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EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND ENTRY OF THE FAR-RIGHT IN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS IN ITALY AND POLAND

by

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B.S. Udmurt State University, 2003

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science in the College of Sciences at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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This project focuses on a comparative analysis of governing coalitions between conservative and far right parties in recent years in Italy (1994) and Poland (2005). The aim is to show how the inclusion of the radical right in government coalitions in these countries reflects recent changes in Western and Eastern European party systems through the reformulation of the old and formation of new party cleavages. The focus in the recent literature on personality clashes of party leaders over the distribution of ministry portfolios does not explain the nature of the disagreement between these leaders about key issues of national politics.

I argue that the mechanism of policy formulation between prospective coalitional partners can be traced at the level of party cleavages which pre-exist the negotiation process between party leaders. The political breakthrough of the far-right parties became possible because of the development of new issues related to the process of European integration and based on the longstanding confrontation between the left and right parties since the beginning of the Cold War. The disintegration of the previous party systems as a result of the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland and the First Republic in Italy in the post-Cold War era created a vacuum partly exploited by the previous anti-system far-right parties and the new emerging ones. At the same time, a clear tendency toward the cartelization of the programmatic supply was prominent on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum. I argue that the rise to prominence of center-right coalitions in the two countries led by Silvio Berlusconi and Jaroslav Kachinskiy respectively represents not only a new dimension in the development of the right wing in Europe but also constitutes a model of political realignment where new cleavages are gradually substituting for the old cleavages described in the Lipset-Rokkan model.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The entry of extreme right politicians in the governments of some European countries in the last fifteen years has attracted considerable attention. The rise to prominence of center-right coalitions in Italy and Poland led by Silvio Berlusconi and Jaroslav Kachinskiy, respectively, represented a new development for the right wing in Europe. The parliamentary elections of 1994 in Italy and of 2001 in Poland marked a phase of electoral realignment in their political history with the appearance of a new type of parties entering the mainstream of national politics (Table 1). After the several decades of the Cold War characterized by the freezing of the party systems in Italy and Poland both international and national institutions and forces buttressed the party system when the previous underpinnings of the political party systems eroded.

Following the 1994 elections in Italy, the first right-wing administration was formed after 34 years of coalitional governments that consisted of the moderate left- and right-wing politicians (Table 2). The pre-electoral coalition of the right parties formed at the time of a confrontation between the center-left and center-right party alliances left on the background of coalition government formation the Christian Democratic groups. According to the electoral results the National Alliance (renamed neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, MSI) captured 13.5 percent of the vote and was awarded six cabinet posts. In Poland after the collapse of the Soviet political system and subsequent fragmentation of the Solidarity movement, a new party configuration emerged. After the end of the parliamentary elections held on September 25, 2005 (Table 3), the expectation among public and party analysts in Poland was that the Law and Justice (PiS) party would form a coalition with the second largest party, the liberal right Civic Platform. Both parties (the PiS and PO) had Solidarity roots, although the PiS apparently

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1 Wellhofer (2001) described the term realignment as a “fascinating case of a meltdown of a party system frozen in the postwar settlement and followed by the emergence of a new political order” (p. 156).
projected a more traditional image overall. However, the expected electoral alliance did not happen. In late October 2005, negotiations collapsed, precipitated by disagreement regarding who would be the speaker of the Polish parliament, Sejm. A stumbling block against forming a coalition in Poland seemed to be the result of the unfulfilled wish of the PO on receiving the Interior portfolio to prevent the PiS from controlling all three of the "power" ministries (Security, Justice and Interior). On November 1st 2005, Law and Justice announced a minority government headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. The minority government depended on the political support of the populist Self-Defence (SO) and the far-right League of Polish Families (LPR) to govern, a situation that made many of those hoping for a PiS/PO coalition uneasy. The constitutional requirement to form a government within a set time period also heated up the coalition negotiations. On May 5th 2006, the coalition government of the PiS, SO and LPR was formed. The analysis of the formation of the new center-right coalitions including the far-right in Italy and Poland leads me to assume that this process reflected transitional political processes in Eastern and Western Europe after the collapse of previous party systems. This is why their comparative analysis is very important for understanding current trends in European politics.

Since the beginning of the transitional periods in the two countries in the late 1980s a new group of parties has appeared in the Western European political scene. Known under different labels (far-right, radical right, extreme right), this group of parties was first represented by the Scandinavian Progress Parties in the 1970s and Austrian Freedom Party, French Front National and the Italian Social Movement. The general characteristics which unify them all are based on the ideological criteria of populist and romantic ultranationalism, a political myth of a homogenous nation which places the nation before the individual and his/her civil rights and which therefore is directed against liberal and pluralist democracy (though not necessarily in favor of a fascist state), its underlying values of freedom and equality and the related categories of individualism and universalism (Minkenberg, p. 170). However, modern far-right parties accept parliamentary forms of political competition and try to get to power through legal forms
of activity. Their electoral success increased throughout the 1990s and persisted in the first years of the 21st century. Norris (2004) points out that the puzzle is deepened by the fact that they received significant electoral support in established democracies, affluent post-industrial “knowledge societies”, and cradle-to-grave welfare states with some of the best educated and most secure populations in the world, all these characteristics should generate social tolerance and liberal attitudes antithetical to xenophobic appeals (p. 2).

The multidimensional nature of contemporary political parties’ policy objectives makes comparison of different far-right parties challenging despite their unique history, party platforms, and electoral strategies. In his analysis of the evolution of the far right in the modern period, Ignazi (2003) has identified two types of far-right parties: those with fascist associations (the old type) and those with no fascist associations but with ultranationalist characteristics and “anti-system” rhetoric/programmatic appeals (pp. 12-13). The Italian Social Movement (MSI) would fit the former type. Founded in 1946, the MSI remained out of the political mainstream for several decades as it reflected a neo-fascist political tradition and unwillingness to break up with the ideology of the national “totalitarian past”. The Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (founded in 1992) and the League of the Polish Families (2001) were widely regarded as being far-right parties without having an association with a fascist political tradition or a long history as anti-system political movements but their ultranationalist views are acute. Having different nuances in ideology and political strategy, Polish and Italian far-right parties were able to achieve the same political result – entry in the center-right coalitions. These nuances are important in understanding how the far-right parties were able to use legal sources of political activity within existing political regimes to leave their anti-system location on the national party spectrum.

The political breakthrough of the far-right parties did not seem to be inevitable. Since the end of the WWII the negative political image of the MSI in Italy barred its access in the political mainstream. Taking into account the results of a public opinion survey conducted at the end of
1974 Sani (1976) showed that despite all efforts taken by party leaders of the communists and neo-fascists to remove the anti-system stigma from their parties it still played a very important role in voters’ assessment of these parties. The Polish far-right in the Soviet period could not count on political legitimacy. Even during the 1990s they did not achieve significant electoral results. In his analysis of political radicalism in the post-Soviet Poland Braun (1997) noted that “extremist political parties do not appear to present a grave or imminent danger for the state” (p. 185). There is no reason to doubt that in the absence of highly visible and dramatic events, the negative political images of the far-right at the mass level worked against them.

In Italy and Poland the far-right parties tried to use legal framework of electoral participation to influence the process of government formation. Signing of political pacts with the center-right parties was one of the most effective mechanisms allowing the far-right to get portfolios in the national government. Golder (2006) notes that electoral coalitions are essentially proto government coalitions. They are established to signal policy preferences and offer the public a clear choice of government alternatives. On the other hand, a variety of research exists in which scholars use formal models to postulate that valence issues have the potential to affect electoral party strategies (Clark, 2006; Schofield, 2003; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl, 1987). In his formulation of the term “valence issues” Stokes (1992) points out that “parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in the public’s mind with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves” (p. 143). Temporary conflicts over particular policy issues would not have a chance to become permanent and to put down deep roots, since they would be quickly replaced by others. But when the composition of coalitions tends to remain the same over time, one would expect cleavages to become firmly established (Sani, p. 2-3).

To appreciate the potentially encompassing role of cleavages, scholars often refer to studies of democratic regimes in plural societies which are characterized by a high degree of sub-culture pluralism based on language, religion, ethnicity, geographic location or some
combination of these attributes. In such societies political parties are attached to one or another of these segments (sub-cultures) (Maor, pp. 21-22). Italy is a country with a relatively long history of parliamentary democracy and party competition reflected by numerous political subcultures. In the case of Poland I take into consideration the fact that during the Cold War era non-party and anti-party political and social organizations in different countries of the Soviet bloc were suppressed by the Communist system with different degrees of success. Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markovski, and Toka (1999) argue that the Soviet regime in Poland between 1948 and 1989 had taken a form of national-accommodative Communism. According to them, this model developed “out of the legitimacy crisis of the national communist regime, during which sustained compromises were forced from the governing power” (p. 23). Moreover, Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that Poland was the only former communist state that never actually experienced a period of totalitarian rule and, therefore, place it in the milder authoritarian rather than the post-totalitarian category (p. 255). Kubik (1994) argues that in Poland before 1989, the cleavage between the communist state and society became very pronounced and strongly influenced politics while this political cleavage (or politicized social cleavage) did not replace other cleavages but rather complemented them (p. 230). Thus, unlike patrimonial and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (which existed in other countries in Eastern Europe except Hungary), the legacy of this model has proven conducive to programmatic competition because the political support of the dominant communist regime was based on the interests of certain social groups.

At the time of the transition to democracy after the end of the Cold war programmatic competition was understood in Poland as a competition where “parties announce identifiable and differing commitments to realize binding political decisions and collective goods they intend to deliver to society” (Innes, p. 87). Because of the absence of party competition at the level of parliamentary debates between ideologically different parties, the confrontation between different political actors during the period of the Soviet regime there took other forms. Polish
author Kubik (1994) argues: “After the Communist take-over, democratic discourse was barred from the public domain. At the same time, the regime never lived up to the new set of standards it claimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. In the emerging political limbo any set of values could have become the ultimate source of standards for the political game” (pp. 253-254). The main social actor which could use these opportunities was Polish Catholic Church which became a center of the anti-communist movement. In the Soviet political system which lacked political freedom the membership of people in different social and religious groups could point at their pro- or antigovernment alignments. Belucci and Health (2007) refer to the linkage between parties and organized society, or “segmentation”. They argue that the capability of parties to penetrate or to create parallel civic organizations has been a key factor in reinforcing group identity and interest representation, so as to strengthen and perpetuate cleavage segmentation (p. 4). As Jacek Kuron, one of the leaders of the Polish antigovernment opposition in the 1960s noted, “in a totalitarian society, even preserving culture, reading literature and discussing philosophy constitute political opposition precisely because they ignore politics in a situation where the state attempts to politicize everything” (Stokes, p. 25).

This project focuses on a comparative analysis of the process of formation of governing coalitions between conservative and far right parties in recent years in countries characterized by polarized party systems and permanent conflicts between different party families. The aim is to show how the inclusion of the radical right in government coalitions in Italy (1994) and Poland (2006) reflects longstanding trends in evolution of social cleavages articulated by political actors in Western and Eastern European party systems. The far-right parties entered center-right coalitions with a difference of twelve years, after both countries experienced the realigning elections of 1994 and 2001. The switching of voter preference from the old large parties (in Italy) or coalitional blocs (in Poland) to the recently emerged new parties was accompanied by the freezing of the party systems along new lines of political confrontation of traditional left vs. right and between the new right parties over the issues related to the European integration
process. This aspect of the party system profile has attracted considerable attention in the recent past, as the proliferation of indices relating to fractionalization, fragmentation, competition, and a host of related constructs attests. The political competition related to the ideological-programmatic position of parties can be measured in terms of their positions on the classic left-right and the new Westernization - Traditionalism dimensions. The former dimension usually reflects socio-economic oppositions, precisely that of government intervention in the economy. But this interpretation of the left-right question is debatable. De Lange (2007) argues that this distinction may replicate the opposition between progressives and conservatives, clericals and anti-clericals, and even the center and periphery. However, I argue that the center-periphery cleavage can be attributed more successfully to the second dimension of political party competitions regarding the issue of European integration. I also believe that the cleavage of urban centers vs. countryside, or rural-urban cleavage was intensified in Western and Eastern Europe by the globalization process following the Cold War.

The existence of permanent social cleavages in Eastern and Western Europe throughout the 1990s was projected into new political party systems. Innes (2001) argues that if the fact of high voter volatility in transitional societies can seem to be merely superficial, stabilization in allegiance on the level of both electorate and professional politicians is instead sought in ideological blocks (p. 85). The electoral laws in the two countries (established in 1993) were supposed to facilitate the formation of pre-electoral large coalitions of parties in Italy and strengthen the positions of the new large parties of different ideological orientations in Poland. The situation of political realignment forced politicians from different party families to run the bargaining process with new and former opposition parties. It gave a chance to far-right parties to actively participate in the bargaining process. The second important factor which should be mentioned here is that the emergence of new parties and a significant shift in party identity among the electorates in some Eastern and Western Europe countries at the beginning of 1990s have generally led to political convergence within the coalitions of left and right blocks of
parties. According to the logic of this research, the rise to prominence of center-right coalitions in the two countries led by Silvio Berlusconi and Jaroslav Kachinskiy respectively represents not only a new dimension in the development of the right wing in Europe but may also constitute a model of political realignment where new cleavages are gradually substituting for the old cleavages described in the Lipset-Rokkan model. The far right parties use difficulties in political negotiations over new issues (related mainly to pro- and contra-Westernization dimension) between pro-system liberal and conservative parties and enter “political field” on the side of conservatives.

In this research I argue that the mechanism of policy formulation between prospective coalitional partners can be traced at the level of party cleavages which pre-exist the negotiation process between party leaders. The disintegration of the previous party systems as a result of the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland and the First Republic in Italy in the post-Cold War era created a vacuum partly exploited by the previous anti-system far-right parties and the new emerging ones. At the same time, a clear tendency toward the cartelization of the programmatic supply was prominent on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum.

My findings are important for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, this study introduces the mechanism of formation of the new type of center-right coalitions with the participation of the far-right parties. Second, I argue that the new center-right coalitions appeared as a result of the party cleavages over different types of social issues according to the Lipset-Rokkan model. Third, I show how decisions made at the level of party elites were reflected by the party constituencies over the long period of time since the end of the WWII.

Organization of the Research

Chapter 2 reviews in greater depth the theoretical debates and main arguments contributing to explanation of the process of coalition government formation. It also details the
objectives of this study and illustrates the problems of analysis. Chapter 3 discusses the development of the cleavage based on a classic left-right dimension (economic and cultural issues). Chapter 4 shows that the strategy of coalition bargaining at the time of the deepening of the globalization process (and the European Union integration as a particular example) has to satisfy two constituencies, one internal (party structures and electorate), the other external (challenges of the EU community), with the existence of the latter causing changes in political preferences of the former. The research concludes with a general analysis of modern trends within and between the blocks of the left and right political parties.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Although they had a relatively long history of participation in parliamentary elections, the Western European far-right parties were long kept out of public office. It was only in the course of the 1990s that they entered the mainstream of European politics cooperating with the moderate right parties in national governments.2 In 1994 Silvio Berlusconi invited the Italian Social Movement (MSI) to join his Forward Italy in coalition government. Austria was the second country to have a government in which a radical right-wing party participated. In 2000 the Austrian People’s Party formed a government with Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party after lengthy political negotiations with the Austrian Social-Democratic Party had failed. In 2002 the List Pim Fortuyn entered the Dutch parliament with 17 percent of votes and was immediately invited into the government alliance by the leader of the Christian Democratic Party. All these parties have been cabinet members and their status as coalition parties is undisputed. Moreover, there are couple other examples of radical right-wing parties that have supported minority governments in “a more or less permanent coalition that ensures acceptance of all or almost all government proposals” (De Swaan 1973, p. 85) and therefore became defacto coalition parties.

In 2001 center right minority governments survived in office due to the support of the far-right parties, the Danish People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party. Several theories provide explanations in these cases of the entry of the far-right in political mainstream.

Because the political phenomenon of “unusual coalitions”, those between the center – and the far-right, is relatively new, there is not much comparative analysis in the literature. The first, clearly pre-dominant view underlines the importance of the office-seeking and policy-seeking

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2 Far-right parties have participated in a total of ten government coalitions. The first case took place in Austria. In 1983, the Freedom Party under the leadership of moderate politician Norbert Steger entered into a coalition government with the Social Democrats. The Austrian Freedom Party had an experience of participation in government coalitions in 1983-86, 1999-2002 and 2003-05. MSI, renamed into the National Alliance, was part of three House of Freedoms coalition governments led by Silvio Berlusconi in participated in 1994-95, 2001-05 and 2008.
theories (in their several variations) in searching for party motives in forming government coalitions. Office-oriented coalition formation theories have their origin in the seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern Theory and Games of Economic Behavior written in 1944. Here coalition formation is introduced as a constant-sum game, in which a fixed “prize” (usually cabinet portfolios) is divided amongst the winners of the game. The actors that lose the game get no payoff. From this assumption it follows that the value of a winning coalition does not increase when new members are added. According to other authors (Laver, 1986; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Axelrod, 1984; Dodd, 1976), a main simple solution to the question of government formation is to form a minimum winning coalition, a collection of parties with the minimum number of seats to form a majority in the legislature. To accommodate these specific features two office-oriented theories have been developed to explain minimal winning coalitions. The minimum size theory (Riker, 1962; Gamson, 1962) predicts the formation of the winning coalition with the smallest weight. Gamson (1962) assumed that “any participant will expect other to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to the coalition” (p. 376). The bargaining proposition theory (Leiserson, 1970) predicts that the minimal winning coalition with the smallest number of actors will be formed. According to Leiserson (1970), “the members of the smaller coalition will prefer to form it, since negotiations and bargaining are easier to complete and a coalition is easier to hold together, other things being equal, with fewer parties” (p. 90). It is widely accepted that the office-seeking theories, being applicable to a wide range of coalition formation cases, give an indication of which coalition will form, but nevertheless their precision rate is low, because in particular cases they lack qualitative characteristics and cannot predict the certain scenario among numerous alternative variants. Westholm (1997) argues that “the proportion of logically conceivable empirical outcomes is incompatible with the theories’ propositions” (p. 7). Overall, the two office-seeking theories within the minimal winning theory predict less than one-third of the government coalitions in post-war Western Europe (De Lange, p. 8). Many authors agree that
in the post-Cold War political landscape in Eastern Europe the new parties had vague ideologies and few clear policy differences (Bielasiak, 1997; Lewis, 1996; Kopecky, 1995; Zubek, 1993). This is why they could construct their political strategy on the basis of pure office-seeking. Thus, it would apply in the case of Poland. But this simple logic does not fit the case of Italy. During the long history of the First and Second Italian Republics only one government in 1962 unambiguously qualified as a minimal winning coalition since substantial proportion of the government coalitions were over- or undersized.

Despite the fact that policy-oriented theories “maintain as a fundamental assumption the notion that politicians are motivated above all else by a desire to get into office” (De Lange, p. 8), they are characterized on the basis of actors’ weights and expressions of parties’ location in the political or policy space. The position of the party within this space reflects its policy objectives. According to the policy-seeking model, a leader of a winning party prefers to construct a government coalition with ideologically compatible parties (Merson, p. 534). This model assumes that policy goals, rather than pure office-seeking, underlie coalition formation, and the coalition parties tend to converge in a zone of agreement on policy or ideology (Laver and Shepsle, 1990; Schofield, 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1990; Muller and Strom, 1999).

The minimal-connected winning theory (Axelrod, 1970) predicts the formation of coalitions that are connected or closed depending on existence of actors situated at the extremes of the coalition. The reason for the connectedness of the coalition lies in the minimization of conflicts of interests. The median legislator on the left-right axis being a central player in a coalitional game inevitably controls the process of political bargaining between different actors.

The minimum range theory, elaborated by De Swaan (1973), predicts the formation of the coalition with the least “ideological diversity” understood as the distance between two members of the coalition on a policy scale. De Lange (2007) focused on the nuances of the minimal range theory drew attention to the point that in the period of bargaining between different parties two scenarios of electoral alliances are possible. The closed version of the latter predicts the minimal
connected winning coalition with the smallest policy range. In this case policy considerations have priority over office considerations and the number of parties within a certain coalition in practice cannot be large. The open version of the minimal range theory does not stipulate that parties characterized by close to the center ideologies have to be connected. It assumes instead that the most extreme parties as coalition partners should be located in closest proximity of each other (De Lange, p. 9). It dictates the logic of ideological convergence between most extreme parties - members of a coalition. According to this theory, far-right in order to be included in a government coalition with liberals have to ideologically move toward the center despite the position of conservatives.

Grzymala-Busse (2001) argues that “if only one policy dimension exists, political parties do not jump over ideological neighbors in coalition formation but if there are several relevant policy dimensions, coalition bargaining may become unstable” (p. 86). This situation can give a chance to enter government coalitions to parties which sustain extreme positions on one policy dimension but may be quite indistinguishable from other parties on some other dimensions. De Lange (2007) points out that the paramount question for political extremists is whether their anti-systemness is reflected by a party’s policy position on the left-right dimension (p. 10).

In some instances parties are excluded from the government formation process on a priority basis. Von Beyme (1985) notes that “many coalitions which might be possible would be politically unthinkable from the start” (p. 323). Some authors assume an “inherent ideological character of parties” which means that both electorate and party elites in their perception attribute parties to certain labels indicating a fundamental “ideological difference” between mainstream and anti-system parties (Capoccia, 2002). Strom, Budge, and Laver (1994) argue that anti-system parties express “fundamental and nonnegotiable points of opposition to the existing constitution, which might conflict with the policy commitments of potential coalition partners” (p. 317). Warwick (1998) notes they “appear to be regarded, or regard themselves, as “beyond the pale” no matter how distant they actually are in ideological or policy terms (p. 331). As a
result, anti-systemness seems to be a part of a system-anti-system dimension that cross-cuts the traditional left-right dimension (D’Alimonte, 1999). The anti-system parties subjected to ‘anti-pacts’ approved by mainstream parties can effectively be discounted as members of any potential government (Martin and Stevenson, 1990; Sartori, 1976). But this account does not provide the conditions that may lead to the inclusion of the far-right in governing coalitions. The logic of pure policy-seeking in coalition formation does not explain why some far-right parties in Western European countries (the Austrian Freedom Party, The Italian Social Movement, the Danish People’s Party) currently do not face anti-pacts while other parties of the same ideological family in other countries (French National Front, Belgian Flemish Bloc) are still ostracized.

De Lange (2007) evaluates the predictive capacity of five office- and policy-seeking party strategies theories (discussed above) in explaining electoral alliances between the traditional mainstream and far-right parties in Western Europe, and finds that overall they predict correctly the formation of eight out of nine government coalitions in which radical right-wing parties have participated. The minimal winning, minimal connected winning and minimal range theory scored highest in terms of predictive capacity (each six out of nine government coalitions). The bargaining proposition theory explained four out of nine, while the minimum size theory only correctly predicts one of the nine government coalitions in which far-right parties have participated (p. 22). However, the first Berlusconi government, formed after the watershed elections of 1994, has been predicted by none of the office- or policy-oriented coalition formation theories. The coalition is oversized (it did not need the Christian Democratic Centre and the Democratic Union of the Centre for its majority status) and hence is not included in the solution sets of the office-oriented theories. Since the latter political groups are the most left-leaning parties in the government coalition, they are not needed for the formation of a minimal connected winning or minimal range coalition. The inclusion of the small Christian parties in the center-right coalition has been interpreted by Warner as a “goodwill gesture”
towards the Catholic electoral constituencies of these parties but this explanation lays beyond the logic of aforementioned approaches. The formation of the 2006 government coalition in Poland following the long existence of a minority government in office and unproductive negotiations with another center-right party, Civic Platform (PO) about forming the new government were not explained by policy-seeking theories either.

In her analysis of governing coalitions in East Central Europe, Grzymala-Busse (2007, 2001) demonstrates that the main constraint in coalition formation in these new democracies is the regime divide between the parties originating from the Communist regime and those with roots in the former opposition to the Communist parties. The same logic can be applied to Western Europe where Communist parties have been excluded from government for several decades, despite their policy positions which were often closer to ruling social democratic parties. Grzymala-Busse argues that “parties perceived as a threat to the democratic system, or whose past alliances are unacceptable to the other parties’ electorates, have been kept out of coalitions” (p. 86-87). Thus, in a post-transition political party system marked by vague and overlapping policy stances, the regime divide is the most fundamental cleavage and therefore the clearest source of party identity which allows to predict results of coalition bargaining. It can be quite applicable to the analysis of the Italian political party system. The crucial characteristic of the traditional moderate conservatives’ strategy there, studied by Sartori (1976), was the existence of fault lines separating them from their neighboring competitors on either left or right. He mentioned that such fault lines were quite common in societies encumbered by highly ideologized politics where “the parties fight one another with ideological arguments and vie with one another in terms of ideological mentality” (Sartori, p. 137). Despite a certain degree of cooperation between the DC and MSI at the municipal administration level and a short time of

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3 The choice of prospective candidate from the PiS party was affected by the 9 October 2005, where Lech Kachinski, the twin brother of the PiS leader Jaroslaw Kachinski, won. Jaroslaw Kachinski had declared before that he would not become the Prime Minister if his brother wins the election
co-existence in the “governments of national solidarity” (1976-1979), with a significant role played by the PCI, two fault lines separated the DC from the neofascist right and extreme left, although the former cleavage was by far the deepest (Pappas, p. 235). The left-right dimension of the socio-economic and cultural conflicts in Italian and Polish societies influenced the formation of new lines of cleavages based on the different attitudes of the liberal and conservative parties to the European integration process. In this research I demonstrate how Polish and Italian far-right parties used the situation of ideological polarization between left and right-wing politicians. After they entered the pro-system right camp their chances to reach political consensus with one of the center-right parties significantly increased.

In the literature, the main explanations contributing to the political breakthrough of the far right in Italy and Poland are the following:

1. The collapse of large traditional conservative parties (Christian Democrats) in Italy and the precocious conservative ideology in Poland created a political vacuum in the space of the Right (Siemienska, 2006; Ginsborg, 2003; Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000; Zukrovska, 2000; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Gilbert, 1995). As noted by Pappas, “with the parties of the traditional center either gone or reduced to insignificance, the pivotal space of national politics was now up for grabs” (Pappas, p. 239). The political heritage of the Christian Democrats and electoral coalition Solidarity was divided between the new parties that emerged on the right side of the political spectrum and previous anti-system parties (the Italian MSI). During the 1990s the chief preference of the majority of conservative democrats was to abandon far-right positions and move toward the center of the left-right continuum.

2. In Italy the political convergence since the 1960s between the mainstream center–right and center-left parties (the DC and the PSI) constituted the creation of the center-left coalition formula. The existence of stable communist governments in Poland excluded the extreme right politicians from government coalitions. The crisis of the welfare policy in the 1990s led to a low demand from centrist political parties for the cooptation of the left within conservative
government coalitions (Carter, 2005; Szczerbiak, 2003; Szczerbiak, 2002; V. Bufacci and S. Burgess, 1998; Newell and M. Bull, 1997; Korbonski, 1996). “Old” party governments postponed the painful and potentially polarizing steps in socio-economic reforms, but by the beginning of the 1990s, when stiff competition and demands for deregulation from their European Community partners loomed large, it became clear that neoliberal reforms were necessary. Adoption of neoliberal monetary policies and efforts to liberalize the labor market could be undertaken only by a center-right government. As long as the door to the left remained firmly closed, the moderate conservative politicians were forced to include a number of “coalitional players” through electoral negotiations with the parties of the authoritarian right.

3. The dynamics of people’s attitudes toward democracy and the index of political interest since the 1970s have reflected the erosion of historical memory regarding anti-fascism in modern Polish and Italian societies (Paggi, 1996; Eley, 1996; Harvey, 1989). As a result, the longstanding political and cultural opposition to the far-right could no longer rally the moderate segment of the electorate. This has opened a “window of opportunity” for revitalized nationalistic sentiments to be mobilized for electoral advantage. In addition, as it is observed by Jackman and Volpert (1996), “the combination of xenophobia and populist anti-system sentiments embodies a blunt challenge to norms of tolerance in liberal democratic societies” (p. 501). In his study of the formation of the post-Cold war European political landscape Tree (1991) noted that a disturbing feature of that time was the reemergence and flare-up of endemic ethnic-nationalistic animosities and conflicts (Thee, p. 246).

4. The formation of the new political image of the far-right parties since the end of the 1980s in Italy and during the 1990s in Poland reflected a partial revision of their political radical programs and rhetoric, and led to their political institutionalization (Pelizzo, 2003; Ost, 1999; Carioti, 1996; Ignazi, 1993). In the process, extreme-right positions found a place in the mainstream political agenda, and thus accrued a degree of legitimacy. On the other hand, according to Hainsworth, the major impact of the “extreme right” in the process of socio-
economic reforms has been to force the political agenda by prompting mainstream parties “to steal their clothes” (1992, p. 21).

In this research I argue that all these factors contributed to the explanation of the phenomenon of the new center-right coalition formed in the period of realigning elections (Italy) or soon after that (Poland). However, here I assume that the political breakthrough of the far-right parties became possible because of the development of new issues related to the process of European Integration and based on the longstanding conflicts between the left and right parties since the beginning of the Cold War. I argue that the mechanism of policy formulation between prospective coalitional partners can be traced at the level of party cleavages which preexist the beginning of the negotiation process among party leaders.

Objectives of the Study

This study takes a historical approach to the development of national political party system in Italy and Poland and aims to trace the impact of the change in these countries’ main political cleavages on the formation of coalition governments of the extreme right. The conceptualization of my research is based on two main concepts: issue evolution and political cleavage.

The concept of issue evolution is well discussed in the recent literature. Because of the drastic reduction in significance of the old socio-economic and cultural issues in the last decades of the 20th century, several scholars (Rommele, Farrell, Ignazi, 2005; Koole, 1996; Inglehart, 1990) point at a general shift over the course of the past three decades away from cleavage-based parties toward modern “catch-all” ones. Kirchheimer (1966) concluded in the 1960s that the era of the mass integration party was passing. In Western Europe, where this trend was especially prominent, the shift was away from strict ideological goals toward more tactically formulated principles, new kinds of social issues, and a greater concentration upon policies that would
provoke minimum resistance in the community. It could mean that the start of the new “catch-all party” era put an end to the long historical period when social cleavages were articulated directly at the level of political party competition. Pasquino (1996) argues that during the 1990s “the shift to the “new campaign politics”, assumed as a prominence of “catch-all” party strategy, was nowhere clearer than in Italy” (Pasquino, p. 194).

