and consumed just a fraction of the resources that the Roman Senate allocated to it. This example is useful because the pirate menace is similar to the threat of the criminally motivated gangs and cartels that Western militaries face in many parts of the world today.

The Roman campaign was brilliantly waged on the security side. First, the Western Mediterranean was broken up into thirteen regions, with each being given a military commander to operate and assume responsibility for it. This division of responsibility is almost identical to the Area of Operations (AO’s) and Operating Environments (OE’s) that are assigned to individual units in present day Western militaries. These pirates were aggressively hunted down and all of their bases in each region were systematically eliminated. The process was then repeated in the Eastern Mediterranean. So far this campaign appears purely kinetic in nature, but what sets it apart is the development aspect to it.

Pompey recognized that the root causes of the pirate menace were largely economical. The large influx of slaves into the Mediterranean world had displaced small-scale farmers, who up to that point dominated the economy. These farmers were replaced with larger, more efficient farms dominated by slave labor. This historical example shows of the disruption of economic patterns and the resulting massive poverty. This example is familiar because it resembles the effects of globalization to many Third World countries. Today's small-scale subsistent farmers are no longer able to compete with Western industrialized farming techniques. In both cases poverty is the result, causing the population to often turn to illegal activity as a means to a livelihood. In this regard, these small farmers turned pirates were no different than the current poppy growers in Afghanistan or the coca growers in South America.

Pompey addressed this problem by implementing development solutions that went hand in hand with his military actions. Even as Pompey's naval forces relentlessly hunted down pirates, an economic solution moved in parallel motion. A series of agricultural colonies were set up for pirate defectors and some lower ranking prisoners. At the same time, an amnesty was announced for any pirate that wished to surrender. Rather than face the might of the Roman war machine, most of the pirates took the amnesty and agricultural colony offer. These
development actions were successful because they addressed the very economic issues that
drove the farmers to piracy in the first place (Warry, 1995).

It is important to note that this successful campaign contained security and development
plans that were drawn up at the same headquarters by the same officers, and were always
intended to complement each other. There was no separation of decision-making power
between the military and the civilian authority. This power was vested in one place and only one
person was held accountable for the entire operation. It is also important to note that in the
Roman Empire, government officials were expected to have a skill set that encompassed both
civil and military management skills. For example, at the time of the Gallic Wars, Julius Caesar
was carrying out this war in his capacity as provincial governor of Transalpine Gaul. Gaul was a
civil post that encompassed both the civil and military aspect of governing. Thus, the two sets of
policy were executed as one, making them far more efficient than if they were separated.

When looking at events closer to recent times, one can find examples of COIN
campaigns waged by the U.S. military during the early part of the 20th century. Two examples
stand out the most – the U.S. Army occupation of Cuba after the end of Spanish-American War
(1899-1902), and the much longer occupation of Haiti (1915-1934). The U.S. Army COIN
campaign in Cuba gives helpful insight when the reader compares it to the recent U.S. conflict in
Iraq. The Cuban occupation grew out of America's desire to rid Cuba of Spain. The U.S. had
decided early on that Cuba would become an independent nation. As soon as hostilities with the
Spanish forces ended, the U.S. Army swiftly moved to resume the functions of Cuba's civilian
government. The U.S. Army’s first move was to disarm the locals, or insurrectos, who had been
rebelling against the Spanish. Many of the insurrectos were little more than bands of armed
men. The insurrectos were bought off with a $75 bonus (Boot, 2002), or the equivalent of
approximately $1,700-1,900 today (US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor statistics). This
amount was close to what the average Cuban made in one year. The bonus allowed most of
the insurrectos to retain not only their pride, but also allowed them to restart a civilian life without
reverting to illegal activities. The U.S. Army also began an immediate food distribution program,
a large-scale school construction program that reached most of the civilian population, and a
sanitation program. An Army doctor by the name of Dr. Walter Reed discovered the mosquito
was responsible for transmitting yellow fever in Cuba, after consulting with a local Cuban doctor.
The U.S. Army consequently started a mosquito eradication campaign. By the time it was
complete, Yellow Fever dropped from approximately 1,400 cases per year to 0 in the capital of
Havana alone (Boot, 2002). Malaria rates followed closely behind.

The overall effect of these measures is that, unlike the recent U.S. conflict in Iraq,
there was no follow-on insurgency. No one in Cuba wanted to challenge or fight the American
troops. The was due to the superb development actions taken along with making sure the
Cuban people knew the U.S. presence was going to be temporary. It is also very important to
note that the U.S. Army alone executed all of the development actions. There were no NGOs,
no State Department, and no USAID. Decisions were made rapidly, and executed by a single
chain of command. The security actions (in this case simple police patrols) were tied into
development actions (Boot, 2002).

The other major U.S. COIN campaign in the early 20th century was the U.S. occupation
of Haiti. Conducted from 1915-1934, this campaign began as a response to the massive
instability of the island's political structure. Haiti had been historically unstable, and during this
time period, the instability threatened Western interests. An example of this threat occurred
when a mob invaded a French delegation, seized the Haitian president hiding there, and then
brutally hacked him into pieces. Fearing attacks on Westerners and possible German
domination of the island, the U.S. landed Marines on Haiti to seize the island. Unlike the Cuban occupation, the U.S. was interested in long-term control of the island. The elite class of Haitian people immediately resisted this move by the U.S. They were afraid the Marines would try to stop their corrupt behavior of using the nation's treasury as their primary means of income. Although the initial landing faced no physical resistance, the dislike of the Americans was made certain at every turn, forcing the Marines to disband the Haitian National Assembly. Despite the elite's hostility, the U.S. forces immediately went to work restoring and creating government services. When the Marines landed there were only two paved roads in the entire country. By the time they left, over one thousand miles of paved roads were constructed. There were eleven new hospitals, a telegraph system, and a new police force that was able to run and maintain government services with very little corruption. All of this was accomplished by only a small contingent of several thousand Marines, and almost no development money. Most of the projects were paid for by tolls levied by the U.S. Navy at the Haiti customs house. In short, the occupation paid for itself. There were two uprisings against the U.S., both led by the disenfranchised Haiti elite’s class and manned by groups of Cacos. Cacos was the term that referred to the gangs living in the interior of the country who benefited the most from political instability. These gangs were also the forces hired to carry out political violence most of the time. Neither of theserevolts ever gained the widespread support of the Haitian population. Successful administration and development action by the Marines effectively isolated the rebel forces politically from the bulk of population. This allowed the Marines and Haitian police to flush the rebels into the open, where better-trained U.S. forces quickly destroyed the so-called freedom fighters (Boot, 2002).

Just as in Rome and Cuba, the development and security actions in Haiti were handled by the same agency, the military. Again, development and security operations went hand in hand and complemented each other. In many cases this avoided violence altogether. However, even when disenfranchised segments of society took up arms against the occupying forces, they were immediately isolated from the rest of society. This isolation consisted of physical isolation through successful security operations and political isolation through successful development actions.

Changes in Army Culture and Shifts in Economic and Social Factors

This section looks at a period of time when counterinsurgency campaigns began to fail and governments started to lose more often than they won. World War II and shifting economic and social patterns were major causes for this. World War II played a significant role in the organizational culture of U.S. Army, and to some degree, other militaries in the West. The generation of officers who fought in colonial and police actions was replaced overnight by a generation of officers that fought large force on force conventional battles. Most people tend to fall back on their previous experiences when dealing with new problems, and the U.S. Army was no different from the 1950’s onward. Commanding generals in the U.S. military sought to reshape military forces based on their experience from fighting against Germany and Japan in World War II. These generals did not visualize the need to train and promote development as a core skill set that Army officers needed to possess. Those skills were not taught, and a mentality was established that soldiers are expected to only know how to execute combat operations. This loss of development skills training that military officers received in the past played a key role in the series of defeats that followed.

There are two other factors that led to COIN campaign failures by Western militaries in the recent past. These were changes in the global economic pattern and a shift in social
concepts and attitudes. It is important for one to remember that colonization is a direct and indirect cause of multiple counterinsurgencies fought in the Twentieth Century. Western colonization and domination of the developing world created massive disruption in local culture, political power arrangements, economic patterns, and existing ethnic/sectarian conflicts. Towards the end of Western colonial rule by Great Britain and other Western nations, this colonization and domination led to the spread of various radical ideologies such as communism, nationalism, and religious extremism. In addition, ethnic conflicts worsened as local power brokers struggled for power and economic resources in the vacuum created by departing colonialists. Since most of the groups who wanted to challenge the status quo lacked the resources to create conventional armies, they turned to guerrilla warfare. Guerilla warfare was the only attainable and realistic means to achieve victory in the face of technologically superior government forces.

One of the major reasons Western powers colonized other countries for the past three centuries was economic revenue. Profitability played a big role in starting new settlements, even in the Americas. The pilgrims may have sailed to escape religious persecution, but their king gave them a charter because he hoped to profit from trade in the New World. Both India and China followed this precedent by seizing coastal enclaves where Western powers could access local markets. Some believe even the British conquest of India can be seen as attempt to "stabilize the market," after the Mogul Empire collapsed into anarchy (Porch, 2000).

This pursuit of revenue was reflected in the methods by which wars were fought during the early colonization period. Colonial governments sought the cheapest and most effective means by which to wage and win wars. These governments also had a lot at stake in terms of fighting and winning. Defeat in a colonial conflict could cause a loss of significant revenue, a possible decline in European political standing, and possible dominion by other European powers. The European economy began to change to an industrial-based economy at the turn of the last century. One could see Western powers seizing colonies not just for the value of their markets, but also for their natural resources. This is one of the reasons many countries made a "scramble after Africa." By the end of World War II, world economic patterns began to shift again. Nations began to focus more on service economies. Therefore, massive amounts of raw materials no longer had to be secured by direct control; they could be purchased off former colonies. This change in economic patterns devalued the worth of colonies and now they were considered to be more of an economic burden. Former colonizing governments came to loath fighting protracted wars in distant lands for little in return. While key resources such as oil still necessitated conventional fights or subsidized coups, most of Africa was abandoned to it fate. This was because Africa was considered worthless in terms of strategic interest at that time.

The second factor that led to COIN campaign failures by Western nations was a shift in social concepts and attitudes towards the developing world. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a concept called the "white man's burden" gained prominence. This was an idea that Western, or more precisely, white people, were superior to people of color. Therefore white people are obligated by a moral mandate to help civilize the less fortunate people of color, who are perceived to be racially inferior. This concept caused Western powers to go to numerous parts of the world where they had very little national interests other than civilizing other races of color. Nowhere is this better seen than in colonial India. The initial British colonization of India was economically motivated, therefore the British showed respect and admiration for Indian cultures. The British developed "Sepoy" battalions, or military units that were manned by Indian troops and led by British officers. The British officers and Indian soldiers worked remarkably well together. Most British officers learned the local language and demonstrated a respect for the culture of their native soldiers. By the mid 1850's, the rise of the "white man's burden" had changed all of this. The British no longer showed any respect for the local culture and few
British officers spoke the local language. A backlash soon followed in the form of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-1858. A large portion of a Sepoy battalion in Northern India rose up in rebellion against the British rule (Fremont-Barnes, 2007). The "white man's burden" was the other reason for the "scramble after Africa." European powers sought to expand their rule to civilize local populations in Africa, not to gain any actual economic or political advantage. This race among colonial powers to civilize Africa nearly caused several conflicts. In 1898 France and Britain almost came to blows over just a few thousand square miles of disease-ridden jungle in Fashoad. Two crises occurred between Germany and France in 1905 and in 1908, over equally worthless pieces of Moroccan desert (Massie R. K., 1991).

Over years the “white man’s burden” concept has changed and the phrase is now considered taboo. However, this concept is still alive and well, and there are plenty of non-white nations involved in similar efforts. Some Western leaders still see themselves as superior to the developing world and believe they have a moral obligation to teach and help the "poor natives" become more civilized. President McKinley made the following quote during the annexation of the Philippines: "I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight and I am not ashamed to tell you gentlemen that I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night it came to me this way... that there is nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the best we could by them, as our own fellow men for whom Christ also died" (Boot, 2002).

Here President McKinley’s belief in the superiority of the United States is clearly shown as he talks about his duty to educate the Filipinos both in terms of civilization and Christianity. Ironically, most Filipinos then were already Catholic.

In today’s world the white man’s burden is often represented by humanitarian assistance. Western nations have a sense of obligation to intervene when they perceive genocide or violations of human rights have been committed. For example, the United Nations (U.N.) clearly states on its website “The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people.” (UN, 2011) This broad statement gives the U.N. a self-appointed legitimacy to intervene in the affairs of other nations based on poorly defined parameters. The U.N. formal definition of genocide may be loosely interpreted and there is no systematic mechanism established to identify genocide in progress. Thus U.N. or western nations are able to interfere in affairs of third world countries any time they are able to generate sufficient public support.

The concept that Western nations are somehow superior and are obligated to civilize other nations, and should intervene in state affairs, is a drastic change to modern foreign policy. Just imagine if the same concept was applied to the U.S. during the Civil War. Throughout that war, over 30,000 Union and 26,000 Confederate prisoners of war perished in prison camps alone (Macdonald, 2003). By today's standards this would have been considered genocide, a crime against humanity, and grounds for intervention under current United Nation policy. Intervention by other nations in America’s Civil War could have had a disastrous effect on U.S. history.

The down side of "a moral obligation to stop genocide," is that these conflicts in developing nations are not as simple as they look. Western media and a general lack of understanding in Western culture routinely paint a picture of "good versus evil." However, the
reality is that both sides in such conflicts commit multiple crimes and atrocities against each other. When Western forces try to protect all civilians, not only do they quickly find themselves in conflict with both sides, but they are also left with very unclear ideas as to their directive. That is, beyond trying to stop atrocities, which comes increasingly difficult.

The moral obligation concept also spawned a wide range of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), all of which operate on ideals based in Western cultural norms. Some of these new organizations have been set up to channel aid, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. These NGOs give massive aid packages to developing nations based on these ideals and Western cultural norms. As a result, the economic aid given to developing nations sometimes does more harm than good. The aid would cause spikes in inflation, breed corruption, and cause a “them versus us” attitude between military forces and similar government entities (Vershinin, 2010). Because of this, Third World governments no longer had to provide services, but could rely on NGOs to do that for them.

Overall, the change in economic and social patterns of the current world has created the breeding grounds for countless insurgencies. Often all that is needed is a crisis or radical ideology to cause a massive conflict. Thanks in part to the modernized version of the “white man’s burden,” Western militaries are sent into conflicts in developing nations. The method of fighting these wars has changed due to an economic stake being replaced by a moral calling. This moral calling often disappears once Western populations began to see the effects these conflicts have on the news. Popular support for such conflicts then quickly evaporates. In addition, the creation of a multitude of development agencies and NGOs has caused a separation in security and development efforts. The U.S. military reshaped its mission after World War II, and therefore welcomed in such changes. Now one can see why there have been many recent failures in counterinsurgency conflicts by Western nations. The next set of COIN conflict examples were far more costly in terms of money and lives lost, and are far less productive than the ones previously given.

Historical examples of failed combinations of development and security operations

The Vietnam War was one of the longest and most painful defeats in U.S. military history. The U.S. won every battle by a wide margin and then lost the war by an even wider one. This was due in large part to the failure of not appreciating the conflict for what it really was. The Vietnam War was a hybrid conflict. This term refers to wars that are both a mixture of conventional warfare and an insurgency. The Viet Cong spread dissent in the population centers and gained popular support through providing services such as education. Simultaneously, the Viet Cong spread terror through a murder and intimidation campaign aimed at government officials and pro-government population segments. All these items are traditional aspects of guerrilla warfare. However, there were also a series of large division on division battles fought by two conventional infantry forces in the middle of dense jungles. These fights between the U.S. and NVA (North Vietnamese Armies) would involve tens of thousands of soldiers with supporting heavy artillery. These battles resembled those of the World War II Pacific Theater in many ways.

The conventional fight was what shaped U.S. strategy. The U.S. Army focused exclusively on conventional battles, while completely ignoring the insurgency. No thought was given to development or solving any of the social and economic issues that caused the war in the first place. The U.S. did not build any schools or roads and did nothing to improve sanitation
throughout the country. Even the strategic Hamlet program was viewed through a security or military prism, rather than a combination of security and development. An appropriate example of this comes from the work of Colonel David Hackworth, who is a four-tour Vietnam veteran. In his book *About Face*, he shares some very interesting ideas about fighting insurgents; unfortunately all of his ideas were kinetic in nature. For the most part, these ideas were a better application of light infantry tactics used in jungle terrain, rather than counterinsurgency tactics. In short, even this highly experienced officer of this era allowed himself to completely separate security and development actions from each other (Hackworth, 1989). Almost all of the development work was done by the USAID and other civilian organizations, with virtually no input from the military or military involvement. The U.S. also neglected many crucial aspects of quality governance regarding the South Vietnamese government. In the past, Western powers would take direct charge of the government including firing corrupt officials and insuring effective services. However, in Vietnam the U.S. refused to take charge. U.S. civilian advisors lacked the military muscle to force the government to change, resulting in unchecked corruption. This corruption did not continue to occur because the local government officials were malevolent or incompetent. Once a culture of corruption sets into organizations, it is very hard for them to break free. Foreign intervention in governments often gives the opportunity for competent and dedicated officials to break free from corruption.

As compared to the success stories above, one can now see that separation of development from security was a large cause of the U.S. failure in Vietnam. Changes in social and economic patterns combined with the culture change in the U.S. military both shaped how the conflict ended.

Before mentioning the Iraq War it is also important to look at the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980’s. Despite a popular perception that the Soviets tried to kill their way to victory in Afghanistan, the truth is very different. The Soviets had a very large and robust civilian advisory effort at almost all levels of the Afghan government. Yet, much like Americans in Vietnam, the effort was split between various ministries and the military. The large influence that the KGB played in shaping the conflict made things even worse. The KGB’s traditional rivalry with the Red Army insured that no coherent plan would be developed to guide the conduct of the war. In addition, just as the U.S. Army did in Vietnam, the Soviet Army focused strictly on the kinetic portion of the conflict without giving any thought given to development or political pacification. Colonel General Vorontsov made the following comments to Valdimir Plastun (a GRU or Soviet Military Intelligence officer) when the GRU tried to merge political goals with the military: “To hell with national reconciliation. Warriors receive medals on their chest and stars on their epaulettes and money not for reconciliation, but for conducting combat operations. This is something that you, expert, do not understand!” (Kalinovsky, 2010). These comments best describe the Red Army’s attitude during the Afghanistan conflict.

Despite 950 million rubles of aid in 1987 alone (equivalent to approximately $1.61 billion U.S. dollars around that time), the Soviet Army, KGB, and Soviet civilian ministries were often working against each other, which destroyed any unity of effort (Kalinovsky, 2010). Many of the Soviet construction projects were very impressive and can be seen throughout Afghanistan today. However, without a comprehensive strategy that tied them into security operations, these monuments proved just as meaningless as many U.S. efforts in Vietnam.

The final example of failed combinations of security and development efforts in COIN campaigns comes from the recent Iraq War. Much like the U.S. Spanish war of 1898, this conflict was started based on mostly on false pretenses that no one knew at the time. The main reason for the war was to remove the corrupt regime that had no respect for its own citizens.
The initial invasion was a short, one-sided operation where the U.S. military and its allies easily overran their opponents. However, unlike the Cuban conflict where the U.S. military rapidly transitioned to the development phase, it did not in Iraq. As a result, a long and bitter insurgency followed. After conventional operations ceased, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were disbanded without reimbursement and sent home. In almost all cases the former ISF had no means of restarting their lives in a civilian world, or the skill sets to do so. On the security front there were no longer any Iraqi troops to enforce law and order in the country, and U.S. forces were initially hesitant to step in. As a result, places like the Iraqi National Museum were looted without any action taken. The U.S. military did not begin to deal with looting in Iraq until pressure from home required action to be taken. Even then, there was very little policy and only vague guidelines were issued to the troops. Soldiers were left to come up with creative means on their own, some of which greatly incensed the local population, causing them to turn against Coalition forces.

