Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test
Abbreviated Journal Title
Games Econ. Behav.
Stated beliefs; Inferred beliefs; Repeated games; Experimental methods; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA; PEOPLE PLAY GAMES; UNIQUE; HETEROGENEITY; MODELS; CHOICE; Economics
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally Verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure, but not with simpler (unmotivated) statements of expected choices of opponents. Scoring rule belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and prior beliefs implied by such models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. We also find that "inferred beliefs" (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can predict observed actions better than the "stated beliefs" from scoring rule belief elicitation. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Games and Economic Behavior
"Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test" (2009). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 2076.