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Historical Legacies & Contemporary Anti-Americanism in Latin America

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HISTORICAL LEGACIES & CONTEMPORARY ANTI-AMERICANISM IN LATIN AMERICA

by

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ABSTRACT

Latin America is often cited as a prime example of historically rooted and deeply embedded opposition to the United States. There exists a prevalent assumption in the literature that suggests a legacy of foreign intervention can breed anti-Americanism. From this theoretical point of departure, we would expect individuals who lived through periods of intervention to express more negative opinions of the U.S. This thesis aims to explore whether historical legacies continue to live on and impact individual-level evaluations of the United States. By exploiting cross-country variation in the *years* and *types* of intervention, this study tests the empirical significance of the relationship between "exposure" to U.S. intervention and anti-Americanism. To quantify the effects, ordered logistical regression analyses are conducted at the regional and country level using an original dataset from Berger et al. (2013b) on CIA interventions and large-n survey data from the 2020 Latinobarometer. The results show that exposure is indeed a significant predictor of anti-Americanism with respondents who lived through periods of intervention having higher odds of expressing negative opinions of the U.S. However, further subset analyses demonstrate how this relationship can vary based on ideological cleavages, country, and the type of intervention that took place.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

What are the long-term implications of U.S. foreign policy misdeeds? Does there exist a persisting legacy of American intervention, and if so, how does it impact perceptions of the United States abroad? Can variation in the levels of anti-Americanism be explained by the historical legacy effects of U.S. intervention? These questions represent an empirically underexplored subject within political science – the link between past foreign policy transgressions and their impact on contemporary political opinions. Understanding the ongoing impact of past foreign policy decisions not only provides a clearer picture for policy makers, but it can also allow a nation to revisit and grapple with its political history.

Despite developments in the balance of power, the United States continues to occupy the central role as a global hegemon. This means that the U.S. often has to strike a difficult balance between intervening in international affairs and respecting state sovereignty. This challenge can mean that either outcome is looked upon unfavorably and can foment negative opinions of the U.S. Perceptions of the U.S. play an important role in shaping international relations and how foreign policy decisions are received by other mass publics. Joseph Nye's theory of soft power engages this concept and argues that when America is perceived positively, U.S. decisions are more likely to be understood and approved of. Evidently, this has significant implications for American policy makers and the nature of what our policy decisions seek to achieve.

Besides its inherent relevance for the U.S., understanding "anti-Americanism" abroad provides valuable insight in the context of other nations. This is especially relevant as emerging economies like China and India seek to build relations with developing countries and these countries choose to forego American relations for a number of reasons. This can shed light on a

variety of issues, from the evolution of economic aid strategies to the effectiveness of foreign messaging. Ultimately, levels of anti-Americanism can be thought of as a powerful indicator of the state of the international system.

The literature on anti-Americanism has seen significant contributions, especially after major events like the September 11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. Scholars have developed nuanced definitions and conceptualizations of what anti-Americanism entails. There is a relevant distinction that is both naturally understood as well as empirically observed, between opinions of what the U.S. does versus opinions of what America stands for. This cleavage between policy and polity implies that perceptions of the U.S. have a multidimensional nature and as a result, anti-Americanism can exist on a scale that ranges in its degree of intensity. Scholars have also explored several causal mechanisms that can explain variation in opinions of the U.S. Evidently, the causes behind this internationally observed phenomenon can vary by region, country, or even the individual, being studied. As a result, the causal dynamics that are more relevant to a region like the Middle East, might not be as relevant in Western Europe.

Amongst these causal hypotheses, the legacy effect of past foreign policy mistakes stands out as a topic that is heavily emphasized from a qualitative perspective. Latin America specifically stands out as one of the prime examples of this discussion considering the high degree of U.S. intervention in the region during the Cold War era. These qualitative analyses will often point to cases like Nicaragua, Chile, or Guatemala where American political and economic interests stood at odds with unfolding state affairs and as a result, U.S. foreign policy often responded with repressive and undemocratic tactics. The assumption posited here is that this historical context would breed negative opinions of the U.S. that can become deeply embedded in national culture and remain ingrained for long periods of time, thereby leaving a “legacy”.

However, this hypothesis has not been subject to the same degree of empirical scrutiny as other causal dynamics. This gap in the literature drives the research of this thesis, which aims to explore the relationship between exposure to U.S. intervention and anti-Americanism at the individual-level of analysis in Latin America.

More specifically, the central question of this study is as follows: "Are the individuals who were exposed to U.S. intervention in their country more likely to express anti-American sentiments?". The presented research aims to answer this question empirically, by employing the use of a CIA intervention dataset and large-n survey data from the region. Examining Latin America is relevant but also proves beneficial because of the cross-country variation in the years and the types of intervention that took place. These distinctions provide more nuance and detail to the analysis which explores various components. For one, does the type of intervention matter? Do higher-intensity interventions produce more anti-Americanism? Additionally, what role can ideology play in moderating the effect of an individual's exposure to U.S. intervention? This has important implications in terms of understanding whether the left and right in Latin America interpret history in different ways. Lastly, the analysis is conducted at an aggregate level with 18 countries in the region and then at an individual country level in order to gain more insight about how this relationship might vary from country to country within Latin America.

The overall argument presented in this research is that exposure to American intervention can indeed have a long-lasting effect on opinions of the U.S. and therefore provides backing to the legacy effect hypothesis. However, individual-country analyses also demonstrate that generalizing such a statement to *all* countries in the region can portray an incomplete picture of the issue. Ultimately, the research argues that even when it comes to collective experiences with

U.S. intervention, Latin Americans are not a monolith and there exists significant variation in the relationship of interest between exposure and anti-Americanism.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

The scholarly literature on anti-Americanism is characterized by a clear divide between two major theorizations of the phenomenon. Early analyses emphasized American exceptionalism and hegemony on the world stage, and the inevitable hostility that ensues abroad. From this perspective, opposition to the United States is depicted as an irrational yet pervasive thought pattern that can be observed internationally. Hollander's (2004) work epitomizes this narrative considering anti-American attitudes are described as psychological coping mechanisms that arise out of the human need to find explanations to domestic misfortunes. Indeed, the author identifies scapegoating and the threat of modernity as the more prevalent sources of opposition to the United States. Following the premises established by this theory, negative perceptions of the U.S. are expected to be overwhelming and groundless.

On the other hand, an alternative theorization of anti-Americanism depicts perceptions of the United States as heterogeneous and multi-dimensional. This analysis draws on the importance of distinguishing the numerous facets that America is comprised of, and subsequently, how opinions about these separate facets can shape broader perceptions of the U.S. Nye (2004) explores this concept and highlights the difference between opposition to U.S. policies versus opposition to the U.S. as a whole. By consulting the Pew Global Attitudes Survey from 2002, the author demonstrates this by showing that despite high approval of U.S. technological achievements and popular culture, a majority of people in 34 out of the 43 countries surveyed said they "disliked the growing influence of America in their country" (Nye 2004, 35). These findings illustrate how people abroad do not look at the U.S. as a monolith and in fact, tend to evaluate America on its separate dimensions.

Nye's concept of soft power is a relevant demonstration of America's multifaceted nature. Aside from its economic and military capabilities, soft power describes a country's ability to advantageously influence other international actors by attracting rather than coercing. The author describes culture, values, and foreign policy as the three main sources of soft power. These resources can also be seen as some of the most prominent facets of the U.S. image abroad. In line with the general distinction between U.S. policies versus American culture, Nye points out that the foreign policy component is the most volatile and subject to change, whereas American culture and values generally enjoy popular support. Indeed, this idea holds true across the literature as scholars emphasize the widespread disapproval of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent rise in anti-Americanism abroad. In addition to unpopular foreign policies, Nye coincides with Hollander in identifying American hegemony and modernity as other sources of opposition to the U.S. However, Nye argues that wielding all the components of American soft power can improve the perception of the U.S. abroad, but can also create an environment where U.S. policies are more likely to be understood and accepted. To this end, the author argues that increasing U.S. communication and interaction with other mass publics is the best way to strengthen American soft power.

Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) build on the literature that describes the various and often contradicting perceptions of the U.S. By defining anti-Americanism as a "psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and American society in general", the authors incorporate the key distinction between what the U.S. "does" versus what the U.S. "is" (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 12). This distinction also relates to the question of how much of anti-Americanism is fundamentally rooted versus how much of it is superficial and fleeting. Additionally, by defining anti-Americanism as a tendency, the authors place its existence on a

continuum that ranges from opinion, to distrust, to deep-seated bias. This conceptualization proves vital because it demonstrates how anti-American attitudes vary in their degree of intensity and therefore, their larger implications. In line with Nye's theorization, Katzenstein and Keohane posit that negative evaluations of U.S. foreign policy tend to sour overall perceptions of America. However, despite recognizing the surge in anti-Americanism after the invasion of Iraq, the general findings of the book indicate that opposition to the U.S. has not reached the point of deep-seated bias where positive evaluations of America are wholly discarded. Most importantly, in exploring the variation in opposition to the U.S., the authors identify four main types of anti-Americanism and two additional, historically oriented permutations. The most relevant to the study of the phenomenon in Latin America are the sovereign-nationalist, radical, and legacy types which highlight U.S. encroachment, revolutionary change of U.S. political-economic structures, and past errors in U.S. foreign policy, respectively (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007). This typology of anti-Americanism conveys how opposition to the U.S. is not explained by a single, overarching mechanism and instead takes on many forms.

Taking note of the few empirical analyses on the subject, Chiozza (2009) delivers what can be considered the most comprehensive and rigorous study of anti-Americanism to date. By utilizing data from the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey administered to 38,000 respondents across seven world regions, Chiozza systematically examines international opinions of the U.S. The investigation contrasts the two dominating theories on anti-Americanism previously discussed – one that depicts the phenomenon as a homogenous syndrome and one that depicts the phenomenon as a multidimensional evaluation. Chiozza finds empirical support for the latter account considering only 1,374 of the 38,000 respondents surveyed held consistently negative opinions of the U.S. across a number of features including American "democracy, customs,

popular culture, technology, approach to business, and actions in the war on terror" (2009, 59). This finding corroborates the ideas put forth by Katzenstein and Keohane considering that deep-seated bias or the wholesale rejection of the U.S. proves to be rare, and most people have at least some type of positive opinion in their overall assessment of America.

After demonstrating how the U.S. is evaluated differently on its various dimensions, the investigation then employs Nye's soft power thesis by testing the relationship between perceptions of the U.S. polity and perceptions of U.S. policies. This part of the study focuses on European and Islamic publics which can be considered two major hotbeds for anti-Americanism. Chiozza does find empirical support for America's soft power capabilities, or the appeal of the American polity and its sociocultural components, even in these two regions that are often generalized as demonstrating strong opposition to the U.S. However, the results also indicate that positive evaluations in this domain do not necessarily translate over to the policy sphere. In fact, most evaluations diverge around these two frames, meaning that positive and negative judgments form part of America's comprehensive assessment. Therefore, contrary to part of Nye's contention, soft power does not produce approval of U.S. conduct in the international arena. By the same token, criticism of U.S. foreign policy does not dispel the attractiveness of American culture and values.

