A Theory of Cultural Tolerance for Preventing Ethnic Conflict: Evidence from Former Soviet States

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A THEORY OF CULTURAL TOLERANCE: EVIDENCE FROM FORMER SOVIET STATES

by

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M.A. University of Central Florida, 2018

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in the Department of Political Science in the College of Sciences at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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ABSTRACT

The prevention of ethnic conflict has been examined and debated upon within the Political Science community; studies involving economic standing, government structure, and historical background have been credited with reducing or preventing ethnic conflict. In the years leading up to the demise of the Soviet Union ethnic conflict was felt heavily throughout the Socialist Republics. After the fall of the U.S.S.R. scholars were certain that ethnic conflict would arise in Kazakhstan but alas it did not, while other post-Soviet states, such as Moldova and Russia, had experienced ethnic conflict. What prevents ethnic conflict from occurring in one state but not the other? This thesis proposes that state efforts to promote cultural tolerance reduce the likelihood of ethnic conflict occurrence. State efforts to promote cultural tolerance include: language recognition, parliamentary reserved seats, constitutional protection, and inclusive citizenship laws. This theory is tested via a large-N regression time series cross sectional model including all of the former Soviet states, examining state-minority group dyads. Relevant factors such as oil, and group level economic inequality are also controlled for. The results reveal that inclusive citizenship laws have a positive significant effect on ethnic conflict, while language recognition seems to have a negative significant effect on ethnic conflict.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Many scholars such as Posen (1993), Lake and Rothchild (1996), Sambanis (2001), Reynal-Querol (2002), Wolff (2006), and Forsberg (2008) have examined why ethnic conflict occurs, and how it can be prevented. In the years leading to the demise of the Soviet Union ethnic riots erupted heavily throughout the Socialist Republics, and Kazakhstan was not exempt from this (Hajda, 1993). In 1986 ethnic riots broke out in Almaty, Kazakhstan as a reaction to the newly appointed ethnic Russian First Secretary Gennady Kolbin. Ethnic unrest was prevalent throughout the Soviet Union: Almaty, Osh, Dushanbe, Sukhumi, Baku, and Kirovabad are some examples of where ethnic riots occurred. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, given the 1986 ethnic riots and Kazakhstan’s multiethnic population, scholars were certain that ethnic conflict would arise there (Schatz, 2000). Contrary to popular belief, however, Kazakhstan did not experience ethnic conflict, while other post-Soviet countries, such as Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia experienced ethnic conflict. In fact the Soviet era ethnic riots blossomed into civil wars in the cities of Dushanbe, Sukhumi, Sumgait, and Kirovabad, but not in Almaty, which had similar Soviet era ethnic riots. What prevents ethnic conflict from occurring in one state but not another? Studies involving economic standing (Forsberg, 2006), government type (Reynal-Querol, 2002) (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000), historical background (Geertz, 1973), etc. provide some explanation for why ethnic conflict does not develop. However, two factors seem to be overlooked: people’s tolerance towards other ethnic groups, and the role the state can play to positively influence people’s tolerance towards other ethnic groups. Perhaps, it is the cultural tolerance strategies implemented at the institutional level, such
as the Assembly of Peoples, that have kept ethnic conflict at bay in Kazakhstan. Can states prevent ethnic conflict through the promotion of cultural tolerance? In this thesis I intend to draw conclusions on the relationship between ethnic conflicts and the efforts of a state to promote cultural tolerance.

Ethnic conflict is defined as any incident of maintained violent conflict where ethnic, national, religious, or alternative communal minorities push for changes in status through challenging the government (Bates et. al, 2003). This study focuses on a subset of this by examining state-minority group dyads. The default environment for this analysis is in a majority ethnic dominant country meaning although these states are multiethnic there is still one predominant ethnic group. The assumption here is that this setting naturally creates risk or tension for the minority group, so what can the state do to alleviate this? This study argues the state could implement policies of cultural tolerance systematically at the institutional level. Cultural tolerance theory is a viable solution in preventing ethnic conflict because it targets the core of the problem by teaching and promoting tolerance of all ethnic identities through state actions. Cultural tolerance is defined as the attitude or perception of one individual towards the social norms, and cultural customs of another culture that is considered foreign to them (Gasser & Tan, 1999). For the purpose of this research however cultural tolerance is explicitly ethnic, meaning a culture that stems from an ethnic background and not any other category such as “pop culture.” I extend this definition further by honing in on state efforts to endorse cultural tolerance. I argue that a state is more likely to face ethnic conflicts when state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are poor or non-existent. State efforts to promote cultural tolerance include: insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through
parliamentary reserved seats or other political representation, granting all minorities equal rights and protection under the constitution, language recognition, and uncomplicated citizenship obtainment.

The "cultural tolerance" theory proposed and its effect on ethnic conflict is tested via a large N regression. To measure ethnic conflict occurrence the Uppsala (UCDP) and ACD2EPR databases are utilized for state conflict, in other words the dependent variable is measured through state-minority dyads. One exception is noted here: the Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict, where state involvement is still uncertain. To measure cultural tolerance a 4 variable scale is presented, and originally coded. As for case selection data was collected from all of the 15 former Soviet republics. The AMAR (Minorities at Risk) dataset was used for the selection of various ethnic groups within each country, which came to 55 ethnic groups total. With 55 ethnic groups employed in the dataset paired with each individual state, it provides a substantial amount of dyads to test, 104. The results are then discussed via case studies that illustrate the theoretical implications generated from them. The purpose of this research is to further investigate the phenomena of variation in ethnic conflict within the former Soviet Union after its denouement.

Better understanding the methods that prevent ethnic conflict can facilitate states with better peace efforts. If the relationship between state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and incidents of ethnic conflict holds true, then perhaps building up the state’s institutional policies and strictly implementing strategies of tolerance can be included in peace efforts/conflict prevention. First I discuss the literature as preventions of ethnic conflict, and cultural tolerance as a preventative strategy. Then, I present the theoretical elements behind cultural tolerance and how states can
promote cultural tolerance. Furthermore, I explain the quantitative measures and methods details, followed by the actual regression results. Subsequently, the results are then elucidated by case studies. Finally, I conclude this analysis with possible implications and setbacks of my research.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Prevention of Ethnic Conflict

Through identifying which techniques work best for ethnic conflict prevention and resolution, governments throughout the world can implement these strategies to combat ethnic conflict altogether. Ethnic identity is frequently considered to be a deep-seeded element in human kind. Something that has identified us based on appearance and ancient history, where our history defines us as belonging to a group of people who are genetically similar to us. Primordialism argues a similar perspective regarding ethnic conflict, theorizing that causes of ethnic conflict date back to ancient times, therefore past violent incidents and deep-rooted animosity causes conflict currently (Geertz, 1973). In compliance with this theory, countries that have weaker kinship ties or a history not rich in past violent incidents should experience less ethnic conflict than others. Prevention of ethnic conflict is difficult because attachment to one’s culture or ethnicity can be interpreted to comprise a “primordial” or more “natural” human connection; one that is stronger than other relationships such as belonging to an overarching government (Geertz, 1973). Cultural tolerance theory however proposes the promotion of tolerating these “primordial” connections to ones culture, and learning to co-exist because cultural elements cannot simply be taken away from people.

Indeed, ethnic identity is made up of intrinsic factors such as history, religion, and language; henceforth it is more often than not a driving force behind conflict as exemplified in the Transnistrian war (Ellingsen, 2000). According to Huntington (1993), when people define themselves by their ethnicity or identity, they will begin to feel an “us” versus “them”
relationship between themselves and of course the remainder of the population that is not of the same origin. In this regard diversity has been linked to ethnic conflict occurrence whether negatively or positively. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) found that ethnic polarization leads to a greater chance of ethnic conflict, because when a society is ethnically imbalanced it presents the majority group with an opportunity to impose upon the minority group and in turn conflict commences; therefore more diversity would be the preventative strategy. In contrast, Sambanis (2001) argued that ethnic heterogeneity positively correlates with ethnic conflict, thus countries with higher ethnic polarization should experience more conflict. Given these theories, it is difficult to conclude whether more ethnic heterogeneity or homogeneity would prevent ethnic conflict from occurring, because ethnic conflict has taken place in both highly diverse and more homogenous states. Notwithstanding, the amount of diversity within a given country is not an element that should be controlled; attempting to do so would be ethically unmoral. These theories overlook the role of the state, however, in being a preventative factor (Cederman et al, 2010). Governments can play a key role in ethnic conflict prevention by promoting agreements in order to resolve ethnic conflicts or keep them from reoccurring (Fischer, 2000). Ostwald posits that public policy can be used to frame identity in such a way that it actually removes the animosity in ethnic divergence (2015). Framing identity can be taken one step further by framing tolerance of other identities through the promotion of tolerance of all ethnic groups at the state level, which is cultural tolerance theory. This allows ethnic groups with the opportunity to cohabitate without the need of assimilation, again the end goal here is coexistence.

Certainly concepts that make people feel “secure” such as having resources, or land have been analyzed to correlate with ethnic conflict. The ethnic security dilemma theory highlights
fear as a factor that drives ethnic groups into conflict due to collective vulnerabilities as well as territorial disputes; ethnic groups want to raise their sense of security (Posen, 1993). Lake and Rothchild (1996) identified ethnic conflict as stemming from resource competition, information failures, problems of credible commitment, as well as strategic interactions between ethnic groups. Ethnic identity becomes pivotal when individuals compete for resources therefore resource competition exacerbates ethnic conflict, so providing equal resources or insuring equal resources for all ethnic groups would work as a preventative strategy (Ellingsen, 2000). In the post-Soviet states however, some ethnic groups that had fairly good economic standings in comparison with the majority group, such as the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan or the Slavic population in Moldova were still a part of ethnic conflict after 1991, therefore equal resources may not always be enough for prevention.

