Title

Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: A neurophenomenological critique

Authors

Authors

S. Gallagher

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Psychopathology

Keywords

schizophrenia; Frith's model; delusions of control; thought insertion; agency; ownership; top-down explanations; bottom-up explanations; neurophenomenology; SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS; BRAIN POTENTIALS; AWARENESS; PET; PERCEPTION; SIMULATION; THINKING; AGENCY; Psychiatry

Abstract

This paper argues that Frith's (1992) account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of a disruption of metarepresentational self-monitoring is inadequate in several specific ways. More generally, this paper argues against top-down explanations for the loss of the sense of agency in such symptoms. In addition, even if delusions of control might be explained by problems involved in motor control mechanisms involving efference copy and comparators, there are good reasons why the same model cannot explain thought insertion. In place of such neurocognitive explanations, the author develops a neurophenomenological explanation for the loss of the sense of agency and the misattribution of actions and thoughts to others in such symptoms.

Journal Title

Psychopathology

Volume

37

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2004

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

8

Last Page

19

WOS Identifier

WOS:000220083500002

ISSN

0254-4962

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