Title

Intersubjectivity in perception

Authors

Authors

S. Gallagher

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Cont. Philos. Rev.

Keywords

embodied cognition; extended mind; enactive perception; intersubjectivity; object perception; CAUSAL COMPLEXITY; CONSCIOUSNESS; EMBODIMENT; COGNITION; Philosophy

Abstract

The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.

Journal Title

Continental Philosophy Review

Volume

41

Issue/Number

2

Publication Date

1-1-2008

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

163

Last Page

178

WOS Identifier

WOS:000257919300004

ISSN

1387-2842

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