The most relevant portion of Chiozza's investigation, as it relates to the endeavors of this thesis, seeks to build an empirical profile of the people who are more likely to harbor anti-American sentiments. To achieve this, two separate regressions are constructed using the 2002 Pew Survey data. One model examines the effects of standard demographic factors including gender, age and education, and the other model examines the effects of four causal conjectures based on ideological predispositions. These include the information-and-contact, traditional

worldview, anti-market worldview, and scapegoating hypotheses, all of which describe attitudinal characteristics that could explain the reasoning behind opposition to the U.S. With respect to demographic indicators, Chiozza finds wide variance across the seven regions. Meaning that, demographically speaking, the type of respondent that expressed anti-American views in one region, could be the type of respondent that expressed pro-American views in another (Chiozza 2009, 134). When it came to the four causal dynamics, the traditional and antimarket worldview hypotheses received less consistent support than the information and scapegoating hypotheses which held true across regions. The most consistent finding relates to the scapegoating hypothesis as those who were unhappy with the state of world affairs were more likely to hold anti-American attitudes, in all seven regions (Chiozza 2009, 132). This speaks to the internationally perceived role that the U.S. continues to occupy as the primary global hegemon. More importantly, Chiozza's empirical analysis demonstrates how there is not one single factor that explains anti-Americanism. Instead, it becomes evident that causal mechanisms manifest differently across regions, which provides an incentive to study the phenomenon on a region-by-region basis.

Shifting to a more focused discussion of anti-Americanism in Latin America, the region has long been characterized as a breeding ground for intense opposition to the U.S. Many historical analyses have emphasized the role of American intervention, neoliberalism, and hegemony in the region, and linked these collective experiences to the organic development of negative attitudes towards the U.S. (e.g., Rubinstein & Smith 1988, Roett 1988, Ross & Ross 2004, Sweig 2006, McPherson 2006, Katzenstein & Keohane 2007). Despite the importance of historical considerations, the existing literature emphasizes that perceptions of the U.S. are multidimensional and therefore extend past historical wrongdoings. This makes it worthwhile to

then evaluate the extent to which historical context influences the broader image of the U.S. in Latin America. This question becomes more relevant as time passes and these transgressions potentially fade in the minds of ordinary Latin Americans. Chiozza's work provides some general insight into the region's perceptions of the U.S. in 2002. Although a large majority of Latin America expressed a favorable opinion of the U.S., when it came to specific dimensions, respondents displayed strong anti-Americanism with 61.84 percent holding a negative opinion of U.S. customs and 58.55 percent holding a negative opinion of U.S. economic foreign policy (Chiozza 2009, 55).

Compared to other regions, the number of empirical analyses that examine opposition to the U.S. in Latin America is surprisingly limited. However, the handful of studies that have looked at this issue highlight that although the region tends to lean more towards pro-Americanism than anti-Americanism, there is still significant variation in popular attitudes (Baker and Cupery 2013; Azpuru and Boniface 2015; Azpuru 2016). As in the rest of the world, the varying degrees of opposition to the U.S. in Latin America can be explained by more than a single factor. Indeed, the studies that have explored this matter have applied and tested the causal mechanisms developed at the international level of analysis. For instance, the information-and-contact hypothesis proposed by Chiozza has been elaborated on in a number of ways. Baker and Cupery (2013) employ this causal logic and argue that different forms of economic exchange, including trade, aid, migration, and remittances, provide the best explanation for popular attitudes towards the U.S. in Latin America. More specifically, they find that American imports in the region have the most positive effect on perceptions of the U.S. precisely because consumers receive more contact with and exposure to American goods. Therefore, this analysis challenges the popular depiction of Latin America as a hotbed for opposition to the U.S. and

instead suggests that people are mostly influenced by the appeal of economic exchange with the U.S. Azpuru and Boniface (2015) utilize 2012 survey data from the Americas Barometer and provide one of the few studies on the individual-level determinants of anti-Americanism in the region. The authors also apply the information-and-contacts hypothesis by looking at the impact of remittances on individual-level perceptions of the U.S. Their empirical analysis provides support for this conjecture seeing as the citizens who received remittances from the U.S. were far less likely to hold anti-American sentiments. This finding further validates the theory behind this causal mechanism and underscores the power of interaction with the U.S.

Another causal conjecture discussed in the broader literature is the tendency to blame the United States for domestic or international affairs and treat it as a scapegoat. Azpuru and Boniface (2015, 119) applied this concept and identified "personal insecurity" as a potential indicator of the scapegoating phenomenon, in light of violence concerns across many Latin American countries. Their empirical analysis shows that citizens who expressed higher levels of personal insecurity were indeed more likely to hold negative opinions of the U.S. The authors also consider leftist ideology in their investigation given it is another widely discussed factor presumed to be correlated with anti-Americanism. Their results indicate that ideology stands out as the most robust predictor throughout all countries, with left-leaning individuals expressing more negative opinions of the U.S.

The issue of ideology is particularly interesting in this context given the broader literature that demonstrates how foreign policy preferences can depend on ideological position (Mirilovic & Kim, 2017). This raises a question of whether ideology can also influence past foreign policy interpretations and perceptions of the United States as a threat to domestic stability. In an extension of previous research, Azpuru (2016) examined anti-Americanism from another angle

by looking precisely at perceptions of overall U.S. influence in respondents' countries. Ideology was included as a control in the model and the results also indicated that right ideology is strongly correlated with positive perceptions of U.S. influence. While conventional wisdom extensively discusses why the Latin American left might dislike the U.S., the fact that the right could have grown fonder of the U.S. for the same reasons is less emphasized. An important piece of this discussion is linked to the success of American intervention in removing leftist leaders and installing right-wing rulers throughout the region (Blum 2004; Kornbluh 2003). Ultimately, however, when the causal dynamics developed at the international level of analysis are applied to Latin America, information and contact, scapegoating tendencies, and ideology prove to be strong indicators of anti-Americanism in the region.

The legacy of intervention and imperialism is a causal conjecture that is of particular relevance to Latin America. Indeed, many scholars have pointed to the collective impact of American military and economic foreign policy in the region. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) suggest that U.S. intrusion could have given rise to different manifestations of anti-Americanism including the sovereign-nationalist and legacy types. Similarly, Roett (1988) argues that negative attitudes towards the U.S. are stronger in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean than in the Southern Cone of Latin America because of the higher degree of American intervention in those countries. However, this notion has been challenged by several scholars. Baker and Cupery (2013) test the impact of American foreign policy misdeeds on the mass opinion of the U.S. in each country by looking at four variables: the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), US troop presence from 1950 to 1995, inflows of arms from the US, and CIA backed presidents. In bivariate regressions, these four variables had a "negligible impact or are negatively correlated with anti-Americanism" (Baker & Cupery 2013, 123). Evidently, these results run counter to

previous theorizations on the impact of U.S. foreign policy misdeeds and the authors maintain that the reason for this is the high amount of economic exchange with these same countries – those that were geographically closest to the U.S. and historically victimized.

Beyond the causal conjectures established in the broader literature, scholars have also explored other potential indicators of anti-American attitudes. For instance, Azpuru (2016) looked at the impact of a respondent's attention to news, political sophistication, and trust in domestic institutions, on the perception of U.S. influence as positive or negative. The results indicated that these three variables are accurate predictors seeing as those that paid less attention to the news and reported a lower understanding of political issues, had more positive opinions of U.S. influence in their countries. When it came to the perceived legitimacy of domestic institutions, the results showed that those with more trust in their local government also expressed more positive opinions of overall U.S. influence. It is important to note, however, the distinction between examining perceptions of U.S. influence as positive or negative versus examining opinions about the U.S. in general. While negative evaluations of U.S. influence can be a part of anti-American attitudes, they do not necessarily mean a respondent is completely hostile towards the U.S.

Studies that focus on the individual-level determinants of anti-Americanism in Latin America are few and scarce. When it comes to demographic variables, Chiozza's work on the empirical profiles of anti-American respondents in each region does provide some initial information. Of the four demographic variables evaluated, the results show that age was the most significant predictor of anti-Americanism in Latin America, with older generations rating the U.S. more unfavorably (Chiozza 2009). The author points to the detrimental impact of U.S. foreign policy on the minds of older Latin Americans, but also points out how this element does

not seem to influence younger Latin Americans as much in their assessment. Interestingly, in reexamining the demographic profile of anti-American citizens in the region, Azpuru and Boniface (2015, 124) found the opposite result – younger Latin Americans were more likely to demonstrate higher levels of anti-Americanism. This discrepancy could possibly reflect the methodological challenge of separating age effects from period and cohort effects (Bell & Jones 2013). Because there is a significant gap in time between the public opinion data used in these two studies, the contradicting results could signal broader cohort effects influencing the people surveyed in 2002 versus those surveyed in 2012. In other words, it could be the case that younger individuals surveyed in 2002 had a shared experience specific to that time that produced more positive evaluations of the U.S., whereas those surveyed in 2012 could have had a different, shared experience that produced more negative evaluations of the U.S. Nonetheless, the potential existence of a generational divide when it comes to opinions of the U.S. raises questions about the long-term impact of past transgressions and diverging political socializations.

Numerous scholars have drawn attention to U.S. intervention policies during the Cold War and suggested the psychological impact of witnessing these historical events. Evidently, the perception of the U.S. that is formed for individuals who were shaped by these political experiences can be marked by American unilateralism and the domestic instability that often followed. By the same token, however, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) suggest that if past mistakes in foreign policy are not repeated, the legacy of intervention can fade in the collective memory of mass publics. Beyond fading, McAdam (2007) argues that as history continues to unfold, negative memories can be replaced, or at least ameliorated, by new positive experiences in the cognitive maps of individuals. This point is particularly relevant to the examination of age as a factor considering that U.S. intervention in Latin America is primarily concentrated during

the Cold War period and therefore something that only older cohorts now had direct exposure to. This presents an interesting puzzle about how historical legacies might shape the development of contemporary political opinions for generations with different exposures.

In a similar vein, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017, 6) examined the attitudinal divergence expressed by citizens of post-communist states and found strong empirical support for the conjecture that "*living through*" Soviet communism influenced the development of individuals' attitudes towards democracy, markets, and social welfare. These findings lend backing to the hypothesis that witnessing major historical developments, such as U.S. intervention in Latin America during the Cold War, could also mark the psyches of older cohorts and result in stronger expressions of anti-Americanism. In contrast, younger generations whose political socialization has not taken place in the context of a major world war, could find fewer reasons to dislike the U.S. However, as Bell and Jones (2013) highlight, there are significant challenges in devising statistical models that separate age, period, and cohort effects from each other, and therefore accurately identify their isolated effects. In their model of the "*living through* communism" hypothesis, Pop-Eleches and Tucker address APC concerns by leveraging cross-country variation in the time periods in which communist regimes were in power. The authors establish a minimum threshold of being at least six years of age for a respondent to qualify as having received exposure to communism (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017, 80). The determination of this threshold is guided by the literature on political socialization which the authors discuss extensively. Exposure was then calculated by looking at a respondent's age and their country of residence to estimate the number of years they lived under a communist regime.