In Communist Eastern Europe the key development through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was ideological stagnation. The totalitarian Communist political system in general left little space for substantive political competition over policy options in major areas such as the economy, culture or regional development. If so political strategists coming out of the most repressive regimes could hardly know which constituencies they could mobilize in terms of partisan political identities. Innes (2001) argues that in Romania, Bulgaria, and post-invasion Czechoslovakia (after the political events of 1968) the suppression of political identity other than an orthodox Communist identity took place. But unlike the patrimonial and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that existed in other countries in Eastern Europe except Hungary, the legacy of national-accommodative Communism in Poland proved conducive to programmatic competition (Innes, pp. 86, 88). Since the end of the 1980s the post-communist Eastern Europe has experienced a critical step in party development when catch-all parties emerged on the basis of already elected monolithic civic blocks. The political development of the Polish anti-communist bloc “Solidarity” reflected a pattern of this tendency. Thus, political competition in different parts of Europe seemed to move in the same direction.

It has been argued by Conti (2007) that “contrary to the rhetoric of political leaders and to the dramatization of the tones in the electoral campaign, if we only consider the programmatic supply, politics in Italy seems in actual fact increasingly more about who is better in doing things than about radically different political projects” (p. 15). Taking into consideration the process of political transition in Eastern Europe Innes (2001) noted that dismantling the planned economy, ending economic stagnation, and preparing for membership in the European Union have tended
not so much to provoke consistent left-right competition as to prove valence issues, “issues on which all parties declare the same objective but dispute each other’s competence in achieving the desired policy” (Innes, p. 85). But all the aforementioned characteristics may not be mutually exclusive. Some part of the electorate may prefer to base their choice on concrete policies, while another part may be more interested in personalities and on messages of a “marketing-type” (Frognier, p. 29). A “personal” or “trusteeship” mandate given to a political candidate can be based on an already existing image about his party.

Knutsen (1986, 1988) considered ideologies as sets of constrained political values which empirically constitute opposed political orientations and consequently value-based cleavages. In the new campaign politics formulation the value-based on ideological cleavages increases in importance and in fact is dominant in post-industrial society, and the main axis of political conflict can be portrayed as having both a general and more specific implications (Knutsen, 1988, p. 325). According to Inglehart (1966), the general idea of this post-industrial cleavage pattern in Western societies relates to the independent and causal role given to the value-based cleavages (Inglehart, p. 182-84). The latter are expected to reveal a dominant explanatory power in relation to concrete political phenomena. Cleavage theory, elaborated in the works of numerous scholars (Gosselin, 2007; Whitefield, 2002; Mutz, 2000; Kitschelt, 1995; Bingham Powell, 1976; Goodin, 1975; Horan, 1971; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Ralf, 1959) claims that the positions of political parties reflect divisions in the social structure and the ideologies that provoke and express those group divisions (Zuckerman, p.132.). The distribution of voters along the lines of cleavages filter response of party elites to new issues that arise in the agenda and forces them to adjust their political strategies in order to build a winning coalition (Marks and Wilson, p. 433).

The political cleavage concept is used in political analysis as division of voters and party elites into political blocks. Maor (2007) notes that cleavages are often conceived as issues, policy differences or political identifications related to certain long-standing conflicts in a particular
society (p. 19). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized three main connotations of the concept of cleavages:

First, it involves a social division that separates people who can be dissatisfied from one another by key social structural characteristics such as occupation, religion, or ethnicity; second, the groups involved in the division must be conscious of their collective identity and must be willing to act on this basis; third, a cleavage must be expressed in organizational terms (p. 11).

Some authors (Allardt and Personen, 1967) distinguish structural and non-structural cleavages. The first ones correspond to those differentiated social groups within which solidarity (cultural attribute) and cohesion (organizational attribute) already exist on other than purely political grounds, whereas non-structural cleavages lack this correspondence. Rae and Taylor (1970) suggest that “the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places” (p. 10). The authors argued that there are several types of cleavages worthy of study: ascriptive or trait cleavages (race, caste); attitudinal or opinion cleavages (ideology or preference); and behavioral or act cleavages elicited through voting or organizational membership. The last approach allows the study of cleavages in societies experiencing the process of erosion of social structure. Bartolini and Mair (1990) point out that the main problem is the conceptualization of cleavages. They argue that the concept lies “in its intermediary location between the two main approaches of political sociology: that of social stratification and its impact on institutions and political behavior, on the one hand, and that of political institutions and their impact on social structure and change, on the other” (p. 215). Because their synthesis is clearly difficult the concept of cleavage is often either reduced “down” to that of “social cleavages” or raised up “to that of political cleavage” (p. 215). Bartolini and Mair (1990) see the solution in dividing of the concept into three elements: an empirical element which can be defined in social-structural terms; a normative element which reflects the self-consciousness and awareness of the referent social group; and a behavioral/organizational element, reflecting the actors (individuals, institutions and parties) which develop as part of the
cleavage. From his point of view Maor (2007) argues that “the organizational focus reflects the importance of both the historical evolution of the divisions in society during state and nation formation, as well as the politicization of the divisions in order to facilitate the mobilization of the electorate during the process of democratization” (p. 21).

In my research I assume that the dominant lines of political, economic, religious, and territorial cleavages formed by the end of the 1980s in Italy and Poland could be projected on the party systems and articulated by certain political parties. In other words, examination of social cleavages should be traced in their dynamic relationship with political cleavages (Kriesi and Duyvendak, 1995). The impact of conditions of policy polarization is important not only on the characteristics of the voter but also on the characteristics of the policy choice articulated by political parties. On the other and, as it was noted by Oskarson (2005), if parties differ in their policy outlook along dimensions strongly related to cleavages we would expect the salience, or strength of these cleavages to be stronger than if the parties stand for much the same policy outlook. The latter perspective recognizes the autonomous role of parties as main players in attenuating or reinforcing traditional cleavages (p. 103). Thus, when the characteristics of individual voters are consistent with the characteristics of the political representatives then party efforts to mobilize issues re-inforce voter identification and preferences, “making them more likely to select the policy alternative that is congruent with their general view of the matter” (Sniderman and Bulluck, p. 347). But at the same time I follow the recommendation of Ekiert and Kubik (1998) that social structures of socialist countries differed from the capitalist structures (p. 98)

Now I turn to the construction of my hypotheses:

- The cleavage based on a classic left-right dimension (economic and cultural issues) led to an ideological confrontation between the traditional left and right parties in the period of Cold War.

- The cleavage along the Westernization – Traditionalism line (attitude to European
Integration, national minorities, immigration, redistribution of economic profits in internal markets at the time of the economic modernization of the 1990s) deepened the urban-rural and center-periphery divisions based on economic interests of the primary and secondary sectors of national economies. It led to the formation of conflicts between the “usual” prospective partners.

- With the formation of new political cleavages the number of prospective coalition partners within each coalitional bloc of parties became smaller. As a result, the ‘unusual coalitions’ between the center- and far-right parties were formed.

This qualitative research is generally based on the reformulation and practical application of the traditional Lipset-Rokkan approach. In “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments” (1967), Lipset and Rokkan formulated a model for structural party cleavages for the typical industrial society in Western and Eastern Europe. The main political cleavages in European democracies were defined as products of two revolutions: national and industrial. The first were one had its origin in the church vs. government and center vs. periphery cleavages (subject vs. dominant culture), while the industrial revolution gave birth to urban vs. rural (primary vs. secondary economy) and employers vs. employees cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1990) argued that “most of parties aspiring to majority positions are conglomerates of groups differing on wide range of issues, but still united in their hostility to their competitors in the other camps” (p. 91). The process of the formation of modern party families started in the 18th century and was accomplished in the last quarter of the 20th century. The scholars noted that the party systems formed in Europe by the 1960s reflected, with few exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s (Table 4). This process led to freezing of the major party alternatives in the wake of the mobilization of major sectors of new reservoirs of potential supporters (Lipset and Rokkan, 1990, p. 111). In my analysis I attempt to show how the Lipset-Rokkan approach can be adopted for the interpretation of transitional political systems in Eastern and Western Europe.

Innes (2001) points out that with the basic left-right division in economic terms excluded, it becomes extremely difficult to find a measure of different kinds of attitudes that coheres well
with anything approaching party blocs. She argues that over the years of political party transformations in different countries the major parties have been either vague in their policy statements or have changed their character enough to make the monitoring of voter shifts by block as an indicator of system stability (Innes, p. 85). I show that the transformation of the political party systems in Italy and Poland at the end of the Cold War led to the revitalization of the old cleavages between the traditional left- and right-wing parties and the formation of new political cleavages which determined the character of the new political party coalitions. This framework allows me to trace the evolution of political cleavages and to show the logic of coalition bargaining after the realigning elections.

In my comparative analysis I assume that Italy and Poland exhibit several similar systemic characteristics to be held constant in my analysis:

- similar national institutional arrangements - parliamentary republics;
- history of practice of coalition government formation;
- dominant Catholic culture and tradition of strong Catholic political parties;
- official anti-fascist moral and political consensus both at the level of public opinion and political elites after the end of the WWII;

The methodological question also concerns the information that can be derived regarding the development of political cleavages. In this research I share the view offered by De Lange (2007) who distinguishes between policy positions for which the relevant evidence is “second hand” (i.e. indirect measures based on evaluations of positions by voters, rank-and-file members, politicians, or experts) and policy positions that are “behavioral” (i.e. direct measures that are derived from the output of parties). Expert surveys constitute measures of the first type, party manifestos of the second type. De Lange (2007) also notes that the measurement of policy positions is complicated by the fact that parties can have multiple and inconsistent policy positions (p. 13). The message they send to voters is not necessarily the same one as they convey to the parties with which they interact trying to form a coalition. Even a more important point is
that policy positions communicated by one party (especially if it belongs to an ‘anti-system camp’) are not always interpreted by other parties in the intended way. De Lange (2007) argues that “this information is filtered by a complex system of psychological processes, which results in the creation of perceptions of policy positions” (p. 14). This study focuses intensively on the “second hand” sources.

In order to better understand the process of coalition government formation based on the development of political cleavages I use some survey materials to show the divisions between different groups of voters based on their perception of party images. But my concern in this study is also the analysis of objective factors that affected party elites decisions at the time of political realignment in Italy and Poland. Parties formulate political strategies by niche marketing in electoral competition in a top-down and highly abstract intellectual process. I argue that the top-down process finds support in an analysis of transitional party systems in Italy and Poland. In an analysis of political transformation in Eastern Europe in post-Soviet era, Innes (2001) points out that “once the decision to become a party had been made, elites from within these movements were free to formulate a party structure and party type unconstrained by any institutional legacies” (p. 89). In his analysis of mass political attitudes in the stable Italian society in the early 1970s Sani (1976) managed to show how voters tend to respond to the structure of political cleavages prevailing at the elite level in an earlier period. The qualitative historical approach can help to understand this logic.
CHAPTER THREE: LEFT – RIGHT DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES

Socio-economic Cleavage

Existence of a dichotomy between left and right ideologies in the 1990s both on a mass level and the level of political elites prevented negotiations on coalition formation between the new left and right parties and limited the range of coalition options. In this chapter I show that the cleavages based on a classic left-right dimension (economic and cultural issues) were characterized by an ideological confrontation between the traditional left and right parties (the PCI - Christian Democratic Party in Italy; the Polish Communist Party - the electoral alliance Solidarity). The formation of a bipolar structure of party cleavages was accomplished by the beginning of the Cold War. The opposition to Communism on a socio-economic basis led to the alliance of a wide range of parties on an anticommunist platform. However, the conflict between Labor and Capital stressed by Communist ideology remained incomplete in Poland because of the absence of a capitalist party in the communist political regime. The traditional cleavage there took a different form of a confrontation between the national working class and the communist state.

Italy

Between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, the Italian party system reflected the division of the post-war world into Communist and anti-Communist camps which were generally based on the confrontation of the Left and Right political subcultures. Bobbio (1996) pits them against each other in the following terms:

The Left values increase social equality over maintenance of social inequality… The Right values defend natural inequality and regard many social inequalities as results of ineradicable natural inequalities and increases in social equality as utopian or authoritarian efforts to eliminate natural inequality” (p 5).

On the basis of this distinction the different liberal and conservative parties can be grouped together because they accept economic inequality as a constitutive element of the societal order.

The configuration of the Italian party system and voter alignments at the time of the First Republic (based on the Constitution of 1948) reflects cleavages that were “frozen” in the 1920s. The formation of numerous parties, represented liberal, conservative and socialist political
traditions was based on the challenges to the Italian political system: democratization and the emergence of mass politics. The short time of the existence of a multipolar party system in Italy ended with the establishment of the fascist political regime from 1922 to 1943. At the end of the WWII, anti-fascist unity was paramount and was expressed in the formation of a government of national solidarity that comprised all the largest national parties. However, the forces that emerged in the post-Fascist period were broadly divided into two camps. The first camp consisted of those groups (Communists, Socialists, Actionists generally supported by the working class) that wished to enact a political and social revolution on the basis of the Resistance movement, or at least to enact a radical reform of the socio-economic order. The second camp comprised those groups (the Christian Democrats and Liberals (PLI) supported by the USA and Great Britain, the Italian Monarchy, the Vatican, the large industrial groups and the existing state personnel) that wished to retain the social status quo by resisting any structural changes to the old order (Bull and Newell, pp. 5-6). The basis of cleavage on the left-right dimension of Italian politics was set.

The largest parties representing the right and left political party camps were the DC (Christian Democrats) and PCI (Communists) respectively. The growth of political participation which arose from the Resistance to the fascist order allowed both large parties to consolidate their positions as mass-based organizations. This enabled them to exercise “a profound influence over the reconstruction of social organizations and interest groups” (Hine 1990, p. 68). The large parties captured many of social groups and, through the development of 'flanking organizations', established social networks that would serve to inculcate partisan solidarity among members of such organizations (Bull and Newell, p. 41). These strategies were particularly successful in the

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4 The most influential parties after the end of the WWI were Italian Liberal party, Italian Socialist Party and Italian Popular party.
5 The Action Party was a radical party on the left of the political spectrum, originally founded by Giuseppe Mazzini in 1953, which did not survive the period of the post-war political settlement.
6 In 1946, following king Victor Emmanuel III's abdication, his son Umberto II had to call a referendum to choose the form of state power for Italy. On June 2, 1946, the republicans won 54 percent of the vote and Italy became a republic.
parties’ subcultural strongholds of the north-eastern (controlled by the DC) and central regions (with dominant positions of the PCI). The electoral strength of the two largest parties, the DC and the PCI, was demonstrated by the fact that together they averaged 64.3 percent of the vote in the period from 1946 to 1992 (Null, Newell, p. 39). As dominant parties they represented the interests of different social groups.

Due to its domination of the Resistance movement and the Committees for National Liberation the positions of the left were strong enough (Bull, Newell, p. 41). In the ‘red belt’ (central regions), the heart of the Marxist political presence (Table 5), the Left tradition derived largely from the post-Risorgimento “red” subculture which countered the economic liberalism that characterized the Italian state since 1861, and was coupled by the effective exclusion of the working classes from conventional political participation through a sharply restricted suffrage (Gunther and Montero, p. 138). Since the end of the 19th century working-class political activity was channeled through the Italian Socialist party (PSI) and affiliated secondary organizations (trade-unions, cultural associations etc.). In January 1921, the communist activists seceded from the PSI and formed the Italian Communist Party (PCI). During the period of the Fascist political regime the PCI made illegal and had only a few thousand cadres. By 1946 it had nearly 2 million members. Sassoon (1997) argues that this “quantitative jump was so massive that it radically changed its central coordinates. The immediate priority established by its leader, Palmiro Togliatti, was to hold together this great mass of workers, peasants and intellectuals and to give it a purpose and a sense of direction” (p. 245). In the 1948 parliamentary elections, the communist party ran for elections as part of a Popular Front in alliance with the Italian socialists (PSI). The Front adopted a star as a symbol of unity and created different parallel organizations (Female Alliance, Constituent of the Land etc.) (Pelizza, 1992). Despite the official position of party leaders7, many of the former partisans and old party cadres had assumed that in the post-War

7 Renouncing a claim to a socialist revolution (because the conditions, he said, were not right) the communist leader
political order the PCI should once more take up the class struggle, stop cooperating with the other “bourgeois” parties and prepare for a socialist revolution.

The anti-communist “white belt” included north-eastern Italian regions consisting of the Catholic subculture, the area where the influence of the Christian Democrats (DC) was the strongest. Bull and Newell (2005) argue that the DC, established in 1943, “was in part a revival of the Italian People’s Party created in 1919 by the priest Luigi Sturzo but declared illegal by the Fascist regime in 1925 despite the presence of some DC members in Mussolini’s first government” (p. 34). Sassoon (1997) notes that the post-war DC has been defined in a variety of ways: as the “party of monopoly capital”, as the “party of Catholics”, as a social democratic party, as a conservative-democratic party with a popular mass base and so on (pp. 235-36). But its anti-leftist ideological component was indisputable. The political strength of the Christian Democrats was based on both internal and external resources it could draw upon to establish an electoral following in the period between the announcement of the armistice between the anti-fascist political forces on September 8, 1943 and the elections held in 1948. Due to their particularly elastic ideology the Christian Democrats managed to articulate the interest of a wide range of the anti-communist electorate relying on socio-economic stimuli. Woods (1997) points out that the DC since the beginning was a “catch-all party,” in various ways it continued to draw electoral support from different social classes and regions (p. 119). Endeavoring to accommodate different segments of the Italian society the party assumed a variety of political traditions. The “white” (Catholic) areas of Bergamo, Brescia, and Veneto reflected party orientation on family values, entrepreneurship, and order. Its record of anti-fascism allowed the Christian Democrats to appeal successfully to a working class (not strongly attached to the communist party) in the

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aspired to what was described as a ‘progressive democratic’ republic. The proposals were to locate power in a single-chamber National Assembly, which would allow the ‘will of people’ to prevail in terms of struggle for new social and economic rights (Bull and Newell, p. 7).
relatively economically advanced Northern areas of Italy8 and peasantry in the less developed southern regions. Landed proprietors and leading members of the capitalist class, who had supported the Fascist government before, found it advantageous to follow the DC’s disguised appeals to class collaboration. The party’s political authority rested on the influence of prominent political families, such as the Gava clan in Naples (Woods, p. 120). Thus, different anti-communist oriented social groups were willing to throw in their lot with the new party and had links to different factions within it (Ginsborg, p. 48-49). Much of the postwar history of the DC consisted of the difficult balancing of the diverse social base, and the party factions, more or less, corresponded to that.

The second factor that accounted for the privileged position of the DC in the post-war Italy was its reliance on the assistance of the capitalist world superpower. The support of the US government was ideological, economic and military. Its ideological component was revealed by the “letter-writing campaign” of 1948, when more than a million letters from the large Italo-American community warned voters of the dangers of a Communist victory in the approaching parliamentary election. In case this message did not get through, the US administration warned the representatives of the Italian government that all assistance under the post-war Marshall Aid plan would cease immediately in the event of the DC being defeated by the Communist-Socialist Popular Front (Ginsborg, pp. 11-16).

By 1945 both the DC and PCI represented the anti-fascist “values of the Resistance” which seemed to be integral to the identity of the new Republic (Duggan, p. 4). The Constitution of 1947 reveals the anti-Fascist concerns of its drafters regardless of their ideological allegiance. To compensate for the left-wing parties’ failure to effect a revolution, the right-wing forces did not oppose the presence of left-wing politicians in the government of national solidarity. However, there was a constant strife between the ideological opponents over specific policies

8 The Popular party of the early 20th century had ties with the country’s labor movement and the DC after the end of the WWII tried to set them up again.
and appointments. After his visit to the USA in 1947, the leader of DC De Gasperi excluded the Communists and left-wing Socialists from the government. It was a start of the exclusive policy toward left-wing politicians. During the next forty-five years the communist party was the second largest party in Italy and demonstrated the second largest result among other parties but the way to the political mainstream was closed.

Despite insurmountable ideological conflicts the PCI and DC demonstrated convergence of their positions over numerous socio-economic issues. It can be explained by a generally pragmatic policy positions of their leaders unlike political views of some lobbyist groups (the USSR, USA) staying on the background of their support. Despite the fact that De Gasperi highly appreciated the Church’s teachings, he was very well aware of the electoral dangers if the DC became a straightforward confessional party. Though the party drew its leaders, activists and voters from the ranks of the Catholic confession, De Gasperi was insistent from the beginning that the DC be quite independent of the Church in the fields of policy making and party activity. The different approaches of DC and Catholic clergy to the agrarian problem in Italy was a good example of the growth of the political independence of the party leaders on policy issues.

At the time soon after the end of the WWII the Christian Democrats and Communists had quite opposing views concerning the necessity of redistribution of land property. The PCI policy toward nationalization of the large estates in the Italian south was well-known. In 1944, when Italian peasants captured the land in the southern regions the Church depicted this as an instance of criminal behavior, mindless violence and class hatred. The peasantry was seen as an ignorant mass easily manipulated by communist agitators. The expression “Southern question” was never mentioned in Vatican documents and there was no admission that large estates had to be eliminated. As the DC began to establish deep roots in the South by formulating proposals for an agrarian reform the Church had to revise its previous position over the issue. The Church’s

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9 The PCI had the lowest percent of votes in 1953 (22.6) and the highest in 1976 (34.4).
position on the populist defense of small peasant property with its modernist undertones was modified in the late 1950s when the Church accepted the need for greater efficiency in modern farming and for larger capitalist farms – just as the DC did (Sassoon, pp. 151-52). Later the party orientation on support of the family capitalism in the South weakened the party links with the advanced sectors of Italian capitalism. The party course on strengthening of ties with the Italian labor class led to the formation of a large number of unions known as “parallel organizations” of the DC: the ACLI, an organization of Catholic workers; the CISL, the Catholic trade union; UCID, the Catholic organization of entrepreneurs and managers, etc. Some of them were supposed to compete with the PCI for popularity among the working class.

The post-war Italian Communist Party largely depended on the Soviet Union in its tactics and general strategy. The participation of the Italian communists in the government of national solidarity was criticized by the USSR for having been too keen on compromise politics (Sassoon, p. 247). However, the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR of 195610 led to the significant reorientation of the party strategy toward the “Italian road” to socialism. The PCI started developing its political ideas based on the Togliattian concept of “polycentrism”. The new approach assumed that there was no longer a single unified and monolithic socialist camp, while the process of decolonization and non-alignment meant that a number of countries rejected the logic of bipolarism. Under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, who became a leader in 1972, the party continued its ideological shift toward democratic principles and acceptance of a reformist way in pursuing socio-economic changes which were a part of Western liberal political tradition: civil liberties, freedom of the press, religious beliefs, political pluralism, etc. However, the PCI preserved a monopoly of Marxist culture in Italian politics.

The role of the PCI as the main representative of the left along with its exclusive status

10 The major event took place on the Congress is a speech by a new Soviet leader Khrushchev. He revealed the extent of Stalin’s purges which led to discrimination of the previous Soviet road to socialism. The invasion of Hungary by the Soviet army in 1956 polarized the situation and forced the PCI to choose the Soviet camp and to justify the intervention.
created a fundamental strategic dilemma for the third largest party in the party spectrum, the PSI. Having signed a “Unity of Action” pact with the PCI in 1934, the Italian Socialists (PSI) became a junior ally and electoral adjunct of the PCI. The same scenario took place before the elections of 1948. After the beginning of the Cold War the Socialists were attacked for their ties with the Communists and were under suspicion of sharing the anti-system propensities of its ally. The PSI seemed to be destined to suffer the same fate with the PCI staying in a permanent opposition. The Socialists tried to escape this role through a gradual development of its stands on domestic and foreign policy, designed to make themselves acceptable to the centrist parties and, even more, to change its image in the eyes of the moderate electorate11 (Sani, p. 14). In the years following 1956 which marked the crisis of the “orthodox” communist ideology in Western Europe the PSI moved towards a governing accommodation with the Christian Democrats, a process culminating in December 1963 with the official entry of the party into the center-left coalition. Sani (1974) points out “this reorientation was extremely costly: it involved sharp polemics with the party’s former ally, bitter fights within the PSI leadership, some losses in popular support, the alienation of the left wing which eventually left the party, not to mention the party’s abandonment of the traditional rhetoric of ’revolution. By 1963 the PSI had passed successfully a whole series of “pro-system” tests, had apparently become acceptable to three of the four centrist parties, and was re-admitted to positions of governmental responsibility for the first time since 1947” (pp. 14-15).

Hine (1979) notes that a large part of the PSI’s constituency did not support the political strategy of the party elites. The Socialists did not benefit electorally, and for the next thirty years the party remained firmly confined, through a variety of ups and downs, to the 9-15 percent range, “constantly in danger that its distinctive identity would be merged with that of its larger ally” (p. 140). Another party with the formal leftist roots, the PSDI, having been absorbed into

11 The party leaders made explicit assurances of the party’s loyalty to the democratic process and condemned strongly the terror in the USSR and the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.
the DC’s orbit, quickly degenerated into “a party of office holders and electoral opportunists” (De Grand 1989, p. 138). Thus, during the post-war decades the whole left party camp ideologically moved toward the center.

The political events which followed the adoption of the strategy of the historic compromise between the DC and PCI as main representatives of the ideologically opposing camps seemed favorable to both parties.12 In July 1976, for the first time since the break-up of the tripartite coalition of 1947 a DC Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, had to appeal to the PCI to support his government in parliament. At the local level cooperation between communists and Christian Democrats was becoming commonplace and by June 1977 a wide-ranging government program had been agreed between the DC, PCI and other parties.13

However, the grand coalition built on the basis of a “historic compromise” lasted only two years. The hardships of the national economy by the end of the 1970s caused a revision of the full employment system and the governing coalition faced numerous difficulties. Under the leadership of De Mita, the Christian Democrats attempted to present themselves as a modernizing force with a neo-liberal ideology able to support the main entrepreneurial groups in order to restructure the Italian economy in the opposite way the communists suggested. The attempts of the PCI leaders to obtain moderate wage settlements to reflate the Italian economy failed. The deep differences in the socio-economic strategy of the dominant parties could not be reconciled at a time of an international economic recession. The Moro’s group within the DC which tried to mediate with the communists was left in the minority. After the assassination of Aldo Moro by the terrorists of the Red Brigades group, the PCI appeared to be partly responsible for the terrorist activity in the country. In 1979, the Communists had to withdraw their support

12 The local elections of 1975 were a stunning victory for the PCI: the 1970 gap between the DC and PCI of nearly 10 percent was reduced to 1.8 percent. A center-left coalition was no longer possible because socialists, republicans and social democrats refused to enter into any coalition without the PCI (Sassoon, p. 250).
13 The PCI did not enter the government but the support of the center-left government made the communists part of it.
for the government of national solidarity. In spite of its legitimizing as a political actor, the PCI stayed in parliamentary opposition throughout the 1980s. It failed in its central endeavor: to break the alliance of the PSI and DC (Sassoon, p. 252).

The structure of political competition between left and right parties has undergone a number of changes over the forty five years of the existence of the First republic. In their analysis of the structure of linkages between parties and organizations in Italy Bellucci and Health (2007) focused on the competition between the left and right party blocs. The authors included the PCI and PSI in the left bloc. The Christian Democrats, PSDI and PRI were grouped in the right DC bloc. On the basis of measurement of the policy space on economic variables drawing on party manifesto data (Figures 1, 2), Bellucci and Health demonstrated that party distances over economic issues were relatively small during the First republic (particularly at the time of “historical compromise” in 1976-79). When the policy difference between the blocs decreased the level of class voting also tended to decrease, and similarly when the policy difference between the parties increased the level of class voting also tended to increase (Figure 2). At the same time the authors point out that policy polarization is not significant for the entire time period because parties’ changing emphases do not explain the inertia of the long-trend of class voting (p. 12). Despite the efforts of the leaders of the PCI to enter the political mainstream the dominant tendency of left-right cleavage prevented them.

Bull and Newell (2005) stress the point that the unavailability of the PCI as a potential coalition partner “stemmed from its self-perception and the perception of those around it” (p. 42). Though reformist in its practice, “it aimed not simply at providing the State with its leading personnel, but at its replacement (albeit by peaceful means) with a qualitatively new kind of state” (p. 42). It was not a main concern for the wide public that the PCI made a considerable

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14The economic variables included in the research were the following: free enterprise vs. controlled economy, private incentives vs. economic planning; economic orthodoxy vs. market regulation; private property vs. nationalization.
contribution to drawing up of the republican Constitution. Additionally it consistently defended it as the heritage of the entire nation. It did not make much sense for the public perspective that during the post-war decades the party became thoroughly “social democratic” in terms of its day-to-day actions in local government and the trade unions. Since it theoretically supported the idea of structural and permanent social changes, the Communist Party continued to be perceived, by both supporters and opponents alike, as anti-system and revolutionary (Bull and Newell, p. 42).

The traditional electoral images of the PCI and the DC were quite opposite. From the perspective of the Christian Democrats, the PCI was a manipulator of the interests of the working class. The DC, according to the “orthodox” Marxist position (never wholeheartedly adopted by the PCI)\(^\text{15}\), was defined as a representative of the Italian monopoly capital. However, the curve presented by Bellucci and Health (2007) shows that the ideological difference between the two blocs of parties representing the left and right was not insurmountable (Figure 1). It can be argued that since the end of the 1960s the ideological shift of the PSI toward cooperation with the Christian Democrats does not allow researchers to classify it as a potential ally of the communists, and make direct connections in their socio-economic platforms. But without doubt during the period of the First republic the left and right parties converged in their positions over socio-economic issues.

Sani (1975) used a survey conducted in 1972 (at the time of the PCI shift toward Eurocommunism) in order to check the correspondence of public images of the Italian extreme parties to democratic credentials. He found that in the eyes of their critics, the PCI has exhibited traits that have raised doubts about party willingness to abide by the rules of the game in a pluralistic society. It has been argued that, despite its surface transformation, the PCI still seemed to be a Marxist-Leninist party which did not change its long-term goals concerning revision of

\(^{15}\) After the end of the WWII the PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti, pointed out that “private capitalism in Italy was not able to develop its own mass party (something akin to the British Conservative Party) and was forced to give its support to the only mass party which could be an effective challenge to the PCI” (Sassoon, p. 236).
the social order. Table 6 shows that voters of all right parties perceived the PCI as a threat to democracy. Even the PSI electorate was split: 37.2 percent of the socialists’ supporters were ready to acknowledge the Communists as a part of democratic consensus but 34 percent were not and 28.8 percent would not give the answer. The respondents’ orientations toward a governmental coalition including the DC and the PCI, reported in Table 7, demonstrate that only Communists and Socialists’ supporters were generally in agreement with this idea. The respondents who identified themselves with the right-wing parties preferred to block the opportunity of a potential “historical compromise”. The 1972 data do not reflect the picture of public preferences at the beginning of the 1990s, by the time of the collapse of the political system of the First republic. But Sani managed to demonstrate the significant role of psychological inertia in the voters’ negative orientations to parties from the opposite party camp. The invisible confrontation between the “red” and “white” camps even after the ‘historical compromise’ of 1977 prevented the organization of constructive political dialogue between the two largest parties, the Communists and the Christian Democrats, at the level of state politics.