In the Cuban conflict the U.S. Army had a plan to restore government services, but this was not the case in Iraq. There was no sanitation restoration plan, no focus on the education system, and no ways of dealing with many of the other social issues that needed to be addressed. Coalition forces responded with kinetic operations when the Iraq insurgency started. These military operations greatly resembled the large-scale search and destroy missions in the Vietnam War. The U.S. civilian agencies played even less of a role than they did in Vietnam. Paul Bremer was initially placed in charge of Iraq as a civilian administrator. However he demonstrated a lack of experience and understanding of the region, thereby alienating large segments of the Iraqi population (Ricks, 2006). Eventually the U.S. military took over lead control again in Iraq, sidelining the civilian administration.

The U.S. military began to change its mode of operation in Iraq in late 2005. It transitioned to a more population centric approach and began to start development operations. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) was founded during the early days of the Iraq War. The CERP used Bath Party funds to sponsor various projects on behalf of the Iraqi people. After the Bath Party funds were depleted, the U.S. Congress appropriated funds for the CERP. The issue that remained was a lack of planning or any sort of meaningful guidance from a central planning authority. The guidance was the same back then as was given to MAJ Vershinin in Afghanistan in 2011 - "go find projects and spend money" (Vershinin, 2010). A lack of U.S. military engineers compounded development issues. The U.S. Army had dispersed most of its heavy construction battalions so development projects were delegated to U.S. Army Reserve units and local contractors. This caused the U.S. to rely almost exclusively on local Iraqi contractors whose skills and ethics left much to be desired. This resulted in large numbers of projects that pumped a great deal of money into the economy, but generated very little to increase actual productivity. This caused massive inflation that only made the majority of the Iraqi population poorer. This combined with a multi-year drought caused the average Iraqi subsistent farmer to be worse off than ever before, even after the American aid effort (Economist, 2013). The land yielded very little in terms of crops, while all Iraqi goods became more expensive.

The Iraqi War ended not because of the successful action by government forces of both the U.S. and Iraq, but more because of the shift in alignment of Iraqi political factions. Many of the Sunni forces that initially fought against the U.S. found themselves manipulated into a civil war with Iraqi Shia factions. Foreign Sunni terrorist groups called Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) drew the Sunni groups into the civil war. These factions soon found that they were losing this civil war. At the same time, the Sunni realized that it was only a matter of time before U.S. and Coalition forces were going to leave Iraq. In 2006 U.S. Congressional elections resulted in a majority that had a new anti-war platform and Iraq withdrawal plan. Facing almost certain
defeat, Sunni groups switched sides turning against AQI in exchange for U.S. protection and a share in the Iraqi government. U.S. forces also changed their tactics to accommodate the shift in the political landscape. The U.S. revamped its tactics to support its new Sunni allies. This move was led by General Petraeus and the new COIN doctrine the U.S military had adopted. U.S. forces changed their primary objective from destruction of insurgents to protection of the population. This created a supporting dynamic where the Sunni insurgents could switch sides enabling U.S. forces to offer them protection. Sunni forces were then able to hunt down the remaining insurgents among their groups. The change in U.S. tactics combined with the change in allegiances by Sunni factions proved to be a driving force of victory. The U.S. government’s goal of creating a stable and democratic Iraq had many setbacks. However, the U.S. was able to achieve its secondary goals of destroying AQI and ending major hostilities prior to withdrawing, which was still considered a victory (Biddle, Freidman, & Shapiro, 2012).

The result in the Iraq War is somewhat similar to what happened in Vietnam. The U.S. failed to achieve its primary objectives because the same authority did not handle security and development. Military forces and civilian agencies also typically failed to complement each other. Just as in Vietnam, U.S. Army planners did not often give the full attention needed to the development side of operations, expecting that it was another agency’s problem issue. It took two years of combat operations in Iraq for the U.S. Army to finally realize that it would have to do most of the heavy lifting. Even then a sufficient plan was not developed nor was there clear guidance from a central authority on how to improve the country. U.S. civilian agencies did not fare much better. The civilian side of the development and governance effort rarely operated outside Baghdad. Towards the end of the war there were some Provincial Reconstruction Teams operated by the State Department. However, these were small and their entrance into the war was too late to make have any significant impact.

The last conflict to be discussed is the NATO war in Afghanistan. The COIN issues in Afghanistan are along the same lines as Iraq. At first there was neglect of the development side of the conflict to the point of being ignored in general. As the situation began to deteriorate, a military and a civilian surge were called for. Although the civilian presence was much larger in Afghanistan than in Iraq, there was still very little cooperation with the military and no centralized plan for integrating civil and military actions. The decision chain was split between the military and civilian agencies, and as a result so were the efforts. Although there was an attempt to integrate lessons from Iraq, this provided only a few successes. The overall issue was that the local populations did not support U.S. forces. In the Iraq War, change in the political landscape allowed U.S. forces to separate insurgents from the population. In Afghanistan, such a shift has yet to take place on a major level. As a result, the U.S. tried to protect a population that was neutral at best and hostile at worst. Although there was progress in securing the south of Afghanistan, without any supporting development the population has not supported U.S. forces in the region. In summary, even when security operations are done correctly, government forces will fail to achieve success if they do not conduct supporting development and political operations.

In conclusion, it is clear that when COIN development and security efforts are planned and executed by a single body, the outcome has been repeatedly successful. In order to win, the COIN plan must contain development and security operations that complement each other. Ideally, COIN operations should be planned and executed by a single governing authority. However, with a sufficient level of cooperation and integration, a mixed civil-military effort can also execute counterinsurgency operations with a great deal success.
Differences in Organizational Cultures of the Civilian and Military Involved in COIN Operations

To fully understand why the civilian and military efforts so often fail to work together, it is important to look at the culture and structure of both organizations. It is not that the two sides do not want to cooperate, but rather the fact that they have different cultural backgrounds. Both sides may use the same words but they speak a different language. It's important to discuss the differences in military and civilian organizations and their mentalities.

The military is a well-organized institution that stresses visible results, accurate and timely reporting, and discipline. One of the most prominent displays of this was in the U.S. Army’s development of data management in Afghanistan. All projects and include supporting documentation were entered into a database where it could be viewed by all personnel with proper clearance. This allowed sharing of information and experience that was easily searchable with the click of a button. For example, when Finnish troops needed to build deep water well, they asked for assistance from the RC-North Civil Affairs Team. A U.S. team leader was able to access a number of projects that were constructed in Southern Afghanistan two years earlier. In less than an hour of research, U.S. forces were able to give the Finnish unit a price listing, blue prints, and after action reports (AAR’s) on the projects. Another benefit of data management was it also allowed for greater transparency on how military project funds were spent. This was a vital tool to keep accountability of the money allocated for military development projects.

Civilian agencies typically have a less well-defined and visible structure, and reporting is often subpar compared to the military. During MAJ Vershinin’s time in RC-North, CJ9 (the civil military section of staff responsible for controlling Northern Afghanistan) repeatedly requested lists and locations of projects executed by USAID and foreign ministries of Coalition nations. The German Foreign Ministry was the only Coalition nation that provided such a list, and the list was extensive but incomplete. The German Ministry of Economic Development that was in charge of most of the development projects refused to provide a project list to Coalition militaries and to its own foreign ministry. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry refused to provide anything, citing legal issues. Other Coalition ministries discussed these lists but took no action in regards to providing information. CJ9's believed other Coalition foreign ministries acted this way because they simply did not have an organized list of what they were doing. This appeared to be the case every time CJ9 requested information from civilian agencies (Froneberger, 2011) Most of these requests were answered with forms of generic white papers lacking any specifics. This in turn reinforces the idea that, in certain cases, many civilian development agencies of Western nations lack detailed reporting and accountability procedures regarding COIN development projects.

Other key differences between civilian development agencies and militaries are size and technical expertise. Size matters not only in terms of capabilities but also in terms of the affect it has on organizational culture. The U.S. military is a very large organization and its size allows it to provide extra resources such as mobility and security. The military’s size but also plays a large part on the mentality of its personnel. Military personnel are aware that they are a part of a much larger organization that is able to support their operational needs. Such needs are the ability to provide accurate reporting as well as other resources such as logistics, intelligence, etc., to continue the mission. The large size of the military also affects the discipline and mentality of its personnel. Military personnel understand that their plans must be “nested,” a term that implies that all plans acknowledge the intent and guidance of higher instructions and
plans. The U.S. Army defines nested as: “The means to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept is included in the other” (US Army, 2004). It is not that the military does not promote individual initiative, but that initiative is used to support a higher mission rather than individual's goal.

The disadvantage to having a large organization is that the military lacks national development training. At the peak of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the U.S. military had almost 120,000 troops deployed per year (Ricks, 2006). A large deployed force is difficult to supply a complete training program for. Often demands for personnel and resources surpass training requirements (development training) and troops have to make do with what is available rather than what is desired.

Many civilian agencies vary widely in regards to size and strength. For example, USAID’s strength decreased from 4,058 personnel in 1980 to 2,200 in 2008, even though the amount of U.S. foreign development aid increased from $10 to $20 billion during the same time frame (J. Brian Atwood, 2008). Even before the reduction, USAID did not have a fraction of the personnel that it needed to carry out its mission. This helped to assure a very independent-minded culture in the organization. Many of the USAID personnel are used to working on their own with very little reporting, as well as little planning. This makes their individual plans difficult to support both logistically and in terms of security. This ad hoc approach originates from the organization's small size and is vastly different from the tightly controlled military approach. These differences often lead to conflict and misunderstandings between the two organizations.

The other aspect to civilian agencies is their superior technical training. In civilian development agencies such as USAID, people stay in their career field for the majority of their careers. They often receive further civilian education in their respective fields and plenty of on the job training. In short, USAID personnel are masters at what they do. No one can match USAID personnel in their fields of expertise. However, this can also create other problems. Because USAID personnel spend most of their careers in the same field, they often lack cross-training in other areas. This tremendous amount of expertise in one focused area can result in losing sight of the larger picture. This means, some civilian agency personnel see the development projects being conducted as ends in and of themselves, rather than a means by which to further U.S. interests in a conflict. Nothing highlights this cultural mindset better than a quote from an article written by three former heads of USAID “The time has come to recognize that the semi merger of USAID and the State Department has not worked. The missions and personnel requirements of the two organizations are different. The State Department often has to deal with pressing issues and naturally views development dollars as only one of the possible tools at hand. State Department officers are superb diplomats, negotiators, political observers, and policy analysts. USAID, in contrast, is an operational and program-management agency focused on achieving sustainable economic growth abroad; its staffers are aid professionals with the technical and managerial skills to get their work done. With USAID and the State Department merged, the urgency of the State Department’s mission and the collective mindset of its personnel end up dominating, to the detriment of the development agenda” (J. Brian Atwood, 2008).

More than anything else, the last sentence demonstrates USAID’s failure to grasp the concept that the State Department’s mission is also now a USAID mission. U.S. taxpayers are not spending money to see life improve in distant conflicts out of charity. Americans give money to charities directly. American taxpayers are spending money to ensure that U.S. interests are furthered through development. USAID is a tool of U.S. foreign policy, and in order to be effective, it needs to recognize this.
Conclusion

Counterinsurgency operations are part of our world and will remain so. Victory in COIN conflicts will only be achieved by effectively combining security and development Joint Lines of Effort. This is the way Western governments operated before World War II. After World War II, changes in the cultures of both Western societies and militaries caused security and development efforts to be split. Until Western governments are able to nest security and development Lines of Effort (LOE’s) together into a single cohesive effort, they will continue to struggle in counterinsurgency conflicts.
CHAPTER 3: The Conceptual Solution to the COIN Problem

Introduction

As stated in the previous chapter, there is a major shortfall in the approaches to COIN doctrine by contemporary Western governments. By separating development and security Lines of Effort (LOE) Western governments have divided their effort. This has often led to poor results that are in no shape or form reflective of the enormous resources and sacrifices committed to COIN conflicts. The need for unification of effort in COIN environments is overwhelming, yet with the division of responsibility between various civilian and military agencies, it is hard to achieve. The research in no shape or form suggests disbanding civilian aid agencies and absorption of their functions by militaries. This would be both counterproductive due to loss of valuable experience as well as unwanted by the U.S. Army. This would also involve the Army in numerous locations throughout the world where there is no security problem associated with military primary expertise. Nor will a simple unification of chain of command achieve the desired effect. As noted in the previous chapter, even when the military and civilian agencies are willing to work together and cooperate at every level, there is still a great deal of disconnect due to the different organizational cultures, core skills, and knowledge that each group brings to the table.

The solution this research proposes is cross training on both sides of governmental effort to give each, at a minimum, a mid-level understanding of the core mission and concepts that the other side offers. Both sides will remain subject matter experts in their respective fields, but the cross training is aimed at ensuring that they understand what their counterparts are doing and are able to integrate their actions into their own operations. To use a military example, an infantry commander may not know everything about an artillery officer’s job, he may not be able to run an artillery battery or calculate the ballistics of a fire mission, but he does know how to integrate fires into his scheme of maneuver. There needs to be a knowledge exchange similar to the example above between U.S. Army officers and USAID/State Department personnel in regards to develop operations. To reiterate, this cross training is for State Department and USAID personnel as well as for U.S. Army officers. USAID and State Department personnel need to develop an understanding of security operations just as much as Army officers need to do the same regarding development actions. A computer simulation such as UrbanSim integrates both the security and development aspects of the COIN environment and can accomplish this cross training. While the technical aspects of UrbanSim will be described in the next chapter, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to describing security and development operations, as well as how they should be integrated in COIN environments. This is necessary for the reader to understand so he or she can see the overall concept behind how counterinsurgency operations work. In short, one needs to know what he or she is training for before a training program can be implemented. Manual 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY (US Army, 2006), there are aspects where it differentiates slightly and where it goes into much greater detail. However, overall it fits well into the contemporary U.S. Army COIN doctrine.

Development theory is a broad subject area and currently there is a lot of literature on how it should be handled. Based on observations by the authors throughout their deployments in COIN environments, the problem with the current approach to development is three-fold. The first issue concerns how most development projects are conducted on such a small scale that it often does not have an impact on a large area. Projects are focused on needs of individual villages and specific communities, often without a thought given to the impact on the entire
province. This bottom up approach has been largely the result of a culture within NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations) and AID (Agency for International Development) agencies that are influenced by a focus on the suffering and pain experienced by individual communities and by a lack of resources and personnel to implement large scale projects. The last issue is ensuring an area is capable of long-term economic development versus giving an area money for short-term pain alleviation. A better recommendation is to refocus on the provincial level projects. Given the limited amount of funds available, the development projects need to reach as many people as possible rather than focus on alleviating pains of individual villages. This is not to say that small-scale projects should not be continued in parallel to larger projects, but the emphasis needs to remain on the larger projects that can carry the maximum impact. Company level units and below are able to accomplish small-scale projects with minimum effort by the use of micro-grants. Currently these are administered at the Company level through use of the "bulk fund" aspect of CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) monies that require only a company commander’s approval. In 2010 this limit stood at $3,000, but this figure can vary based on local theater regulations.

The second issue that hinders development operations in COIN environments is the use of local contractors. While many of contractors are men of integrity, the majority lack the technical expertise to execute projects to a sustainable level, and many of them want to use the accepted custom of bribes and “under the table” payments that are typical in many third world countries. There are numerous cases in Afghanistan’s NATO controlled RC-North where poorly built local schools collapsed only two years after construction. In addition, MAJ Vershinin (Vershinin, 2010) observed two out of four irrigation projects in RC-North destroyed by floods prior to completion, between January 2010 and May 2011. One of these projects was destroyed due to the contractor taking short cuts and using insufficient assets to verify his work. There have also numerous cases of local contractors stealing, overcharging, and skipping steps specified in the contract to maximize their profits. Using the RC-North example again, the most appropriate illustration of the above was a case with the Swedish government where it paid $2 million dollars upfront for a school in 2009, only to never see the contractor again. The Swedish government suffered a financial loss of $2 million, but what was far worst was the loss of respect and influence with the local populace. This further degraded the political standing of the Swedish government in northern Afghanistan.

Many Coalition governments use local contractors in COIN environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan because of an aspect of the Keynesian theory. This aspect states that, by pumping money into the local economy, one can spur economic growth while developing local expertise. In practice however, the results are far more disappointing. In most cases, all that is accomplished is the creation of several extremely wealthy individuals who then move their money into offshore accounts. The local area or province remains impoverished and the poorly designed and executed projects will typically last only two to five years. In addition, by pumping more money into the economy without increasing the productivity, massive inflation is created. Such an example is the current annual inflation rate of thirteen percent in Afghanistan (CIA, 2013).

A possible solution to the above issue would be to create construction units. These should be built around Western engineers and skilled labor, hiring local unskilled labor to all manual tasks. At the same time it is vital to hire local engineers and administrators to help run the new units. Over time frame of several years the locally hired engineers are gradually worked into positions of greater responsibility until they are ready to assume responsibility of running the construction units. Once this occurs, Western governments will turn the new construction units over to the local government, or privatize it based on that government’s policy. This gives
that nation the ability to deliver a quality product at low cost, while simultaneously building up its local construction capacity. It is imperative that the Western government's personnel continue to monitor the construction units after the handover to reduce corruption. Some corruption is unavoidable, but by building up the new unit gradually there is hope that a "corruption free" culture will emerge after the handover. This will enhance the training effort as well as open a debate to start reforms that will change the way things are currently conducted in these COIN environments.

The last major issue depicted is the balance between immediate pain alleviation for local communities in the present/near term, and developing the area and governmental capacity in the future/long term. An appropriate analogy of this is a patient who is dying of cancer. In much of the third world, the cancer is poor governance. Most aid agencies and NGOs are focusing on alleviating the pain caused by this cancer by filling in the gaps in host government services; this is equivalent of giving relief to the cancer patient. Unfortunately, this just makes the patient more comfortable and thus more reluctant to undergo the needed surgery to cure the cancer. So the end result is that cancer is still killing the patient and now he is also addicted to the pain relief. In the end, only an internal reform of the government itself can cure the cancer. This is done by making the government more efficient and effective in delivering key services with a very minimal amount of corruption, if any. Otherwise, there is no hope for these types of nations in the future. This is important to remember because development projects must be aimed at not only solving a specific issue, but also at increasing host government capacity to deliver services to the people. Only then can the insurgency be separated from the population and destroyed by the government's forces.

Developmental Theory

The development actions that are needed to help stabilize the province are focused primarily on economic development and improving quality of life. Irrigation projects, transportation infrastructure transportation projects, micro-grants, and communications such as mobile phone technology, these are all examples of projects that will greatly increase the local wealth production. On the other hand, projects such as sanitation, health, education, electricity and improved governance are aimed at increasing the quality of life.

Development Aspect to COIN Operations

Economic vs. Quality of Life Projects

The correct balance between development projects is hard to find. Ideally the goal should be focused mostly on economic development. Once the local economy has improved, the local government should have more money in form of taxes to develop its services or to at least to allow private businesses to step in and develop those services. NGOs are also appropriate at filing in the gaps created by the lack of government services in the quality of life issues described above. Working and cooperating with NGOs can be difficult for military forces due to the difficulty of gaining an NGO's trust and support. Many NGOs take pride in being independent from government organizations, to include the military. Many NGOs also have negative preconceptions concerning the military. Despite this, NGOs should be welcomed and integrated as much as possible into military development operations. Military forces should invite NGOs in and brief them on the campaign and operational level plans, while excluding
non-essential tactical information for operations. However, military forces need to ensure that its information security protocols do not end up causing NGOs to be ineffective. That being said, military forces should check with NGOs to see if they can fill in any gaps generated by plans of action. However, at no point should the NGO feel that the military is trying to control them. It should be made as clear as possible that any help the NGO can give is welcome, and there needs to be a clear understanding by the host government that an NGOs assistance is voluntary. It is important that military officers, who come from a culture of directness and chain of command, to be tactful in expressing themselves to NGOs.