The review of the existing literature on anti-Americanism yields two relevant findings for this study. In the context of Latin America, there are major discrepancies with respect to the

relationship between age and anti-Americanism. Understanding the link between age and anti-Americanism is valuable because it provides insight into a causal mechanism that remains empirically underexplored – the persistence of historical legacies related to U.S. interference in the region's affairs. Importantly, Latin America is often cited in the literature as a popular example of a region where legacy effects continue to impact mass attitudes toward the U.S. However, empirical analyses that explore the significance of this causal mechanism are limited in number and scope. Indeed, the impact of the individual-level experience of *living through* American intervention on perceptions of the U.S. has not been explored in Latin America. By drawing from studies that examine other types of historical legacies' impacts on the development of political attitudes, the Latin American experience with intervention and its effects on the individuals who witnessed it can be better understood.

CHAPTER III: EXPECTATIONS AND METHODS

The literature on anti-Americanism has explored various causal mechanisms that can foment opposition to the United States across individuals and countries. While some of these causal conjectures have been empirically investigated, the theory of historical legacy effects stands out as one that has not undergone the same degree of empirical scrutiny. Much of the existing research on this topic is comprised of qualitative analyses that examine cases of American military intervention and draw conclusions about the implications of these historical developments. The causal logic behind legacy anti-Americanism hypotheses assumes that those subject to imposed U.S. foreign policy would naturally develop more anti-American attitudes. The case of Latin America is often referred to as a prime example of a region that has undergone heavy U.S. meddling, in part due to its geographic proximity but also because of U.S. concerns with respect to revolutionary movements. With its extensive history of American intervention, it is reasonable to infer that Latin Americans who witnessed these events would become more opposed to the United States. More commonly discussed cases like Guatemala or Chile embody the problematic nature of American intervention in the region which often threatened self-determination efforts. Because of these implications, it would make sense that countries like Guatemala and Chile, with an extensive record of being subject to U.S. intervention, would hold more anti-American sentiments. More specifically, in line with this hypothesis, it would make even more sense that the individuals who *lived through* intervention in these countries would express higher anti-Americanism.

With that said, the literature on the legacy effects of U.S. foreign policy does acknowledge and discuss how negative memories of the United States can be replaced by new,

more positive interactions. This suggests that legacy anti-Americanism is perhaps not as deeply rooted and therefore more transitory than other variations of the phenomenon. However, scholars on the subject have also drawn from political psychology and socialization fields to contemplate how the experience of living through American intervention could mark individuals and moreover, potentially embed itself in national culture. In the context of Latin America, there are few scholars who have explored part of this question by examining the relationship between U.S. intervention and anti-Americanism at the country level (Baker & Cupery 2013). However, scholarly research has not probed the question of whether this relationship can manifest itself differently at the individual level of analysis. In the case of Latin America, it is feasible to infer that as younger generations develop more positive interactions with the United States, the legacy effect of American intervention subsides. Similarly, it is possible and worth exploring whether the older generations who generally hold the first-hand experience with abrasive U.S. foreign policy, express more anti-American feelings. This question sheds light on the potential long-term ramifications of foreign intervention and how it could mark an individual's cognitive perception of the United States.

In this light, this thesis aims to examine the empirical validity of historical legacy effects as a causal mechanism for anti-Americanism. Because Latin America is often cited as a representative example of deeply embedded opposition to the United States, choosing to test this theory in the region proves valuable because the findings either corroborate or debunk the significance of the relationship between intervention and anti-Americanism. In addition, examining Latin America also proves useful because there is variation in the *type* of U.S. foreign policy interference. This means that although most countries have had some sort of experience related to American intervention, the legacy effects cannot be generalized and assumed to be

uniform across the region. Indeed, in countries like Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, the U.S. intervened by supporting already-existing regimes whereas in Chile and Guatemala, the U.S. intervened by installing and supporting new political leaders. Similarly, in countries such as Panama and the Dominican Republic, American foreign policy intrusion extended over a longer period of time whereas in Peru and Argentina, it was much more brief and short-lived. When examining the relationship between exposure to U.S. intervention and anti-Americanism, it is crucial to acknowledge different country experiences and account for them in the quantitative analysis portion of the research.

Considering the literature on historical legacy effects, there are several hypotheses that are borne out of the Latin American context. The overarching hypothesis of this investigation is that individuals with exposure to American intervention are more likely to develop negative opinions of the U.S. and therefore express anti-Americanism. As other scholars have discussed, the causal link for this working hypothesis relies on the psycho-social implications of witnessing foreign meddling in one's country's affairs. However, because country context matters, more specific hypotheses can be offered that account for different historical experiences. Based on the previous discussion, it is posited that the *type* of intervention is a relevant factor that influences exposure. More specifically, higher intensity interventions where the U.S. "installed *and* supported" a political regime can be inferred to have had a stronger effect than lower intensity episodes where the U.S. only supported an already-existing political regime. This hypothesis is based on the presumed effects of foreign suppression of grassroots movements and elected leaders. Additionally, given the well-established relationship between ideology and anti-Americanism, it is also posited that left-right cleavages can also have distinct moderating effects

on individuals who were exposed to intervention. Further subsets in the analysis allow these hypotheses to be explored.

H_1: Individuals who were exposed to U.S. intervention will express higher levels of anti-Americanism when compared to their non-exposed counterparts.

H_2: Individuals who were exposed to higher intensity U.S. interventions, where the U.S. both "installed *and* supported" a regime, will express higher levels of anti-Americanism than their non-exposed counterparts and than those who were exposed to lower intensity interventions.

H_3: Individuals on the left who were exposed to U.S. intervention will express higher levels of anti-Americanism than their non-exposed counterparts, whereas individuals on the right who were exposed to U.S. intervention will express lower levels of anti-Americanism than their non-exposed counterparts.

Given that the dependent variable defining this research is anti-Americanism, I employ the use of large-n survey data to examine mass attitudes toward the U.S. The Latinobarometer survey provides insight into a diverse set of public opinion matters, including perceptions of the U.S. in the region. This survey has been administered to about 1,000 respondents across 18 countries in Latin America since 2004. Academic scholars have previously used the Latinobarometer survey data to empirically investigate a range of issues, with anti-Americanism being one of them (e.g. Baker & Cupery 2013, Azpuru and Boniface 2015, Ambrosius and Mesegeur 2023). This thesis makes use of the latest Latinobarometer data from 2020 with a sample of 20,204 respondents across the standardized 18 countries, which include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The large n of the survey allows my research to examine mass attitudes toward the U.S. and probe the question of whether historical legacy effects exert themselves as a significant contributing factor to the expression of anti-Americanism at the individual level of analysis.

There are two questions in the Latinobarometer that gauge an individuals' perceptions of the United States. Question thirty A in the survey asks a respondent: "Overall, do you have a very favorable (1), somewhat favorable (2), somewhat unfavorable (3), or very unfavorable opinion (4) of the United States? Don't know (8) and no answer (0)." (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 2). Question thirty-five A asks a respondent: "When all its actions are considered, on balance would you say that the United States has more of a positive influence or has more of a negative influence in Latin America? Positive influence (1), negative influence (2), and don't know / no answer (0)" (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 3). In line with the definition and conceptualization proposed by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 12), anti-Americanism can be best understood as a tendency that ranges from mild opinions to deep-seated bias. Therefore, to examine the varying degrees of anti-Americanism, this study utilizes question thirty as the dependent variable for the empirical analysis.

The general breakdown of this variable demonstrates what other studies have consistently shown: opinions toward the U.S. in Latin America lean more "pro-American" with close to 65 percent reporting a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion and about 25 percent reporting a somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion. Despite the tendency in favor of the U.S., the results still demonstrate a degree of variation in attitudes toward the northern hegemon. This provides an incentive to examine whether this could reflect remaining legacy effects of intervention. Because the dependent variable is ordinal, the model employs ordered logistic regression analysis to examine the determinants of anti-Americanism. This model allows the

empirical analysis to retain information about the dependent variable and its four increasing levels, while also controlling for other alternative explanations identified in the literature. For transparency, all response distribution, summary statistics, and regression tables in this paper were created using Stata export packages asdoc and outreg2.

Table 1: Response Distribution for Anti-Americanism

Q30ST.A Opinion about the United States (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 2).	Frequency	Percent
(-5) No answer	428	2.12
(-1) Don't know	1,577	7.81
(1) Very favorable	3,651	18.07
(2) Somewhat favorable	9,431	46.68
(3) Somewhat unfavorable	3,062	15.16
(4) Very unfavorable	2,055	10.17
Total	20,204	100

*Notes: Prepared by author using Latinobarometer 2020 data.

All variables in the model were recoded to account for "don't know" or "no answer" responses which were treated as missing values. With the dependent variable of anti-Americanism for instance, there were 2,005 "don't know / no answer" responses which were recoded as missing and therefore narrowed the sample down to 18,199 total respondents. The model also includes ideology as a relevant control considering the literature has clearly established the relationship between the political left and opposition to the U.S. Ideological cleavages can also be hypothesized to influence the relative exposure to American foreign policy intrusion, with the expectation that those on the political left are more aware of and strongly

opposed to foreign meddling. Therefore, because ideology can influence both the dependent and independent variables of interest, it is included to account for alternative explanations to the relationship being tested. This variable is based on Question 18 in the Latinobarometer survey which asks respondents: "In politics, people normally speak of "left" and "right". On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself? None (97), don't know (98), no answer (99)" (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 2). As with anti-Americanism, don't know and no answer responses were treated as missing and omitted from the analysis. The model also includes gender and education as standard sociodemographic controls that can play a general role in the attitudes a respondent holds. Importantly, age is not included as a sociodemographic control in the model because the construction of the independent variable makes it highly correlated with age and including it would raise issues of multicollinearity. This limitation of the study is further discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

In order to examine the impact of historical legacies, the independent variable of interest in the model is individual-level exposure to American intervention. However, because U.S. foreign policy intrusion was not uniform across the region, this thesis employs various tools and techniques to account for cross-country differences in the experience with American intervention. An important first step in this process involved identifying which countries in Latin America experienced any U.S. intervention, which *type* of intervention, and the *duration* of said intervention. Fortunately, the work of Berger et al. (2013b) and their dataset on CIA interventions facilitated this component of the empirical analysis. The authors constructed an original dataset that identifies successful CIA interventions based on declassified documents. Because cases of intervention are based on these resources, observations in the dataset are generally limited to 1989 and primarily occur during the Cold War era.