Specific institutional and ideological movements throughout the globe have also aroused ethnic conflict, and the new norms of equality have left ethnic groups to challenge the status quo, leaving ethnic subordination a thing of the past (Horowitz, 1985). In this case states that experience less inequality should have less ethnic conflict. Horowitz (1993) presented two types of ethnic conflict prevention: structural techniques and preferential policies. The structural techniques include innovations in federalism or government structure, regional autonomy, and electoral systems. Preferential policies consist of public and private sector opportunities such as business, education, and employment. Policies to manage or settle ethnic conflicts, territorial organization, containment, institutional frameworks to accommodate each party involved in the conflict, and intervention from the international community have all been formerly used (Wolff, 2006). Political freedom has been deemed extremely effective as a means to neutralize the
hazard of ethnic conflict outbreak, even when managing polarized states (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). Correspondingly on the basis of ethnic conflict prevention, high levels of political representation amongst the populations of both religiously polarized and ethnically diverse states have been found to reduce the amount of ethnic conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Political representation has been also tested to reduce ethnic conflict in new democracies such as in post-Soviet Eastern Europe (Alonso & Rufino, 2007). This study accounts for political representation as a variable in cultural tolerance measurement; minority reserved parliament seats. Ethnic networks theory proposes ethnic conflict to be the result of mobilization. Even state leaders can cause ethnic conflicts by placing emphasis on religious, racial, or linguistic divisions (Sambanis 2001). The Chechen and Russian ethnic conflict best illuminates this theory, where on both sides political leaders exacerbated ethnic divisions, utilizing negative ethnic propaganda. In Russia the Chechens were depicted as “bandits” and “terrorists” (Russell, 2002). In Chechnya ethnicity was used as a catalyst to start an uprising for full sovereignty (Russell, 2005). It is imperative to note here that similar to the way state leaders can cause ethnic conflicts through mobilization, they also have the capability to prevent ethnic conflict through the same methods. Central to cultural tolerance theory are state efforts placing emphasis on equal or proportional representation and unity- by utilizing divisions in a positive way in turn promoting tolerance, out of the former Soviet states this is best illustrated through Kazakhstan’s Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, which works hard in emphasizing unity amongst all ethnic groups. Yet, no one has examined the promotion of cultural tolerance as a means to combat ethnic conflict, therefore, the next section reviews literature that may support this hypothesis.
Cultural Tolerance as a Preventative Strategy

Cultural tolerance studies have examined the effects of tolerance on feelings of aggression, intergroup contact, and citizen regime type. Few studies evaluate cultural tolerance’s impact on ethnic conflict especially from a state-level analysis therefore the existing literature is limited. I intend to fill this gap by analyzing the effect of cultural tolerance on ethnic conflict from a state-level analysis. There is a need to explore this because there are already unexplained cases of variance in ethnic conflict such as in the former Soviet Union region- where ethnic riots flourished into civil wars in cities such as Dushanbe, Sukhumi, Sumgait, and Kirovabad, but did not produce conflict in Almaty. Although there are no specific studies of the effect of cultural programming on preventing ethnic conflict, initial studies of cultural programming suggest that they do change individual behaviors and that they are linked to lower rates of conflict. Cultural tolerance is a key component to ensure stability and peace within any state. Cultural tolerance is defined as the attitude or perception of one individual towards the social norms, and cultural customs of another culture that is considered foreign to them (Gasser & Tan, 1999). In this study, however, cultural tolerance is focused explicitly on ethnic background and not on any other category of culture such as “pop culture” for example.

To begin with, presenting the effects of implementing cultural tolerance can be taken from that of an individual scale and applied to a state global scale. For instance a study conducted by McAllister et al. (2000), found that the distribution of flyers promoting tolerance and moral engagement in a high school reduced the amount of physical and verbal aggression towards other
ethnicities. Likewise, Solomon and Saucier (2006) analyzed the effects of tolerance-promoting events and found that they were effective in reducing participants’ feelings of animosity and increasing their cultural acceptance. These studies exemplify the importance of cultural and ethnic tolerance on an individual basis, which can be utilized and applied on a state level.

Alternatively when looking at a state level case study on cultural/ethnic tolerance Hodson et al. (1994) showed that in Yugoslavia, areas where ethnic intolerance was high, the amount of conflict was also high. Here, heterogeneity (diversity) and intergroup contact promoted tolerance in Eastern European states. Subsequently, Moore Jr. (2001) found that maritime trade and “the freedom of conscience” increased ethnic/religious tolerance, which in turn reduced violence. In both of the above cases, intergroup contact promoted peace amongst ethnic groups. The more groups began to trade amongst each other or come into contact altogether trust and bonds were learned, in other words, tolerance was learned, in turn promoting peace.

Moreover, state efforts to promote cultural tolerance include the treatment of minority groups within those states, such as granting them the same rights and respect as the majority group. McIntosh, et al. (1995) rationalized that the treatment of minority groups within the states of Romania and Bulgaria will correlate with the amount of ethnic conflict there. Likewise, the factors that attribute to ethnic tolerance are pivotal to the strategy of a state in promoting or strengthening tolerance statewide. Political ideology, perceptions of threat, age and education have all been found to influence the degree of ethnic tolerance within Romania and Bulgaria (McIntosh et al., 1995). Citizen regime type and ethnic tolerance have also been proposed to hold a strong relationship with one another, specifically along the lines of political ideology,
satisfaction with democracy, as well as national identity (Weldon, 2006). Henceforth, the above factors can be utilized by countries to promote ethnic tolerance.

Furthermore, central to my theory is Kazakhstan’s promotion of cultural tolerance. Although many believed that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan would face severe ethnic conflict due to the diverse ethnic population residing there as well as structural instability during that time, the opposite actually happened. On the contrary the integration of all ethnicities and policies used to promote ethnic tolerance managed to keep the peace in Kazakhstan amongst all ethnic groups (Schatz, 2000). Kazakhstan’s case illuminates the importance of cultural tolerance promotion in combating ethnic conflict. The next section explains the theoretical elements of this piece.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL ELEMENTS

To what extent do state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness help in preventing ethnic conflict? I argue that state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are inversely related to the likelihood of ethnic conflict. This is because just as ethnic identity is a learned concept, tolerance of other ethnicities and cultures can also be taught and implemented structurally as a tactic to combat and prevent ethnic conflict vis-à-vis state efforts. Having respect for cultural and ethnic differences is pivotal in creating successful policies aimed at inter-ethnic conflict prevention (Laubeova, 2000). Better understanding the factors that correlate with ethnic tolerance can equip states with better strategies in implementing tolerance related policies. When an ethnic group is respected, embraced, and included within a government there is less incentive for that ethnic group to rise up against the government or want to initiate conflict. The default setting for this analysis is in post-Soviet multiethnic states that have one predominant majority ethnic group. The assumption here is that, even in multiethnic societies when there is one dominant ethnic group this naturally creates risk or tension for all other ethnic groups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Therefore it is up to the state to alleviate this and insure all ethnic groups feel equal and safe through the promotion of cultural tolerance. The state can promote cultural tolerance through its own actions such as recognizing the language of an ethnic group, having reserved parliamentary seats for all ethnic groups, granting constitutional protection of all ethnic groups, and implementing inclusive citizenship laws for all ethnic groups.
These actions by the state demonstrate that all ethnic groups are tolerated and encouraged to be active members of society, which simultaneously sets an example for the majority ethnic group to also be tolerant and inclusive of all other ethnicities. The end goal here is not cultural assimilation, or ethnofederalism, but rather peaceful cohabitation or co-existence by building up cultural tolerance within the state.

I argue that a state is more likely to face ethnic conflicts when state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are tenuous or absent. State efforts to promote cultural tolerance include: 1) insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through parliamentary reserved seats or other political representation. Political representation gives ethnic groups a voice to be heard and a sense of importance, this has been argued to decrease ethnic conflict greatly (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Due to the existence of corruption in former Soviet states resulting in an elite concentration of power, one could argue there is no substantial say for anyone other than the president. Nonetheless it is the “thought” or gesture of parliamentary reserved seats or any other form of political representation that provides the ethnic group with a positive signal of importance and equality. 2) Granting all minorities’ equal rights and protection under the constitution, this instills a sense of security (Posen, 1993) for the minority group knowing that they are protected under a legally binding document, especially one as pivotal as a state’s constitution. 3) Language recognition-when a state recognizes the language of an ethnic group this too sends a positive signal that a major part of the groups’ identity is respected and accepted (Ellingsen, 2000). 4) Finally, non-rigorous citizenship obtainment; citizenship, and barriers to citizenship for members of an ethnic group is definitive of how the state treats all ethnic groups as far as inclusion, and is essential in cultural tolerance policies
(Laitin, 1998). If rules and regulations for obtaining citizenship are difficult or complicated this signals to different ethnic groups that the titular group may want them to leave rather than integrate (Laitin, 1998). Of course this feeling of exclusion can result in tension for the minority groups in turn motivating them to engage in conflict. In contrast, if citizenship obtainment is not difficult, this signals to the ethnic group that they are welcome and tolerated.

**Hypothesis:** *State efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are inversely related to the likelihood of ethnic conflict.*

**Independent variable:** *State efforts in promoting cultural tolerance*

**Dependent Variable:** *Ethnic conflict.*

**Unit of analysis:** *Dyads (pairing between state and ethnic group)*

I predict that poor state efforts (or lack of) to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness within a state will have a positive effect on the amount of ethnic conflicts that state will have. I theorize this because once a state begins to engage in non-nationalistic behavior or simply does promote the tolerance of diversity, then in turn the citizens of the said state will begin to follow this pattern. Akin to the way that one’s ethnicity or ethnic identity is a learned concept, tolerance of other ethnicities and cultures can also be taught and utilized as a preventative strategy towards ethnic conflict. The former Soviet Union extends an interesting case study for analyzing ethnic conflict. This region provides the most likely case in illuminating the impact of cultural tolerance on ethnic conflict. All post-Soviet states share a common Russo-Imperial history where they were taken over by Russia and integrated into the Soviet Union. The fifteen post-Soviet republics also present enough variation in ethnic make up, for instance Russia is more ethnically diverse while countries such as Estonia are more homogenous. All of the post-Soviet republics had to
adopt the Russian language as a primary official language, and culturally assimilate to a Russo-
communist society, in this sense the countries share a similar past. Ethnic conflict however, is
experienced differently throughout the region. The states that put forth more effort in cultural
tolerance strategies and inclusiveness should experience less conflict. While the post-Soviet
states that had a more nationalistic, and exclusionary agenda should experience higher ethnic
conflict. The next section explains the quantitative approach in testing the cultural tolerance
theory.
CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE MEASURES

Cultural tolerance theory is assessed via an analysis of correlation between cultural tolerance and ethnic conflict occurrence through a large N logit regression. More specifically a time-series cross-sectional model is exercised. The logit model is used because it works best for binary dependent variables. Dyads of the state and a specific ethnic group remain the unit of analysis because this reflects the ethnic conflict definition as uprisings against the government; therefore state-ethnic group dyads are employed accordingly. Standard errors are clustered to the dyad to assuage the assumption of independent observations across time within the same dyad. In other words, standard errors account for interdependence within dyads across time. The dataset extends from 1991 (after the fall of the Soviet Union) to 2014, to show trends over time, and includes 104 dyads. The dataset contains country, dyad, year, four different variables that represent cultural tolerance (independent variable), and conflict occurrence (dependent variable). As for case selection I collect data from all of the 15 former Soviet republics. I utilize the AMAR Minorities at Risk (Birnir et al., 2015) dataset for the various ethnic groups within each country, which comes to 55 ethnic groups total.

These ethnic groups were chosen based off a threshold: the smallest ethnic group in Russia that has been linked to a conflict through the ACD2EPR dataset (since Russia is the largest country out of the former Soviet Union). This ethnic group is the Nogai with a population of about 103,660, equating to roughly .072% of Russia’s total population. Every ethnic group that is

---

1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan
included in this dataset has reached the .072% threshold from the total population of that specific

country. With 55\(^2\) ethnic groups employed in the dataset paired with each individual state, it

provides 104 dyads to test with 2496 observations in total. The states within the dataset account

for the dominant ethnic group within that state, because the central government is generally a

monopoly or dominated by a particular ethnic majority group (EPR Core, 2014).

Both the Uppsala (UCDP) and ACD2EPR databases are implemented to measure ethnic

conflict occurrence, this way both large and small-scale ethnic conflicts are accounted for. Ethnic

conflict is defined as any incident of maintained violent conflict where ethnic, national, religious,
or alternative communal minorities push for changes in status through challenging the

government (Bates et. al, 2003). Here, conflict occurrence is mainly state-minority group

conflicts, with the exception of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict where the involvement of the state is

still up for debate (although there is much evidence pointing to the involvement (Hill & Huskey,

2010; Hanks 2011; Laruelle 2012). The ethnic conflict variable is coded as binary 0 or 1, 0

meaning there was no ethnic conflict between the specific dyad within the given year, and a 1 if

there was.

