Title

Situationism versus Situationism

Authors

Authors

T. J. Rodgers;B. Warmke

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Ethical Theory Moral Pract.

Keywords

Virtue Ethics; John Doris; Situationism; Character; Virtue; VIRTUE ETHICS; OBEDIENCE; CHARACTER; ATTRIBUTION; PSYCHOLOGY; RESISTANCE; Philosophy

Abstract

Most discussions of John Doris's situationism center on what can be called descriptive situationism, the claim that our folk usage of global personality and character traits in describing and predicting human behavior is empirically unsupported. Philosophers have not yet paid much attention to another central claim of situationism, which says that given that local traits are empirically supported, we can more successfully act in line with our moral values if, in our deliberation about what to do, we focus on our situation instead of on our moral character. Call this prescriptive situationism. In this paper, we will point toward a previously unrecognized tension between these two situationist theses and explore some ways for the situationist to address it.

Journal Title

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Volume

18

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2015

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

9

Last Page

26

WOS Identifier

WOS:000348640100002

ISSN

1386-2820

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