The division of Italian society over socio-economic issues cannot fully explain the nature of the political conflict between the left and right-wing parties. The broad ideological component of the cleavage was more prominent. The only two main political party platforms which attracted a sizable amount of voters prevented other parties from creating sizable alternatives. Since the DC and its allies knew that they were virtually guaranteed a place in government regardless of election outcomes, the collapse of a government was always more or less quickly followed by the installation of a new one composed of an altered combination of the same parties. Close to being complex constellations of interests, rather than unitary actors endowed with their own programmatic profiles, the parties found it difficult to take decisive initiatives in the most significant areas of public policy, especially in the socio-economic sphere (Bull and Newell, p. 42). As a result, the parties, linked in their opposition toward the PCI, were under little pressure to develop coherent legislative programs and develop new electoral strategies. Bull and Newell
assume that the main basis of support for the governing parties in their competition with the main party in opposition was ideological (that is, anti-communist), allowing them to establish clientele relationships with their followers. It created benevolent conditions for a political realignment which took place at the time of the election of 1994.

Poland

The particular characteristic of the cleavage over socio-economic issues in Poland is the absence of a social class of bourgeoisie with its political representatives. The cleavage between the national working class and the state became the dominant line of the conflict. In his analysis of traditional cleavages in Poland Zarycki (2000) notes that since the last quarter of the 18th century the conflicts with employers were seen in Poland as part of the national independence struggle on the “economic front” (p. 863). During the inter-war period of 1918-1939 the greatest part of Polish industry was owned by foreign capital and this fact, undoubtedly, influenced the development of the employers – employees’ cleavage in a separate political conflict.

The modern Polish state constructed in November 1918 was characterized by several deeply rooted social tensions, both in ideological terms and in relation to territorial disputes. The problems of integrating and recovering former Austrian, German and Russian territories after the end of WWI in administrative terms seemed complicated. The conflicting political orientations within Polish political elites and lack of traditions of parliamentarism prevented formation of large political subcultures as it discussed earlier in the case of Italy. Historically the main sources of disputes between different left and right-wing parties were international rather than domestic issues. At the beginning of the 20th century Polish parties took different approaches in their struggle for national independence. The right-wing National Democratic Party (1897) rejected loyalty to the portioning powers (Germany, Austria and Russia). Nevertheless, the party favored Slavic Russia against Germany and Austria. However, its leaders firmly rejected armed struggle
for independence and stressed “the value of unceasing grass roots work to build up national resources in every field of activity as a preparation for independence” (Dziewanowski, p. 57). The party leader Dmowski considered the Jews as main enemies of Polish economic emancipation. The Polish Socialist Party (1897) was the largest on the left side of the political party spectrum. Its political platform was characterized by nationalism and pro-Polish independence views. The most famous party leader Pilsudski, instead of alliance with Russia, advocated an alliance with Germany and the weakening of the Russian Empire (later the Soviet Union) by creating new states (which would form a federation) on its periphery. It could facilitate Polish security and economic development (Zarycki, p. 589). The most radical Polish party on the left was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL). It had a more pro-revolutionary ideology (in classic Marxist terms). However, the PSP and SDKPiL could not cooperate within one party alliance.

After 1918 the Polish parties still experienced the influence of the previous “ideological heritage” and could not form stable electoral coalitions. Kolankiewicz and Lewis (1988) describe the political situation in Poland by the time of the military coup staged by Pilsudski in May 1926 as a period of “sharp ideological and ethnic disagreements” (p. 10). They argue that “the consequence of Poland’s territorial and social fragmentation was an inability to construct a party system capable of producing and implementing the policies needed to tackle the country’s diverse political and economic problems” (p. 10). The authoritarian political regime of Pilsudski lasted until 1935 and the process of political party competition was frozen.

Prior and during WWII the local Polish mainstream politics encompassed different political subcultures: liberals, agrarians, Catholic clericalists and right-wing extremists. Hellen (1996) notes that as Poland was liberated in 1944-45 by the Soviet army, the communists had the cards stacked strongly in their favor (p. 106). The Red Army and Soviet security organs immediately set up to protect the Polish Committee of National Liberation in its first political acts. This was a pre-emptive action which was directed against the bourgeois Government-in-
Exile in London and the Armia Krajowa.16

Turning to the analysis of the elements of the left political subculture in Poland, it is difficult to discern a positive correlation between the strength of the various local communist parties and the modalities of their coming to power. After losing their two seats in the Sejm in 1922, the Polish Communist Party (KPP) never regained parliamentary representation. In 1926, the communists, together with elements of the military and the moderate left, supported the May political overturn organized by Pilsudski but soon after that they were promptly dispersed by the authoritarian political system. The KPP was dissolved by the Comintern (The Comintern (Communist International) was an international Communist organization founded in Moscow in March 1919. Its purpose was to expand the idea of revolution abroad). Studying the phenomenon of the subsequent political triumph of Communism in Poland Hellen (1996) points out that Poland, with its miniscule pre-war communist movement, went communist before Czechoslovakia where the party had constituted a politically relevant force for two decades (p. 102). It allows me to assume that the level of strength of the left political subculture on a mass level was not directly linked to its political articulation by a single party. In 1938, over 70 percent of the economically active population in Poland was engaged in agriculture. Rural overpopulation meant that 4.5 million peasants eked out a precarious existence. Over 61 percent of agricultural holdings were deemed to be not self-sufficient. Less than 1 percent of landholdings encompassed 45 percent of arable land which did not favor intensive exploitation. About five hundred thousands of urban population were unemployed (Kolankiewics and Lewis, p. 20). In his evaluation of generic radicalism in Polish society soon after the end of the WWII Schopflin (1993) argues that it in general favored a revolutionary change of some sort, even though not necessarily a communist one: “The substance of this radicalism should be traced back

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16 The Armia Krajowa was the largest Polish resistance organization, loyal to the Polish government in exile in London. It was formed in 1942 and incorporated most of the other Polish resistance groups (with the exceptions of communists and some far-right groups.)
to the nature of peasant belief systems. The implications of this situation for the post-war period was that there existed a sizeable section of society which was ready to think in radical categories, for whom the root-and-branch extirpation of the old elite was welcome and who were fully prepared to respond to the language of total transformation used by the communists” (p. 69).

After the invasion of the USSR by Germany in June 1941 the Soviet government in Moscow again required the existence of a communist party in Poland. The KPP’s mass membership by that time was utterly decimated that led to a reconstitution of a new party an in Warsaw in January 1942. Its core consisted of handful KPP survivors and of an “initiative group” smuggled from the USSR. In its first manifesto, the party, named the Polish Workers Party (PWP), stressed “the twin goals of national independence and social revolution, thereby breaking with the internationalist ideology of the KPP and initiating the characteristic blend of Nationalism and Leninist Socialism” (Davis, p. 91). Initially the PWP called for a Popular Front “without traitors and capitolators” but in 1943, on the Comintern’s insistence, the line softened for a while. The party was prepared to set up alliances with some more moderate forces, mainly the left flank of the Polish Socialist Party (PSS) and some leftist organizations catering to peasants and intellectuals. Talks also started with the Warsaw representatives of the Government in exile in London, and reached moderate success. Hellen (1996) notes that as the Soviet Red Army advanced, the Soviets took full control of the local communist parties and prevented them from going too far in the forging of alliances with non-communist politicians (p. 109).

Despite the fact that the KPP had announced its openness to any sort of political alliance with “truly democratic” political groups directed at the anti-Nazi struggle, cooperation between them could have only a temporary character. In 1943, Boleslav Bierut, the new Secretary-General of the PWP, had insisted that undisputed communist control over the Popular Front was more important than whether or not the socialists joined it. A new political strategy of the Polish communists was clear: ally only with weaker forces that can later be swallowed (p. 109). This strategic line was demonstrated on June 28, 1945 when the Prime Minister of the London
government, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the right wing of the Peasant movement agreed to return from exile and enter into a Provisional Government of National Unity.17

The first transitional Polish government set up in 1945 was not overtly dominated by the communists or their allies: the agrarian, socialist and communist parties had six seats each, the Catholic Labour Party three – in fact, all other parties were infiltrated by the communists. As the socialists and communists initiated socio-economic reforms following the Soviet model18 (nationalizing all factories with more than forty employees, putting production under state control, and a land reform was being implemented) Mikolajczyk found himself in the odd position of simultaneously being Vice Premier and leader of the opposition. In the plebiscite concerning most important socio-economic issues which took place in the summer of 1946 he directed his supporters to vote no to one of the three questions posed, in order to differentiate himself from the communist-dominated bloc. After some blatant vote rigging the ruling Bloc declared a resounding victory for its “three times yes” line, which demoralized the Mikolajczyk camp. The rising internal conflict within the government seemed indisputable. In the February 1947 elections the socialist-communist bloc was reported as having won four of every five votes cast. Mikolajczyk soon after was blamed as a traitor and foreign spy and had to leave the country in October 1947.

The rigid confrontation between the left and right in the Polish government started quite notably since the beginning of the Cold War. The international circumstances had a significant influence on the evolution of the political cleavage in the country. A new social system, based on

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17 Among those co-opted politicians were E. Osobka-Morawski (first Chairman of the Committee for National Liberation and then, until early 1947, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. who had led a break-away pro-communist faction of the Socialist Party before the war; the Zionist Sejm deputy E. Sommerstein; the pre-war Finance Minister Kwiatkowski; and even B. Piasecki, known as leader of the ONR and the Falanga, far-right organizations of the pre-war Poland. The latter examples clearly illustrate the length to which the Communist camp was prepared to go to ally itself with the generic right politicians. The main significance of this tactic was to lead the US and Britain to recognize the transitional government, abandoning its London rival.

18 The KPP leader Wladislaw Gomulka was the minister responsible for them, while other leading KPP figures were in charge of internal security and foreign affairs
the Soviet model that existed in the USSR, was imposed on the Polish party system. In Seton-Watson’s 1951 book The East European Revolution, a clear pattern of an active Soviet quest for domination was identified with three phases: genuine coalitions, false or facade coalitions, and ultimately monolithism or total Soviet control. Ideological consistency was the basis for the hastened streamlining of the Socialist Bloc, manifested by the novel theory of Popular Democracy as only another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Since the beginning of the Cold War on the level of political party competition we can talk about the communist subculture in broader terms naming it “the left political camp”. At a meeting in Poland in 1948 one of the Soviet party leader Andrei Zhdanov launched the “Two Camps” thesis, which called for all communist parties to “take the lead in resisting the plans of American imperialist expansion and aggression in all spheres” (Hellen, p. 103). The 1945-47 economic programs of the Polish government indicated socialist rather than communist aims. But even later social reforms were not directly copied from the Soviet model that existed in the USSR. The small number of employers was wiped out and no political debate on any subject, existing in Western democracies, was officially allowed (Taras, p. 48).

The salient feature of the regime of popular democracy in Poland that it was under the communist party supervision and guidance. Marxist-Leninist ideology posited a transitional period of proletarian dictatorship in order to ensure that the capitalist class would be swiftly liquidated and a classless society created. The dominant ideology prohibited the existence of classes and strata not yet ready for full-blown communism and, as a result, admitted the possibility of representation of their interests by “non-orthodox” left-wing political parties. As Taras (1995) points out, in crafting the communist regime in Poland an effort was made to maintain some semblance of pluralism. In its formal characteristics Poland remained a multi-party system throughout the period of the Cold War, although it had little in common with the Western standards of democracy. The so-called “facade” small parties, one for farmers (the United People’s Party) and another one for the Polish intellectuals (the Democratic Party), were
allowed to exist within the official parliament (Table 8). However, several satellite parties could not dispute the political monopoly on decision making by the ruling Communist party. These social interest organizations accepted both the supremacy of the PUWP and the validity of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The allied parties provided a type of vehicle for the official political regime: while formally subordinated to the ruling party, they and their media could propagate the fine-tuning of the system according to the preferences of their respective constituencies: rural-agrarian and liberal intellectuals. But besides the left-wing “puppet parties” two Catholic groups, Znak and Pax, were also allowed to be represented in the Sejm. However, all abovementioned political groups could not claim to be virtual representatives of political competition over socio-economic interests.

The real competition between different interest groups can be traced on the societal level. Within two years, the Polish party system was fully consolidated under the complete hegemony of the renamed Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) after finally amalgamating with its main political allies – the Polish Socialist Party (Grzybowski, p. 40). As the party strengthened its hold on power, membership rolls expanded to some 1.3 million by the end of 1948 (Rupnik, p. 117). Seeking to strengthen its links with society, the party leadership decided both to enlarge the membership and to broaden its social base. The absorption of the Socialist Party accounted for a large portion of the influx. The majority of the new members had not been closet communists before – a large portion of the new membership had a peasant background and was eager for social advancement. During the 1960s the net growth of the party averaged in excess of 7 percent per year and exceeded two million party members. However, the share of the workers among party members permanently decreased and during that time the percent of white-collar members

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19 Znak (the “Sign”) was a Catholic group that agreed to cooperate with the new regime. Its origins lay in the publication by lay Catholics of the newspaper Tygodnik Powszechny (“Universal Weekly”). In 1957 a group of independent Catholic deputies was elected to the Sejm with the party’s approval.

20 Pax is a Catholic organization formed in 1945 by Boleslaw Piasecki and admitted to the Sejm in 1957.
exceeded it (Table 9). The recruitment drive was also added by the use of political patronage, especially in the areas to the East of the Oder-Neisse line annexed from Germany. These territories were for all practical purposes treated as a communist colony, where non-communist parties were unable to establish even a toe-hold (Schopflin, p. 67). With the establishment of the regime the system organization of the State led by the Communist party was built through the network of local party units. The PUWP developed a pyramidal structure in which the primary, occupationally centered, organizations were politically and administratively subordinated to the territorially-based town and district committees. These, in turn, were responsible to the provincial committees which were controlled by the central organs of the party. Weydental (1978) argues that having grown from a socially marginal radical group with strongly anti-governmental traditions, the communist party was singularly ill-equipped to take over the management of the entire country. From the beginning it had suffered from an acute shortage of qualified manpower capable of generating popular support for the party directives and positive cooperation with from various social strata and interests (p. 48). The party response to the challenge of a legally organized “puppet” political opposition was quite calm. Anxious not to antagonize the population whose preferences could not be overall controlled and filtrated by the existing party structures, the dominant regime accepted the emergence of several political parties with a general left-wing orientation.

At the same time, several potentially oppositional centers focused on socio-economic issues still existed. Dissident liberal intellectuals were the only one social group which could provide salience for different kinds of issues. In 1964 a campaign against critical intellectuals was launched. Hellen (1996) points out that “by 1965 Gomulka had proven a disappointment to liberals and conservatives alike, and Polish society began a descent into centrifugality and instability. Most visibly it took the form of a Kulturkampf between, on the one extreme, the revisionist historians and the artistic avant-garde on Central Europe’s most vibrant cultural scene, and, on the other, the hard-line so-called “Partisans”” (Hellen, p. 137). The social
demonstrations which took place in March 1968 seemed to be a dangerous step, considering the stability of Party hegemony. For the liberal intellectuals it signified their final disillusionment with the Party’s ability to self-transform. Hellen (1996) assesses this moment as a start of “anti-politics”, the project of the anti-party groups to create autonomous structures not only outside the ruling party, but ignoring altogether traditional forms of political opposition (p. 139).

The creation of the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) in 1976 was crucial in a number of ways. The membership of the organization included many well-known dissidents who had served an apprenticeship in the opposition (Jacek Kuron, Jan Lipski, Adam Michnik, Karol Modzelewski). Their main mission was to synthesize the struggle for the worker’s rights with the ideas of the civil society among different social groups. The establishment of the KOR gave other intellectuals the confidence to organize anti-system movements as well. A Committee for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCIO) which can be characterized as a “Flying University”, offered occasional lectures to students by liberal dissidents. A nationalist Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) supported the revival of the Polish national consciousness “under the pressure of the regime”.

In his characterization of the political opposition in communist Poland Ascherson (1993) used a term “forum politics” to capture different anti-system political movements. Their main ideological platform was based on: an emphasis on human rights; nonviolent methods; the vision of a self-managing civil-society functioning independently of the state; belief that such a civil society could be constructed even before the communist system was replaced; stress on the importance of cross-national activity in the development of civil society; advocacy of social liberalism, thereby distinguishing forum politics from positions held by the Catholic church; the frequent Marxist pedigree of practitioners, who were either the offspring of communists or had

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21 As a result of student protests in February 1968 the disturbances were used as a tool to intensify the campaign against the Polish Jews. Many Jews in the Party, armed forces, bureaucracy and academia were dismissed as “revisionists” or “Zionists” and urged to emigrate.
themselves been critical Marxists, and the third-way ideals that made forum politics often skeptical of Western capitalist models (pp. 225-226). The most important social mission of the liberal social groups (the KOR, first of all) was that they not only unified different discussion groups represented by dissident intellectuals, but became an important source of support for the Polish workers. When interfactory strike committees were set up in the summer of 1980, the KOR became a critical channel for communication across the country (Taras, p. 106).

The rise of social protest by the working class was the second important force in the deepening of the socio-economic cleavage in Poland. The workers’ groups remained the major area of political self-organization not controlled by the ruling party. Despite the fact that the Communists announced the establishment of a political system most beneficial for the working class, Poland experienced several labor protests, usually suppressed by force (1956, 1970, 1976, 1980 etc.). As early as in 1956 workers in Poznan who were dissatisfied with an increase in work quotas staged a riotous strike which was put down by tanks. By that time the old hard-liners in charge of the Party had for some time been attacked by a more liberal grouping for their lack of understanding for the plight of ordinary working people (Hellen, p. 130). The return of Gomulka to the position of First secretary became the first step on the “Polish Road to Socialism”. Apart from the national assertiveness he propagated, Gomulka insisted on the need for lessened repression, increased tolerance of criticism and more autonomy in the economic field. 22 But despite all initiatives taken by the government, by the end of the 1970s the state was in effect bankrupt and shortages of foodstuffs, medicine and fuels became evident. In August 1979, the Gdansk workers organized new strikes that swept both the Baltic coast and the Silesian mining and industrial areas. This time the government had to negotiate. The Party Central Committee dismissed Gierek and appointed a Party leader Stanislaw Kania, a politician widely seen as a compromise candidate. The way for a dialogue with the opposition not only on economic, but

22 The socio-economic initiatives of the new party leadership advocated a scaling-down of investments in heavy industry.
also political concessions was open. On August, 31st, 1979 Walesa signed the documents legalizing the Solidarity trade union which became the oppositional center of political activity. Within months it developed into a mass movement with ten million members from all strata of society (Hellen, p. 148). The bipolar structure of Polish politics was finally clearly articulated.

The social unrest of the industrial working class in Poland resulted from two countervailing processes: its rapid expansion in the first two decades of communism and the blocked avenues for its further upward mobility by the mid-1970s (Taras, p. 100). Economic and, increasingly, political mobilization of workers in the 1970s challenged the system to respond to their distributive and participatory demands. Goodwyn (1991) argues that whereas the establishment of the KOR in 1976 was a “milestone in self-organization” there were earlier efforts undertaken by workers to engage in political action: “The mystique created around KOR had the effect of concealing the much more instructive workers dynamics that actually undergirded the remarkable mobilization of civil society” (pp. 386-387).

A number of sociological surveys, particularly those conducted under the less restricted conditions of 1980-81 have shown a large social protest potential, especially exposed by the Polish working class. Jones, Bealmear, and Kennedy (1984) presented data (Table 10) from 1975 in comparison with 1979 (after the formation of the KOR and Solidarity) on the issue of the public evaluation of socialism’s ability to perform adequately as a socioeconomic system. As can be seen from the polls conducted from the mid to late 1970s, public attitudes tended to be negative. In response to the question “How does socialism work out in practice in Poland – very well, well, badly?” the percentage given a positive evaluation fell from 22 to 15 percent, while negative evaluation increased from 58 to 72 percent. The feelings of political indifference created a problem for the formation of organized protest movements. However, the role of labor organizations in the formation of people’s attitudes toward different forms of organization of social protest was prominent. Public opinion surveys conducted in the 1970s confirm that feelings of injustice were predominant that time. In 1972, the Central Committee of the PUPW
commissioned a study on workers’ political attitudes, based on a sample of 2,800 workers from large factories throughout Poland. The study found that workers favored illegal methods for resolving conflicts with the authorities: 40 percent favored strikes, 20 percent, absenteeism; 11 percent, slowdowns; and 9 to 10 percent, industrial sabotage. Only a tiny minority felt that the trade unions were an effective means to solve such conflicts. Both the party factory committees and the trade unions were viewed overwhelmingly as an apparatus for mobilizing workers to achieve the party’s aims. The results of the poll also showed a correlation of critical views with high skill and pay levels (MacDonald, p. 3). At the beginning of September, 1980, only 60 percent of respondents said that they expected social, economic, and political improvements to result from agreements between Solidarity and the state authorities (Jones, Bealmear and Kennedy, pp. 145—146). But the major gain perceived by the population was clearly that of the development of new trade unions (Table 11). It was especially true of those with most and least education. The authors argue that it can be a result of the former considering the likely general political and social consequences of this, and the latter seeing it as a gain in power by workers to pursue their own interests (p. 147). Thus, the independent trade-union Solidarity was perceived as a main representative of the working class in the socio-economic conflict with the state.

A 1984 research survey presented by Sarapata (1992) allows to assume what social groups were more prone to critical assessment of the socioeconomic situation in Poland. Sarapata developed an eleven-level scale to measure respondents’ satisfaction with such factors as income, housing, food supply and leisure time. The survey demonstrated that the values of satisfaction with life were above the mean for white-collar workers and peasants and below the mean for skilled and unskilled workers. Whereas two-thirds of unskilled workers and peasants mentioned alcoholism and laziness as being the root of Poland’s crisis, skilled workers were prone to blame the authorities as often as they did society. By contrast, the intelligentsia (those with high education) most frequently cited economic mismanagement and autocracy as causes of the crisis (Sarapata, pp. 98-103). It is hardly surprising that workers and intelligentsia found
common ground to organize politically. Taras (1995) argues that similar understanding of the reasons for the social crisis of communism, mass political alignment separated both skilled workers and the better educated Poles from the nomenklatura - party officials and the party-appointed managerial class – and from the peasantry. In a comparative Polish-French sociological study conducted in the spring of 1989 Rychard (1992) found that “Polish workers perceive themselves as the main actors of change more often than other groups and more often than French workers” (Rychard, p. 176).

The Martial law of 13 December 1981 signed by the new state leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski had little support in Marxist-Leninist theory. Kolankiewicz and Lewis (1988) argue that Jaruzelski’s coup was designed to enhance central leadership control within the party, neutralize the political influence of Solidarity and implement major price rises, particularly for food production (p. 148). The name of a new institution of state power – a Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) was not associated with the communist political regime. Davies (1986) points out that the coup itself was proof that the Party had lost its ability to govern because it “had collapsed at the culmination of a long process of decay, which had been sapping respect for its corrupt leaders, its failed policies, and its irrelevant ideology for years” (p. 22). The attempts at economic reform by the Jaruzelski regime did not seriously altered the orthodox, centrally-planned economic system. However, as Gerrits (1990) argues “the traditional dilemma remained: economic reforms needed active, enterprising citizens while political stability demanded passive, docile subjects” (p. 7). The efforts to generate institutionalized mass support through the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) or the official trade union (OPZZ) failed. The left political subculture – the basis of government support for several decades – could

23 The Martial law was active until July 22, 1983. The anti-system political movements (Solidarity and other, smaller organizations) were officially delegalized. After establishment of the martial law Poland did not experience the scale of social terror seen in Czechoslovakia after 1968, however a curfew was imposed, the national borders were sealed, and road access to main cities was restricted. Mail was a subject to censorship.

24 Jaruzelski had been a member of PUWP since the WWII, but he nevertheless managed to project himself as foremost a Polish patriot.
exist only around the communist party. However, by the end of the 1980s it was almost completely discredited in the public mind and seemed to be responsible for the socio-economic tensions in Polish society. Party affiliation was not only a status lacking in attractiveness but also a socially divisive factor identified as a source of social antagonism by nearly a third of those questioned in 1987 (Table 12). The survey data clearly demonstrate the coexistence of socioeconomic sources of social tensions (earnings, material possessions, distribution between manual and white-collar work) with dissatisfaction with official political actors (PZPR and the abstract ‘power institutions’). At the same time, the role of conflict over faith and religious practice in 1987 was not very high (17.5 percent of respondents mentioned it) but not low as well.

In her analysis of the socioeconomic situation in the period of the economic transition Kolarska-Bobinska (1994) argues that the 1980s witnessed an increased acceptance of non-egalitarian values in Polish society. During the next decade the change in the structure of ownership, growing unemployment together with the simultaneous rapid increase in the number of new private enterprises, the unprecedented boom in the commercial sector, bankruptcies (as a negative feature of the transitional period) started shaping both the new character of the entire economy and the position of various groups in the labor market (p. 110). The author notes that the attitudes of various social groups toward privatization were of key importance to the formation of social alliances. It was supported mainly by people with higher education, professionals, private entrepreneurs, managers and young people. However, less advantageous social groups preferred stability to the “unpredictable” consequences of capitalism. The logic of these people was formulated this way: “Formerly everything was clear: we had a government and bureaucracy which were against us while we were against them. Matters did not stand well, but we knew precisely how they were and what we could expect” (Kolarska-Bobinska, p. 123). In 1990, 50 percent of respondents employed as professionals declared that they would like to engage in starting up their own business, as compared to 26 percent of skilled and 20 percent of
unskilled workers (Kolarska-Bobinska, p. 123). While market-type solutions encountered increasing support, a high proportion of Polish society declared its loyalty to the achievements of state socialism, highlighting employment security, state price controls and social services (Wydra, p. 123). The patterns of general public attitudes in Poland towards the political past of Communism reflect the interesting trend. The positive thinking about the former regime reached a peak very soon. In 1992, 42 percent of Poles had in different degrees positive evaluations of the Communist political system before 1989. Between 1992 and 1996, the group of people with positive evaluations of the former regime shrank to 25 percent. By 1998 the general social attitude ameliorated up to 30 percent of “nostalgie” people (Haerpfer, p. 12). Despite the previous disappointment in the communist party and the dominant socio-economic system the left political subculture managed to remain strong enough during the 1990s.

The differences between opposite mentalities on socio-economic issues were soon represented at the political party level as a conflict between egalitarian socialist political philosophy and pro-liberal ideas of the parties of the Right. The old socio-economic cleavage in the communist period between the Polish working class and the state on the level of social consciousness has been transformed into a cleavage similar to Western practice, one between new capitalists (and right parties as representatives of their interests) and workers whose needs were articulated by the new left (SLD). However the old confrontation between the Solidarity and the communist party took new forms in the 1990s.

The fall into illegality as a result of the trade union law of October 8, 1982 and the emergence of the official communist trade union OPZZ became an obstacle to Solidarity’s enterprise activities. Moreover, Wydra (2000) notes that the underground position of the Solidarity between 1981 and 1989 entailed a virtual suspension of experiences of collective identity. The author argues that during 1983-84 “the we-image of we-Solidarity evaporated into a broad image of generalizations such as the slogan “we the Poles”” (p. 139). However, a persistent myth of unity kept the underground Solidarity as a “monolithic collective subject”
(Szacki, p. 718). After its reappearance as a legal political force in 1989, Solidarity managed to stay united only for a brief period of time, splitting eventually into a swarm of political groupings. The three major currents within the movement were Social-liberal/ Social-democratic, Christian-democratic/conservative (with strong nationalistic and anti-communist overtones), and Trade-unionist (radical and looking to the state as a guarantor of employees’ rights). (Wasilewski, Betkiewicz, p. 33). The further evolution of the different trends within the political brand Solidarity depended on the new socioeconomic and political conditions of the Polish republic starting with 1989.

The historical development of the socio-economic cleavage between the state and the national working class in Poland influenced the public perception of the Solidarity movement. It became appropriate to distinguish between an “old” and a “new” Solidarity within one political movement. The first one (formed in 1978) represented the socio-economic interests of workers (first of all, skilled workers) and acted as a large independent labor union suppressed by the Martial law of 1981. The second “legalized” Solidarity was still organized as a trade union but at the same time, during the last month of the Communist regime, it enjoyed the political support of numerous social groups unified in their opposition to the Communist party. Thus, a “second” Solidarity acted as a wide anti-communist electoral alliance of politicians with different political orientations (from extreme right to anti-communist left). However, contrary to the evolutionary process of disintegration of the “second” Solidarity after 1989, the ideological animosity between the leaders of Solidarity and the former Communist regime blocked any possible cooperation with the socialists as political heirs of the latter.
Cleavage of Secularized Society vs. Clericalism

The role of the second important factor stressed in Rokkan-Lipset’s analysis of traditional political cleavages, religion, is relevant to Polish and Italian reality during the Cold War period. Religion plays an exceptionally important role in both countries. Consequently, the influence of the Catholic Church, both in Italy and Poland, is one of the main mechanisms of cultural consolidation. After the separation of church and state (which happened in Italy after the formation of the national state in 1861 and was completed by the Communist regime in Poland) there was a conflict between secular and religious power. The conflict between communist ideology and the Roman Catholic Church after the beginning of the Cold War that continued in the 1990s influenced the positions of the right parties against prospective coalition alliances with the left parties.

Italy

The overwhelming majority of Italians are Catholics. But, as Bull and Newell (2005) argue, in the 20th century Italy a politically significant social division was seen between “those for whom religion is a matter of active reference to their faith and those for whom their religious self-identity is a purely nominal affair or who, in spite of their nominal self-identity, are outright opponents of the Church on many issues” (p. 64). The questioning of the role of religion in Italian politics has roots stretching back to the foundation of the State. The conflict between secular and religious subcultures has to a large extent a historical explanation. As a result of the unification in 1861, the Church was deprived of all of its territories in the peninsula by the newly formed Italian state. The Church therefore refused to recognize the secular institutions and forbade Catholics to participate in Italian politics. However, with the rise of socialism in the first quarter of the 20th century and the threat to its moral authority that this posed, the Church initiated the formation of the Catholic People’s Party (1919). The latter was supposed to compete with the secular ideology of the left political movement for the allegiance of the newly enfranchised masses.25

During the period of the Fascist regime the Roman Church was able to secure its long-

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25 In 1912, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti initiated electoral reform which established universal manhood suffrage.
term influence on Italian affairs by negotiations with Mussolini and the signing of the Lateran Treaty. As a result the Church was not only able to counter the totalitarian pretensions of Fascism, but was enabled to emerge as one of the most powerful social institutions at the war’s end. Bull and Newell (2005) argue that the collapse of the Fascist state, and German occupation of most of the country by the end of 1943, “created a void in which the Church and the Resistance movement became the only points of reference and of contact for Italians who had no other authority to whom to turn except the Nazis and Fascists. The Church, having deep roots in civil society, through its parishes and collateral associations, became a rallying point for working out ideas and attitudes. On the other hand, popular backing for the Resistance, dominated as it was by the Communist Party (PCI), gave to the latter authority and legitimacy” (p. 65).