To calibrate cultural tolerance into the data, 4 separate variables are calculated and

originally coded. The four criteria cultural tolerance variables consist of: 1) Is the language of the

ethnic group recognized by the state; this is vital in that language is a major fundamental part of

ethnic identity (Ellingsen, 2000), when a language is recognized by the state it shows the ethnic

group that a major part of their identity is recognized and to an extent respected. 2) Is the ethnic

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group protected under the constitution of the state; this ensures the ethnic group that it is protected or secure (Posen, 1993) by a legally binding document and creates legitimacy and reassurance for the ethnic group. After coding was completed however all of the dyads received the same score for this variable, henceforth due to lack of variance constitutional protection was excluded from the regression model. 3) Are there minority reserved parliamentary seats for the ethnic group within the state; this takes legitimacy one step further by not only stating that the ethnic group has a voice in the government but it actually proves that the ethnic group has a voice within the government and therefore matters (Reynal-Querol, 2002). 4) Are there barriers to citizenship for members of this ethnic group, are some of these stronger than others; this is definitive of how the state treats all ethnicities and is pivotal in cultural tolerance (Laitin, 1998).

Each of the four criteria variables received its own score from 0 to 3 signifying low (0) to high (3) “cultural tolerance” for that specific variable. Beginning with language recognition, all recorded data was obtained from Ethnologue and further investigated by country specific constitutions. Then the next criterion was constitutional protection, data was gathered directly from each country specific official constitution. Furthermore, parliamentary seats reserved for the specific ethnic group was measured as binary, 0 or 3. Data for this variable was recorded from the official parliament/government websites of each country, and country specific official constitutions. The fourth and last criterion was citizenship barriers/inclusiveness, all data recorded for citizenship was obtained from official country specific constitutions, and legislationline.org, which is sponsored by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. All four variables of cultural tolerance are measured equally at four points from
0-3; this ascertains that the variables are ranked fairly as they are all equally weighed. All of the coding specifics are included in the codebook for reference.

All of the control variables are replicated data from a working paper by Konstantin Ash and Fanglu Sun, “Inequality in Public Service Provision and Ethnic Rebellion.” Where ethnic group borders from 1961 *Atlas Narodov Mira* (ANM) (Bruk et al., 1964) were geocoded into polygons from Cederman et al. (2010) in the GREG (Geo-referencing of ethnic groups) dataset. This data is advantageous in that it uses ArcGIS to map the level of wealth geographically in regions throughout the world, aligning with the ethnic make up of the area-making it the closest way to measure exact inequality amongst ethnic groups. The ethnic group data matches well onto the dyads specified from my dataset. The data also allows for a more precise means of controlling for alternative variables.

**Controls**

There are a plethora of plausible factors leading to less ethnic conflict, therefore I control for a multitude of them. Public service provision has been linked to ethnic conflict onset; electricity is a key component of public service provision and can be represented through intergroup light intensity (Barnes & Floor, 1996). Light intensity captures the intensity of nighttime lights coming from one square kilometer globally, and is quantified into geocoded quadrants (DMSP/OLS). Taking this light intensity at the country level and dividing it by a country’s population density produces country light density. Light intensity at the group level divided by group density (population density of specific ethnic group per geographic area) produces group
light density. Therefore, I control for this with lights inequality, which is a log of group light density divided by country light density, a straightforward measure of variance from the national average. The measure was made to balance out extreme values in light deviation and normalize the inequality measure around zero. Elevation provides ethnic groups with more “rough terrain” also resulting in a higher chance for conflict onset (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Therefore I control for this using a measure of mean group elevation, elevation mean. The averages for each ethnic group were generated from ArcGIS utilizing the Global Digital Elevation Model, capturing values by a 30 square kilometer resolution global grid (Survey, 2006). Accessibility is important for the inclusion of all groups and a key component of this is state penetration or government rule reaching throughout its territory, therefore groups farther away from the capital city may be more likely to initiate conflict. The average distance to a country’s capital per ethnic group I control for using capital distance mean -developed using data from PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen et al., 2012). The smaller an ethnic group is relative to a country’s total population the less likely it is to initiate conflict (Caselli & Li, 2006). Subsequently, group size is a variable used to represent the population of an ethnic group within a given territory divided by the total population of the country. Log population is also controlled for which is a log of the country’s population count (SEDAC Gridded Population Data).

Typically, countries with higher GDP per capita income experience less conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Accordingly, I control for this utilizing a logged measure of GDP per capita- Log of per capita GDP, national wealth per capita is obtained from the Penn World Tables, this provides a national measure (Heston et al., 2002). To control for group level economic inequality data is taken from the 2006 Nordhaus et. al G-Econ project,
which is a geophysical based dataset for economic activity. The G-Econ data covers gross cell product (the regional equivalent of gross domestic product), and dividing this by population density gives us the economic density. Thus, I control for Group Economic Density divided by Country Economic Density (Nordhaus et. al, 2006), which gives me the Economic Deviation, in order to standardize this measure I use the log as economic inequality, or gross cell product inequality, accounting for group level inequality. Furthermore, proximity to petroleum or diamond deposits can affect ethnic conflict occurrence (Grossman, 1995). Henceforth I control for this proximity with petroleum distance, where distances to both diamond deposits and petroleum from the ethnic group region (Lujala et al., 2007, 2005) are employed in the models. Finally, I control for peace years 1-3 or cubic polynomials (Carter & Signorino, 2010), which are added to account for duration dependence (one year’s observation is impacted by the prior year and so on). Peace years are a constant measure of the number of years since the ethnic group was last involved in conflict where measures two and three are squared and cubed measures of the first. Cubic polynomial approximation to the hazard is as follows: \( s(t_i) = x_1 t_i + x_2 t_i^2 + x_3 t_i^3 \) by utilizing this specific technique deciphering temporal dependence is more precise.
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

The results render some interesting discoveries, however, it is important to note that the variable of constitutional protection was omitted from the regression models due to lack of variance amongst dyads throughout time. Below, four models or versions are presented: two without controls (models 1 and 3), and two with controls (models 2 and 4), standard errors are clustered to the dyad in models 3 and 4, finally the peace years (1-3) represent cubic polynomials, which are used in each model.

Table 1 Logit Regressions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
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<td>Minority Seats</td>
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<td>-0.760***</td>
<td>-0.680**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>-1.161*</td>
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<td>-1.161**</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
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<td>Lights Inequality</td>
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<td>Log of per capita GDP</td>
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<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>Economic Inequality</td>
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<td>-0.344**</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Since Last Ethnic Conflict</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceyears2</td>
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<td>0.315***</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>0.315***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceyears3</td>
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<td>-0.009***</td>
<td>-0.007***</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Constant</td>
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<td>0.621</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(5.939)</td>
<td>(0.621)</td>
<td>(3.667)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2496</td>
<td>1793</td>
<td>2496</td>
<td>1793</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$  Standard Errors are clustered to the dyad in models 3 and 4 only.

Model 1 illustrates the significance of all three independent variables used to signify cultural tolerance with a negative effect for language recognition. For every one unit increase in language recognition the probability of ethnic conflict increases by almost 74%, where the p value is less than 0.001, this not only significant but also counterintuitive from the original theory. Next for every one unit increase in minority seats the likelihood of ethnic conflict decreases by 30% where the p value is smaller than 0.05, however this significance no longer holds when the controls are added in. Nevertheless, for every one unit increase in the citizenship variable the prospect of ethnic conflict decreases by 76% with a p value less than 0.001, which is significant and remains through regression models 2-4.
Model 2 highlights the significance of language recognition, where for every one-unit increase in language recognition the probability of ethnic conflict increases by 71%, with a p value less than 0.001. Minority seats however loses its significance once the controls are added in, now rendering a 10% decrease in ethnic conflict per every one unit increase in minority reserved seats. Citizenship shows significance with a p value less than 0.05 where for every one-unit increase in citizenship ethnic conflict decreases by 68%. Model 3 does not contain the control variables however as the standard errors are clustered the percentages change from Model 2 and resemble Model 1’s values, however minority seats remains insignificant. All in all, Model 4 utilizes all of the control variables and standard errors are clustered to the dyad. Language recognition similar to Model 2 presents a 71% increase in ethnic conflict per every one-unit increase in language recognition with a p value of less than 0.001. Minority seats variable shows an 11% decrease in ethnic conflict for every one-unit increase in minority reserved seats. Citizenship exhibits a 68% decrease in ethnic conflict for every one-unit increase in citizenship, and here the p value is less than 0.01, meaning the significance is stronger than in Model 2. As for the control variables it seems lights inequality, elevation mean, log gdp, and economic inequality are significant in both Models 2 and 4.

The findings still point to cultural tolerance as a plausible solution to ethnic conflict, however there are key points to be noted. One of the variable was untestable, one was not significant and two were significant (with one holding a negative correlation). Constitutional protection of ethnic groups is omitted from the results due to lack of variance across time, meaning all of the dyads had the same score and therefore could not be properly tested. Language recognition is shown to correlate with ethnic conflict in a negative context. Perhaps,
when recognizing the language of an ethnic group, more autonomy is felt by the group, in turn leading to a want for independence versus integration. Minority seats has some significance in the early model but this is lost as the controls are added, the effect here could be lost because Kazakhstan is the only country that has minority reserved seats (along with Lithuania for the Poles) out of the sample. In any case political representation could still be considered as a preventative strategy against ethnic conflict because it has produced significant results in other studies when the ethnic group has an effective influence in legislative decision-making (Alonso & Rufino, 2007). As mentioned above the only two states that had minority reserved political representation were Kazakhstan and Lithuania, which is perhaps why the results lost significance. Furthermore, citizenship shows a positive correlation with ethnic conflict throughout the models. The inclusiveness for less difficult citizenship deters ethnic conflict because it signals to any ethnic group that they are welcome in that country. The next section discusses the results through case studies in order to understand the results and analyze where, why, and how they hold up in real world examples.
CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS

Constitutional protection for minority ethnic groups signals that they are secure and safe as protection is guaranteed via a legally binding document (Posen, 1993). Nevertheless, due to lack of variance across time for each dyad for the constitutional protection variable its significance was untestable. Each dyad within the dataset received a score of 1 for constitutional protection, implying that the constitution did contain language that ensures protection of all minorities and peoples as a whole, but does not specify or mention the specific group at hand. Moreover, there are studies claiming language differences may cause ethnic conflict, or by the same token can be used to mitigate ethnic conflict (Mac Giolla Chriost, 2003), and that the greater the language difference between two groups the smaller the chances are for conflict onset (Laitin, 2000). However, the data proves a counterintuitive finding: more language recognition leads to a greater probability of ethnic conflict. Perhaps this is due to the sense of autonomy that is felt when the language of an ethnic group is recognized, leading to a greater demand for independence from the majority ethnic group dominate state, which can result into conflict when the state does not comply. In other words language recognition can fall into the spectrum of ethnofederalism, where greater autonomy is given to the ethnic minority group within its jurisdiction. Ethnofederalism, although thought of as a useful means to achieve peace, on the contrary has been linked to exacerbating conflict if not instigating it (Roeder, 2009).