There are some important exceptions and caveats that are worth pointing out in the use of the Berger dataset (2013b) in this paper. For one, the dataset identifies some cases of intervention that predate the establishment of the CIA, in Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. Based on supporting documents for the data, these years seem to be included in the identified periods if the CIA was continuing an operation that had been initiated by another branch of the U.S. government. For instance, in Nicaragua, U.S. support for the Somoza regime predates the establishment of the CIA, but once the agency was founded, "it coordinated with the regime and provided large quantities of military aid, including CIA aircraft with pilots" (Berger et al. 2012, 10). Ultimately, the years of intervention that precede the establishment of the CIA seem to be included if the agency was taking on an already-existing project.

On the other end of the time window, the dataset identifies intervention as taking place in El Salvador until the "present". What "present" means exactly is currently ambiguous considering that the source for this episode listed in the supporting documents is a book published in 2004 which is Blum (2004). Although this complicates the coding process for this particular country, the authors also provide a supporting document (see zipped file on author's webpage cited in references section) that is dated June 7th of 2012, which reports intervention taking place in El Salvador until the "present" once again. Therefore, the empirical analysis opts to use 2012 as the end of intervention for El Salvador. However, given the uncertainty this casts on the empirical analysis of this paper, the analysis is also run without El Salvador and results are briefly discussed in the following chapter.

In the end, the empirical analysis in this research opts to report the interventions accurately and consistently as identified in the Berger (2013b) dataset. This means the analysis

includes interventions that predate the establishment of the CIA (Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Dominican Republic), and interventions that extend past the Cold War era (El Salvador). This presents an opportunity for future research to consider different time windows that constrain the analysis to provide a more nuanced understanding of how different periods of intervention (pre-Cold War, Cold War, post-Cold War) could impact respondents' relative exposure. Therefore, the empirical analysis employed in this thesis is a straight-forward way of utilizing the Berger (2013b) data as it is listed, but future research could develop a more nuanced use of the data by considering other time windows that account for differences in broader historical periods.

Although the analysis includes four interventions from before 1947 and one after 1989, there is still not enough variation to include age as a control in the model and therefore, this study cannot examine the effects of exposure while controlling for the age of respondents. In particular, the fact that El Salvador is the only country that is identified as having experienced intervention in a more contemporary period, limits the number of younger respondents who were exposed, when compared to the number of older respondents who were exposed, in the overall sample. Having access to more records of post-Cold War era interventions would allow researchers to identify cohorts of sufficiently differentiated ages with similar levels of exposure. As CIA documents continue to be declassified, future research can look more closely at whether exposure to intervention, independent of age, proves to be a significant driver of anti-Americanism amongst individuals. This would address concerns of differentiating "age-period-cohort" effects from each other as exposure would be effectively isolated from age and this would ensure the relationship examined does not just reflect older age, which some studies in the literature have found to be a contributing factor to anti-Americanism.

Another important limitation worth pointing out is that the scope of U.S. "intervention" in this research is constrained to successful CIA episodes as identified in the Berger (2013b) dataset. This raises issues considering that CIA activities were often covert and mass publics abroad were not fully aware of the events unfolding before them nor the degree of U.S. involvement in their country affairs. Therefore, having lived through a period of American intervention does not necessarily mean a respondent received "exposure" to intrusive U.S. foreign policy. The formal definition of U.S. intervention certainly extends past CIA operations and can be said to include public military disputes, economic sanctioning, and other factors, which extend past the scope of this study. This would mean that countries like Mexico, Costa Rica, or Venezuela, which the Berger (2013b) dataset does not list as having experienced CIA interventions, could be reevaluated. For instance, in Costa Rica, although the CIA did not explicitly support or install a political regime during this period, the U.S. government did place significant pressure on the government to militarize against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (Roberts 1990). Moreover, because of its geographical proximity, Costa Rica was considered a valuable military planning base for the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary forces. Once again, this demonstrates how the episodes identified by the Berger (2013b) dataset are open to dispute. However, these gaps also present an opportunity for future research to examine the relationship between anti-Americanism and a more comprehensive definition of intervention.

The dataset by Berger et al. (2013b) includes a baseline indicator of successful CIA interventions where the U.S. either provided support for a regime already in power or where it both "installed *and* supported" a political leader. There is a disaggregated version of the baseline indicator to distinguish cases in which the U.S. only supported an already existing political regime versus cases in which it first installed and then supported a political regime. The sample

was narrowed down to the same eighteen countries in the Latinobarometer survey which allowed for specific time periods of U.S. influence in each country to be easily identified. In Chile for example, the dataset identifies two instances of American installation and support of a political regime from 1964 to 1970 and then again from 1973 to 1988. These dates correspond with the CIA's financial support for candidate Eduardo Frei in the 1964 elections, until 1970 when Salvador Allende won the democratic vote, and the second episode is marked by the U.S.-backed military coup in 1973 which toppled Allende's government and installed military dictator, Augusto Pinochet, who remained in power until 1988.

The independent variable of interest of this study is exposure, for which there are different versions of the variable. In order to accurately report exposure based on the interventions identified in the Berger (2013b) dataset, all versions of the exposure variable include the episodes that predate the establishment of the CIA in the four countries mentioned previously and the more contemporary episode identified in El Salvador. Alternatively, excluding these periods and constraining the analysis to interventions taking place from 1947 to 1989 would not have accurately reflected the full breadth of identification of interventions as seen in the Berger (2013b) dataset.

The first version of the exposure variable is a numerical measure of the number of years an individual in a particular country was exposed to general U.S. intervention ("expo_num"). Importantly, this includes exposure to both "support only" and "install-and-support" interventions and therefore generalizes the definition of exposure. To calculate these exposure values, a second version of respondents' birth year was created ("by_2") to add six years to the original value and account for the minimum threshold of being at least six years old for exposure to count. As discussed in the literature review, the threshold of being at least six years of age is

based on political socialization theories that identify this early stage as a point where individuals begin to be marked by major historical events and can carry that on later in their lifetimes. Other studies have also utilized the age of six as a threshold for exposure to other political phenomena (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2016) and extensively discussed the justification for this number. This variable can be thought of and will be referred to as a respondent's "base year" of exposure. Therefore, for a person born in 1950, their base year would be 1956, their years of exposure would count from 1956 and on, that is until the end of intervention in their respective country.

Respondents' base years of exposure were subtracted from the year that marked the end of American intervention in each country. In a country like Ecuador with a single period of intervention from 1963 to 1968, respondents' base year was subtracted from 1968 to indicate whether they were exposed to the events and for how long. Evidently, if a respondents' base year was greater than or equal to 1968, the value was either negative or equal to zero. People who were not old enough to be counted as having received exposure or simply born after the period of intervention resulted in negative values, which were recoded as zero to indicate they did not receive exposure. Similarly, people born much earlier, whose calculated years of exposure exceeded the duration of the intervention were recoded as having received the maximum for each respective country. In the case of Ecuador, where the intervention lasted a total of five years, the maximum value of exposure a respondent could receive is then five years. For instance, an Ecuadorian born in 1945, whose base year was 1951, would be originally calculated as having received seventeen years of exposure, so these values were recoded to equal the maximum of five years.

Figure 1: Determining Exposure – Ecuador Example



*Notes: Prepared by author, dates obtained from Berger et al. (2013b). Process for calculating exposure is explained in text.

For countries like Chile and Panama where there are several periods of U.S. intervention, a similar but slightly more detailed approach was taken to calculate exposure. For each instance of intervention, a separate variable was generated to calculate exposure to the individual episodes ("interv_1", "interv_2", "interv_3", etc.) and then aggregate them in the "expo_num" variable along with the rest of the countries. The same process described above was applied to each intervention – taking the last year of the episode, subtracting respondent base years, and recoding according to the minimum and maximum values. In the case of Chile which has two windows of intervention from 1964 to 1970 and 1973 to 1988, maximum exposure is equal to six years for the first episode and fifteen for the second, for a total maximum of 21 years. This means that someone born in 1962, whose base year is 1968, would be calculated as having received two years of exposure to the first intervention and the full fifteen years of exposure to the second intervention, for a total of 17 years of exposure. As this example demonstrates, in these types of countries, it is possible that respondents receive some or no exposure to earlier episodes of intervention, but some or the maximum number of years of exposure to later episodes. The final

step in this process was to aggregate the values of exposure to each intervention into the "expo_num" variable where the *total* number of years is measured.

Figure 2: Determining Exposure – Chile Example



*Notes: Prepared by author, dates obtained from Berger et al. (2013b). Process for calculating exposure is explained in text.

Across the 18 countries in the sample, the number of years of exposure ranges from 0 to 75, with values generally being correlated to age. The numerical variable of exposure was then used to create a dummy variable ("expo_binary") that indicates whether a respondent received any exposure to either type of intervention, regardless of the amount of time. For this version of the variable, "expo_num" values that were greater than zero were set as equal to "1" to indicate that the respondent was indeed exposed to intervention. This was done to examine the relationship between general exposure to U.S. intervention and anti-Americanism, and moreover, examine whether more years of exposure created an intensifying effect on the level of expressed anti-Americanism. Running the models with these different versions of the independent variable

also served as a general robustness check meant to test the strength of the statistical model and corroborate the validity of the results.

The last versions of the independent variable of interest are only applied at the aggregate level and they focus specifically on exposure to higher-intensity interventions where the U.S. installed *and* supported a political regime ("inst_supp" and "inst_supp_binary"). These variables are included to probe whether the type of intervention matters and to understand how exposure to a higher degree of intervention impacts the relationship with anti-Americanism. As with the general exposure variables, the first version ("inst_supp") is a measure of the number of years a respondent was exposed to an install-and-support (IS) intervention and the second version ("inst_supp_binary") is a binary variable that simply indicates whether a respondent was exposed, regardless of the number of years.

Of the 18 countries in the Latinobarometer, only Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama are identified in the Berger (2013b) dataset as countries in which the CIA successfully installed and supported a political leader. For these countries, the "inst_supp" values are equal to the number of years of general exposure ("expo_num") and the "inst_supp_binary" values are also equal to the binary variable for general exposure ("expo_binary"). The difference is that the remaining 12 countries, including those that were previously identified as having periods of intervention in which the U.S. supported an existing political regime, were coded as having received zero years of exposure to this higher degree of intervention. Therefore, the install-and-support variables measure exposure in the same way, but they specifically look at cases in which U.S. foreign policy meddling was more intense.

The model is first run with all 18 countries to produce an aggregate analysis of the relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism at the regional level. Importantly, this

includes country-fixed effects to control for time-invariant factors across the 18 countries in the sample. The analysis runs models for each of the different versions of the independent variable ("expo_num", "expo_binary", "inst_supp", and "inst_supp_binary"). Additionally, in the last several models, the aggregate analysis is subset by left and right cleavages to examine whether ideology can have a mediating effect on intervention and anti-Americanism. Considering that this particular set of CIA interventions tended to favor rightist leaders that were anti-Cuba and more aligned with U.S. interests (Absher et al., 2023), this subset analysis aims to understand whether exposure has different effects on the left and the right, and their corresponding opinions of U.S. The existing literature suggests that exposure to intervention for individuals on the left might intensify the relationship with anti-Americanism and produce more negative opinions. Similarly, exposure to intervention for individuals on the right could potentially ameliorate anti-Americanism and result in more positive opinions of the U.S.