Large vs. Small Projects

As mentioned above, one of major issues facing development action is that the balance has swung too much in favor of smaller projects and not enough towards the larger, more influential projects. Both types of projects have pro’s and con’s. The larger projects, when correctly done, impact more people. These large-scale projects benefit a larger portion of the population versus a collection of smaller local projects completed at the same cost. In short, the larger projects have economies of scale and are more highly visible, demonstrating to the local population the benefits of supporting their legitimate government. This action contributes towards “winning the hearts and minds of the people,” a critical element to defeating an insurgency. Some of the disadvantages of large projects include being slow to complete, draining considerable resources in terms of construction efforts and engineering support, and being highly visible targets for insurgent forces to attack. As a result, these large-scale development tasks require security forces that, in turn, are taken away from other security-related duties. Finally large-scale projects do not offer the instant gratification or “pain relief” as referred to in the cancer analogy mentioned above.

Smaller projects are contrast to larger projects because they are quick to build and because they have more of an immediate impact on the local community, although this impact is for only a small portion of population. Another great benefit for small projects is that they are usually a good way to establish a rapport with the local community. Most power brokers in third world countries are local and think locally because that is where their power base lies. Their immediate concerns are local and most of the projects that they want completed are these small, local projects. Quickly building these projects is a great way to establish a relationship with those local leaders and can help pave the way for greater development. On the down side, multiple small projects can also stretch the resources of local development agencies, whether military or civilian. Since these smaller projects are more numerous, the local development team will have to spend more time visiting each site to inspect its progress. Another disadvantage of small projects is that they are less visible, and therefore bring less prestige and legitimacy to the government.

Impact vs. Prestige

Prestige is how much people respect and value something. In COIN environments, prestige and perception are everything. People will only support the government if they perceive that the government is capable of delivering key services such as security, justice, health, education, electricity and sanitation, to the local population. The actual state of what is happening on the ground may be irrelevant to the peoples’ perception. One only has to think back to the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War as an example. Despite this operation being an overwhelming military success for U.S. forces, it was perceived as defeat by the U.S. public,
thus starting the long and bitter road towards defeat and withdrawal from the conflict (Hackworth, 1989). Successful projects can greatly increase the government's prestige among the population, but it only takes the failure of one project to negatively impact the popular perception of the government. So in many ways these development projects are done not only there to increase the economic standing of the community or improve its quality of life, they are also done to sway the popular perception of the government. That is, they are done to win the ever-important hearts and minds of the people.

Maintenance and Securing Local "Buy In"

Another vital issue when it comes to development is sustainment and local "buy in" of the projects conducted. Every project conducted must be maintained. The exact maintenance issues specific to projects types will be discussed later, but all have their own issues. In 2011 the U.S. Army's MAAWS-A (Money As A Weapons System-Afghanistan) Manual, USFOR-A PUB 1-06, began to require a Memorandum of Sustainment. Local leaders who agreed to maintain development projects after their completion signed this memorandum. In most cases those agreements were not worth the paper they were written on because they were not legally binding. A joke in Afghanistan started among U.S. forces that said, "How much does it cost to maintain a road? No one knows it's never been done."

The best way to overcome this issue and ensure that the project continues to be maintained is to secure a "buy in" from the local government and community. A good way to do this is to get the local power brokers to fund at least a part of the project, thus giving them partial ownership of it. It cannot be emphasized enough just how valuable it is that the local government and population support the project. Any plans, especially ones that have not been originated by the local government, need to be approved by the local government and power brokers first. One method of doing this is to first describe the problem and then help guide the local official to a solution. The solution that the local official proposes is usually the same as the planned project. However, now it becomes the official's idea and plan.

Once again, NGOs can be a great tool to secure a local "buy in". Many of the NGOs have developed deep relationships with local actors, and thus have a considerable amount of influence with them. NGOs can also be a great tool to run ideas through before projects go into their planning phase. Many of these NGOs have been on the ground for a long time and are therefore more familiar with the areas. This is also where small projects can be very useful. Small projects can be used to secure the good will and cooperation of both local actors and NGOs, to help support larger projects whose immediate benefits may not be visible to them at first. It is important to understand that just because a project seems like a bribe towards a local official, this does not mean it cannot benefit the community. For example, in the city of Fayzabad in the Badakshan Province of Afghanistan, the U.S. Army purchased uniforms for the municipal city workers. While the project was done mainly to appease the city mayor of Al-Nuri, who was the most powerful actor in the province, the project also enhanced the prestige and image of the city. This increased the perception of the benefits of city services (Vershinin, 2010).
Projects by Type

Economic Projects

Infrastructure

These projects are aimed at increasing the infrastructure of the local area, primarily the roads and bridges that provide the transportation network to the area. They connect various communities, allowing goods produced in one area to reach markets and people in other areas. This is especially vital in various parts of the world that have been devastated by recent conflicts. Many of the roads were never great to begin with, and have been heavily damaged by fighting, land mines, and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices).

For infrastructure projects to be beneficial, it is important to first identify the economic patterns in the area, to include a focus on production areas and markets. Once this is completed, it is possible to identify areas that need transportation connections and other aspects of transportation improvement. Roads should be paved and have culvert protection to prevent IED and landmine emplacement. It is also important to resist the urge to build gravel roads. Gravel roads are much harder to maintain and usually only last two to three years before needing replacement. It is also vital that regular maintenance is conducted to repair the damage done by fighting and winter conditions. Roads are among the best development projects to undertake both due to their impact on economic sphere and their ability to greatly facilitate security forces operations by increased mobility. However, security forces must also be allocated to protect roads. If left unsecured, roads can become useless due to the emplacement of insurgent checkpoints and IEDs.

Irrigation and Agricultural

Irrigation and agricultural improvement projects can either be a huge success or a significant failure, depending on the skill, resources and local expertise allocated to them. The benefits from these types of projects can be enormous. Irrigation fed land versus rain fed land can see a major increase in crop yield per acre, greatly improving the local economy. In addition, this land can produce profitable crops, also known as cash crops, right beside subsistence crops. The down side of an irrigation project is, no matter how well designed or planned the project is, floods can destroy it in a blink of an eye. To properly design an irrigation system, a hydrological study must be done. Unfortunately, the cost for one can cost millions of dollars, even though most local irrigation projects cost below $100,000 (Vershinin, 2010). To justify the cost of such a study, an irrigation system must be built that encompasses the entire river system. Only then will the odds of success go up. It is also important to note that just as a road system, irrigation projects require constant maintenance even flooding issues. Canals can fill up with silt and water can slowly erode the edges of any flood control walls. Therefore it is vitally important to get a "buy in" from the local leaders and power brokers on helping to maintain irrigation and agricultural development projects. Only these local leaders and power brokers can keep a system in running order once it is built.

A good idea when it comes to types of irrigation projects is not to look to the most modern systems in Western countries. The infrastructure and technical skills in many Third World countries are very basic, and often cannot sustain a modern irrigation or agricultural project. A much better suggestion is to look to history for inspiration to build cheap, manageable
projects. An irrigation system that worked in ancient Yemen is far more likely to succeed in today’s Afghanistan rather than a technically superior modern system used in the United States.

Micro-grants

Micro-grants are very useful tools to help boost newly established local businesses. These grants, if properly utilized, can spur the local economy by giving small businesses and newly formed businesses the funds necessary to become more productive. BRAC and Grameen Bank are two NGOs operating in Bangladesh that have done a phenomenal job of using micro-grants. Their efforts lifted a large percentage of the population out of poverty, even without government spurred economic growth. (Economist, 2012). Using micro-grants, however, requires a very deep knowledge of the local community. Corruption is rampant in the Third World countries, and simply handing out money often results in the money going into the pockets of local powerbrokers or even the insurgents the government is trying to fight. Therefore, in order to have a successful micro grant program, there first needs to be a very strong and highly developed relationship with the local government or with a well trusted NGO as mentioned above. Trusted NGOs can share their local knowledge to insure that the money is being used for its intended purpose. A follow-up verification program is also vital. One way is to insist that the local vendors who have received aid keep receipts of all purchases. This will not necessarily prevent corruption since receipts can sometimes be falsified, but it will slow corruption down some.

The three types of projects mentioned above are not the only projects that can successfully impact an area in terms of economic development. There are many others types of projects that can accomplish the same results in an area. Local military officers and USAID officials will have to judge the needs of their areas based on observation, and then determine what projects can be completed.

Quality of life/governance projects

Health and sanitation

Health and sanitation projects include clinic/hospital construction, procurement of medical supplies and equipment, garbage collection, and sewer system construction. While all of these projects differ based on the local area, maintenance is still the one common aspect that must always be kept in mind. If a new clinic is constructed, some vital aspects that must be considered are where the doctors and nurses come from and who is paying for the maintenance on the building. These questions must be addressed before the project even begins. Another major consideration is the steady supply of electricity. Most national grids are in poor shape and are completely unreliable. It does no good to have an excellent surgery room, if the lights or equipment fail in the middle of an operation. While generators are an easy solution, a steady supply of fuel for them must be found before the generators are purchased.

Garbage collection and sewer systems are easier in terms of maintenance, but these projects can only be run for a limited time by foreign aid agencies. A clear path towards host government takeover of any services provided must be agreed upon before a project takes place, whether it is a sewer system or an irrigation project. Sewer systems must designed to be as simple as possible while accomplishing the needed tasks, thus ensuring ease of maintenance by the local entity responsible.
Education

Education projects involve school construction, purchasing of school supplies, and in extreme cases, funding of educational staff. Education projects have the same maintenance and personnel issues as health projects do. If a school is to be built, than a teaching staff must be obtained ahead of time. If school supplies are to be purchased, then the local government must have a plan to distribute them and must be able to acquire them on its own in the future. Computers are often a highly regarded and sought after item. Many local schools will ask for them, but few have a reliable electricity supply or knowledge base to keep them running. In many cases the computers will either sit idle in storage or will be sold off by the school staff for profit. As in health projects, any educational project that uses electricity must first have an identifiable source of electricity or a steady supply of generator fuel. Development projects that fund local school staff should be highly discouraged. In many cases, these projects only encourage poor governance by the host nation, who will never resolve the pay problems as long as foreign donors continue to fill in budget short falls. Often enough, these budget shortfalls result from gross mismanagement and corruption rather than a lack of resources.

Power Generation

Power generation projects seek to improve the electrical grid, power lines, power plants, generators and fuel for the local community. There are numerous difficulties associated with electricity projects. These projects are technically difficult, they involve considerable local politics, and maintenance is always an issue. One of the biggest drawbacks, however, is that these types of projects require a plan at the national level and require a national distribution network. Power generation development projects can also be extremely expensive. In 2010, the U.S. Army’s CERP funds for a Kandahar power plant totaled over $200 million (Capaccio, 2010). This amount was over one fourth of the $800 million in CERP funds allocated to the whole country for that year for all types of projects (Katzman, May 3, 2012). This one project’s cost created development budget shortfalls for every other regional command in Afghanistan that year. As mentioned before, sustaining electrical projects is always a factor. Unless the U.S. Army plans to spend $200 million per year on running the Kandahar power plant for the rest of the Afghanistan conflict, a reliable source of fuel will have to be found by the Afghani government. Otherwise, this power plant will become non-operational in the future. The same is true in regards to the smaller generators that local communities might request. Until the issue of fuel is resolved, no electricity projects should be funded.

Governance

These are projects that are aimed at improving the functions of the local government. These can include purchasing equipment, renovating or constructing government buildings, or training programs for government officials in aspects such as rule of law, policy planning, etc. It is important to remember that a building does not make an efficient government. Skilled and dedicated government officials do however. An efficient government can be ran out of a tent just as well as out of a palace. In many cases, these projects should be used to reward improved governance and to help establish rapport with the local government. Some training programs will improve the governance level but typically not by much. As always, the maintenance of these facilities becomes a large issue and must be resolved before anything is constructed.
Security Theory

So far the Development LOE (Line of Effort) has been discussed in detail. One must now turn to discuss the Security LOE, which goes hand-in-hand with the Development LOE. There are many types of security operations and all of them can generally be grouped into two sections - offensive and defensive. Offensive operations include information operations, raids, cordon and searches, and reconnaissance operations. Defensive operations are focused on base security, logistical convoys, and area security. All of these operations have their time and place and will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.

Host Nation’s Forces

Training host nation military forces and developing procedures for integrating them and any other local security forces is vital in COIN environments. In doing this, it is crucial to see the strengths and weaknesses of these forces and how they differ from Western military forces. Western troops typically have superior combat formations and have excellent communication gear. This gives Western forces an edge in having the ability to execute complex maneuvers, as well as in being able to integrate firepower and aviation assets. Western troops also have superior personal equipment, such as body armor. This gives them an edge in both offensive and defensive combat operations. However, Western forces lack local knowledge and cultural understanding. This is a great hindrance in combat operations where Western forces are almost blind. A further difficulty is the length of combat tours for Western or Coalition troops that range only six to fifteen months. On average, it takes three months to establish and familiarize themselves with their Operating Environment (OE), during which these Western troops are often ineffective. Only afterwards are Western troops able to function at their peak performance level. After about the nine-month mark, the performance of many Western troops begins to decline as fatigue sets in, and they should be rotated out. (Vershinin, 2010).

Host nation forces (HNF) are opposite to Western troops in many ways. These forces lack communication tools to integrate outside assets, they lack body armor and other advanced equipment, and they often lack the necessary training to execute complex maneuvers. HNF are also weaker in offensive operations and defensive operations. However, HNF are superior in local knowledge and cultural understanding. Host nation forces can often tell ethnic differences and tribal allegiances just by a person's looks and actions, a skill that is often vital in COIN. HNF do not have limited tours of duty and are there in that COIN environment permanently. This gives them unparalleled local knowledge and a greater personal stake in the war than Western troops.

There are several ways to mix Western and host nation forces for optimal results. Since host troops usually outnumber Western force three to one, most defensive tasks are best left to HNF. Check point operations and base security are also best left to the host nation's military, due to the cultural awareness that makes them superior in common day to day interactions with local civilians. Offensive and reconnaissance operations are best conducted by a mixture of both HNF and Western troops. This allows for the Western force's offensive capability to be given greater precision by the host nation's cultural capability. Even a four-man liaison group operating with a HNF infantry platoon can greatly increase the platoon’s capability. The small liaison team can tie the HNF platoon into Western assets like fire support and medical evacuation while, while the platoon still maintains its local cultural understanding.
There is a trend among some Western forces in regards to the misuse of host nation troops. In most cases it springs from very natural differences between the two types of troops. Host nation troops speak a different language and have different values. Therefore, even things such as living conditions can be a divisive issue. It is very human for people to treat such differences as inferiority. This issue can be prevalent among junior soldiers who have no experience of dealing with people outside their cultural norm. Leaders at all levels must fight this negative trend. This is especially true when dealing with assigning tasks in combat operations. If Western or Coalition forces consistently place host nation troops in dangerous assignments, fail to support HNF in combat, or prioritizing Western casualties during medical evacuation, this can quickly hurt their relationship. On the other hand, when Western forces treat host nation troops as their own, they quickly see vast improvements in HNF performance. It is vital to identify the shortfalls in equipment and capabilities of host nation forces and take steps to mitigate it as soon as possible. Western forces can ensure a constant bond of trust with HNF by assigning missions that the HNF are capable of executing, and also by supporting them with assets that they lack. Sharing danger in combat is the quickest way of building a bond and establishing mutual respect between host nation forces and Western troops, and will lead to a remarkable improvement in performance on both sides.

**Offensive Operations**

**Information Operations**

These are operations aimed at spreading pro-government messages throughout the population. As stated in FM 3-13, Information Operations, “Effective IO combines the effects of offensive and defensive IO to produce information superiority at decisive points (US Army, 2003). The ultimate goal is to convince the people that they want to side with the government and not with the insurgents. These messages must have an underlying theme that focusing on why government is better than the insurgents for the population. In addition, the IO message must be tailored to each segment of the population, explaining how the main message applies to them. There needs to be a specific IO message tailored to reach each individual in that particular society, regardless of his or her role.

Equally important is that the IO message must be the truth. Government forces must resist the temptation to lie or bend the truth to support its operations. Any unfortunate accident (such as collateral damage due to government or coalition operations killing or injuring civilians) must be acknowledged, and restitutions must be made. It is important to showcase and promote any government successes as well as highlight the damage and death done by insurgent atrocities.

The last issue is the means by which the message is spread. It is vital that the delivery method can reach the local people. For example, the government should not use leaflets if the local population is 80% illiterate. This will have little impact. All that will be accomplished is providing the population with fuel for their stoves. Radio stations combined with distribution of small radios to families is one method. Another method is word of mouth through the use of reverse informant networks, that is, instead of paying people to inform on their neighbors, you pay them to spread your message. The government must then use other means to verify that these networks are working before paying informants. The key is to reach the population in a manner that they will believe before the insurgency establishes a way to lie or misinform the populace. A suitable aspect to view successful IO is through marketing techniques used by
many of the today's large corporations. In the end IO is marketing, because it is trying to sell the
government to the people.

*Raids*

Raids are precision strikes at known enemy locations. They may target safe houses, bomb making factories, known enemy leaders and weapons caches. To be successful, forces need reliable intelligence combined with speed and surprise. Often the best way to achieve good results is with a combination of dismounted infiltration paired with dedicated vehicular or air support force located within rapid striking distance. Raids are very likely to result in contact with the enemy so a great deal of thought must be given to medical evacuation and fire support.

Raids are dangerous both for the government forces and for the civilian population. Intelligence is often spotty and may also be contradictory. Incorrect information often results in a raid on the wrong target. Therefore, throughout out raid planning a great deal of thought should be devoted to insuring possible collateral damage. It should also be noted that bringing a heavy weapons system along on a raid might actually lower the amount of collateral damage done. Tanks, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and machine gun systems give the commander a chance to escalate the level of violence appropriate to the resistance level. One of the biggest issues in Afghanistan is that air assault elements, which lack heavy firepower of their own, are forced to call in more destructive air power to resolve their situation when they run into heavy resistance. An airstrike, armed with even the lightest munitions, usually demolishes the entire house with everyone in it, whether they are military targets or innocent civilians. However, a round from the main gun of a tank will many times only destroy the room from where the enemy fire is coming from and not everyone else in the house. This may cause troops to continue to fire heavier weapon systems, which can create more collateral damage at a greater distance.

In short, sound intelligence, thorough planning, and speed and surprise are keys to a well done raid. In many ways those requirements are contradictory. Thorough planning takes time while a key to a successful raid is also engaging the target as soon as the intelligence arrives, before it becomes outdated. Quality battle drills can help solve this dilemma. Battle drills can quickly shorten the planning process and generate a time sensitive response. All the commander has to do is adopt a battle drill to a specific mission. That way a subunit, whose normal task in a raid is outer security, only needs to know where to set up. This subunit already knows the triggers for its move, the communications plan, and medical evacuation plan. Time saved by battle drills make them the keys to a successful raid.