A real life example of the language recognition results is Russia’s calamitous relationship with the ethnic Chechens. The Chechens live in the Caucasus region and are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group (Russell, 2005). In 1858 after a long history of resistance dating back to the 17th century, Russia finally conquered Chechnya; conflict however, did not end there (BBC,
In 1929 the Chechens rebelled against Soviet uniformity and for the next decade Chechnya was booming with conflict and repression. Consequently, Soviet intrigue grew for the region as it was ripe with oil and Russians were brought there to oversee the oil industry, not to mention rumors that the Chechens were collaborating with the Germans during World War II added even more reason for the Russians to be present there (Kipp, 2001). As a result of the chaos Joseph Stalin, one of the former leaders of the Soviet Union, proposed what he deemed as a “solution” to these issues, and ordered for the mass deportation of ethnic Chechens to Kazakhstan and Siberia. The exile was carried out in 1944 however Nikita Khrushchev another former Soviet leader proclaimed that the Chechens were free to return to their homeland in 1957 (Russell, 2005). The animosity that grew from this exile only added to the already existent grievances of being imperialized by the Russians. In 1958 ethnic riots broke out in Grozny, which began a ripple of riots that continued until 1965 (BBC, 2012). Soon followed the policy of glasnost in the 1980s and nationalist rights movements began to surface all over the U.S.S.R. including Chechnya prompting its self-determination campaign (PBS, 2002). In November of 1990 Chechnya demanded parliamentary and presidential elections, as part of its separatist movement (PBS, 2002). In 1991 Soviet air force general Jokhar Dudayev seized the KGB headquarters in Grozny, forcing Moscow to offer the elections, and Dudayev won presidency.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya decreed a Declaration of State Sovereignty. In 1992 Chechnya adopted its constitution and declared itself as an independent and self-governing entity with a president and parliament (BBC, 2011). The Chechen language was then recognized because it became the official language within Chechnya’s jurisdiction, which added to Chechnya’s autonomy movement that motivated Chechnya to rebel. Almost two years
later (1994) Russia invades Chechnya in order to end the independence movement and so re-began ethnic conflict. Yeltsin dispatched troops to enter Chechen territory and up to 100,000 people were killed in that war, which lasted until 1996 (BBC, 2011). In 1996 former president of Chechnya Dudayev was assassinated from a Russian missile attack, and Russia signed a briefly lived peace treaty with new president Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev, who was president until 1997. Interestingly enough in 1997 Russia recognized Maskhadov’s government and him as the Chechen president, even so the ethnic conflict was not ended but only contained for a brief period. Not too long after in 1999 a second large-scale ethnic conflict was initiated, after Vladimir Putin came into power in Russia and led a military operation against the Chechen rebels (Al-Jazeera, 2014). Both sides of the conflict felt atrocities such as torture, kidnapping, rape, and summary executions from the side of the Russian troops. While the Chechens, also conducted kidnappings, killing of civilians and colossal revenge attacks (Kramer, 2004). Ten years down the road Russia officially ceases its military operation against the Chechens, nonetheless conflict still persists even currently and relations remain unstable (Al-Jazeera, 2014).

Autonomy created a channel for deep-rooted grievances and a stronger national identity, and perhaps without language recognition it would not have fallen into that (Cornell, 2002). The Russia-Chechen dyad exemplifies a case where language recognition did not lead to less conflict, however the Chechen culture was not exactly tolerated by the Russian state either. The ethnic cleansing that took place is a leading example of high cultural intolerance by Russia. From the dawn of their post-Soviet conflicts, Russia to its own population and international community began to portray Chechens as “bandits”, “terrorists”, deeming their entire regime as “criminal,” demonizing the ethnic Chechen group, as well engaging in countless human rights violations.
within the region (Russell, 2002). Negative ethnic propaganda was employed on both sides, where Russia did not want the Chechens to have full sovereignty. Dudayev (the then leader of Chechnya) used ethnicity as a tool to start an uprising for the gaining of sovereignty, utilizing propaganda in his fight for autonomy (Russell, 2005). Dudayev went after policies that revolved around ethnic exclusion, establishing nationalist policies, and wanted to achieve succession from Russia at all costs, willing to sacrifice the lives of many (Sharafitdinova, 2000). It seems on both ends there was a major absence of efforts to promote cultural tolerance. Perhaps if Russia had been more open to the ethnic Chechens and promoted tolerance within the nation as well as in its relations with Chechnya (almost akin to her methods with the Tatars) the Chechens would feel as though they are an equal and important part of Russia and ethnic conflict would have never occurred. The ethnofederalist approach to lessen conflict does not represent the integral method of practicing cultural tolerance by a state, and language recognition is but one part of the cultural tolerance theory. Perhaps language recognition can produce negative outcomes when ethnofederalism is the end goal of a minority group, but is offset by the other three variables.

According to the results citizenship has a positive effect on ethnic conflict where the more inclusionary and less difficult citizenship requirements decrease the probability of ethnic conflict. Transnistria is a prime example of this where the citizenship requirements in Moldova are the strictest in comparison to the remaining former Soviet states. The feeling of exclusion signaled from complex citizenship requirements as well as the other exclusionary factors in Moldova paved the way for the Russians and Ukrainians to rebel within the territory. The events leading up to the Transnistrian War hold much merit in understanding the exclusionary tactics of Moldova. In the early 16th to 19th century, the Moldovan territory was fought over by various
powers, with the main opponents being Russia and the Ottomans (BBC, 2012). Eventually (1878) the Ottomans recognize Romania, which included western Moldova. In 1918 after the Bolshevik revolution within Russia, Bessarabia (eastern Moldova) calls for independence and a union with Romania, the Treaty of Paris in 1920 approves the union however the Bolsheviks did not (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). The Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is then established in 1924, and in 1940 Russia completely annexes Bessarabia joining it with the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The new republic was renamed the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. It has been argued that this new identity of “Moldovans” was created by Joseph Stalin in order to justify the incorporation of a new nation state into the U.S.S.R. In fact, the Moldovans were now considered a separate ethnic group from Romanians, even made to write in Cyrillic instead of traditional Latin letters (Heintz, 2005).

From 1941 to 1945 a Romanian regime was temporarily set up in Moldova after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union; only to be driven out by Soviet forces right before the end of World War II (BBC, 2012). During the 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev came into power Moldovan nationalism was resurrected in compliance with Gorbachev's "openness" era. As with other Soviet Republics Moldova declares itself a sovereign state in 1990, and gains full independence in 1991 (BBC, 2012). Although the Constitution was officially adopted in 1994, Moldova's Parliament ratified its official laws on citizenship in turn institutionalizing them on June 5th 1991 (Rotaru, 2014). Of course the 1991 citizenship laws allowed for Soviet Moldovan citizens to remain citizens of Moldova, where they had up to a year to decide either to keep or renounce their citizenship (Rotaru, 2014). Moldova is one of the few post-Soviet states that received a score of zero for citizenship requirements meaning its citizenship laws are of the most
exclusionary in comparison to the other states. For example Moldova requires a 10-year consecutive residency, a test to show knowledge of the Moldovan Constitutional provisions, a language proficiency test, lawful proof of income, and a renouncing of any other citizenship for people seeking citizenship through naturalization (legislationline.org). The language proficiency test subsists of the following criteria: the individual must sufficiently comprehend both conversational language as well as official information, answer and be able to discuss inquiries on social life in Moldova, read and be able to sufficiently comprehend any given text of laws, social nature, and other regulations, as well as write a narrative regarding a social topic (legislationline.org; Embassy of Moldova).

The citizenship laws were pivotal in that they contributed to the nationalistic movement that was taking place in Moldova since the 1980s, adding more burden to the already uneasy tensions between the ethnic Moldovans and predominantly Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian) population residing in Transnistria. The Gagauz were also involved in the ethnic conflict, who are a Turkic speaking Orthodox Christian group predominantly in southern Moldova (Minorities at Risk, 2010). The ethnic conflict (Transnistrian war) that broke out in Moldova was a by-product of the nationalist uprising over issues revolving around language, identity, and culture (Waters, 1997). The political divisions in Moldova grew strong, as those on the east bank of the Dnister were pro-Russia, while those on the west bank were pro-Moldova. In 1989 in response to the language law in Moldova the Gagauz formed the Gagauzi Movement as well as their first congress leading to the creation of the Gagauz Autonomous SSR inside of Moldova (Minorities At Risk, 2010). In 1990 delegates from the Gagauz region and Transnistria held a meeting with the Supreme Soviet officials and demanded regional autonomy, this request was of course denied.
and deemed as treasonable but both formed their own republics anyway; Gagauz Republic, and Dnestr Moldovian Republic. Henceforth, violence broke out in fall of 1990, which persisted sporadically until it blossomed into a full-blown war in March 1992 (U.S. Library of Congress). The Moldovan government attempted to disarm the Transnistrian separatists who had the support of Russia’s 14th army, eventually the war ended with a ceasefire in July 1992 (U.S. Library of Congress). The largely Russian speaking Slavic population of Transnistria saw the presence of the Russian army as protection and did not want their ethnic identity to be overwhelmed by the rest of Moldova seeing as how they made sure to break away from Russia and establish or resurrect their own ethnic identity, which included culture and language changes (The World Post). Perhaps the exclusionary citizenship laws only exacerbated the nationalist uprising and identity crisis that lead to ethnic conflict, which is highly supported by the regression results.

Similarly since the results render for more inclusionary and less difficult citizenship laws to decrease the probability of ethnic conflict occurrence Kazakhstan can be taken as an exemplary model. As argued by Schatz (2000) Kazakhstan presented more favorable policies that carried a familiarity to the “Soviet era categories of cultural harmony.” The inclusive citizenship laws highlighted the more inclusive agenda of the state towards the ethnic Russians. Kazakhstan received a score of 3 from 1991 to 2014, deeming the states citizenship laws as highly inclusionary. In 1993 Kazakhstan officially adopted it’s constitution and from 1991-1992 the citizenship laws were the same as Soviet times therefore open, which remained the case after the constitution was implemented (Makaryan, 2006). When Kazakhstan ratified its constitution in 1993, the citizenship laws were also institutionalized-where individuals seeking citizenship through naturalization have to have a 5-year continuous residency (3 years if married to a
citizen) and there are no history, language, constitutional tests, or alternative requirements (legislationline.org). The inclusive citizenship laws that Kazakhstan kept even after independence were pivotal because during that time ethnic Russians were facing much discrimination in other post-Soviet states such as Estonia, Latvia, and even Moldova (Laitin, 1998). These Baltic States felt that Russian imperialism during Soviet times was unjust and forced onto them. Estonia did not grant citizenship to ethnic Russians who were citizens during Soviet times, Latvia as well because they felt occupied by the Russians during Soviet times and believed that all of Russia’s actions were done illegally therefore the Russian people should not be legal citizens. In 1991, Latvia even adopted a parliamentary guideline that did not permit ethnic Russians to apply for citizenship for at least 16 years (Laitin, 1998). Kazakhstan’s inclusive citizenship laws signaled to the Russians that they are still welcome even after the Soviet Union was no more. Kazakhstan also felt Russian imperialism heavily and could have carried the same grievances as the Baltic States, but it did not. Kazakhstan has proven to be a key example of a state whose efforts promote cultural tolerance, keeping ethnic conflict at an all time low. Following the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Kazakhstan’s salient cultural diversity was presented as a hindrance on nation and state building. Indeed, ethnic tensions were heightened in the northern regions where the majority of the population was Russian, which placed pressure on Kazakhstan to integrate the area into the Russian Federation, and it did not help that in Russia a Nobel Prize winning author insisted on this movement (Schatz, 2000).

