Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations
Abbreviated Journal Title
New Ideas Psychol.
Intention; Normativity; Representation; Neuroscience; Cognitive; psychology; MIND; GESTURES; CHILD; Psychology, Multidisciplinary; Psychology, Experimental
To many philosophers, a scientific explanation of our contentful intentional states requires us to identify neurological representations that implement intentional states, and requires a reductive explanation of such representations' contents in terms of objective physical properties. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, contentful intentional states are normatively constituted within linguistic, social practices. These cannot be completely accounted for ill Purely physical terms. I outline this normative thesis, defending it from four objections: that it is not naturalistic, that social norms depend oil optional desires to conform, that it over-intellectualizes having intentional states (so excludes animals and infants), and that it cannot account for the causal role of content. I explain the ramifications for scientific psychology and neuroscience, and for interpreting the results of such empirical research. Nothing is objectively a contentful representation, yet some brain states or processes can be normatively constituted as representations with content. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
New Ideas in Psychology
"Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations" (2009). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 1388.