*Cordon and Search*

Cordon and searches are large-scale operations that involve blocking off and searching entire sections of a city or even the whole city. Government forces usually establish outer and inner cordons aimed at keeping outsiders out, and insiders in. Government forces then go house to house to search for insurgents and weapons. Needless to say, these operations are highly intrusive and great care should be taken to use this tool as rarely as possible. One of key mistakes made during the early stages of Iraq War was to use cordon and search missions as the primary tool to fight insurgents. The result was a deeply alienated civilian population that only further strengthened the insurgency. On the other, hand cordon and searches are the most effective way of rooting insurgents out of population centers. Due to the above issues, cordon and search operations should be used sparingly. This type of operation should be used mostly
during the clearing stage, and while establishing area security. These way military forces do not
have to repeat clearing and area security operations again.

Cordon and search operations have generally been rechristened “Cordon and Knock”
operations by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was done to mitigate the negative
impact of cordon and search operations and to demonstrate a gentler approach. Although
government forces usually asked for permission to search, the answer "no" was not accepted.
Once government or coalition forces are inside, the resident family is led into the courtyard. The
family elder then accompanies soldiers inside the house while they search so to assure him that
nothing is stolen. The family was then thanked for their cooperation and asked to remain in
doors for the duration of the operations. Since contact is likely during this type of operation,
compensation money should be made available to immediately reimburse innocent civilians for
any damage done.

Reconnaissance Operations

Reconnaissance operations are aimed at developing information. Army doctrine (FM 3-20.96)
categorizes reconnaissance into four forms, three of them are; area, zone, and route.
(US Army, 2010) Area reconnaissance seeks information about specific points on a map. For
example, area reconnaissance may be focused on confirming the presence of an enemy force
on a hill. Zone reconnaissance is aimed at gathering information on a large area, such as a
town, a map zone of several squared kilometers or a specific Named Area of Interest (NAI).
Route reconnaissance is directed at checking a specific route to see if it can support vehicular
traffic for specific types of vehicles while also verifying bridges conditions along the way. In
COIN environments, route reconnaissance is often tied into route security. The recon element
not only checks the route, but is also responsible for keeping it clear of mines, IEDs (Improvised
Explosive Device), and enemy ambushes. It is vital to understand that in COIN environments,
the objectives of reconnaissance are not always kinetic. A unit may be tasked to conduct zone
reconnaissance to focus on civilian infrastructure, identify the key power brokers and civilian
leaders, and establish local demographics. Brigadier General McMaster’s, 2005 offensive into
Tal Afar was partially used as role model for the new COUNTERINSURGENCY Manual (FM 3-24).
GEN McMaster said it best when he stated, "We do not need new doctrine for the COIN
environment, and we already have one and can use it. Route clearance is nothing more than
route Reconnaissance, and a SWEATS assessment is nothing more than zone reconnaissance
with civilian objectives” (McMaster, 2006).

Defensive Operations

Base security

Base security operations usually seek to protect government military bases. They may
include passive measures such as gate and tower guards, and active measures such as local
patrols around the base perimeter to prevent direct action attacks or enemy mortar
emplacements. Great care should be taken to ensure the soldiers who are conducting base
defense operations know the local area. More specifically, these soldiers need to identify the
local pattern of life. The benefits of this are two-fold. First it allows recognition to changes in the
pattern of life in the surrounding area, which are usually indicators of an upcoming attack.
Secondly, it also prevents soldiers from confusing daily local movements for attacks, thus
limiting possible collateral damage. For example, a local shepherd who walks up to the base front gate should be treated differently than a stranger who has never been seen before.

**Logistic convoys**

Logistical convoys are aimed at delivering supplies to military units throughout the country. These convoys contain large numbers of soft vehicles such as fuel tankers and cargo trucks, which are low risk and high payoff targets for insurgents. In addition to destroying government forces, insurgent forces will also attack these convoys to capture supplies for personal use. Due to the vulnerability of convoys, protection forces may consist of both heavily armed escorts and established military outposts along the most heavily used routes.

**Area security**

Area security is a concept that was developed in the later stages of Iraq War, and has close ties to the new Army Counterinsurgency manual. The driving idea behind area security is to establish a dense government presence in key areas of the host nation country. This involves setting up smaller bases closer to population centers and establishing permanent checkpoints at key locations such as bridges and choke points (point where traffic is forced through and cannot go around). The goal behind area security is to position government forces in forward areas so they can both protect the civilian population and disrupt the insurgents by making it difficult for them to operate. It becomes much harder for insurgents to assassinate a popular government official when the only way they can get to their target is to go through multiple military checkpoints. Even if the insurgents are able to get through the checkpoints without being randomly searched, they still have to pass back through checkpoints after their assassination. This time the checkpoints will be on high alert. This is not to say that area security makes insurgent attacks impossible. Insurgents will still come up with new and creative ways to bypass security measures, but it does make it far more difficult for them, thus reducing the effectiveness and frequency of attacks. A good way to envision area security is to picture a medieval castle on a hill. From the high ground the lord can see everything moving in the valley below. Therefore, the peasants or local populace can receive early warning and take shelter while the lord and his knights deal with the attackers. (MAJ Harper, 2009)

![Figure 1: Iraqi Army fort in Nineveh province, 2008.](image)
Figure 1 exhibits proof that Area Security has not changed much since medieval times. A well-fortified position on high ground gives defenders the advantage in case of attacks, but also provides uninterrupted observation for miles around the fort. This makes it difficult for insurgents to conduct operations around this area. (Vershinin, 2010)

Area security operations can have a negative impact on civilian lives. While they greatly increase security they can also cause hardships. Checkpoints create traffic jams and slow down commerce. It is important to present the IO message to the population in a manner that portrays the coalition forces as protectors rather than occupiers. On the same note, it is vital that every soldier understands that he or she is responsible for spreading this message, not just the leaders of Psychological Operations (branch of the U.S. Army typically responsible for spreading the messages that the IO branch designs). It only takes one incident caused by one careless soldier to destroy the relationship between the community and the forces tasked with its protection. At the same time, common courtesy and respect demonstrated by soldiers while they conduct their daily operations can go a long way to create a solid bond with the community.

Integration of Security and Development in a Typical COIN Campaign

The idea behind counterinsurgency operations is simple. Government forces dominate the battlefield through superior firepower, mobility, numbers, and training. Yet none of these factors matter if the insurgents are able to blend in with the local population and then gain legitimacy and support of the people. In the end, government forces only control the immediate vicinity around them. Furthermore, the military advantages enjoyed by government forces can be counterproductive, especially the use of indiscriminate firepower. When used incorrectly, this can actually alienate the very people the government seeks to win to its side. To win, the government must first separate the insurgents from the civilian population and that can only be done through a combination of security, superior IO, and development actions.

The newest U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual, FM 3-24, goes a long way to lay out the steps behind a COIN campaign into three phases - Clear, Hold, Build. Another phase should be added to these three, which is the Shape phase. The Shape phase should take place before the Clear phase. Although the Counterinsurgency Manual does not mention it by name, the Shape phase's presence is implied through the example of the 2005 Tal Afar operation "Restoring Rights," which can be used to illustrate this new concept (US Army, 2006). Each of these four phases has its own characteristics in terms of the security and development operations conducted, as well as the types of resistance encountered. The transition between phases can be difficult to pinpoint due to there being a gradual transition from one phase to another.

Shape

In the Shape phase security forces have just entered a new area. Their primary concern is first to establish a base of operations and then to begin to shape the conditions so they become favorable for a large clearing operation. This includes a heavy reliance on reconnaissance patrols to gain a clear picture of the area followed by raids to disrupt enemy operations.
Reconnaissance

At this point reconnaissance needs to have a broad-spectrum focus. Security operations need to concentrate on identifying insurgent groups - their strength, composition and disposition. In addition, security needs to identify the insurgent forces' motivation, and whether they are ideological (i.e. religious or nationalist) criminal, or self-defense groups. It is vital to understand that even within a specific group certain elements within it may have a different motivation. For example, the militant group JAM (Jaish Al Madih, the Shia extremist group led by Muqtadar al Sadr) in the Iraq War was not solid in its motivation. While JAM’s hard-core members were fanatical Shia, there were also large numbers of locals that joined the group for self-protection against AQI (Al-Qaida in Iraq – a Sunni insurgent group) terror operations (Biddle, Freidman, & Shapiro, 2012). It is critical to understand the motivation behind insurgents because many of them can be separated and then convinced to stop fighting, or to even join government forces. To do this, one must be able to find out and resolve these insurgents' grievances. This was the case with many of the Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq during the Awakening process. The Awakening refers to when the U.S. Army recognized the poverty, unemployment and lack of security for many of the Sunni living in Iraq, and addressed these grievances by setting up local Sunni militias. These militias were paid wages by the U.S. government to protect their neighborhoods. These actions helped alleviate the local Sunni grievances which started swaying the local population and powerbrokers to join the U.S. in its war against Sunni insurgent’s extremist groups, or AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq). The security sphere also involves identifying any social services that insurgents may be providing the local population, such as was done by JAM in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon. After clearing operations commence, the government will have to either compete with these insurgent-provided services or take them over. Either way, these social services present a far greater danger to government control than the combat arm of the insurgency. That is because these services give insurgent groups legitimacy rather than the government. Coalition forces can convince the local population to give its support to the government over insurgents only by ensuring that the local government generates these social services.

The reconnaissance effort has equally important responsibilities to push for demographic and economic objectives. A demographic map must be established prior to clearing operations. Ethnicity, religion, and tribal affiliation need to be identified. All segments of the population to include subgroups with similar goals and aspirations must be established, including key leaders and power brokers. No strenuous effort should be made to contact the leaders and power brokers at this point, although none of them should be turned away either. There is no way to provide protection for these leaders at this point, because area security has not been established. Therefore, any extensive contact with these leaders will provoke insurgent reprisals against them. On the economic front, the primary means of livelihood should be identified as well as economic patterns. This includes the development of raw materials, the transportation to of them to refinery sites, and finally the distribution of them to markets and consumers. Locating the bottlenecks in the process is crucial to conducting economic development later on. During the reconnaissance phase, ground forces need to identify small-scale projects that can be rapidly implemented once government forces have taken control of the area. However, no projects should be executed, only identified. This is due to government forces not being able to provide security for any projects at this point. Any completed projects will most likely benefit the insurgent IO effort instead of that of the government.
**Violence level**

The Shaping phase occurs during the most violent period of the insurgency and numerous enemy engagements will occur with insurgent forces throughout the AO. The insurgents will often misconstrue the reconnaissance patrols for attempts to hold ground, and will believe that they are "beating back" government forces. This violence will no doubt ensure a greater amount of collateral damage. At this point it is vital to record any damages done to civilian property. Soldiers and leaders should be encouraged to record and be open about any collateral damage even if it was caused by mistake. These mistakes should be used as learning tools rather than punishment. The list of damages should be recorded and plans should be made to compensate the locals during the clearing operations. Also, due to high level of violence, NGOs should be discouraged from going into the area. The NGOs cannot be fully protected and at least some of their efforts will go towards benefiting the insurgents' social IO campaign.

In many ways this heightened level of violence actually benefits the government. It encourages insurgents to stay and try to hold ground, thus making them easier to identify and target by superior government forces. It also creates a perception among the population of "dark times," which will end with the next phase of clearing operations. The civilian populace will not want to this level of violence to return again, thus giving the Coalition and government IO effort another benefit. That is, to convince the population to support the government and continued peace once area security has been established.

**End State**

The end state of this phase is to see government forces in possession of a clear picture of the environment in which they are to operate. Coalition and government forces will have identified the insurgent groups and their motivations, the key segments of the populations and their motivations and key leaders, and finally the economic system of the area. Insurgent networks will have been disrupted, thereby setting the stage for conducting large clearing operations.

**Clear**

The Clearing phase is also heavily dominated by security operations. Once the situation has been shaped to favor government forces and all reconnaissance objectives have been met, the government can move in to seize control of the area.

**Cordon and Search**

Large-scale cordon and search operations occur during the Clearing Phase. The government troops will flood into the area to be cleared and will stay until insurgents have been defeated and removed. Combat troops will be conducting clearing operations therefore non-combat soldiers such as cooks and mechanics will handle government base security. The area targeted for the clearing operations is isolated before government forces sweep through. Any known insurgent points are targeted with precision raids. Initial contact is made with the local
powerbrokers that were previously identified in the shaping phase. Information operations start in full force, constantly spreading the pro-government message in the area. The list of damages caused during shaping operation should be compensated as soon as government troops have swept through the area. Restitution should come in the form of money and construction materials such as cement and cinderblocks. Ideally, restitution should be handled in two ways. First, a restitution court handles all claims that have not been identified by government troops. Secondly, a house-to-house repayment operation should be conducted. These missions are based on the list of previously identified damaged residences compiled by government forces that caused the damage in the initial phase. It is vital that this first act of government services to the local people is quick and efficient. This will mean a great deal towards winning the popular support. On the same note small, quick impact projects need to be undertaken to help secure popular perception of the government’s legitimacy. Such projects can include new wells, water purification systems, and even agricultural tools handed out to population, along with humanitarian aid. NGOs should be invited in as soon as clearing operations have been completed. At the same time, mid-level projects should also be identified. At this stage it is too early to begin large-scale projects to improve the economic health of the region, but still need to be identified for future work. Most of the development projects in this phase are aimed at improving immediate quality of life and at gaining local support.

Area Security

At the end of the Clearing phase, the government also needs to transition to area security and begin to focus on defensive rather than offensive operations. Checkpoints need to be established, and routes in and out of the area need to be either secured or blocked off. Government forces also need to move out of their large bases and establish smaller company and platoon sized bases closer to the population. This will allow for faster response times and will also secure the local population against insurgent retaliations. Many of the local insurgent groups that are motivated by self-protection should be reached out to. In many cases, the presence of permanent government troops will convince these insurgent groups to switch sides and give their support to the government. This process can be further hastened by "deputizing" them, such as the Sons of Iraq were. Another method could be offering a financial reward for protecting their homes, while at the same time giving them a guarantee of support from government forces in case of attack. It is vital that these guarantees are real. There have been several cases in Iraq where U.S. forces guaranteed protection to several Sunni leaders, causing them to switch sides. However, the U.S. later failed to deliver on these promises (Biddle, Freidman, & Shapiro, 2012). An example of this took place in 2007 in the North Babyl Province of Iraq. The compound of a Sheik who led the local Awakening movement was under attack by insurgents for three hours. Although the sheik was on the phone for the better part of the siege, U.S. forces failed to intervene in a timely manner due to concerns about a possible ambush along the route to the compound. As a result of the sheik’s death, the Awakening effort collapsed in the area and did not resume until six months later. It is better to show U.S. commitment by taking a risk in assisting local leaders who are allies, than to let them be attacked. If these pro-government local leaders are injured or killed, this can result in the population placing its support behind the insurgents. If the local leaders see government or Coalition forces risk their lives to support one of their fellow leaders, they are much more likely to support the government.

Coalition and government troops must maintain good conduct and discipline while stationed at these forward combat outposts in urban areas. Many of these combat outposts are often manned with only platoon-sized elements, led by a Platoon Leader and a Platoon
Sergeant. This is a great deal of responsibility given to a 22-26 year old officer, but it is expected. Maintaining good order and discipline is a must in order to prevent that unit from committing unlawful or questionable acts and causing negative outcomes. In Yusufiyah, 2006, a young, poorly lead, and undisciplined group of soldiers committed the cold-blooded murder of an Iraqi family as well as rape. This set the local task force’s mission back years from the progress they were working towards. It also undermined the strategic focus of the Iraqi surge operation that was beginning at the time (Frederick, 2010).

End State

The end state for Clearing operations should be the seizure of key population centers, destruction of all large insurgent formations, disruption of insurgent operations, establishment of area security, and compensation for all damages made during clearing and shaping operations. In addition, humanitarian aid, small-scale development projects, and contact with local powerbrokers should have all been initiated.

Hold

The Hold phase’s purpose is to finish the transition from a once enemy held area into a friendly area. At the start of this phase, government forces have just finished clearing operations and have won a military victory in eyes of many of the local people. The insurgents have been disrupted and have mostly gone underground while seeking time to adjust to the new government tactics. It is imperative to understand that the government forces’ victory and the reduction in violence do not result in significant achievements in and of themselves. Instead, they are temporary items that buy time for political and economic development. Political and economic developments are the true fruits of the government’s military campaign. Without this development, the insurgents will start their anti-government operations again by adopting new tactics to work around the government’s security preparations. The only way the insurgents can be permanently isolated from the population is by promoting the economy and good governance. During this phase, security operations will continue to target insurgent bases while trying to minimize civilian casualties.

Reconciliation and political consolidation

The main effort for reconciliation and political consolidation efforts is political stability. The local powerbrokers identified and contacted in the previous phases need to be firmly won over and merged into the new government’s plan. A political mechanism for grievances and requests for action must be established, that way the people will seek to resolve their differences through dialogue rather than violence. Reconciliation talks between government and local insurgent groups that are open to peace should commence, as well as mediation efforts by the government to resolving local conflicts. Government services such as health and education need to resume or be created. At this point, development projects need to focus on supporting government services. NGOs should be encouraged to help with humanitarian efforts and in resuming government services. At the same time, larger development projects that focus on economic development such as road construction and irrigation need to be initiated. It is also vital that the government or Coalition forces provide security for all large-scale projects. These projects will be the most important to insurgents and will be attacked if not properly protected.
The end state for the Hold phase is the establishment of a government capable of delivering basic services and the political merger of the bulk of the local power brokers.

**End State**

The Operational end state should be focused on political goals. Most of the local power players have been moved into the government camp and now support government efforts. Economic projects are initiated and are underway. Reconciliation efforts have reached out to all of the insurgent groups that have shown an interest in ceasing combat operations, and who are now willing to take part in political talks.

**Build**

By this start of the Build phase the security is well established and some security measures can be lessened. The insurgents should be isolated politically and become easier to target as the local population either expels them or turns them into government forces. An amnesty and reconciliation program should be going in full swing, as the bulk of insurgents are faced with certain military defeat and a drastic loss in popular support. Because of this, these insurgent groups are now more open to laying down arms in exchange for pardons.

**Establishing local government**

During this phase the political agreements reached during Hold phase should be implemented. Local governments should be established and begin to provide services to the population, replacing the NGOs and Western aid agencies. Schools, social services, and health programs should be in full swing and begin to show results. The economic projects should be coming to fruition by this point, greatly increasing the quality of life for the population. By this point, the military should begin to transition out of the forward combat outposts and hand over security to local police forces. In addition, military forces should also hand over development operations to aid agencies and the local government. Many of the local militias that have started out as “self-defense” insurgent groups should either be disbanded or absorbed by the police forces. After all, men who willingly risked their lives to defend their villages are often the kind of men who would do a great job serving and protecting as police. Becoming police officers also provides these men with jobs and prevents them from slipping into criminal activity. The criminally motivated insurgent groups should also be targeted and given a choice of taking new jobs or being engaged by government security forces. During this time, the development effort should focus heavily on economic development, with an emphasis on agriculture, basic skills training, development of basic industry, and fiscal diversification through the pursuit of various cash crops.

**End State**

The end state of this phase is the permanent reduction of violence by neutralizing any remaining insurgent groups to no more than a minor nuisance that can be easily handled by the local police. This will allow the government’s army to return to its barracks. The government is now fully established and is providing all necessary services to the populace. Finally, local areas are beginning to pay taxes to the government to increase its services and help the economy.
Conclusion

In conclusion it must be noted that the steps described above fit not only within FM 3-24, but also within the historic examples of successes mentioned in Chapter 2. As one can see security and development go hand in hand at all levels of COIN operations. Even in the Shaping phase where security operations dominate the environment, a major effort is given to shaping the conditions for developmental actions immediately after that phase is completed. Thus the security and development lines of effort are inseparable. In summation, only development actions can win the war against an insurgency and convince the local population to support the government. Security actions are taken mostly to buy time and room for developmental actions to occur, but nonetheless, development actions cannot take place without them. Cross-training personnel on both aspects of security and development may be the only way to reverse the current negative trend of Western governments. If done properly, this will help Western governments to begin to win counterinsurgency wars.
CHAPTER 4: Research on the Use of UrbanSim to Conduct Training in Integrating Security and Development.