Contrary to the predictions of many Western analysts however, Kazakhstan was able to transition into an independent state while still accommodating the needs and rights of all ethnic groups within the country not just the Russians, therefore ethnic conflict did not erupt (Schatz,
2000). Rather, Kazakhstan took on an internationalist approach to state building keeping nationalistic and ethno-centric tendencies at bay. For instance, Dario Citati from the Institute of Advance Studies in Geopolitics andAuxiliaries Sciences for OSCE, highlighted Kazakhstan refusing to take on a state approach allocated on ethnic nationalism. Citati applauded Kazakhstan in its remarkable attempt to be respectful towards all ethnicities with a solution based on pragmatism, he explained, “the same fact that at the moment of independence the Kazakh nation did not represent the majority of population had prompted the authorities to promote interethnic tolerance and even to counter some expressions of Kazakh nationalism. The key of the State ideology is the distinction between the “Kazakh identity” (referred to specific Kazakh culture) and the “Kazakhstanian identity” (based on citizenship and shared values independently from ethnic belonging) (OSCE, 2016).

These examples of peaceful efforts with the Russians in the country show why ethnic conflict has not blossomed in Kazakhstan. Although there was a large emigration of Russians out of Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union, this was due to solely economic reasons, rather than ethno-nationalism (Bandey & Rather, 2013). Even so Russians still populate Kazakhstan, currently maintaining the size of second largest ethnic group after the Kazakhs themselves. Russians are spread out throughout the country, however there are five northern districts within Kazakhstan that are predominantly Russian. Even so, these majority Russian districts did not form ethnic territorial administrations like Trans-Dniester area in Moldova, which I argue is due to Kazakhstan’s national efforts to include Russians and promote cultural tolerance (Zadyrkhan, 2004). Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s language policies also made life easier for the post-Soviet multiethnic population living there, especially the Russians. Instead of forcing language changes
such as in Moldova, Russian was kept as an official language in all spheres of communication and education. The integral method of cultural tolerance was utilized heavily in Kazakhstan with the Russians, not only keeping relations peaceful but also it kept the majority Russian northern part of Kazakhstan from officially attempting to secede (Schatz, 2000). Unlike the Russia-Chechen case, language recognition played a positive role here, which is contrary to the regression results. This could mean that language recognition causes more conflict in more heavily populated ethnic minority regions, such as Chechnya (Roeder, 2009).

Indeed for minority reserved seats the results became insignificant once the control variables were accounted for. However, there is still something to be taken away here from Kazakhstan’s incorporation of minority_reserved parliament seats: the Peoples Assembly. Kazakhstan in particular has incorporated cultural tolerance into its political system through the National Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK). This model can be used in all post-Soviet states to help integrate a balance of harmony amongst ethnic groups.

The activities of the National Assembly of people of Kazakhstan (APK) reads as follows:

An important element of the political system of Kazakhstan, strengthens interests of all ethnic groups, to ensure the strict observe of the rights and freedoms of citizens irrespective of their ethnic affiliation became the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, created March 1st, 1995 on the initiative of the President of the country N.A. Nazarbayev. The idea of creation was announced by the President of Kazakhstan in 1992 at the first Forum of People of Kazakhstan. Activities of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan is aimed at implementation of the state national policy, ensuring socio-political stability in the country and improving the
efficiency of cooperation between state institutions and civil society in the sphere of interethnic relations (Assembly.kz, 2016).

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors proclaimed that the APK plays a rare and historic role in Kazakhstan’s commitment to inter-ethnic stability (OSCE, 2015). Thors stressed consultative and parliamentarian bodies such as the APK are pivotal in developing and implementing laws and policies that advocate cultural/ethnic tolerance as well as the integration of societies, which not only helped in keeping peaceful relations with the Russian population but also all other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. Thors also highlighted that great obstacles remain in integrating national minorities elsewhere in Central Asia and post-Soviet states (OSCE, 2015). Saodat Olimova of the Sharq Research Centre at the OSCE High-Level Conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination also praised Kazakhstan’s efforts; Olimova reported the states within the region have managed to support and maintain interethnic peace, deeming Kazakhstan as the greatest success story from the former Soviet Union in this regard. Olimova highlighted that the state policy in inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan, and the role of the APK ensures the rights of all ethnic groups generating an atmosphere of social tolerance in turn keeping relations peaceful with the Russian population and other ethnic groups (OSCE, 2013).

The above three cases illustrate the findings from the results; Chechnya depicted a case where language recognition tied into ethnofederalism and lead to ethnic conflict. Furthermore, the Moldova case exemplified how exclusionary citizenship laws played into a nationalistic movement resulting in ethnic conflict, as concluded by the regression findings. Finally,
Kazakhstan represents the positive effect that inclusionary citizenship laws have on ethnic conflict occurrence, and demonstrates the appropriate state efforts in cultural tolerance strategies.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

The prevention of ethnic conflict is still a developing concept that can vary in its effectiveness in different methods from case to case. Take the successor states of the former Soviet Union as an example, where ethnic conflict has been prevented in some countries but not in others, even though the states share a fairly similar Soviet history and ethnically driven departure from Russia. Ethnic riots were widespread throughout the U.S.S.R. during its final years, yet the ethnic tensions became ethnic conflict, carried over into the post-Soviet era in some states, but not all. Kazakhstan is an interesting case because scholars were sure that ethnic conflict would erupt and place a hindrance upon its state building and overall stability because of its multiethnic population, Russian dominant northern region, and 1991 ethnic riots (Schatz, 2000). Ethnic conflict however did not occur as predicted, what could have caused this to happen in Kazakhstan but not in other post-Soviet states?

This study proposes a theory of cultural tolerance for ethnic conflict prevention. Cultural tolerance at the institutional and state level has been overlooked as a means to prevent ethnic conflict. The four variables that were measured to represent cultural tolerance efforts from the state side are: minority reserved seats, constitutional protection, citizenship laws, and language recognition. Insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through parliamentary reserved seats signals more than the notion that they are tolerated, but also that they are tolerated enough to be represented in a political body within the states governmental sphere. Constitutional protection gestures to the ethnic group, that the sole legally binding document the state was built from, assures their protection, and if a group is protected they are also tolerated. Citizenship laws if inclusionary or non-rigorous signal to ethnic groups that they are welcome or
that the state has made citizenship laws inclusive because they approve citizenship obtainment
from all ethnic groups, which translates that they are tolerated because they are welcome.
Language recognition transcribes into cultural tolerance because language is a core part of an
ethnic groups culture and identity, once their language is deemed as recognized and free to be
used this highlights tolerance-the results produce some contrary findings however that can be
argued to correlate with ethnofederalism.

After running the regressions with appropriate control variables (lights inequality, elevation
mean, capital distance mean, group size, log of country population count, log of per capita GDP,
economic inequality, petroleum distance, and peace years) the findings are varied. Language
recognition although significant, seemed to have an opposite effect on ethnic conflict onset. This
can best be explained through the negative effects of ethnofederalism and language recognition
exacerbating the need for autonomy. There are implications to consider from the language
recognition variable. Perhaps states should focus more on integral methods of incorporating
minority ethnic groups into society including language policies versus the ethnofederalist
approach of granting sovereignty and separate language policies. The conflict between Russia
and the Chechens illustrates a case where language recognition along with other ethnofederal
strides lead to a greater demand for sovereignty and a concrete opposition to integration. While
on the contrary language recognition in Kazakhstan seemed to have a positive effect on ethnic
conflict prevention with the Russians as well as other ethnic groups. Citizenship laws showed to
have a positive effect on ethnic conflict, highlighting that more inclusionary and less difficult
citizenship policies lead to less ethnic conflict. Moldova having some of the most difficult
citizenship laws posits a scenario that could have instigated the Transnistrian war by adding to
the nationalist uprisings and ethnic tensions, while Kazakhstan has inclusive and easy citizenship laws with no recorded ethnic conflict. Implications from the citizenship variable suggest that states should incorporate more open citizenship laws in order to help prevent ethnic conflict. There is a contrast in the findings where recognizing a language leads to conflict, but restrictive citizenship laws also increase conflict as they force people to learn another language. Perhaps, language is a variable that has varying effects depending on the circumstances.

Policy makers should consider the negative correlation between language recognition and ethnic conflict as a further implication that ethnofederalism does not prevent ethnic conflict, but instead may exacerbate it. In this case policies should be structured towards integrating minority ethnic groups as part of the state instead of creating a separate state or land for them to govern with its own language. The positive effect that inclusionary citizenship laws have on ethnic conflict should be taken into account as well. Policy makers can advocate for less rigorous and exclusionary citizenship laws in order to deter ethnic conflict. Researchers can interpret the language recognition results as yet another study that confirms the negative effect ethnofederalism may have on ethnic conflict occurrence. The generalizability of the results is fair in that the Soviet Union provides enough variation in different countries and ethnic groups, however not enough variation for the constitutional protection variable to be assessed, which is one of the limitations of this research. Prospects for future research include using a greater sample size, not only post-Soviet states but states from all over the world to add even more generalizability. Perhaps then, constitutional protection will have variance and can be properly tested. Also, the use of state-minority group dyads might be a positive externality for reducing conflict in general, which can also be addressed in future research. Another limitation is the lack
of states with minority-reserved seats in government. Similarly, a greater sample size of
countries from around the globe will provide more states that have minority reserved parliament
seats, allowing for a more sufficient test on the plausible significance of this variable.
APPENDIX A : CODEBOOK
Thesis Dictionary

Cultural Tolerance
Cultural tolerance is defined as the attitude or perception of one individual towards the social norms, and cultural customs of another culture that is considered foreign to them (Gasser and Tan, 1999, 112). For the purpose of this research however cultural tolerance is explicitly ethnic, meaning a culture that stems from an ethnic background and not any other category such as "pop culture."

National Efforts to Promote Cultural Tolerance
1) Insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through parliamentary reserved seats or other political representation. Political representation gives ethnic groups a voice to be heard and a sense of importance, this has been argued to decrease ethnic conflict greatly (Reynal-Querol, 2002, 26). Due to the existence of corruption in former Soviet states resulting in an elite concentration of power, one could argue there is no substantial say for anyone other than the president. Nonetheless it is the "thought" or gesture of parliamentary reserved seats or any other form of political representation that provides the ethnic group with a positive signal of importance and equality. 2) Granting all minorities' equal rights and protection under the constitution, this instills a sense of security (Posen, 1993) for the minority group knowing that they are protected under a legally binding document, especially one as pivotal as a state's constitution. 3) Language recognition-when a state recognizes the language of an ethnic group this too sends a positive signal that a major part of the groups' identity is respected and accepted (Ellingsen, 2000). 4) Finally, uncomplicated citizenship attainment; citizenship, and barriers to citizenship for members of an ethnic group is definitive of how the state treats all ethnic groups as far as inclusion, and is essential in cultural tolerance policies (Laitin, 1998). If rules and regulations for obtaining citizenship are difficult or complicated this signals to different ethnic groups that the titular group may want them to leave rather than integrate (Laitin, 1998). Of course this feeling of exclusion can result in tension for the minority groups in turn motivating them to engage in conflict. Versus the exact opposite, if citizenship attainment is not difficult, this signals to the ethnic group that they are welcome and tolerated.

