Dimensions of State Fragility: Determinants of Violent Group Grievance, Political Legitimacy, and Economic Capacity

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DIMENSIONS OF STATE FRAGILITY:
DETERMINANTS OF VIOLENT GROUP GRIEVANCE,
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, & ECONOMIC CAPACITY

by

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M.S. University of Minnesota Twin Cities, 2014

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Major Professor: Barbara Kinsey
ABSTRACT

State fragility has severe political implications. In the literature, fragile states have been referred to as “chaotic breeding grounds” for human rights violations, terrorism, violent extremism, crime, instability, and disease (Patrick 2011, 3-4). International organizations have also expressed concern regarding the potential of “fragile states” to disrupt collective security as threats such as transnational terrorism and human displacement from violent conflict have the potential to permeate borders (Patrick 2011, 5). This research project aims at extending our understanding of state fragility by examining three distinct dimensions of state fragility proposed in the literature: i) state authority, ii) state legitimacy, and iii) state capacity. I narrow the scope of these dimensions by focusing on 1) violent group grievance, 2) political legitimacy, and 3) state economic capacity, respectively.

The first dimension, state authority, is related to a government’s control of unlawful intrastate violence. The second dimension, legitimacy, is linked to the public acceptance of the right of an authority to govern law through its practice and influence (Weber 1958, 32-36; Gilley 2006, 48; Connolly 1984, 34). The third dimension, capacity, represents a state-society relationship characterized mainly by the state’s ability to provide public goods and protection of citizens and residents from “harm” such as natural disasters and economic downfalls (Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 7).

This dissertation examines each of these dimensions using quantitative analyses based on large-N datasets and cross-sectional longitudinal models to fill gaps in the literature on state fragility. In particular, I hypothesize 1) number of refugees increases the level of intrastate violent group grievance (state authority), 2) state human rights violations decreases popular support and thus public perceptions of state legitimacy, and 3) population constraints, such as
food insecurity and disease increase economic decline and thus compromise the state’s economic capacity. Internal violence, loss of legitimacy, and a weakened economy may increase levels of state fragility.

Each of these three studies controls for alternative explanations and covers the time period between 2006 and 2014. The analysis results confirm the main hypotheses of this study and are expected to offer a more concise conceptual framework of state fragility, and better empirical understanding of potential contributors to state fragility.
Dedicated to the anonymous men, women, and allies of the United States Intelligence Community who risk their lives without recognition to provide us the level of security and freedom we are blessed to experience.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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While the support of family has never gone unnoticed, my life choices and academic journey have also taken me to twenty different countries outside my family’s reach. It is in these places where I learned new languages, made new friends, and essentially created a new life with every move. As such, I was beyond fortunate to experience genuine moments of love, support, and friendship with Amanda Ocker, Spencer Bishop, Kristen Larson, Pete Simpkins, Amanda Siegel, Tara Allard, Louis-David Simoneau, Nalini Ramer, Cameron Haley, Heather Muroski, Luke
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So it is with great humility that I present this dissertation and acknowledge that any academic or professional success is not solely my own. The completion of this dissertation demonstrates a shared, collective accomplishment belonging to more than just myself. Without the love, guidance, and support of these individuals and countless others I would not be the scholar or man I am today. Lastly, I take sole responsibility for any mistakes committed in this dissertation, which should not in any way diminish the incredible commitment, compassion, and intellect of those mentioned.
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<td>CIFP</td>
<td>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
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<tr>
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<td>OECD</td>
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<td>PRIO</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“The gravest dangers to [the] U.S. and world security are no longer military threats from rival
great powers but rather cross-border threats emanating from the world’s most poorly governed,
economically stagnant, and conflict-ridden countries” (Patrick 2011, 3). The European Security
Strategy and international organizations such as the United Nations have also expressed concern
regarding the potential of these “fragile states” to disrupt collective security as threats such as
transnational terrorism and human displacement from violent conflict have the potential to
permeate borders (Patrick 2011, 5). In the most recent decade, scholars and politicians have
shifted their attention to the emerging concept of state fragility, defined as “a condition of the
state manifesting attributes such as 1) loss of physical control of its territories, 2) an erosion of
legitimate authority, and 3) an inability to provide reasonable public services, protection, or
interact with other states as a full member of the international community” (Fund for Peace 2017,
n.p.).

The missing puzzle piece to an understanding of state fragility is an in-depth empirical
analysis to corroborate (or contradict) existing scholarly assumptions of determinants. Scholars
such as Patrick (2007) and Carment, Samy, and Prest (2011) have been able to parse out basic
observations and commonalities of fragile states (e.g. violent conflict), but fail to determine or
empirically measure specific causes. I intend to fill the analytical gap to explain what is
contributing to observed conditions (e.g. economic scarcity, violent conflict) of fragile states.

Neither scholars nor politicians can fully address conditions of state fragility until
specific determinants are identified. Thus, this dissertation does not attempt to present a solution

1
to solving violence, economic inequality, or scarce resources of fragile states because the causes of these issues still remain untested and largely unknown. Instead, I conduct three separate analyses of potential determinants by utilizing each dimension of state fragility as its own dependent variable.

This dissertation is not an exhaustive exploratory study attempting to identify every possible determinant of state fragility, but it will be amongst the first to systematically analyze the effects of three potential determinants (number of refugees, state human rights violations, and population constraints) on state fragility through a multidimensional approach. Without an empirical contribution to support existing conceptual frameworks, we fall short of being able to truly understand, address, or prevent potentially harmful effects of state fragility.

The Questions

Due to the aforementioned conditions politicians may refer to fragile states as “chaotic breeding grounds” for human rights violations, terrorism, violent extremism, crime, instability, and disease (Patrick 2011, 3-4). It is commonly argued in the literature that state fragility includes aspects of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (Carment, Prest, and Samy 2011, 56; Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 1). Yet despite this concept’s seemingly important political and security relevance, it has also been referred to as an elusive concept since many determinants of state fragility have not been examined empirically (Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 1-2). This dissertation aims to provide a better understanding of the factors that account for state fragility by analyzing each of its three dimensions (authority, legitimacy, and capacity) as dependent variables in three separate analyses. I narrow the scope of these dimensions by focusing on explaining 1) violent group grievance, 2) political legitimacy, and 3)
state economic capacity. These dimensions were narrowed conceptually to reduce ambiguity and permit systematic testing. For example, narrowing “state authority” (i.e. control of unlawful use of violence) to a more specific form of violence (e.g. violent group grievance) allows examining systematically the relationship between this dimension and a hypothesized determinant.

In particular, I examine the effects of the 1) presence of refugees on the level of violent group grievance, 2) state human rights violations on governing elite legitimacy, and 3) population constraints on the state’s economic capacity. Internal violence, loss of legitimacy, and a weakened economy may increase state fragility and impact negatively citizen wellbeing. I rely on quantitative analyses to examine these relationships.

In each analysis I control for regime type and economic development. According to the Fragile States Index (FSI), violent group grievance is the “violence existing between social groups” (Fund for Peace 2014, n.p.). Violent group grievance captures a distinct form of intrastate violence, specifically small-scale hate crimes and ethnic group clashes associated with powerlessness and discrimination. I expect the level of violent group grievance to be lower in autocracies than in democracies due to higher levels of repression commonly associated with autocratic regimes. Consider North Korea, for example, where civilian fear of violent retaliation from an autocratic government uninhibited by a constitution or political accountability to the citizens deters civilian use of unlawful violence. That is not to say civilians may not also face punishment for unlawful violence in a democracy, but one would expect such practices to be evaluated in courts of law subjected to due process. I also anticipate the level of violent group grievance to be lower in economically robust states. More developed states have institutions and
processes in place (such as unemployment benefits) to potentially buffer grievances which may have otherwise evoked violence.

Further, I expect the effect of human rights violations on governing elite legitimacy to be lower in autocracies than in democracies. I assume that in democracies leaders are expected by citizens to uphold democratic principles and thus be scrutinized and held accountable when they violate such principles, not so in authoritarian regimes. I also expect governing elite legitimacy to be higher in more economically developed states compared to less developed states. The assumption is that more developed states enjoy greater legitimacy than less developed states since they provide more abundant economic goods and opportunities to citizens.

Lastly, I expect the effect of population constraints on state economic decline (state capacity) to be larger in more authoritarian compared to less authoritarian states. In democracies democratic accountability and also more effective organizational communication channels and networks, and decentralization of decision-making compared to authoritarian regimes, thus I expect the effect of population constraints on state economic decline to be lower in democracies. However, it may argued that greater centralization of decision making in authoritarian regimes may result in more effective management of population constraints and thus in lower economic decline; thus the effect of population constraints on economic decline may be smaller in more authoritarian states than less authoritarian states. I test for these two alternative scenarios.

I also expect this effect to be higher in less economically developed states. In less developed countries (LDCs) economic resources are already relatively limited; thus, the effect of population constraints on economic decline is expected to be larger in LDCs than in developed states where economic resources are relatively more abundant. I will examine these
considerations further to decrease the ambiguity of state fragility as scholars attempt to examine more closely who is experiencing assumed “detrimental” effects of state fragility and how detrimental they really are.

**The Main Theoretical Arguments**

This section specifies briefly the theoretical connections between state fragility and each of its dimensions examined in this study: state authority, legitimacy, and economic capacity.

**State Authority**

The first dimension of state fragility I examine, state authority, is related to the government’s control of unlawful civil violence. In the literature, state authority is the state’s ability to maintain a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violent force within its borders generally perceived as essential in maintaining the rule of law and civil order (Brinkerhoff 2011, 131). Thus ongoing civil violence from nonstate actors constitutes a challenge to and undermines state authority.

I argue that a major factor that accounts for violent group grievance with potential to challenge a state’s authority is the presence of sociopolitical pressures associated with the number of refugees. When social identities such as ethnicity, language, or religion are perceived to be threatened by an increase of refugees, the primary homogenous group may act to counter the perceived threat(s) posed by refugees in order to 1) prevent their national identity and way of life from being compromised and 2) protect access to scarce resources. Existing literature reinforces this postulation that social identity determines to a certain extent the behavior of people (Warnecke, Masters, and Kempter, 1992).
In short, I anticipate a positive relationship between an increase of refugees and violent group grievance in the state based on the social identity and economic interest theory. This theory suggests that actual or perceived competition for scarce resources translates into inter-group conflict (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In the case of accepting refugees for example, Germany’s acceptance of nearly one million refugees in 2015 is more likely to condition violent group grievance with social and welfare programs compared to countries without. Despite the capacity for these programs to largely offset competition for resources, “xenophobic backlash” was consistently reported throughout refugee inflows in Europe, specifically (Krcmaric 2014, 182-183). The extent of this backlash in terms of civil violence remains empirically untested.

Further, I argue that factors conditioning this association may be access to economic resources and regime type. I expect that the relationship between the number of refugees and violent group grievance to be weaker in economically stronger states since resources are often more abundant. Next, I expect the effects of violent group grievance to be weaker in democracies than authoritarian regimes since democracies often have institutions and processes for expression of grievances (e.g. free and fair elections; freedom of press). So in essence, the underlying assumption is that more economically developed and democratic states have institutional structures that may serve to mitigate harmful conditions of a perceived threat to peace. The statistical model examining the relationship between the number of refugees and violent group grievance in Chapter Three will control for regime type and economic development to empirically test these assumptions.
Elite Governing Legitimacy

The second dimension of state fragility is legitimacy. This link is the perceived absence of rule of law, that is, the extent to which citizens have confidence in the elites, law enforcement, and rules of their society (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014). I utilize the theory of social impact to explore the connection between state human rights violations and governing elite legitimacy. According to the social impact theory, public opinion changes are based on interactive, reciprocal, or recursive events from social environments (Nowak, Szamrej, Latané, 1990). In essence, we all interact within our own environments and every action has potential for a negative reaction. I specifically examine the reaction of civil intrastate perceptions of the state’s elite governing legitimacy when elites commit state human rights violations. An example could be disapproval from a portion of the American public of George W. Bush for the detainment and torture of suspected terrorists after 9/11.

In summation, lack of confidence in a governing elite may result in political changes such as impeachment, loss of alliances, or international sanctions, thus implicating the state’s fragility. These political regime changes may or may not impact citizen wellbeing or increase state fragility. However, the assumption is that society’s collective negative perception or disproval of state human rights violations can indeed lead to sociopolitical tensions. The potential for an impact to a state’s degree of fragility may manifest when sanctions are incurred or alliances are lost as a result of human rights violations.

An exemplar case is that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire) in the early 1990s, which capitalized on “Cold War tensions and garnered support from the West until faced with the growing evidence of human rights abuses” (U.S. Department of State 2007). The
Democratic Republic of Congo’s government security services “routinely committed acts of torture and ill treatments of detainees held incommunicado at secret detention sites” (United for Human Rights 2012, 43). These detainees were critics of the government and the routine beatings, stabbings, and rape directly violated Article 5 (No Torture) of the Declaration of Human Rights.¹ The infractions directly resulted in loss of foreign support and aid following the Cold War.

State Economic Capacity

State economic capacity refers to “the power of leaders to mobilize resources for productive and defensive purposes” (Tikuisis, Carment, Samy and Landry 2015, 567). A lack of capacity to contain grievances, population demands, or neutralize violent interstate threats, for example, compromises citizen wellbeing and thus increases fragility. This variable is consistently operationalized in the literature by means of economic indicators such as GDP/capita and resource inequality (GINI coefficient)(Easterlin, 1967; Hendrix, 2010).

Specifically, I examine how population constraints may result in decreasing state economic capacity. Population constraints are defined as “pressures on individuals within a state experiencing hardships associated with disease, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and demographic growth/mortality rate” (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). These conditions may inhibit a population’s ability to contribute towards their own state’s economy. A lack of population participation as workers and/or consumers due to one or more population constraints may prove detrimental, even temporarily, to their country’s economic capacity.

¹ Article 5 explicitly states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (United for Human Rights 2012, 43).
The effects of ‘population constraints’ on state economic capacity are expected to be smaller in developed than in developing countries. Less developed countries (LDCs) are at an inherent disadvantage compared to more developed countries due to fewer relative resources to meet public demand for public goods and services. In essence, the effects of population constraints are then likely to be conditioned by political systems and institutions (such as emergency relief) capable of buffering consequences related to the aforementioned pressures. Put simply, if a developed state such as the United States experiences frequent hurricanes they are already more equipped to provide emergency services and relief to their population than a LDC such as Haiti.

These dimensions, theoretical mechanisms, and relevance in the literature will be explored further in the literature review as well as in the respective chapters.

**Significance of Research**

This dissertation attempts to fill the existing literature gap on state fragility by advancing and narrowing the focus on three dimensions of state fragility: 1) violent group grievance, 2) elite legitimacy, and 3) economic capacity of the state. In addition, this dissertation will contribute greater conceptual clarity and empirical results to the literature on state fragility by examining empirically the contributing factors to state fragility. While these dimensions of state fragility may not be exhaustive, this dissertation will nevertheless aim to provide a theoretical connection for each dimension to state fragility and empirically explore these dimensions by means of large-N datasets and cross-sectional longitudinal models.
Dissertation Plan

Chapter 2 reviews the literature and theories associated with state fragility. I discuss the existing literature and conceptual and empirical limitations. Also, I describe the multidimensional approach I adopt and proceed to link directly each of the three dimensions in the literature (authority, legitimacy, and capacity) to state fragility. The chapter then concludes with the expected contribution of this research to address existing gaps in the literature.

Chapters 3-5 each examine the factors that explain one of the three dimensions of state fragility. Chapter 3 examines the first dimension of state fragility, authority. I discuss state authority as a state’s monopoly on the use of violent force and the association between state authority (operationalized as violent group grievance) and the number of refugees.

Chapter 4 is an examination of the second dimension of state fragility - legitimacy. This chapter examines the relationship between state human rights violations and governing elite legitimacy.

Chapter 5 analyzes the third dimension of state fragility - capacity. It examines the relationship between population constraints and the economic capacity of the state. The hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3-5 are evaluated by means of cross-national longitudinal statistical models.

Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses the contribution of this research to the literature of state fragility and concludes. The primary objective of this dissertation is to provide substantive results regarding the contributing factors to state fragility to provide policymakers with a better understanding of the conditions underlying fragile states.
CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF STATE FRAGILITY

In this chapter I first discuss the literature on state fragility and then construct a theoretical framework linking state fragility to each of its three dimensions articulated in the literature: authority, legitimacy, and capacity.

Brock et al. (2012) argue that, “the global system of sovereign states is a relatively recent development since the process of decolonization following the Second World War” (4-5). In fact, it was not until the late twentieth century that “Western-style modern states consisted of law and order, developed economies, and defined nations of people” (Brock et al. 2012, 5). This distinction of the state as a sovereign unit in an international community (rather than historical communities or empires with contested borders) becomes relevant in terms of how states recognize each other’s sovereignty. The United Nations consisted of only five states in 1945 compared to the 192 recognized states by 2012 (Brock et al. 2012, 5).