Introduction

As discussed in earlier chapters, integrating security and development across all branches of the government and the military is the key to winning counterinsurgency conflicts of the future. All personnel from the State Department, USAID, and the military must understand their mission and how their specific mission fits within the overall plan of the campaign. One of the methods of cross training Army and diplomatic personal on combining security and development operations is through the use of simulations. UrbanSim is a current training simulation that shows the most promise in teaching security and development, as well as increasing the COIN knowledge and decision-making abilities of officers in the U.S. Army.

UrbanSim

Software background

The Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) started to develop UrbanSim in 2006, after hearing complaints from Army officers on the lack of training tools for COIN operations. This game is modeled after the real-world deployment experiences of Army leaders (Mockenhaup, 2010). Personnel from the Simulation and Training Technology Center who initiated the fielding of UrbanSim stated the following regarding UrbanSim: “UrbanSim is a game-based learning solution that is designed to train leaders in the execution of the “Art of Battle Command” in complex environments where counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations predominate. The UrbanSim experience is divided into three components: a two-hour, self-paced, instruction module that provides students with basic knowledge on the doctrinal principles of COIN and Stability Operations, a game-based practice environment, and an instructor-led After-Action Review. Built initially to train new battalion commanders attending the U.S. Army School for Command Preparation at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, the UrbanSim Learning Environment has been used to effectively train Soldiers in multiple institutional and operational unit settings. The trainees range in rank from Private (E-1) to Lieutenant Colonel (O-5). The success achieved with the UrbanSim project is attributable to three key factors. First, the tools were developed using proven instructional design principles. Second, the technologies were created using a spiral development process in close collaboration with trainers. Third, the components of the UrbanSim Learning Environment have been employed by trainers experienced in using game-based tools to effectively achieve specific training objectives” (Wansbury, Hart, Gordon, & Wilkinson, 2010).

UrbanSim is a computer simulation loosely based on the game called Sim City. UrbanSim places the user in charge of a U.S. battalion in one of two scenarios, either Iraq or Afghanistan. It is a turn-based simulation that places the emphasis on the decision-making process and rates the user’s overall performance along six lines of effort: civil security, governance, host nation security forces, information operations, essential services, and economics. The user’s score is also calculated as a percentage of how the local population views the U.S. and Coalition forces. This view is shown in terms of for, neutral, and against.
UrbanSim begins with a detailed background reader that can be given to users prior to starting the simulation. The briefing focuses a great deal on key leaders in the area and their interactions with each other. The economic background is also provided for the player as well as a list of key infrastructure in the area. Once the player has been familiarized with the background reader, he or she can go through a tutorial on how to play the game. After the tutorial is complete, the user can start on one of the six scenarios currently offered by UrbanSim. UrbanSim also comes with a separate video called the Primer. The UrbanSim Primer discusses at length aspects of COIN as well as the concepts on which the software was built. It also features interviews with some of the most successful commanders that participated in early Iraq and Afghanistan COIN operations. These commanders share their successes and failures in counterinsurgency operations.

UrbanSim’s interface is composed of a map that displays the Area of Operations for the U.S. Battalion that the user controls (see Figure 2). The different areas of the map are clearly defined as well as the amount of support for the Coalition in each area, the key infrastructure, and the key leaders. Overlays can be toggled to display additional information such as the status of each area in respect to the six lines of effort. The player is able to task the line maneuver units, Civil Affairs (CA) team, Personal Security Detachment (PSD), Battalion Medical Services, and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from the U.S. battalion element. Each tasking gives that particular unit a specific area and one task to complete from a drop down menu. Some of the tasks include key leader engagements, information operations, patrols, cordon and knocks, cordon and searches, and checkpoints. The player can also assign units to conduct development projects based on displayed infrastructure. A development project’s budget must fit within the CERP funds available to the Battalion. Further actions include direct cash payments and medical treatment to the local population. The medical treatment the user can provide is similar to the U.S. Army’s Medical Capabilities (MEDCAP) mission, where a battalion medical team and security element go out and provide basic level medical services to citizens of the local area.
After each turn, any significant information such as attacks or results from key leader engagements are reported via Situation Reports (SITREPs) to the user. Significant Activities (SIGACTs) that report activity within the AO are also given to the user. Finally, recommendations from staff sections such as operations (S3) and intelligence (S2) are available to provide the user advice on how to achieve mission objectives.

**UrbanSim as a Tool for Integrating Security and Development**

UrbanSim does a respectable job in terms of integrating security and development. The game was designed to demonstrate the importance of civil-military integration. The designers stress non-kinetic operations and place an emphasis on information operations and interactions with local key leaders. Then those leaders are swayed not simply through speeches, but through development actions that improve the governance and economics of the area. For example, the mayor becomes far more pro-Coalition after U.S. forces repair the sewage treatment plant in his city.

**Development Operation**
Development operations are based on the background reader presented to the students before the simulation begins. This background reader paints the picture and connects key infrastructure to a specific area. For example, one of the background readers explains how several areas rely heavily on a single grain-shipping terminal. The UrbanSim designers attempted to tie the population support to key projects that directly affect that specific population.

The above concepts fit well with the items that drive integration of security and development. These items focus the player to explore how the development operations are tied into increased security. Given that separating insurgents from the population is the key to the establishment of security in an area, it is vital to understand that separation is often achieved through developmental actions and political engagements, not security alone. In this respect UrbanSim is a useful tool for teaching the integration of security and development.

**Political Operations**

Political operations focus on engaging the key leadership of areas within the simulation. These operations are set up in a similar fashion to the development operations. In both cases, the U.S. Army units work with the local leaders through key leader engagements or information operations. In both cases, development projects are tied to the key leaders based on their personal power base. Just as in development operations, UrbanSim does a good job of properly showing how key actions in development and negotiations can persuade key leaders to start supporting the Coalition and new government rather than the insurgents.

**Security operations**

These operations consists of various tasks that include elimination of known terrorist bases, patrols, cordon and searches, cordon and knocks, checkpoint operations, and raids. The more heavy-handed or kinetic operations seem to elicit a proportionally negative response from the local population. Thus, UrbanSim tends to encourage the player to use a more restrained approach in regards to security operations.

In many ways the security operations seem to be more inaccurately represented in UrbanSim versus the other two types of operations already mentioned. Recent COIN security operations have evolved from U.S. forces acting unilaterally, to joint operations or bilateral operations with HNF, to the current unilateral operations executed solely by HNF in Iraq and some places in Afghanistan. Many of the previous COIN hardnosed tactics have given way to more lenient approaches. For example, cordon and searches have evolved into cordon and knocks, flash checkpoints have developed into HNF manning permanent checkpoints, and time sensitive targeting information have developed raids. The somewhat aged tactics available in the UrbanSim seem designed to push the player away from kinetic operations and more towards development and non-kinetic operations. This seems to neglect proper security measures for actual COIN operations in some instances. One of UrbanSim’s most noticeable shortfalls is that there are limited options available that allow the player to establish area security to help increase the overall security for the civilian population. In addition, there is a noticeable lack of proper coordination with host nation security forces in the game.
Overall Assessment of UrbanSim to Train Integration of Security and Development

Despite noted weaknesses in security operations, UrbanSim is still the best training simulation currently available to model the decision-making process for counterinsurgency operations. No other serious game is able to replicate the vital interaction between security and development aspects of COIN. Although UrbanSim can be improved upon in its current state, it is still the most useful package for preparing military and civilian decision makers for upcoming deployments in counterinsurgency environments. Recommendations on these improvements will be made in the last chapter. That being said, one must also realize that UrbanSim was not designed for one hundred percent fidelity. Rather, UrbanSim focuses on concepts, decision-making abilities, and being able to see the second and third order of effects of one’s decisions as a leader while deployed in COIN environments.

SME Interview and Experiment Research

Null Hypothesis H:0

The use of UrbanSim does not improve Company Grade officers’ application of COIN skills, to include security and development, above that of the standard Program of Instruction (POI) currently being used at the U.S. Army Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC).

Alternative Hypothesis H:1

The use of UrbanSim improves Company Grade officers’ application of COIN skills, to include security and development, above that of the standard Program of Instruction (POI) currently being used at the U.S. Army Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC).

Methodology

UrbanSim Subject Matter Expert (SME) Interview

Two types of research were conducted to test the hypothesis and answer the research question. First, a subject matter expert (SME) interview was conducted with four Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) Instructors. The second type of research was an UrbanSim experiment conducted with MCCC students. The experiment will be discussed later. This SME interview took place from 2-6 February 2013, via internet, phone, and in person. The SME interview participants were all either current or previous MCCC instructors and all had used UrbanSim multiple times to help train junior officers at the MCCC. In addition, all of the instructors had an average of twelve years of experience as an officer in the Army, were senior Captains (CPT) or Majors (MAJ), had an average of 3-4 years’ experience being deployed to COIN environments, and were instructors for a minimum of 1-3 years at the MCCC. The SME Interview contained six questions that related directly to what the instructors’ assessment of UrbanSim was in regards to training junior Army officers, how UrbanSim training would best benefit junior officers, and if UrbanSim would be beneficial as a cross-training tool for State
Department and other civilian personnel. The questionnaire is contained in Appendix A. and the results will be discussed in the next chapter.

**UrbanSim Experiment**

The UrbanSim experiment took place from 6-7 February 2013, at the Maneuver Center of Excellence Headquarters Building, at Fort Benning, GA. The experiment was conducted in a classroom setting. The participants in the study consisted of two groups of 20 male junior Army officers, aged 25-41 years old, with the rank of Captain (CPT), who either just graduated from or arrived to start the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC). All participants were volunteers and were divided into two groups consisting of twenty officers each. Group A (Experimental Group) utilized approximately eight hours of UrbanSim training to learn COIN skills, concepts, and overall awareness. Group B (Control Group) conducted self-directed COIN training on materials used at the MCCC. These materials were selected by a consensus of current MCCC instructors and consisted of MCCC related doctrinal COIN documents such as Field Manuals, official briefings, vignettes, and lessons learned. The experiment timeline can be found in Appendix B.

**Procedure**

The first day of the experiment on 6 February 2013 consisted of taking a roll call to ensure all participants were present, having the participants fill out a demographic survey, and then briefing the participants on the nature and process of the experiment. The demographic survey consisted of questions relating to the participants’ age, rank, number of months deployed to COIN environments, number of times using serious games, if the participant had previously used UrbanSim, and if the participant was a MCCC graduate or not. The demographic survey can be found in Appendix C. After the participants were dismissed, the demographic surveys were used to divide the participants into the two groups for the experiment. Any participant having prior experience with UrbanSim was moved to Group A. This ensured that the Control Group’s (Group B) COIN evaluation scores would not be affected by previous UrbanSim use.

On 7 February, all participants were gathered in the classroom and were divided into the two groups. Both groups started their training at the same time. Group B conducted its approximately five hours of self-directed COIN training on MCCC computers. Their training was made up of a mixture of Army publications, PowerPoint briefings, and other COIN materials. Group A participants conducted five hours of COIN training with UrbanSim, in pairs, to include the UrbanSim Primer, UrbanSim “knobology” training, two to three iterations of UrbanSim, and an instructor-led After Action Review (AAR). The UrbanSim iterations that were used in the experiment were from the Al-Hamra (Iraq-based) scenario. Afterwards, each Group A participant took an attitudinal survey based on his or her assessment of UrbanSim’s capabilities and limitations. Group A and B participants finished the experiment by taking an identical twenty-five-question COIN evaluation. Each group was given an hour and a half to complete it.
The UrbanSim experiment gave the research three different sets of data. Each of these will be described now. First, UrbanSim users participated in an instructor-led AAR once training was finished. The AAR lasted approximately forty-five minutes. The participants were asked to share both positive and negative points concerning the use of UrbanSim. In addition, Group A participants were asked what type of junior Army officer training UrbanSim would be best used for. Finally, the participants were asked how UrbanSim could be improved upon. The next chapter will discuss the AAR results in detail. A consensus of the AAR comments can be found in Appendix D.

Group A participants completed the post-training UrbanSim survey next. The survey was developed to conduct research on how UrbanSim could be improved upon from its current state. The post-training UrbanSim survey questions were Level 1 or Reaction questions from Kirkpatrick's Four Levels of Learning Evaluation. These types of questions measured participants' satisfaction with the UrbanSim training simulation (Kirkpatrick, Basarab, & Freitag, 1998). The survey consisted of four Likert Scale questions where the participant was asked to rate UrbanSim on certain capabilities and limitations. The participant had to choose a number from one to ten for the rating, and then explain why he or she gave UrbanSim the rating. The User improvement survey can be found in Appendix E.

As mentioned above, the final part of the experiment consisted of the actual COIN evaluation completed by both groups of participants. The COIN Subjective Judgment Test consisted of two parts. The first part of the evaluation was a fifteen-question subjective judgment test (SJT) developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The Situational Judgment Test (SJT) given to both groups measured the student’s ability to apply COIN knowledge, decision-making, and doctrine in practical situations. Both the SJT and COIN test evaluated the learning that the two groups were subject to during the experiment. The COIN evaluation questions were Level 2 or Learning questions from Kirkpatrick’s Four Levels of Learning Evaluation. These types of questions measured learning to
the extent in which the participants changed their attitudes, increased their knowledge, and/or increased their skills as a result of using UrbanSim (Kirkpatrick, Basarab, & Freitag, 1998).

The SJT was slightly modified to force the test taker to select only one answer for the first part of each question. The test consisted of an Iraq-based COIN background reader and several situations. The participant was asked several questions based on the situation and had to select the best answer out of the 4-5 answers choices given. In addition, each question had a discussion portion for the participant to explain the critical factors involved in making his or her decision. The participant was given one point for each part of the question he or she answered correctly, for a total of two points per question and 30 points total. The second part of the COIN evaluation consisted of ten questions relating to basic Army COIN doctrine, with each being worth one point. These questions were a mixture of multiple-choice, fill in the blank, and listing the correct answer. Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) instructors selected the UrbanSim training iterations, helped to construct and approve the COIN evaluation and answer key, and assisted in grading the COIN evaluations. The COIN evaluation can be found in Appendix F. The COIN evaluation results will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5: Results and Discussion

Summary of Data Results

The experiment conducted at Ft. Benning’s MCCC collected data on individual performance and simulation effectiveness in the area of applying the fundamentals of COIN. There were two types of data collected – qualitative data and quantitative data. The qualitative data consisted of UrbanSim SME interview results from MCCC instructors as well as the UrbanSim AAR and survey comments made by experiment participants (MCCC students). The quantitative data consisted of the UrbanSim COIN evaluation test results from both experiment groups. The qualitative data suggested that UrbanSim does help improve the COIN knowledge and skills of junior officers and that it is a valuable tool for training. However, the quantitative data results showed that there was no significant difference between the experiment group and the control group mean test scores when each conducted the two-part COIN evaluation. The COIN evaluation consisted of a Situational Judgment Test section as well as a COIN fundamental test section.

Demographics results

Forty test subjects were broken down into two groups - UrbanSim users (Group A) and a COIN self-study group (Group B). The self-study group studied various subjects related to COIN and the application of doctrine from FM 3-24. In order to ensure there was a balanced distribution of subjects, a demographics survey (Appendix C) was conducted the day prior to the experiment consisting of, rank, age, number of times deployed to a COIN environment, number of times the subject had used a serious game, number of times (if any) a subject had used UrbanSim, and were they a MCCC graduate or not. The demographic survey results were used to divide the participants into groups. The demographic data was not specifically analyzed further during the experiment. However, this data may be of use in future research.

The test subjects completed a demographic survey with the following descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 for Group A (UrbanSim users) and Table 2 for Group B (non-UrbanSim users). Table 3 is combined of Groups A and B.

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<th>Table 1: Group A (UrbanSim users)</th>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Times Used Serious Games</td>
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<td><strong>UrbanSim experience</strong></td>
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<td><strong>MCCC Graduate</strong></td>
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| **Table 2: Group B (COIN Self-study/non-UrbanSim users)** |
|--------------------------|----|---------|---------|--------|---------------|
| **Age**                  | 20 | 26      | 41      | 29.78  | 4.67          |
| **Deployed COIN**        | 20 | 8       | 36      | 14.2   | 7.01          |
| **Times Used Serious Games** | 20 | 0       | 10      | 1.25   | 2.21          |
| **UrbanSim experience**  | 20 | N/A     | N/A     | 0.05   | 0.22          |
| **MCCC Graduate**        | 20 | N/A     | N/A     | 0.85   | 0.36          |

| **Table 3: Combined A and B** |
|-----------------------------|----|---------|---------|--------|---------------|
| **Age**                     | 40 | 25      | 43      | 29.67  | 4.84          |
| **Deployed COIN**           | 40 | 0       | 36      | 12.97  | 6.01          |
| **Times Used Serious Games** | 40 | 0       | 10      | 1.07   | 1.71          |
| **UrbanSim experience**     | 40 | N/A     | N/A     | 0.15   | 0.36          |
| **MCCC Graduate**           | 40 | N/A     | N/A     | 0.85   | 0.36          |
Participant performance data was collected and assessed using the COIN evaluation that had been previously validated by SMEs to include the answer key. As previously stated, Group A participants executed five hours of UrbanSim training to include the Primer, knobology training, and two to three iterations of the game. Group B participants executed approximately five hours of COIN self-study learning with small group instructor guidance. Both groups completed the COIN evaluation as the last part of the experiment. The results of both groups’ COIN evaluations are located in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4: Summary of Group A results

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<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Summary of Group B results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>SJT</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Performance Assessment

The objective of this experiment was to assess UrbanSim to determine whether this training simulation increases the COIN knowledge, decision-making skills, and the ability to apply COIN fundamentals for junior officers. In order to show improved performance, the
desired outcome were higher overall COIN evaluation test scores in the experimental group versus the control group.

The effect of the UrbanSim simulation was addressed in the following hypothesis:

$H:0$ The use of UrbanSim does not improve company grade officers’ application of counterinsurgency skills, to include security and development, above that of the standard Program of Instruction (POI) currently being used at the U.S. Army Maneuver Captain’s Career Course.

$H:0 : \mu_1 = \mu_2$

$H:1$ The use of UrbanSim does improve company grade officers’ application of counterinsurgency skills, to include security and development, above that of the standard Program of Instruction (POI) currently being used at the U.S. Army Maneuver Captain’s Career Course.

$H:1 : \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$

**ANOVA**

Results of a one-way between subjects ANOVA indicated that Group A ($M=26.30$, $SD =3.5$) did not perform better than Group B ($M=25.5$, $SD=4.27$) on the SJT, $F(1, 38) = .420$, $p > .05$. This was based on the $p$-value being greater than $\alpha$; which is in the rejection region. This showed there is no statistical difference between the experimental group and the control group and that the use of UrbanSim is not a factor in determining the amount of correct answers during the evaluation of a subject’s performance. As a result, the analysis failed to reject the Null Hypothesis. The two groups are not significantly different.

**Table 6: ANOVA Summary Table for Total Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>579.2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>585.6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survey**

The User Improvement Survey (Appendix E) given to Group A was completed upon finishing UrbanSim training. The survey consisted of four questions evaluating certain aspects of the simulation. The subjects were asked to rate certain capabilities and limitations of UrbanSim based on targeted objectives for improvement identified by the researchers. The
subjects rated these capabilities and limitations using Likert Scale questions. The responses ranged from one to ten on a negative to positive scale.