In an additional effort to account for differences across countries, the empirical analysis is also applied at the country level, for which Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile are chosen as illustrative examples. This allows the research to observe how the relationship between exposure to intervention and anti-Americanism can differ from country to country with diverse histories and contemporary political contexts. Additionally, this allows the analysis to examine variation in the *type* of intervention and the *duration* of intervention by way of country selection rather than solely through an aggregate analysis that generalizes the operational definition of exposure. Indeed, Argentina is an example a relatively brief "support only" (SO) intervention where the U.S. supported the military coup that overthrew Isabel Peron's government. On the other hand, Ecuador provides an example of an intervention where the U.S. "installed and supported" (IS) a political regime but was also short-lived. In 1963, the CIA assisted in a military coup that

removed Carlos Arosemana due to concerns of ties to communist Cuba and a U.S.-backed military junta held power until 1968. The last illustrative example is Chile which is arguably the most known case study of U.S. intervention in the region, where the CIA installed and supported Augusto Pinochet and where the period of intervention is longer than in other Latin American countries. Despite popular referencing to Chile as a prime example of the ramifications of intervention, empirical analyses that test the relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism in this country are scarce and missing. However, by looking at these individual countries, the aim of this study is to enhance understanding of how exposure to different experiences might strengthen or weaken the relationship to anti-Americanism. This provides an opportunity to either validate or question traditional narratives about the nature of the relationship between Latin America and its perceptions of the United States.

Table 2: Summary of Key Variables

Variable label	Variable description
AA	Anti-Americanism Q30ST.A: "Overall, do you have a very favorable (1), somewhat favorable (2), somewhat unfavorable (3), or very unfavorable opinion (4) of the United States? Don't know (8) and no answer (0)." (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 2).
age	LB respondent's age
by_2	Respondent's base year of exposure = birth year + 6 (minimum threshold)
expo_num	Exposure to general intervention (SO & IS) in number of years
expo_binary	(0) Not exposed to general intervention (1) Exposed to general intervention
inst_supp	Exposure to IS intervention only in number of years
inst_supp_binary	(0) Not exposed to IS intervention (1) Exposed to IS intervention
ideology	(0) Left (5) Neutral (10) Right Q18ST: "In politics, people normally speak of "left" and "right". On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself? None (97), don't know (98), no answer (99)" (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 2).
gender	(0) Male (1) Female
education	S16: "What level of education do you have? What was the last year you completed? What sort of technical school? What sort of institute, etc.?" (Latinobarometer Questionnaire 2020, 6). (1) No studies (10) Completed higher education

*Notes: Variable transformation details are discussed in methods section. Data obtained from Latinobarometer 2020 and Berger et al. (2013b).
*Notes: Age and gender variables are provided in Latinobarometer data, but the exact wording of questions is not included in questionnaire.

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Aggregate Analysis

At the regional level, the variable that measures anti-Americanism has a mean score of 2.193 which corresponds with a "somewhat favorable" opinion of the U.S. on the four-point ordinal scale in the survey. Similarly, across the 18 countries, the ideology indicator has a mean of 4.962 on the ten-point ordinal scale from left to right, with 5 being neutral on the political spectrum. The average Latinobarometer respondent also has about 10 years of education. The rest of the indicators are either standard demographic factors (age and gender) or correlated to age (by_2, expo_num, expo_binary, inst_supp, inst_supp_binary) and therefore reflect the stratification of the sample. For instance, the average respondent is about 41 years old but there are respondents as young as 16 and as old as 100. There are also similar amounts of males and females included in the survey as demonstrated by the mean of 0.522.

Table 3: Aggregate Level Summary Statistics

Variable label	Observations	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
AA	18,199	2.193472	0.8849583	1	4
Age	20,204	40.99852	16.53834	16	100
By_2	20,095	1984.951	16.54433	1926	2010
Expo_num	20,095	4.506942	9.216907	0	75
Expo_binary	20,095	0.3191341	0.4661527	0	1
Inst_supp	20,095	1.326997	4.236797	0	31
Inst_supp_binary	20,095	0.1266982	0.3326428	0	1
Ideology	16,242	4.962381	3.016691	0	10
Gender	20,204	0.5215304	0.4995486	0	1
Education	20,201	10.36647	4.347595	1	17

*Notes: Maximum years of exposure is high because countries like El Salvador are identified as having long periods of intervention until 2012. Data obtained from Latinobarometer 2020 and Berger et al. (2013b).

Given the discrepancy identified in the literature, the first model run at the aggregate level examines age as the independent variable of interest. As shown in Table 3, in the region as a whole, age is positively correlated with anti-Americanism at the strictest significance level of 0.01. This indicates that older respondents in the 2020 Latinobarometer survey rated the United States more negatively than younger respondents and aligns with Chiozza's findings in 2008. These preliminary results provide an incentive to further explore why older cohorts might express more anti-Americanism.

Considering the literature on the presence of legacy effects in Latin America, the second model utilizes the numerical exposure variable ("expo_num") as the independent variable of interest. Contrary to the literature on legacy effects and the hypothesis offered in this study, the number of years of exposure appears to be negatively correlated with anti-Americanism. The second model in Table 3 shows a decrease in the log odds of expressing anti-Americanism (as demonstrated by the negative regression coefficient), when the number of years of exposure increase. However, this finding is not statistically significant. While the findings from this model indicate that the relationship is the opposite of what was predicted, – a positive relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism – subsequent models with different versions of the exposure variable probe whether this result is consistent.

The third model utilizes "expo_binary" as the independent variable and the results offer a stark contrast seeing as general exposure (both SO and IS interventions) is positively correlated with anti-Americanism. This can be interpreted as the individuals who lived through general intervention, regardless of the number of years and the type of episode, having higher odds of expressing negative opinions of the U.S. More specifically, a one unit increase in general exposure increases the log odds of expressing higher levels of anti-Americanism by 0.09. It is

worth noting here that excluding pre-CIA episodes would not impact the binary exposure variables considering that affected respondents would still be exposed, only for less time. However, constraining the analysis to exclude intervention after the Cold War era (namely the identified period in El Salvador), could potentially impact the findings of the binary exposure models given that some of the younger respondents in this country would then be coded as not having received any exposure. However, constraining the analysis to different time windows extends past the scope of this thesis and is an aspect of the empirical analysis that can be explored in future research.

Because log odds are less intuitive than probabilities, Table 5 offers the marginal effects, or the percentage change in probabilities, for key model 3. The left-most column shows predictor variables and below each one, the four increasing levels of the dependent variable – anti-Americanism. This can be interpreted as a one unit increase in exposure, (in this case from "not exposed" to "exposed"), decreasing the probability of reporting a (1) or a "very favorable" opinion of the U.S. by 1.4 percent. Similarly, for a one unit increase in general exposure, the probability of reporting a (4) or a "very unfavorable" opinion of the U.S. increases by 0.8 percent. In contrast to the previous model with the years of exposure, these results are statistically significant at a moderate confidence level of 0.05. While this does provide some evidence in favor of the working hypothesis of the research, these results also raise questions about the negative relationship observed in the previous model.

One reason as to why these models might have produced opposite results is because of the countries the CIA intervention dataset identifies as having no periods of intervention – namely Venezuela. In a country where opinions of the U.S. are much more negative, the fact that all survey respondents are coded as having received zero years of exposure to intervention

presents a challenge. Because anti-Americanism is comparatively higher amongst these respondents, the low exposure values could sway the results of this model in the opposite direction and produce a negative relationship between years of exposure and anti-Americanism. By the same token, the CIA intervention dataset identifies periods of intervention of more than fifty years in countries like Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. The same challenge presents itself here because countries like the Dominican Republic have much lower levels of anti-Americanism, but the unusually high exposure values can sway the observed relationship in the negative direction. Ultimately, this discrepancy demonstrates an important limitation of this research – the periods of intervention determined using the Berger et al. (2013b) dataset are open to dispute and this makes it difficult to definitively calculate the number of years a respondent was exposed to U.S. intervention in their respective country.

The results from these first three models are mixed. Exposure to generalized intervention, which includes both "support-only" (SO) and "install-and-support" (IS) episodes, produces different results when examining the number of years exposed versus general exposure. When it comes to the effects of being exposed for longer, it is clear that exposure does not have the predicted intensifying effect of producing more negative opinions of the U.S. However, the positive and statistically significant relationships between both age and the exposure dummy variable with anti-Americanism seem to align with conventional wisdom on the historical legacy effects of U.S. intrusion. The findings provide some preliminary evidence of how the legacy of American intervention can occupy the minds of individuals who lived through these historical events when making their overall assessment of the United States.

In order to account for differences in the severity of interventions, models 4 and 5 use the exposure variables that specifically look at higher-intensity episodes where the U.S. installed *and*

supported a political regime. The fourth model uses "inst_supp" which measures the number of years a respondent was exposed to an IS intervention with the same methodology outlined in the methods section. In this case, there is a positive relationship between years of exposure and anti-Americanism, although this is not statistically significant. This finding also runs counter to the second model which looks at years of exposure to general intervention and could indicate that the type of intervention can have a mediating effect on a respondent's opinions of the U.S. The fifth model uses "inst_supp_binary" as the independent variable, which captures whether a respondent was exposed to an IS intervention or not. To reiterate, with both of these variables, respondents that lived through SO interventions were coded as not having been exposed IS interventions in an effort to differentiate the two. In this model, exposure is also positively correlated with anti-Americanism at a moderate significance level of 0.05. More specifically, a one unit increase in IS exposure increases the log odds of expressing higher levels of anti-Americanism by 0.138. Table 6 offers the marginal effects for this key model as well which can be interpreted more easily as a one unit increase in IS exposure (from "not exposed to IS intervention" to "exposed to IS intervention"), decreasing the probability of reporting a (1) or a "very favorable" opinion of the U.S. by 2.1 percent. Similarly, for a one unit increase in IS exposure, the probability of reporting a (4) or a "very unfavorable" opinion of the U.S. increases by 1.2 percent.