Ethnic Conflict
Ethnic conflict is defined as any incident of maintained violent conflict where ethnic, national, religious, or alternative communal minorities push for changes in status through challenging the government (Bates et.al, 2003). This study focuses on a subset of this by examining state-minority group dyads. The default is in a majority ethnic dominant country meaning although these states are multiethnic there is still one predominant ethnic group. The assumption here is that this setting naturally creates risk or tension for the minority group, so what can the state do to alleviate this?

Analysis
In order to advocate the generalizability of the theory I will test it further via a quantitative analysis of cultural tolerance and ethnic conflict occurrence through a large N regression. To measure ethnic conflict occurrence I use the UCDP database for state conflict, in other words the dependent variable is measured by state vs. minority group (with the exception of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict where it was a dominant majority ethnic group vs. a minority group without the involvement of the state). To measure cultural tolerance I provide a 4 criteria scale that
establishes a composite variable, which will be originally coded. As for case selection I will be collecting data from all of the 15 former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. I utilize the AMAR (Minorities at Risk) dataset for the various ethnic groups within each country, which comes to 55 ethnic groups total. These ethnic groups were chosen based off of a threshold: the smallest ethnic group in Russia that has been linked to a conflict through the ACD2EPR dataset (since Russia is the largest nation out of the former Soviet Union).

With 55 ethnic groups employed in the dataset it provides a substantial amount of dyads to test: 104. The dataset extends from 1991 (after the fall of the Soviet Union) to 2014, to show trends over time, and includes 104 dyads with 2496 observations. The data will contain ethnic group, country, year, conflict occurrence (dependent variable), and cultural tolerance (independent variable). Also, I control for economic factors using the GINI index to control for inequality, and a logged measure of GDP per capita of each ethnic group to control for wealth (Heston et al., 2002). To allow for a more accurate and precise measure of inequality amongst ethnic groups I replicate data from a working paper by Konstantin Ash, “Inequality in Public Service Provision and Ethnic Rebellion.” Where ethnic group borders from 1961 Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) (Bruk et al., 1964) were geocoded into polygons from Cederman et al. (2010) in the GREG (Geo-referencing of ethnic groups) dataset. This data is exquisite in that it uses ArcGIS to map the level of wealth geographically in regions throughout the world, aligning with the ethnic make up of the area-making it the closest way to measure exact inequality amongst ethnic groups. Geographic variables are also controlled for such as average distance from a country’s capital for each ethnic group from the PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen et al., 2012). Mean group elevation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) is also accounted for via the Global Digital Elevation Model from ArcGIS. Finally, proximity to petroleum or diamond deposits is controlled for in the model (Lujala et al., 2007, 2005).

Countries:
1. Kazakhstan
2. Kyrgyzstan
3. Russia
4. Tajikistan
5. Turkmenistan
6. Azerbaijan
7. Georgia
8. Belarus
9. Ukraine
10. Lithuania
11. Latvia
12. Estonia
13. Armenia
14. Uzbekistan
15. Moldova

Ethnic Groups: Abkhazians, Adzhars, Adyghe, Kabardins, Armenians, Avars, Azeris, Bashkirs, Belorussians, Buryats, Bulgarians, Chechens, Chuvash, Crimean Russians, Crimean Tatars,
Measuring Cultural Tolerance
Due to the ambiguity of cultural tolerance, I measure it as one composite variable made up of four different criteria:

1. Is the language of the ethnic group recognized by the state? (Are some languages more recognized than others?)

2. Is the ethnic group protected under the constitution of the state? (Are some constitutional mentions in a stronger language than others?)

3. Are there minority reserved parliamentary seats for the ethnic group within the state? (Are reserved seats different for some groups than others?)

4. Does the government emphasize majority ethnicity or is it an inclusive state? (Are there barriers to citizenship for members of this ethnic group, are some of these stronger than others?)

Why are these criteria important; how do they signify cultural tolerance?

1. Language recognition is vital in that language is a major fundamental part of ethnic identity (Ellingsen, 2000, 229), when a language is recognized by the state it shows the ethnic group that a major part of their identity is recognized, accepted, and to an extent respected. Ethnic identity is made up of intrinsic factors such as history, religion, and language henceforth it is more often than not a driving force behind conflict (Ellingsen 2000, 229). Language recognition should thus be a source of conflict prevention.

2. Constitutional protection creates legitimacy and reassurance for the ethnic group. Granting all minorities' equal rights and protection under the constitution, instills a sense of security (Posen, 1993) for the minority group knowing that they are protected under a legally binding document, especially one as pivotal as a state's constitution.

3. Minority reserved parliamentary seats takes legitimacy one step further by not only stating that the ethnic group has a voice in the government but it actually proves that the ethnic group has a voice within the government when participating via the seats. High levels of political representation amongst the populations of both religiously polarized and ethnically diverse states have been found to reduce the amount of ethnic conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002, 26).

4. Citizenship, and barriers to citizenship for members of an ethnic group is definitive of how the state treats that ethnic group, and is pivotal in cultural tolerance (Laitin, 1998).
Variable Measurement (DV)
For each of the 104 dyads provided in the dataset I measure the 4 criteria per given year, beginning in 1991 and ending in 2014. Ex: Russians in Kazakhstan i.e. the treatment of Russians in Kazakhstan will be measured via the 4 criteria per year. Each criteria or piece of the composite cultural tolerance (IV) variable will be equal in scaling, in other words they are all equally weighed (even the binary one).

1. Language recognition will be measured on a four- point scale ranging from 0 to 3.
   • 0 signifying: 1) the language of the ethnic group was not recognized at all in that year 2) knowledge of the official language was an obligation.
   • A score of 1 is given if: 1) the language of the ethnic group was not recognized at all in that year 2) knowledge of the official language was not an obligation.
   • A score of 2 is given if: 1) the language of the ethnic group was recognized in that year 2) knowledge of the official language was an obligation.
   • A score of 3 is given if: 1) the language of the ethnic group was recognized in that year 2) knowledge of the official language was not an obligation.

2. Constitutional protection will be measured on a four-point scale ranging from 0 to 3.
   • 0 signifying: 1) the constitution does not contain any language regarding minority rights in general and protection of (this includes minorities as a whole as well as the specific ethnic group).
   • A score of 1 is given if: 1) the constitution contains language that ensures protection of minorities as a whole, and does not specify or mention the specific group at hand.
   • A score of 2 is given if: 1) the ethnic group is mentioned as specifically protected under the constitution i.e. protection is guaranteed under the constitution by law, but minorities as a whole are not mentioned.
   • A score of 3 if given if: 1) the ethnic group is mentioned as specifically protected under the constitution, 2) all minorities are mentioned as a whole as protected under the constitution.

3. Parliamentary seats reserved for the specific ethnic group will be measured as binary, 0 or 3.
   • 0 signifying that there were no parliamentary seats reserved for the ethnic group within that specific year.
   • 3 signifying that there were parliamentary seats (minimum of one seat) reserved for the ethnic group within that specific year.

4. Citizenship barriers/inclusiveness will be measured on a four-point scale ranging from 0 to 2.
   • 0 signifying that: 1) Specific tests are given to obtain citizenship, one or more of the following: history test, language test, legislation test, national anthem test, etc. 2) Must live in the country for 8 to 10 or more years, 3) Must prove sufficient source of income 4) Must prove sufficient knowledge of the native tongue, enough to be able to communicate.
   • A score of 1 is given if: 1) Specific tests are required to obtain citizenship 2) Must live in the country for 3 to 7 or more years 3) Must prove sufficient source of income 4) Must be able to communicate in native tongue of the country.
• A score of 2 is given if: 1) Specific tests are not required to obtain citizenship, the individual must have lived in the country for 10 or more years, prove a sufficient source of income, and knowledge of the native tongue; enough to be able to communicate.
• A score of 3 is given if: 1) Specific tests are not required to obtain citizenship 2) Must live in the country for 5 or more years (or less/no residency requirements) 3) There are no specified language requirements.

**Ethnic Conflict (IV) Measurement**
Ethnic conflict will be measured on a dichotomous scale ranging from 0 to 1.
• A score of 0 is given if there is no recorded ethnic conflict for that dyad within the given year.
• A score of 1 is given if there is recorded ethnic conflict for that dyad within the given year.

**Control Variables:**

**Lightsineq**- Log of Lightdev (Group Light Density divided by Country Light Density, a simple measure of deviation from the national average). Designed to smooth extreme values in Lightdev and standardize inequality measure around zero.

**Elevationmean**- Mean elevation for a given group in meters, and calculated through GIS. Taken from the GTOP030 world elevation raster from the USGS.

**Capdistmean**- Mean distance from nation’s capital for a given group in kilometers and calculated through GIS, taken from PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen et. al, 2012).

**Groupsize**- Grouppop divided by countrypop produces a measure of the relative size of a group to a country’s population.

**L.pop**- Log of country population count.

**L.gdp**- Log of per capita GDP.

**Econineq**- Log of econ deviation taken to standardize measure.

**Petrolistance**- Distance from the nearest petroleum-oil and natural gas deposits for a given ethnic group. Calculated through GIS, the distance is in decimal degrees. Groups that have petroleum deposits of their territory are coded as zero- data obtained from Lujala et al. 2007 dataset.

**Peace Years 1-3**- Years where group is not conducting a conflict (based on forpeaceyears variable) using cubic polynomial method to control for duration dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).
Coding Sources

Soviet Union Constitution: (Included because some nations did not immediately adopt their own constitution until years later, therefore it is used for coding).
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/1977toc.html

Citizenship tests for all post-Soviet countries:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/38af/04ad21ebae41e8376dd1767e01877999520.pdf

Kazakhstan:

Language Recognition: I utilize Ethnologue for all recognized languages. Knowledge of the Kazakh language has never been an obligation within the country since independence, and before, therefore each dyad receives a minimum of 1. However the score is 0 for 1991-1992 since the Constitution was still based on the Soviet one, and knowledge of the Russian language was indeed an obligation.

Russian was coded as recognized from 1991-2014. According to Ethnologue some languages: Ukrainian, Uzbek, Tatar, Uyghur, and German were recognized since 1997 therefore they are coded accordingly.
https://www.ethnologue.com/country/KZ/status
https://www.ethnologue.com/about/language-status
http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/2970000151

http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/1977toc.html

1993: Constitution is established

Changes to the constitution:
http://www.nyu.law/global.org/globalex/Kazakhstan1.html#ConstitutionoftheRepublicOfKazakhstan

Changes to the constitution and parliament:
http://www.parlam.kz/en/history

Parliamentary reserved seats:
1991-1992: Coded 3 from 1991-1992 for all ethnic groups that had representation within the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, Koreans, Tatars, Uyghurs, and Germans receive 0 because they did not have seats in the Supreme Soviet.
1993-2006: All ethnic groups receive 0 because they did not have parliamentary reserved seats outside of the APK.
2007-2014: All ethnic groups receive a 3 because in that year the APK was given parliamentary status and official seats within the Majilis chamber.