Below is a summary of Group A’s survey results. For summary purposes, the 10 points were divided among the five categories below. Appendix C contains additional UrbanSim demographic survey data.

Table 7: Group A Post Training Assessment of the Effectiveness of Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much does UrbanSim force you to conduct an analysis of the area’s political, economic and social landscape? Or does the simulation conduct the analysis for you eliminating the need for the user to do so? With 10 being your own analysis and 1 being all information provided to you by the simulation.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much does UrbanSim provide you with the ability to develop an economic plan? This means you must identify the bottlenecks in the economy and attempt to fix them with specific projects. How much does it simply offer you a few choices based on where your current progress is in the simulation with a more of a reactive rather than proactive approach? With 10 being proactive and 1 being reactive.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well does UrbanSim reflect accurate kinetic operations, with each type of operation being unique in its own mode? With 10 accurately describing the kinetic operation and 1 being poorly reflecting the types of kinetic operations.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well does UrbanSim reflect actually amount to interaction with Host Nation Forces (HNF)? Should HNF’s contribute to your operations by establishing local security as well as provide some maneuver elements to your operations, or should they remain as bystanders? With 10 being they should contribute and provide some maneuver forces and 1 being the simulation is suitable as a training tool for use of HNF.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After Action Review

Additionally, there was a post-UrbanSim training After Action Review (AAR) held with Group A and facilitated by a MCCC Small Group Instructor (SGI). The discussion followed a simple sustain and improve format that included participants' recommendations.

The overall consensus was that UrbanSim is a positive and appropriate learning tool for Company Commanders and Battalion staff to use within their respective elements. Furthermore, participants were able to see trends within the simulation on how to use and or not use kinetic versus non-kinetic operations. Additionally, it was agreed upon that the "hands on" technique was advantageous to traditional PowerPoint classroom learning and discussion. There was a consensus among the Group A participants that the UrbanSim Primer would work well as a learning tool for Platoon Leaders, Platoon Sergeants, and Squad Leaders/ Section Sergeants. There was a consensus that troops in positions below the noted leadership roles would not have the authority to typically influence decisions.

Recommended improvements to UrbanSim included allotting more time to sift through and process all of the information provided by the background reader and simulation. During the experiment, the UrbanSim users were paired in teams but still noted issues with trying to work through all of the information provided in the short amount of training time. In relation to operational Army units, staffs typically consist of multiple elements divided into staff function such as intelligence, operations, etc. At the company level, the Commander is able to delegate certain responsibilities such as intelligence gathering and dissemination to his Company Intelligence Support Team, as well as utilize his Executive Officer and First Sergeant in the assistance in carrying out current operations. Additional recommended improvements included incorporating NGOs and joint operations with HNF into the simulation. Another improvement mentioned is fixing the indiscriminate use of monetary funds, which is not realistic according to present Army protocols such as USFOR-A Pub 1-06, also called MAAWS-A (Money As A Weapons System - Afghanistan). Contracting laws set by the U.S. Congress guide this publication (U.S. Army, 2011). One of the most important improvements participants mentioned was altering the scoring mechanism in UrbanSim. Participants recommended that the numeric pro/anti-Coalition percentages be changed to SITREP-based outcomes. This way the player judges his or her performance on how the game reacts to the decisions made. The full listing of AAR comments is located in Appendix D.

Instructor/SME Interviews

In addition to the above qualitative data, five MCCC instructors (SME’s) were given an UrbanSim questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of five Likert scale questions along with discussion sections. Verbal interviews were also conducted with each MCCC instructor. The goal of the questionnaire was to find out if UrbanSim is a valuable tool for COIN training for junior officers and USAID and State Department personnel, as well as find out how UrbanSim should be used. Below is the summary of the questionnaire: (The SME’s mean rating for each question is in bold)

For the first part of each question or statement, rate your opinion in the blank provided using a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Neutral, and 10 = Strongly Agree.
Question 1

Using UrbanSim increases the knowledge of junior officers on COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, principles, and analysis. **8.25**

What is the impact of using/not using UrbanSim in COIN instruction for junior officers at the MCCC?

UrbanSim provides appropriate COIN scenarios, practical experience, and quantifiable data that show the user how to exercise COIN fundamentals.

Question 2

Utilizing UrbanSim is worth the additional time and resource investment because of the improvement in COIN training for junior officers. **9.25**

Why or why not?

UrbanSim is valuable and it improves COIN training for junior officers by:

- Being simple and easy to use – a small investment in time and money.
- Junior officers are able to see the second, third, and fourth order effects of their decisions.
- Imparts COIN principles and situational awareness on junior officers.

Question 3

UrbanSim would have a positive impact on training junior officers in COIN at the Company/Battalion level, if it were to be implemented Army-wide. **7.5**

Why or why not?

UrbanSim can be an extremely valuable tool depending on who is using it, how it is used, and what it is used for. Leaders must be motivated, and have to invest the necessary time and effort in training with it, whether in Officer Professional Developments (OPDs) or staff exercises.

Question 4

UrbanSim should be re-instituted into the MCCC curriculum. **9.5**

Why or Why not?

UrbanSim was not removed from the MCCC curriculum, but rather it took a lesser priority to other demands and requirements from higher headquarters as well as instructors using more traditional methods (white boards, etc.) to instruct COIN.
Question 5

The use of UrbanSim at the MCCC and/or Battalion level can reduce classroom or training hours of instruction for junior officers. 2.0

Why or why not?

UrbanSim improves or enhances COIN training, but does not reduce classroom hours due to the amount of preparation and background needed to give the students or users. UrbanSim also helps reinforce COIN principles and can help in teaching staff officer functions, but again, it will not feasibly reduce classroom hours.

Question 6

UrbanSim could be a beneficial cross-training tool for U.S. State Department and other government personnel who deploy to COIN environments, in regards to learning the Army’s approach to security and development. 9.0

Why or why not?

UrbanSim would be beneficial due to:

• It can assist in training civilian agencies in how to prioritize non-lethal targeting and it can show how targeting affects the COIN environment.

• It paints an appropriate picture of the COIN environment so civilian agencies can see how the military operates and how it impacts the environment they are in.

• It should also be used with an Army Liaison Officer (LNO) to help discuss the nuances associated with the Army’s security and development operations.

The following improvement data was obtained from verbal interviews with the MCCC instructors:

How would you improve UrbanSim?

Host Nation Forces (HNF) would have the ability to take the lead without having U.S. forces primarily conduct all operations and planning. The ability to create for the user to have a control of HNF, essentially, a secondary player. If U.S. forces continue to lead operations, induce casualties to encourage reality within COIN environments.

For development operations, identify bottlenecks, and patterns, i.e., use a networked targeting approach to identify Methods of Action/Approach (MOA). If the simulation is executed in this manner, use the over a 3 day time period with the same users to ingrain the training.

Provide a training support package for instructors that illustrate and explains how to use UrbanSim to instruct junior officers, and how to reach pre-determined objectives.
If instructors have clearly defined training objectives and guidelines, a lesson plan or sound POI, students will enjoy the simulation and will learn more.

**What future uses do you see for UrbanSim?**

Battalion and above staff training exercises.

Culmination exercises for junior officers as well as State Department personnel.

**Results Interpretation**

The test scores from the quantitative data suggest that there was no difference between the control group and the experimental groups' test scores. In other terms, the use of UrbanSim and the associated training package did not improve the test scores of the experimental group over the control group. However, the qualitative data mentioned above suggests that UrbanSim is a valuable tool. The researchers theorize that there is one likely cause to explain why there was no significant difference in the COIN evaluation scores between the two experimental groups. That is, the group of participants had reached their “ceiling” in COIN instruction. This “Ceiling Effect” happens when data is collected from a group of individuals who have become proficient at something (Hessling, Traxel, & Schmidt, 2013). In this case, thirty-four of the forty participants just graduated the MCCC. Out of forty test subjects, only six were identified as not being MCCC graduates. The POI for the MCCC includes Module 4, which focuses on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) in COIN environments. Additionally, many of the missions given to the students to conduct during their company-planning phase also involved COIN scenarios. Throughout the MCCC, the students were inundated with COIN knowledge and decision-making skills. Therefore, the thirty-six recent MCCC graduates had become very proficient in COIN knowledge and decision-making skills. In regards to the six non-MCCC graduates, the background they had in their respective Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) would have provided them COIN training. In addition, their previous unit training conducted in between deployment cycles (assuming they were assigned to operational units as platoon leaders), would have given them practical experience in COIN fundamentals. Finally, thirty-nine out of the forty officers that took part in the experiment had been deployed to COIN environments, and many had been deployed multiple times (See Appendix C for Demographics).

**Limitations**

The experiment had several limitations, based on time constraints, participant interaction with the system, and current system capabilities. The participants had limited exposure to UrbanSim’s current inventory of scenarios. The experiment was conducted over the course of only one day or a maximum of 8 hours of training, due to the schedules of MCCC students. Therefore, participants could only execute two to three scenarios out of the six scenarios currently offered by UrbanSim. Access to participants was limited based again on the number of recent graduates from the MCCC and conflicts with individual schedules. This resulted in only thirty-four of the forty participants being MCCC graduates. The six non-graduate participants were divided equally between the two groups. Next, a scenario that specifically emphasizes security and development joint lines of effort does not exist within the UrbanSim inventory. The Al-Hamra (Iraq) version of UrbanSim was selected by a consensus among MCCC instructors due to it having slightly more development-focused scenarios. Lastly, there
was the inability to conduct a pre-experiment measure of performance due to the participant time constraints mentioned above. This would have entailed giving the experimental group (Group A) a COIN evaluation before and after the UrbanSim training, to measure any change in performance. A pre-test would have established a baseline for the groups pre-existing COIN knowledge. This could have proved that Group A had reached the ceiling effect previously discussed.

Assessment

Overall it is the researchers’ assessment that the qualitative data provides more insightful information regarding the usefulness of UrbanSim as a training tool than the SJT scores. The use of COIN is not a “hard” science per say, but it is often described as an art and is subject to objectivity. COIN is a constantly evolving subject matter. Finding the right questions and answers that work for every experiment, or a "cookie cutter" experiment, is often impossible. As discussed previously within chapters two and three, history and time will tell what the right and wrong answers and approaches have been. Tools such as UrbanSim provide the positive, proactive approach the military needs to train its leaders in an increasingly restrained budget environment. While it is not a "magic bullet" that can cure all problems in and of itself, UrbanSim can be tremendously beneficial if it is properly utilized as a part of a COIN-training program. UrbanSim can act as a great force multiplier in training today's U.S. military and civilian personnel for COIN environments.
CHAPTER 6: Conclusions and Recommendations

Review

In conclusion, it is the researcher’s assessment that the use of UrbanSim improves the ability of military personnel to apply and integrate COIN skills across the full spectrum of security and development operations. As the previous results and assessment section discussed, the quantitative data showed no change with the use of UrbanSim; however the qualitative results portion of the experiment outweighed the COIN evaluation scores due to the inherent nature of COIN principles.

Recommendations for Improvement of UrbanSim Based on Experiment Results

Based on the comments made during the post-UrbanSim AAR session and the participant survey, the participants’ recommendations for improvement can be broken down into three areas:

- Improve the complexity of interaction between UrbanSim and the player.
- Improve the analytical tools that UrbanSim offers the player to use.
- Improve UrbanSim’s capability for the player to work with host nation forces (HNF).

Improve the Complexity of Interaction between UrbanSim and the Player

The first major recommendation deals with the difficulty of taking a very complex simulation system and reducing the possible inputs from the player into a very few limited options. Many of the participants in the experiment felt that to properly portray the situation, the player would need to have the ability to interact with many more local actors such as politicians, powerbrokers, etc. Therefore, the participants thought that the level of complexity in UrbanSim should be reflected in the number of decisions a player is able to make. Many felt that the background reader provided a very complex and in depth analysis but did not feel that the same level of depth was provided during the game play.

Improve the Analytical Tools that UrbanSim Offers the Player to Use

The second recommendation came about because the participants felt too much of the data had been interpreted by the game rather than the player, causing the level of analyses offered to the player to be insufficient. The participant comments from both the post-training survey and the AAR reflected this issue and called for improvements on UrbanSim. Many of the participants wanted to conduct individual analysis rather than having the game just give it to them. One of the participants suggested that, instead of displaying a player’s progress during the game in a numerical format such as the percentage of the population that was For, Neutral, or Against the Coalition, it may be better to show progress based on the SIGACTs and SITREPs the player receives after conducting missions. This way every action the player executes will generate a response he or she has to interpret based on the population’s actions, rather than the computer-generated percentages.
Improve UrbanSim’s Capabilities for the Player to Work with Host Nation Forces

The third recommendation made by the participants both in the AAR and post-training survey pointed to the fact that host national forces (HNF) should be active alongside the Coalition forces in the game. Part of the HNF joint effort with Coalition forces is represented by units that have Military Transition Teams (MITT) and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT). These are teams of advisors attached to HNF in Iraq and Afghanistan that are able to exert a great deal of influence over their HNF counterparts. In addition, UrbanSim needs to reflect training opportunities to make HNF more effective, reflecting training programs that Coalition troops can conduct with their partnered HNF units.

Recommendations for Improvement of UrbanSim

Several recommendations can be made to improve UrbanSim based on the researchers’ COIN deployment experiences, observations, and use of the game. These recommendations are based on the need to integrate security and development operations in COIN environments and consist of two parts. The first set of recommendations for improvement deals with the simulation and how it can be improved, while the second set deals with the method in which the simulation could be used.

Improvements to UrbanSim Software

While UrbanSim is a highly effective tool, there are several areas in which it can be improved upon in its intended purpose as a COIN trainer. This game should be divided into two versions - a short campaign and a long campaign version. The short campaign should be created almost identically to the current game, with only a few minor improvements. The long campaign version of the game would integrate all of the below recommendations. Both of these versions will be discussed in recommended training methods later. The main issue with the UrbanSim simulation is that it does not properly support the Shape, Clear, Hold, Build COIN campaign method mentioned before in Chapter 3 and as outlined in FM 3-24.

Introduction of a Reconnaissance Mission

During Shaping operations, the primary focus is on reconnaissance operations. However, in UrbanSim, reconnaissance is not needed because most of the important information such as the key infrastructure and key leaders is presented to the player at the beginning. This can be improved by leaving most of important information hidden until the player orders one of the battalion units to conduct reconnaissance into the area. These initial reconnaissance operations will help focus efforts to ensure the Shaping stage is conducted early in the campaign. In addition, this option will also force the player to conduct more of his or her own analysis. Such analysis would consist of identifying and dividing the population into segments based on their common characteristics, rather than having the game give it to him or her. Conducting reconnaissance operations will also force the player to spend more time analyzing the local economy rather than receiving a staff update or briefing. This could be accomplished by adding another drop down menu that will give the option of conducting a reconnaissance mission. Within this option, there should be another drop down menu giving
reconnaissance objectives to the mission, thereby allowing units to focus on economic, security or political objectives. By adding additional missions, a higher fidelity for the current state can be achieved. It would allow for enhanced integration into current COIN doctrine. It will allow for the UrbanSim user to gain an optimal picture of steady state operations for both security and development.

**Economy**

The second aspect of UrbanSim that could be improved upon is the economic background. As of right now, the economic background in the simulation is very simplistic. It needs to be greatly expanded to include a means of production in each area. For example, each local area can contain a certain amount agricultural production, a certain amount of manufacturing, and certain amount of commercial activity. Doing this might seem simplistic, but it will do more to accurately represent the method of local towns or villages contributing to the local economy in the real world. Next, UrbanSim needs to have a distribution network layout to demonstrate how products are taken to the market. The local transportation network of roads should also be represented in the game to facilitate economic interaction and area security operations. Area security operations would be executed by the player through tasking units to build and man checkpoints at chokepoints within the transportation network. The goal here would be force the player to conduct analysis of the area’s economy and then identify bottlenecks. At the same time, more options should be made available for development projects in the area. These projects should include irrigation projects as well as the other types of projects mentioned in Chapter 3.

Another improvement for UrbanSim would be to change the display screen and menu options for development projects such as in figure 4. While some key infrastructure should remain on the primary display map, the main economic data should also be available to the player by clicking on the area icon button for a particular district. Once the player clicks on the area icon button and the area menu is displayed, the player should be able to select the proposed economic tab to display all relevant economic data. Another tab in the same area menu, should also display all of the available projects that could be conducted in that specific area.
Finally, the last recommended change to the current version of UrbanSim is that the local Army units should only need to periodically check on ongoing development projects as an additional task, rather than having the project consume all of that unit’s time for that turn or multiple turns. This change would more accurately represent how actual units in Iraq and Afghanistan deal with these projects. Improvements for the economic aspect of UrbanSim would be to generate a higher fidelity part for the development portion of the COIN environment. Through an increase in the types of development operations to choose from the simulation can now prepare the user for the full complexity of development missions they will be facing in the COIN theatre.

**Population and Politics**

The main recommendation here is to add another tab in the area menu that will allow the player to view all population statics in the area through a pop-up window. The population statistics tab should be located next to the economy tab mentioned above and should be displayed in a pop-up window. The display of key leaders on the main map should be kept as it is. One other aspect that should be introduced into the game is the linkage between insurgent
groups and political leaders. Some militias should be linked to specific political leaders and populations. Therefore, if one of these sets of populations is persuaded to become Pro-Coalition, then the game should have the option to cause these linked militias or insurgent groups to either stand down, lose support, become more readily identifiable, and/or lose its ability to recruit new members to replace losses.

*Host Nation Forces*

While Coalition forces do not control host nation forces, it is possible to convince the local HNF commanders to participate in Coalition operations. Correct use of HNF is a vital aspect of COIN operations. By giving the player the option to control HNF forces, player understanding is improved with respect to HNF’s strengths and weaknesses. This in turn facilitates proper integration of HNF into coalition forces security and development operations. The recommendation here is to allow the player to control at least a portion of HNF in UrbanSim, thereby simulating the U.S. Army OMLT and MITT teams that advise and help with HNF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. HNF units should not be represented as being as effective as Coalition units in combat operations, especially if they operate by themselves. The exception to this would be the option for HNF to conduct defensive operations such as checkpoint security. HNF units should be represented as more effective in reconnaissance operations than Coalition units as well, to reflect a greater familiarity with local culture and population.

Another recommendation for UrbanSim is having a mission option for Coalition units to train HNF, thereby increasing their effectiveness. The effectiveness of HNF should depend on the number of casualties they suffer and the amount of training they receive. Finally there should be an option for joint operations. Under those circumstances, the player should have an option to split a U.S. platoon into two sections if they are going out with a HNF unit. Joint operations should highlight Coalition force’s superior combat power and HNF force’s superior reconnaissance abilities. This should be done to encourage the player combine forces, thereby reinforcing the concept that all missions should be joint operations between Coalition and HNF.

*Scenario Builder*

In addition to the recommendations made above, UrbanSim also needs a scenario builder that would generate random scenarios instead of the Iraq and Afghanistan scenarios currently available. Scenarios should be built from other areas of the world where the player does not have familiarity with the conflict. The intent here is to force the players not to simply memorize the best-case answers. The goal of the UrbanSim is to develop critical thinking skills in the field of counterinsurgency, rather than teaching the player to figure out how to best manipulate the game to achieve the highest scores.

*Approaches for the Use of UrbanSim*

As mentioned above, the researchers recommend that UrbanSim have two versions – a short campaign version and a long campaign version. The short campaign would be similar to the current system with some minor changes based on the recommendations above. The long campaign version would be developed for Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) and staff training exercises, and would allow for several days of game play.
Short Campaign Version

The short campaign version should be used for individual training and to familiarize the player with the software in preparation for larger training exercises. The short campaign version should be utilized for military officers down to platoon level and should be used in military training schools as part of the COIN curriculum. In addition, this version should also be used for USAID and State Department COIN training.

