Title

Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics of Locally Differentiable Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria

Authors

Authors

M. R. Caputo;C. Ling

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

Dyn. Games Appl.

Keywords

Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Stackelberg; equilibria; POLLUTING NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES; STOCK EXTERNALITIES; PIGOUVIAN; TAXATION; STRATEGIES; MODEL; LOOP; Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications

Abstract

The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. It is shown that the follower's intrinsic comparative dynamics agree in their form and qualitative properties with those of every player in a feedback Nash equilibrium, while those of the leader differ in form. The difference allows, in principle, an empirical test of the leader-follower role in a differential game. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics of feedback Nash equilibria, feedback Stackelberg equilibria, and those in the corresponding optimal control problem are qualitatively identical.

Journal Title

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volume

5

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2015

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

1

Last Page

25

WOS Identifier

WOS:000350042300001

ISSN

2153-0785

Share

COinS