Title

Defining consciousness The importance of non-reflective self-awareness

Authors

Authors

S. Gallagher

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Pragmat. Cogn.

Keywords

blindsight; consciousness; higher-order theories; intentionality; non-reflective self-awareness; phenomenality; Linguistics; Language & Linguistics

Abstract

I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.

Journal Title

Pragmatics & Cognition

Volume

18

Issue/Number

3

Publication Date

1-1-2010

Document Type

Article

DOI Link

http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.18.3.04gal

Language

English

First Page

561

Last Page

569

WOS Identifier

WOS:000290968000005

ISSN

0929-0907

Recommended Citation

"Defining consciousness The importance of non-reflective self-awareness" (2010). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 7047.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/7047