Long Campaign Version

The long campaign version of UrbanSim would be best utilized in Army or other military War Fighter and collective training exercises at the Division, Brigade, and Battalion level. The exercise should be used as a Capstone requirement for units and should integrate State Department officials with military officers. This type of exercise would take place in two parts - a conventional war to liberate an area and then Stability/COIN operations to stabilize the area after the target regime has collapsed. The overall intent is to ensure that the unit is capable of conducting full spectrum operations from conventional combat to low intensity stability and COIN operations. During the exercise, platoon leaders and company commanders would utilize their units in the same manner as during actual deployments. The target audiences for this version of UrbanSim are Battalion and Brigade staffs and their subordinate units, as well as any civilian personnel that would be attached to them during actual COIN deployments. The exercise would last several days and would require multiple stations networked together on several levels to create a single cohesive exercise.

UrbanSim would be used for the second part of the War Fighter or MRE exercise during Stability and COIN operations. If possible, scenarios and maps from the conventional part of the War Fighter exercise should be exported to UrbanSim for consistency. Bypassed enemy units from the conventional fight would ideally form the core of the insurgency in the UrbanSim scenarios. In short, the training goal for this exercise is to avoid a scenario similar to what U.S. and Coalition forces faced in Iraq. That is, where the initial invasion and conventional war went superbly, but then the host nation’s stability degenerated due to a protracted COIN fight. A fight that could have been prevented was it not for a lack of planning and proper training.

Areas for Future Research

Areas for future research would look into conducting UrbanSim training and an experiment with USAID and State Department personnel. Due to certain constraints, this was not possible to accomplish within the scope of the experiment. The goal of this would be to gauge the interest in conducting UrbanSim training in order to cross-train such personnel on military COIN operations. Again, this would be done so that the U.S. could minimize the aforementioned mistakes in future COIN conflicts. If USAID and State Department personnel obtain UrbanSim training, the next phase of the research would be integrating these groups into military War Fighter exercises as mentioned above. That way one can study the effect of having military, State Department, and other civilian agencies collaborate together on to how best solve COIN development issues.
MCCC Instructor Interview Questions for UrbanSim Experiment:

Name: __________________________________________

Rank: _______

Length of Time Teaching UrbanSim at the MCCC: ___________

For the first part of each question or statement, rate your opinion in the blank provided using a scale from **0 to 10 where 0 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Neutral, and 10 = Strongly Agree.** For the second part of each question, write or type your answer below the question. Use the additional space if necessary. **Note:** In this study, we are looking for a general **consensus** regarding the answers. Thank you for your help in this study.

1. Using UrbanSim increases the knowledge of junior officers on COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, principles, and analysis. _______

   What is the impact of using/not using UrbanSim in COIN instruction for junior officers at the MCCC?

2. Utilizing UrbanSim is worth the additional time and resource investment because of the improvement in COIN training for junior officers. _______

   Why or why not?

3. UrbanSim would have a positive impact on training junior officers in COIN at the Company/Battalion level, if it were to be implemented Army-wide. _______

   Why or why not?

4. UrbanSim should be re-instituted into the MCCC curriculum. _______

   Why or Why not?

5. The use of UrbanSim at the MCCC and/or Battalion level can reduce classroom or training hours of instruction for junior officers. _______

   Why or why not?

6. UrbanSim could be used as a beneficial cross-training tool for U.S. State Department and other government personnel who deploy to COIN environments, in regards to learning the Army’s approaches to security and development. _______

   Why or why not?

**Additional space to write answers. Make sure you list the question number the answer corresponds to.**

**Additional Comments:**
APPENDIX B: Ft. Benning Experiment Timeline
**UrbanSim Experiment Timeline:**

**Wed 6 Feb:**
1200-1300  MCCC Instructor interviews during lunch – order lunch take out (Bldg 4, Rooms E167/E169)
1300-1500  Meet experiment participants and go over details; permission forms, demographic survey, divide into 2 groups, test all equipment
1500-UTC   Make copies of all COIN evaluations, questionnaires, etc.

**Thur 6 Feb:**
0800-0845  Intro to experiment and roll call; divide 2 groups up to start training
0845-1000  Group A starts UrbanSim Primer; Group B starts self-directed training
1000-1030  Group A does Knobology training on UrbanSim
1030-1430  Group A completes 1 full iteration of UrbanSim (15 iterations); they must be completed by 1430
1430-1500  UrbanSim AAR; Group B rejoins Group A at 1500
1500-1700  COIN evaluation is completed by both groups; Group A also does UrbanSim questionnaire prior to COIN evaluation
1700-UTC   Grading of COIN evaluations
UrbanSim Experiment Demographic Survey (Print Information Neatly)

Rank: _________
Age: ________
# Months Deployed to COIN Environments _________
# Times Used Serious Games _________
Have you used UrbanSim before?  Yes ______  No ______
Are you a MCCC Graduate?  Yes ______  No ______

Do Not Mark Below This Line
__________________________________________________________________________

Group # for This Participant : _________________
APPENDIX D: User After Action Review
UrbanSim AAR
MCCC Ft. Benning, GA
7 Feb 2013

Preparation:

- Sustain:
  - Ease of use/interface
  - Realistic feedback (not instant; series of meetings w/ key leaders)
  - Surplus of information
  - Hand’s on technique advantageous to classroom COIN tng.
  - Enables junior leaders to see that there is no ONE LOE,
  - Tutorial was good (knobology)
  - Primer would work well for LT’s/PSGs/SLs
  - Consensus on UrbanSim being good for Company Commanders and Battalion staff to use
  - Can see trends with game on how to use/not use kinetic and non-kinetic operations

- Improve
  - Too much information for an individual (staff functions enable cdr to sort through and process information)
  - Provide background information prior to execution. Students had background readers but said no one would realistically sift through 60 pages of data. Use 10-15 min video to prep for game as the background reader
  - Aim for company level instead of battalion level (enables use for Cdrs at all levels)
  - Game does not provide enough complex interactions to provide for the complex scenarios. Company’s can only be tasked to do one thing at one time – not realistic to actual COIN operations where Co’s and PLT’s check on development project security in route to Cordon and Knock missions, etc.
  - Inability to see fruits of your labor.
  - Increase the realistic abilities of the enablers.
  - Incorporate NGOs.
  - More interface with the system. Develop pull-down Bio’s on key leaders or short cut’s to SIGACTS to have more information to make decisions in game.
  - Partnered patrols with HN forces – Make more realistic in being able to use HNF forces to do joint missions if you get them to a certain training/readiness level
  - Tasking of HN forces.
  - Additional scenarios (not just Irq/Afg)
  - Game pushes you to be more reactive, watching the score and you want to improve your score.
  - Inability to choose a follow up to a cordon and search, etc.
  - Ineffective monetary allocation without discretion.

Recommendations:

- No score at the end, _should_ be measured off of SITREPs, unit graded summary, etc. _NO NUMBERS!_
• Keep mission debrief at the end though, but don’t provide the immediate feedback during the game. Constant score keeping (percentages) after each iteration causes users to lean towards manipulating game to improve scores rather than learning
• SITREPs from each unit maneuvering, and a daily wrap up by the S2/S3 IOT analyze your actions and plan for the next phase/step.
• Provide something like a RIP/TOA brief verbally to players prior to execution.
• At company level, use the COIST cell to provide staff work.
APPENDIX E: User Improvement Survey
# UrbanSim Post-Training Questionnaire

1. On a scale of 1-10 how much does UrbanSim force you to conduct an analysis of the area's political, economic and social landscapes? Or does the simulation conduct the analysis for you eliminating the need for the user to do so? With 10 being your own analysis and 1 being all information provided to you by the simulation.

2. On a scale of 1-10 how much does UrbanSim provide you with the ability to develop an economic plan? This includes identifying the bottlenecks in the economy and attempt to fix them with specific projects. How much does it simply offer you a few choices based on where your current progress is in the simulation with a more of a reactive rather than proactive approach? With 10 being proactive and 1 being reactive.

3. On a scale of 1-10 how well does UrbanSim reflect accurate kinetic operations, with each type of operation being unique in its own model? With 10 being accurately describing the kinetic operation and 1 being poorly reflecting the type of kinetic operations.

4. On a scale of 1-10 how well does UrbanSim reflect actually amount to interaction with Host Nation Forces (HNF)? Should HNFs contribute to your operations by establishing local security as well as provide some maneuver elements to your operations, or should they remain as bystanders? With 10 being they should contribute and provide some maneuver forces and 1 being the the simulation is suitable as a training tool for use of HNF.

# Additional comments:
APPENDIX F: COIN Evaluation
COIN EVALUATION

Rank: __________
MCCC Graduate? Yes _____ No ______
Unit: _______________________________________
Date: __________________
Group # ________ (Group #1 = UrbanSim Users / Group #2 = Self-Directed COIN training users)

Instructions: Thank you for volunteering to complete this Counterinsurgency (COIN) evaluation. The purpose of this exercise is to assess how commanders make judgments about command decisions during COIN and Stability Operations. The evaluation will be broken up into two sections. Section I is a Situational Judgment Exercise with 15 vignette based questions. Section II is a 10 question short answer/multiple choice assessment that will test your knowledge of basic COIN principles and operations.

In Section I of the test you will be presented with background information about a fictional AO and a series of short vignettes, followed by a two-part question. Part 1 of the vignette question will include several proposed actions that you could take to address the situation. We ask that you use your knowledge of COIN and Stability Operations doctrine to choose the best possible action out of the options given and put a circle around the number (1,2,3,4, or 5) that is to the left of it. There is only one best possible action. Part II of the vignette question asks you to briefly describe what factors/ critical information from the vignette and the storyline (including the given background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made. Again, use your knowledge of COIN and Stability Operations doctrine in answering the question. You will use the box provided to write your answers to the question. Part I and II of each vignette question are worth the same amount of points.

In Section II of the test you will write in the correct answer(s) in the space provided below all fill-in-the-blank questions. You will circle the letter (A,B,C or D) that is to the left of the correct answer for all multiple-choice questions. There is only one correct answer for each multiple-choice question.

This COIN evaluation should take approximately 1 - 1.5 hours to complete. Your participation is voluntary. You can exercise your right to not participate at any moment. All responses will remain confidential. Your participation will help the U.S. Army its efforts to improve future leader training.

Note: Please ask the instructors for help at any time if you are unsure about something regarding the evaluation.

COIN Evaluation Section I

Background Reader
Please review the following background information. You will use this information to complete the exercise.

- You are the Battalion Commander of 1-23 CAB
- Your battalion’s area of operations (AO) is a fictional city in Iraqi.
- You have been there for 100 days and a majority of your efforts are focused on the "hold" and "build" phases of the clear-hold-build operation
- You have five neighborhoods identified as Zones A-E, and your area encompasses the rural areas around the city (see Figure 1 on page 3)
- The overall population is about 60% Shia, 40% Sunni Arab
- Zones A and B are wealthy areas
- Zone C is middle class
- Zones D and E are poor and include the former industrial areas of the city
- Zone A is nearly 100% Sunni
- Zones B and D are nearly 100% Shia
- Zones C and E are mixed
- Overall attacks in your AO are down from over 20 attacks a day one month prior to your RIP/TOA to an average of 45 attacks per month
- Zones A, B and C have mostly attacks against the population-- murder, intimidation, kidnapping, suicide bombing-- and Iraqi Security Forces-- suicide bombing, IEDs-- with few attacks against US forces
- Zones D and E and the outskirts of the city account for 80% of the total attacks and 90% of the attacks on US forces—complex attacks, IEDs, mortar and rocket attacks, direct fire attacks
- Unemployment in your AO is around 75% overall, but Zones D and E are over 90%
- Reporting says that insurgent recruiting, both Sunni and Shia, focuses on the poorest areas with the highest unemployment
- You have three different groups of Iraqi Security Forces that you are partnered with: Local police (IPs), National police (INPs), and Iraqi Army (IA)
- The IPs are new, amidst training, and many are not yet on the payroll. They reflect the ethnicity of the population very well.
- The INP are nearly 100% Shia. Although they are competent, they have been widely infiltrated by members of the Jaish-al-Mahdi (JAM), an anti-American Shia group
- The local IA unit is very competent and about 80% Shia. It has a Shia commander and Sunni XO with Sunnis holding several key staff positions
- Local elections haven’t yet been held
- The local government is composed of a Mayor- selected by the previous unit and approved by the provincial governor, a city council- selected by the mayor and approved by the previous unit, and neighborhood councils- selected by straw polling at neighborhood, town-hall meetings
- The Zone D and E neighborhood councils haven’t met. One of your goals in the governance LOE is to have them do so
- The city council has been accused of focusing all of its efforts on the wealthy neighborhoods

SWEAT-MS
• **Sewer.** The sewer system in Zones A, B and C are functional but damaged with only 8 of the 14 pumping stations working at capacity. The open sewers in Zones D and E are intact, but highly unsanitary. The open drains are only maintained by the inhabitants, not by city workers.

• **Water.** The city drinking water in Zones A-C exceeds UN minimal guidelines. The drinking water in Zones D and E is filtered river water and is dangerous. The water contains significant chemical and organic contamination and routinely causes illness in the population.

• **Electricity.** Electric power generation and distribution continues to be a national problem. Anecdotally, the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) estimates that Zone A receives an average 8 hours of power per day, B and C about 15 hours, and D and E less than 3 hours per day. No formal electricity study has been conducted.

• **Academics.** The majority of the pre-war schools are operational even if some are in disrepair. However, there is no unified curriculum and the city council is working to establish one on which all parties might agree. In Zones A-C there is 1 school for every 350 students, but in Zones D and E there is fewer than 1 school per 1000 students.

• **Trash Collection.** Presently there are no trash collection services and the populace self disposes of trash either through burning or dumping. The city would like routine collection reestablished in the near future.

• **Medical.** The city has one level III capable full service hospital in Zone C and several local neighborhood clinics.

• **Security.** Overall attacks in your AO are down from over 20 attacks a day one month prior to your RIP/TOA to an average of 45 attacks per month

**BCT Guidance:**

• 1-23 CAB will work closely with HN security forces to continue to provide security throughout the AO. Additionally, you will work with local infrastructure, civic, religious, and economic leaders to restore the city’s civil infrastructure and ensure productiveness of the population. Carefully blend use of force with political, information, and infrastructure concerns. Find some suitable projects to make short gains and devise plans to reduce the city’s overwhelming unemployment.
Problem Set 1-3 data

Unemployment in your AO hovers around 75%, however, in your two poorest neighborhoods, Zones D and E, it is nearly 90%. The city council has taken-up several measures to increase employment opportunities throughout the city, but hasn’t focused efforts on the poorest areas. You have received multiple reports that insurgents are recruiting new members from the neighborhoods with the highest unemployment rates. Those areas see the higher levels of direct action attacks against both U.S. and host nation security forces and while attacks are decreasing in most of your area, they continue apace in the poor neighborhoods. The HN security forces patrol in the poor areas, but they have had no recruiting drives in those neighborhoods and have turned some applicants from there away, based on the threat of infiltration.

1. You have been allocated $60,000 per month for locally approved commander’s emergency response program (CERP) projects. Your battalion S-5 asked for your guidance on priorities for those projects. He has pre-built one-day labor projects for area clean up, curb painting, trash pick-up, and rubble removal. The project options are as follows:

   **Project 1**: Proposes to recruit men from Zones A-E, and have them clean-up trash, clear rubble, etc. throughout the city. The project is valued at $60,000.00 and will employ 20 men from each zone per day for 30 days.

   **Project 2**: Proposes to recruit men from Zones D and E, and have them clean-up trash, clear rubble, etc. throughout the city. The project is valued at $50,000.00 and will employ 40 men from Zones D and E per day for 30 days.

   **Project 3**: Proposes to recruit men from Zones D and E and have them work in their respective neighborhoods cleaning up trash, clearing rubble, etc. The project is valued at $24,000.00 and will employ 20 men from each zone per day for 30 days.

As the Battalion Commander, what would you execute?
Move forward with project 1

Move forward with project 2

Move forward with project 3
With input from the councils of Zones D and E

Meet with the city council to determine which zones and projects take priority, and take action based on their vote.

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

- The effects you want to achieve (non-lethal targeting)
  - High unemployment in zones D & E
  - Little to no income (poor) in zones D & E
  - Most attacks on US forces come from zones D & E

- Attempt to mitigate the above with a quick, high impact, low cost CERP project focused in D & E to begin to win the hearts and minds of the population there.

2. You receive multiple reports that Shia insurgents are successfully recruiting among the unemployed men in Zone D, your poorest neighborhood. The reports say that the groups are paying up to $200 per attack against ISF or Americans and that they are using two warehouses as IED factories. When you asked the police chief about the buildings, he said that they are agricultural warehouses and they employ about 20 workers each; one is owned by a Shia city council member and the other by a Shia sheik who lives outside the city-limits. Ten minutes ago, 2230 hours, your Charlie Company commander called to report that a walk-in Shia informant, who has a 70% accurate reporting history, came to the company COP reporting that an insurgent meeting was occurring at the warehouse owned by the sheik. Through UAV surveillance, you see 5 vehicles and 15 men around the warehouse. As you watch, one vehicle leaves and several men enter another car, four other men are loading unknown bundles into a truck. Your company commander asks for your guidance, he says he can have a U.S. patrol at the warehouse in 15 minutes, or a combined patrol with IPs in 35 minutes. Based on the current intelligence, you should:

1. Order your company commander to raid the warehouse immediately.

2. Send U.S. patrol immediately to the warehouse and have them isolate the building. When the combined patrol with IPs arrives, conduct a joint search.

3. Request an airstrike on the warehouse, trucks and men.
4 | Inform the IPs of the latest intel and ask them to take appropriate action.

5 | Hold off on any immediate actions and have your company commander schedule a meeting with the warehouse owner ASAP

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-Within 15 minutes you will have isolation, then 20 minutes later you can clear with host nation security forces (HNSF) to bolster their confidence and increase their legitimacy → follow up with the PAO.
3. After the incident at the warehouse in zone D, your C Company commander reports that Mr. Hasan, the Zone D neighborhood council president, agreed to have the neighborhood council meet to discuss the recent insurgent recruiting. The Zone D council has not met in nine months because they claim the city council ignores them. However, before he brings the council together, Mr. Hasan wants to be able to offer the neighborhood some incentive to avoid the insurgency and support the local government. Hasan is adamant that there must be real progress to encourage the council to meet. Your company commander wants to detain Hasan for extortion. You should:

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<td>1</td>
<td>Have your company commander encourage Hasan to meet with his neighborhood council, but don't commit to projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Have C Company work with Hasan to set-up a CERP project to repair the sewage pumping station in Zone D prior to the meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Order your CA team to repair some of the schools in zone D as a demonstration of good faith to Mr. Hasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Allow your C Company commander to detain Hasan for extortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Have the C Company commander and the CA team work with the city council to develop a project—stipulate a price limit and tell them it must employ over 30 men.</td>
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Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-It is direct, but involves the Commander, CA team, & city council-You want to further this relationship and collaboration. Also focuses on job creation and the drinking water problem.

-You will learn what Hasan really wants and what motivates him as well as the councilmembers

4. Attacks on the populace are up in the western province part of your AO. The area is fairly rural with several large farms and many small sheep and goat herding farms and is populated, almost exclusively, by Sunnis from the Dulaime Tribal Confederation. Intelligence reports have mentioned three sheiks in the area as possible insurgent leaders, but little direct contact has been made in the area. A search of the reporting database shows no prior reporting. Your closest unit – Bravo Company is currently training local security forces in its company zone. How would you address this situation?
1. Have your Bravo Company coordinate daily patrols with IPs from Zone A and focus on interacting with the farmers.