For nearly twenty years since 1929 the Catholic Church was the only official alternative to fascism. In a largely rural society where over 40 percent of the active population by the end of the 1940s was engaged in agriculture, low levels of geographical mobility and relatively undeveloped state provision in areas such as sickness and old age meant that the Church, with its myriad collateral associations was bound to be the most significant organizational presence in the daily lives of citizens. It facilitated the provision of an organizational home for political and intellectual cadres who became the leaders of the post-war DC. The emergence of a single Catholic Party, the DC, in 1943 was possible because of the intention of the Church to enter the political field to preserve its interests. Since its foundation the Christian Democratic Party could rely on all kinds of support from the Catholic Church. The Vatican provided the DC with the more than two million members of the Catholic Action, the 25,000 members of the clergy, and in 1948 the 300,000 army of the “civic committees” organized by Luigi Gedda, a leading figure

26 The Lateran Treaty and the Concordat signed between the representatives of the Catholic Church and the Italian government in 1929 presented the former an official sovereign status (the ‘City of the Vatican’), made religious instruction in schools compulsory, established Church jurisdiction over marriage, provided for state financing and of the priesthood, and stipulated that, as long as the Church abstained from political involvement, Catholic Action and the Church’s other lay organizations could continue their educational, cultural and recreational activities.

27 Catholic Action was founded in 1867 as the Society of Italian Catholic Youth, with the purpose of involving laypersons in the life of the Church through proselytizing activities and charitable works.
in Catholic Action (Bull and Newell, p. 40). The organization Catholic Action became increasingly political. The forms of mass devotion were transformed from purely religious and local to semi-political and national.

The major opponent of Catholicism was anti-clericalism which also had traditions among the Italian middle classes dated from the period of Risorgimento.28 The positions of anti-clericalism were strengthened by Marxist ideology. Central Italy was a heartland of Marxist subculture. However, the organizational capacities of the post-war Italian anti-clericalism were not strong enough. Its main political expression, the Action Party, was politically weak and evaporated after the parliamentary elections of 1946. The Italian communists were ready to put up with some of the Church’s demands. At the time of the debates on the project of the new constitution the PCI voted in favor of the inclusion of the Concordat in the new official document. But this political success did not prevent the ideological polarization between the two dominant subcultures, Catholicism and atheist Marxism.

Sassoon (1987) points out that the Church never officially accepted the doctrine of a single party for the Catholics and the Pope never explicitly told the faithful to vote for the DC. However, according to De Gasperi’s diaries, on 12 November 1946 he received the visit of “an important member of the Vatican hierarchy” who told him that any cooperation with the anti-clerical parties (i.e. the PCI and PSI) could no longer be tolerated (p. 151). The Pope intervened in the 1948 elections instructing Catholics to vote for candidates prepared to defend God’s law and Christian doctrine (p. 150). By that time De Gasperi as a party leader not only won his battles within the party (particularly the leader of the left-wing faction Giuseppe Dossetti) but also managed to prevent the formation of an alternative Catholic Party (the Party of the Christian Left). The anti-leftist platform of the DC was clearly articulated.

In the immediate post-war years the Vatican frequently exploited its spiritual power for

28 Risorgimento is a 19th century revolutionary movement for Italian unification. The ideology of Risorgimento was based on the ideas of the French Revolution of 1789.
explicitly political objectives. After the exclusion of the Italian communists from the coalitional government and the victory of the DC in the 1948 elections Pope Pius XII made his most important statement on communism. Vatican decree of July 1, 1949 was directed against members, supporters, and followers of Communist parties. It prescribed exclusion from the sacraments for “conscious and voluntary membership in the party, support for it, and the reading and dissemination of its publications” (p. 152). The harsher penalty of excommunication (on the ground of apostasy) was imposed for those Catholics who “espouse the doctrine of materialistic and anti-Christian communism” (Cviik, p. 95). One month later the Church explained that excommunication would apply not only to those who joined or supported the PCI but also to any of its associated organizations or allies including the trade union CGIL and the PSI (Sassoon, p. 151). Ginsborg (1990) notes that fear of communism led Cardinal Siri, archbishop of Genoa and head of the Italian Episcopal Conference, along with other members of the episcopate to warn the Italian electorate that it was a moral sin to vote “for lists and candidates who do not give sufficient assurances of respecting the rights of God, the Church and mankind” (p. 117).

At the time of the inclusion of the Socialists characterized by their pro-American and anti-communist views in the center coalition with the Christian Democrats the position of the Vatican was still rigid. In April 1959 the Holy See reminded Catholics that it was forbidden to vote for Marxist parties and asserted that it was similarly forbidden even to vote for those which might call themselves Christian, but in fact helped the communists or cooperated with them (Sassoon, p. 152). The center-right coalition was the only one possible alternative to the left.

In May 1960, the Church attempted to establish its supremacy in state affairs by enunciating the “basic points” of the Christian teaching: the Church must guide the faithful in both ideas and practice; the Church cannot be politically neutral; the Church must be the judge of whether political cooperation between the faithful and non-believers was permissible; the Church cannot allow believers to cooperate with Marxists. However, at the Eighth Congress of the DC, on 27 January 1962 the party delegates surmounted the Church “veto” for cooperation with the
socialists. Sassoon (1987) notes that by 1962 the strategy of the DC was determined by political, not religious considerations.

The efforts to weaken the cleavage between religion and secularism were taken by the new Pope John XXIII when he promised to distance himself from Italian political affairs. The next step was the adoption of the 1963 encyclical which opened up the possibility for a dialogue with socialism. It made a distinction between “false ideologies” (i.e. communism and Marxism) and the political movements they inspired (the actual communist movement). The Pope argued that political and social movements, unlike doctrines and ideologies, are never static. The former can change with history. Eight years later, in 1971 Paul asserted that no single social system could be derived from the “social doctrine” of the Church (Sassoon, p. 153-54). This statement could lead to the argument that Catholics could be active in various political parties.

The traditional ideological conflict between Catholicism and left political ideologies took public attention from another more general dimension of the cleavage. The important encyclical Populorum progressio (March 26, 1967) declared as incompatible with Christian principles a system which puts at the center of everything the pursuit of private profit and competition. The emergence of new social issues made the problem of pursuing one cohesive strategy by the DC and Catholic Church more relevant. In 1970, the parties of the center and the left had legalized divorce. The Vatican strategy tended to seek a modification of the law and the Pope had expected that the DC would act as a mediating force with the pro-divorce parties. However, the DC took a more intransigent anti-divorce stand. The Catholic hierarchy criticized the decision of party leader Fanfani to use a popular referendum to abolish the divorce law because it would cause a religious split even within the anti-communist subculture. During this campaign many leading Catholic intellectuals fought openly on the side of the divorce parties and forged new links with the parties of the left, particularly the PCI.29 The results of the referendum held on 12

29 The longstanding result of the conflict within the DC over the issues of the 1970s was a split of the party into two
May 1974 fixed the victory of the pro-divorce groups. Clearly a large number of Catholic voters supported the lay position. It has been estimated that 16 percent of the DC electorate voted in favor of divorce. After the defeat Fanfani noted divisions within the Church and his own party (Sassoon, p. 154).

On the wave of the emergence of new social movements many young Catholics began to construct for themselves new organizations outside the control of the DC. Some of them were more conservative than the official religious institutions. Communione e Liberazione, a 70,000-strong movement of young people was founded in the North and Center Italy in order to resist modern capitalism and technical progress (Sassoon, p. 156). By 1975-76 the leaders of the Christian Democrats feared that the party lost its monopoly over the Catholic representation. Since the 1970s the DC could no longer rely on the political role of the Church. The majority of the believers still perceived the DC as “the party of the Catholics” but only as an instrument which was more likely than others to implement their wishes.

In their research Bellucci and Height (2007) inspected the relationship over time between religion and vote compared to the level of religious-secular policy polarization. The authors stress the point that the levels of religious voting in Italy have historically been much higher than class voting (Bellucci and Height, p. 14). Figures 3 and 4 depict the trends over time for the association between religiosity and vote compared to the policy difference between the blocs of the left (PCI, PCI) and right parties (DC, PLI, PRI, PSDI) on religious-secular issues. It demonstrates very little sign of any correlation. Moreover, the authors argue that the dramatic decline in class and religious voting in 1994 cannot be attributed to changes in the mobilization strategies of the parties because “the religious issues were expressed in the electoral arena to more or less the same level as previously, but none the less the level of cleavage voting sharply declined” (p. 14). Bellucci and Height (2007) turned to a measure of the long-standing links groups (the Italian People’s Party (PPI) and Christian Democratic Center (CCD) which joined left and right party blocs in the 1990s.
between associational organizations affiliated to the historical social cleavages on the one hand and the political parties which represent these groups on the other. Figure 5 demonstrates that the level of church penetration in the centre has historically been very high. In 1963, 71 percent of the members of parliament (MPs) from the DC had an affiliation with the Catholic Church, compared to just 1 percent from the Left (Bellucci and Height, p. 15). Even though there is a relatively high level of union penetration in the center bloc it represents mostly shared penetration (together with contacts with religious civil groups) while there is a high percent of the left MPs (more than 90 percent) who are associated with unions only. The researchers can argue that the structure of alternatives has changed over time. Since the transition to the Second republic there is a clear change in the organizational base of political parties. By 1994 there is a sharp drop in the “Catholic only” penetration and combined Catholic and union penetration in the bloc of the center, but also a sharp drop in the union penetration in the left. Bellucci and Height (2007) point out that whereas the old DC bloc was characterized by close ties with the Church, and to a lesser extent with the unions, the Berlusconi center-right bloc that emerged in its wake does not have the organizational base of the DC because Forward Italy was made up of businessmen and professionals who do not have these links with organized society (p. 16).

Since the 1960s the process of secularization of the Italian society caused continuous change in the propositions on either side of the religion/secularism divide. In 1956, 69 percent of the adult population claimed they attended church at least once a week. This can be compared with 37 percent in 1976 and 30 percent by 1990 (Bull and Newell, p. 64). Bull and Newell (2005) explain this dynamic based on an analysis of the level of economic growth from the 1950s and ensuing urbanization, greater privacy and new leisure opportunities, new mobility, and weakening of local attachments. The DC was faced with the dual problem of a decline in the size of its principal support group in conjunction with a decline in the propensity of the remaining members of the group to vote for the party.

Bellucci and Height (2007) managed to demonstrate the role of cross-cutting pressures
that Italian voters faced since the 1960s. In proportional representation of votes between different social groups of the electorate (Figure 6) there is no significant difference in class preferences between practicing Catholics from the middle and working classes but a somewhat large gap between religious and secular voters from the same social strata. Thus, party mobilization strategies of the two blocs of parties depended upon the voters’ location in the Italian dual cleavage system. Voters exposed to reinforcing pressures along class and religion cleavages in the 1990s were more responsive to somewhat different and mutually consistent party policy platforms, than voters who are exposed to cross-cutting pressures. The religious cleavage, through cross-cutting trend with the class division explained the fact why voters with the same economic interests found out that they failed to share them. Bull and Newell (2005) presented this dilemma this way: “Workers who attended mass regularly might feel that to give support to the traditionally anti-clerical forces of the left would be to do violence to their religious outlooks, and hence levels of ‘working-class solidarity’ in voting would be correspondingly reduced” (p. 70).

The cross-cutting cleavages, along with the gradual secularization of Italian society, influenced the conditions of the electoral campaigns in the 1990s. The share of the electorate that experienced cross-cutting pressure was large enough. It hampered party appeals to traditional socio-economic and religious issues. This tendency led to changes in party stereotypes among the mass electorate. In 1959, 67 percent of Italians thought that a good Catholic could not be a communist or vote for communists. By 1974 only 41 percent thought that a good Catholic could not vote for a communist. Twenty years later only 15 percent of the respondents thought so (Donovan, 2000, p. 140). Sassoon (1987) points out that ‘good’ Italian Catholics are now conscious that they are a minority, even though 90 percent of the population calls itself Catholic (p. 158). However, regular churchgoers still tend to vote for the right. In 1992, 65 percent of regular mass attendees voted for right-wing parties, while those who attended churches only irregularly or not voted for the left (Donovan, 2000, p. 140).
After the 1992 election and subsequent collapse of the DC the Vatican had to break its nearly 50-year-long support for Catholic party politics in Italy. The president of the CEI (the Conference of Italian Bishops), Cardinal Camillo Ruini, accepted officially “the end of the political unity of Catholics”, recognizing that there was no possibility of reconstructing a single Catholic party in Italy (Sassoon, p. 158). While large proportions of the Italian electorate disregard Church teachings in matters of faith and personal morals, the Vatican continues to speak with authority and tries to influence the votes of about 15 percent of the electorate, which is far from negligible (McCarthy 2000, 148). It seeks to lobby for change by urging Catholics to support candidates who will defend its fundamental values. Nonetheless, despite its claims of being the ideological successor of the DC, the PPI did not join any alliance and got only 11.1 percent of votes. The explanation of this result was quite simple - without real chances to get political power the Popular Party was far less attractive to religious voters wishing to keep the left out of office rather than Forward Italy or Northern League.

According to the results of the 1994 parliamentary election, the DC electorate had not been replaced by one party but by several fragments which were included into two blocs of parties. However, the distribution of votes of the Catholic electorate is not even. In 1994, 70 percent of PPI electors were practicing Catholics, and so were 32 percent of Forward Italy, 23 percent of the Greens, 21 percent of the Northern League, 19 percent of National Alliance and 13-14 of both the PDS and RC (Sassoon, p. 158-59). A Catholic political scientist and admirer of the traditionalist Catholic thinker De Maistre, Domenico Fisichella in 1994 joined the National Alliance and became a Minister of Culture in the new government. On the other hand, in 1994 the Italian post-communists selected as a leader of the center-left coalition an observant Catholic technocrat Romano Prodi.

The religious conflict in Italian society at the beginning of the 1990s was to a considerable degree coterminous with the ideological cleavage, which, in conjunction with the former, gave rise to the existence of two subcultures, the Catholic and the Marxist. One side of
the divide was marked by strong feelings of identity with the secular values of class solidarity and sympathy toward the Soviet Union characterized by official anti-religious ideology. Another large group of Italians preserved a strong attachment to the Church with its ecclesiastical hierarchy and accepted the Church’s guidance in social and political affairs (Bull and Newell, p. 65). The religious convictions of politicians and the electorate in the 1990s were transformed into views to the spheres of family values and secular culture.

Even though the cleavage over the issues religiosity and secularism does not correspond directly to the preferences of the left and right groups of the electorate, the images of political parties still depend on it. Even newcomers on the right side of political spectrum demonstrated their allegiance to the ideas of moral traditionalism. At the time of the electoral campaign of 1994 Northern League announced its commitment to traditional social hierarchies relating to class and gender. The traditionalist rhetoric of the LN became a significant element in the public debates. “Family values” (reappropriation of women's role as nurturers of their families) came to provide one of the staples of the League's rhetoric. Implicit in the party slogans is a party nostalgia for an archetypal Lombard peasant family with a stable set of hierarchical social relations. The notion of 'cultural complacency' means an attachment to what are construed to be “superior” values relating to work habits and social behavior that would allow those who have them (Lombards, northerners) to flourish in a privatized economy (Moioli, 1992).

The Italian Social Movement (MSI) renamed in the National Alliance before the elections of 1994 seemed to be a traditionalist party in its ideological platform. According to the results of a study of the cultural and religious views of the party members on an “authoritarian scale” in 1990, the majority of respondents supported the centrality of discipline in contemporary society, opposition to free circulation of pornography, and the demand for total obedience from one’s own children. Thirty four percent of the MSI activists would prevent homosexuals from running bars and restaurants. Forty eight percent of the party members disagreed that abortion was legal even in special circumstances (Ignazi, p. 90-91). In its party platform announcement on 27
February 1994 the party leaders stressed their “highly moral” views. Besides reaffirming the basic Catholic values “shared by large segments of Italian society”, they promised to fight against abortion; to help future mothers in distress; to bring genetic engineering under strict control; to help large families; to promote voluntary work; to reward families that keep their old people living with them; and to ensure that strict drug laws are enforced (Sznajder, p. 90).

Among the relatively secular “newcomers” on the right side of Italian politics, Forward Italy tried to overcome the ideological differences and contradictions within this grouping. In his declaration made on November 23, 1993 Berlusconi stressed “values instead of ideologies”. He claimed that the program of his political party “is based on the family, the enterprise, the market, profits; but also on solidarity, the Christian principles of respect and tolerance” (Sznajder, p. 97). As an architect of the 1994 electoral coalition, Berlusconi ran the electoral campaign claiming his intention to preserve fundamental social values based on Christianity. Following his political appeals the left parties were represented as main ideological opponents.

Poland

The particular feature of the Eastern European communist societies was a polarization of symbolic discourses that gave meaning to people’s experience in relation to state politics. Both secular communist state authorities and the national Catholic Church tried to construct an image of a unified nation.\textsuperscript{30} The Catholic Church in Poland has always been the strongest church in Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{31} (Szajkowski, p.71). Polish Catholicism represents not only a system of religious beliefs and sacramental acts, but also the embodiment of Polish cultural values and

\textsuperscript{30} In the case of Poland Zarycki (2000) doubts a substantive role of the church-state conflict because of the dominant role of the church in the national history (p. 862). During the period of partitions (1775 - 1918), the central Polish government did not exist and Polish political life revolved around the issue of independence. Zarycki points out that the short period of the Second Republic in Poland (1918 – 1939) was not sufficient for the development of a real independent church-state conflict. According to him, during the communist period, the prevalent secularization of the state was imposed by Soviet domination.

\textsuperscript{31} After its victory during the Counter-Reformation in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the Church ruled unchallenged during the several centuries.
traditions. Because of the long years of foreign domination the Catholic Church became the national institution, the core element of the nation’s identity. Jerschina (1972) argues that after the emergence of the state after WWI it had a great moral authority and strong link with all the social groups from peasants and landowners, to the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia (p. 6). But this authority did not automatically ensure it a role in government. Even the parties with a Marxist heredity (Polish Socialist party) tried rather not to come into conflict with the Church. The only party with an anti-catholic and anti-clerical program was the Communist Party of Poland (Jerschina, p. 82). The ideological positions of the latter and Polish Catholicism were irreconcilable.

During the Communist period the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was generally perceived as an anti-state force, an organization opposing, as much as it could, the communist transformation of society, its economy, polity and, especially, its culture. The Church opposed the new official atheism, the secularization of education, and the elimination of religious elements from new, officially constructed national traditions. It was also against other communist reforms: changes in the legal system, the nationalization of the economy, the introduction of a one-party system, the suppression of political opposition, the liberalization of divorce laws, and the legalization of abortion. However, as Mach (2000) argues, in the reality of everyday life, the Church paid little attention to the problems of citizens’ private lives. Not did Catholic priests pay much attention to problems such as work ethics. The ideological discourse instead concentrated on the construction of a national identity for society in such a way that religion became its central element. Communism appeared as “a totally alien element”, incompatible with traditional social values (pp. 117-18).

After the establishment of the Soviet regime both Communist and religious authorities received a great deal of popular support strengthened by their identification with Polish national
interests. For the first time Poland was a homogenous society not only ethnically, but religiously. The factors which contributed to that were: redrawing of Poland’s borders, which left many members of ethnic and religious minorities outside the new borders while a great majority of the newcomers professed the Catholic faith (Gilarek p. 138). Michel (1994) points out that the existence of the Catholic Church in Poland seemed to be a potential threat to the Soviet system because it was the only institution that had both buildings and trained leaders, around which political opposition could crystallize. The Polish Church had links with the Vatican, which were beyond the state’s control. Thus, Catholic religion might have become a center around which an ideological outlook would form, a place that would protect values incompatible with the official values.

In September 1945, the Polish government canceled the 1925 concordat with the Vatican on the grounds that the Vatican had refused to recognize the new regime and continued to support the government-in-exile. But before the beginning of the Cold War the political authorities refrained from a direct confrontation with the Catholic Church (Michel, p. 94). The Church in general avoided doctrinal disputes with the Marxists and did not object to major reforms such as the nationalization of industry and banks, and land reform. In foreign policy, the bishops warmly supported the country’s demand for official recognition by the West of its title to the former German territories in the north and west that Poland had held in 1945. The Agreement of 1950 was the first of its kind between the Communist state and the Catholic Church in Poland. It consisted of 19 points, the most important of which were the following: the Polish episcopate recognized its duty to be loyal to the state; the Polish bishops agreed not to cooperate with the

32 Chrypinski (1984, pp. 124-25) notes that in the situation of the postwar hardships of the newcomers the church took the initiative and started manifold charitable activities with the help of thousands of catholic volunteers, most of them priests and nuns. Stressing the strong links of Poland and Catholicism with these lands, the church laid solid foundations not only for the social unification of the people residing in the recovered territories but also created a deep sense of identification with the entire Polish nation
underground political opposition; the episcopate was obliged to oppose the anti-Polish propaganda of the German Catholic clergy; the bishops also agreed to support the collectivization of farms. The government, for its part, allowed religious teachings in state schools; monasteries were permitted, and the Catholic University in Lublin was formally recognized and accepted by the state (Cviik, p. 141). The prospective persecutions were delayed because of the agreement. For the government, the agreement was an ideal argument against international reports about religious persecutions in the Soviet state.

Cviik (1983) notes that during the first post-war years only once did the Church offer an open political challenge to the communist politicians. A pastoral letter published during the runoff to the January 1947 election urged all Catholics “not to vote for any party that was against Christian ethics and the teachings of the Church” – that is, the Communists (p. 94). A communiqué issued on May 24, 1946, by the Plenary Conference of the episcopate raised the issues of personal freedom, the protection of human life, the torching of prisoners, and the deprivation of religious assistance to them. The bishops pointed out that these offenses, committed by the holders of power “without any legal basis and directed against individuals and entire families, constituted an unprecedented violation of the innate rights of humanity and the humiliation of human dignity” (Chrypinski, p. 131). The 1947 document stressed the problems with religious freedoms. Nevertheless, it did not contain any anti-state opinions.

After the October 1952 Sejm elections the anti-Church campaign organized by the communist regime started again. A number of priests were arrested on spying charges. The episcopate in Warsaw, under heavy pressure from the government condemned the four most oppositional to the Communist regime hierarchs. The prominent Polish bishop Wyscinski refused to join the condemnation, was arrested on 29 September 1952. In 1952, the Polish government initiated a process of abolition of religious instructions in state schools. The same year the authorities announced a Decree on Ecclesiastical Appointments, according to which the activity of the church had to be approved by the official state authorities. Clergy were supposed
to swear loyalty to the State. In response, the Polish bishops noted that the decree was contrary to the Polish constitution and they were ready to leave vacancies in the official church structures (Cviik, p. 142). The situation characterized by open conflict with the Church caused the Communist party to formulate principles of its policy toward national Catholicism. It resulted in the publication of The Theses Concerning a Policy towards the Church dated by 1953. The document confirmed by the Central Committee of the PUWP was established to promulgate the strategic policies of the party according the following principles:

- First, “the denunciation and political isolation of the most aggressive, reactionary and hostile group of the Church’s hierarchy from the rest of the clergy” was supposed to isolate the leaders of the most active opposition to the Soviet state.

- Second, the decision “to recruit as many clergy as possible who would be loyal to and cooperative with the state authorities” opened the possibility to use the political support of the hierarchy of the Church.

- Third, “the gradual political and organizational (but not religious) emancipation of the Catholic church in Poland from the Vatican” could undermine its links with the West.

- Fourth, “the gradual confinement of the role of the church to the religious sphere with total acceptance of freedom of conscience and practices in other churches” was aimed at splitting the organizational capabilities of the Catholic organization but also support a secularization from “above” in order to create a civil religion which would gradually replace Catholicism (Cviik, p. 142).

However, the end of Stalin's era in the USSR had a significant influence the liberalization of the political regime in Poland. After three years of imprisonment Wyscynski was released in December 1956 and soon after he negotiated a revised version of the 1950 Church’s agreement with the state. According to this document, the Polish Church had the right to administer its own affairs again, and religious instruction in schools was reinstated. The government agreed to the appointment of five new bishops for Poland’s western territories (Jerschina, p. 17). As a good
gesture toward the Church, the government allowed a group of Catholic intellectuals close to the
Church to be elected to the Sejm and to form their own group, Znak (“The Sign”). The group
was also allowed to found Clubs of catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) in five cities. At the end of
December 1956 Wyscinski officially supported the new communist party leadership with
Gomulka at the head. However, by 1958 the “political truce” between the party and the Church
ended. Strict censorship was reestablished and most of the information about the Catholic
Church in Polish mass-media was eliminated. Local authorities refused to permit the building of
churches in large new housing estates and in 1961, religious instruction in schools was made
illegal (Cviik, p. 99).

The Church-state confrontation continued through the 1960s but by that time the
positions of Polish Catholicism were quite stable. Casanova (1994) argues that since the 1960s
the church, having established its right to defend both religious rights of Polish people, and the
rights of the nation, began to expand its protection into new areas, such as human and civil rights
(p. 100). Wyscinski openly criticized the violations of human rights in Poland during the anti-
Semitic campaign of 1968. On March 11, the five Znak deputees in the Sejm protested to the
prime minister, Josef Cyrankiewicz, against the treatment of the students by the authorities and
demanded “steps to relax the political situation,” above all by “putting an end to brutal police
action” (Cviic, p. 99).

The informal alliance between the Catholic Church and Polish liberal intellectuals
(formed at the time of social unrest in 1968) was strengthened when publications in magazines
close to the Church helped the dissidents who had been forbidden to write in party-controlled
newspapers. Tygodnik Powszechny, the weekly organ of the Znak opened its columns to the

33 Especially sharp debates took place in 1965 when the national issue came to the fore. Poland’s catholic bishops in
a letter to their German colleagues had “forgiven and bedded for forgiveness” (for the WWII and its legacies). The
PUWP hard-liners saw this not only as inference in the Party’s prerogative to determine foreign policy but they got a
good chance to attack the Church for betraying the national interests and “going soft on German revanchism”
(Hellen, p. 138).

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opposition intellectuals and allowed them to write under pseudonyms (Raina, p. 406.). After the tragic events of December 1970, when Polish workers demonstrated against the communist regime to protest proposed meat price hikes, the episcopate solemnly stated that “the fatherland belonged to all and that all have a sacred right to enjoy peace and security” (Chrypinski, p. 132).

In the period of June 1976 workers’ riots, the Catholic hierarchy called on the authorities to stop the repression and to start a dialogue with society. At this time the government, sensing its growing political weakness, sought to appease the Church with concessions. The government had to shelve its 1973 plan for an educational reform (Chrypinski, p. 132). More permits were issued for new churches to be built. Seeking to broaden his political support, First Secretary Edward Gierek had a conversation with the Pope in the Vatican on December 1, 1977. Soon after that the communist leader assured cardinal Wyszynski that the party wanted to preserve religious freedom. But the Church refused to be persuaded into silence and passivity by these gestures (Cvičík, p. 103).

The struggle between the Church and Communist regime for the influence on the Polish youth moved the episcopate to defend their position, in 1973, the authorities were preparing a new educational reform. The bishops, unhappy with several features of the project perceived as designed to paralyze catechistic action and to circumscribe greatly parental influence over their children, debated the issue and presented their comments to the government. Not finding a positive response to their objections, they finally brought the problem to the attention of the general public in three pastoral letters on May 5th, June 17th, and September 14th, 1973. The letters included vigorous protests against atheist indoctrination and school curricula that completely omit the role of the church in Polish history and culture. Cardinal Wyszynski in a letter of June 10th, 1978, to the chief of the Office for Religious Affairs condemned the “perniciousness of dialectical materialism as a method of interpreting the Polish past” (Chrypinski, p. 128). Chrypinski (1984) mentioned several facts of pressure of the communist authorities on the Catholic University of Lublin in order to undermine its academic freedom and
curtail its work.34

In the attempt to gain as much support as possible, to establish itself in the circumstances of the Communist political domination, the Church tried to pursue an extremely inclusive policy toward Polish citizens. Mach (2000) points out that “it opened its door as widely as possible, inviting everybody who did not identify with communism to join” (p. 119). Liberal intellectuals, many of whom in their religious attitudes, beliefs and the practice of their everyday life were very far from the ideal type of devoted Catholic – were allowed to cooperate within the Church’s organizational framework. The dissidents were able to publish in Catholic journals, to organize lectures, or to exhibit works on the Church’s premises.

The semi-official cultural struggle between the Polish Church and secular Soviet state reached its peak in 1966 when Poland became an arena of competitive church-state celebrations in various locations throughout the country. In Giiezno, on April 15th, 1966 Archbishop Wojtyla celebrated Polish Christianity and the Defence Minister Spychalski took part in a celebration of Polish statehood. In Poznan on April 17th, there were two celebrations, one with the Catholic Pope, and the second one with the First Secretary of PZPR (Gilarek, p. 143). In 1975, the first “week of Christian Culture” was organized in Warsaw. The Weeks soon became popular among different social groups.35 The backbone of activities, offered by high religious dignitaries (including Cardinals Wyszynski, Wojtyla, and Macharski), consisted of lectures delivered by specialists in different fields of sciences and covering a wide range of topics that touched religion and historical/cultural issues. In addition there were concerts, films, art exhibits, meetings with scholars, writers and artists ostracized by the Polish official culture. Banished

34 The authorities interfered with the elections of rectors (in 1951 and 1965), imposed limits on the admission of students (1952 and 1960), ordered the liquidation of the School of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences (1952), dictated the transfer of senior classes to other universities (1963), and suspended the right to lecture of several well known professors, including J.Pastuszka, C.Strzewski, and I.Czuma. In addition to these difficulties the government ignored the school’s financial problems imposing on it heavy taxes.
35 The Weeks of Christian Culture usually were held in local churches but often they extended to other places such as the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia, the offices of cultural periodicals, and the abodes of campus ministries (Chrypinski, p. 130).
from theaters and lecture halls, magazines and books, the oppositional intellectuals found in the churches “an outlet for their creativity and eager customers for their works” (Chrypinski, p. 130). Such meetings were beneficial for both sides, especially as a platform of cultural convergence and cooptation between clergymen and oppositional liberal intellectuals. Together they filled a vacuum created by a planned atheization of mass culture. Gilarek (2000) points out that “despite the fact the communists tried to attract as many people as possible by organizing garden parties, sporting events, exhibitions, meetings with soldiers, and so forth, the Poles tipped the balance decidedly in favor of the church, when far greater numbers attended the celebrations of Christianity” (143).

