Title

Voting games and computational complexity

Authors

Authors

G. W. Harrison;T. McDaniel

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

Oxf. Econ. Pap.-New Ser.

Keywords

ELECTION; SCHEMES; RULES; Economics

Abstract

Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is difficult to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others preferences.

Journal Title

Oxford Economic Papers-New Series

Volume

60

Issue/Number

3

Publication Date

1-1-2008

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

546

Last Page

565

WOS Identifier

WOS:000257190500008

ISSN

0030-7653

Share

COinS