Existing literature refers to state fragility as a concept capturing and measuring the extent to which the “actual institutions, functions, and processes of a country fail to accord with the strong image of a sovereign state” (Migdal 2001, 1-2). This “strong image” of the state refers to the Weberian depiction of the state as the dominant actor and legitimate authority of a society (Carment, Prest, Samy 2011, 84). Fragility is then a process and convergence of structural changes and events that arise under specific conditions. Examples of these events may be (but are not limited to) large-scale conflict, disengaged leadership, or emergence of a crisis (Carment Prest Samy 2011, 21). By this definition, all states can be classified as fragile to some extent. This recognizes that a state with robust economic, political, and social capabilities still may have relative weaknesses. Therefore state fragility is a matter of degree rather than solely a dichotomy.
due to its dynamic processes involving state-society relations and essential features of territory and force (Carment, Prest, Samy 2011, 84-85).

According to The Fund for Peace (FFP), some defining characteristics of fragile states include (but again are not limited to) “a loss of physical control of its territories, an erosion of legitimate authority, and/or an inability to provide reasonable public services, protection, or interact with other states as a full member of the international community” (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). State fragility is intended to be a general term in the literature commonly associated (and sometimes used interchangeably) with state weakness, failure, and collapse (Carment, Prest, and Samy 2011, 84). While the term arguably remains a heuristic for its all-encompassing nature, it also serves as a basis to observe and examine potentially harmful conditions of the state as a “cohesive and coherent whole with explanatory merit for both academics and policymakers” (Carment, Samy, Prest 2011, 85).

There exist two dominant schools of thought on fragile states²: 1) fragile states pose a “tremendous threat” and 2) fragile states is a “politically charged term” that does not pose an imminent threat (Martin 2012, 1). Reinforcing the first paradigm, America’s Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that fragile states are the “main security challenge of our time” (The Economist, 2011). The National Security Strategy corroborated this concern by stating that the U.S. specifically is “now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones” (White House 2002, 1).

According to Brooks (2005) fragile states are often unable to suppress intrastate violence, lose control of territory, and exhibit economic inequality (1160-1161). In essence, this describes

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² Fragile states in this context refers to a singular subject, but is commonly presented interchangeably with descriptors such as “failing”, “weak”, or “collapsing”.
fragile states as experiencing economic, political, and social pressures as catalysts for violent conflict and economic instability. The question remains as to what these “catalysts” (i.e. determinants) of state fragility are and the extent of their potential detriment to the state.

In contrast, the second conceptual school of fragile states posits that fragile states do not pose an external international threat or an inherent national security risk (Martin 2012, 2). Rather, it is a term politically constructed for “norms to be imported and provide justification for Western intervention” in international events posing a perceived threat (Newman 2009, 434). This position may have some merit if you consider states such as Iraq (and subsequent 2003 U.S. invasion), which is consistently classified as one of the top five most fragile states annually in the world⁴ (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). One of the explicit goals of the Iraq Invasion of 2003 was to “spread U.S. influence and secure supposed U.S. interests by regime change” (Shamoo 2015, 1). After 9/11, U.S. citizens and many in the international community expected some degree of retaliation by the Bush Administration. The targeting and military intervention of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was politically “justified” due to an “alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction” (Shamoo 2015, 1).

However, the first perception of fragile states is more persuasive than the latter. An inability to address events such as terrorist presence or widespread unlawful violence within one’s state for example may permeate borders and spread elsewhere. Syria’s intrastate conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is an exemplar case by which political elite’s inability to suppress terrorism enabled acts of terror to be conducted in Libya, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen (Cockburn 2015, 8). This demonstrates a legitimate implication fragile states.

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In 2006, for example, the top five most fragile states as classified by the Fund for Peace were 1) Sudan, 2) Congo D.R., 3) Cote d’Ivoire, 4) Iraq, and 5) Zimbabwe.
states pose if not addressed with or without “Western intervention”. The question remains as to what determinants of state fragility pose the greatest threats domestically with potential for international implications. I attempt to address this question with analyses of likely contributors to state fragility based on existing literature.

The following section presents conceptual and empirical limitations associated with state fragility and the emerging need for a multi-dimensional approach to examine this broad topic more rigorously.

Conceptual and Empirical Limitations

Initial study of state fragility was strictly conceptual and aimed at proposing frameworks for future empirical examination contingent upon data availability (Patrick 2007, 644). While there is literature attempting to grasp the nuances of what it may mean for a state to be “fragile”, there also exists conceptual ambiguity and a lack of empirical research examining potential determinants.

For example, while Patrick (2007) did not explicitly measure state fragility, he is the first scholar to deviate from a dichotomous approach of classifying states as “failed” or “not failed” to a categorical range increasing in severity of state fragility. This scale involved seven categories of fragility: 1) endemically weak states (e.g. Zambia), 2) resource-rich poor performers (e.g. Nigeria and Angola), 3) deteriorating situations (e.g. Zimbabwe), 4) prolonged political crisis (e.g. Nepal before 2006), 5) post-conflict situations (e.g. Mozambique and Uganda reaching a negotiated settlement after conflict) 6) brittle dictatorships (e.g. North Korea and Myanmar), and 7) reform-minded governments struggling with unfavorable legacies (e.g. Georgia). The
construction of this scale is debated in the literature regarding the specific criteria for each typology and the actual benefit to labeling each country without distinct measures.

Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2008) filled a gap in Patrick’s (2007) work by attempting to broadly define the concept of state fragility as “low income countries under stress” and develop an approach to measure it accordingly (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2008, 1). Their motivation for this was, in part, due to observing the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) determining intentional donor aid for countries solely based on one “low income” variable, a part of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2008, 1). Basically, Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray expose a weakness to the way in which state fragility is being conceptualized, measured, and applied in politics but do not propose an alternative method. Rather they focus solely on improving the existing method of measurement by applying Zadeh’s (1965) fuzzy-set theory to existing CPIA ratings. The fuzzy-set theory accounts for degrees of membership in a set [classification] beyond an interval rating to provide a more accurate assessment for broader concepts such as fragility (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2008, 2-3). By applying “fuzzy sets” to 76 available countries for the year 2005, their results indicate that countries close to the threshold of their CPIA quintile may be incorrectly classified and thus affect OECD’s economic aid distribution for developing, fragile states (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2008, 8). In sum, they clarify and define fragility via CPIA, but as a purely economic variable rather than approaching state fragility as consisting of more than solely economic considerations.
Two years later Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) were the first (and to my knowledge remain the only) to operationalize state fragility. The authors conceptualize state fragility as a condition of the state that manifests “an inability to provide basic services, meet vital public needs, demonstrate unstable/weak governance, persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, or a high propensity for conflict and civil war” (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010, 769). Based on Sub-Saharan African countries that are viewed as some of the most fragile states in the world Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) examine whether a state’s growth, colonial history, or institutions have an effect on its fragility. They argue that economic, demographic, institutional, and geographic factors influence state fragility. A shortcoming of their study, however, is the lack of theoretical framing to support their propositions. Thus, exploratory hypotheses are formulated on the links between economic development and institutional political instability on one hand and fragility on the other (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010, 770-772):

To test their hypotheses, the authors identify 41 sub-Saharan countries varying in their fragility status for two cross sections (1992-1999 and 2000-2007) based on data availability. To operationalize fragility they use the World Bank’s CPIA rating to discern different levels of fragility. The CPIA first ranks all countries and then categorizes them into quintiles. Countries in the lowest quintile are designated a 1 and classified as “fragile” (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010, 770). All other countries are designated a 0 for not reaching the threshold of fragility.

In an attempt to identify as many plausible potential factors of state fragility, the authors include 26 independent variables: economic, demographic, institutional, and resources contexts. Justifications for the inclusion of each variable are largely absent. In essence, they broadly mention that economic indicators include per-capita income, growth rate, private investment,
human capital, and natural resources (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010, 773). Furthermore, quality of government includes variables of trade openness, available resources, rate of inflation, and the size of the government. Lastly, their institutional/civil variables include civil rights repression, regime change, armed conflict, and ethnic fragmentation. Their underlying expectation is that fragility increases as a result of poor economic, political, and institutional conditions.

The unit of analysis for their research design is country by year. Their panel is composed of two cross-sections: 1992-1999 and 2000-2007 based on data restrictions. The authors ran a total of 14 models utilizing probit and covariate analyses, while controlling for endogeneity (reverse causality) and omitted variable bias.

Results from Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) provide explanatory power for understanding influencing factors of state fragility. Their central finding is that quality of institutions in terms of repression, conflict, and ethnic fragmentation are the main determinants of fragility. Furthermore, the probability of a country to be fragile “increases with restrictions of civil liberties and with the number of revolutions” (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2012, 769). Beyond lack of concise theoretical reasoning throughout, they provide future scholars with a framework to evaluate explanatory variables that were significant in their study.

Carment, Samy, and Prest (2011) attempted to “bridge the gap between theory and policy” regarding state fragility with a comprehensive framework on the dimensions of state fragility: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. In addition to their framework, they extended McGillivray and Feeny’s (2008) analysis by using a larger number of observations from over 100 countries

4 See next section “A Multidimensional Approach” for an in-depth discussion of each dimension with consideration for the relevance and theoretical mechanism linking dimensions back to state fragility as a whole.
between 1980 and 2006. Their results indicate that fragile states tend to be largely “under-aided”, but the few common recipients of aid such as Afghanistan, Congo (D.R.), and Burundi often experience negative returns to development as an attempt to combat fragility, potentially due to over-dependence on foreign resources and/or ineffective, corrupt governments\(^5\) (Carment, Samy, and Prest 2011, 146, 156).

Brinkerhoff (2011) examines the connection between state fragility and intrastate conflict by conceptualizing fragile as states that are “unable and/or unwilling to fulfill basic governance functions” (131). He argues, “conflict mitigation is a useful mechanism for instating subnational reforms to mitigate conditions of state fragility” (Brinkerhoff 2011, 131). By suggesting that state-society relations largely determine a state’s fragility, quality of governance becomes a crucial aspect for “reconstructing” the state for decreased fragility (Brinkerhoff 2011, 131). Though Brinkerhoff does not conduct an empirical analysis testing his propositions, he does articulate his conception of governance as the “rules, institutions and processes that balance expectations, capacity and political will” (Brinkerhoff 2011, 135). In essence, he proposes that the “interpenetration between the two domains of state and society” should be considered (i.e. perception of governance, corruption, etc. rather than solely considering economic development) by future scholars to test empirically (Brinkerhoff 2011, 135).

Lastly, Patrick (2011) defines state fragility as “the degree to which [a state] has deficits in one or all of its dimensions” (19). Therefore he operationalizes state fragility by using indicators that fall under the three dimensions of state fragility. Essentially he draws associations based on the State Weakness Index by comparing the economic, political, security, and social

\(^5\) These results are only capturing aid as a percentage of a state’s GNI for the year 2006
welfare of over 100 countries for a given year. While his findings do not test directly determinants of state fragility, he argues that negative conditions including violence, disease, natural disasters, etc. have a tendency to permeate and even spread from a country of origin. This assumption, however, was not directly tested. Here, I examine systematically likely contributors to state fragility that have been understudied in the literature by means of a multidimensional approach.

**A Multidimensional Approach**

As discussed in the previous section, while scholars debate which dimensions state fragility may entail, there is general agreement on including aspects of 1) Authority, 2) Legitimacy, and 3) Capacity based on state fragility’s definition from the Fund for Peace (FFP) (Carment, Prest, and Samy 2011, 56; Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 1). Fragility of the state is now observed on a continuum (rather than as a dichotomous variable) relative to other states by utilizing political, social, and economic pressures falling under three dimensions: authority, capacity, and legitimacy (Tikuisis, Carment, Samy and Landry 2015, 567). States are considered fragile to the extent to which they are deficient along any one of these dimensions when compared with other states. For example, the Fund for Peace’s (FFP) Fragile States Index (FSI) listed Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan amongst the ten most fragile states in the world for inabilities associated with aspects of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. In this section, each of these dimensions are theoretically linked to state fragility and used as dependent variables in statistical analyses. Results may reveal determinants of state fragility that have yet to be empirically tested.
Dimension I: Authority

Weber (1958) argues that a state’s “authority” explicitly refers to an elite’s ability to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violent force within its borders. Thus the sanctuary or inability to suppress acts of violence from nonstate actors is indicative of a state’s fragility. Failure to suppress violent intrastate conflict such as acts of terrorism, coup d’état, or warlordism is indicative of this “loss of monopoly” because the state is either unwilling or unable to maintain authority over the people as other individuals or groups rival and challenge the authority of the state. Thus, in the literature the “authority” dimension of state fragility is consistently related to intrastate violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Bigombe et al. 2000).

The number of interstate wars has been in drastic decline since the two world wars. Specifically, out of a total of 128-armed conflicts between 1989 and 2009, only eight were interstate (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2009). This means that the other 120 armed conflicts were occurring within a state. Intrastate violent conflict may manifest itself in the forms of riots, terrorism, or civil war contributing to state fragility for “where there is large-scale, intrastate violence there also tends to be an ongoing challenge to state authority, thus increasing state fragility” (Brock et al. 2012, 2).

The “cause and effects” of intrastate conflict (largely civil war) are examined extensively by Collier and Hoeffler (2004 and 2008) and Bigombe et al. (2000). Their findings indicate that violent grievances (i.e. hate crimes) often result from social ethnic exclusion, xenophobia, competition, and inequality. Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) analysis finds that resource and

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6 Armed conflicts in Harbom and Wallensteen’s study was defined as violent confrontations resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths
economic variables (e.g. food scarcity or GDP/capita) associated with these grievances contribute explanatory power to violent conflict and the subsequent increase of state fragility (Brinkerhoff 2011, 135-136). However, other determinants beyond economics remain untested. It is a gap I intend to fill by examining the effect of the number of refugees on violent group grievance.

**Dimension II: Legitimacy**

Furthermore, literature on state legitimacy related to state fragility is organized in two constructs. The first is normative, concerned with “the standards that an actor, institution, or political order must conform to in order to be considered legitimate” (Bellina et al., 2009). This conception includes consideration for public consent or pursuit of perceived justice, often through democratic election. The second construct is an empirical approach to examining legitimacy as “whether, how, and why people accept or reject a particular actor or institution” (NORAD 2009). Therefore legitimacy is based on public perception. Existing literature argues that decreased elite legitimacy is connected to state fragility by means of acting as a “hindrance for making the state a robust institution” that may result in government change or loss of foreign alliances for democracies (NORAD, 2009).

I define legitimacy as “the extent to which leaders have the support of the population…” (Tikuisis et al. 2015, 567). Thus, legitimacy is viewed as the right and acceptance of an authority to govern law through its practice and influence (Weber 1958, 32-36; Gilley 2006, 48; Connolly 1984, 34). Max Weber determined that legitimacy is an amorphous, fluid, and continuous characteristic of the state (Horowitz 1977, 23-25). While Horowitz (1977) argued that democracy
is not a necessary condition for the establishment of legitimacy, the inclusion of a set of legal practices, ethics, and customs provide context by which to evaluate a state’s legitimacy. Connolly (1984) argued that citizenry actively abiding by and “willfully living in accordance” with the state system contributes and directly validates its legitimacy (Connolly 1984, 5).

Kane (2001, 1-13) argued that legitimacy is an often-overlooked “powerful force” of tangible capital⁷. Citizens perceiving failing legitimacy due to poor rule of law or human rights violations may incite protests, riots, and resistance capable of increasing a state’s fragility by supporting opposition leaders to challenge governing authorities (Schaar 1981, 17). Pakistan, for example, is experiencing consistent civil and political turmoil capable of threatening a regime with an estimated 140 nuclear weapons (Davenport 2016, n.p.). Orentlicher (1991) states that new regimes consistently prosecute prior human rights violations of a predecessor to reaffirm the new regime’s legitimacy and standard for a just rule of law (2541).

Dimension III: Capacity

Capacity is a third dimension of state fragility. The literature defines state capacity as a socially constituted and dynamic phenomenon by which the state as an institution, governing elites, and the people have an ability to address grievances and effectively operate as an interconnected system (Malloy 1991, 9; Hameiri 2007, 123; Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Krebaum 2012, 7). Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Krebaum (2012) state that an inability to fulfill these functions is indicative of increased fragility via the inability of the state to provide public goods (7).

⁷ Kane (2001) specifically conceptualized legitimacy in this context as “morality”
Hendrix (2010) conceptualizes and operationalizes state capacity via three variables: 1) military capacity, 2) bureaucratic administrative capacity, and 3) quality and coherence of political intuitions. His inquiry is whether or not aspects of a state’s capacity (e.g. institutional or economic factors) result in decreased fragility. His general findings suggest that economic capacity is the “most theoretically and empirically justifiable and statistically significant” (Hendrix 2010, 1-2). Thus a relatively low level of capacity (i.e. ability) to address defined manifestations of state fragility (such as a loss of physical control of territories or provision of basic civil services) falls subject to a classification as a fragile state. Specifically, this conceptualization can then be narrowed to economic capacity.