The results from these two models that specifically examine the impact of exposure to IS interventions on a respondent's level of anti-Americanism show a consistent and positive relationship between the two variables of interest. Importantly, the regression coefficient for this model is higher than the coefficient for the general exposure model which lends backing to the idea that IS interventions have a stronger effect in creating negative opinions of the U.S. This

supports the working hypothesis of the study and demonstrates how the degree of intervention is a relevant factor to account for when evaluating the historical legacy effects of U.S. foreign policy. As the qualitative literature has emphasized, the reasons as to why this might be the case are abundant. In the context of the Cold War and U.S. interests at the time, Latin Americans that lived through IS episodes witnessed the removal of democratically elected leaders, the installment of right-wing regimes that often infringed on human rights, and ultimately suppressed state sovereignty (Blum 2004; Kornbluh 2003). However, when discussing these results in their historical context, it is worth noting that these interventions often took place as part of covert operations whereby local constituents did not necessarily know the U.S. government was intervening in their country's domestic affairs. This presents another significant limitation of this research – having lived through an identified period of intervention does not mean individuals were aware of the events that were unfolding. Nonetheless, the results from this analysis indicate that respondents who were exposed to IS interventions, as identified by the Berger dataset (2013b), do tend to express more negative opinions of the U.S. This raises questions about why these individuals end up interpreting their history with a more anti-American perspective.

With respect to other explanatory variables included in the analysis, the ideology predictor remains one of the most robust indicators of anti-Americanism throughout all models. Those on the far left of the political spectrum have much higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism at the strictest significance level of 0.01. The gender indicator is also consistent with females having significantly higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism than their male counterparts. Interestingly, the results for the education predictor are consistent, up until further subset analyses discussed in later paragraphs. Throughout the first five models, those with less

years of schooling have higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism at a narrow significance level of 0.01. Put together, these predictors help build and clarify the demographic profile of Latin Americans with more negative opinions of the U.S. – left-leaning, female, and less educated individuals tend to harbor more anti-American sentiments.

Models 6 through 9 offer a subset analysis of exposure by ideological cleavage, hence the smaller n, to observe whether the left and right have different interpretations of history and therefore, their contemporary opinions of the U.S. This was separately applied to the general exposure dummy variable (expo_binary) in models 6 and 7, and then to the IS exposure dummy ("inst_supp_binary") in models 8 and 9. The first model for each of these looks at respondents further left on the political spectrum and the second looks at respondents further right. More specifically, on the Latinobarometer survey scale from 0 to 10 with 5 being neutral, left placement was considered anything from 0 to 4 and right placement was considered anything from 6 to 10.

When exposed to general intervention, model 6 indicates that the left has higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism at a significance level of 0.1. This falls in line with conventional wisdom and the existing literature which links leftist ideology with more unfavorable opinions of the United States. The Latin American left has often been characterized for its anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist rhetoric (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007; McPherson 2005) and cases of U.S. foreign policy encroachment in the region provide a basis for these narratives. Interestingly, model 7 shows that for respondents on the right, there is an inverse relationship between general exposure and anti-Americanism. In other words, respondents on the political right who were exposed to either type of intervention, are more likely to express positive opinions of the U.S., or lower levels of anti-Americanism. This does provide some evidence to say that the left and right

can have different interpretations of history, although this finding is not statistically significant. However, the fact that these two groups have opposite relationships does shed light on the possibility of right-leaning individuals being supportive of U.S.-backed regimes which generally favored the right. This presents a point of contention that is generally absent in the literature – not all Latin Americans disagreed with regime change. In fact, the political instability and skepticism often associated with the left could have influenced some individuals on the right to approve of U.S. intervention.

When exposed to IS intervention specifically however, models 8 and 9 show that both the left and the right exhibit positive relationships with anti-Americanism, although statistically insignificant. However, the fact that the relationship is positive for both groups provides some evidence to say that higher-intensity interventions have an all-around negative impact on opinions of the United States. With "support-only" interventions, one could argue that the inverse relationship for the right demonstrates how the U.S. can find sympathizers when opposition arises domestically, without the need for heavy American meddling. However, the nature of IS interventions entailed severely defying local processes and orchestrating U.S.-aligned outcomes. In these cases, the results of the research indicate that the U.S. is not able to find sympathizers across either end of the political spectrum. Moreover, both the left and right appear to interpret these historical events with a more unfavorable view of the United States. Ultimately, while in some cases, ideological alignment can split interpretations of history, disaggregating the analysis by the type of intervention shows that when encroachment is extreme, the left and right seem to converge on their development of negative perceptions of the U.S.

As mentioned in the methods section of the paper, the identified period of intervention in El Salvador presents a challenge for the empirical analysis considering the ambiguity of the end year. In an effort to address this issue, Table 4 provided below reports the results for the aggregate analysis with all countries in the Latinobarometer, excluding El Salvador, hence the smaller n of about 14,300 respondents. Even when excluding El Salvador from the analysis, the aggregate results are largely similar to those reported in Table 3. More specifically, key models 3 and 5 still demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism, although the regression coefficients are slightly lower for both. Additionally, with respect to the ideology subsets, the left's exposure to general intervention continues to exhibit a positive relationship with the dependent variable and remains significant at a level of 0.1. A notable change is with respect to model 2, which looks at the number of years of exposure. When excluding El Salvador, this changes from being negatively related with anti-Americanism to now being positively related, although still insignificant.

Table 4: Aggregate Analysis

VARIABLES	(1) Age	(2) Exposure years	(3) Exposure binary	(4) IS exposure	(5) IS exposure binary	(6) Left exposure	(7) Right exposure	(8) Left IS exposure	(9) Right IS Exposure
Age	0.00373***								
	(0.00101)								
Ideology	-0.0965***	-0.0947***	-0.0960***	-0.0953***	-0.0957***				
	(0.00543)	(0.00544)	(0.00543)	(0.00542)	(0.00542)				
Gender	0.214***	0.206***	0.210***	0.208***	0.209***	0.113**	0.313***	0.111**	0.314***
	(0.0309)	(0.0310)	(0.0310)	(0.0310)	(0.0310)	(0.0512)	(0.0428)	(0.0512)	(0.0428)
Education	-0.0186***	-0.0235***	-0.0210***	-0.0221***	-0.0215***	0.00480	-0.0319***	0.00357	-0.0310***
	(0.00419)	(0.00411)	(0.00410)	(0.00406)	(0.00405)	(0.00679)	(0.00552)	(0.00672)	(0.00544)
Expo_num		-0.00182							
		(0.00239)							
Expo_binary			0.0900**			0.131*	-0.0225		
			(0.0408)			(0.0667)	(0.0537)		
Inst_supp				0.00541					
				(0.00483)					
Inst_supp_binary					0.138**			0.140	0.0328
					(0.0598)			(0.0932)	(0.0796)
Observations	15,150	15,079	15,079	15,079	15,079	5,371	8,019	5,371	8,019

*Regression coefficients reported in log odds
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Aggregate Analysis - Excluding El Salvador

VARIABLES	(1) Age	(2) Exposure years	(3) Exposure binary	(4) IS exposure	(5) IS exposure binary	(6) Left exposure	(7) Right exposure	(8) Left IS exposure	(9) Right IS exposure
Age	0.00446***								
	(0.00104)								
Ideology	-0.0970***	-0.0957***	-0.0962***	-0.0955***	-0.0959***				
	(0.00555)	(0.00556)	(0.00555)	(0.00554)	(0.00554)				
Gender	0.204***	0.197***	0.199***	0.197***	0.198***	0.105**	0.303***	0.103**	0.303***
	(0.0317)	(0.0318)	(0.0318)	(0.0318)	(0.0318)	(0.0520)	(0.0441)	(0.0519)	(0.0441)
Education	-0.0203***	-0.0246***	-0.0235***	-0.0247***	-0.0240***	0.00333	-0.0335***	0.00209	-0.0324***
	(0.00432)	(0.00424)	(0.00423)	(0.00419)	(0.00418)	(0.00693)	(0.00577)	(0.00685)	(0.00568)
Expo_num		0.00261							
		(0.00290)							
Expo_binary			0.0841**			0.127*	-0.0264		
			(0.0409)			(0.0668)	(0.0539)		
Inst_supp				0.00487					
				(0.00483)					
Inst_supp_binary					0.132**			0.137	0.0295
					(0.0599)			(0.0932)	(0.0797)
Observations	14,392	14,321	14,321	14,321	14,321	5,205	7,526	5,205	7,526

*Regression coefficients reported in log odds
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Marginal Effects for Model 3 with "expo_binary"

DV = AA	dy/dx	Std.Err.	z	P>z	[95%Conf.	Interval]
Expo_binary						
1	-0.014	0.006	-2.210	0.027	-0.026	-0.002
2	-0.004	0.002	-2.180	0.029	-0.007	-0.000
3	0.009	0.004	2.200	0.028	0.001	0.018
4	0.008	0.004	2.200	0.028	0.001	0.015
Ideology						
1	0.015	0.001	17.560	0.000	0.013	0.016
2	0.004	0.000	11.120	0.000	0.003	0.005
3	-0.010	0.001	-16.820	0.000	-0.011	-0.009
4	-0.009	0.001	-17.090	0.000	-0.010	-0.008
Gender						
1	-0.032	0.005	-6.760	0.000	-0.041	-0.023
2	-0.009	0.001	-6.150	0.000	-0.012	-0.006
3	0.022	0.003	6.730	0.000	0.016	0.028
4	0.019	0.003	6.740	0.000	0.013	0.024
Education						
1	0.003	0.001	5.120	0.000	0.002	0.004
2	0.001	0.000	4.790	0.000	0.001	0.001
3	-0.002	0.000	-5.090	0.000	-0.003	-0.001
4	-0.002	0.000	-5.100	0.000	-0.003	-0.001

*Marginal effects in terms of percentage change in probability.

Table 7: Marginal Effects for Model 5 with "inst_supp_binary"

DV = AA	dy/dx	Std.Err.	z	P>z	[95%Conf.	Interval]
Inst_supp_binary						
1	-0.021	0.009	-2.310	0.021	-0.039	-0.003
2	-0.006	0.003	-2.280	0.023	-0.011	-0.001
3	0.014	0.006	2.310	0.021	0.002	0.027
4	0.012	0.005	2.310	0.021	0.002	0.023
Ideology						
1	0.014	0.001	17.530	0.000	0.013	0.016
2	0.004	0.000	11.110	0.000	0.003	0.005
3	-0.010	0.001	-16.790	0.000	-0.011	-0.009
4	-0.009	0.001	-17.070	0.000	-0.010	-0.008
Gender						
1	-0.032	0.005	-6.720	0.000	-0.041	-0.022
2	-0.009	0.001	-6.120	0.000	-0.012	-0.006
3	0.022	0.003	6.690	0.000	0.015	0.028
4	0.019	0.003	6.700	0.000	0.013	0.024
Education						
1	0.003	0.001	5.300	0.000	0.002	0.004
2	0.001	0.000	4.940	0.000	0.001	0.001
3	-0.002	0.000	-5.270	0.000	-0.003	-0.001
4	-0.002	0.000	-5.280	0.000	-0.003	-0.001

*Marginal effects in terms of percentage change in probability.