The Church gained the heaviest external back-up when Karol Wojtyla, the former Archbishop of Cracow, was elected Pope John Paul II in 1978. His papal grand tour of Poland in 1979 allowed millions of people to collectively show their support of ideas fundamentally opposed to the communist belief system. It demonstrated remarkably the weakness of the ruling Party in comparison with the support for the Church and “the other Poland” (Hellen, p. 147). The Pope became a symbol of the anti-communist protest. Kubik (1994) argues that the Pope also symbolized “the link between Eastern Europe and the west, the relation which the communist state tried hard to make their societies forget” (Kubik, 1994, p. 130).

Gilarek (2000) notes that during the Communist period, whatever the internal differences, Polish Catholics always spoke and worked in unison because this was the only way to create an effective counter-balance to the state. The minor differences were unimportant and “the high prestige of Catholic Church, under whose auspices people of different orientations struggled for freedom and independence, remained unquestionable” (p. 143). A number of surveys undertaken by the Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFE-RL) during the 1970s and in the period of leading up to imposition of martial law in December 1981, provide a valuable information about positions of the Church in peoples’ perceptions opposed to the official regime (Table 13). In hypothetical free elections the ruling Communist party could get only a minimal percent of
votes. However, the so-called Democratic Socialist Party which could enjoy electoral support of social groups close to leftist political ideas got quite a large percent of “votes” although its support steadily eroded (from 52 percent in 1974 to 32 percent in 1979-80). Its main “opponent”, the Christian Democratic Party, improved its “electoral position” gaining 5 percent. The public popularity of the Catholic Church seemed to be eminent because another right-of-center Conservative party got an insignificant percent of “votes”. The main component of these hypothetical elections is a competition between a right party with a sufficient religious component against a modernized left party.

By May 1981, the Communist party was the least-trusted institution in Poland. According to a survey conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Studies of Polish Radio and Television, asked to evaluate fifteen organizations and institutions according to the amount of confidence and trust they had in each, respondents produced a rank order (Table 14). The Catholic Church was given the highest ranking (81 percent giving an unqualified vote of confidence), with the Army and Solidarity coming in somewhat behind at 64 and 62 percent, respectively. The PUWP (ruling Communist party) had a only 10 percent of unqualified confidence (60 percent of people gave it a negative rating). In 1981 there was no reason for tension between religious institutions and the Solidarity which focused on the socio-economic demands of Polish workers. Thus, the cleavage of religious/secular issues was left on the background of public attention.

Since the first steps of activity of the Independent Trade Union Solidarity in August 1980, the relationship between church and labor activists was founded on a mutual understanding and brotherhood (Chrypinski, p. 132). The church was willing not only to provide the movement with religious services but also to defend the independent trade union and its members in case their rights would be endangered. Bishop Dabrowski and members of Joint Church-Government Commission represented themselves as mediators between the two conflicting sides when Cardinal Wyscinski met with the new communist party leader Kania and on March 26, with
Jaruzelski. The Church leaders gave many public demonstrations of their public support for independent movements that adopted for themselves the name of Solidarity. Chrypinski (1984) argues that “the episcopate’s pressures and demonstrative acts on behalf of Solidarity contributed to the restrained behavior of the authorities and to legalization of independent social organizations” (p. 133). The socioeconomic cleavage was formally overlapped with the secular-religious dimension.

In the 1980s the Church became the third member in a tripartite political constellation along with the Party, and Solidarity. Its political prominence was indisputable. However it is hardly possible to characterize the Church’s position that time as neutral. On September 7, 1980, the Solidarity received its formal blessing from Cardinal Wyscinski during a visit by Lech Walesa. The Church played a direct and active role in the campaign for the recognition of the farmers’ union, Rural Solidarity, whose registration was finally allowed by the government in April 1981. At the time of open suppression of the opposition to the communist government under the martial law of 1981 the Catholic Church attained its greatest influence. The Catholic hierarchy preferred to downplay temporarily the substantive secular-religious issues in its relationship with the state and to focus on more relevant social issues of human rights. On this ground the idea of a social covenant was announced in the theses issued on April 5, 1982, by the primate’s Social Council, a thirty-member organization headed by Stanislav Stomma, a well-known member of the Catholic parliamentary group Znak. The council called for the relegalization of Solidarity and other suspended organizations, the removal of restrictions in the area of human rights, and the drawing up of a general program of social and economic reform (Chrypinski, p. 135). The political role of the Church by that time was undisputable and in order

36 As early in April 1976, the Catholic priests demanded the extension of the nation’s social security system to private farmers.

37 However, as Casanova (1994) points out, the churches were more crowded than ever before and during the martial law period.
to avoid the escalation of the bloody conflict the government refrained from attacking the episcopate.

The end of the communist monopoly on power after the “round table negotiations” in 1989 opened new opportunities for Polish Catholicism. The new government of 1989 consisting of a large number of politicians from Solidarity was naturally perceived as having close relations with the Roman Catholic Church. The first non-communist Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was a well-known member of the Catholic intelligentsia. After the fifty years of ideological struggle with communism where it was a major architect of the anti-communist protest, the Church appeared as a victorious, triumphant and extremely powerful institution. In the early 1990s it was the most organized and most coherent social institute in a rather chaotic political environment (Mach, p. 120). As a result, it was able to “reap the benefits” of its prominent opposition to a now thoroughly discredited former regime (Byrnes, 2002).

Mach (2000) argues that with the end of the Cold War the discourse of binary opposition between religion and secular state largely disappeared as it “no longer corresponded with the feeling that most people began to have of living in a free world” (p. 120). However, the Polish Church lacked any practical experience in operating in a democratic pluralistic society. Unlike Western political systems where religious organizations are strongly linked to states and political parties, the central paradox is that Poland being a predominantly Catholic country has never produced a politically strong Christian democratic party (Wasilewski, Betkiewicz, p. 45). Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s Polish national opinion polls showed that a majority of the Poles objected to the Church’s involvement in national Politics (Mach, p. 121).

The social and political meaning of religiosity was very pronounced in the post-Cold War era and the level of religiosity seemed to be the strongest predictor of voters’ position on the Left-Right continuum. In the first fully democratic elections of 1991 the Left camp was represented by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Labor Union (UP), clearly secular and, at times, anti-clerical. On the other hand, some parties of the Right (the Christian National
Union, a member of the AWS coalition) had close contacts with representatives of the Catholic Church (Zarycki, p. 861).

Due to the support of conservative politicians the Church made an effort to introduce religion as part of an obligatory school curriculum. The Church’s chief argument of that was a link between the Polish national identity and religion, and the ideological identification of secularism with communism. The communist regime was blamed for the removal of religion from school, and the Church tried to reintroduce it at the time of the first non-communist government. But the lack of qualified teachers caused difficulties in practice, especially outside big urban centers. On the other hand, the decision to teach religion in schools was made without proper public discussion. The opponents of the Catholic initiative insisted on the rights of children to choose whether to attend classes of catholic religion or not in Poland as “a culturally pluralistic society” (Mach, p. 121).

During the 1990s non-Catholic minorities and non-believers became more numerous in the Polish society. Processes of Westernization and secularization in many points were incompatible with the religious catholic worldview and the Church objected to their popularization, especially in the media. Markoski (1997) argues that along with the issue of religious education in public schools another important debate that divided Polish society into two camps belong to the line of religion/secularization cleavage. At the beginning of the 1990s the issue of abortion became especially prominent (p. 236).

Communist Poland had a very liberal abortion law, which permitted abortion if a woman had serious economic problems. Because of the rapid shift of attention of the Church from politics to morality and family after the end of the Cold War, abortion became suddenly a big

38 During the 1990s various campaigns were launched against eroticism, cult of astrology, publications that could offend Catholics by questioning or mocking the principles of their faith. Mach (2000) argues that “at the beginning of the 1990s in Eastern Europe sexual “morality – the aspect of family life of particular concern to the Church – was very far from the Catholic ideals: abortion was widespread, extramarital sex was popular and accepted, and contraceptives had become a norm for large segments of the population. Any form of sex education at schools, according to the Church, would mean promoting moral relativism” (p. 122).
issue led to a new ideological confrontation. A long debate on this issue revealed deep divisions within Polish society. As a result, legal abortion was restricted by the parliament to cases when a woman’s life was in danger from pregnancy that resulted from a crime. Tworzecki (1996) points out that “the law was a compromise between those who, like the Church, supported a total ban on abortion and those who took a liberal, pro-choice view” (p. 46). However, this compromise did not last long. The 1993 parliament dominated by the Socialists changed the law to make abortion legal in all occasions. In response the Church developed a discourse that identified abortion with killing. (2000) points out that during the anti-abortion demonstrations in Poland that time, abortion was presented by cultural traditionalists as a danger for the nation. Those who supported liberalization in the family issues were portrayed as enemies of the Polish nation and as communists (Mach, p. 123). As a result, liberalism was interpreted as being against religion, and liberal Western culture as a danger to the cultural identity of Poles.

Operating within an old polarized view of the world both communism and liberal ideology tended to be identified by the Church with atheism. Aware that the majority of the electorate supported liberalization of the abortion law, the Catholic hierarchs opposed the idea of solving the question through a referendum, and tried to use its moral authority to prevent the parliament from confirming “extremely liberal laws”. In the absence of a direct party representative within the parliament, the Church’s leaders tried to find a ‘reliable’ political actor among “available” post-Solidarity parties. However, from 1993 to 1997 the Church had no political party or coalition to advance its interests in parliament. The Peasant Party was considerably less anticlerical than the Social Democrats (SDL), but it was a left-leaning party with close ties to the former communist government. The right parties that did reach the threshold – The Freedom Union and the Union of Labor – represented the segment of the old Solidarity movement that was least closely attuned to the Church’s interests and least amenable to the bishops’ pressure. As Millard (2003) said, “this default meant that none of the parties espousing religious values and strong links with the church would be represented in the Sejm”
In 1997 in a situation of highly polarized party competition between the Solidarity Alliance and the SLD the communist/anticommunist debates were very suitable for the interference of the Catholic Church. Byrnes (2002) notes that during the electoral campaign of 1997 religious leaders made several statements showing Church's political preferences for Solidarity as a movement which “make reference in its platforms to the Catholic social teachings” (p. 38). In the bishop’s conference the hierarchy released a statement discouraging Catholics from supporting “candidates who participated in the exercise of power at the highest party or government levels under totalitarian rule” (Byrnes, p. 35). But soon after the elections the problem of the search for reliable political allies became relevant for the religious leaders again. The polarized view of politics represented by the Polish Catholic Church in the 1990s could no longer be compatible with the existence of numerous liberal, conservative, and agrarian parties. The radical reforms that came after 1989 revealed that the Church experienced serious difficulties with “operation in the free market of symbolic discourses” (Mach, p. 126). Mach (2000) notes that previously (in the Soviet period) “highly inclusive, open to all independent-minded people, the Church began to demand complete loyalty of those who identified and affiliated to Catholicism” (p. 126). It seemed easier for the Church to apply totalitarian methods, and the old, familiar language of struggle with a longstanding ideological opponent rather than under condition of competition in a liberal political order. Even some prominent members of the Polish Church hierarchy were aware of that. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary of the Polish Episcopate, announced: “For the Church an unquestionable shortcoming of democracy is its inseparable feature – the principle of majority. This principle cannot be applied to essential issues, that is to those who relate to the principles of faith or morality, within the Church as well as outside it, in the state” (Mach, p. 125). After 1988 the Catholic political movement still introduces itself as a dominant antileftist force in Poland but by the end of the 1990s it became one of the centers of the counter-
modernization tendency toward liberalism. Rokkan (1970) in his historical analysis of the role of the Catholic Church in the Counter-Reformation Europe of the 17th century showed that it could play “a major role in the development of peripheral nationalism” and mentioned Poland as an example of the alliance between the Church and nationalist or secessionist leaders against the rulers of the center (p. 128). The same phenomenon appeared in the post-Cold War era. From the traditionalist point of view, the secularized West was characterized by a moral decline and its cosmopolitan culture threatened the national identity of Poles based on religious values. Since 1989 the increasing openness of Poland to Western ideological challenge resulted in the Church criticisms about European integration. During the pro- and contra-European debates in the 1990s many of the Catholic hierarchy took the side of nationalistic far-right politicians who opposed European integration on the grounds that it would harm the country’s national interest by bringing unfair economic competition and destroying traditional values (Mach, p. 124). A radical Catholic vision on some social issues in their implementation and radical opposition to the national liberal and left parties could intersect only with political claims made by the far-right parties. For many influential members of the Catholic hierarchy the temptation of entering the political field in alliance with them was hard to resist. The way to a radical conservative interpretation of religious ideas in political debates was open.

Since the middle of the 1990s the most militant activists of the Church have been grouped around Radio Maria, a broadcasting company led by Father Rydzyk with a daily audience of about one million people with extreme views on problems of morality in modern society and apparently radical even for liberal Church leaders. The supporters of the far-conservative radio oppose market reforms as the source of social inequality and do not hesitate to point at Jews as main scapegoats for economic hardships. Mach (2000) points out that “radio Maria is also the voice of nationalists and those who oppose European integration and wish to see Poland as an ethnically pure, traditional, Catholic country” (p. 125). The large group of the Episcopate has to distance themselves from the radio, especially when it had anti-Semitic
programs. At the same time, the far-right League of Polish Families (LPR), founded in 2001, owed much of its success to the chauvinistic religious radio station. Its party political agenda was based on the synthesis of nationalism and Christian solidarity. From the very beginning the LPR evolved to the far right and quickly became the party of Catholic fundamentalists and radical nationalists with strong anti-German and antisemitic overtones (Wasilewski and Betkiewicz, p. 45). Moreover, soon after the election in 2001 a group of deputies separated from the LPR created new parties known as the Polish Circle (led by Jan Lopuszanski) and Catholic-National Movement (Antoni Macierewicz). The alliance between most traditionalist Catholic activists and far-right politicians became evident. Both groups opposed themselves not only to the ‘atheist left’ but to liberal secularists as well.

The second, less radical political alternative to the secularized left and liberal right was the party called Law and Justice (PiS) led by Jaroslav Kachinski. Millard (2005) argues that during the Polish transitional period Kachinski succeeded from membership in conservative right Civic Accord (PC). In 2001, he became a leader of the PiS. The party’s accommodation with elements of the old Christian National Union (ZChN) further strengthened its relations with the Church (Millard, 2005, p. 1023). Putting strong emphasis on national and family values, law and order in social relations the new conservative party easily attracted attention of the Catholic hierarchs. Presenting himself as a champion of Catholicism, the Law and Justice in its electoral appeals did not always correspond to the Church's teaching. Kachinski supported the death penalty and demonstrated quite flexible stances in stem cell research and vitro fertilization, which, like the death penalty, were supported by the population. However, the PiS, in accordance with the official position of the Catholic Church, favored strengthening restrictions on abortion. The party was against euthanasia and legal recognition of homosexual couples, and highly critical of issues related to sex and violence in the national media. Promoting itself as a pro-family party, the PiS prior to the elections of 2005 promised to build 3 million inexpensive
apartments as a way to help young Poles get married (Wasilevski, Betkiewicz, p. 45). In order to get a substantive share of traditionalist conservative electorate Jaroslaw Kachinski tried to establish strong relations with ultra-conservative Radio Maria station. Due to a regular practice of interviews and propaganda of Kachinski’s ideas a Radio Maryja commentator, Robert Nowak, asked the listeners to support the PiS and denounced the opponents of the PiS leader’s political vision as “liars and hypocrites”. Maciej Zieba, the head of the Dominican order in Poland, in an interview at the BBC characterized the role of the radio station in the political success of Law and Justice as “obviously influential, especially because of its million listeners... like an army... they will go out and vote for Law and Justice”. A recent opinion poll found that 74 percent of the radio’s listeners would vote for Kachinski’s party (BBC News, 2006).

The third actor of the future government coalition of 2005, Self-Defense (SO), although declaring itself “a truly patriotic Polish left”, did not belong to the former Communist tradition, but preferred to focus instead on the values of “the Individual, the Family, Work, and a Dignified Life”. Millard (2005) notes that in 2005 for the first time SO also “sought to tap into the religiosity of Polish society by emphasizing papal inspiration and religious values, though it was not overtly clerical in the manner (particularly) of LPR” (p. 1016).

At the beginning of the 21st century the Catholic political movement in Poland is actively involved in the political process supporting conservative and far-right political parties. It allows the new conservative and populist parties to use the longstanding dichotomy between religion and secularism in Polish society in their political interests. Taking into account the positions of the secular right Civic Platform and the traditional left SLD and PSL on the clerical/secular dimension, Law and Justice as a constructor of the governing coalition made a quite rational choice.
Salience of the Left-right Dimension of Political Cleavages after the Cold War

Even after the end of the Cold War, a number of authors (T. Zarycki, 2000; Hellen, Berglund and Aarebrot, 1998) confirm the existence of the traditional dichotomy between the blocks of the left and right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001) argued that by the end of the 1990s, Italy and Poland still experienced the separate but cross-cutting cleavages of class, religion and center-periphery (presented as the opposition between the urban/industrial/service economy and the traditional rural economy) (p. 180). Both left and right-wing political forces had to reconfigure and adapt to new changes in the national politics at the end of the 1990s.

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the PCI leader Achille Occhetto announced the beginning of the transformation of his party into a non-Communist political force with a new name - the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). Esping-Andersen (1985) argues that the development of the new political strategy was motivated by the realization of its interests to "adapt the party program to the logic of majority politics" (p. 8) with its need to maintain the identity as the means to preserve the unity of the left political camp. The logo of the PDS consisted of an oak tree that retained, in a small circle at the tree's roots, the previous symbol of the Italian Communist Party. This was done to demonstrate the historical continuity of the party's ideology. The crisis of the traditional Communist movement along with the decline of the DC compelled some moderate politicians to think the reorganization of a wide range of left political groups under their leadership. Throughout the 1980s, the PSI leader Bettino Craxi built his political reputation on decisiveness and attempting to construct for his party the image of one capable of delivering efficient and stable government in alliance with the DC. Encouraged by the results of the 1990 regional elections, which saw the PSI's vote advance to 15.2 percent and the PCI lose 6 percent, he thought of making the former communists more negotiable in debates with the moderate right parties (Bull and Newell, p. 44). But these hopes did not last long. In 1991,
the same year as the formation of the PDS, the communist dissidents within the former PCI led by Armando Cossutta launched the Communist Refoundation Party (RC). The Proletarian Democracy, a far left political group, merged into the new party, which was aimed at uniting all “orthodox” Italian communists. Thus, the groups within the left political camp took an irreconcilable position toward the convergence of ideological stances with the former opponents from the right side of the political party spectrum.

Having experienced significant loss of popularity since the 1970s, the DC was in permanent crisis as representative of the right groups of the Italian electorate. However, it reflected the crisis of the whole system of political parties of the First Republic. The former dominant parties (the DC and PCI experienced sufficient loss of votes) (Table 15). The Mani Pulite (“Clean Hands”) anti-corruption investigations and the associated Tangentopoli (‘Bribe City’) campaign at the start of 1992 finally undermined the political positions of the Christian Democrats. The party elites were accused of endemic corruption practices at the highest levels, causing many spectacular arrests and resignations. After two years of mounting scandals and divisions, the party disbanded in 1994. The main political consequence for Italian party system was in the fact that the former center of government coalitions gave away.

A new electoral system established after the referendum in 1993 replaced the previous system of proportional representation.39 The central idea was to encourage pre-election compacts between parties rather than post-election coalitions that had not received popular endorsement. Anticipating the anti-center impact of a majoritarian system, the DC, already internally divided, split into two groups: the Italian People’s Party (PPI) and Christian Democratic Center (CCD).

Nevertheless, due to its major role in the period of the First republic in Italy, the former dominant Catholic political subculture continued to provide a sense of identity to many

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39 Single-member majority-vote districts now elected 75 percent of the seats and 25 percent of the seats were elected proportionally.
generations of Italian voters. In 1994, 70 percent of PPI electors were practicing Catholics, and so were 32 percent of Forward Italy, 23 percent of the Greens, 21 percent of the Northern League, 19 percent of National Alliance and 13-14 of both the PDS and RC (Sassoon, p. 158-59). However, the difference between the old large right party (the DC) and the new ones (the Northern League, Forward Italy and National Alliance) was very prominent. According to a national survey held in September 1993, DC voters preferred a coalition with the left PDS over one with the Northern League by a two-to-one margin (Wertman, p. 147).

The anticommunism of the political newcomers became a new remarkable phenomenon. All three new right parties represented themselves as ideological opponents of the leftist ideology. The National Alliance as a political heir of the far-right MSI could not accept an electoral alliance with the left parties because of traditions of longstanding confrontation with the left. Woods (1995) argues that the strategic position of another right party, the Northern League, based on a neo-liberal approach to society could not accept the prospect of an alliance with the former Communists (PDS) because the party countered left and right values: “freedom versus the state, efficiency versus equality and people versus politicians” (p. 180).

Finally, Forward Italy was created in an effort to capture the moderate voters of the old DC which was the ideological opponent of the Italian left (Woods, p. 120). On January 26th, 1994, Silvio Berlusconi announced publicly his decision to enter politics ("Entering the field", in his own words) on a platform centered on the defeat of the political and social heritage of Communism (Wikipedia, Silvio Berlusconi). Running his political party four months before the parliamentary election, Silvio Berlusconi criticized the old system of “political patronage” and promised to bring a real efficiency to the national economy. The political platform of the FI before the elections of 1994 was summed up in four main socio-economic principles which can characterize it as a center-right party. First, a guarantee of freedom through a maximum of economic liberty, less bureaucracy and more private initiative. Second, democracy based on a smaller governmental apparatus, more effective in its actions, more rigorous in law enforcement
and performing only the duties that the private sector is unable to carry out. And third, the principle of competitive market mechanisms in order to eliminate “a bureaucratic-parasitic class”. A fourth goal was an economic development and a higher standard of living for all through creation of an effective social security system in order to reduce public expenditure and encourage productive private investment (Sznajder, p. 96). Sznajder (1995) points out that the supporters of Berlusconi hailed him as “the "new self-made man," an outsider who was going to bring a new efficiency to the public bureaucracy and reform the state from top to bottom” (p. 97). In order to create the image of a new right party attractive for the Italian working class, Berlusconi promised to create a million new jobs due to lower taxation while a policy of economic liberalization would free the funds necessary to fuel recovery. The formula, made into a slogan, was that if every fourth employer in Italy took one more employee, a million new jobs would be created (Sznajder, p. 97).

The preferences of the mass electorate were also quite stable. Despite the fact that the total volatility scores for the Italian elections of 1994 were extraordinarily high (41.9 percent), its respective interbloc volatility score (5.8 percent) was surprisingly low (Gunther and J. R. Montero, p. 91.) After the collapse of the dominant center-right party (the DC) most Italian voters simply shifted their support to different parties within the same center-right bloc. Despite the fact that the rate of total volatility in Italian elections between 1992 and 1994 was among the highest in Europe, the interbloc volatility was quite moderate (Tables 16, 17). This reflected the political realignment that happened at the 1994 parliamentary elections.

In Poland, during the 1990s the Left-Right cleavage remained the dominant axis in the national politics and the principal conflict visible in the political discourse. As Millard (2004) notes, the divide between the left and right political camps was maintained in rhetoric, in programmatic differences, and in popular support throughout the 1990s (p. 47). According to Zarycki, the two main political cleavages were identified in Poland by the middle of the 1990s: “secularism vs. religious fundamentalism” and “political and economic liberalism vs. populism”
(p. 852). This bipolar configuration of the Polish political scene, dominated by a historical conflict between the heirs of the left political camp and anti-communists, provided specific conditions for the implementation of liberal economic reforms. The confrontation between the leftist egalitarian political philosophy and market-oriented liberal ideology was prominent but not the main explanation of party struggle.

By the middle of the 1990s the heirs of the former communist party (SLD) revealed their pro-market socio-economic orientation when they were elected to the government. Innes (2001) mentions that party competition that time did not address the distribution of economic resources as a key element of debates between new parties. Nevertheless, the role of the political party images was prominent. The dominant conviction of the leaders of the right was that the “West” represented the only alternative to Soviet hegemony and the ineffective socialist economic system. It led to the gradual evolution of the political heirs of Solidarity toward the right-wing political direction. Sosnowska notes that the aversion of many Polish social scientists to Marxist sociology led most of academics to support the anti-communist opposition at the end of 1990s and unconditionally adopt modernization theory as the only non-Marxist, liberal tool for the analysis of national social and economic transition (Zarycki, p. 864). As a result, the SLD inevitably had to suffer from the negative image of the communist period, created by right politicians, as its ideological heir.

The remarkable feature of anti-communist social activity in Poland during the last decades of the Cold War was its support by workers, a social group which was supposed to be the constituency of the communist government. Places with the strongest organizational infrastructure and traditions of protest registered the highest number of protest events. Among the country’s 49 regions, the strongholds of Solidarity in 1980-81 and centers of opposition against the post-martial law regime were most populous and industrialized areas: Warsaw region, Silesia, Gdansk region, Krakow, Szczecin, and Lodz. In his book The Defeat of Solidarity (2005) Ost gave a good example of the ideological position of Polish trade-unions in the first
transitional years in conversations with their leaders in the manufacturing city of Starachowice in 1994:

I met with two Solidarity officials. When I asked them about the situation, they first spoke in a resigned way about the bad economic conditions for their workers and the city and then unleashed a torrent of angry words filled with attacks on “the communists.” When one went on to tell me about his “right-wing” views I affected surprise, interjecting that many people see trade unions in their very essence as left institutions. “Yes,” he responded at once, “as unionists, we should be leftists. But after forty-five years of oppression by red barons, we can’t be. So you’re right: we should be leftists, but we aren’t (Ost, p. 121).

On the other hand, he argues that the structural legacy of communism left a great part of the Polish labor class unable to carve out a sense of its own interests, and thus unwilling and unable to forcefully defend its interests afterwards. But this argument can be more related to the working class highly influenced by Solidarity. In their research Ekiert and Kubik (1998) present data which show that in Poland, following the transfer of power and dissolution of the communist regime in 1989, there was a gradual increase in all relevant dimensions of protest events (duration, scope, number of participants). The authors argue that most protest actions were engendered by group-based cleavages while issue-based cleavages, typical for Western Europe since the 1970s, generated relatively few protests (Ekiert and Kubik p. 100). The magnitude of protest was growing since 1989 and the protest cycle reached its peak in 1993. The protestors were mainly drawn from two social groups: industrial workers and public (state) sector employees. The majority of protesting workers were employed by large state-owned industrial enterprises particularly privileged under the old Soviet regime. Miners, defense industry workers, steel workers, heavy machinery builders had enjoyed better wages and benefits than workers employed in other sectors of the economy. Since the beginning of the transitional period they were losing their privileged positions and were quick to express their discontent. Because the state was still responsible for the employment of different groups of the labor class, the socioeconomic cleavage in Poland took the same form it had much in common with the Soviet period. Ekiert and Kubik (1998) point out that the principal cleavage of protest politics
after 1989 was very similar to the one driving anti-communist politics. In both cases it was “the state” vs. “the people-dependent-on-it” (Ekiert and Kubik, p. 102). Consequently, protest politics in post-Communist Poland was still “traditional” in Rokkan’s sense: it was driven mostly by economic grievances and distributional issues of well-defined social groups (p. 102). New organizations did not emerge in the period protest activities but they were formed as a result of divisions within existing organizations – Solidarity and ex-communist federation OPZZ which had considerable resources at their disposal. Since the structure of national employment changed considerably during the 1990s40 the strength of social groups oriented toward support of state socialism decreased.

Solidarity as a broad-based anticommunist coalition movement, with dissident groups at its core, performed most successfully under the slogans of democratization, marketization, return to Europe, freedom, and prosperity. Innes (2001) argues that “after the collapse of the Communist system the first democratic elections in Eastern European states were more like plebiscites on the basic issue of change and against Communism than anything resembling multidimensional party competition” (p. 88). But the biggest difficulty for Solidarity was to transform itself from a broad coalition of right political groups to organized right parties with disciplined memberships and coherent political platforms suitable for times of profound economic reforms. Since 1989 Solidarity left the political scene open for the new emerged national parties and acted more as a traditional trade union. The political movement associated with this name entered a phase of disintegrative politicization and fragmentation marked by different political orientations and personal animosities. Ost (2005) portrayed the leaders of Solidarity as intellectuals who had won the worker’s trust in the Soviet period and then moved from being champions of political liberalism to champions of economic liberalism (p. 192).

40 The number of people employed by private firms increased significantly from 47 percent in 1989 to 63 percent in 1995, the private sector output as a share of GDP declined from 52.3 percent in 1989 to 39.3 percent in 1995, the share of services increased from 34.8 to 53.1 percent (Ekiert and Kubik, p. 101).
As Thee (1991) points out, in the first post-Cold War years “the main gravitational hub of transformation in Eastern Europe seemed to be located in Poland, burdened with a long-standing economic crisis and now undergoing a truly heroic treatment of systemic change” (p. 246). Although the Soviet domination over Poland was over, the Left-Right conflict had not ceased to influence the political scene and discussions over the moral interpretation of the communist period remained the central element of the political dispute. Using the Lipset-Rokkan language, Zarycki (2000) spoke of the “freezing” of this cleavage. As examples of this phenomenon he points to “the accusations by the hard-liners (anti-communists) that the post-communists had betrayed the national interest during the communist period (by cooperating with the “Soviet occupiers”) and that they appropriated state assets when the period of privatization began” (p. 860). The Social Democrats as political heirs of the previous political regime denied a direct connection with the communist ideology, but were prone to see anti-communists as parochial and authoritarian nationalists and dangerous religious fanatics. The issue of lustration became the mirror of the political debates reflecting the existing cleavage over the left-right dimension between the two party camps since the end of WWII.

Because the Polish political transition was based on an elite bargain between two blocs and the May-June 1989 election was only partially free the communists retained both a number of key positions and a conceivable influence in the new parliament. The first post-communist Polish government established in August 1989 explicitly rejected pursuing a policy of de-communization. This was claimed by premier Mazowiecki in his September 1989 inauguration speech when he pledged to draw a 'thick line' under the communist past and to forgive in the

41 The term "lustration" came from the Latin for "purification." In the political literature, it refers to a situation when a new government tried to prevent members of the former political regime from holding office in the new civil services.