In essence, economic capacity’s connection to fragility is that a lack of capacity to contain grievances, population demands, or neutralize violent interstate threats compromises citizen wellbeing and thus fragility. State economic capacity refers to “the power of leaders to mobilize resources for productive and defensive purposes” (Tikuisis, Carment, Samy and Landry 2015, 567). Specifically, I examine how population constraints may result in a decreasing state economic capacity. Population constraints are defined as “pressures on individuals within a state experiencing hardships associated with disease, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and demographic growth/mortality rate” (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). These conditions may inhibit a population’s ability to contribute towards their own state’s economy. A lack of population participation as workers and/or consumers due to one or more population constraints may prove detrimental, even temporarily, to their country’s economic capacity.

For example, Haiti had limited economic resources (and thus capacity) to invest in state-building after natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy in 2010. An inability to repair, rebuild,
invest in a state’s economy is considered detrimental to the wellbeing of the state and indicative of fragility. In contrast, a state capable of recovering from negative conditions (i.e. determinants of state fragility) may be less encumbered by associated pressures of a crisis relative to more fragile states with less capacity to resolve a crisis. The question remains as to what may contribute to decreased economic capacity.

Figure 1 presents the conceptual map of the multidimensional approach used in this study.
Contribution

Fragile states pose “numerous consequences for the affected country, its inhabitants, neighbors, and the international community” (Patrick 2011, 41). As such, mitigating harmful local, regional, and global repercussions of state fragility may reduce any actual or perceived harm. The intended contribution of this research is to identify these potential determinants of state fragility using empirical analyses to fill an existing gap in the literature and thus reduce ambiguities and provide political elites insight on potentially harmful (or maybe even avoidable) conditions of state fragility.

In summation, literature on state fragility generally considers aspects of authority, legitimacy, and capacity when determining potential dimensions. Frequent conceptual limitations are associated with approaching state fragility on a continuum, while empirical limitations are due to a lack of large-N analyses. The next chapter assesses the relationship between pressures from the number of refugees and violent group grievance to address the “authority” (control of unlawful use of violence) dimension of fragility. By applying theories of social identity and economic competition for scarce resources, I proceed to evaluate the potential manifestations within a society related to the presence of refugees that may result in a more fragile state.
CHAPTER THREE: REFUGEES & VIOLENT GROUP GRIEVANCE

Introduction

Do refugees have an effect on state fragility? In this chapter I examine whether economic and cultural pressures associated with the number of refugees result in a more fragile state by means of increased violent group grievance. Refugees are defined in this study as “individuals forced to flee their country due to persecution, war, or violence with well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group” (United Nations 2016, n.p.). According to the Fragile States Index (FSI), violent group grievance is the “violence existing between social groups” (Fund for Peace 2014, n.p.). Violent group grievance captures a distinct form of intrastate violence, specifically hate crimes and ethnic group clashes associated with powerlessness and discrimination. My main hypothesis in this chapter is that as the number of refugees increases violent group grievance due to economic and cultural conflict between refugees and citizens also increases.

I expect the primary participants in this conflict to be the minority refugee group and citizens (i.e. natives) of the host country. Other actors such as government officials (e.g. governing elites, their armed forces, and police) or “external” participants (e.g. Peace Officers, foreign militaries) may also intervene in the conflict to prevent persecution or influence the outcome. In this chapter I focus on the conflict by which citizens violently resist refugees due to shared perceptions that they may have the most to lose (e.g. job security, cultural integrity, political influence) to refugees. The foundation of the argument is that refugees increase ethnic
diversity which in turn leads to violent group grievance. In contrast, refugee absence equates to less ethnic diversity and thus less violent group grievances, as defined in this chapter.

By committing violence against the refugees, citizens may believe they protect their economic security (e.g. employment opportunities) and assumed dominant national culture including traditional and religious practices. In short, citizens may view refugees as an economic and/or cultural threat. Thus, they may engage in violence over preexisting economic resources and cultural traditions. This study assumes that there is a ‘dominant’ national culture and tradition in the host state; it does not account for cases where the incoming refugees are of the same culture as the host state’s culture or that of a major group in the state\(^8\).

I begin with a literature review on the connection between violent group grievance and the number of refugees. I then construct a theoretical framework based on economic interest theory and social identity theory to examine the mechanism of the relationship between refugee pressures and violent group grievance. I proceed to describe the research design, data, and methodology to test for these effects. Finally, I describe the findings of my analysis and conclude.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

Intrastate violence can manifest in a multitude of ways ranging from small-scale hate crimes and homicides to mass-casualty civil war. This literature review focuses solely on one specific form of unlawful violence: violent group grievance. Unlike the voluminous literature on civil war, violent group grievance remains largely understudied, which is surprising given the

\(^8\) The primary independent variable is unable to be deconstructed to exclude specific cases where there is not a dominant national culture. As such, cases that do not have a dominant culture are included in my analysis; this may be considered a limitation to this study.
increase of intrastate violence since the Second World War (Buhaug et al. 2006, 3). I first discuss existing literature on the relationship between violent group grievance and refugees and then proceed to discuss the theoretical framework of this study that addresses some of the shortcomings in the violent group grievance literature.

**Literature Review**

In the literature the connection between violent group grievance and refugees is understudied. The existing literature on refugees and violent group grievance is based mainly on qualitative studies. A review of existing literature reveals two main findings: the presence of refugees 1) incites violence (Rule, 1989; Zolberg et al., 1989; Krcmaric, 2014) and 2) has a mixed or neutral effect on violence (Lum, 2016; Richmond and Valtonen, 1994; Koopmans, 1996).

Rule (1989) argues that ethnic violence associated with refugee presence may be attributable to differences amongst social groups. These differences can be political representation, access to resources, or tolerance of contrasting cultural practices such as religion or language. Rule hypothesizes these differences can build to a point of social frustration within a society that may lead to “violent action, not often directed against governments after all, but against members of antagonistic ethnic, racial, or religious groups” (204). Rule does not address the mechanism of the connection between social differences and frustration, but does hypothesize a positive effect of frustration on violence. He argues the “primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism… If frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely [whereby] men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence in proportion to the intensity of their
frustration” (Rule 1989, 202). The essence of the theory suggests intergroup frustration amongst refugees and natives has potential to turn violent when individuals perceive “indignation or perceived injustice” (Ibid).

To be sure, “frustration” is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for social conflict. There are other mediating factors not addressed in Rule’s analytical framework. To illustrate, there are cases where individuals of a population suffer, even starve to death, but still do not engage in violent conflict. An example would be the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is considered amongst the most ethnically diverse and politically corrupt countries annually with over 12 million civilians experiencing starvation (largely attributable to sanctions imposed by the United States) (NCRI 2014, n.p; World Bank 2017, n.p.). Members of ten primary ethnic groups in Iran (e.g. Persians, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs, etc.) experience food poverty and immense repression from their government yet do not engage in violent conflict against their government, one another, or refugees. Thus, other factors may be present under which conflict may or may not manifest from civil frustration.

According to Zolberg et al. (1989) rapid, basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures may lead to violence attributable to inequality and oppression of “subordinate classes” including refugees and peasants (245). Zolberg et al. (1989) argue minorities are frequently the victims of small-scale violent conflict because they lack the resource capacity to flee elsewhere (256-257). This factor of availability of group resources at the time of societal changes may condition the relationship in ways Rule (1989) does not take into account. Zolberg et al. did not systematically test the relationship between radical social transformation and violence, but they do make a probabilistic argument that rapid social transformation (i.e. effects
of globalization) may lead to ethnic violence where neither society nor the state is capable of effectively managing distribution of economic resources, territories, etc. between natives and refugees (Zolberg et al. 1988, 256-257).

The latter findings suggest that refugees may have a mixed or neutral effect on violent group grievance as argued by Richmond and Valtonen (1994). Richmond and Valtonen argue that “state sovereignty can no longer be maintained in an absolute way… where boundaries are permeable for money, goods, and information but not for people” (Richmond and Valtonen 1994, 205). He suggests that economic and developmental factors condition the effect of the number of refugees on conflict, which he examines via a qualitative analysis on “catalysts of social, economic, and political change rooted in migration pressures” (Richmond and Valtonen 1994, 26). According to Richmond and Valtonen, the presence of refugees often has a mixed effect on violence depending on whether political institutions provide economic opportunity and integration for refugees in the labor market (Richmond and Valtonen 1994, 26). Opportunity in this context refers to refugee capacity to joining the workforce as a driving factor of a growing economy. In contrast, when host countries (such as South Africa in the 1950s) do not provide aid in terms of social services (e.g. job placement or welfare for the unemployed) conflict may be more likely (Richmond and Valtonen 1994, 25). Thus, for Richmond and Valtonen an important factor that may affect the level of violent group conflict is the state policies aimed at incorporating refugees in the economy and labor market; in other words the driving factor in conflict avoidance is the host country’s capacity of providing economic opportunity.

Now, developed countries may be more likely to have institutional arrangements for the economic integration of refugees than developing countries. This is consistent with the
expectation described above that perceived threat to resources may depend on the availability and abundance of resources a state possesses. Natives of a wealthy developed state may not perceive as large a threat to their economic wellbeing compared to natives of a poor developing state. This suggests violence may not be as prevalent in developed countries compared to developing countries (to be sure there is variation in violence across developing and also developed countries).

Koopmans (1996) takes into account political factors that may explain violent group grievance. He examines European cases from 1988 to 1993 to assess the apparent effect of the number of refugees on internal violence and voting for radical parties of the right. Koopmans explores whether or not the presence of refugees has an effect on violent ethnic conflict and right wing voting intended to prevent further influxes of minorities. He presents a theoretical argument on grievance and opportunity to explain the assumed connection between radical party voting and violence attributable to racism. To clarify, he theorizes natives attribute their hardships to and thus violently express grievances against refugee groups when elected political elites “enable” (actual or perceived) social justifications for doing so. The findings show Germany experienced the highest level of internal violence involving refugees and minority groups due to a “combination of nationalist rhetoric by established parties and swift and effective policies restricting the rights of foreigners and refugees” (Koopmans 1996, 211).

A weakness of Koopmans’ study is the lack of specification and operationalization of the violence measure. The author simply refers to this measure as capturing “extreme right and racist violent actions” (Koopmans 1996, 204). In this quantitative study, different countries have conflicting definitions and interpretations of what racist violence may be. For example, the
“racial violence” measure for Great Britain could include “threatening behavior or physical attacks” reported by refugees/native British, whereas the violence measure for Germany required Volksverhetzung (incitement to racial hatred) influencing an act of violence reported to and involving police authority (Koopmans 1996, 189). Consistent anti-Semitic hate crimes and small-scale acts of violence are an example of cases frequently included in Koopmans’ analysis. Further, Koopmans concludes that results are mixed due to other intervening factors such as police presence and aspects of political party and level of democracy. This study presents an argument for political parties conditioning the effect of the number of refugees on violent group grievance that is consistent with the expectation described above that in democracies the level of violence may be higher than that in autocratic regimes. The underlying theory is that democracies permit grievances to be aired in the form of public demonstrations that have potential to turn violent, whereas autocracies often repress such demonstrations from occurring.

More recently, Krcmaric (2014) examines social structural factors by considering why refugee flows may cause conflict in some host states but not others. He argues “refugees cause conflict when they alter the host state’s ethnic balance of power [in their favor]” (Krcmaric 2014, 182). This ethnic balance of power refers to the host state’s “ethnic contract… a bargain that specifies how groups divide benefits in accordance with the underlying distribution of power” (Krcmaric 2014, 183). He concludes shifts in relative power may result in shifts of this ethnic contract for social, political, or resource benefits and thus subsequently incite violence over these changes. In short, refugees obtaining political or social power (by means of elections or otherwise) may experience an increase in benefits that citizens may perceive as unjust and use violence to maintain their perceived claim to existing benefits.
Krcmaric (2014) applies theories of bargaining failure and war to the number of refugees and ethnic violence. Essentially the capacity to negotiate and compromise on territories, laws, and cultural practices conditions the effect of the relationship between refugee flows and violence. He examines the case of Serbia’s Kosovo region in 1999 when “animosity between ethnic Albanians and native Serbians escalated rapidly as oppressive policies of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic fueled growth of resistance groups (195). After Milosevic launched an ethnic-cleansing operation against Albanian villages in Serbia hundreds of thousands of citizens fled south towards Albania and Macedonia. Both of these countries had remarkable social, geographic, economic, and political similarities with the notable exception of ethnic composition and sociopolitical tolerance (Krcmaric 2014, 206, 214). Demographically, Macedonia consisted of a Slav majority with an Albanian minority and Albania was a homogeneously Albanian population.

As the crisis intensified and over 300,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees crossed into Macedonia, “ethnic animosity increased and police and border guards allegedly abused refugees” inciting refugee retaliation and persistent small-scale conflicts thereafter (Krcmaric 2014, 206). Refugees responded by first organizing a group known as the National Liberation Army (NLÀ) and then setting demands for the use of Albanian as “the official state language, a new census, an Albanian university, and greater influence in national politics” due to the radical demographic shift (Krcmaric 2014, 208). Krcmaric argues the sudden influx of Kosovar Albanians in Macedonia “upset the distribution of latent power and distribution of benefits between the Slav
majority and Albanian minority” which incited violent group grievance across the region⁹ (Krcmaric 2014, 196).

Meanwhile, Albania, incurring over 400,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees, provided refugees with resources (even homes) to facilitate the mass migration (Krcmaric 2014, 212). In doing so, refugees were reportedly “grateful” and began looking for work in the region to establish cross-national relationships and solutions for economic and social prosperity. His findings suggest Macedonia experienced conflict because civilians perceived refugee flows to “upset the level of power between the country’s ethnic groups” (Krcmaric 2014, 214). Krcmaric argues this stark contrast in violent or non-violent outcome is attributable to the ethnic balance of power; In essence, there was no native group to act on a perceived threat, whereas the Slav majority in Macedonia feared becoming the demographic minority and violently repressed to maintain economic and political power and the benefits of such power (e.g. territory or job opportunity).

In sum, existing literature on the connection between refugees and violent group grievance examines a number of socio-structural, psychological, and political factors that may help explain cases where the number of refugees result in varying degrees of violence. However, there is a lack of data and systematic analyses to evaluate different propositions. In this chapter I examine this question systematically; I construct a more developed theoretical framework incorporating both economic and cultural-based theories to articulate why I expect the number of refugees to

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⁹ Krcmaric uses the Stenkovec Protest as an example, whereby over two thousand Kosovar Albanian refugees protested against the harsh repression and treatment of Macedonians. The international Crisis Group stated this Albanian uprising in Macedonia lead to the state “teetering on the brink of collapse” (Krcmaric 2014, 207).
result in increased violent group grievance. Then I conduct an analysis that controls for intervening factors.

**Theoretical Framework**

In this section, I argue that the connection between the number of refugees and violent group grievance can partly be explained by differences in culture (e.g. language or religion) and/or competition for resources. I propose the mechanism of social identity and economic interest theory affects violent group grievance occurring within a state. Differences between social ethnic groups may become increasingly significant when one group attempts to violently suppress the other in an effort to protect resources, way of life, or out of xenophobic tension\(^{10}\). Thus, the number of refugees may increase the level of violent group grievance occurring within a state as differences amongst the in and out-groups become recognized and stimulate prejudices capable of turning violent.

Those who perceive economic and cultural threats of the number of refugees are more likely to manifest violent group grievance to avoid the damaging effects of this perceived threat than those who do not, unless the political regime is capable and willing of effective repression (for instance Egypt and China) (Hendrix and Brinkman 2013, 2). Sniderman et al. (2004) examine the basis of civil opposition to immigrant minorities. Their analysis relies on public opinion survey data collected in The Netherlands from 1998-1998. Findings suggest that considerations for national identity “dominate those of economic advantage which evoke exclusionary policies” and anti-immigrant sentiments at large (Sniderman et al. 2004, 35). I

\(^{10}\) I consider group members engaging in violent behavior as representatives of their ethnic group.
examine how economic and cultural factors may result in violence— not just anti-immigrant sentiments.

By incorporating the possibility for cultural (i.e. racial or ethnic) factors to play a role in addition to economic and political conditions, we might be able to better understand why states exhibit violence without resource scarcity. Lake and Rothchild (1996) argued, “ethnic violence is most often caused by collective fears of the future” (41). They provide a theoretical link between “collective fears” and ethnic conflict. They argue most ethnic groups coexist quite harmoniously until “ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict, and fear of what the future might bring” (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 43). As these fears arise “states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups which as central authority declines, become fearful for their survival” (Ibid). This conflict could then begin to manifest as the masses begin to fear for the safety and struggle to resolve perceived dilemmas surrounding culture or resources. It is a distinctly separate condition from a purely economic-driven assumption to explain why conflict may occur.