While these results provide some insight on the presence of legacy effects at the regional level, the Latin American experience with U.S. foreign policy is certainly not uniform, and therefore, more information can be garnered by looking at individual countries. The CIA interventions dataset identifies countries in which the U.S. intervened by supporting already existing regimes and other cases in which the U.S. intervened by installing and then supporting a new political leader. Therefore, in the following section, Argentina is examined as an illustrative example of a country where the U.S. supported an already existing regime; Ecuador is examined as an illustrative example of where the U.S. installed and then supported a new political leader over the course of a short period of time; and Chile is examined as an illustrative example of where the U.S. installed and then supported a political leader over the course of a longer period of time.

Country Analysis

Out of the 18 countries in the Latinobarometer, the Berger (2013b) dataset identifies episodes of "support only" intervention in ten countries, "install and support" intervention in six countries, and no intervention in three countries. Panama is an exception because it is the only country that experienced both types of intervention during this period. Table 7 provides a summary of the duration, type of intervention, and model results for each country in the sample. The third column reports the relationship (whether positive or negative) between the independent variable of interest, "exposure", and the outcome variable, anti-Americanism. Given the more consistent results obtained using the exposure dummy variable, this analysis utilizes "expo_binary" as the independent variable across countries. The last column of the table indicates whether the observed relationship is statistically significant or not. Lastly, the countries highlighted in blue are the illustrative examples that were selected to provide a more in-depth discussion of the observed results in their specific historical context. While the rest of the individual country models are not discussed in this paper, these results can be provided by the author upon request.

Out of the ten countries with support-only interventions, four had positive relationships between exposure and anti-Americanism and five had negative relationships. However, only Peru and Uruguay had statistically significant results and both countries exhibit positive relationships between the variables of interest. The duration of intervention in this group of countries ranges from a single year, as in Colombia, to a period of more than sixty years, as in Panama. It is worth noting here that although these time windows are heavily researched by Berger et al., (2013b), the years are still subject to dispute and inevitably, some might argue that

intervention in certain countries began or ended at different points. More importantly however, the wide range in the possible years of exposure demonstrates that there is still substantial variation amongst countries with the same type of intervention. Given that in this category, there are more negative relationships than positive, Argentina was selected as an illustrative example of a support-only intervention.

Out of the six countries with install-and-support interventions, three demonstrated positive relationships between exposure and anti-Americanism and three demonstrated negative relationships. However, only Brazil and Ecuador demonstrated statistically significant results, and both have positive relationships between the variables of interest. The duration of interventions in this category also varies with shorter periods of five years, as in Ecuador, to longer periods of more than thirty years, as in Guatemala. To capture these mixed results, Ecuador is selected as an example of a shorter intervention with a positive relationship and Chile is chosen as an example of a longer intervention with a negative relationship.

Something to bear in mind when comparing the results of the individual country models to the aggregate analysis is that although overall there are more negative than positive relationships, only the positive relationships are statistically significant. This can explain why at the aggregate level, the observed relationship is positive. The results from the aggregate analysis with respect to higher-intensity interventions are also reflected in the breakdown of results for individual countries with IS episodes. Although there is an even split of positive and negative relationships, the two countries that have significant results are both positive with comparatively lower p-values, meaning the null hypothesis can be rejected with more confidence. The higher proportion of positive relationships and the lower p-values of these results can explain why at the aggregate level, IS interventions have a higher coefficient or stronger relationship with the

outcome variable. In summary, the country level models align with the aggregate analysis when considering that across the board, the countries that have statistically significant results all demonstrate positive relationships between exposure and anti-Americanism.

Table 8: Summary of Country Models

Summary of country models			
Countries by intervention, n = 18	Duration	Exposure and AA	Significance
Support-only interventions			
Argentina	1976 - 82	-	No
Colombia	1962	+	No
Dominican Republic	1930 - 78	-	No
El Salvador	1932 – 2012*		
Honduras	1964 - 88	-	No
Nicaragua	1936 - 79	-	No
Panama	1903 - 68	+	No
Paraguay	1954 - 89	-	No
Peru	1965	+	Yes *
Uruguay	1964 - 83	+	Yes *
Install-and-support interventions			
Bolivia	1964 - 78	-	No
Brazil	1964 - 77	+	Yes ***
Chile	1964 - 70, 1973 - 88	-	No
Ecuador	1963 - 68	+	Yes **
Guatemala	1954 - 85	-	No
Panama	1981 - 87, 1989	+	No
No record of intervention			
Costa Rica			
Mexico			
Venezuela			

*Notes: Data obtained from Latinobarometer 2020 and Berger et al. (2013b). Individual country results can be provided by the author upon request.
*Notes: El Salvador country model is not run because every respondent is coded as (1) exposed. Similarly, models are not run for countries with no intervention because every respondent is coded as (0) not exposed.
*Notes: Detailed discussion of why 2012 was set as the end of intervention in El Salvador can be found in methods section of the paper.

Argentina: “Support-Only” Intervention

The period of intervention in Argentina is identified from 1976 to 1982 which is a relatively brief duration. The onset of this intervention corresponds with U.S. support for the military coup that overthrew Isabel Peron’s government as it struggled to rein in hyperinflation and left-wing guerillas. During this period of military rule, the junta carried out large-scale political persecution campaigns that targeted dissidents in the backdrop of anti-communist agendas. Infamous subversion tactics such as torture, kidnappings, and forced disappearances characterize this period of state terrorism commonly referred to as Argentina’s Dirty War, which resulted in an estimated murder of 30,000 people (Robben, 2012). Despite awareness of human rights abuses, by 1978, the U.S. government had provided trainings to thousands of Argentinian soldiers and more than $250 million in military assistance (Schmidli, 2011). The offset of the intervention or the end of U.S. support for the military regime coincided with its defeat in the Falklands War in 1982.

In comparison to the regional averages, anti-Americanism trends slightly higher in Argentina with a mean score of 2.33. The typical respondent is also slightly more right-leaning and has about two more years of education than at the regional level.

Table 9: Argentina Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
AA	1,048	2.333015	0.9367676	1	4
Age	1,200	42.2225	15.44869	18	96
By_2	1,200	1984.277	15.46436	1931	2009
Expo_num	1,200	2.133333	2.766816	0	6
Expo_binary	1,200	0.3991667	0.4899313	0	1
Ideology	786	5.282443	2.385011	0	10
Gender	1,200	0.53	0.4993073	0	1
Education	1,200	12.81083	3.104795	1	17

*Notes: Data obtained from Latinobarometer 2020 and Berger et al. (2013b).

From this historical context, the working hypothesis of this research would suggest that Argentinians that were alive and lived through this period of intervention, would have developed more negative attitudes toward the U.S. However, as Table 9 demonstrates, in Argentina, the relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism is negative, although not statistically significant. Because the construction of the independent variable of exposure is correlated with age, this relationship is also reflected in the first model where it can be observed that younger Argentinians have higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism. The second model looking at years of exposure demonstrates the same pattern observed at the aggregate level: individuals with less years of exposure have higher odds of demonstrating anti-Americanism. The third model with the general exposure dummy ("expo_binary") is consistent with this finding as those not exposed have higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism. While this does not mimic the results at the aggregate level, this could be due to the challenges posed by specific countries with either no periods of intervention or long periods, as discussed previously. However, these results show this problem is not being observed in Argentina's country model.

In contrast, the subset analyses based on ideology do mimic the results observed at the aggregate level. The fourth model looks at individuals further on the left, for which there are only 197 observations, and out these individuals, those that were exposed to intervention do seem to have higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism, although this is not statistically significant. The fifth model looks exclusively at the Argentinians further on the right of the political spectrum and these results indicate that in this cohort, those with less exposure to intervention have higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism. Conversely, this can be interpreted as those who were exposed have lower odds of expressing negative opinions of the U.S. However, only the result observed for the right is statistically significant at a level of 0.1. This falls in line with the analysis offered on SO interventions which suggested that the right can support American intervention when there is organic opposition that arises domestically. In hindsight, right-leaning respondents who lived through this period and disapproved of leftist movements, could go on to approve American intervention efforts and subsequently develop more positive perceptions of the U.S.

On the whole, the results in Argentina coupled with its historical background makes several points. For one, the negative relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism could indicate that those who lived through this intervention were unsatisfied with the Peronist administration and did not disapprove of U.S.-backed regime change. Alternatively, this observation could also signal that those who were not exposed, generally younger respondents, have other reasons for which to express stronger anti-Americanism. Another possibility that can be garnered from these results, which is an important limitation of this research, is that intervention efforts were often covert and therefore, individuals who lived through these historic

events might have not been aware of the situation that was unfolding and the U.S. government's role in that process.

Table 10: Argentina Country Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Age	Exposure years	Exposure binary	Left exposure	Right exposure
Age	-0.00406				
	(0.00434)				
Ideology	-0.319***	-0.319***	-0.319***		
	(0.0315)	(0.0315)	(0.0315)		
Gender	0.212	0.212	0.215	0.0382	0.284*
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.270)	(0.156)
Education	-0.0126	-0.0125	-0.0118	0.0835*	-0.0794***
	(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0250)	(0.0433)	(0.0273)
Expo_num		-0.0214			
		(0.0240)			
Expo_binary			-0.0872	0.0860	-0.271*
			(0.139)	(0.276)	(0.160)
Observations	740	740	740	197	586

*Regression coefficients reported in log odds
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Ecuador: “Install-and-Support” Intervention

The period of CIA intervention in Ecuador is identified from 1963 to 1968. Prior to intervention, vice-president Carlos Arosemena superseded president José Velasco in 1960 following a split in the coalition. With the success of the Cuban Revolution at the forefront of international politics at the time, countries in the region were faced with increased pressure by the U.S. to cut ties with Cuba. Arosemena’s failure to denounce the communist regime led the CIA to intervene by disseminating propaganda, infiltrating political parties, training police forces, and carrying out attacks that were pinned on left-wing groups (Blum 2004). By 1963, the agency’s operations had successfully antagonized members of the far-right which allowed a U.S. backed junta to come to power. The military regime suspended civil liberties and outlawed the Ecuadorian communist party, although this was an already fragmented organization. Despite undergoing military rule, this period is often referred to as *dictablanda* or “soft dictatorship” considering the junta did not commit extreme human rights abuses in comparison to other countries and elections were restored by 1968, which marks the offset of U.S. intervention.

In comparison to the regional averages, anti-Americanism trends slightly lower in Ecuador with mean score of 2.092. With respect to other indicators, ideology leans more to the left with a lower mean score of 4.577 and respondents have about one more year of education when compared to the regional average. Interestingly, the lower mean score of anti-Americanism and the slight tendency to the left could signal more contemporary processes whereby leftism is not necessarily bound to traditional narratives that depict the U.S. as an imperialist, capitalist power. This raises a relevant point on what leftism currently means in Ecuador and in Latin

America as a whole and whether it has evolved into a different ideological perspective with more nuance when it comes to the region's relationship with the United States.