42 During the “Round table” negotiations held in March 1989 between the communist PZPR and the Solidarity democratic opposition the ruling party agreed to allow 35 percent of the seats in the Seim to be openly contested. As a result the Solidarity won all the 161 contested seats in the new Sejm and 99 out of 100 of the Senate seats. In August 1989 Solidarity politician Tadeusz Mazowiecki was confirmed as the first non-communist premier in post-war Poland at the head of the government in which the PZPR was in minority.
name of national reconciliation and transformation. Rather than applying collective guilt for the 
former party the new liberal government promised to de-communize through dismantling the 
communist power monopoly and assessing supporters of the previous regime on the basis of their 
professional characteristics and loyalty toward the new government. Szczerbiak (2002) argues 
that at the time when Poland was relatively isolated within the Soviet bloc and communists still 
retained considerable influence over the political process the seeking open conflict could 
destabilize the political situation and lead to unpredictable results (p. 556). In 1990, with the 
change of political configuration within the collapsing Soviet bloc and growing dissatisfaction 
with the social consequence of the Balcerowicz's economic reform the political conflict between 
the left- and right-wing political parties was has been revitalized. Ost (2005) argues that at the 
time when “Polish society had just completed a long struggle against the communist system, it 
was easy to persuade people that any short-term hardships could be ascribed to its misrule” (p. 
101). The issue of de-communization of the state apparatus could be used as a lever by those 
political elites on the right of the Solidarity movement who “felt excluded from the first 
Mazowiecki government and appeared to find a natural champion in the union's legendary leader 
Walesa” (Szczerbiak, p. 557). Lustration went to the top of the political agenda in December 
1991-June 1992 with the advent of Olzewski's minority government committed to a more radical 
break with the communist past and the 'thick line' policy of the first liberal governments.

The de-communization and the policy of lustration were major elements in the electoral 
platforms of the post-Solidarity right-wing parties which supported Olszewski such as the Center 
Agreement (PC) and the Catholic Election Action. These parties achieved relative success in the 
first fully free parliamentary election held in October 1991 when the PC got 8.71 percent and the 
CEA – 8.79 percent. The strongest party within the last electoral alliance, Christian National 
Union (ZChN) became a good example of the new ideological trend in the new Polish politics. 
The ZChN was a social conservative but economically to the left party. It supported a generous 
social welfare program, trade protectionism, active involvement of the Catholic Church in
politics, and religious instruction in the schools. The ZChN had very negative stances toward the left political forces and actively participated in both the conservative Suchocka and Olszewski governments. The first attempt to run the process of lustration was discredited when Olszewski’s interior minister Macierewicz delivered a list of 64 alleged high-ranked secret agents and collaborators with the Communist regime which included the President, Sejm Marshal, minister for foreign affairs and even former dissidents and opposition activists (Szczerbiak, p. 557). It was interpreted as a desperate attempt of the ruling political elites to save the crumbling minority administration by discrediting its political opponents.

The 1993 electoral law introduced new electoral thresholds of 5 percent (for parties), 8 percent (coalitions), and 7 percent (the national list). The new electoral formula was intended to give an advantage to larger parties and thus to encourage alliances and mergers of smaller ones. This led to the early “freezing” of the political party spectrum (Agh, 1991, p. 203). The main representative of the left party camp, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and its allies in the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) won a victory in the September 1993 parliamentary election. It symbolized the formation of a bipolar party system in the new Polish party system. The defeat of the Christian and nationalist conservatives, whose parties all finished under the electoral threshold, required creation of a new right-wing electoral bloc. Taking into account the fragmentation and crisis of the new right parties, the Solidarity president Marian Krzaklewski offered Solidarity’s services in the next elections. Ost (2005) notes:

If the victory of the left had initially left Solidarity both outraged and disillusioned, the reality, once it set in, seemed to give the union a new vitality. It seemed to cure it of its identity crisis by giving new life to an old narrative. Once again, the union knew what to do: it had to fight the communists (p. 79).

Szczerbiak (2002) argues that in “a political climate in which former communists were able to resurrect themselves, the issue of “dealing with the past” became increasingly salient and was instrumentalized by the Polish right as part of the power struggle” (p. 570). Solidarity as an electoral alliance of the transitional period of Polish politics was incompatible with the modern
practice of electoral party competition between parties with clear ideologies. Ost (2005) points out that the leaders of Solidarity had never felt comfortable contesting economic issues because the ex-communist government was the most favorable one labor had had since 1989. When Solidarity initiated health sector strikes at the end of 1993, the government responded by offering more money for a no-strike clause which contributed to making 1995 and 1996 years of remarkable peace. In 1995 the government revised the 1990 privatization law to include a number of significant labor-friendly measures, such as allowing more free shares for employees, extending share giveaways to farmers and fishermen, encouraging employee buyouts, and allowing some corporatized firms to remain state-owned (Ost, p. 80). Thus, the Social Democratic government seemed to defend the interests of the Polish labor class. On the other hand, Szczerbiak (2002) argues that the formation of a socialist government fostered among right political groups “a growing perception that members of the pre-1989 communist elite were returning to key positions of power and influence at both national and local level (p. 560). In his book The Collapse of the “Real Socialism” in Poland (1993) Tittenbrun studied the phenomenon of “nomenklatura capitalism” which provoked resentment of many Polish toward many former members of the communist political elite who had successfully reinvented themselves as private businessmen at the beginning of the 1990s.

The impact of the foreign factor, very important in the critique of the communist government in the Soviet period, continued playing an important role in maintaining the cleavage between the left and right-wing parties in the 1990s. It resurfaced dramatically in December 1995 when the SLD premier, Josef Oleksy, was accused of having been a Soviet and Russian spy. Although this was not proved, Oleksy had to resign in January 1996. Szczerbiak (2002) notes that the ““Oleksy affair” moved the issue of politicians’ links with the security services, and lustration more specifically, back to the top of the political agenda” (p. 561). In this context he points out that the political triumph of the left in 1993 did not mean that public support for lustration (or even for more wide-ranging de-communization) disappeared in the political
discourse of Poland. We have clear evidence (Tables 18, 19) that a majority of Poles have always supported examining information of people taking different civil positions in the state apparatus. A public demand for it remained high throughout the 1990s. In January 1998, 80 percent of the electorate supported lustration of the premier, ministers, parliamentarians, senior civil servants, judges, procurators and diplomats; 65 percent supported lustrating councillors; and 51 percent supported vetting journalists working on public TV and radio (p. 559). From the Table 20 we learn that support for de-communization was particularly strong among right-wing AWS voters, while left-wing SLD voters demonstrated strong opposition to this policy. Supporters of the two moderate left and right parties, respectively the PSL and the UW, were much more evenly divided. In April 1997, the Polish Sejm passed the lustration bill with 214 votes in favor, 162 against (virtually all SLD deputies) and 16 abstentions. The Polish lustration law appeared as an example of lustration without automatic removal from office and was criticized by representatives of the Polish right both within and outside parliament for not going far enough (Szczerbiak, p. 568). Thus, attitudes towards the communist past became the key factor in determining left-right self-placement on levels of both politicians and the electorate.

The dominant role of the left-right cleavage in the post-Cold War Polish politics was well illustrated by the fact that in the first round of the 2005 presidential elections the main candidates from the competing political camps Kwasniewski and Walesa together gained more than 68 percent of registered votes. Traditionally feared and criticized in the previous times by both the Communist and Christian Democrats, the personalization of politics has made inroads at the national level. But the traditional dichotomy between the blocks of the left and right parties remained. Walesa ran a very aggressive campaign and once again deployed rough anti-communist rhetoric. Kwasnewski’s narrow victory (51.7 vs. 48.3 percent of votes in the second

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43 The bill was not aimed at excluding former communist party functionaries from certain public offices but rather it was directed at those individuals with links to the communist-era security services. The 1998 amendments to the lustration law extended its scope quite substantially to include all barristers, bringing the total number of officials subject to lustration to approximately 20,000 people (Szczerbiak, p. 567-68).
round of elections) only reinforced the perception among Polish right politicians that former communists now controlled all the main institutions.

By the time of the 1997 elections, the two main parties (or rather electoral alliances) were Solidarity Election Action (AWS) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). The AWS appeared in 1996 as a broad coalition of parties with roots in the anti-communist opposition. In the alliance with the Freedom Union (UW) as its junior partner Solidarity managed to defeat the left bloc of SLD-PSL. The new right government included many parties and individuals that had comprised the Olszewski government and tried to break with the political tradition of the communist past. The power to initiate lustration procedures was given to the members of the Polish parliament through the introduction of the so-called “parliamentary denunciation”.

Millard (2003) argues that the 2001 parliamentary realignment elections showed the “now-feeble relevance of anti-communism” and reemphasized the democratic legitimacy of the SLD while the Polish politics ceased to embody the historic division between the heirs of Communism and Solidarity (p. 72). However, during the 2005 electoral campaign both Law and Justice and League of Polish Families in their electoral platforms offered a “turning point marking the end of the Third Republic (begun in 1991 with the first fully free elections) and the start of the Fourth Republic which was “destined” to experience moral cleansing through deep lustration, anti-corruption measures and reaffirmation of Catholic values (Millard, 2005, p. 1016). The ideological confrontation between the new left and right-wing parties started again.
The cleavage between the state and local/regional interests is traditional and can be observed since the early stages in Western European democracies. During the 1990s, the phenomenon of rising nationalism was evident even in parties that had not been associated with national-populism in the past. The process of European Integration brought the classic cleavage “center-periphery” on the supranational level and led to changes in ideological platforms of liberal and conservative parties. As communist parties during the Cold War were perceived by the public as guides of Soviet authority, the pro-integrationist liberal parties in the 1990s could be seen as agents of Western influence. On the other hand, euroscepticism became an ideological nucleus of a second group of right parties focused on expressing the frustration and hardships of a wide range of groups in the population, as a reaction to the processes of integration in the European Community and economic modernization. Markovski (1997) labels these social and political divisions as conflicts between “secular libertarian cosmopolitans” vs. “religious authoritarian nationalists” and “economic populism” vs. “market liberalism”. The principal difference in the positions over the issue of European integration between parties on the right side of the ideological spectrum hampered the process of coalition government formation in Italy and Poland.

Italy

Political processes in Italy in the 1990s, as in many other European countries have been heavily influenced by structures external to the state. Due to Italy’s prominent position among European nations, Italian representatives play an important role in the EU institutions. However, the European role played by the country at the beginning of the 1990s was not strictly correlated to its implementation record. Giuliani (2003) notes that in the implementation of EU measures the main cause of the Italian delay and ineffectiveness is namely the weak participation of Italian representatives in the policy process in Brussels (p. 150). In such circumstances certain nuances in party political platforms on the issue of European integration could play an important role in coalitional negotiations between them. Ladrech (2002) linked the development of party positions with the process of European integration and argues that Italian parties changed and adapted to a newly developing international landscape and responded to the impact of integration, ultimately influencing the direction of this process.
Conti and Verzichelli (2001) argue that two basic arguments dominating the most quoted interpretations of the Italian international and foreign policy during the 1990s are hardly questionable. First, a clear divide at the time of the First Republic between a fully pro-European government elite (from the Christian Democrats to some Socialists) and a Eurosceptical opposition, including the nationalist heirs of the fascist ideology (the extreme right of the MSI) and the leaders of the Communist party.44 Second, the Italian government elites recently used to keep a loyal but “reserved” judgement on European integration. Pridham (1980) notes that since the governments led by Christian Democrats De Gasperi and Gaetano Martino in the 1950s, “there was no clear involvement of the Italian political elites in the process of European integration” (p. 81). Following several decades Italy was always a “middle rank power”, submitted to the American views on international relations and to the general initiatives of France and Germany (Conti, Verzichelli, p. 29). The longstanding diplomatic strategy of Italy was reflected in the 1983 DC electoral manifesto. The party leaders stated that the country is “loyal to its choice for the West, seen not only as military but also as political solidarity and within this choice the party developed its free-market policy and a policy of international integration, during the years of the reconstruction as well as today, particularly aimed at building a united Europe” (Conti and Verzichelli, p. 30). The Christian Democrats were strong supporters of the Single European Act (SEA) and the idea of an open of market. They called for the creation of an economic and monetary union with a single currency in Europe. The party leaders argued in favor of construction of European supranational institutions to promote the standards of efficiency and economic development. European integration was seen by the leaders of the DC as a solution to domestic socio-economic and political stagnation, and for this reason deeper integration was presented as equal to domestic political advantage. The combination of

44 However, the anti-European stances of the communist leadership were changed over the 1970s, when an Euro-communist ideology was developed. At the beginning of the 1990s two radical parties (MSI and the RC) had clearly opposed the ideas of European integration, presenting a set of counter-arguments against the Europe of Maastricht (Daniels 1993).
Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism figured as an unchallenged choice. After the approval of the SEA in 1986, the growing amount of EU directives adopted had emphasized the Italian ineffectiveness in keeping pace with the process of “Europeanization”. The radical solution adopted in Italy at the end of the 1980s for speeding up the implementation of EU directives – an annual law – has only concealed, for a brief period, its underlying problems in domestic policy (Giuliani, p. 151). At the beginning of the 1990s the basic commitment of the Christian Democrats to European integration process did not produce any new original proposals.

The ratification of the Maastricht treaty (1992)45 coincided with significant changes in the Italian party system. However, the European Integration issue was discussed among party elites in a more attentive way than in the past, and also a growing plurality of positions seemed to be emerging. Conti and Verzichelli (2001) argue that starting in 1992 the political debates present a great variety of political opinions among Italian parties, the disappearance of the “no stances” attitude and a significant presence of moderate and radical Euroscepticism. They point out that since the beginning of the Second Republic the European issue became more divisive among right-of-centre than among left-of-centre parties (with the far-left new Communist party being the only Eurosceptical party of the left) (pp. 28-29).

Before the 1994 elections the most optimistic views about the European Integration process on the right side of the party spectrum were represented by the Italian Popular Party which labeled itself an ideological successor of the DC. Due to the longstanding rejection of nationalism and supranational ideology of Catholicism the PPI called for intensification of the integration process. At the same time, the party appeal in support of integration was based on pragmatic grounds, as the means to economic prosperity for Italy. Moreover, the new Christian Democrats did not question the benefits of international economic integration. As a result, the

45 The Maastricht Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992 in Maastricht, between the members of the European Community and entered into force on November 1, 1993. It created the organization of the European Union.
PPI supported an Italian active role in the EU integration process on both economic and political dimensions.

Forward Italy, as a newly born center right party, was presented to the voters on March 1994 with a program which included scarce references on European Integration. The party’s draft of European manifesto did not draw much attention to the international role of the EU and was characterized by a moderate position on the assessment of the domestic impact of the EU institutions (Conti, Verzichelli, p. 29). Berlusconi, being an active supporter of economic neoliberalism, favored advancement of the “free market” on the European level, and minimal state intervention in entrepreneurial activity. As a result, integration could pressure national governments to reduce market regulation. The enhancement of Italy's international status in the UN, NATO and EU was posed as a goal. However, Berlusconi was quite critical regarding the intention of European institutions to shift political authority somewhat away from state control because it would undermine national sovereignty. As a result, the FI position on the integration process was clear but only in terms of moderate support without efforts to speed it up.

The traditional image of the National Alliance, the renamed far-right Italian Social Movement, was hardly compatible with the ideals of the European Union. The party manifestos for a short period before the 1994 elections do not give a clear picture of the party evolution on this issue. The fascist legacy led the party to keep a negative approach to European integration, perceived as it was a threat to national autonomy. In the 1986 statute of the MSI European integration was not mentioned as one of the party's goals or principles. The former party leader Pino Rauti denied the legitimacy of the system of international relations reflecting the anti-American and the pro-Arab tradition of the far-right. However, the MSI cadres and some groups of the party electorate supported the European-nationalist line because of its political and military potential (Ignazi, p. 90-91). However, any kind of supranational authority was firmly rejected. In 1990, since the beginning of the leadership of Gianfranco Fini, the party ideological stances on foreign affairs became quite moderate. The MSI-AN accepted the role of the inter-
governmental approach to European integration if the latter remained essentially subordinated to national interest. At the same time, the Maastricht treaty was rejected as an “agreement between bankers”, incapable of providing real political solutions to the problem of the EU. The disintegration of the EMS and economic rivalries within the EU were seen by the party elites as political matters of cardinal importance not to be left to the decisions of international financial agencies (Sznajder, p. 91). However, Fini demonstrated his willingness to negotiate with coalition partners to smooth the negative consequences of the integration process. In general, the idea of Europe was understood by the MSI leaders as a confederation of sovereign states which was preferred to a union based on economic principles.

The case of the development of policy stances of the Northern League (LN) is especially interesting because the party's attitudes towards the EU were very contradictory and depended on particular circumstances and issues. Globalization characterized by growing internationalization of trade, finance and production seemed to be highly appraised by Bossi. The LN was a party with a clear focus on the economic efficiency of highly developed regions. Bull (1996) argues that since the beginning of the 1980s the Italian north-east was favorably placed within the EU, and can be compared, in terms of wealth, to Rhone-Alpes, Baden-Wurttemberg or south-east England (p. 264). Integration provided an economic framework for regional political autonomy. The League’s central demand of creation of conditions allowing the well-developed regions (Lombardy, first of all) to represent their identities could be easily reconciled with the logic of the integration process when supranational authority gradually replaced the political role of state institutions. On this ground, at the end of the 1980s, the LN’s leaders thought of loosening up of the Italian nation-state (pp. 263-64). However, they focused on the negative characteristics of globalization as well. During 1987-90, hostility to the growing, if still minor, immigration of

46 However, in its electoral platform published shortly before the election of 1994, the MSI presented explicit territorial claims (Istria, Fiume, Dalmatia) addressed to the Republics of Former Yugoslavia. It sparked a huge debate between the far-right supporters and Italian Foreign Minister Nino Andreatua (Carioti, p. 64).
North Africans and other foreigners into Lombardy was an important theme in public statements and published writings associated with the League. It was a part of an overriding distinction between “us” and “them” that pervaded the discourse of the League (Allievi, p. 166). The 1992 political program of the LN stated explicitly:

Our party's strongly critical attitude towards migratory policies stems from our specific concept of mankind. A human person is not simply an economic agent: he or she is also made up of affections, cultural values and identities which can find their best expressions in separate historical and environmental communities. Immigrations, having a purely economic value, break up this equilibrium (Bull, 1996, p. 175).

The League's electoral platform of 1994 ensured that only immigrants with work permits would be allowed to stay in the country. It stressed the need to set immigration quotas for each of Italy's 20 regions. According to Griffin (1992) the party represented a subtle corruption of liberal principles in so far as “the subtext of the attacks on the parasitic nature of Roman bureaucracy, the South and the Mafia is the myth of Northern Italy's social homogeneity and its imminent regeneration within a new order, albeit an economically and politically Liberal one” (p. 176). It is an important point that in Italy at the beginning of the 1990s the most severe intolerance towards non-west European immigrants was represented by the party pursuing a neoliberal economic policy in the most industrialized areas of northern Italy. Throughout the 1990s political attitudes of the LN towards the EU membership became more critical also because of the greater prominence of the “Eurobureaucracy centralism” that time. Conti and Verzichelli (2007) argue that “at an earlier stage, support to European integration was seen by the Northern League as a tool for the Italian north regions to exit the nation-state, but in the reality the integration process changed the process where the exit-orientation of the North might grow and so the process itself turned somehow against the party” (p. 31). The scatterplot presented by the authors (Figure 7), based on the empirical distribution of the 129 party documents for several decades since the 1950s, reflects the development of the party positions based on the dimensions of overall
perception of European integration process and prevailing content about European integration. It seems clear that all Italian new center-right parties are located on the Eurosceptic side of the scatterplot. It is surprising that the far-right MSI-AN at the time of the 1994 elections had higher overall estimation of EU integration process than the FI and LN. But nevertheless, the all three coalition partners had quite opposite positions on the European integration issue taken by the PPI and the left parties (except the far-left RC).

At the time of the 1994 parliamentary elections all three parties of the center-right cartel (FI, LN and MSI-NA) did not characterize themselves in defense of Italy as a “peripheral country” from authoritative European supranational government. However, they all had a strategy to alternate hints of support to the general idea of integration on the basis of issue-specific “soft Euroscepticism” (Conti, Verzichelli, p. 82). The challenge on the domestic political arena from the PDS and especially PPI with their clear pro-European stances and support for “European acceleration”, created room for a significant change of the general Italian pro-European vision of the European integration process. From that point during the 1990s the FI, AN, and LN started to oppose EU with increasingly radical tones.

It can be clearly argued that at a time of “rapid mutation of the internal political arrangements in Italy” (Giuliani, p. 152), Europe has mainly remained a dormant issue in public debates between party constituencies. The cleavage over the issue of European integration was prominent only at the level of party elites. Reshaping the discourse of the new right parties (FI, MSI-AN and LN) was based on the support for some specific issues of integration (support for the Monetary system, celebration of the EP direct election, creation of a single market) and came together with a critical assessment of the political initiatives of the European government on which a large consensus among the coalition partners took place. It played a role at the time of

47 For each document the researchers considered the distribution of measurements of the stances on the process of European integration (a five point scale from –2 to 2), and a second step where the assessment of the perceptions of the respondents about EU impact on domestic policies is combined with the historical vision of European integration.
the formation of the coalition government in 1994.

Poland

Throughout the 1980s the majority of Poles had called into question the authenticity and legality of the communist regime. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the center of ideological discussions in Polish society gradually moved toward an attitude in support of the broadly defined West. A general attractive image of Western democracy and economic prosperity revoked the idea of Polish European identity. In a practical sense EU and NATO memberships represented the two pillars of the “return to Europe” project, which includes the adoption and institutionalization of Western norms of social, political and economic organization. As an influential external agent, prospective EU membership remains a central foreign issue of political relevance within Poland (Steves, p. 340). The debates around the reform of inclusion in the EU community shaped the evolution of new lines of political cleavages. Since the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, the European political establishment requires Poland to demonstrate “clean human-rights records, meticulous adherence to Western economic and political norms, and tolerance toward both neighboring countries and national minorities” (Janos, p. 16).

During the transitional period which started in 1989, the neoliberal economic reforms were endorsed by authoritative Western advisors. However, as Ferry (2003) argues, it was impossible to simply transplant an administrative model from an established liberal democracy to a country in the process of transforming from a communist system (p. 1106). As economic crisis management receded in the first post-transitional years, a new set of policy constraints began to fulfill the accession requirements for membership in the EU: the functioning of a competitive market economy, high administrative capacity in the private and public sectors, and a clean judiciary and working interior forces (Innes, p. 90). The ability of the state polity to adapt
Poland's economic and political structures to the Western European integration framework rose numerous debates at the level of masses and party elites. Kitschelt (1995) argues that during the years of transition from “national communism” to market liberalism in the 1990s “libertarian positions embraced integration in the Western economic civilization and sphere, whereas authoritarians insist on national autonomy to protect a unique cultural heritage that provides a line of defense against the libertarian civilization” (p. 462). With regard to the Rokkan-Lipset center-periphery cleavage, the divide was between “hard-liners” defending the peripheral culture of the particular Polish ethnos and “soft-liners” ready for compromise and a partial or total acceptance of the dominant European system related to the logic of globalization.

However, the division of the Polish society on the issue of European Integration is not based on confrontation between dominant worldviews as during the period of the Cold War when competition between the Soviet socialist system and Western capitalism left numerous nuances within the left and right ideologies. During the post-Cold War decade, at least three main party camps relied on the support of different social groups. The first camp consisted of those who advocated the speediest possible integration within the EU. The second had many serious doubts but generally was not against the process. The third camp comprised of firm opponents of the EU and most “foreign ideas”.

In the period between 1990 and 1995, the G-2448 made a total of $21.5 billion in assistance commitments to Poland, of which more than 45 percent came from the EU (Ners, pp. 63-65). The financial help of the Western countries to Poland at the time of the socio-economic transition strengthened positions of pro-EU lobbyist groups on the Polish political arena. Due to financial guarantees given by Western politicians and banks, the most entrepreneurial Polish liberal parties have developed a strategy to distinguish themselves in the political spectrum by

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48 The Group of 24 (G24) is an international organization founded in 1971 to coordinate the stances of developing countries on development finance and international monetary issues.
emphasizing the sequencing of pro-market reforms, credibility in their delivering, and, most important, their operating style in negotiating with Western partners rather than a coherent ideological platform (Innes, p. 90). The Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments (1989-1991) espoused a liberal internationalist ideological stance toward Europe, advocating a “Europe of regions” in which Poland’s national identity would be preserved alongside its emerging European identity (Steves, p. 343). Few years later, in May 1995 the former prime minister and fellow UW member, Hanna Suchocka, emphasized that “if Poland does not become a member of the EU, it will mean isolation, marginalization and in consequence the collapse of Polish civilization” (Stadtmuller, p. 31). The only one danger seemed to be, as it was stressed by the leader of pro-free-market Union for Real Politics (UPR), if the EU was dominated by the left and the “ubiquitous Eurocrats”. In this case economic freedom of Poland could be fiction (Stadtmuller, p. 31).

The position on European Integration of the ex-communist alliance of the left, SLD and PSL, was more cautious. Rosati (1999) argues that it was “not so much a symptom of a dislike of the West in general but a reflection of fears that too hasty and ill-prepared bids to enter Euro-Atlantic structures might led to an unnecessary destabilization of the situation in Central Europe” (p. 12). Some politicians, especially within the Pawlak-led Social Democratic (SdRP-PSL) government of 1992 favored closer relations with Russia. However, the general position of the SLD during the 1990s evolved toward support of intensification of the integration process. The Social Democratic prime minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz in 1996 argued that “the European orientation is dictated by the most basic interests of our country and it is built on values that are common for Poland and the EU” (Stadtmuller, p. 30). For the Marxist-Leninist groups, such as the Union of Polish Communist (ZKP) European integration was not a threat in itself but just another manifestation of capitalist domination. The most concrete counterarguments to the entry of Poland in the EU from the left fringe of the political spectrum were made by PSL politicians.
who claimed to defend the interests of Polish farmers and were concerned about the fate of domestic agriculture. The attitude of the PSL to integration was one of the key elements which distinguished the party from its political ally, the SLD. However, even the PSL did not reject integration outright, and stressed the need for parallel strengthening links between Poland and other Central European countries.

The third position toward EU integration was represented by the nationalist right. The nationalist-populist parties such as Center Accord, Christian National Alliance (ZChN), and Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), while committed strongly to NATO membership, were more critical to European socio-political integration than liberal parties. The ZChN represented quite skeptical views based on a combination of prejudice and national memory. The party leaders argued that apart from being a front for German expansionism, the EU was a danger to Polish sovereignty and independence, Catholicism, traditional moral values, as well as the national economy (Stadtmuller, p. 32). As it was argued by Thee at the beginning of the transitional period in 1991, the deep-rooted Polish nationalism appeared as a radical alternative to the liberal market-oriented politicians (represented by the UW and the UPR) within the Right camp when the political debates were compounded by the sudden intrusion of increased economic polarization (Thee, p. 246). The same warnings were expressed by Adam Michnik, a politician from the liberal-democratic wing of the Solidarity: “The greatest threat to democracy today is no longer Communism, either as a political movement or as an ideology. The threat grows instead from a combination of chauvinism, xenophobia, populism and authoritarianism, all of them connected with the sense of frustration typical of great social upheavals (p. 7). Millard (1996) notes that through the economic turbulence of 1992-93 social discontent embraced some xenophobic and nationalist traits (p. 205). But openly chauvinist political groups in the first half of the 1990s were relatively small and could not claim to represent a wide range of social groups.

The program of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) before the national elections of 1997
was generally pro-European but also called a slowing down of the process of integration, and strongly emphasized that the power of the EU should not supersede that of the nation-state (Stadtmuller, p. 33). However, the beginning of substantive negotiations with the EU Commission started soon after the electoral victory of the AWS. It put the question of Polish membership in a completely different perspective compared to the early 1990s and seemed to mark the beginning of a new stage in shaping opinions on integration on the part of politicians and society as a whole (Stadtmuller, p. 29). In 1999, the Polish government published a “National Program” of Preparation for Membership in the EU which stated that it had undertaken steps to “encourage creation of an efficient system and relevant structures of regional development support compatible with Community rules” (Ferry, p. 1104). However, applying to the composition of the government coalition in the period Buzek’s government (November 1997 - October 2001), Steves (2001) points out that as many as 60 AWS coalition MPs were from parties such as the KPN-OP and ZChN, both of which opposed Poland’s Europe agreement (p. 344). Moreover, Ryszard Czarnecki, a representative of the ZChN, occupied a position of the head of the Committee for Integration (KIE). This event demonstrated that the inclusion of politicians opposed to the Poland’s membership in the EU did not create any obstacles for the governing center-right elites to move toward Eurointegration, but at the same time allowed to show European parliamentarians an alternative to their loyal pro-European position. Czarnecki himself saw his role as one of mediating between the extremes of both Euro-enthusiasts and avowed enemies of the EU within the coalition. Stadtmuller (2000) notes that he tried to soften previous remarks made regarding Germany’s role in the EU, the threat to Poland constituted by foreign capital, and the loss of sovereignty EU membership would entail describing himself as “Polish Gaullist” (p. 33). Nevertheless, the ZChN, been a part of the AWS coalition in the

49 The first visit of new Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek to Brussels in November 1997, as well as his initial policy statements in which a strong emphasis on NATO membership, was supplemented by similarly strong support for EU membership.
elections of 2001 experienced significant loss of votes and did not enter the new parliament.

By the time of the preparations to negotiate with European institutions in 1999 popular support for Eurointegration among Poles had begun to erode. It started declining from 72 percent in April 1997 to 64 percent in February 1998 and to 55 percent in May 1999 (Blacyca, Kolkiewicz, pp. 140). Steves (2001) argues that the extended delay in accession caused resentment and even popular opposition to Polish membership (p. 343). Stadtmuller (2000) provided an explanation for this tendency this way: as the negotiations on Polish membership in the EU began to go further, so greater sections of Polish society became less sanguine over the costs of EU membership. Table 21 shows that over the year and a half (August 1997 – December 1998) the number of people assuming that delay in the reform process would retard Poland’s development and its chances of meeting the requirements of global, political and economic processes increased.

The position of respondents toward the participation of Poland in the European integration process was reflected on their party preferences. Stadtmuller (2000) argues that at the end of the 1990s integration was most strongly favored by respondents under 24 years old of age, the well educated, managers, professionals and students. The researcher notes that although all of these groups tend largely to the right of center in terms of their thinking, both the SLD and the AWS have a solid pro-European base of support. The overwhelming majority of liberal UW and AWS supported the Polish membership in the EU (Table 22). The Social Democrats also preferred to see their country being a member of the European community. At the same time, the electorate of the PSL was split in regard to this issue. Rural dwellers, people resident in the east of the country, and people on low incomes who were largely supporters of the party were prone to express a negative opinion. The protest electorate needed political representation.