In sum, an influx of refugees may result in violent group grievance due to social, political, and economic conditions. I argue that cultural in addition to economic theories may help us understand the relationship between the number of refugees and violent group grievance. Specifically, I rely on the social identity and economic interest theory to examine the relationship between refugee presence and violent group grievance. I argue that when aspects of group identities such as ethnicity, language, or religion are impacted by an increase in immigration, the primary ethnic group may resist the perceived threat(s) posed by refugees. This resistance may
take the form of violent means to 1) prevent their national identity and way of life from being compromised and 2) protect access to scarce economic resources.

The social identity theory postulates that perceived threat from conflicting religious values, and opportunity for misunderstandings based on language or cultural differences can incite protest participation, panic, even violence (Sniderman et al. 2004, 35-36). The premise of this theory is that individuals of a society exist, interact, and compete across a variety of social groups for relative power, resources, and benefits (Greenfield and Marks 2007; Turner 1975). In this case, natives of a host country function as the in-group, while refugees may be treated as the out-group and as a result are targeted for a perceived threat to in-group way of life and resources.

The social identity theory is an emotion-based approach to understanding violent group grievance. Petersen (2002) argues that emotion (primarily fear, hatred, and resentment) is a “mechanism that triggers action to satisfying a pressing concern” (17). He argues an emotion like fear or hatred “raises the saliency of one concern over another and heightens cognitive and physical capabilities necessary to respond to the situational challenge” (17-18). Thus, a native in-group perceiving a threat to aspects of their culture may act on their negative emotions to preserve their cultural identity and way of life. According to Petersen (2002), violent group grievance may occur when 1) a structural change (such as a refugee influx) occurs, 2) the native in-group perceives a threat, and 3) collectively builds emotions such as fear, hatred, or resentment based, then 4) act on emotions to resist perceived threats to wellbeing (i.e. cultural integrity or access to resources) (23). To be clear, he does not propose a mechanism that turns resentment among the native population into violence. I, however, argue this mechanism is the perceived threat to culture and/or resources.
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) argue non-economic, cultural factors may even be the main drivers of anti-immigrant and refugee sentiments. They suggest natives derive utility from “living in a society with a well-defined sense of national identity and well-understood and accepted social norms… natives may oppose excessive immigration on the grounds that it undermines these norms with or without disliking foreigners per se” (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006, 844). To test these assumptions O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) use the 1995 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) module on national identity. Citizens from 24 countries were polled from 1995-1996 to determine the level of anti-immigrant and refugee sentiments. Findings suggest respondents demonstrated “attitudes towards immigration reflecting nationalist sentiment”, especially when natives perceive refugees to have limited skills and subsequent contribution to their economy (857).

Further, the economic interest theory posits actual or perceived competition for scarce resources translates into inter-group conflict (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Warnecke et al., 1992). Rule (1989), Zolberg et al. (1989), and Krcmaric (2014) refer to this potential for competition for economic resources to incite conflict between social groups but do not take into account social factors. Specifically, the social identity argument may help to explain some of the case anomalies where competition for resources falls short as an explanation for violent conflict (Brown 1995, Capozza and Brown 2000, Huddy 2001).

My underlying theoretical assumption then is that citizens of the host country resort to violence in an attempt to protect 1) existing economic/resource benefits and 2) their cultural
practices and way of life. However, developmental, political, and institutional factors are expected to mitigate the effects of these inflows on conflict. For example, economically developed states have policies such as labor laws and safety nets that serve as an economic buffer to “external” influences (such as the number of refugees) which developing countries often lack (Schneider et al. 2003, 29-31; Rodrik 1997, 84). Further, democratic regimes may experience more conflict because of constitutional protections for freedom of association such as protests, demonstrations, and institutions that may mobilize supporters based on such identities of culture (e.g. ethnicity or religion). Then again, democracies are based on greater tolerance of diversity that may result in less violence. My model controls for level of democracy that allows for testing of these alternative effects.

With recent conflicts such as that of Syria resulting in increased refugees, assumptions can be made for aspects of social competition and potential for cultural clashes to influence states (particularly developing states) in profound ways. This research is designed to examine the level of association between the number of refugees and violent group grievance. Implications are then derived to tentatively assess the potential value or consequences refugee influxes pose for the host country.

Research Design and Variable Operationalization

Dependent Variable

In this study the dependent variable is violent group grievance. The Fragile States Index (FSI) states that group grievance is the “tension and violence existing between social groups and

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11 I acknowledge that on average only a small fraction of citizens resorts to violence. Thus, these events may be considered “rare” but nevertheless do occur in all states at varying levels.
the state’s ability to provide security is undermined allowing the potential for further fear and violence” (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). Variable measures comprised within violent group grievance include discrimination, powerlessness, and intrastate violence. More specifically, this measure of violence captures “ethnic clashes” such as hate crimes or intrastate conflicts attributable to discrimination (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). For example, these violent events must involve ethnic clashes rather than interpersonal (e.g. relationships) or criminal (e.g. robbery). “Group” in this context refers to ethnic groups rather than number of people. To be clear, a case of a single attacker who stabs a refugee would be included. In short, this measure includes all intrastate conflict associated with ethnic violence, such as ethnic civil wars or demonstrations against refugees becoming violent, for example.

**Main Independent Variable**

The main independent variable refugees is defined as “individuals forced to flee their country due to persecution, war, or violence with well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group” (United Nations, 2016). The World Bank provides number of refugees by estimating the refugee population by country/territory of asylum for 264 states annually from 1960-2014. I use number of refugees in the model (not the percent of refugees as a percent of the population) due to the widespread “visibility” of their presence irrespective of the size of the host state’s population, especially via the mass media, local and national.

Based on the previously discussed theoretical mechanism, I expect pressures associated with the number of refugees to increase violent conflict. The underlying mechanism is citizens may perceive refugees as a threat to resources or culture, rather than contributing members to a
growing workforce, and engage in violence to preserve their way of life and access to scarce resources. Civil frustration and ethnic tension may result in hate crimes (i.e. group grievance) against refugees and small-scale social conflict capable of contributing to a state’s fragility by means of unlawful violence. A state quickly ending violence could be observed as less fragile, but the assumption is that strong states with governing authority are able to mitigate, prevent, or deter the majority of these cases.

Control Variables

The following control variables are included in the model:

1. GDP/Capita

   GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population in U.S. currency. World Bank, the source of these data, operationalize GDP per capita by using the “sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Calculations do not include deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets, depletion, or degradation of natural resources” (World Bank 2017, n.p.). The expected relationship between GDP/Capita and violent group grievance is negative, suggesting that an increase in GDP/capita will result in fewer grievances. The assumption is that socioeconomic wellbeing for citizens results in more resources and thus less competition for such resources and so decreasing the potential for violent grievances.

2. Human Development Index (HDI)

   The United Nations Development Programme provides this variable. Rather than just an economic indicator of development, this variable measures levels in 1) life expectancy, 2)
education, and 3) income\textsuperscript{12}. It is a composite statistic ranging from zero to one. Higher ratings indicate higher levels of human development.

I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in developing compared to developed states. In less developed countries (LDCs) where citizens may face higher unemployment levels and struggle to secure a living, they may be more vulnerable economically and thus more likely to compete for already limited resources for survival. In LDCs refugees consuming scarce resources may be more likely to trigger violence by citizens against perceived contributors to economic hardship. In developed states where resources are relatively less scarce and thus competition for resources lower, lower levels of violent group grievance are expected. Further, I assume that increases in human development address certain grievances (such as economic hardship), whereas lower levels of human development may be associated with competition for scarce resources leading to violence.

3. Democracy

I utilize two indicators to capture democracy. First, the Polity IV Project provides data on the level of democracy for 167 countries from 1946-2015. The values range from Autocracy (-10) to Full Democracy (10). Second, the World Bank created a “Voice and Accountability” variable to capture perceptions of the “extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, association, and a free media” (World Bank 2017, n.p.). This variable has a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year. Lower values signify weaker democracy, while higher values signify stronger democracy in relation to the

\textsuperscript{12} The correlation between GDP/capita and the Human Development Index is 0.6884.
variable description above. The two indicators are correlated at 0.8395, but there is no multicollinearity to affect tests of statistical significance.

Democracies often permit citizens (through constitutions or political doctrine) to participate in public protests and demonstrations, which have the potential to turn violent as grievances are aired. Protest demonstrations and alternative institutional arrangements (e.g. political parties and organizations) may be largely suppressed in autocracies, thus less violent group grievance would be expected. However, democratic institutions are channels for the expression for citizen grievances so it may be argued that less violence is likely in democracies than in autocratic regimes. Thus, democracy may be associated positively or negatively with violent group conflict.

I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in democratic compared to autocratic states. In democracies constitutional protections exist for citizens to have the right to participate in public protests and demonstrations, which have the potential to turn violent as grievances are aired. Protest demonstrations and alternative institutional arrangements (e.g. political parties and organizations) may be largely suppressed in autocracies, thus less violent group grievance would be expected. On the other hand, however, democratic institutions are channels for the expression for citizen grievances so it may be argued that less violence is likely in democracies than in autocratic regimes. For example, citizens in a democracy may use the vote to act on their underlying grievances whereas citizens in autocracies or authoritarian political systems are not able to participate in elections and therefore may take it upon themselves to act on their grievances against perceived threats. Therefore, although I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in democracies than autocracies, the effect may be in the opposite direction.
4. Control of Corruption

This variable, also a Worldwide Governance Indicator, is operationalized as the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Control of Corruption also has a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year. Similarly, lower values signify weaker control of corruption, while higher values signify stronger control of corruption in relation to the variable description.

I expect the relationship between control of corruption and group grievance to be negative, suggesting that a government’s inability to control corruption results in an increase in violent group grievance. This may be due to the allocation of resources to address pressures resulting from the number of refugees. States that have greater control of corruption may allocate such resources more effectively (addressing refugees’ needs and citizens’ grievances) thus containing the level of violence compared to states that have less control of corruption.

5. Political Stability

The World Bank operationalizes Political Stability as the perceptions of the likelihood of politically motivated violence, including acts of terrorism. This measure of politically motivated violence includes acts of state-sponsored and non-state group acts of terrorism. Non-state group acts of terrorism are included only if the attack was committed to advance a political cause. By this definition, I expect the relationship between political stability and violent group grievance to be negative, suggesting that a government capable of inflicting or permitting politically-motivated violence on its citizens to also be capable of repressing citizens from committing acts of violent group grievance.
This Worldwide Governance Indicator also has a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year. Lower values signify weaker stability, while higher values signify stronger stability in relation to the variable description above.

6. Population Size

The World Bank contains a variable indicator of population size for country-year, defined operationally as the number of residents of the state regardless of legal status/citizenship (World Bank 2017, n.p.). I anticipate a positive relationship between population size and grievance, suggesting that in states with larger populations the opportunity for violence may be larger than in countries with smaller populations. On the other hand, larger states are better equipped to deal with refugees and might also be more diverse, thus lessening the cultural threat perception.

Data and Empirical Strategy

The unit of analysis for this research design is Country, Year. The sample is 178 countries from 2006-2014. This timeframe is attributable to data restriction since The Fragile States Index started in 2005 and thus in the most recent decade data in regard to refugees has become more robust and available to the public.

Furthermore, I use a one-year lag for both development (HDI) and control of corruption since grievances associated with either would likely take time to manifest. I estimate the effects using a Driscoll-Kraay XT Regression that corrects for heteroskedasticity. I use a cross-sectional longitudinal (XT) model with fixed effects to assess the relationship between refugee pressures and violent group grievance.

H1: I expect a positive relationship between the number of refugees and violent group grievance.
H2: I expect a negative relationship between GDP/Capita and violent group grievance.

H3: I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in developing compared to developed states.

H4: I expect higher levels of violent group grievance in democratic compared to autocratic states.

H5: I expect a negative relationship between control of corruption and violent group grievance.

H6: I expect a negative relationship between political stability and violent group grievance.

H7: I expect a positive relationship between population size and violent group grievance.

**Results and Analysis**

Table 1 shows the effect of the number of refugees on violent group grievance is statistically significant and in the anticipated direction.
Table 1: Refugees and Violent Group Grievance (DV) XT Regression with fixed effects; Driscoll-Kraay

| Independent Variables          | Coefficient | SE    | P>|t| |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------|------|
| Refugees                      | 5.00e-07    | 7.62e-08 | .000 |
| GDP/Capita                    | .00002      | 6.07e-06 | .002 |
| L.Human Development           | 4.7656      | .9550 | .000 |
| Voice & Accountability        | .2508       | .0735 | .001 |
| L.Control of Corruption       | -.3692      | .1535 | .017 |
| Stability                     | -.2589      | .0301 | .000 |
| Level of Democracy            | .0234       | .0099 | .020 |
| Population (logged)           | -.9441      | .2926 | .002 |
| Constant                      | 17.6796     | 4.3565 | .000 |
| Prob>F                        | 0.0000      |       |      |
| Within R-Squared              | 0.0986      |       |      |
| N (observations)              | 1146        |       |      |

The regression results indicate that as refugee pressures increase, group grievance also increases by 5.00e-07 on average. To illustrate, an increase in refugees from 100,000 to 200,000 results in an increase of .05 in the index of violent group grievance (a scale from 1 to 10). This finding confirms the main hypothesis of this study on the effect of refugee pressures on violent group grievance.

The effect on the dependent variable is shown in Figure 2, which shows the statistically significant, positive relationship between number of refugees and violent group grievance. Predicted values of violent group grievance as numbers of refugees increase from zero to three million are shown on the Y-axis of Figure 2.

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13 See APPENDIX A: CHAPTER THREE SUMMARY STATISTICS
As this figure indicates, high numbers of refugees are not always “necessary” for a state to experience mid-to-high degrees of violent grievance capable of impacting fragility. This finding suggests that number of refugees is an important determinant of state fragility. As such, the inclusion of refugees belongs in the security studies literature.

All control variables are statistically significant. However, four coefficients are not in the direction expected. First, the relationship between GDP/capita and violent group grievance is positive; suggesting increased GDP/capita results in more violent group grievance. This finding appears to be reinforcing the assumption made by Sniderman et al. (2004) that cultural factors

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14 See y-axis scale starting at 6 (rather than 0) on a 0-10 scale.
may account for violent conflict even in circumstances where there is relative economic
prosperity. However, the unanticipated negative effect needs to be investigated further. To be
sure, GDP/per capita is not an indicator of wealth distribution, or level of economic inequality
that may be a better predictor of violent group grievance.

Second, the relationship between HDI and violent group grievance is also positive. While
contrary to initial expectation, the finding mirrors that of GDP/capita therefore not
surprising. This finding suggests that an increase in development in terms of education, longevity,
and income also results in increased violent group grievance. This may be attributable to
civilians violently resisting perceived threats from the number of refugees to protect current
benefits associated with development.

Third, the relationship between voice and accountability and violent group grievance is
positive, suggesting that an increase of freedom of expression, association, and free media is
associated with an increase in violent grievance. This may suggest the freedom to express
grievances has potential to turn violent (e.g. protests resulting into riots).

Lastly, the relationship between level of democracy and violent group grievance is
positive, suggesting that increased democracy results in more violent group grievance. The
rationale may reside in autocratic elites being able to effectively oppress citizen opposition and
violence before violent group grievances increase. In contrast, democratic states permitting
expression of grievances (e.g. protests) may indirectly permit increased opportunity for violence
to erupt.

Because of the unexpected directions of these coefficients, I test for multicollinearity to
determine potentially highly collinear measures amongst the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Voice and accountability, control of corruption, and political stability were highly correlated, but further testing revealed that controlling for this collinearity did not affect the statistical significance or direction of any variables.

**Limitations and Conclusion**

This research examines the relationship between pressures associated with the number of refugees and violent group grievance. The main hypothesis in this study was confirmed while controlling for a variety of factors associated with violent group grievance as an indicator of state fragility’s dimension of authority. This first large-N quantitative analysis is consistent with findings in the literature that number of refugees result in increased violent group grievance. I argue the theoretical mechanism for this relationship to be social competition for resources and preservation of cultural identity.

In conclusion, states experiencing economic or cultural pressures associated with refugees may experience increased violent group grievance and thus increased fragility. My findings imply that richer, democratic states are more fragile in this context than less developed, autocratic states. This contradicts assumptions in the literature on fragile states suggesting rich democracies often less fragile than poor developing countries (Patrick, 2011). Improving data and exploring other potential determinants of violent group grievance may help researchers to better understand the mechanism and dynamics of this association.

Now, a limitation of this study is that violent group grievance does not distinguish empirically between violence against refugees and that against immigrants. Rather, the measure captures ethnic violence, specifically hate crimes and conflicts attributable to discrimination. Such violence, to be sure, may include acts of violence committed against immigrants; however,
it is not possible to deconstruct this index since each value of this variable is based on quantitative and qualitative data I do not have access to. To account in part for this limitation I attempted to locate data on the number of immigrants to include it in the analysis as a control variable. However, such data were not available for the cases and years included in my study.

