Title

Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors

Authors

Authors

S. Gallagher

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Philos. Explor.

Keywords

interaction theory; simulation; folk psychology; primary; intersubjectivity; enactive perception; POINT-LIGHT DISPLAYS; MIRROR NEURONS; GAZE SHIFTS; PERCEPTION; SIMULATION; INFANTS; RECOGNITION; INTENTIONS; EMOTION; OTHERS; Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue to operate as our ordinary and everyday basis for social cognition. I also argue that enactive perception rather than implicit simulation is the best model for explaining these capacities.

Journal Title

Philosophical Explorations

Volume

11

Issue/Number

3

Publication Date

1-1-2008

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

163

Last Page

174

WOS Identifier

WOS:000263140200002

ISSN

1386-9795

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