At the time close to the parliamentary elections of 2001 the critical claims about the Polish role in Euro-integration process were made by conservative right politicians. One of the
most famous of them, Jan Lopuszanski stated that as “currently constituted, the EU was injurious for Poland and Europe as a whole. The method of Brussel’s socialists is based on leveling all that does not fit a common pattern and they build unity on money and by killing identities” (Stadtmuller, p. 35). At the time of debates in the Sejm concerning ratification of the NATO agreement Lopuszanski voted solely against Polish membership in this organization opposing his views to the position of the ZChN. At the time of the approaching 2001 parliamentary elections this party shifted toward the center right political mainstream represented by the AWS. At the same time, the ZChN tried to embrace the Christian democratic ideology and abandon entrenched nationalist positions. As a result, the most radical party members preferred to leave it. The two parties with clear Eurosceptic positions appeared instead in the 2001 elections – the League of Polish Families and Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland. The formal reason explaining the emergence of these parties was a disintegration of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) coalition, which was formed in 1996 as an umbrella organization for the numerous center- and nationalist right parties in Poland. In the 2001 election, the remnants of the AWS failed to clear the percent threshold necessary for coalitions to receive seats in the Sejm. However, the key reasons of the electoral breakthrough of the new populists were deeper.

According to the electoral outcomes of the 2001 elections, the Self Defense (SO), League of Polish Families (LPR), and Civic Platform (PO), were all more liked among those groups of the electorate which paid special attention to the role of the European integration issue. The LPR was the most radical Eurosceptic party. The core of the new party came mainly from what in the mid-1990s was the National Party and a few other minor nationalist groupings. Some of the LPR prominent representatives, as Lopuszanski, had been members of the ZChN before. The LPR radically opposed joining the EU suggesting instead support for the project a “Europe of sovereign nations”. In most of the party’s publications EU membership was presented as another form of hegemony or even partition of Poland by the Western countries. The most notable
slogans used by the LPR were "Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels", "Poland for Poles", "Every Pole will have a job in EU, so let’s go there. Every Pole will have a Mercedes… to wash" (Markowski, pp. 12-13). In the perspective of the LPR supporters, EU membership represented a danger commensurate to the 18th century partitions concerning all domains of life: economy, religious identity and land. The party leader of the LPR, Roman Giertych, believed that a union controlled by European social liberals cannot be reformed.

The second national-populist party, the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SO), appeared in the 2001 parliamentary elections as a main representative of Polish farmers. The SO’s EU campaign differed considerably from the one offered by the LPR. The party leader Lepper had argued that his political platform was not fundamentally against EU entry, but he had rejected particular terms of agreement, especially in the economic sphere, and more specifically, agricultural policy domains. The Polish foreign policy was accused of contributing to the country becoming a market for production surpluses of the Western countries. In the party’s perspective, the “liberal” politicians had contributed to the destruction of the Polish industry and agriculture. Lepper claimed to characterize the party’s position as a “Eurorealism”, arguing that Poland should postpone membership in the EU until it could get better conditions for accession.

Euroscepticism of the SO appeared to be more “pragmatic” than LPR’s irreconcilable anti-EU position. The particular feature of the former’s view was a pragmatic evaluation of Poland’s inability to prevent the assumed corruption and incompetence of EU bureaucrats. The SO supporters did not seem to feel any less “European” than other Eurosceptics among center left and right politicians, nor did they have any less trust in NATO. However, both parties shared basic ideas which allowed them to appear as representatives of frustrated groups of Polish electorate. Markowski (2005) argues that the attraction of Eurosceptics to SRP and LPR does not appear to be a story of mobilizing the formerly unmobilized “silent majority”. He managed to demonstrate that both parties drew the vast majority of their support among Euroskeptics from those who were already participating in the political process in 1997. LPR Euroskeptics
overwhelmingly came from the nationalist supporters of the AWS in 1997. 50 Self-Defense picked up the majority of its Euroskeptics from the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and the Union of Labor (UP). 51 This led to the conclusion that LPR’s Eurosceptics were mainly bearers of rightwing political behavior, while Self-Defense picked up strong opponents of Eurointegration with a history of left-wing political behavior. Moreover, according to Markowski (2005), “LPR Eurosceptics are overwhelmingly more rightist than the average Eurosceptic, and SRP Eurosceptics are significantly more leftist than the average Eurosceptic” (p. 21). Nevertheless, both parties were very similar in terms of their electoral support - four-fifths of the LPR Eurosceptics were hard core Eurosceptics, as compared to a still significant but not quite as large two-thirds of the SRP Eurosceptics (p. 21).

The phenomenon of the left-wing Self Defense adopting nationalistic rhetoric seems to be a particularly interesting political phenomenon that appeared in Eastern Europe in the transitional period of European integration. The political realignment of 2001 in Poland was supplemented by the rise of Euroscepticist sentiments which were used by national-populist parties. The 2003 Polish referendum on EU membership revealed a strong link with voting behavior in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections. Voters who had supported SRP and LPR in the 2001 parliamentary election were much more likely to oppose EU membership than voters for the pro-EU parties. At the time of the parliamentary elections of 2005, the political platforms of the LPR and SD remained basically the same ones they had been in the previous elections.

The third Polish party with a high score of objective proximity between elites and party supporters toward the issue of European Integration, Civic Platform (PO), had quite opposite views compared to the electoral platforms of the two radical populist parties. At the time of the 2005 elections Millard (2005) characterized the PO as the party that “inherited the mantle of the

50 LPR picked up approximately 12% of the overall 1997 AWS electorate in 2001, but almost 20% of the Eurosceptic 1997 AWS electorate Markowski, 2005, p. 18).
51 Self-Defense picked up 3%, 5%, and 19% of the 1997 SLD, UP, and PSL electorates overall, respectively, but 6%, 13%, and 24% of their Eurosceptic 1997 electorates (Markowski, 2005 p. 18).
Freedom Union” and as “the most “civilized” Polish party” (Millard, 2005, p. 1029). At the time of the electoral campaign of 2005, the Civic Platform’s commitment to better relations with European nations was well known. The representative of interests of national business and liberal intellectuals, the PO since its onset in 2001 promised to ratify the new EU treaty in short terms. In an interview, the party deputy, Bronislaw Komorowski said: “We want to quite consciously move from the periphery to the heart of the European integration” (Kulish, 2007).

Law and Justice as the last decisive actor in Polish politics supported integration with the EU only on terms beneficial for Poland. It was in favor of economic integration and tightening the cooperation in areas of energy and military security, but was skeptical about closer political integration. The party leader Yaroslav Kachinski was against the formation of a European superstate or federation. At the time of the 2005 elections the PiS’s concept of “Europe of strong states” was opposed to the “Deepening integration” approach of the Civic Platform. In terms of ideological proximity the choice made by moderate conservative politicians between pro-European views of the PO and the Eurosceptic stances of the populist LPR and SO depended on concrete foreign circumstances. Bynander (2005) explains this logic arguing: “When Poland joined the European Union as a full member in May 2004, it was still unclear what that Union was, pending the postponed final negotiation of the EU constitution. Although the new members have full disclosure of that process, it is likely that they will not be entirely happy with the result, nor with the other concessions forced upon them in last-minute membership negotiations that ultimately led to the Copenhagen summit accession decision. It is likely that Poland will assume a leading role52 in such advocacy of re-examination of EU policy” (p. 11). Kachinski and his party seemed to make the same choice the Buzek government did in November 1997 at the beginning of the second round of the European integration process. The inclusion in the national

52 Poland was territorially the largest country-candidate to the entry in the EU in 2004 and after becoming a member of the organization it got a large number of votes.
government of the leader of Self-Defence, a party with a moderate Eurosceptic position, reminds of the role assigned to Czarnecki, a representative of the nationalist Christian National Alliance in the government led by the moderate right politicians from Solidarity. The coalition between the PiS and two populist parties is thus understood as a “tactical” alliance.

**Urban-rural Cleavage**

The traditional urban–rural cleavage in the social and political conditions of the Italian and Polish societies during the 1990s seems to be a form of the “center-periphery” conflict along the economic dimension. According to Zarycki, “the spread of industrialization can be considered equivalent to the spread of the centrally-imposed culture of the dominating nation-state” (p. 851). At the same time the process of European integration widened the gap in development between urban and rural sectors. Many localistic political movements have been stimulated by the perceived failure of the state to provide economic efficiency to particular country regions whereas their constituencies seemed to be losers in the process of economic development. This failure provoked different political responses to similar social challenges. As a result, conflicts between political parties on the same side of the right party spectrum took place (Italian Northern League – MSI; PO – PiS), and led to conflicts between prospective partners of government coalitions.

**Italy**

The emergence of Italy's Northern League in the late 1980 and early 1990s as a particularly new phenomenon of national politics put the role of the development of Italian northern (urban) and southern (rural) regions at the center of the political debate. The electoral party disputes at the time of the 1994 election campaign to a large extent focused on the 'Southern problem' in the development of the Italian state and tended to draw heavily and rhetorically on a series of well worn stereotypes that equate the South with forms of social and economic backwardness opposing it to the well-developed North (Davis, p. 53). Sznajder (1995) points out that this issue was a part of more general process. He argues that during the last decades of the 20th century traditional cleavages based on political polarization in Italy were replaced by new cleavages resulting from the process of asymmetric modernization (p. 85).

The theoreticians of the world-system approach (Wallerstein, Stubbs, Cox) study
particular world regions through the prism of multi-level governance accompanied by a reshaping of cultural and political identities ‘leading many local and regional groups, movements and nationalisms to question the nation-state as a representative and accountable power system (Agnew, 1995, p. 265). Cox (1984) develops this idea saying that in the period of Globalization the state has been converted into “a transmission belt from the global to the national economy, where heretofore it had acted as the bulwark defending domestic welfare from external disturbances” (p. 49). However, “domestic welfare”, sustained by national governments, is under the pressure of two main actors. The supra-national entities (European Community) coordinate collective policies to deal with internalization of trade, production and finance. Micro-regions as territorial units within national counties tend to increase regional disparities due to the free movement of capital and labor and to the weakening of the nation state’s regulatory powers. The result of these processes is the emergence of a political cleavage between different parties oriented toward different groups of interests at the state-province level.

Compared to France, Germany and England, a sense of shared national identity has never been strong in Italy (Agnew, 1995, p. 158). Italian national politics, to use the terms of March and Olsen (March and Olsen, 1989), has been “aggregative” rather than “integrative”; based on the pursuit of particular interests more than the commitment to a common set of values and the adoption of a collective worldview. Strong municipal identities in Italy have long preceded the emergence of regional ones. Italy’s large cities, in particular, have their own identities and do not generally form part of their own region’s model of development of socio-cultural configuration. Agnew (1995) points out that Venice as a large city does not belong to the modello veneto, a conglomerate of localities which surround a megalopolis, since the former possesses a different socio-economic structure and cultural environment; Milan has very little in common with eastern Lombardy (p. 271). Thus, regional capitals have not been capable of interpreting and representing the interests of their regions, precisely because they have little in common with the socio-economic systems which characterize the wider regional territory.
Since the Italian economy decentralized, regional disparities in economic development increased, state reforms exposed the inefficiency and corruption of the state beyond the everyday indignities of involvement with the central bureaucracy and parts of the Italian South became ever more strongly identified with crime. The shifting political-economic position of Italy had produced new pressures for a “localization” of Italian society (Agnew, 1989). In such circumstances the formation of a political party pursuing a separatist policy was quite possible.

The Venetian League, a small regional political group in the north-eastern part of Italy, attracted the first groups of supporters promising to preserve their dialect. Identifying regional cultural differences was the most important element in the early election campaign of 1983. Very soon the party leader Umberto Bossi managed to bring together the disparate leagues (initially consisted of six territorial unions) into one “umbrella” organization providing it with a common program and electoral organization. Very soon the party rhetoric shifted to an emphasis on territory as a reference point for socio-economic interests rather than cultural identity per se. Lombardy was depicted by party leadership as suffering from the state bureaucracy run by and for the material support of the southern regions. The state was seen as favoring ‘southerners’ through public spending while the North relied largely on individual private initiative alone.53

LN represented a specific type of urban-rural cleavage. Economically and socially, Italy’s north-eastern regions, together with the central regions were identified as the “third Italy”, characterized by the prevailing model of small-scale industrialization, low social polarization, and the persistence of strong kinship and social networks. This model of capitalism differed substantially from both the large state industry typical of the north-west and the underdevelopment of the south (Bull, p. 262). A very rapid process of industrialization and economic growth was demonstrated in the east-north (particularly in Veneto and Trentino-Alto

53 Attention was repeatedly drawn to how 31 percent of the South's economic product derived from state spending compared to only 18 per cent in the North - itself increasingly divided economically between stagnant (e.g., Calabria) and dynamic (e.g., Abruzzo) regional economies (Agnew, 1995, p. 166).
Adige) during the last two decades of the 20th century. In the 1970s they were only slightly above the national average in terms of GDP per head. Between 1970 and 1993 both regions doubled their gross domestic product, whereas Italy as a whole experienced a growth of 75 percent (Bull, p. 263). The economic success of the northern-eastern region enabled Bossi to construct a strong regional boundary around it which had led to “the politicization of regional identity and the emergence of the region as a framework for political action” (Keating, p. 17). Bull (2005) argues that “the Lombard League’s political success in the early 1990s can be explained partly by the fact that it has taken on the representation of the local model of economic development at a time when this is perceived to be in difficulty and in need of support, at least in terms of efficient public services, widespread services to industry, access to finance, and better infrastructure” (p. 263).

The central political idea developed by Bossi is a focus on the productivity of big and small northern business weighed down by corrupt “southern” Roman bureaucracy and Roman political parties. According to the leader of the LN, the latter were organized with reference to the Cold War rather than the emerging world of economic competition between regions and localities. A specifically political argument in the party program at the time of the 1992 election was announced this way: “Competition today is no longer between states but between regions and macro-regions” (Agnew, p. 164).

The electoral strength of the LN came from the crisis of the Christian Democratic party. Since the end of the 1960s the DC revealed itself decreasingly capable of defending the small business interests of the northern groups of the electorate which were in conflict with its clientelistic support of the agriculture in the south. The NL became a new representative of the interests of northern small business. In the rest of Italy there was almost zero support for the League. At the beginning of the 1990s, the LN enjoyed deepening of support in its initial areas of strength rather than contagious diffusion into new areas. The analysis of zones where the League achieved its highest political support in 1987-92 vs. elsewhere in the North reveals some of the
possible causes of this tendency. The party was most popular in localities with higher incomes on average from manufacturing industry; higher growth in industrial incomes in the 1980s; larger numbers of private firms; larger numbers of industrial employees; and lower public transfers per inhabitant. The electoral expansion of the LN was most evident where the growth of small industrial sectors (industrial districts) had been accompanied with lower levels of dependence on state transfers. At the same time, those local areas in northern Italy were most associated with dynamic economic growth.

According to Agnew (2005), the strong allegiance to the League appeals is grounded more on its regional-geographic characteristics rather than by support from particular social strata. On the other hand, the role of cultural factors should not be overestimated. Voters responded positively to its “invention” of a Lombard identity associated with anti-party and anti-centralist views despite the absence of a “true” ethnic identity to which they can point (p. 160). The transversal character of the appeal exercised by the League, cutting across social strata, follows from this geographical integration of local interests, “common” language and antagonism to “outsiders” from other regions. The expansion of the League is, therefore, a symptom of the ongoing fragmentation/localization of the postwar Italian political system rather than of the emergence of a movement whose “imagined community” is either an independent Lombardy or a new northern Italian state.

The analysis of the relationship between the party elites and demands of the League's electorate helps reveal several puzzles. In the first period of its electoral activity, the LN tried to point at the regional dimension of Italian politics whereas very few people were attracted to ethnoregionalism. Davies (1996) points out that throughout northern Italy local and plus national identifications are much stronger than regional ones such as that of 'Lombard' (p. 154). Nevertheless, League activists have consistently stressed in their electoral slogans the administrative inefficiency of the state. Later the party constructed several complicated political
concepts designed to reform Italian regional borders and institutions which were not understood by the party constituency. The analysis of social movements of supporters of the NL reveals the evident contradiction between the localized political support and the electoral strategy of becoming a national party with the main residence in Rome.

The main party problem, since the end of the 1980s closing the way to the national politics, was the narrow concentration of its electoral support outside northern Italy. At the same time, unlike the LN the positions of other political 'newcomers' located on the right side of the party spectrum (Forward Italy and National Alliance) were strong in the South.

The MSI characterized itself as the most intransigent champion for national unity in a period when the LN received votes from the mostly urban northern electorate. The party leader Fini argued against the notion of “three Italies” and billed himself as defender of the countryside. The main social appeal was addressed to the rural, petit-bourgeois electorate of the south which had traditionalist and conservative preferences (Ignazi, 1993). Disaggregation of society in the south, inability to develop forms of horizontal social mobilization comparable to the trade unions and cooperative movements in northern Italy (Davies, p. 59) have been central barriers to economic growth and social change there. Sznajder (1995) argues that the Italian South, as a less developed part of the country, “still finds the idea of an intervening nation-state appealing, not only because it regulates economic matters while respecting private property and individual initiative, but also because it has claims to solve the problem of regional cultural differences through the promotion of common national values” (pp. 101-102). This situation created a special need in state apparatus in all processes of social activity in the South. The statist ideological platform of the MSI was quite applicable for the southern localities. In its electoral 1994 program the MSI did not oppose free markets and entrepreneurship, but criticized privatization of public enterprises and granted the state a tutelary role in order to strengthen the national economy and avoid “sectoral colonization” by large multinational companies. To encourage production in low-developed districts and to combat unemployment in the agricultural
sector it was proposed to create new workplaces and tax exemption on reinvested profits. The party in accordance with the neo-fascist tradition proposed establishment of forms of corporative social representation.

The MSI political project of unitarian welfare state had almost nothing in common with the neoliberal regionalist ideas of the LN party elites. The political articulation of the urban-rural cleavage, complemented by the territorial dimension of the conflict, was represented by two parties located on the right side of political spectrum. The political debates between them were characterized by harsh rhetoric. The editorial writer of the Secolo d'Italia (paper owned by the MSI), in response to Bossi's coarse attacks against his party said: “The League is not a contender like all the rest: it is an enemy to be beaten” (Carioti, p. 64). However, the conflict between two regional-based parties did not prevent them from electoral collaboration. It happened mainly because of the mediating position taken by the third party, Forward Italy which managed to find an overlapping consensus with both MSI and NL.

The FI and NL were new right parties which adopted the economic platform of neoliberalism. Visco (1994) points out that in the Italian context where traditional right ideology has been even more state-orientated than left political views, the LN in its ideological stances came much closer to the right-wing Anglo-American economic philosophy associated with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and with the nostalgia for a simpler past characteristic of the “anti-politics” adopted in Great Britain and the USA in the 1980s and 1990s (p. 17). The open identification of the FI and NL with the needs of small entrepreneurs and the claim of a “dependency” created by the welfare state came especially close to the key themes of the “enterprise culture” of Thatcherism (Krieger, 1986). The alliance of local politician Bossi and the television entrepreneur Berlusconi in the 1994 national election can be explained by their common commitment to Thatcherite rhetoric and electoral appeal to the same groups of Italian electorate. At the same time, the ideas of a strong executive central power, rejection of the federalist administrative division of Italy, along with a social appeal addressed to different
groups of voters based on “patrimonialization” of politics brought the policy stances of the MSI and FI closer (Sznajder, p. 97).

However, the fundamental reasons explaining electoral collaboration between different right parties are even more pragmatic. In 1994, only Forward Italy and the Party of Democratic Socialism were truly national political parties. Thus, only they could become architects of the center-right and center-left party coalitions respectively. The LN remained contained in the North, unable to expand beyond its regional heartland. But even in that region, due to the new electoral law of 1993, there was the possibility of the League being squeezed between the FI and the PDS as a classic “third” party in a majoritarian system. The alliance of local politician Bossi and the television entrepreneur Berlusconi in the 1994 national election can be explained by their common commitment to Thatcherite rhetoric and electoral appeal to the same groups of electorate. The mutual fear that each party would capture the electorate of the other facilitated negotiations between Northern League and Forward Italy. The network of the private channels controlled by Berlusconi proved more effective than the League’s localized campaigning in spreading the “protest anti-Rome” message to the largest possible national audience. The fear of losing the themes of right-wing national populism to Berlusconi proved a stronger draw for Bossi in the 1994 election than did the commitment to his regional activists and their antipathy to businessmen-politicians such as Berlusconi (Agnew, 1995, p. 168).

Since the first years of participation in parliamentary elections, the MSI received a lion share of political support in the southern Italian regions. The geographical distribution of votes during the next decades had a direct impact on the social appeals of the party leadership. The entrenchment of the AN in the South and the penetration of Forward Italy into all regions of the country, including the North created the opportunity for the creation of an alliance between them. According to the results of the 1992 election in southern Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, northern

54 The first 1948 electoral results confirmed the relevance of the north-south cleavage for the MSI: the party elected six deputies, all from southern constituencies, and 69.6 percent of its votes were cast in the region south of Rome.
Campania and Puglia, the AN was the leading party. In the municipal elections in 1994 in Sardinia and Sicily Forza Italia was in the lead (over 30 percent of votes) (Agnew, 1995, p. 165). But positions of both right parties were challenged by the left. Northern Lazio was split between the PDS and the National Alliance. In Naples, Calabria and Basilicata the PDS had the edge over the other parties, which caused the need for electoral collaboration between the FI and MSI.

In 1994 the Northern League and the National Alliance became a part of the center-right party alliance led by Berlusconi, even though there was a continuing contrast in their appeals - to “local society” and “national state” respectively - as the main locus of political identity. The continuing commitment of the AN to the ideological heritage of Fascism and state economic intervention, and its association with the southerners stigmatized by the League have provided a target for derision from the League's leaders even after July 1994. Despite the pragmatic need for the creation of an electoral alliance of the right parties (FI, NL and AN) the urban-rural cleavage was reflected in the process of coalition bargaining. Notwithstanding the resolution of the conflict between the AN and NL, Berlusconi's government has suffered since the beginning from a chronic instability created by internal ideological contradictions and conflicts of interests within the party coalition.

Poland

The cleavage of urban centers vs. countryside was traditionally very strong in Eastern Europe (Von. Beyme, p. 129). The urban and rural camps represent distinct groups in Polish society. The rural camp is represented by petty peasants, a social group specific to Poland where the attempts at nationalization of private farms in the Soviet period failed. The urban electorate consists of the businessmen and intellectuals, which exists as a separate social stratum only in Eastern and Central Europe (Zarycki, 2002, p. 852). Nevertheless, the political articulation of a historically rooted cleavage in the 1990s was complemented by external processes. The
development of the European integration is the most important of them. The synthesis of socio-economic tensions and external influence on the country’s economic development led to the formation of the urban/rural cleavage into specific phenomena characterized by Tworzecki (1996) as a dichotomy between “agrarian populism” vs. “market urban market liberalism”.

A society undergoing a transition toward integration into the European community evolves through a unique set of institutional and socioeconomic constraints which create complex and evolutionary distributions of state power (Offe, 1991). Steves (2001) notes that this shifting power landscape leads to a conflict of interests between different sectors of the national economy and puts foreign relations on the national electoral agenda, with competing political elites utilizing foreign policy as one resource to garner domestic popular support (p. 340). Zarycki (2002) argues:

In an international, industrial and economic context, the economic center of Poland, when seen as a peripheral country, has been firmly located in Western Europe for a long time. The western part of Poland is much more urban than its eastern part. Thus, Polish urbanization and, later, industrialization spread eastward from the West (p. 853).

The communist period in Poland continued the large-scale processes of industrialization and urbanization, which radically altered the country’s socio-economic landscape. The process of modernization led by the state was accompanied by the willingness of local party elites to take more responsibilities on themselves. At the same time, the anti-etatist concept of a “self-governing republic” with devolved authorities from the central to the local administrative level was prominent in the Solidarity movement from the early 1980s. Thesis 21 of the Solidarity program in the period of its legal existence in 1980-81 called for free elections for sub-national government units which would get the right to levy taxes. These themes were debated at the round-table negotiations in 1988-89 (Illner, p. 17).

Gorzelak (1998) argues that in the post-communist transitional period, approaches to the

Zarycki (2002) points out that most Polish towns were established according to German laws and that a large proportion of the urban population of premodern Poland was German (p.662).
reform of regional government reflected two basic views. The first one stressing the political flux and economic uncertainty of Poland’s post-communist setting demanded the creation of a strong, centralized state to defend Poland’s national identity and sovereignty. The centralized state could increase its power over limited economic resources while central authorities could try to control regional economic inequalities and protect those regions that seemed to be more vulnerable in the period of transition (p. 74). The second approach is based on decentralizing the state through democratization and economic liberalization of the Polish society. According to Ferry (2003), “it demanded a decentralized view of the regional tier of government with strong regions exercising significant political and financial autonomy in order to spur development on their own territories” (p. 1106). Various political parties aligned themselves along this axis.

Trying to enter the EU Polish politicians had to meet particular requirements suggested by EU’s official institutions. The European Commission assesses the CC’s (Country candidates) efforts in meeting a specific list of policy priorities through the publication of “Accession Partnerships” and “Regular Reports”. Chapter 21 of the document 'Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments' (1993) stressed the importance of building the capacity of institutions involved in regional policy and the management of Structural Funds. The Commission expected CCs to establish on their territories administrative units matching its nomenclature for territorial units (NUTS). Larger, stronger regions, fitting the international criteria ought to be more prominent partners in bargaining over domestic economic initiatives (Ferry, p. 1105). In order to count on EU funding Poland had to form administrative units categorized with reference to NUTS level 2 with population thresholds of 800,000-3 million people56 (Ferry, p. 1099). This principle provoked debates between different political forces and appeared as an example of how Commission requirements can be shaped by political cleavages.

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56 EU structural funds, allocated to Poland in 2001, were directed at regional as well as national administrations with the aim of building ‘capacity’ at both levels with clear incentive to Poland to strengthen the competencies of its regions (The PHARE Program, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50004.htm)
over domestic issues between three groups of Polish parties.

The Democratic Union (UW), headed by the economist Leszek Balcerowich, was the main Polish liberal party at the beginning of the 1990s and enjoyed electoral support mainly by the urban population, with the liberal intelligentsia as its core electorate. One of his main slogans was to “smash the People’s Republic model of a centralized government and state administration” (Ferry, p. 1106). Another prominent pro-European liberal party, Union of Political Realism (UPR), was a relatively small group, radically market-oriented. Support for diminishing the role of the state in regional matters reflected the popularity of neoliberal economic principles amongst the Solidarity elite (particularly circles associated with the UW). According to their logic, in a decentralized state there are much richer possibilities for regions to form their policies, more in tune with specific local institutions and needs. This liberal political camp was strongly committed to a pro-European outlook and tried to intensify negotiations with EU institutions at the end of the 1990s. The first proposal of the AWS/UW coalition government after the victorious 1997 elections advocated reducing the number of administrative regions from 49 to 12, based on large urban centers. It was presented by neoliberal politicians as the most rational way to make policy implementation more efficient, with regions large enough to be self-financing units and to contribute to the process of recovery in “economic black spots” (Ferry, p. 1107).

The former communist camp, grouped around the Democratic Social Alliance, during 1993-97 contested decentralization and delayed the regional reform process. The general position of the Social Democrats (SLD) was to maintain a strong state with a redistributive function in order to protect particular social groups that suffered from the hardships of the economic transition, especially in economically weaker regions. The party stances were strengthened by the interests of central bureaucracy, regional administrative elites which did not want to leave
their positions after accomplishing the administrative reforms. The SLD leader, President Aleksander Kwasnewski, opposed the planned territorial division arguing that the social consequences for capitals of less economically advanced regions not included in the new model would be severe (Ferry, p.1107). The main political ally of the SLD, Polish Peasant Party (PSL), was the main representative of Poland’s farming sector and had its own views on the necessity of administrative reform. The existing system of 49 regions seemed to be optimal for the PSL leaders. They feared that administrative reform would upset the balance of power at the local level while the party strongholds amongst local elites in the villages and countryside could be weakened by a shift of focus to district or regional administrative levels. Second, the PSL opposed any changes which might affect its traditionally strong support in rural areas. The logic was quite simple: the larger the regions, the smaller the political representation of the PSL in Polish parliament.

During the debates over administrative reform the political views of Polish nationalists within and outside Solidarity camp were much closer to the stances of the left-wing politicians than to the ideas of Polish neoliberals (Table 23). The Polish nationalist right feared that the strengthening of regional authorities would facilitate cross-border cooperation between regions and foreign states and create obstacles for pursuing of strategic national interests. In their view administrative reform could undermine the integrity of the Polish state. Ferry (2003) notes that in comparison with the West, the process of democratization and decentralization in Poland was introduced “virtually overnight amidst the upsurge of patriotism that accompanies the achievement of national sovereignty” (p. 1107). In this context the tension between those political forces on the right who desired to consolidate the power of the nation-state and the neoliberals wanted to devolve authority to the regional authorities was prominent. Ferry (2003)

57Aleksander Kwaśniewski became a president in 1995 defeating in the second round of elections his opponent Lech Walesa. After the end of the first term, Kwaśniewski was re-elected in 2000. His second term ended on December 23, 2005.
points out that after the 1997 elections conservative former anti-communists and more religious and anti-European factions from the Solidarity camp, such as the MP Jan Lopuszanski, supported an intermediate proposal of creating 25-31 regions because large regions would “hand over Poland's newly won independence to another “International”, this time with its headquarters in Brussels” (p. 1108).

In July 1998, 3 months after the government consisting of Solidarity representatives had made its original proposal assuming creation of 12 administrative units in Poland, Kwasnevski vetoed the bill and proposed instead a new system of 17 regions. The government had to compromise and the new division of Poland into 16 regions was agreed. Ferry (2003) sees in that a victory for the SLD and an embarrassing failure for the AWS-UW coalition (p. 1108). However, the party positions on administrative reform reflected a new cleavage between the elites of large prosperous regions (mostly urban areas) and the interests of the Polish secondary economy (rural areas). Evidently it was reflected in the proposals of different political parties (Table 23). The big gap between the positions of the left-wing parties, the liberal pro-EU groups of Solidarity movement and more traditionally oriented nationalists emerged.