Another limitation of this study is that I assume that each country in the data sample has a “dominant” culture that is different from that of the refugees. Refugees that have the same culture as that of the dominant group or a group in the host state may experience less violent group grievance; but I do not test for this effect.
CHAPTER FOUR: STATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS & POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Introduction

Do state human rights violations have an effect on political legitimacy? In this chapter I examine whether reputational costs associated with state human rights violations result in a more fragile state by means of decreased political legitimacy. Human rights are defined as “fundamental, inalienable legal rights of all human beings under international law as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948” (Donnelly 1986, 606-607). Commonly associated rights described in the Declaration include the right to life (Article 3) and freedom from slavery (Article 4) and torture (Article 5). Legitimacy refers to public acceptance of the right of an authority to govern law through its practice and influence (Weber 1958, 32-36; Gilley 2006, 48; Connolly 1984, 34). In this chapter, popular support for the government and/or its leader is used as a proxy for political legitimacy, defined as “the level of citizen support for the government and/or its leader.” This variable is constructed by expert assessments and opinion surveys (PRS Group 2017, n.p.). The main hypothesis in this chapter is that as the level of state human rights violations increases, popular support for the state’s government of leaders’ legitimacy decreases due to reputational costs associated with immorality, injustice, and violation of international law.

Human rights violations committed by the government or state leadership occur mainly for political reasons and usually involve political opposition. For instance, by eliminating leaders of coup d’etats or the leadership of competing political parties, governing elites may preserve their power and rule. Victims may also be ethnic or social groups, i.e. minorities (e.g. Jews or
LGBTQ+) as governing elites aim to “purify” a society in accordance with current political, religious, or social norms. For example, Chechen authorities arrested, tortured, and/or committed extrajudicial killings on over 100 male citizens assumed to be homosexual or bisexual at recently built concentration camps (Kramer 2017, n.p.). Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov condoned the use of torture techniques involving starvation, electric shock, and physical beatings until victims were “barely alive” to acquire names of others “suspects” (Ibid). Chechen citizens exist within an “ultra-conservative [Islamic] society in which homophobia is widespread”, which emboldens the political rhetoric and acts of this particular human rights violation (Walker 2017, n.p.). Western governments and the United Nations “widely condemned” these accusations corroborated by the Human Rights Watch (Chan 2017, n.p.).

The question I examine is whether violations such as these are associated with decreased popular support of the political elite and their rule thus diminishing their legitimacy. In this chapter I focus solely on human rights violations committed by state actors. I assume that citizens hold their political leaders accountable for actions perceived as unjust, immoral, or unlawful. I expect higher levels of perceived political legitimacy in response to human rights violations 1) in developing compared to developed states and 2) authoritarian compared to democratic states. In less developed countries (LDCs) citizens may lack the education or means (e.g. press or technology) to be informed of state human rights violations compared to citizens of developed countries (MDCs). I assume access to resources more commonly found in MDCs permits citizens to become informed and potentially respond (i.e. protest or vote) more effectively to such violations. While diffusion of such information can occur in LDCs without resources such as internet or mobile phones, I argue that fewer resources to become informed
and express disapproval diminishes citizen capabilities and results in higher levels of political legitimacy. In the literature there is no systematic study of the relationship between level of development and political legitimacy. I test for this relationship by controlling for the level of development in my model.

In authoritarian states I would assume popular support for the government and/or its leader to be relatively low to begin with since rule is established without a fair electoral process. As such, it is anticipated that the effect of human rights violations on political legitimacy should be smaller than that in democracies because popular support there may already be relatively low and people may “expect” such violations from a leader uninhibited by democratic accountability. Authoritarian regimes may also repress civil demonstrations of disapproval, or control facets of the news media, thus reducing the potential for human rights violations to become known or acted upon. This may lead to more perceived legitimacy of an elite than there would be if democratic ideals such as freedom of speech or press were upheld to allow civil expressions in the form of protests. Thus, in authoritarian regimes I would expect a smaller effect of human rights violations on political legitimacy.

Further, citizens of democracies may have high expectations of elected leaders due to democratic ideals of “liberty and justice for all”. Second, citizens in democracies likely have on average greater access to information compared to civilians of more authoritarian states that may impose restrictions on information (e.g. prohibited civil internet use in North Korea). I argue a higher level of education may provide civilians of democracies the understanding to 1) recognize a human rights violation, 2) become informed with ample resources, and 3) act upon such information. This may translate in higher reputational costs that is lower popular support (lower
legitimacy) for government and/or leadership compared to those in authoritarian regimes. Lower levels of legitimacy may in turn lead to additional costs for the government/leadership or the state, for instance internal opposition challenging the current government or state.

This chapter begins with a literature review of the connection between political legitimacy and state human rights violations. I then construct a theoretical framework based on social impact theory to examine the mechanism of the relationship between state human rights violations and political legitimacy. I proceed to describe the research design, data, and methodology to test for these effects. Finally, I describe the findings of my analysis and conclude.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

Political legitimacy remains largely understudied, which is surprising considering a lack of political legitimacy may incite major events such as political overthrow by opposition potentially implicating civilian wellbeing. Further, there are no studies directly examining the relationship between state human rights violations and political legitimacy.

By examining factors that may influence levels of political legitimacy, we may better understand if violation of morals, ethics, and legal practices related to human rights violations have an effect on legitimacy. Due to the lack of studies on state human rights violations and legitimacy, I first discuss existing literature on popular support related to human rights such as democracy and civil liberties. I then present a theoretical framework theorizing on the association between state human rights violations and legitimacy.
Literature Review

The existing literature on legitimacy is based mainly on qualitative studies attempting to 1) define what constitutes political legitimacy and 2) explore potential measures and determinants of legitimacy. I discuss both of these components in the literature review before presenting a theoretical framework of the relationship of state human rights violations on political legitimacy. Further, a review of existing literature reveals two main findings: 1) aspects of social trust and civil freedoms have implications for the level of popular support and 2) loss of popular support has the potential to result in political change.

This potential political change may or may not impact civilian wellbeing or the state’s fragility, but the underlying assumption is that society's collective negative perception or disapproval of state human rights violations can indeed lead to perceived government non-legitimacy, and sociopolitical tensions in some cases. To be clear, there is a distinction between support for state institutions, and government and leadership. However, governing elites operate in an institutional context within the government and state. It is within these institutional parameters that the government or the leadership may break the law; thus the level of support for the government and/or leadership may also partly reflect the level of support for state institutions; citizens may perceive a lack of legitimacy in the courts, bureaucracy, the executive or other institutions of the political system. Loss of state legitimacy increases the level of a state’s fragility as it may give rise to anti-regime opposition groups, imposition of sanctions, loss of allies, and so on.
Legitimacy: Concepts, Measures, and Determinants

Weber argues that legitimacy is an amorphous, fluid, and continuous characteristic of the state apparatus (Horowitz 1977, 23-25). Further, he suggests democracy is not a necessary condition for the establishment of legitimacy. Rather, the inclusion of a set of legal practices, ethics, and customs provide context by which to evaluate a state’s legitimacy regardless of whether or not a state is democratic (Ibid). In essence, legitimacy can be observed and even compared amongst any states with recognized laws, ethics, and leadership. Horowitz (1977) argues legitimacy can be observed as an “institutionalized regime consisting of hegemonic rule and broad-based consensus between the holders of power” (26). He does not provide specific standards in terms of laws, ethics, and leadership to use for comparison but argues that acts of 1) vote tampering (in democracies) and 2) human rights violations (across all states) are likely to jeopardize a regime’s legitimacy (Horowitz 1977, 31-33).

Connolly (1984) incorporates another component to the concept of state legitimacy, that of public participation. He argues that citizenry actively abiding by and “willfully living in accordance” with the state system contributes and directly validates its legitimacy (Connolly 1984, 5). He does not directly examine a relationship between public participation and perceived legitimacy, but his study provides a context by which scholars can recognize the concept of legitimacy. For example, public participation may be observable from citizen engagement in events such as participating in elections, the military, or governing administration. In contrast, a lack of public participation may be indicative of a lack of legitimacy. Put simply, Connolly (1984) argues citizens must first recognize the governing system and leader to then interact, join, or resist the establishment. Specifically, Connolly (1984) suggests that participation can be
observed as active involvement with the state system in areas of the military, public service, or participating in elections. He argues a lack of involvement in these areas or resistance in the form of social demonstrations or attempts at overthrow (i.e. violent or non-violent revolution) demonstrates failing legitimacy of the state since its authority is directly challenged.

Further, Kane (2001) in his definition of legitimacy integrates the concept of *morality* of elite behavior. He argues that morality is its own “powerful force” of tangible capital (Kane 2001, 1-13). Specifically, Kane (2001) argues morality “presumes moral choice, an identification of values argued to be worth defending or pursuing and directions held to be worth taking” (20). Since policies are socially directed decisions, morality invokes support from willing actors with intent to continuously improve aspects of security, liberty, and wellbeing of its citizens. Therefore Kane argues that morality ensures legitimacy by gaining public trust. Violating public trust by committing human rights violations and infringing upon citizen wellbeing would suggest immorality and thus a lack of legitimacy.

According to Vassilev (2004), *economic performance* is also considered when determining political legitimacy (113). He argues, “economic difficulties may engender deep anti-system sentiments at the mass level, encouraging anti-regime activism at the elite level” (Ibid). Vassilev (2004) examines post-communist Bulgaria to find that relatively low economic performance (e.g. GDP/capita, or average annual income) and low political performance in terms of popular support indicates a lack of legitimacy (118-120). Further contrary to Horowitz (1977), he postulates economic performance in democratic regimes (such as Bulgaria) especially strongly influence popular support. Specifically, he states, “since democratic rule is based on the consent of the ruled, a secure and stable democracy cannot be established and maintained
without broad-based popular endorsement” (Vassilev 2004, 113). However, despite Bulgaria’s economic performance deficit and subsequent “widespread popular dissatisfaction threatening regime stability, it has not lead to regime collapse” (Ibid). Therefore economic performance may or may not affect popular support. I evaluate the effect of economic factors on popular support in my analysis.

According to Schaar (1981) states experiencing social resistance in the form of protests or riots may experience failing (or utter lack of) legitimacy (Schaar 1981, 17). He does not systematically test this proposition. However, I take this a step further by arguing violence in the form of armed conflict, rather than just protest demonstrations may be indicative of failing legitimacy. I argue violent armed conflict (i.e. intrastate battle involving state actors) demonstrates political confrontation with the existing government and leadership. Thus citizens may perceive their leader as incapable of maintaining the rule of law.

Gilley (2006) attempts to advance the study of legitimacy by proposing aspects of social trust, good governance, and civil liberties as closely correlated to ideas associated with legitimacy. He seeks to clarify the meaning of political legitimacy and proposes potential measures such as corruption and attitude survey questions. Specifically, Gilley argues political legitimacy is “a major determinant of both the structure and operation of states… [Whereby] states lacking legitimacy devote more resources to maintain their rule rather than effective governance, which reduces support and makes them vulnerable to overthrow or collapse” (Gilley 2006, 499).

Seligson (2002) quantifies the effect of corruption on legitimacy within four Latin American countries: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Paraguay. He operationalizes
legitimacy as “diffuse [political] support attempting to tap into confidence in the key institutions of government [such as the courts and police]” (Seligson 2002, 402). Survey questions were associated with ideals of respect, pride, support, and trust of the state political system on a scale from 1 (low support)– 5 (high support). Seligson (2002) is the first to incorporate development (level of education and income) in a statistical model examining the relationship between corruption and legitimacy, though only applied to the four aforementioned countries with statistically insignificant results. However, his findings do support the proposition that government corruption in the form of brutal police activity and elite bribery can delegitimize the state from the perspective of both internal (e.g. popular support) and external factors (e.g. foreign aid) (Seligson 2002, 421-422).

For the most part these propositions have not been tested. This chapter attempts to contribute to this body of literature by studying systematically the effect of human rights violations on legitimacy.

In sum, in the literature government or state legitimacy across different kinds of regimes is linked to popular levels of support or trust; further, this popular support or trust is based on popular perceptions of the morality, legality, or performance of the government or state leadership in relation to enforcing the rule of law, and the state of the economy. I incorporate these elements in my theoretical framework and analysis. I use popular support as proxy for legitimacy and examine the effect of human rights violations on popular support across states with different levels of democracy. Further, my analysis controls for economic growth, intrastate military conflict, corruption, and human development.
Theoretical Framework

In this section, I argue that the connection between state human rights violations and elite legitimacy can partly be explained by public perceptions of government performance. Civilians perceiving their government and/or leader as immoral or unjust or breaking the law by committing human rights violations may withdraw their popular support and resist. Specifically, committing human rights violations has reputational costs associated with less popular support for government and/or leadership. Thus, the level of state human rights violations may decrease the level of political legitimacy of a government or state; this may have implications such as internal opposition challenging the current government or state. In short, the importance of this research resides in understanding that governments violating human rights may damage the state’s legitimacy.

I specifically examine the popular perceptions of the state’s governing elite if/when elites commit state human rights violations. I propose the mechanism of social impact theory helps understand how human rights violations affect state legitimacy. According to social impact theory, public opinion changes are based on interactive, reciprocal, or recursive events from social environments (Nowak, Szamrej, Latané, 1990). In essence, we all interact within our own environments and every action has potential for a positive or negative reaction.

An awareness of state human right violations may lead to lower popular support for a governing elite due to emotion-based reactions as fear or shame for injustice being committed. This in turn has potential to result in further costs such as loss of alliances or international sanctions, thus implicating the state’s fragility. These may or may not impact citizen wellbeing or increase the fragility of the state. However, the assumption is that a society’s negative
perception or disapproval of state human rights violations can indeed lead to sociopolitical tensions and regime change. The potential for an impact to a state’s fragility may manifest when internal opposition challenging the current government or state occurs as a result of human rights violations.

Popular civil support of a political elite can increase or decrease for a plethora of reasons. Actual or perceived political “success” (e.g. winning an election or war) may increase popular support, while actual or perceived political “failures” (e.g. corruption or exile) may result in less support. What constitutes a political success or failure may differ across countries. However, I assume state human rights violations are likely to jeopardize elite governing legitimacy due to reputational costs associated with perceived injustice.

Individuals may perceive their state leader as partially responsible for personal or economic hardships. For example, presidential candidates in democracies have won elections based on a promise to create more jobs and improve the daily life of their would-be citizens. Citizens may cast a vote accordingly in hopes of receiving perceived benefits should a change manifest in their lives and thus give social credit or praise to the current leader whether or not the leader was responsible.

When governments or government leaders become the source of a threat to an individual or group’s life sociopolitical costs to legitimacy may be incurred. Citizens and/or members of the international community (e.g. policy or state neighbors) witnessing the use of violations could question government motives and practices, resulting in further costs such as a loss of allies, overthrow by political opposition, or international sanctions; these losses may increase a state’s fragility. An example of an international reaction and consequences of decreased state legitimacy
is that of Zimbabwe in 2002 when the EU imposed sanctions for human rights violations under President Robert Mugabe. Specifically, political violence and “serious violation of human rights and restriction on the media undermined the prospect for a free and fair election” which lead the EU to withhold 128 million euros in development aid for five years (The Guardian 2002, n.p.).

An additional example is the case of the United States after September 11th, 2001, when the international community made it clear that the use of waterboarding was unethical if not illegal due to violation of Article 5 of the UDHR; “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment (United for Human Rights 2012, 43). Despite the violation of international law, by 2008 U.S. authorities held an estimated 270 prisoners at Guantánamo Bay without charge or trial (Ibid).

In the decade following 9/11, rumors and eventually evidence of human rights violations at Guantanamo resulted in demands from individuals and organizations such as the United Nations and Center for Constitutional Rights to bring an end to its existence and subsequent violations (CCR, n.d.). Legal battles and public outcry against American tactics in this context resulted in President Obama conceding and sending plans for the closure of Guantanamo Bay to Congress for approval (Liptak and Labott 2016, n.p.). The threat to losing state legitimacy in terms of accepted use of governance (especially in democracies) was comprised to the point of altering actions that may further incur social costs by closing the source of human right violations and the public’s objections. Gronke et al. (2010) report opinion poll data on the U.S. torture techniques from 2001-2009 following the 9/11 terror attacks. They analyze 32 polls representing the opinions of approximately 30,000 Americans, which reveals the majority of Americans expressed disapproval of such tactics and thus the government (437). Now, it may matter at what
point in time to observe the public reaction to state human rights violations. Public reaction to such violations may sway over time depending on the political and international context. The dynamics of potential sways in public opinion await further study.

An additional example of violating Article 5’s freedom from torture is that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007. The Republic Guard and Special Services of Kinshasa “arbitrarily detained and tortured numerous individuals labeled as critics of the government by means of beatings, stabbings, and rapes of those in custody” (United for Human Rights 2012, 43). These violations sparked the legal and charity involvement of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) when the Congolese Government was perceived as unethical and incapable of ensuring justice for their people (Crisis Watch, 2007). Members of the international community and charity organizations viewed the Congolese government as untrustworthy, corrupt, and decided to intervene accordingly, thereby diminishing the state’s legitimacy.