Parliament/APK:
https://www.kazakhembus.com/content/kazakhstan-unique-assembly-people-maintains-ethnic-harmony
https://www.rferl.org/a/1077396.html

KZ-Rus: 1991-1992
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77const05.html

Citizenship Test: 1991-2014-Sources include all changes made to citizenship tests, however none of the changes affect the scoring.
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/38af04ad21ebac4e8375dd77df0f01877999520.pdf
http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/7910004800_

Russia:
1993: Adopted the Russian constitution.
All coding done by using the Federal Russian Constitution - not Constitutions of the 21 republics within Russia because they are not actual independent countries.
No changes made to the Russian Constitution except for in 2008, however this had to do with presidential terms and does not effect the scoring here.
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/Cpt1Ck86BZ729/content/id/571508
Constitution does not contain specific language for minority protection, however does ensure equal rights regardless of racial/national background.

Parliament/federal assembly:
1991-1992: Coded according to the Supreme Soviet since Russia’s constitutional framework did not solidify until 1993. So all ethnic groups that were part of the Supreme Soviet are coded 3 for parliamentary reserved seats, but not the ethnic groups that were not represented in the Supreme Soviet.
1993:
https://iacis.ru/emp/parliaments/parlamenv_uchastniki/rossiyskaya_federatsiya/
http://www.duma.gov.ru
Law on National Cultural Autonomy (NCA) was adopted in 1996, with the objective of providing persons belonging to nationalities other than the majority Russian ethnic group autonomy in the promotion of their languages and cultures.  
http://www.eicerofoundation.org/lectures/Dr_Federica_Prina_Minorities_in_Russia.pdf

However, under Putin’s more centralized ruling things have changed as far as the power given to the autonomous regions in Russia.  
Also, the NCA has not really achieved full preservation of the cultures and languages of various ethnic groups who believe they want more on the basis of minority language education and media.

Political structure of Russia (in order to code for parliamentary reserved seats):  
http://www.rogerdarlington.mg.uk/Russianpoliticalsystem.html  
http://countrystudies.us/russia/34.htm  
https://www.rbth.com/politics/2014/01/09/why_are_there_so_many_presidents_in_russia_32969.html  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/russia.html?nav=el  
http://www.senat.fr/senatdumonde/english/russie.html

Russian Federal Assembly is made up of the lower house “The State Duma” and the upper house the Federation Council. 
The State Duma is more powerful—all bills must be considered first by the State Duma, even the ones proposed by the Federation Council.  
The Federation Council consist of two members from each of Russia’s 85 subjects—which includes the 21 republics, 46 oblasts,  

Minority group reserved parliament seats is complex in Russia because the Federation Council includes representatives from each of the 85 subjects, however Russia does not allow ethnically based political parties in the country.  
Several revisions were also made to the Federation Council and how each of the two representatives is appointed.  
1993-2000: Original way of choosing leaders from each through electoral processes within each electoral district.  
2000: New way of choosing leaders where they are appointment by higher officials to the federation.  

Option 1. Although two representatives from each of the 85 subjects are a part of the Federal Council this does not mean the seats are reserved for specific ethnic groups; therefore they are coded as 0. There is a major difference between ethnic group reserved seats within a parliament, versus ethnic representatives who happen to be chosen because the region where they reside has a higher population of their specific ethnic group.  

One of the means to advance uniformity in Russia is by situating minority issues outside political processes. Political parties on the basis of ethnicity are banned in Russia and considerations
linked to minority rights do not constitute part of mainstream parties' political platforms. This scenario markedly differs from political systems in which representatives of minorities have reserved seats in parliament, and/or guaranteed opportunities to actively participate in law- and policy-making. Meanwhile, regional leaders — including leaders of ethnic regions — have generally been absorbed into the ranks of the party of power. United Russia. The resulting political uniformity largely excludes public debate on matters of relevance to minorities (Prina, 2015, pg. 8).

http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Dr_Federica_Prina_Minorities_in_Russia.pdf

Option 2: Any ethnic group belonging to the 21 republics in Russia are coded as 3 since two representatives are chosen from those areas.

Option 3. However this changes in 2000 because the new process allows higher officials to choose representatives from each subject, therefore this does not ensure an ethnically reserved seat in parliament, in other words it does not guarantee a seat for a specific ethnic group.

Language is coded based on ethnologue and the Constitution, the knowledge of the Russian language is required however.

Each language is coded for 1991-1992 as 0 because knowledge of the Russian language was an obligation under the Soviet system.
Beginning with 1993, each language is coded based on status in Ethnologue, which provides the year in which it became recognized.

Source for citizenship
Citizenship coding for 1991-1992 was based off of the more relaxed citizenship obtainment of the former Soviet Union.
1993-2014-Coding based off of new citizenship requirements.
https://www.rt.com/politics/russian-citizenship-ancestors-language-764/

Ukraine:
Constitutional Protection:
1991-1995-Coded based off of the Soviet Union Constitution
www.kmu.gov.ua/document/110977042/Constitution_eng.doc

Constitution was adopted in 1996, and then amendments were made in 2004. 2004 amendments weakened the power of the president. In 2010 these amendments were overturned, only to later be reinstated in 2014.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2014

Parliamentary minority reserved seats:
1991-1995: Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet.  
1996-2014: [Link]  
Although Ukraine’s parliament “Verkhovna Rada” has a Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations, it does not have minority reserved or seats/representation reserved for specific ethnic groups. This has not changed from 1996-2014.  
[Link]  
[Link]  
1996-2014: Citizenship requirements have not changed outside of ways to have it revoked.  
[Link]  
Language Recognition: Coded through ethnologue-  
1991-1995: No languages are recognized aside from Russian which was an obligatory language to learn and speak in the Soviet Union.  
1996-2014: Coded per specific language via ethnologue, which states the specific year the language became recognized.  

**Belarus:**  
No constitutional protection of specific minority groups, and no parliamentary reserved seats for minority groups, because there are no minorities—Miroslav Shapovalov.  

Constitution: Adopted in 1994, amended twice- in 1996 and 2004—these were mainly about the power of the President and do not effect coding.  
[Link]  
[Link]  
[Link]  
[Link]  
Government of Belarus: Belarusian government is the “Council of Ministers” made up of the Prime Minister of Belarus, his deputies and ministers.  

“The Government is accountable to the President of the Republic of Belarus and answerable to the Parliament.”  
[Link]
Minority reserved parliamentary seats: 1991-1993 Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet. 1994-2014: Coded using Belarusian government structure, which does not have parliament seats reserved for specific ethnic groups, or other forms of political representation.

http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6381

Language Recognition:
Coded based off of ethnologue.
1991-1993: No languages are recognized aside from Russian which was an obligatory language to learn and speak in the Soviet Union.
1994-2014: Coded per specific language via ethnologue, which states the specific year the language became recognized.

Georgia:
After the 1991 Georgia had the “Decree on state power” of 1992, which was in place until 1995.
http://archive.ipu.org parlinfo-e/reports/are/2119_97.htm
http://www.parliament.am/library/varchakaniravaxaxtumner-Georgia.pdf
Constitution of Georgia was officially adopted in 1995, and amended in 2004, and again in 2010. Where the 2004 amendments significantly increased the powers of the President, and the 2010 amendments did the opposite.

None of the amendments should have an effect on the coding.


Political structure of Georgia: Semi-presidential representative democratic republic where the President is the head of state and the Prime Minister is the head of the government.
Parliamentary reserved seats: http://www.parliament.ge/en/
https://synergy.wordpress.com/2010/10/19/ethnic-minorities-in-georgia/

There are no specifically reserved parliamentary seats for specific ethnic groups or minority groups in Georgia, although there is a council for gender equality.

Citizenship in Georgia: Adopted in 1993
http://migration.commission.ge/index.php?article_id=165&clang=1
- Has to legally and uninterruptedly reside in Georgia for at least 5 years prior to the submission of the application. A document certifying a legal and uninterrupted stay in
Georgia is a Georgian visa, a residence permit or card, a stamp bearing the date certifying the crossing the Georgian state border;

- Should know the state language to the pre-defined level. Georgian language skills are examined by a special commission through testing;
- Should know Georgia's history and the basis of Georgian legislation. applicant’s knowledge is examined by a special commission through testing;
- Should be employed in Georgia or/and own a real estate in Georgia, or be engaged in entrepreneurial activities on the territory of Georgia, or own interest or shares in an enterprise in Georgia.

http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/5498

Language Recognition: 1991: No languages are recognized aside from Russian, which was an obligatory language to learn and speak in the Soviet Union.
1992-2014: Coded per specific language via ethnologue, which states the specific year the language became recognized.


Azerbaijan:
Constitution was adopted in 1995, prior to 1995 however Azerbaijan had its Soviet Constitution, therefore all coding is done accordingly.
The Constitution was amended in 2002, and again in 2009.
http://azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/constitution_01_e.html
Constitution guarantees the protection of all people regardless of ethnic background, but not specific groups. And this does not change from 1995 onward.
http://azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/doc/constitution_e.pdf

Political structure of Azerbaijan:
http://www.azerbaijan.az/_GeneralInfo_/PoliticalSystem/politicalSystem_e.html

Government of Azerbaijan:
http://azerbaijan.az/portal/StatePower-General/generalInfo_e.html

Minority group rights and political representation:
There are no parliamentary reserved seats for specific ethnic or minority groups.
1991-1994: Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet.
1995-2014: Coded using the Azerbaijani government structure per year, which does not change across time in terms of minority representation in government.

Citizenship: Current citizenship laws in Azerbaijan were made in 1998, prior to the 1995 Constitution however the Soviet citizenship laws still stood. 1995-1998 was an undefined period for citizenship policies.
http://www.refworld.org/pdfs/id/3ae6b527717.pdf
5 years or residence, proof of income, proof of knowledge of language required to become a citizen.

Language recognition: Coded using ethnologue, except for Soviet period where no languages apart from Russian were recognized.

**Kyrgyzstan:**
Constitution was originally adopted in 1993 and amended in 1996, 2003, 2006, and then a referendum was passed in 2007 for a new Constitution and finally in 2010 again, which is the current Constitution.
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/kyrgyz_const.pdf
https://www.rfir.org/a/kyrgyzstan-constitutional-referendum-whats-at-stake/28164053.html
Although it has been reported that KG’s old constitution is unattainable the new constitution is very similar to the old one except the power of the president has been diminished and more power has been placed in Parliament.
1993-2014 Kyrgyz Constitution with changes over time (all of which do not effect coding).
Constitutional protection is general and does not single out any specific ethnic group.

Government structure: http://www.gov.kg
No parliamentary reserved seats for specific ethnic or minority groups.
1991-1992: Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet.
1993-2014: Coded using the government of KG where there is no political representation of ethnic/minority groups.

1993-2014 coded by the Kyrgyz citizenship laws.
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1487936628_kyrgyzstan-citizenship-law-eng.pdf
Laws for citizenship http://www.refworld.org/docid/4693a5e514f.html
1993: Must live in KG for the last 5 years, renunciation of foreign citizenship, mastering of state language, proof of income.
2007: Same requirements for citizenship, except now dual citizenship is allowed.