2. Have your Bravo Company coordinate a conduct a cordon and knock with IPs from Zone B and focus on finding illegal weapons and contraband.

3. Coordinate with the Iraqi Army and National Police for increased presence and outreach.

4. Schedule a meeting, one at a time, with the three sheiks mentioned in the reports to discuss the security in the area and the needs of the farmers.

5. Order your Bravo Company to establish a series of checkpoints and roadblocks designed to search all vehicles into and out of the area.

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

- No direct contact has been made before – now we are at least beginning to open the lines of communication with these influential sheiks, and draw our own conclusions on their ties to the insurgency.
- INP are nearly 100% Shia and IA 80% Shia → attempt to have the meeting with the IA Sunni XO or Sunni holding another key staff position. This integrates local security forces into the meeting, and, initially, will prevent tensions between Shia and Sunni.
- Attempt to leverage these meetings and ascertain why there is an increase in attacks on the populace, and how this can be reduced.

5. An Iraqi Army (IA) patrol discovered an IED on the main sewage treatment facility holding tank in Zone D. While searching the surrounding area they discovered a man with an AK-47, and while attempting to capture him, they shot and killed the man. Upon searching the individual, they found that he possessed a city police badge and ID and that he lived two blocks from the sewage plant. The police chief called your headquarters for assistance. You need to determine the best way to handle the situation. You should:

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<td>1</td>
<td>Conduct an independent investigation of the incident and then meet with appropriate leadership at the IA and IP to discuss.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Encourage the IP chief to take the lead and handle this situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coordinate a cordon and search with the Iraqi Army for increased presence and security near the sewage treatment facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conduct a multi-agency joint investigation in which representatives from each security force group participate.</td>
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</table>
Establish a series of checkpoints and roadblocks designed to search all vehicles into and out of the area.

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

- Allows participation from each agency, and this can help to keep tempers down and determine accurate findings.

6. The Army Corps of Engineers recently conducted a survey of the city’s electric grid and found that it was in disrepair. They delivered the results of the survey directly to the mayor and he, along with his advisors, developed a plan to improve the grid over the course of 90 days. The plan looks solid, but at a recent meeting to discuss the plan, members of the Zone D and E neighborhood councils threatened to quit. Their main complaint was that they believed the plan to improve the city’s power grid focused too heavily on the city center and neglected the poorest regions. Although the plan did call for more improvements downtown, it seemed to be because the repairs there were easier and quicker than those in the former industrial zones. The proposed plan is valued at $55,000.00 per month for 3 months. This will use a significant amount of your CERP funds (you have $60,000.00 budget per month for CERP projects) and would basically eliminate any chance of funding additional projects in Zones D and E for the next 90 days. You should:

1. Put the project on hold pending further analysis.

2. Use the CERP funds for a series of smaller CERP projects that would target essential services in Zones D and E and revisit the electric grid later.

3. Approve the project and have your CA team launch an information engagement in the poor neighborhoods explaining why the improvements appear lopsided.

4. Approve the project, and provide Zones D and E with local generators for electric needs as a temporary solution.

5. Ask the mayor and neighborhood councilmen to develop potential solutions to the issue.
Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-Supports the local plan and has CA to discuss with D & E. Possibly follow up with a project in D & E when complete.
7. Security has improved in the market areas and as a result foot traffic in the main market downtown has increased dramatically. However, the merchants are complaining because shoppers are forbidden from driving into the market (ISF closed the market to vehicle traffic because of the VBIED threat). The city council has taken-up the issue and recommends a shopper’s trucking service to haul large purchases to the designated parking areas. The trucks would be purchased using a business micro-loan and would be owned by a merchants coop. The drivers would come from currently unemployed men in the city. The police chief disapproves of the plan and wants the merchants to pay off-duty policemen to haul the merchandise. Rate the following actions:

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<th>Support the city council’s plan and encourage the police chief to live with it.</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Allow the police chief and mayor to find a solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Establish U.S. checkpoints at the market so that no matter who drives the trucks, your soldiers will search them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Support the police chief’s plan and ask the city council to do the same.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Order your CA team and company commander to mentor the council and police towards finding a compromise.</td>
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Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

Facilitates cooperation and will prevent future security issues with the police.

8. Your Bravo Company Commander reports that on a recent combined patrol with Iraqi Army forces he witnessed the Iraqi Army soldiers beat a local citizen. When he stopped them, they claimed the man was an insurgent and had information about IEDs that were recently emplaced. Your unit detained the individual. You should:

|   | Conduct a joint investigation of the incident with the Iraqi Army. |

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<td>2</td>
<td>Have your company commander detain the civilian for immediate questioning and order the XO to proceed with a joint investigation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Release the suspect to the IPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Order your commander to return the detainee to the Iraqi Army.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Process the detainee and send him to higher headquarters for interrogation.</td>
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Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

- Place the man/detainee in the safety of US forces and call for a joint investigation into the incident.

9. Your HHC has been running an ISF training academy on your FOB. The academy has the only live fire tire-house (urban live fire course) in the province and has been very effective in increasing the combat skills of both Iraqi Police and Iraqi Soldiers. However, the local neighbors have complained about the noise and asked the mayor to close the range. The range has been certified by both brigade and division as safe. Today, a local man approached your main ECP and told the guards that a young man was killed this morning by a ricochet from the range. Your HHC commander reports that the range was not open today and closed early yesterday evening. You should:

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<td>1</td>
<td>Order your guards to detain the individual at the ECP because he is lying.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ask the mayor and police chief to come to the FOB and deal with the claim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Order your HHC commander to conduct a joint investigation of the incident with the Iraqi Police, but keep the range open.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Immediately suspend range firing and order your HHC commander to conduct a joint investigation of the incident with the Iraqi Police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Suspend range firing indefinitely and work to have the range removed.</td>
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Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

- The range is the only live fire facility in the province, and has proven very effective in increasing the combat skills of the ISF → Keep it open as the man’s story is clearly fabricated, or at least didn’t occur because of range firing.
- Conduct a joint investigation to both put a local ISF face on it, and to actually determine if there is any truth to the man’s story. Possibly a young man was killed by gunfire in the village, but maybe it came from an adjacent unit, a negligent discharge, celebratory fire…. Find out the cause and rectify the situation, or determine the man lied and cannot be trusted.

10. Insurgent mortar fire has been a real threat to your soldiers and the ISF recently. In the last three weeks, five incidents of effective mortar fire have led to two friendly KIAs and five WIAs. All the attacks have come from farmland in the northwest, just north of town in a sparsely populated Sunni area, the last two attacks came from the same palm grove—about 100 yards from the closest group of houses. The palm grove and houses are owned by a wealthy Sunni farmer who says he has no information about who may have conducted the attacks and claims that his family has repeatedly been threatened by the insurgents. How would you handle this situation?

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<td>1</td>
<td>Order your Engineer company to bulldoze the palm grove.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Order your nearest Company commander to raid the buildings to kill/capture any men found there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coordinate a joint cordon and knock with Iraqi Police of the land and buildings, have scouts establish joint ambushes with the IA, and establish and ISR plan to observe the area and ID the mortar team in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Establish TCPs on all roads into and out of the area jointly with the IP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Assist the ISF in ISR, but allow ISF to operate independently.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

11. A local mosque in Zone A has had a visiting mullah for the last three weeks. Routine mosque monitoring reports of his sermons on the previous two Fridays were “neutral” and three Shia, National Police Officers have routinely attended the mosque. Today, Alpha Company heard him calling on members to “remove the evil crusaders from the city.” They made a flash report to you because they believe the imam is inciting violence. The sermon is currently ongoing, but will end in the next 30 minutes. What is the best way to handle this situation given your goal of gaining support from the local populace?

1. Order your Alpha Company commander to detain the imam when he leaves the mosque.
2. Ask the Iraqi National Police commander in your AO to investigate the incident.
3. Have your Alpha Company and the local police conduct a joint investigation.
4. Initiate an IO speaker message telling the population to boycott the mosque.
5. Meet with the civic and religious leaders in the area to discuss the incident.

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-ISR and scouts operate independently while joint cordon and knock puts a combined face on the operation.

-INP commander is better suited to deal with a religious leader. Additionally, some INP already attended the Mosque. (reasoning against #3)
12. You receive approval to build a water treatment plant to serve Zones D and E. The plant will create 300 temporary jobs for security and construction and about 70 permanent jobs once complete. The construction is highly specialized and must meet international standards. The Corps of Engineers will make the final decision on the contractor, but would like input from you and the city council. Four contractors are competing for the job. The best-suited, most experienced contractor for the job is the mayor’s son-in-law (who is an accomplished contractor with a sterling reputation). He employs 75% locals on his team. The mayor is pushing the city council to recommend him. The next best choice is a Turkish contractor who would hire 55% local-hires. The third and fourth best choices are from Baghdad and plan to bring crews from there. You should:

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Recommend the Turkish contractor in order to avoid the appearance of corruption.</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Recommend one of the Baghdad contractors to avoid the appearance of corruption, but keep the money in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Support the Mayor and council in whatever decision they make.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Strongly urge the council to approve the mayor’s son-in-law because he is the most competent and will employ the most locals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-In the end, the project will be done correctly, with 75% local hires. Support the local government and their decision.

13. Because of the partnership with your unit, all the way down to the station level, the IP is becoming more capable every day. You are confident that they will have a trained cadre that can take over the lead for local security in the next 90 days. However, the IP is still short on their recruiting goals and has asked for your help. You Should:
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<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Start a recruiting drive in Zones D and E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Start a recruiting drive in Zones A and C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Allow the IP to share recruiting venues with the IA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Start an IO campaign to attract motivated citizens of the city into the IP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Recruit volunteers from the INP to the IP.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-Applies to all zones.
Your BCT commander called to inform you that there will be local elections 60 days from now. He wants ISF to have the lead for the security but wants you and your unit to ensure that there are no attacks and that every voter has the ability to cast a ballot. He wants minimal US Army presence at the polling places. There will be monitors from The Carter Center (a US NGO) at the polling stations and you will be responsible for providing billeting and transportation to the teams. He wants the IPs to provide the local security at the polling stations with INPs and IA securing the roads into and out of the city center. The Provincial Director General of Interior (DGI) and the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) will have operational control (OPCON) for all HNSF for the operation and you are authorized direct liaison with them. The IP are not ready for this mission right now and you are concerned that the INP and IA may cause problems for Sunnis as they try to vote.

14. The mayor has been very popular with the citizens of the city, but he has been accused of corruption by a number of local businessmen and has frequently opposed your security initiatives. He has, however, been very good at getting support for the city from both the provincial and national government. At the last council meeting he told you he was very concerned about the upcoming elections. He is confident that he will be a competitive candidate, but he is worried that many of his selectees on the city council may be defeated by opponents who dislike the regime in Baghdad. He fears that this will cause gridlock for the council and damage the relationships with the provincial and national government. You should:

1. Support the mayor, politically, by meeting publicly with the councilmen that he supports.
2. Carefully plan your actions so that you don’t influence the vote.
3. Help the mayor to develop a message that will stress the positive effects the council has had on the city, and then integrate it into your information engagements.
4. Task your CA team to canvas the neighborhoods to find which city council candidates are the most “pro-US”, and then support them politically.

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

- Be transparent → Both in the security and with supporting any of the candidates.

15. One week before the election you receive four intelligence reports that cite four different sources all telling the same story: Two Sunni IP officers (names unknown) from the same IP station (station unknown) in the city are planning an attack against a polling station in the high school in Zone B. The IP officers will, reportedly, wear suicide vests built into their
police body armor and detonate themselves when the polling station is full. The IPs are reportedly former leaders of Ansar Al Islam Shia death squads. The intelligence reports are secret, and can’t be shared with Iraqi Security Forces. You should:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inform the city chief of police and jointly investigate the reports with the IPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inform the police chief to investigate the reports with the IPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Order the city police chief not to allow Shia officers in any Zone A polling area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Forbid any IP to wear body armor at polling places.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Share the reports with the DGI and PCOP and allow them to handle the situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using doctrinal concepts, briefly describe what factors/ critical information from this vignette and the proceeding storyline (including background reader) should be taken into consideration before a decision is made?

-Investigate and increase security at the high school. Adjust any security rosters, if published, to keep attackers away from high school.

COIN Evaluation Section II

1. List the five elements of an insurgency. (FM 3-24.2, pg 2-3)
   - Leaders
   - Guerrillas (also acceptable is Combatants)
   - Underground (also acceptable is Political Cadre)
   - Auxiliaries
   - Mass Base (also acceptable is Sympathetic Population)
2. The Urban Operational Framework consists of the following five steps: Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate, Transition. (FM 3-06, p.6-1)

3. A Measure of Effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (FM 3-24 p. 5-27)

4. A corrupt host-nation leader who may need to be replaced would be an example of a Non-lethal target. (FM 3-24, p.5-30)

5. The ______________ combines data from the HPTL, intelligence synch plan, and attack guidance matrix. It lists HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for detecting, attacking, and assessing the effects. (1 point) (FM 3-24.2, p. 4-28)

   A. Target Selection Standards
   B. Attack Guidance Matrix
   C. Decision Brief
   D. Target Synch Matrix

6. In Counter-Insurgency operations _________ targets are usually more important than _________ targets; they are never less important. (1 points) (FM 3-24, p. 5-29)

   A. Short-term … Long-term
   B. High-Value … High Pay-off
   C. Slow-moving… hardened
   D. Non-Lethal … Lethal


   An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

8. List two of the seven possible Lines of Effort in COIN IAW FM 3-24.2. (FM 3-24.2, P 3-7 – 3-8)

   1. Establish Civil Security
   2. Establish Civil Control
   3. Support HN security forces
   4. Support to governance
   5. Restore essential services
   6. Support to economic and infrastructure development
   7. Conduct info engagement

9. Which of the following is not an insurgent strategy IAW FM 3-24.2 (also known as "Insurgent Approaches" in FM 3-24)? (FM 3-24.2 p. 2-17 – 2-19) (FM 3-24 p. 1-5 – 1-8)
A. Urban Strategy
B. Military-Focused Strategy
C. Conspiratorial Strategy
D. Terrorist Strategy

10. List 2 of the 5 contemporary imperatives of counterinsurgency. (FM 3-24, p. 1-24 to 1-26)

   Manage information and expectations
   Use measured force
   Learn and adapt
   Empower the lowest levels
   Support the Host Nation

WHEN COMPLETE:

When you are finished with the entire evaluation, please hand in your work to your instructor. You may go back and review/change your answers on any of the evaluation questions while time still remains. If you make any changes, make sure you clearly mark out or mark through any answers you do not wish to use. Once time is called, you must turn in your work.

APPENDIX G: CONSENT AGREEMENT
Governance and Security Simulation Assessment for Counter-Insurgency Operations: UrbanSim as a training tool for battalion and company level US Army officers

Informed Consent

Principal Investigator(s): Greg Sandifer, MAJ, US Army, FA57

Sub-Investigator(s): Alex Vershinin, MAJ, US Army, FA57
Frank Weiland, MAJ, US Army, FA57

Faculty Supervisor: J. Peter Kincaid, PhD

Investigational Site(s): Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC)
Maneuver Center of Excellence
Ft. Benning, GA

Introduction: Researchers at the University of Central Florida (UCF) study many topics. To do this we need the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. You are being invited to take part in a research study which will include about 45 recent graduates of the MCCC. You have been asked to take part in this research study because you have experience with COUNTERINSURGENCY principles and applications and will be placed in leadership positions in which to apply these principles. You must be 18 years of age or older to be included in the research study.

The person doing this research is MAJs Greg Sandifer, Alex Vershinin, and Frank Weiland of the UCF Modeling and Simulation department. Because the researchers are graduate students, they are being guided by Dr. J. Peter Kincaid, PhD, a UCF faculty supervisor in the Modeling and Simulation Department.
What you should know about a research study:

- Someone will explain this research study to you.
- A research study is something you volunteer for.
- Whether or not you take part is up to you.
- You should take part in this study only because you want to.
- You can choose not to take part in the research study.
- You can agree to take part now and later change your mind.
- Whatever you decide it will not be held against you.
- Feel free to ask all the questions you want before you decide.

Purpose of the research study: The purpose of this study is to evaluate and provide an overall assessment of the UrbanSim simulation as a viable M&S tool for the U.S. Army to help instruct and train company grade US Army officers.

What you will be asked to do in the study:
- O/A 07FEB120900 begin a full scenario of UrbanSim or SGI guided COIN refreshing.
  - O/A 07FEB121100 you will be asked to take part in answering a one-page, anonymous questionnaires consisting of a demographics survey, and a 4 part UrbanSim feedback questionnaire.
  - O/A 07FEB121130 you will be asked to complete an anonymous Situational Judgment Exercise (SJT) consisting of 15 questions, with a follow on 10 question short answer quiz.

  - When you have completed your questionnaire and test, please place it in the drop box located at the front of the room.

  - You will interact with the SGIs with assistance from the researchers.
  - The research is expected to be complete at approximately 1230.

  - You do not have to answer every question or complete every task. You will not lose any benefits if you skip questions or tasks.

Location: The test will take place at the MCCC computer lab, Ft. Benning, GA.

Time required: We expect that you will be in this research study for 3.5-4 hours one time session.

Risks: There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with the study.

Benefits: There are no expected benefits to you for taking part in this study.
Compensation or payment: There is no compensation or other payment to you for taking part in this study.

Anonymous research: This study is anonymous. That means that no one, not even members of the research team, will know that the information you gave came from you.

Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, concerns, or complaints or think the research has hurt you, talk to Gregory E. Sandifer, Graduate Student, Modeling and Simulation Program, College of Engineering, (407) 255-6189 or Dr. J. Peter Kincaid, Assistant Director, Modeling and Simulation Program, University of Central Florida (407) 882-1330 or by email at pkincaid@ist.ucf.edu.

IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. You may also talk to them for any of the following:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
- You want to get information or provide input about this research.
APPENDIX H: IRB APPROVAL
Approval of Human Research

From: UCF Institutional Review Board #1
FWA 0000036, IRB 0000128

To: Gregory E. Sanders and Co-PIs: Alex Vershinin, William F. Weiland

Date: January 17, 2013

Dear Researcher:

On 1/17/2013, the IRB approved the following human participant research until 1/16/2014 inclusive:

Type of Review: UCF Initial Review Submission Form
Expedited Review Category 07
This approval includes a Waiver of Written Documentation of Consent.

Project Title: Governance and Security Simulation Assessment for Counter-terrorist Operations: UrbanSim as a planning tool for battalion and company level US Army officers

Investigator: Gregory E. Sanders
IRB Number: 06-0314

Funding Agency:
Grant Title:
Research ID:

Research ID: N/A

The scientific merit of the research was considered during the IRB review. The Continuing Review Application must be submitted 30 days prior to the expiration date for studies that were previously expedited, and 60 days prior to the expiration date for research that was previously reviewed at a convened meeting. Donor name changes to the study (i.e., protocol, methodology, consent form, personnel, etc. etc.) before obtaining IRB approval. A Modification Form cannot be used to extend the approval period of a study. All forms must be completed and submitted online at https://research.ucf.edu.

If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 1/16/2014, approval of the research expires on that date. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request to IRB so that IRB records will be accurate.

Use of the approved, stamped consent document(s) is required. The new form supersedes all previous versions, which are now invalid for further use. Only approved investigators (or other approved key study personnel) may solicit consent for research participation. Participants or their representatives must receive a copy of the consent form(s).

In the conduct of this research, you are responsible to follow the requirements of the Investigator Manual.

On behalf of Sophia Drehgeler, Ph.D., L.C.S.W., UCF IRB Chair, this letter is signed by:

Signature applied by [Name] on [Date] 01/17/2013 01:28:43 PM EST

IRB Coordinator
REFERENCES


http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm/