Beyond acts of torture, examples of human rights violations pertaining to nuances of “freedom of thought” of Article 18 of the UDHR have incited similar responses. For example, the Burmese military junta of Myanmar shot, beat, detained, and destroyed the personal property of monks leading peace demonstrations (United for Human Rights 2012, 45). In an attempt to repress social movements undermining the legitimacy of often-violent tactics employed by the Burmese governing authority, hostages of peaceful protesters were also captured to prevent similar future demonstrations. These events became known as the Saffron Revolution, which gained the attention of the international community and its large-scale associated response ranging from European demands to release detainees to widespread sanctions against “the leaders of the regime and its financial backers” (Brunnstrom, 2007).
These are merely a few of potentially countless known (or unknown) cases of human rights violations, which can pose reputational costs resulting in loss of legitimacy; in addition loss of allies, overthrow by political opposition, or international sanctions may follow. In sum, loss of state legitimacy may imply increased state fragility due to such reputational costs. I will test empirically whether human rights violations are associated with popular support of the government or leadership viewed here as level of perceived legitimacy. The goal of this research is to determine the effect of human rights violations on elite legitimacy to examine whether or not infringing upon human rights has reputational consequences for the government. The relationship between human rights and legitimacy is understudied. This chapter attempts to contribute a systematic study of legitimacy to fill a gap in the literature.

**Research Design and Analysis**

**Dependent Variable**

In this study the dependent variable is elite legitimacy. Elite legitimacy is defined as the right and acceptance of an authority to govern law through its practice and influence (Gilley 2006, 48; Connolly 1984, 34). I operationalize this variable by using *popular support* as a proxy variable. Popular support is defined as the “level of citizen support for the government and/or its leader” determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys (PRS Group 2017, n.p.). The PRS provides the level of popular support for 141 states monthly from 2002-2016. Although it would be ideal to conduct the study using monthly data and thus incorporate all available information, other variables included in the model are available annually; therefore I use the monthly average for a given country-year. To be sure, this may introduce random error and thus constitutes a
limitation of this study since the level of popular support may change from month to month in the same year. The country-year scale ranges from 0 (lowest support) to 4 (highest support).

Main Independent Variable

The main independent variable, human rights violations, is defined as the level of “state abuse of fundamental human rights” as outlined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). Examples of these 30 internationally recognized human rights include Freedom from Slavery (Article 4), Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment (Article 5), and Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Exile (Article 9). The Fund for Peace examines any known (credible reporting of) state violations to derive a value of 1-10 for a given country-year. Specifically, this measure captures state violations such as religious persecution, torture, and executions without fair trial. Lower values signify a lesser degree of human rights violations while higher values signify a higher degree of human rights violations. The Fund of Peace provides the level of human rights violations for 178 states annually from 2005-2017.

The Fund for Peace examines whether there is “state abuse of legal, political and social human rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions” (Fund for Peace 2017, n.p.). Examples of violations captured in this measure include (but are not limited to) politically inspired acts of violence perpetrated against civilians and the denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents (Ibid).

Based on theoretical mechanism discussed earlier, I expect state human rights violations to decrease popular support. The underlying mechanism is that human rights violations are
associated with lower levels of legitimacy. I argue reputational costs associated with immorality, injustice, and illegality of violating human rights lead to less popular support (i.e. legitimacy).

Interaction Variable: Level of Democracy

The Polity IV Project provides data on the level of democracy for 167 countries from 1946-2015. The values range from Autocracy (-10) to Full Democracy (10). I anticipate a positive relationship between level of democracy and popular support, expecting that an increase in democracy will increase popular support.

I also expect the effect of human rights violation on support to vary depending on the level of democracy. I anticipate a negative relationship between state human rights violations in more democratic states and popular support. However, the effect of human rights violations on support (steepness of the slope) may be larger in more democratic than less democratic states. The assumption is that citizens of democracies hold their leaders to a higher ethical standard since they may have voted for the leader as opposed to citizens of more authoritative states.

Further, a democratic leader violating international law by committing human rights violations may also be viewed as violating democratic ideals of peace, justice, and liberty, for example. In addition, democracies often provide citizens (through constitutions or political doctrine) opportunities to voice and act on democratic freedoms such as the right to religious expression (Article 18). As such, I assume that increases in democracy contribute to civil wellbeing, whereas lower levels of democracy may be associated with perceived repression or hardship, which may be capable of leading to a decrease in popular support.
Control Variables

1. GDP Growth (%)

GDP growth is the annual gross domestic product change. The PRS Group, the source of these data, operationalizes GDP growth using the “percentage increase or decrease to assign a risk point between 0.0 (6%+ decrease) and 10.0 (6%+ increase)” (PRS Methodology 2017, 8-9). I anticipate a positive relationship between GDP growth and popular support.

The assumption is that higher economic growth results in more resources in a society, which may be attributable to their elite (e.g. trade agreements and international imports/exports) and thus associated with increasing popular support.

2. Unemployment Level (%)

I use the PRS Group variable for unemployment rate. It measures the annual percentage of the labor force without work for a given country-year. The values range from a minimum of 0.7% (Thailand in 2011) to a maximum of 90% (Zimbabwe in 2011).

I anticipate a negative relationship between unemployment and popular support, expecting that an increase in unemployment will decrease support. I assume that increases in unemployment incite certain grievances (such as economic hardship) a political elite may be expected to help alleviate, whereas lower levels of unemployment may be associated with less grievance and discontent with political leadership.
3. Human Development

The United Nations Development Programme provides this variable. It measures life expectancy, education, and income. It is a composite statistic ranging from zero to one. Higher ratings indicate higher levels of human development.

I anticipate a positive relationship between human development and popular support; I expect that an increase in human development will be associated with an increase in popular support. I assume that increases in human development address certain grievances (such as economic hardship) and increase popular support of government and leadership, whereas lower levels of human development may be associated with competition for scarce resources leading to a decrease in popular support.

4. Political Corruption

The PRS Group provides a variable indicator of political corruption, defined as actual or perceived “financial and political corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business” (PRS Group 2017, 4-5). The PRS provides the level of corruption for 141 states monthly from 2002-2016. I operationalize this variable by taking the monthly average for a given country-year value. The country-year scale ranges from 0 (less corruption) to 6 (more corruption).

I anticipate a negative relationship between political corruption and popular support, suggesting that an increase of perceived corruption decreases popular support of a leader and/or government. I also anticipate loss of support from perceived corruption to require time to manifest due to diffusion of information. Hence, I lag the variable by one year.
5. Armed Conflict

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) provides a variable of armed conflict, defined as “armed conflict between two parties of which at least one is the government of a state resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (PRIO 2017, n.p.). PRIO provides the number of armed conflicts for over 150 countries from 1946-2012. I operationalize this variable by creating a binary value where 0 is no armed conflict and 1 has a presence of armed conflict based on their definition, respectively.

I anticipate a negative relationship between armed conflict and popular support. The assumption is that citizens hold their leaders accountable to protect and defend their lives and liberties.

Data and Empirical Strategy

The unit of analysis for this research design is country, year. The sample is 141 countries for the time period between 2006 and 2014. This timeframe is due to data limitations since The Fragile States Index started in 2005 and thus in the most recent decade data in regard to human rights has become more robust and available to the public.

Furthermore, I use a one-year lag for the control variable of corruption since potential for perceived illegitimacy associated with corruption would likely take time to manifest. I use a cross-sectional longitudinal (XT) model to assess the relationship between state human rights violations and popular support. I estimate the effects using a linear XT regression with correlated panels and corrected standard errors that corrects for heteroskedasticity.

H\textsubscript{1}: I expect a negative relationship between state human rights violations and popular support.
H2: I expect a negative effect of state human rights violations on popular support that varies by level of democracy. I hypothesize that this effect is larger in more democratic states compared to less democratic states.

H3: I expect a positive relationship between GDP growth and popular support.

H4: I expect a negative relationship between unemployment and popular support.

H5: I expect a positive relationship between human development and popular support.

H6: I expect a negative relationship between political corruption and popular support.

H7: I expect a negative relationship between armed conflict and popular support.

**Results and Analysis**

As Table 2 shows, the effect of state human rights violations on popular support is statistically significant and in the anticipated direction.
The regression results indicate that the coefficients on each of the variables of the interaction term are significant\textsuperscript{15}. Thus the effect of human rights violations on popular support is different at different levels of democracy. The coefficient of each of the two variables in the interaction cannot be interpreted independently of the other. The interpretation of the effect of human rights violations on support would be that as state human rights violations increase, popular support for the government and/or leader also decreases by .0792 on average when democracy is zero. Thus a more effective interpretation is shown in a graph of the effects.

\textsuperscript{15} See APPENDIX B: CHAPTER FOUR SUMMARY STATISTICS
The effect of human rights violations is shown in Figure 3, for selected levels of democracy. Figure 3 shows the relationship between state human rights violations and popular support of the government/leadership when democracy equals -5, 0, and 5:

![Effect of State Human Rights Violations on Popular Support](image)

*Figure 3: State Human Rights Violations and Popular Support*

As Figure 3 indicates, there is a negative relationship between the level of human rights violations and popular support at different levels of democracy. These levels of democracy were selected to portray a high, mid, and low level of democracy; I have not graphed the effect at very high values of level of democracy that is at highly democratic states (e.g. Sweden) or highly authoritative states (e.g. North Korea). I expect that highly democratic states such as Sweden or
Switzerland would be unlikely to commit human rights violations\textsuperscript{16}; and citizens of highly authoritative states may not be expected to provide sincere responses when asked about their support of the government or leadership because of fear for retribution.

Figure 3 indicates that less democratic states experience a greater loss of support as violations increase compared to more democratic states. While popular support in less democratic states is higher than that in democracies at low levels of state human rights violations, the support reaches lower levels in less democratic states than in more democratic states as violations increase. I expect this to be the case since rule in less democratic states is established without a fair electoral process. In essence, authoritative leaders ruling without democratic accountability may commit human rights violations despite civil disapproval, thus decreasing perceived legitimacy further.

The positive relationship between GDP growth and popular support is in the direction expected with a statistically significant coefficient; suggesting that increases in GDP growth result in more popular support. This finding reinforces the assumption that an increase in GDP growth will result in more political support. The assumption is that higher economic growth results in more resources in a society, which may be attributable to their elite (e.g. trade agreements and international imports/exports) and thus associated with increasing popular support. In essence, if a country’s economy is flourishing a population may partially attribute that prosperity to decisions made by the elite (e.g. trade agreements or macroeconomic and fiscal policies).

\textsuperscript{16} On a scale ranging from 1-10, the 2014 FSI provided a State Human Rights Violation value of 1.2 for Sweden, 1.7 for Switzerland, and 9.7 for North Korea, for example.
Now, contrary to expectations the relationship between development and popular support is negative. This finding suggests that an increase in education, income, and longevity results in decreased popular support. This may be attributed to higher levels of education associated with higher development. Educated citizens may be more critical of their government or leadership than citizens with lower levels of education.

The relationship between perceived political corruption and popular support is positive, suggesting more corruption leads to more support. Further research is needed here to explain this finding since public protest against state corruption is evident in public demonstrations against corruption in many countries, as well as governments falling over corruption scandals. This suggests that, in some instances at least, voters do hold governments accountable when corruption is evident.

Lastly, contrary to my expectations unemployment and civil conflict are not statistically significant. Further research is needed to explore these results.

Limitations and Conclusion

Do state human rights violations have an effect on political legitimacy? This chapter seeks to explain the connection between state human rights violations and legitimacy using popular support as a proxy. While there are many assumptions regarding potential determinants of legitimacy, there are few studies that examine this link systematically (Gilley 2006; Seligson 2002). Current studies on the link between human rights violations and legitimacy rely on case studies and the findings are mixed.

This chapter conducts a systematic study of the link between state human rights violations and popular support. Findings from a large-N study confirm that state human rights
violations result in decreased popular support across different levels of democracy. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by examining the direct impact of human rights violations on popular support of government and leadership. The literature seldom mentions human rights violations as a potential determinant of political legitimacy. Much of the literature explores the effects of the state of the economy or perceived corruption. Further, the findings of this study may be important to the field of state fragility. It is important to inform decision makers that state human rights violations may play a role in their level of legitimacy. In essence, violating international law by committing human rights results in less popular support. This loss of support may result in internal opposition challenging the current government or state.

I assume leaders (particularly democratic leaders subject to elections and impeachment) are accountable to voters and aim to appease civilian grievances. By acknowledging social disapproval (perceived through opinion polls or demonstrations) and refraining from committing violations, elites may preserve popular support and their power. In contrast, elites employing such tactics of human rights violations to preempt rebellion by doing so they decrease the legitimacy of their rule, generating more discontent and perhaps rebellion (Danneman and Ritter 2014, 254).

The findings of this research may be important to future studies in the field of political legitimacy and state fragility. Based on the implications in the findings, scholars may be motivated to construct alternative measures related to legitimacy, since a limitation of the dependent variable in this chapter is that is constructed from survey data. In cases with high levels of human rights violations people may be reluctant to be sincere in their responses. Opinions and approval ratings of political elites can fluctuate greatly and this may create
volatility in the dependent measure. Improving data and exploring other potential indicators or proxies of legitimacy may help researchers to better understand the mechanism and dynamics of this association.
CHAPTER FIVE: POPULATION CONSTRAINTS & STATE ECONOMIC CAPACITY

Introduction

Do population constraints have an effect on state economic capacity? In this chapter I examine whether population constraints result in a more fragile state by means of decreased economic capacity. Population constraints are defined as, “pressures on individuals experiencing hardships associated with disease, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and demographic mortality rate” (Fund for Peace 2016, n.p.). State economic capacity refers to “the power of leaders to mobilize resources for productive and defensive purposes” (Tikuisis, Carment, Samy and Landry 2015, 567). A decrease in state economic capacity may be indicative of the state’s lack of capacity (i.e. inability) to contain societal grievances, meet population demands, or neutralize violent interstate threats, all conditions that may increase state fragility.

In this chapter, economic decline is used as a proxy for state economic capacity and is defined as “performance of, and [political] response to, economic decline and associated consequences such as extreme social hardship involving [but not limited to] income, resource inequality, inflation, unemployment, debt, and poverty levels” (Fund for Peace 2016, n.p.). My main hypothesis in this chapter is that as the level of population constraints within a state increases, state economic decline also increases. I argue the theoretical mechanism for this relationship is the high costs population constraints place on the economy and concomitant human capital implications since these conditions may also inhibit a population’s ability to contribute towards their own state’s economy (i.e. as workers and/or consumers). High costs and
a lack of population economic participation due to population constraints may prove detrimental to their country’s economic capacity, thus increasing the state’s fragility.

I expect higher levels of state economic decline in 1) developing compared to developed states and 2) more authoritarian compared to less authoritarian states. Compared to more developed states, less developed countries (LDCs) have more vulnerable economies characterized by higher unemployment rates, larger debt, lower growth, and limited resources. Thus I expect that population constraints in LDCs may exacerbate economic hardships and contribute to further economic decline than in more developed countries. In essence, LDCs are at an inherent disadvantage compared to more developed countries (MDCs) due to fewer relative resources to meet public demand for public goods and services. Thus I expect the effects of population constraints on economic decline to be conditioned by the capacity of economic institutions to act as a buffer to such pressures. To illustrate, if a developed state such as the United States experiences frequent hurricanes they are already more equipped to respond to the economic implications of such events than a LDC such as Haiti.

Further I expect lower levels of state economic decline in democracies compared to authoritarian regimes due to greater accountability to electorates and also organizational communication channels and networks, and decentralization of decision-making in democracies compared to authoritarian regimes. I do not expect these processes in relatively closed, authoritarian polities such as North Korea. Hence, I expect higher levels of economic decline in more authoritarian compared to less authoritarian states when population constraints increase. On the other hand, it may be argued that more centralized decision-making structures in authoritarian states may allow for a quicker and more efficient reallocation of resources to deal
with disasters compared to complex policy processes in more decentralized systems in
democratic states. Thus, there may be lower levels of state economic decline in more
authoritarian compared to less authoritarian states. I test for these two alternative scenarios in my
model.

The main argument in this chapter is that in addition to the costs of population constraints
on the economy, a population suffering from such constraints will not be able to fully participate
in the economic activities of the state. These factors are critical to maintain state abilities related
to productive markets and provisions for the collective good (Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum
2012, 9). In sum, the goal of the investigation is to determine the effect of population constraints
on state economic capacity.

The importance of the association between population constraints and economic decline
resides in understanding that all else equal the severe implications of population constraints may
increase the level of a state’s fragility. Scholars and governing elites commonly acknowledge the
costs to a state of population constraints such as hurricanes or disease. However, there are no
systematic studies that examine the potential detrimental effects of these constraints on a state’s
capacity in connection to state fragility. By better understanding the association between
population constraints and state economic decline and connection to state fragility, policy
decision makers may better prioritize and prepare emergency planning and response to disasters
in order to reduce subsequent negative impacts to civil wellbeing and the state’s economic
capacity.