Language recognition:
Coded using ethnologue, except for 1991-1992, which is coded using the Soviet system.

**Uzbekistan:**
http://constitution.uz/en
There is no specific Constitutional protection of ethnic groups or minority groups.

Minority reserved seats:
Government structure: https://www.uzbekistan.org/uzbekistan/political/
There are no minority or specific ethnic group reserved parliamentary seats, nor is there sufficient political representation of various ethnic groups.

Citizenship:
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b4d3c.pdf
https://www.uts.edu/cpsees/uzbekcit.htm
Adopted in 1992, coded as such.
http://www.multiplecitizenship.com/wsel/ws_UZBEKISTAN.html

Language Recognition: Coded using ethnologue.

Armenia:
http://www.parliament.am/parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng
http://www.president.am/en/constitution/
No specific protection of minority or ethnic groups, however does include equal rights for all regardless of race, ethnic background, gender, etc.

Government:
1991-1994: Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet. No minority reserved seats or political representation up until recent times.

Citizenship:
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51b770884.pdf

Language recognition: Coded using ethnologue.

Tajikistan:
Constitution: Adopted in 1994, amended in 1999 and 2003. No protection of specific ethnic groups in constitution however all people are protected regardless of ethnic background.
1991-1993: Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet. 1994-2014: No minority/ethnic group reserved seats in parliament or other political representation.

Language Recognition: Coded using ethnologue.

Citizenship: 5-10-year residency is required, knowledge of the Tajik language is required and tested, no proof of income is necessary. –Direct from the Embassy of Tajikistan in America.

Turkmenistan:
https://www.uta.edu/cpses/TURKCON.htm
Constitution does not specify protection of any ethnic group or minority group however it does contain language guaranteeing the protection of all people regardless of ethnic background etc.

http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Turkmenistan/sub8_7b/entry-4819.html
1991: Coded using the Soviet government structure, where any majority ethnic country that was part of the Soviet Union receives a 3 because they were represented in the Supreme Soviet.
1992-2014: No minority reserved seats or other political representation.

Language Recognition: Coded using ethnologue

Citizenship: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/actionpopup/id/7023
An individual may be accepted into the citizenship of Turkmenistan by his petition if he:
1. makes a commitment to obey and respect the Constitution and laws of Turkmenistan;
2. knows the state language of Turkmenistan sufficiently well to communicate;
3. has had permanent residence on the territory of Turkmenistan for the past seven years;
4. has a legitimate source of livelihood on the territory of Turkmenistan.
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/527235634.pdf

Moldova:
Constitution: Adopted in 1994 and has been amended 8 times. Therefore, all coding 1991-1993 is done using the Soviet constitution and government.
http://www.president.md/eng/constitution
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/moldova-referendum-on-constitutional-amendments/
http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-moldova
There is language within the Constitution ensuring protection of all people regardless of ethnic background, however there is no protection of specific ethnic groups.

Government structure: https://moldovanpolitics.com/political-system-2/
http://www.conulateofmoldova.in/govt-of-moldova.html
http://cls.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=11b6e97e-82a7-4b29-b2e1-37e7482b4a52%40sessionmgr4010
Political representation of minority groups is very limited, the Gagauz have the most political representation and that is because they are members of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, or other leftist groups, however there are no reserved seats in Parliament for specific ethnic groups.

http://www.sua.mfa.md/citizenship-en/

Language Recognition: Coded using ethnologue.

**Latvia:**
Constitution was adopted in 1922, however reinstated only after Soviet times in 1990 (articles 1, 2, 3, &6), fully 1993.
Part of human rights was added in 1998.
Protection of specific minority or ethnic groups are not mentioned at all, and protection of all humans regardless of ethnic background was not added until 1998.

Government structure: http://www.latvia.eu/key-facts/politics
Little to no minority or ethnic group political representation:
No minority or ethnic group reserved parliamentary seats.


2013 amendments were made to simplify the citizenship process.
http://www.gencs.eu/news/view/2246
Lithuania:
http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2006.pdf?lang=en

“The rights of the human being may not be restricted, nor may he be granted any privileges on the ground of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views.”

The Constitution does not contain language insuring the protection of any specific ethnic or minority group, however it does state the protection of all people regardless of ethnic background.


“Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania-Christian Families Alliance Political Group”-Established in 1994, represents the Poles, and has 8 seats in the Seimas.

Minority rights: http://minorityrights.org/country/lithuania/
There are no reserved seats in parliament for specific minority or ethnic groups besides the Poles.

Citizenship:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5960.html

Language Recognition: Coded using ethnologue.

Estonia:
Constitution: Adopted in 1992, amended several times however these amendments did not effect the protection of different ethnic groups.
The Constitution also contains language protecting all people regardless of ethnic background, however it does not state the protection of any specific ethnic or minority group.

Minority groups in Estonia:

Parliamentary reserved seats/Government structure:
There are no minority-reserved seats in parliament, or political representation of different ethnic groups in general.
1991: Coded using Soviet government

https://www.workinestonia.com/living-in-estonia/obtaining-citizenship/
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/33/topic/2

Language Recognition: Coded using ethnologue

Political representation and ethnic conflict in general:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d61b/4d51bbae6a221bafbde8472c91eaf8d0f8d1.pdf
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=11b6e97e-82a7-4b29-b2e1-37c7482b4a62%40sessionmgr4010

Ethnic Conflict Measurement:
For every country-ethnic group dyad UCDP (Uppsala) is used.

Kazakhstan:
1) No recorded ethnic conflict
http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/765

Russia:
1) 1991, Russia-Republic of Armenia, Civilians
2) 1993, Russia-Parliamentary Forces
3) 1994, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
4) 1995, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Civilians
5) 1996, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Civilians
6) 1999, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Civilians
7) 2000, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Civilians
8) 2001, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Civilians
9) 2002, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Civilians
10) 2003, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
11) 2004, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
12) 2005, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
13) 2006, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
14) 2007, Russia-Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
15) 2007, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
16) 2008, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
17) 2009, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
18) 2010, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
19) 2011, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
20) 2012, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
21) 2013, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates
22) 2014, Russia-Forces of the Caucasus Emirates

http://udcp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=57&entityType=0

Kyrgyzstan:
1) 1990, Kyrgyzstan-Uzbeks
2) 2010, Kyrgyzstan-Uzbeks

http://udcp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=5510&entityType=5
http://udcp.uu.se/#country/703

Uzbekistan:
1) 1999, Uzbekistan-IMU
2) 2000, Uzbekistan-IMU
3) 2004, Uzbekistan-JIG

http://udcp.uu.se/#actor/133

Turkmenistan:
1) No recorded ethnic conflict

http://udcp.uu.se/#country/701

Tajikistan:
1) 1992, Tajikistan-UTO, Civilians, PFT
2) 1993, Tajikistan-UTO
3) 1994, Tajikistan-UTO
4) 1995, Tajikistan-UTO
5) 1996, Tajikistan-UTO
6) 1997, Tajikistan-Forces of Khudoberdiyev
7) 1998, Tajikistan- UTO, Forces of Khudoberdiyev
8) 2000, Tajikistan- Forces of Mullo Abdullo
9) 2010, Tajikistan-IMU, Forces of Mullo Abdullo
10) 2011, Tajikistan, IMU

http://udcp.uu.se/#actor/131

Ethnic Conflict Measurement (IV):
ACD2EPR Dataset:
Azerbaijan:
2) 1993-1993, Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov), Group: Azeri
3) 1995-1995, OPON Forces, Group: Azeri

Georgia:
1) 1991-1992, National Guard and Mkhedrioni, Group: Georgians
4) 1992-2008, Republic of South Ossetia, Group: Ossetians

Moldova:
1) 1992-1992, PMR, Group: (Blank-Missing Data)

Russia:
2) 1990-1990, APF, Group: Azerbaijanis
3) 1993-1993, Parliamentary Forces, Group: (Blank-Missing Data)
4) 1994-2007, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Group: Chechens
5) 1999-1999, Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district, Group: (Blank-Missing Data)
6) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Chechens
7) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Avars
8) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Dargins
9) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Kabardins
10) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Ingush
11) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Kumyks
12) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Lezgins
13) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Adyghe
14) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Balkars
15) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Circassians
16) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Karachai
17) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Laks
18) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Nogai
19) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Tabasaran

Uzbekistan:
1) 1999-2000, IMU, Group: Uzbeks
2) 2004-2004, JIG, Group: Uzbeks’

Tajikistan:
4) 2000-2010, Forces of Mullo Abdullo, Group: Tajiks
5) 2010-2011, IMU, Group: Kyrgyz
6) 2010-2011, IMU, Group: Tajiks
7) 2010-2011, IMU, Group: Uzbeks
Final Coding Sources Used for IV:
Ethnic Conflict Measurement (IV);
Coded Using Uppsala UCDP Dataset and ACD2EPR Dataset

Kazakhstan:
1) No recorded ethnic conflict  
   [http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/705]

Kyrgyzstan:
1) 1990, Kyrgyzstan - Group: Uzbeks  
2) 2010, Kyrgyzstan - Group: Uzbeks  
   [http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=5510&entityType=5]  
   [http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/703]  
   [https://www.rferl.org/a/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/2074849.html]

Uzbekistan:
No recorded ethnic conflict  
[http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/133]

Tajikistan:
1) 1997-Forces of Khudoberdiyev, Group: Uzbeks  
2) 2010-2011, IMU, Group: Kyrgyz  
3) 2010-2011, IMU, Group: Uzbeks  
   [http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/131]

Turkmenistan:
1) No recorded ethnic conflict  
   [http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/701]

Russia:
2) 1994-2007, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Group: Chechens  
3) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Chechens  
4) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Avars  
5) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Dargins  
6) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Kabardins  
7) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Ingush
8) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Kumyks
9) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Lezgins
10) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Adyghe
11) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Balkars
12) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Circassians
13) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Karachai
14) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Laks
15) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Nogai
16) 2007-2013, Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, Group: Tabasaran

http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=57&entityType=0

Ukraine:
1) 1992, Crimea declared independence, Group: Russians
2) 2014, Ukraine-Maidan, DPR, IPR, United Armed Forces of Novorossiya, Group: Russians

http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/61

Azerbaijan:
2) 1993, Talysh Uprising during coup, Group: Talyshes
2) 2014, Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Group: Armenians

http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/64

https://books.google.com/books?id=RWWLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=talyshes+1993+coup&source=bl&ots=gnnfvWBFqJ&sig=nHmGLqOn8xyqyuZFBgn-aXe2w31&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwju0_fG1nTZAhlUq7YMKHTgA8QO6AEI8zAEyvq8MQ

Armenia:
1) 1991, Government of Russia, Republic of Armenia, Group: Not stated

http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=330&entityType=0
http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/330

Georgia:
2) 1992-2018, Republic of South Ossetia, Group: Ossetians

http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/63
http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=843&entityType=0

Estonia:
1) No recorded ethnic conflict

http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/366

Moldova:
2) 1992, Independent Gagauz uprising, Group: Gagauz
http://ucdp.un.se/#actor/55

**Belarus:**
1) No recorded ethnic conflict
http://ucdp.un.se/#country/370

**Latvia:**
1) No recorded ethnic conflict
http://ucdp.un.se/#country/367

**Lithuania:**
1) No recorded ethnic conflict
http://ucdp.un.se/#country/368
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