Relative portfolio performance evaluation and incentive structure
Abbreviated Journal Title
MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE; NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH; COSTLY INFORMATION; MORAL HAZARD; MARKET LINE; EFFICIENCY; BENCHMARKS; CONTRACTS; INDUSTRY; MANAGERS; Business
Mutual fund managers are the agents of investors, and their efforts to improve their performance are influenced by either explicit or implicit incentive structures within fund organizations. An efficient fund evaluation should control for organizational elements that affect managerial incentives in evaluating their performance. I propose an incentive-compatible portfolio performance evaluation measure in which managers are to maximize investors' gross returns net of managerial compensation. I consider the effect of organizational elements such as economies of scale on incentive and thus on performance. Finally, I compare this new measure with the Sharpe ratio.
Journal of Business
"Relative portfolio performance evaluation and incentive structure" (2006). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 6028.