This chapter begins with a literature review on the connection between state economic
decline and population constraints. I then construct a theoretical framework to examine the
mechanism of the relationship between social and economic costs associated with population constraints and economic capacity. I proceed to describe the research design, data, and methodology to test for these effects. Finally, I describe the findings of my analysis and conclude.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

State economic capacity remains largely understudied in the state fragility literature. And yet, a lack of economic capacity may incite economy failures, such as depressions, or recessions capable of implicating civilian wellbeing, and increasing state fragility. Further, there are no existing studies that examine the relationship between population constraints and economic capacity. There are studies that examine the effect of single dimensions of population constraints on single dimensions of economic decline, for instance population growth on economic performance; for the most part, these studies are limited to small-N analyses have resulted in statistically insignificant findings (Easterlin 1967, 107).

Due to the lack of studies on population constraints and economic capacity, I first discuss existing literature on economic performance (i.e. growth/decline) related to constraints such as resource scarcity, population effects, and natural disasters. I then present a theoretical framework introducing population constraints as a determinant of economic capacity to address this shortcoming in the literature.

**Literature Review**

The existing literature on economic capacity is based mainly on small-N quantitative studies attempting to explore various determinants of economic performance (growth or decline). I discuss such determinants in the literature review before presenting a theoretical framework.
introducing the direct relationship of population constraints to economic capacity. Further, a review of existing literature reveals two main findings: 1) certain population constraints such as low fertility rates and natural disasters partly account for the level of economic decline and 2) the effects of population constraints appear to be higher in LDCs.

Economic decline may or may not impact the state’s fragility in every case, but the underlying assumption is that a state experiencing high levels of population constraints may be unable to perform sufficiently to protect territory or provide basic public goods or services in such critical economic conditions. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Indonesia is an exemplar case in which basic social and economic activities were temporarily suspended to recover from infrastructure damage. This single event resulted in the death of 230,000-280,000 people across 14 countries from waves up to 100ft tall (Szczepanski 2016, n.p.). It is estimated that “66% of the fishing and industrial infrastructures [in this region] were destroyed… including 51,000 vessels, most fishing equipment, and coastal buildings, which resulted in adverse economic effects both at local and national levels” (FAO 2015, n.p.). But there is a lack of systematic studies to evaluate the effects of such events on state economic capacity and thus state fragility.

*Economic Capacity: Concepts, Measures, and Determinants*

The literature defines state capacity as a socially constituted and dynamic phenomenon by which the state as an institution, governing elites, and the people have an *ability* to address grievances and effectively operate as an interconnected system (Malloy 1991, 9; Hameiri 2007, 123; Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 7). Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum (2012) argue
that the inability of the state to fulfill these functions and provide public goods is indicative of increased state fragility (7).

Hendrix (2010) seeks to identify and address competing concepts and measures of capacity in a conceptual, exploratory article. He argues capacity in the literature has commonly considered: 1) military capacity, 2) bureaucratic administrative capacity, and 3) quality and coherence of political institutions. However, he argues economic capacity is the “most theoretically and empirically justifiable [factor] to capture state capacity, [to] address [societal] grievances, and effectively operate” (Hendrix 2010, 1-2). In essence, Hendrix (2010) narrows the concept of state capacity to economic capacity. He argues economic capacity can be operationalized using GDP per capita, however he does not conduct a systematic study of economic capacity as he defines it. I follow his lead by operationalizing state capacity as economic capacity and measure economic capacity as economic decline.

I use economic decline as a proxy for capacity because severe economic decline, operationalized as high government debt, unemployment, and poverty levels, and low GDP/capita levels indicate failing capacity to perform basic functions of the state (e.g. protect territory and provide basic public goods and services), thus contributing to the state’s fragility. In essence, increased economic decline equates to decreased economic capacity and thus compromises fragility.

Easterlin (1967) conducts a quantitative study of the effects of population growth on economic performance in developing countries specifically. By considering human capital a resource for economic performance and critical micro-component for state survival through participation, he argues the mechanism of the connection between population growth and
economic development is “implied growth in the labor supply and thus in productive performance and capacity” (Easterlin 1967, 99). He examines the relationship between population growth and growth rate of per capita income across developing nations for 1957-1958 and 1963-1964. He finds “accelerated population growth has not typically yielded growth in per capita income” (Easterlin 1967, 107). He postulates conditions where limited natural resources and/or a high unemployment rates in LDCs may be contributing to his statistically insignificant findings. However he does not test systematically resource scarcity in his research design.

Easterlin (1967) argues that “large and abrupt changes [population constraints] may still create widespread pressures and needs as individuals and collective capacities are overwhelmed to cope with them” (107); however data limitations did not allow for the evaluation of this hypothesis. Another limitation to this study is that only “non-Communist countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America [except for Israel, Japan, and South Africa] with populations around two million or more are included” (Easterlin 1967, 106). Further, the time period for this study is limited to two years. In my study I control for population growth and use a larger sample that includes all countries for a longer timer period, from 2006-2014.

Scully (1989) examines the relationship between government expenditures and economic growth for 65 LDCs from 1960-1980. He argues political corruption (namely in situations with international aid relief) is associated with inefficient “government allocation of resources compared to private allocation” (Ibid). In short, he finds that developing states with “relatively large state sectors produced less output per head with the same input ratio than nations with relatively small government sectors” (Ibid). I control for quality of governance and political corruption to evaluate their effects on economic decline.
Guimaraes et al. (1993) introduce an alternative factor to the literature on economic decline, that of the impact from *natural disasters*. Guimaraes et al. (1993) postulate natural disasters have a net negative economic effect on the state economy (97). The authors consider “immediate losses of wealth from physical catastrophes and temporary surges in income and employment” attributable to a natural disaster. They examine the economic gains and losses from Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina in 1989 to find $1.3 billion in lost crops and timber, $3 billion in residences, and $1 billion in commercial and industrial structure costs were incurred from this single event” (Guimaraes et al. 1993, 98). Their findings support their hypothesis that economic gain remained below unreimbursed wealth loss, thus having a negative economic effect. In short, disasters, similar to disease, are costly and affect the economy as shown in the Guimaraes et al. (1993) study. The costs of population constraints such as disease and natural disasters are included in the independent variable of this study and expected to be negatively associated with economic capacity.

Todd (1989) examines the relationship between disease and economic costs. Specifically, he considers acute bacterial foodborne disease for the United States and Canada from 1978 to 1982. He provides estimates on the annual cost of certain foodborne diseases (e.g. Salmonellosis, Botulism, Shigellois) based on the number of cases and cost in millions. For example, the United States in 1978 had 1.1 million cases of Salmonellosis resulting in an estimated $2,300 million economic impact (Todd 1989, 315). This is one form of foodborne disease for a single country year. In essence, he provides estimated costs of this disease.

Todd (1989) proceeds to discuss implications of these costs associated with “medical costs, productivity loss, leisure time loss, and value of human life/death” (Ibid). He concludes
that “on an annual basis an estimated 1 million cases of acute bacterial foodborne disease in Canada cost nearly $1.1 billion and 5.5 million cases in the United States cost nearly $7 billion” (Todd 1989, 313). These cases are indicative of the high costs of disease to the state.17

Finally, Barro (1996) proposes and incorporates potential determinants (e.g. rule of law and democracy) of economic growth (GDP/capita) in a cross-country exploratory study. He examines the effect of these determinants for 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. Barro (1996) finds development (education and life expectancy), rule of law, low inflation, and trade improvements result in economic growth (Barro 1996, 2). Further, he finds mixed results on the level of democracy on economic growth. Specifically, there is a lack of statistical significance since not all democracies yield relatively more economic growth compared to less democratic states.

Therefore I use an interaction term in my model to evaluate the effects of population constraints on economic decline at different levels of democracy. Modernization theory posits political development, structural differentiation, and resource mobilization associated with level of democracy may have an effect on economic growth (Tipps 1973, 202). Level of democracy may be a political structure that may temper the effect of population constraints on economic decline via democratic accountability, facilitation of communication, and decentralization of decision-making. On the other hand, it may be argued that more decentralization of decision-making may be less effective in mitigating the effects of population constraints on economic

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17 The measure I use in this analysis, population constraints is an index that includes three specific kinds of disease: HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, which remain largely understudied in relation to economic decline of the state. (See Research Design for the description of the index population constraints).
decline than less decentralization associated with more authoritarian states. I test for these effects and do so for a large sample of countries and years (See Research Design).

While the studies described in this literature review provide a foundation from which to examine population constraints on economic decline, none is based on large-N datasets. Further, these quantitative studies were performed before the year 2000 and had data limitations. This chapter attempts to conduct a systematic study of this relationship examining whether or not population constraints have an effect on the level of economic decline based on a sample of 170 countries between 2006 and 2014.

Theoretical Framework

In this section, I argue the theoretical mechanism for this relationship, in addition to the high costs of population constraints on the economy, is a shortage of human capital since these conditions may inhibit a population’s ability to contribute towards their own state’s economy (i.e. as workers and/or consumers). A lack of population economic participation due to one or more population constraints may prove detrimental to their country’s economic capacity. Put simply, a population with high mortality/morbidity results in lack of collective civil participation in the state’s economic functions. In this context, the state is viewed as a broader system by which each citizen plays a role in maintaining it in a micro-capacity (Hameiri 2007, 131). I argue when a relatively high portion of the population is physically struggling due to population constraints, participation decreases and the state’s capacity (i.e. ability) to respond and meet demands decreases. I assume population constraints are prior to state economic capacity and have varying effects on capacity depending on the state’s development and level of democracy; to be sure, economic decline is likely to affect aspects of population constraints such as disease or mortality.
rate. Lagging population constraints so that population constraints in year $t$ are modeled as associated with economic decline at $t+1$ may partly take this endogeneity effect into account; however, I expect that natural disasters at year $t$ would affect economic decline at $t^{18}$. This may be a limitation in the study to be addressed perhaps by using distinct indicators of population constraints rather than a composite index.

Theoretically, physical inability to perform in the workplace or socially engage may result when individuals experience population constraints detrimental to their wellbeing and the perception of further morbidity or mortality prevents active civil and economic engagement. A lack of active civil participation as workers and/or consumers due to one or more population constraints may prove detrimental to their country’s economic capacity. In particular, high mortality rates attributable to population constraints and subsequent shortage of human capital are likely to affect negatively the state’s economic decline. For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Indonesia encumbered the state with high economic costs but also led to high mortality, a subsequent shortage of human resources that may have impaired state economic capacity, thus increasing the state’s fragility. For data on the connection between human capital shortages and economic decline in this case, ideally I would have access to data on human capital needs in different sectors of the economy prior to and following the tsunami. So, although the unemployment rate in Indonesia in 2003 was lower (9.5%), than in 2004 (9.9%) following the tsunami (World Bank 2017, n.p.) it does not provide information about potential demand and supply of human capital across economic sectors, or other factors that may have contributed to this change.

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18 I estimated a model with the independent variable lagged however the coefficients were virtually identical to those in the model estimated with the variable not lagged.
I expect that negative effects from population constraints directly compromise the economic functions of the state. Such constraints may negatively impact the state’s economic capacity to yield a strong military or protect territory, or provide public goods and services to address popular demands thus implicating the state’s fragility. This relationship is understudied due to data limitations. The chapter’s contribution to this literature is that it provides a systematic analysis to evaluate this relationship.

**Research Design and Analysis**

**Dependent Variable**

In this study the dependent variable is economic capacity. The literature defines state capacity as a socially constituted and dynamic phenomenon by which the state as an institution, governing elites, and the people have an *ability* to address grievances and effectively operate as an interconnected system (Malloy 1991, 9; Hameiri 2007, 123; Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 7). Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum (2012) state that an inability to fulfill these functions is indicative of increased fragility via the inability of the state to provide public goods (7). I operationalize this variable by using *economic decline* as a proxy variable defined as, “performance of, and [political] response to, economic decline and associated consequences such as extreme social hardship involving [but not limited to] income, resource inequality, inflation, unemployment, debt, and poverty levels” (Fund for Peace 2016, n.p.). The FFP provides the level of economic decline for 178 states annually from 2005-2016. The country-year scale ranges from 1 (low decline) to 10 (high decline).
Specifically, this is an index that contains measures such as 1) central government debt (% GDP), 2) unemployment (% of total labor force), 3) population below national poverty line (total %), and 4) GDP/Capita. The Fund for Peace takes these quantitative values into account before incorporating qualitative analysis to gauge the severity of the economic decline for each country year based on the variable definition above.

Main Independent Variable

The main independent variable, population constraints, is defined as pressures on individuals experiencing hardships associated with disease, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and demographic growth/mortality rate (Fund for Peace, 2016). The Fund for Peace examines “demographic pressures such as the number of natural disasters, presence of large-scale disease, food/water scarcity, and population growth” to derive a value of 1-10 for a given country-year (Fund for Peace, 2016). Lower values signify a lesser degree of population constraints while higher values signify a higher degree of population constraints. The Fund for Peace provides the level of population constraints for 178 states annually from 2005-2017.

The Fund for Peace (FFP) incorporates in this index specific quantitative measures associated with disease, resource scarcity, and demography. First, measures for disease include 1) prevalence of HIV (%) for men and women between the age of 15 and 49, 2) malaria death rate per 100,000 people for all ages, and 3) Tuberculosis morbidity and mortality per 100,000 people. Next, measures for resource scarcity include 1) depth of food deficit (kilocalories/person/day) and 2) population undernourished (%). The demography measure is mortality rate per 1,000 men and women. Lastly, the FFP examines qualitatively natural disasters and their severity for each country year to derive a composite value for population constraints.
I expect a negative relationship between population constraints and state capacity, proposing that an increase in population constraints detrimental to civilian wellbeing will decrease the state’s ability to maintain its economic functions. However I also expect the effect of population constraints on economic decline to vary depending on 1) the level of democracy and 2) the level of development.

Interaction: Population Constraints and Level of Democracy

The Polity IV Project provides data on the level of democracy for 167 countries from 1946-2015. The values range from Autocracy (-10) to Full Democracy (10). I anticipate the effect of population constraints on economic decline to be conditioned by level of democracy. In particular, I expect this effect to be smaller in less authoritarian states compared to more authoritarian states due to greater accountability, and more effective organizational communication channels and networks and decentralization of decision-making in less authoritarian compared to more authoritarian states. I do not expect these processes in relatively closed, authoritarian polities. On the other hand, it can be argued that the more centralized decision-making structures of more authoritarian states may allow for more efficient reallocation of resources to deal with disasters compared to complex policy processes in more decentralized less authoritarian systems. I test for these two alternative scenarios.

Interaction: Population Constraints and Level of Development

I expect that the effect of population constraints on economic decline to be larger in states with lower levels of development compared to states with higher levels of development. In less developed countries (LDCs) economic resources are already relatively limited thus the effect of
population constraints on economic decline are expected to be larger than in developed states where economic resources are relatively more abundant. The United Nations Development Programme provides a measure for development, the Human Development Indicator, which measures life expectancy, education, and income. It is a composite measure ranging from zero to one. Higher ratings indicate higher levels of human development. This measure of development takes into account the distributional outcomes of economic resources that are not depicted by measures such as economic growth or GDP per capita. Population constraints in states with lower levels of human development are expected to have larger effects on economic decline than in states with higher levels of human development.

Control Variables

The following control variables are included in the model:

1. Control of Corruption

   The World Bank provides this Worldwide Governance Indicator, defined as the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Control of Corruption is operationalized with a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year. Similarly, lower values signify weaker control of corruption, while higher values signify stronger control of corruption in relation to the variable description.

   I expect a negative relationship between control of corruption and economic decline, suggesting a government’s ability to control corruption results in less economic decline. The expectation is that less corruption results in a more efficient, prosperous economy and thus less economic decline.
2. Quality of Governance

The World Bank provides Worldwide Governance Indicator, defined as the perceptions of the “ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (World Bank 2017, n.p.). Quality of Governance is operationalized with a range from -2.5 to 2.5 for a given country, year. Similarly, lower values signify weaker quality, while higher values signify stronger quality in relation to the variable description.

I expect a negative relationship between quality of governance and economic decline, suggesting a government’s ability to formulate sound policies and regulations results in less economic decline. The expectation is that quality governance results in a more efficient, prosperous economy and thus less economic decline. This variable is substantively and empirically different from the level of democracy in that it accounts for civil perception of regulatory quality\(^{19}\).

3. Population Size

The World Bank contains a variable indicator of population size for country-year, defined operationally as the number of residents of the state regardless of legal status/citizenship (World Bank 2017, n.p.).

I expect a negative relationship between population size and economic decline, suggesting that an increase in population size results in less economic decline. The assumption is that an increase in population size is associated with an increase in opportunity for a larger work force and subsequently less economic decline.

