Title

UNDERPRICING IN PUBLIC LOTTERIES: A CRITIQUE OF USER-PAY AND ALL-PAY TARIFFS

Authors

Authors

D. Scrogin

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

Econ. Inq.

Keywords

GOODS; Economics

Abstract

A body of literature spanning from medical ethics to public economics has amassed regarding the rationing of underpriced public resources. This study investigates the effects of price on entry, individual and aggregate expected consumer surplus, and tax revenues in user-pay and all-pay (AP) lotteries. Comparative statics indicate that expected surplus may increase (decrease) as price increases (decreases) if entry is sufficiently responsive though entry in AP lotteries is inelastic at all prices. Further, the lotteries are shown to be outcome equivalent under revenue equivalency. Selected results are evaluated numerically with simulations performed across a broad class of distributions describing individual private values. (JEL D45, D61, H42).

Journal Title

Economic Inquiry

Volume

47

Issue/Number

3

Publication Date

1-1-2009

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

500

Last Page

511

WOS Identifier

WOS:000268168500006

ISSN

0095-2583

Share

COinS