The bivariate analysis of the impact of the urban-rural divide upon European identity in post-Communist states, presented by Haerpfer (2002) shows a clear pattern for the Eastern European countries (with the exception of Romania): the higher the number of inhabitants in a given town, the higher the probability of a person developing a European identification. Although Table 24 shows that European identity in Poland is not strong enough, the greatest share of “Europeans” is visible in large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Hence, it can be argued that the extent of the European identity is associated with the degree of urbanization in Poland. The urban-rural divide does not look especially prominent but it is very clear. In the Polish villages, 14 percent of the rural population identify with Europe, whereas in Polish big cities like Warsaw or Krakow 22 percent of the urban population label themselves “Europeans” (Haerpfer, p. 115). The general support for EU membership based on the urban-rural divide
shows the same trend (Table 25). The share of “pro-Europeans” among Poles goes up from 30 to 34 percent but not so significantly as in other Eastern European countries (Haerpfer, pp. 133-34). Thus, I can speak of a comparatively high homogeneity of Polish society in 1998 along with the urban-rural dimension with regard to EU enlargement.

Zarycki (2000) argues that at the time of the 1997 parliamentary elections, the urban-rural conflict was almost exclusively represented by the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) as a “political force with the seemingly uniform social appeal in Poland because it received electoral support from the relatively numerous petty peasant population” (p. 854). The second factor explaining the electoral strength of the PSL concerns its historical heritage. The party was a direct heir of the ZSL (United Peasant Party), one of the two allies of the ruling Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) during the communist period. It allowed the PSL to preserve political links with its traditional supporters in the Soviet period. However, the party could not monopolize electoral preferences of the whole Polish peasantry. Zarycki (2000) mentions that during the 1990s the cleavage between different groups of the electorate over the issues of rural/urban development was already based on a left-right dimension of the national politics and a recognition of a decisive role of the religious factor. But all three dimensions were strongly correlated to the territorial redistribution of voters.

Left-voting regions were mainly represented in urban Western and Northern lands by Silesia, Pomerania (with the exceptions of Kaszuby), and the Polish part of former East Prussia in northern Poland (Warmia and Mazury). Most people in these former German territories in the Communist period were not peasants but rather workers on state farms (PGRs). Most of these state enterprises went bankrupt at the time of economic transition and since the beginning of the 1990s the region suffers from high structural unemployment. However, Zarycki (2002) argues that the electorate in these areas is mainly liberal. High labor volatility, relatively high level of education and the lack of strong historical traditions in the region are benevolent for liberal ideas. The “northern” and “western” Polish intelligentsia strongly voted for the liberal Freedom.
Zarycki (2002) notes that “the regional cultural conditions have created a kind of Polish melting pot, resulting in a population that is much more creative than in the rest of the country, more willing to take risks and more future-oriented. In this light, the inhabitants of the Western and Northern Lands are best prepared for Poland joining the European Union thanks to their acceptance of a secular state, proximity to Western Europe and optimism” (p. 861).

The electoral core of the right parties is concentrated mainly in the former large rural Austrian territory in the Polish south-east, Galicja. A low level of industrialization, agrarian overpopulation and historical tensions between the peasantry and conservative landholding gentry are the main characteristics of the region. The population of this conservative, traditionalist Catholic area has been historically known for its high proportion of "petty gentry." Zarycki (2002) argues:

Clericalism, intolerance, authoritarian propensities, moral dogmatism, and all other vices of traditionalist conservatism are linked to such modern phenomena as the massive Galician support for the anti-Communist opposition, the success of Solidarity in the region and its high rate of voter turnout (p. 15).

The highest intensity of the Right option during the 1990s was found in the Tatra Mountains and the southern foothill region (Podhale) and Highlanders. All these regions are represented by the most religious and conservative population in Poland. In the presidential elections of 1990 and 1995 Lech Walesa enjoyed almost unanimous electoral support there. Podlasie, located in north-eastern Poland, was the second electoral “heartland” of the Polish Right.

If population of relatively homogenous regions of the formerly Austrian-occupied Galicja and ex-German Western and Northern Lands is quite stable in its electoral preferences along the right and left options respectively, the third historical part of Poland, the former Russian partition zone in the East is the area of the strong contrast between large cities (Warsaw, Lublin, Radom)
with a liberal electorate and the countryside dominated by the anti-liberal option. The contradictions between agricultural economic interests on one side and urban interests on the other, lack of a democratic tradition in the 19th century and existence of the Soviet regime since 1945 made the Polish East the main source of ideological radicalism.

The role of “urban-rural cleavage” was quite prominent at the 1997 parliamentary election when the left-wing rural Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the right-wing urban Freedom Union (UW) represented the interests of different social groups. However, at the time of the realigning elections of 2001 a split in the Polish rural electorate was evident. The PSL was part of the left party alliance with the SLD whereas new parties with populist pro-rural slogans entered the electoral field.

A trade union Self-Defense was founded in 1992 and took part in a number of parliamentary elections without demonstrating any significant electoral success throughout the 1990s. At the time of economic hardships and debates over the issue of European integration the SO leader Andrzej Lepper attracted popularity for his organization of direct social actions of protest (attacking public buildings, road blockades, and the like). Polish farmers who had attempted to take advantage of the transition to a market economy were the most enthusiastic party activists. Markowski, Tucker (2008) note that “the party leaders blamed international conspiracies and liberals in general, and high interest rates at banks in particular, for their lot” (p. 6). However, political appeals to all kinds of social marginals, suffering from economic transition, also took place. Stressing his strong anti-elitism, Lepper called for a direct version of democracy and referenda. In the 2001 elections SO contested for first time as a party focused on socio-economic issues. The party’s unexpected success (10.5 percent support) was mainly achieved due to support of middle-aged rural and small towns inhabitants from Eastern Poland.

58Nevertheless, the plurality of preferences on the ideological party spectrum was also due to existence of ethnic and religious minorities in eastern Poland. The Orthodox inhabitants in Podlasie region, a geographical zone on the border with Belarus, provided “quasi-unanimous support” to the SLD candidates in the presidential and parliamentary elections (Zarycki, p.5).
In the same elections the LPR got 7.87 percent of votes, mainly from provincial areas, small and medium size localities, and rather poorly educated and less affluent people.

The 2003 Polish EU referendum once again reflected the former political divisions over the urban-rural cleavage in Polish society. Despite its general support by Polish society the most anti-union votes were among inhabitants of central and East Poland that is the former Russian annexed territory (Figure 8). All administrative districts where the population was against joining the EU were located in this region of Poland. That was caused among others by the large participation of the rural population attached to the land, tradition, mistrust towards changes and the “others” (“strangers”) (Barwinski, p. 4). The support for EU accession was considerably larger in Galicia (70-75 percent) and, even more markedly, in the former Prussian sector of partitioned Poland (northern and eastern territories demonstrated 85-90 percent of support). Barwinski (2007) explains this result in terms of positive experiences and economic expectations of economic contacts with Western Europe, among others with Germany and Austria (p. 5).

The last test of the role of the urban-rural cleavage was taken at the time of the Polish presidential elections in 2005 between the leaders of liberal PO Tusk and conservative right PiS Kachinski (Table 27). Altogether Kachinski received 54 percent of votes, and Tusk 46 percent, with a low voting participation of 51 percent (Barwinski, p. 7). Although each candidate won in eight provinces, Kachinski’s victories were by far wider margins. Kachinski dominated the Eastern regions where religious sentiments were strong. He performed well in the countryside - southern sub-Carpathia, with 73% of the vote and in eastern Lublin, with 70.5%. The poor Polish central regions of Swie Kokrzyskie (64.9%) and in Mazowsze (but not in Warsaw itself) also supported Kachinski. Tusk won in all largest cities, demonstrated highest rates of support in the western regions and in the North (about 58 percent) (Millard, p. 47). As a result, conservative,

The final referendum results were 77 percent for accession, 23 percent against it, and the participation reached 59 percent.
national and social slogans succeeded over the promises of liberal economic reforms. Characteristically, Kachinski achieved the largest support in those regions, where the opposition against Poland’s accession to EU in the referendum held two years earlier was the strongest. The competition between two alternative right-wing candidates drew attention even from the traditional left electorate. Barwinski (2007) argues that a distinct characteristic of the elections in western Polish regions “was more voting against Kachinski then voting for the Liberal Tusk” (p. 9). The representatives of national and religious minorities (especially Orthodox Belorussians in Podlasie) were voting for Tusk because they had been afraid of Kaczynski’s national-catholic slogans. The “voting against”, a classical feature of electoral process in regimes of divide democracies, was quite prominent in Poland.

Despite the existence of the urban-rural cleavage and the confrontation between different ideological camps, there are no strong isolationist or secessionist political movements in Poland. Zarycki (2000) notes that the particular regions, such as Podhale, Kaszuby and Upper Silesia can be classified as peripheral because they managed to preserve their cultural particularities as far as they had not been destroyed or replaced by the central culture. However, even in Kaszuby, where the dialect and cultural traditions are very different from the main Polish standard, the issue of political and cultural autonomy does not attract public attention. There is no open resistance against the center there. The weak Polish regionalism, with the sole exception of Upper Silesia, has not expressed itself in the form of political movements (p. 10). Unlike Italy, Polish radical parties did not focus on the problem of preservation of the state from separatist ideologies. The main opponent has always been located outside national borders. At the time of the intensification of the integration process in the 21st century the Polish far-right and populist parties preferred to consolidate their strength around the conservative party. As a result, the liberal and left political forces were left aside.
CONCLUSION

Despite the existence of numerous differences and nuances in the coalition bargaining process, Italy and Poland provided the first cases of political alliances between the center- and far-right parties in Western and Eastern Europe respectively. In my comparative analysis of political cleavages between prospective coaltional partners in these two countries I took into consideration these countries’ similar systemic characteristics. Italy and Poland are parliamentary republics based on executive coalitions. Both countries experienced a strong influence of Catholicism on their political systems although Poland lacked the tradition of a Christian Democratic Party. Italy and Poland sustained an anti-fascist moral and political consensus at the public and elite levels after the end of WWII. Finally, the most important similarity between these two countries is that since the beginning of the Cold War the governing alliances there lacked realistic alternatives in the choice of coalition partners because of the political monopoly on power of the Polish Worker’s Party (PZRP) and dominant role of the Italian Christian Democrats (DC). After the end of the Cold War both countries experienced significant changes in their political systems – the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland and the formation of the Second republic in Italy. Under these circumstances both individual parties and party structures changed. The political transformation and electoral realignments that happened in the two countries soon after the end of the Cold War offered new scenarios of coalition formation.

The formation of coalitions between the center-right and far-right parties in Italy and Poland may be partly explained by new electoral reforms. After the 1993 referendum in Italy a new majoritarian electoral system replaced the previous system of proportional representation. The central idea was to encourage pre-election compacts between parties rather than post-election coalitions that had not received popular endorsement. Anticipating the anti-center
impact of a majoritarian system, the DC, already internally divided, split into two groups: the Italian People’s Party (PPI) and Christian Democratic Center (CCD). Under the pressure of the new electoral law, the Northern League and National Alliance in fear of being squeezed between the Forward Italy (FI) and the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) as classic “third” parties in a majoritarian system, signed electoral pacts with Berlusconi. Two pre-electoral coalitions, the center-left and center-right party alliances, were formed. The 1993 electoral law in Poland introduced new electoral thresholds for parties and party alliances, 5 and 8 percent respectively. The new electoral formula was intended to give an advantage to larger parties and thus encourage alliances and mergers of smaller ones. As a result, two alliances were formed: one around the Social Democrats, and the electoral bloc Solidarity.

The electoral reforms in Italy and Poland compelled political parties to seek coalition partners due to the fragmented and polarized party systems and contributed to the early “freezing” of the political party spectrum. But the changes in institutional arrangements in the two countries do not explain why certain parties were included in the government coalitions while other parties were not. The specific coalition formation that took place in Italy (1994) and Poland (2006) is not fully determined by institutional changes.

In theories of coalition formation one important criterion is the ideological proximity of the parties in the coalition. Now, in both cases the ideological difference between the two blocs of parties representing the left and right party camps in Italy and conservative and liberal right ideologies in Poland was not insurmountable. In terms of ideological proximity the choices made by Berlusconi and Kachinski as architects of political coalitions in Italy and Poland respectively, depended on concrete circumstances surrounding the party debates over domestic and foreign issues. On the other hand, over the years of political party transformations in Italy and Poland the major parties have been either vague in their policy statements or have changed their character. Therefore, what explains the specific party configurations in the coalitions of 1994 and 2001 in Italy and Poland respectively?
A general shift over the course of the 1990s to the “new campaign politics” in Italy and Poland was characterized by “catch-all” party strategies adopted by the new political forces. The disintegration of the previous party systems as a result of the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland and the First Republic in Italy in the post-Cold War era created a vacuum exploited by the previously anti-system far-right (MSI) and the new center-right parties (Italian Forward Italy and Polish Law and Justice). In addition, there was a clear tendency toward a cartelization of the programmatic supply from both the left and the right side of the political spectrum. As it was argued by Conti (2007), “contrary to the rhetoric of political leaders and to the dramatization of the tones in the electoral campaign, if we only consider the programmatic supply, politics in Italy seems in actual fact increasingly more about who is better in doing things than about radically different political projects” (p. 26). The process of the convergence of programmatic supply between the moderate left and right politicians was quite evident. Bellucci and Health (2007) demonstrated that in the period between 1963 and 1996 the party distances over economic issues between Italian Communists and Christian Democrats were relatively small. The same tendency was evident in Poland. Although part of the national communist political tradition, during the 1990s the Polish Social Democrats moderated their stances on economic and foreign policy issues. Supporting to a certain extent the deepening of European integration and liberal economic reforms, the SLD presented an option for cooperation with the center-right parties over the key issues of foreign and domestic national policies. But policy convergence over pragmatic issues in the two countries would not bring any political dividends in terms of cooperation between the center-left and center-right parties (with the exception of the period of “historic compromise” of 1977-79 in Italy) because of the existence of several lines of cleavages.

In this research I argue that in the post-transition Italian and Polish political party systems marked by vague and overlapping policy stances, the regime divide is the most fundamental cleavage and therefore the clearest source of party identity which allows to predict results of coalition bargaining. The “two camps” thesis launched by Soviet politician Zhdanov in 1948
dividing the political spectrum between the communist and “bourgeois” blocs of parties in Poland was quite applicable to the analysis of political configurations in Italy since the beginning of the Cold War as well. The regime divide between parties originating to the Communist movement and those with roots in the opposition to the former Communist parties (the DC, Solidarity) preserved the fault lines separating them from each other.

The cleavage based on a classic left-right dimension (economic and cultural issues) excluded a possibility of coalition bargaining between the FI and PCI in Italy and the PiS and SLD in Poland. In both countries this happened because of a deep-rooted confrontation within the previous and current regimes of these divided democracies. Over the decades of the Cold War an irreconcilable conflict between ideological opponents - the communist and anti-communist parties – took place. In Italy the system of imperfect bipolarism was based on a confrontation between the center-center-left coalitions and the anti-system PCI, despite the efforts of communist party leaders to improve the party image and temporal “historic compromise” (1977-79) with the DC. In Poland and Soviet political regime prevented the formation of an anti-communist party or bloc of parties. However, the strength of such powerful social actors as the Polish Catholic Church and the independent trade-union Solidarity allowed them to articulate social cleavages at the level of civic groups and an organized labor movement opposed to the dominant regime.

The division of Polish and Italian societies over socio-economic issues during the 1990s cannot fully explain the nature of the political conflict between the left and right-wing parties. The confrontation between the leftist egalitarian political philosophy and market-oriented liberal ideology was prominent but not the main explanation of party struggle. The broad ideological component of the cleavage based on public party images was more relevant. At the time of the 1994 parliamentary elections in Italy and the 1997 Sejm elections in Poland two main political party platforms attracted a sizable amount of voters and prevented other parties from creating sizable alternatives. The traditional socio-economic and cultural issues were added in the
phraseology used during the Cold War. In spite of the absence of the formal division between the
left and right blocs in Poland throughout the 1990s, the association of the SLD with the former
communist party and the acceptance of the Western secular order inherited from their previous
ideology blocked its cooperation with the right parties. The realigning elections of 2001 in
Poland created a new configuration of political parties. Three parties – the liberal right (PO),
conservative right (PiS) and far-right (LPR) - appeared on the right side of the political spectrum.
Four years later the cornerstone to which all parties of the center-right coalition came to a
consensus was a strong opposition to the heritage of Communism and its ideological heir, the
SLD. Since the beginning of the 1990s the negative memory of the former communist regime at
the mass level provoked numerous debates between different political groups over the issue of
“lustration” understood as an attempt to get public approval for preventing the members of the
former political regime from holding office in the new civil service. As a result, the political
parties which were distant in their views over the issues of a “historical past” could not come to
agreement over the new issues on the political agenda.

The left-right dimension of the socio-economic and cultural conflicts in Italian and Polish
societies influenced the formation of new cleavages based on different attitudes to European
integration by the representatives of the right fringe of the political spectrum. The cleavage
along the Westernization–Traditionalism line (attitude to European Integration, national
minorities, immigration, and redistribution of economic profits in internal markets at the time of
the economic modernization of the 1990s) deepened the urban-rural and center-periphery
divisions based on economic interests of the primary and secondary sectors of the national
economies. It led to the formation of conflicts between the “usual” prospective coalitional
partners within the center-right coalitions (the National Alliance and the Northern League in the
case of Italy and the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform in the case of Poland). In Italy this
conflict was smoothed by the mediating role of Berlusconi. However, it prevented the stable
functioning of the center-right coalition. In Poland the differences in the positions between two
post–Solidarity right parties regarding the key problems of domestic and foreign policies blocked
the coalition negotiation process. Moreover, the 2005 presidential campaign revealed a
substantial socio-cultural difference among supporters of the PiS and the PO. This allows me to
argue that the political cleavages between different social groups over the urban-rural and
religious-secular issues preserve a confrontation between the pro-Western liberal and “national”
conservative political parties in some Eastern and Western European democracies.

The third argument tested in this research states that with the formation of new political
cleavages the number of prospective coalition partners within each coalitional block of parties
became smaller. As a result, the “unusual coalitions” between the center- and far-right parties
were formed. In spite of all the remarkable differences between the coalition partners within the
center-right coalitions in Italy and Poland, the new type of electoral alliances could not emerge
without the convergence of party ideological positions toward many important issues. In Italy
and Poland all three coalition partners had quite opposite positions to those of the liberal right
and the left parties on the issue of European integration (except the far-left RC in the case of
Italy). The far-right parties had to revise their positions toward the general idea of integration on
the basis of issue-specific “soft Euroscepticism” supported by the new center-right parties. On
the domestic political arena the challenge from the PDS/SLD and especially PO/PPI, with their
clear pro-European stances and support for “European acceleration”, created room for a
significant change in the general Italian and Polish pro-European vision of the European
integration process. The inclusion in the national government of the leaders of Self-Defense and
National Alliance by Kachinski and Berlusconi respectively, both parties with a moderate
Eurosceptic position, was intended to show European parliamentarians an alternative to their
loyal pro-European position. The coalition between the center-right and far-right parties is thus
understood as a “tactical” alliance. However, the political alliance between the FI and MSI in
Italy and the PiS, SO, and LPR in Poland would be impossible without the existence of the
longstanding cleavages between the right and left parties. The conflicts between moderate political parties provided the extreme-right politicians with a space in the mainstream political agenda, and thus a degree of legitimacy.

After the collapse of the previous party systems in Italy and Poland the remaining political players were legitimized to govern, even those with a past experience of radicalism and fringe politics. In Italy this tendency is so overwhelming that the convergence within left and right party camps has in the end opened a space at the extremes of the policy space (Conti, p. 20). In the aftermath of the 1994 new elections, there were no anti-system parties of any relevance that occupied the extremes. In 2001, trying to maximally expand the basis of his coalition of the House of Freedom, Berlusconi made an electoral pact in Sicily with the Fiammi Tricolore, an unapologetically fascist sect that rejected Fini’s efforts to mainstream the far right movement. The last example provides an interesting challenge to the open version of the minimal range theory of coalition formation. The latter stipulates that parties having most prominent differences within a coalitional alliance move closer in order to stabilize the composition of the coalition.

There is reason to believe that in actuality the deep divisions in Polish and Italian politics are still due to lack of a mutual recognition between the historic left and right and their party leaders. The parliamentary elections of 1994 and 2001 marked the beginning for a new “electoral cycle” in the two countries. A political culture of alternation has now been rooted in Italian and Polish party systems. Taking into account the modern tendencies of the political party transition from polarized to moderate pluralism and convergence within the center-right coalitions in the two countries, I agree with Nicolo Conti that the specifics of the political climate in the two countries should be sought not only in the policy preferences of the parties but elsewhere (Conti, p. 18). It is important to understand how the logic of the new electoral circle reflects the political processes in Eastern and Western Europe in the post-Cold War era, during which new prominent
issues impacted the formation of new lines of political cleavages. The implication of the new “electoral cycle” is that the bipolar thinking within certain party systems makes communication between moderate political adversaries difficult, providing the opportunities for new anti-system political players to enter governing coalitions.
APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>Italy (1994)</th>
<th>Poland (2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Conservative right</td>
<td>Forward Italy (FI)</td>
<td>Law and Justice (PIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal right</td>
<td>Pact for Italy – Italian People’s Party (PPI), Patto Segni</td>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist Right</td>
<td>Northern League (LN)</td>
<td>Self-Defence (SO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far right</td>
<td>National Alliance (AN)</td>
<td>League of Polish Families (LPR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist camp</td>
<td>Alliance of Progressives (1)</td>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance - Labor Union (SLD-UP) (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In the national general election in Italy held on March 27th, 1994 to elect members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate the Alliance of Progressives included Democratic Party of the Left, Communist Refoundation Party, Federation of the Greens, Italian Socialist Party, the Net, Democratic Alliance

2. The Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union was the electoral committee and a coalition of two Polish political parties in the 2001 parliamentary elections and the 2004 elections to the European Parliament.
Table 2
Summary of the March 27th, 1994 Chamber Deputies Election Results in Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent of votes</th>
<th>Difference in number of seats with the last elections in 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pole of Freedoms, Pole of Good Government</td>
<td>Forward Italy-CCD – 21.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italian Social Movement – 13.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern League – 8.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pannela List – 3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Progressives</td>
<td>Democratic Party of the Left – 20.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Refoundation Party – 6.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federation of the Greens – 2.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italian Socialist Party – 2.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pact for Italy</td>
<td>Italian People’s Party (PPI) – 11.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patto Segni – 4.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3
Summary of the September 25th, 2005 Sejm Election Results (main parties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent of votes</th>
<th>Difference in number of seats with the last elections in 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative right: Law and Justice (PIS)</td>
<td>27,0%</td>
<td>+111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal right: Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>24,1%</td>
<td>+68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical right: Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland</td>
<td>11,4%</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>11,3%</td>
<td>-161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of polish Families (LPR)</td>
<td>8,0%</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Cleavages, Critical Junctures, Issues and Party Families According to the Lipset/Rokkan Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleavage</th>
<th>Critical juncture</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Party family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center-periphery</td>
<td>Reformation-Counter-reformation, 16th-17th centuries</td>
<td>National vs. supranational religion; national language vs. Latin</td>
<td>Ethnically and linguistically based parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Church</td>
<td>National Revolution, 1789 and later</td>
<td>Secular vs. religious control of mass media</td>
<td>Religious parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Industry</td>
<td>Industrial Revolution, 19th century</td>
<td>Tariff levels for agriculture products; control vs. freedom for industrial enterprise</td>
<td>Agrarian parties; Conservative and Liberal parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-Worker</td>
<td>The Russian Revolution, 1917-19</td>
<td>Integration into national polity vs. commitment to international revolutionary movement</td>
<td>Socialist and Communist parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 47), Maor (2007: 23)

Table 5
Volatility, Net Change, and Mean Communist Vote by Region in Italy in 1950-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
<th>Net % Change</th>
<th>Mean % of vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average vote</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ascher, W., Tarrow, S. (1975: 486)
Figure 1: Party Bloc Positions on Left-Right Economic Issues in Italy, 1963-1994
Source: Bellucci, Health (2007: 10)

Figure 2: Class Voting and Polarization of Left-Right Issues in Italy, 1963 – 1996
Source: Bellucci, Health (2007: 12)
Table 6
Respondents’ Perceptions of Parties of the Extreme Left as a Threat to Democracy, by Party Preference in 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties of the extreme left are a threat to democracy</th>
<th>Party preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion, no answer</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(276)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sani (1975: 27)

Table 7
Respondents’ Orientation toward a Governmental Coalition Including the PCI and the DC, by Party Preference in 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>PSI</th>
<th>PSDI</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>Non indicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion, no answer</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sani (1975: 28)
Table 8
Polish Sejm During the Years of Uncontested Elections, 1952-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUWP</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The non-party members were some formally independent deputies and since 1957 the representatives of the Catholic movements the Pax and Znak.

Source: Weydental (1978: 179)

Table 9
Polish Workers’ Party (membership)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Workers Percent</th>
<th>Peasants Percent</th>
<th>White Collar Percent</th>
<th>Others Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>235.3</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,240.9</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,343.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,154.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,775.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,320.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,436.9</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10
Opinions on How Socialism Works in Poland (Question: “How Does Socialism Work Out in Practice in Poland”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975-76</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badly</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very badly</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones, Bealmear, Kennedy (1984: 158)
Table 11
Opinions on the Results of August 1980 Developments in Poland (Question: “What, in Your Opinion, is the Most Important Result of the Latest Developments?”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Basic Technical and Incomplete Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to improve the material standard of living of working people</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcement of the emergence of new trade unions</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major increase in the potential of the existing trade union’s activities</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear delineation of the scope of censorship by the Department of Media Control</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something else</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones, Bealmear, Kennedy (1984: 147)
Table 12
The Sources of Social Antagonism in Poland in 1987 (Percentage Mentioning Factor)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay, earnings</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property, material possession</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, official position</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opinions</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of PZPR</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division between manual and white-collar work</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/rural residence</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between older and younger generation</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith and religious practice</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origin</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kolankiewicz, Lewis (1988: 167)

Figure 3: Party Bloc Positions on Secular-Religious Issues in Italy, 1968-1996
Figure 4: Religious voting and polarization of religious issues in Italy, 1968 – 1996

Source: Bellucci, Health (2007: 14)

Figure 5: MPs Associated to Social Cleavage Group Organization in Italy, 1963 – 1996

Source: Bellucci, Health (2007: 11)
Source: Bellucci, Health (2007: 17)

Figure 6: Social Cleavages and Vote Choice, 1963-96 (log odds of voting centre compared to left of middle class secular, middle class Catholic, working class Catholic vs. working class secular)

Source: Bellucci, Health (2007: 17)

Table 13
Party Preferences in Polish Hypothetical Elections (percent of votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know, other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones, Bealmear, Kennedy (1984: 157)
Table 14
Public Confidence in Institutions and Organizations (Question: “Do you Have Confidence in the Following Institutions or Organizations?”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution or Organization</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>To some extent Yes</th>
<th>To some extent No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Difficult to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Catholic church</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Board of Control</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of State</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public prosecutor's office</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The courts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch trade unions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front of National Unity</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Militia (police)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic party</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Peasants' Party</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish United Workers' Party (Communist)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones, Bealmear, Kennedy (1984: 151)
Table 15
Decline in Votes for Italy’s Major Parties, 1972-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC + PCI</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC+PCI + PSI</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. By the 1994 elections, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) had split into two distinct political formations – Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) and the Refounded Communist. Also, the party tradition of the DC was continued by the Popular Party (PPI).

Sources: Instituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT)
Table 16
The Most Volatile European Elections, 1945-2000 (percent of votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-82</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977–81</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–58</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-87</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–48</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Interbloc Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977-81</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-87</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-77</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-48</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunter, Montero (2001: 87)
Table 17
Electoral Volatility in Italy during 1948-1996 (percent of votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
<th>Intrabloc Volatility</th>
<th>Interbloc Volatility</th>
<th>Interbloc Volatility as Percentage of Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-48</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-53</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-58</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-63</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-68</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-72</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-76</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-79</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-83</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-87</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-92</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-96</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunter, Montero (2001: 87)
Table 18
Polish Attitudes Towards Vetting Key Public Officials, 1994-1999 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Szcerbiak (2002: 559)

Table 19
Polish Attitudes towards De-Communization, 1996-1999 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Szcerbiak (2002: 560)
Table 20

Party Supporters Attitudes towards De-Communization in Poland, October 1999 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>For</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity Electoral Action</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Union</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Szcerbiak (2002: 562)
Figure 7: Party Attitudes to European Integration in a Two-Dimensional Space in Italy (means by period)

Source: Conti, Verzichelli (2003: 60)
Table 21
Attitudes of Poles towards Polish Membership in the EU and Polish Economic Strength (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August 1997</th>
<th>December 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland should improve and modernize its economy, and then try to become a member</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland should become a member of the EU as quickly as possible because membership will</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speed the improvement and modernization of Polish economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stadtmuller (2000: 39)

Table 22
Support of the Parties’ Electorates for Polish Membership in the EU (Question: “If a        | For       | Against   | I do not know |
| Referendum Concerning Polish Membership of the EU would be Held Now, Would You Vote”     |           |           |              |
| (January 1999)                                                                            |           |           |              |
| Party                                                                                    | For       | Against   | I do not know |
| UW                                                                                      | 82        | 12        | 6            |
| AWS                                                                                     | 74        | 14        | 12           |
| SLD                                                                                     | 73        | 19        | 8            |
| PSL                                                                                     | 51        | 36        | 13           |

Source: Stadtmuller (2000: 39)
Table 23
Party proposals for new regional decisions in Poland after elections in 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party group</th>
<th>Number of regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity Electoral Action/Freedom Union (AWS/UW)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist parties</td>
<td>25-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result of compromise</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ferry (2003: 1108)

Table 24
Urban - Rural Divide and European Identity in Poland (Percent of Respondents Who Identify Themselves with Europe in 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>&lt;5,000 (inhabitants)</th>
<th>&lt;100,000</th>
<th>&gt;100,000</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>+29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: New Democracies Barometer 5 (Haerpfer, 2002: 115)
Table 25
Urban-Rural Divide and EU Accession in Poland (Percent of Respondents Who Support the Idea of Entry of Poland into EU in 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>&lt;5,000 (inhabitants)</th>
<th>&lt;100,000</th>
<th>&gt;100,000</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>+30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: New Democracies Barometer 5 (Haerpfer, 2002: 133)

Figure 8: Results of the EU Referendum in 2003
Source: Barwinski (2007: 4)
Table 26
Support for Presidential Candidates in the Second Round of Elections in Poland in 2005 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Donald Tusk</th>
<th>Lech Kachinski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary education</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic vocational education</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and post-secondary</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licentiate and higher education</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural voters</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban voters</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities 20,001-50,000</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities 50,001-100,000</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities 100,001-200,000</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities 200,001-500,000</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities over 500,000</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 18-24</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 25-39</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 40-59</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over 60</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Millard (2006: 1026)


(Eds.), *Political Parties and Electoral Change: Party Responses to Electoral Markets*. Sage Publications Ltd.


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