\(^{19}\) The correlation between quality of governance and democracy is a value of .5544
4. Armed Conflict

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) provides a variable of armed conflict, defined as “armed conflict between two parties of which at least one is the government of a state resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (PRIO 2017, n.p.). PRIO provides the number of armed conflicts for over 150 countries from 1946-2012. I modify this variable by creating a binary value where 0 is no armed conflict and 1 has a presence of armed conflict based on this definition. I assume economic costs of armed conflict at year t affect economic decline the same year t.

I expect a positive relationship between armed conflict and economic decline, suggesting an increase of armed conflict results in increased economic decline. The assumption is that human capital (i.e. the work force) being diverted to defensive purposes (e.g. protecting territory) rather than economically productive purposes results in economic decline. Further, in situations of war many state resources are redirected towards the war effort, not just the human capital but budget priorities, destruction of productive facilities, and interruption of trade and commerce related to economic decline.

Data and Empirical Strategy

The unit of analysis for this research design is Country, Year. The sample is 178 countries from 2006-2014. This timeframe is attributable to data restriction since The Fragile States Index started in 2005 (with far fewer available countries compared to 2006 onward) and only in the most recent decade data on population constraints become more robust and available to the public. It is important to note, however, that this time period includes the global economic and financial crisis. During this time many countries fell into recession independently of specific
population constraints and different countries were affected differently from this severe global economic downturn. I expect that the control variables, human development and quality of governance, that I include in the model may partly control for these effects.

I estimate the effects using a Driscoll-Kraay XT Regression that corrects for heteroskedasticity. I use a cross-sectional longitudinal (XT) model with random effects to assess the relationship between population constraints and economic decline.\(^{20}\)

- **H\(_{1}\)**: I expect a negative effect of population constraints on state economic decline that varies by level of *democracy*. I hypothesize that this effect is smaller in less authoritarian states compared to more authoritarian states.
- **H\(_{2}\)**: I expect a negative effect of population constraints on state economic decline that varies by level of *development*. I hypothesize that this effect is smaller in more developed states compared to less developed states.
- **H\(_{3}\)**: I expect a negative relationship between control of corruption and state economic decline.
- **H\(_{4}\)**: I expect a negative relationship between quality of governance and state economic decline.
- **H\(_{5}\)**: I expect a negative relationship between population size and state economic decline.
- **H\(_{6}\)**: I expect a positive relationship between armed conflict and state economic decline.

\(^{20}\) Diagnostics show that the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors pooled OLS estimation procedure is appropriate given the structure of the data.
Results and Analysis

As table 3 shows, the effect of population constraints on economic decline is statistically significant and in the anticipated direction.

Table 3: Population Constraints and Economic Decline (DV) XT Regression with random effects; Driscoll-Kraay

| Independent Variables          | Coefficient | SE   | P>|t| |
|-------------------------------|-------------|------|-----|
| Population Constraints        | .4993       | .1321| .000|
| Level of Democracy            | .0192       | .0101| .058|
| Constraints*Democracy         | .0020       | .0011| .059|
| Control of Corruption         | -.3495      | .0471| .000|
| Quality of Governance         | -.3773      | .0284| .000|
| Population                    | -1.35e-09   | 1.09e-10| .000|
| Human Development             | -2.0920     | 1.230 | .091|
| Constraints*Development       | -.3926      | .1317 | .003|
| Armed Conflict                | -.5186      | .1285 | .000|
| Constant                      | 5.458       | 1.2134| .000|

Prob>F 0.0000
R-Squared 0.7853
N (observations) 1385

Also, the regression results indicate that the coefficients on each of the variables in the interaction terms are significant\textsuperscript{21}. Thus the effect of population constraints on economic decline is different at different levels of democracy and development. The coefficients of each of the two variables included in the interaction term cannot be interpreted independently of the other. Thus for instance the interpretation of the effect of population constraints on economic decline would be that as population constraints increase, economic decline also increases by .4993 on average.

\textsuperscript{21} See APPENDIX C: CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY STATISTICS
when democracy and development are zero. Thus a more effective interpretation is shown in a graph of the effects.

The effect of population constraints on economic decline is shown in Figure 4, which shows the statistically significant, positive relationship between population constraints and economic decline at different levels of democracy at every interval when democracy equals -5, 0, and 5:

![Effect of Population Constraints on Economic Decline](image)

*Figure 4: Population Constraints and Economic Decline; Levels of Democracy*

As Figure 4 indicates, there is a positive relationship between the level of population constraints and economic decline at all three different levels of democracy. These levels of
democracy were selected to portray a high, mid, and low level of democracy while omitting extreme values such as highly democratic states (e.g. Sweden) and extremely authoritative states (e.g. North Korea). Effects here appear nearly identical, that is the slopes are nearly parallel, but with different intercepts indicating democracies at higher levels of economic decline.

The relationship between population constraints and economic decline is positive as expected but with different intercepts showing higher levels of economic decline in democracies, suggesting that democracies may not be performing as well as more authoritarian regimes. In sum, this finding is contrary to my earlier expectations.

Figure 5 shows the effect of population constraints on economic decline across different levels of human development.
As we see there is a positive relationship between the level of population constraints and economic decline at three different levels of development. These levels of development were selected to portray a high, mid, and low level of development. The low and high values are one standard deviation below and above the mean of my development measure respectively. This graph indicates that the effect of population constraints on economic decline is larger in LDCs than in MDCs as expected.

The coefficient on development is negative as I expected, suggesting there is a negative association between development and economic decline. Yet, again the interpretation of the coefficient is a \(-2.09\) effect when population constraints equal zero so it is more effective to look
at the graph. In essence, in states where development is low the effect of population constraints on economic decline is larger than in states with higher levels of development.

Further, 6 indicates there is a positive relationship between the level of population constraints and economic decline at different levels of democracy and development at every interval:

Figure 6: Population Constraints and Economic Decline; Levels of Democracy and Development

Figure 6 shows that level of development conditions the effect of population constraints on economic decline to a greater extent than level of democracy. In states with low levels of development the effect is larger than in states with higher levels of development almost
irrespective of the level of democracy. Further Figure 6 shows that the effect is the largest in states with lower levels of development and higher levels of democracy. On the other hand, in more developed more authoritative states it appears the effect is at its lowest level.

The effect of control of corruption on economic decline is negative as expected, suggesting government capacity to control corruption reduces economic decline. Thus, a lack of government capacity to suppress corruption increases economic decline that may contribute to a more fragile state.

Further, the relationship between quality of governance and economic decline is also negative suggesting that improved regulatory quality results in higher state economic capacity.

The relationship between population size and economic decline is also negative suggesting larger number of citizens equates to a larger work force and higher state economic capacity. This finding support’s Easterlin’s (1967) argument that there may be “implied growth in labor supply and thus productive performance and capacity” (Easterlin 1967, 99). It is also possible that when disasters strike in large economies, a smaller proportion of the population is affected as a share of the overall population. Further, large economies may have more flexibility to compensate.

Contrary to my initial expectation the relationship between armed conflict and economic decline is negative. This finding suggests that the occurrence of armed conflict results in decreased economic decline. This finding suggests that battles aid rather than impact negatively the state economy. A potential justification for this finding is that battles may benefit the economy in terms of profits associated with manufacturing of weapons, gaining resource-rich territory, or employment opportunities in the armed forces. However since the measure of armed
conflict in this analysis does not distinguish among different levels of conflict or the time length of the conflict more research is needed to examine the effect of intrastate conflict on economic decline.

Conclusion

Do state population constraints have an effect on economic decline? This chapter seeks to explain the connection between population constraints and state economic capacity using economic decline as a proxy for state economic capacity. While there are many arguments regarding the potential determinants of state economic capacity, there are few studies that examine this link systematically (Easterlin 1967; Scully 1989). Current studies on the link between population constraints and capacity rely on single case studies or small-N analyses and the findings are mixed.

This chapter conducts a systematic study of the link between population constraints and economic decline. Findings from a large-N study confirm that population constraints result in increased economic decline across different levels of democracy and development. The level of development conditions the effect of population constraints on economic decline to a greater extent than level of democracy. In states with low levels of development the effect is larger than in states with higher levels of development almost irrespective of the level of democracy. Further the effect is the largest in states with lower levels of development and higher levels of democracy. On the other hand, in more developed more authoritative states the effect is at its lowest level. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by evaluating the impact of population constraints on economic decline across different levels of democracy and development.
The literature seldom mentions population constraints as a potential determinant of capacity. As stated prior, I assume population constraints are prior to state economic capacity and have varying effects on capacity depending on the state’s development and level of democracy; to be sure, economic decline is likely to affect aspects of population constraints such as disease or mortality rate. This may be a limitation in the study to be addressed perhaps by using distinct indicators of population constraints rather than a composite index. Much of the literature explores only the impact of single factors on capacity such as population growth. Further, the findings of this study may be important to the study of state fragility. It is important to inform decision makers that population constraints may play a role in the levels of economic capacity. In essence, an increase of population constraints may result in increased economic decline and thus state fragility. This economic decline may result in a lack of capacity to protect civilians from interstate threats, provide public goods, and address citizen demands.

I argue that relatively high levels of population constraints impact also negatively active civil participation in critical economic functions of the state. I also argue the theoretical mechanism for this relationship, in addition to the high costs of dealing with population constraints (pressures on state budgets including increased dependence on state welfare functions), is a shortage of human capital since these conditions may inhibit a population’s ability to contribute towards their own state’s economy (i.e. as workers and/or consumers). A lack of population economic participation due to one or more population constraints may prove detrimental, even temporarily, to their country’s economic capacity, thus increasing the state’s fragility.
Further, this study shows that all else equal countries at low levels of development are particularly vulnerable to population constraints such as disease and natural disasters; such events diminish the state’s economic capacity increasing thus its fragility. This finding supports the argument that international efforts to alleviate the implications of population constraints in less developed countries also aims at increasing international security in addition to the important humanitarian relief stated objectives.

The findings of this research may be important to future studies in the field of economic capacity and state fragility. Based on this study’s findings, scholars may be motivated to construct alternative measures related to capacity, since a limitation of the dependent variable in this chapter is that is constructed solely with economic variables; future research may take into account other dimensions of state capacity such as military strength, for example. Exploring other potential indicators or proxies of capacity may help researchers to better understand the mechanism and dynamics of the association between population constraints and state capacity.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This dissertation treats an important research question explaining variation in state fragility across different countries over time. Fragile states are considered one of the “defining challenges in our world, now and for many years to come [as they may become grounds for] anarchy and poor governance… where violence and oppression can spread, transnational criminals can operate with impunity, and terrorists can train to gather, plot, and kill the innocent” (Patrick 2011, 3). International organizations have also expressed concern regarding the potential of “fragile states” to disrupt collective security as threats such as transnational terrorism and human displacement from violent conflict have the potential to permeate borders (Patrick 2011, 5). Thus fragile states pose “numerous consequences for the affected country, its inhabitants, neighbors, and the international community” (Patrick 2011, 41). This study contributes to a better understanding of state fragility, a condition with important domestic and international consequences.

My work aims at providing building blocks for the study of state fragility. In the literature state fragility is defined as “a condition of loss of state control of physical territory and legitimate authority, and state inability to provide basic public goods” (FSI 2017, n.p.). However, systematic research in this topic is in its nascent stages; conceptual, theoretical, and empirical treatment of state fragility is scant in the literature. I engage in conceptualizing state fragility, identify empirical indicators that I link theoretically to three dimensions of state fragility, and proceed to examine their determinants.

I examine three distinct dimensions of state fragility proposed in the literature: i) state authority, ii) state legitimacy, and iii) state capacity. I narrow the scope of these dimensions by focusing on 1) violent group grievance, 2) political legitimacy, and 3) state economic capacity, respectively. In particular, I examine the effects of 1) the number of refugees on the level of
domestic violent group grievance, 2) state human rights violations on public perceptions of state legitimacy, and 3) population constraints, such as natural disasters and disease on the state’s economic capacity. Internal violence, loss of legitimacy, and loss of economic capacity are expected to contribute to a state’s fragility.

The study covers 174 countries and the time period between 2006 and 2014. Based on large-N datasets, and cross-national, longitudinal statistical models the analysis confirms that 1) refugees result in increased violent group grievance, 2) state human rights violations result in decreased popular support, and 3) population constraints result in greater economic decline. The study also takes into account how levels of democracy and development condition some of these effects. So, I find that economic capacity in more developed states is less vulnerable to population constraints compared to that of less developed states, and that more authoritarian states are more vulnerable to losing state legitimacy due to state human rights violations compared to less authoritarian states.

Limitations and Future Research

The empirical results in this study are tentative since there are data limitations that do not allow for optimal operationalization of indicators or control of all relevant alternative explanations. My study of the effects of numbers of refugees on violent group grievance would benefit from evaluating also how numbers of immigrants may contribute to violent group grievance. Or, the respective effects of armed conflict on state legitimacy or state economic capacity would be estimated more accurately if data on the magnitude and duration of armed conflict were available.
Further, in my study of the effects of human rights violations on government/leadership popular support, the proxy for state legitimacy, clearly there is error included in the measurement of these variables. Not all state human rights violations are detectable, observable, or known. Including political transparency as a weight in this measure therefore may be a way to begin improving it. Further, measures of government/leadership popular support rely on public opinion polls which are likely not reliable in highly repressive states such as North Korea where participants may be hesitant to provide sincere responses. Creating alternative methods to capture state legitimacy would be a challenging but worthwhile contribution to the field of international security.

In addition, the study of each dimension of state fragility evaluates the effects of levels of democracy and development. But democracy and development are broad indicators that include multiple elements. Evaluating the specific contributions of institutional and political factors, or the relative importance of different aspects of development for state fragility would substantially enhance understanding of state fragility in future studies. For instance, to what extent is democratic accountability useful in understanding state economic capacity? Or how does level of decentralization of decision-making affect state economic capacity or violent group grievance?

In sum, to understand better the contributing factors to state fragility researchers may aim at generating indicators and datasets that allow for the evaluation of different relevant variables on state fragility. For instance, regarding the variable of population constraints used in this study, only in recent years have data on resource scarcity become more robust and available to the public; the collection of data on food insecurity has not been prioritized or consistently pursued for many countries. The results in this study show that population constraints may pose harmful
implications to the state economy with consequences for state fragility, suggesting thus that we need to prioritize the collection of such data and systematically examine their effects on state economic capacity.

The study of state fragility may benefit by assessing the dynamic effects of human rights violations, refugee inflows, and population constraints. These dynamics may be only partially captured by the models used in this study but future research on the effects of the change in these factors on state fragility may be useful to better understanding state fragility. For instance, it is important to understand how changes in the numbers of refugees entering a country may affect the level of violent group grievance. Or how sudden onsets of contagious disease may affect state economic capacity.

Therefore, there is a lot remaining to be addressed in future research. It is important to conduct systematic analyses to assess and extend existing conceptual frameworks, in order to be able to better understand, address, and hopefully mitigate the contributing factors to state fragility. Further research may explore additional dimensions of state fragility (for instance, foreign military interventions or collapse of major economic resources) and their potential determinants, or extend the time period under study. My work provides a foundational understanding for three determinants of state fragility that may be addressed in a variety of ways by governing elites and international organizations (such as the United Nations) if it is understood that these may be potential sources of state fragility posing a threat to international security.
Policy Recommendations

To be sure, this dissertation is not an exhaustive exploratory study of state fragility, but it is amongst the first to use a multidimensional approach. This dissertation has informed us that 1) numbers of refugees, 2) state human rights violations, and 3) population constraints all contribute to a more fragile state all else equal. From this understanding policy recommendations can be made to mitigate associated harmful effects. To be clear, I do not advocate for prohibiting refugees from entering a state. Rather, I would recommend ensuring sufficient resources, political and economic, for the social and political integration of refugees in host societies. I would argue that this approach may reduce potential fear by native populations of losing limited resources and culture clashes.

In regards to state human rights violations, my policy recommendation would be to strengthen national and international oversight institutions that monitor human rights violations. My statistical results have shown that committing state human rights violations results in decreased perceived political legitimacy that may increase a state’s fragility. Understanding of the connection between human rights violations and state fragility may inform policy makers and provide them with additional incentives to monitor and preempt such practices.

Lastly, mitigating the spread of disease, depletion of resources (e.g. food and water), or impact of natural disasters may prevent a reduction in the level of state fragility. For example, ensuring proper medical care for regions impacted by high levels of HIV, tuberculosis, or malaria deaths may ensure a more prosperous economy and state capable of defending itself from external threats. In addition, having efficient planning for emergency relief during natural disasters may mitigate the loss of human capital and subsequent impact to the economy. In sum, national and international coordination to preempt human rights violations, and effectively manage refugee inflows and population constraints in order to prevent group violence
and deterioration in state economic capacity respectively is likely to increase the level of international security. These policy recommendations and continued research may serve national and international policy makers to prevent increasing levels of state fragility capable of impacting negatively international security.
APPENDIX A: CHAPTER THREE SUMMARY STATISTICS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Grievance</td>
<td>1,564</td>
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