Title

Intentionality and intentional action

Authors

Authors

S. Gallagher

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Synth. Philos.

Keywords

EXPERIENCE; WILL; Philosophy

Abstract

Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.

Journal Title

Synthesis Philosophica

Volume

20

Issue/Number

2

Publication Date

1-1-2005

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

319

Last Page

326

WOS Identifier

WOS:000239457000006

ISSN

0352-7875

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