Title
Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany
Abbreviated Journal Title
J. Bank Financ.
Keywords
executive compensation; corporate governance; Germany; agency; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; FIRM; Business, Finance; Economics
Abstract
With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Journal Title
Journal of Banking & Finance
Volume
27
Issue/Number
7
Publication Date
1-1-2003
Document Type
Article
Language
English
First Page
1391
Last Page
1410
WOS Identifier
ISSN
0378-4266
Recommended Citation
"Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany" (2003). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 3736.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2000/3736