Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Abbreviated Journal Title
Account. Organ. Soc.
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS; UNITED-STATES; MODEL; Business, Finance
Because public accounting is a regulated practice, the profession actively manages its relationship with the state. While prior studies have analyzed the profession's efforts to shape its regulatory environment, few studies have examined the profession's pointed attempts to influence a specific regulatory policy that affects the practice of auditing in the United States. Drawing on extant theories of regulation and political economy, this study investigates the rationality and effectiveness of political action committee (PAC) contributions paid to members of the US Congress by the US public accounting profession during the policy formulation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Based on the results of empirical tests, we conclude that the US profession strategically manages its relationship with the federal government, in part, through direct involvement in the financing of political campaigns. Furthermore, the profession's pattern of contributions implies an ideologically conservative as well as a professional regulatory motivation for providing financial support to federal legislators. Thus, although the US profession continues to proclaim the primacy of its public interest orientation, it does not appear to be politically neutral when attempting to influence public policy. (c) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Accounting Organizations and Society
"Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002" (2008). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 1057.