Table 11: Ecuador Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
AA	1,129	2.092117	0.7428261	1	4
Age	1,200	39.445	15.71956	18	86
By_2	1,200	1986.498	15.69906	1940	2008
Expo_num	1,200	0.6508333	1.594585	0	5
Expo_binary	1,200	0.1566667	0.3636378	0	1
Ideology	915	4.577049	3.024574	0	10
Gender	1,200	0.5108333	0.500091	0	1
Education	1,200	11.7325	3.451213	1	17

*Notes: Variable transformation discussed in methods section. Data obtained from Latinobarometer 2020 and Berger et al. (2013b)

In comparison to Argentina, the case of CIA intervention in Ecuador can be said to be of a higher degree because the U.S. installed *and* supported a political regime. The overarching hypothesis of the investigation suggests that individuals who lived through interventions would express more anti-Americanism than their non-exposed counterparts. A further component of the hypothesis suggested that there would be a stronger relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism in countries where the U.S. intervened to a higher degree, as in the six countries that experienced install-and-support interventions.

The results observed from the country-level model in Ecuador provide a stark contrast to Argentina. In this case study, age is positively correlated with anti-Americanism, although this finding is not statistically significant. However, the second model shows that the number of years of exposure (expo_num) is positively correlated with anti-Americanism and is statistically significant. The third model with the binary variable ("expo_binary) corroborates this finding

and indicates that exposure in general, regardless of the number of years, is associated with more anti-Americanism. There is a much stronger, positive relationship for this third model which suggests that in Ecuador, the number of years of exposure does not necessarily intensify negative opinions of the U.S.

The subset analyses on ideology demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between exposure and anti-Americanism across respondents on both the left and the right. In other words, people on both ends of the political spectrum that lived through intervention tend to rate the U.S. more unfavorably, although neither of these findings are statistically significant. This seems to suggest that in this case, ideology does not moderate the effect of being exposed to intervention.

The results from the country-level models in Ecuador raise several points for consideration. For one, the positive and statistically significant relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism does support the working hypothesis of this investigation. Moreover, this aligns with the additional component of the hypothesis that suggests respondents in countries with install-and-support interventions would demonstrate higher levels of anti-Americanism. These results lend backing to the argument that higher-degree intervention, like foreign imposed regime change, does negatively impact perceptions of the U.S. and can have long-lasting repercussions. Furthermore, as the subsets on ideology demonstrate, this can alienate individuals across the political spectrum, not just those on the left. However, a puzzling piece of this example relates to the historical context and the nature of the regime change in Ecuador. The limited literature on this topic seems to indicate that the U.S.-backed junta in Ecuador was not as authoritarian or extreme when compared to other countries, even Argentina or Chile. Because that is the main causal link driving the hypothesis, this discrepancy raises questions about whether the positive relationship is simply due to the fact that the U.S. intervened to a higher

degree by installing a regime. Alternatively, this could indicate that there are other contributing factors that extend past the scope of this investigation and can provide a more comprehensive explanation of why Ecuadorians that were exposed to intervention are more likely to express anti-Americanism.

Table 12: Ecuador Country Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Age	Exposure years	Exposure binary	Left exposure	Right Exposure
Age	0.00665				
	(0.00450)				
Ideology	-0.0879***	-0.0875***	-0.0876***		
	(0.0231)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)		
Gender	0.397***	0.397***	0.400***	0.264	0.421**
	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.217)	(0.185)
Education	-0.0340	-0.0337	-0.0335	0.00442	-0.0244
	(0.0216)	(0.0213)	(0.0212)	(0.0334)	(0.0276)
Expo_num		0.0826*			
		(0.0444)			
Expo_binary			0.415**	0.328	0.290
			(0.195)	(0.297)	(0.252)
Observations	876	876	876	341	474

*Regression coefficients reported in log odds
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Chile: "Install-and-Support" Intervention

The Berger (2013b) dataset identifies two episodes of CIA intervention in Chile – one from 1964 to 1970 and the other from 1973 to 1988, for a maximum total of 21 years of exposure for any given respondent. Prior to intervention, Salvador Allende, a self-proclaimed socialist, had come within three percent of winning the 1958 presidential election. From this point forward, the CIA began intervening in Chile by employing its set of covert operations – hijacking political parties, splitting leftist coalitions, putting out propaganda, and training locals as anti-communist spokespersons. The CIA also chose to financially support Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party which was a successful endeavor as he beat Allende and won the 1964 election with 56% of the vote (Blum 2004). However, Allende's *Unidad Popular* ran on a popular redistribution campaign and managed to win the following election in 1970 with a plurality vote. An important component of this campaign included the nationalization of private industries, most notably copper mines, which were owned by American corporations. This, along with the general threat of Marxist ideas spreading in the region, motivated the CIA's installment of a military junta led by Augusto Pinochet in 1973.

Evidently, the success of the coup removed the democratically elected president and marked the beginning of a 17-year period of military dictatorship. During this time, the government carried out severe human rights abuses with estimates reporting more than 3,000 deaths, 40,000 political prisoners, and about 200,000 people forced into exile (Harmer, 2016). The creation of a secret police, state-led persecution campaigns like the "Caravan of Death", and the use of a major soccer stadium as a detention center, all convey the environment of terror that came about. Another popularly discussed component of the Pinochet regime is its

implementation of market-based policies and the role of the "Chicago Boys", which were U.S.-trained economists who pushed for privatization of major industries and trade liberalization. Although Chile experienced surges of economic growth during this time, the deregulation of the financial sector encouraged risky and high amounts of borrowing. By 1982, a dramatic increase in interest rates discouraged international trade and as a result, hundreds of Chilean companies and banks went insolvent. The financial crisis triggered high unemployment and inflation, and the percentage of the population living in poverty went up to 55 percent (Davis-Hamel, 2012). For these reasons, Chile is a heavily discussed example of the repercussions of CIA intervention.

It is important to note however, that in terms of orchestrating the military coup, most of direct U.S. involvement consistent of covert economic and political warfare. As in the other country examples, the main tools of intervention included blocking loans and disseminating propaganda through CIA-backed news agencies (Kornbluh, 2003). The end goal was to create an environment that justified a military coup, be it by economic pressure or by instigating fear of socialism. This means that although U.S. foreign policy set the stage for Pinochet's takeover, the U.S. government took a more hands-off approach after the fact.

In comparison to the regional summary statistics, anti-Americanism in Chile runs higher with an average score of 2.353. The average time of exposure to U.S. intervention is eight years which is higher than in the other two illustrative examples and corresponds with the later occurrence of the episodes. With respect to other indicators, ideology leans more left with an average score of 4.556 and the average respondent has about three more years of education than the regional average.

Table 13: Chile Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
AA	1,063	2.352775	0.8661392	1	4
Age	1,200	44.49083	17.00767	18	89
By_2	1,200	1981.39	17.02261	1937	2008
Expo_num	1,200	8.4375	8.689976	0	21
Expo_binary	1,200	0.5933333	0.4914165	0	1
Ideology	689	4.555878	2.116553	0	10
Gender	1,200	0.5375	0.4987996	0	1
Education	1,200	13.52333	2.710888	1	17

*Notes: Variable transformation discussed in methods section. Data obtained from Latinobarometer 2020 and Berger et al. (2013b)

Given the historical context and popular discourse, the results from the country-level analysis in Chile can be considered surprising. As the first model shows, age is negatively correlated with anti-Americanism, meaning that younger respondents are more likely to have negative opinions of the U.S. This runs counter to the results observed at the aggregate level and demonstrates how there exists significant variation at the country level. The second and third models reflect these findings as exposure is also negatively correlated with anti-Americanism, although not statistically significant. The subsets on ideology show that across the left and the right, respondents who were not exposed to intervention tend to express more anti-Americanism. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as respondents on both the left and the right who did not live through intervention tend to hold the more unfavorable opinions of the U.S., although this is not statistically significant. Across the board, respondents in Chile who were exposed to intervention, have lower odds of expressing anti-Americanism. Given the use of Chile as a primary example of the implications and repercussions of U.S. foreign policy errors, this raises an interesting point that runs counter to conventional wisdom and popular narratives about this

country. These results could point to several things – the possibility that not all Chileans disapproved of regime change, especially in the context of widespread fears of socialism, or alternatively, this could signal that younger, "non-exposed" Chileans have more pertinent issues with the U.S. that produce higher levels of anti-Americanism than in their older counterparts.

Table 14: Chile Country Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Age	Exposure years	Exposure binary	Left exposure	Right exposure
Age	-0.00947**				
	(0.00482)				
Ideology	-0.290***	-0.293***	-0.292***		
	(0.0378)	(0.0379)	(0.0378)		
Gender	0.274*	0.276*	0.277*	-0.000198	0.373**
	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.224)	(0.157)
Education	-0.0569*	-0.0507	-0.0459	-0.0204	-0.0850***
	(0.0329)	(0.0329)	(0.0318)	(0.0437)	(0.0297)
Expo_num		-0.0128			
		(0.00920)			
Expo_binary			-0.248	-0.277	-0.170
			(0.160)	(0.239)	(0.160)
Observations	636	636	636	277	591

*Regression coefficients reported in log odds
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

The central question of this research aimed to explore the relationship between individual-level exposure to U.S. intervention and anti-Americanism. The empirical analysis at the aggregate level does provide support for the working hypothesis which suggested that exposure would be positively correlated with anti-Americanism. More specifically, the distinction by the type of intervention also supports an elaboration of the hypothesis which suggested exposure to install-and-support episodes would produce a stronger, positive relationship with anti-Americanism. At moderate significance levels of 0.05, both key models 3 and 5, allow us to reject the null hypotheses and demonstrate there does exist a statistically significant relationship between exposure and anti-Americanism. These models also indicate that the number of years of exposure does not intensify negative opinions of the U.S. which does go against an iteration of the study's hypothesis. Instead, the models indicate that those who were exposed to intervention, regardless of the amount of time, tend to have more negative attitudes of the U.S.

The subsets by ideology aimed to explore whether the left and right can have different reactions to exposure, in relation to their opinions of the U.S. The only statistically significant finding at the aggregate level is that the left, when exposed to general intervention episodes (both SO and IS types), has higher odds of expressing anti-Americanism. This falls in line with a component of the third hypothesis, as individuals on the left who were exposed tend to express higher levels of anti-Americanism. The relationship with the right's exposure and the dependent variable is less consistent and therefore more unclear. While in cases of general intervention, the

left and right seem to have different interpretations of history, when exposed to higher-intensity episodes, both sides seem to converge on their development of more anti-Americanism.

Although results at the aggregate level show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the variables of interest, the individual-country analyses also showcase how this relationship can vary substantially across countries in the region. In fact, at the country level, there is not an overwhelming number of positive relationships between exposure and anti-Americanism. However, the four countries that exhibit statistically significant results are all positive which can explain why the relationship is positive and significant at the aggregate level. Similarly, when looking at the countries with IS episodes specifically, the higher proportion of positive relationships and significant results, could be why at the aggregate level exposure to IS intervention is positively correlated with anti-Americanism with a higher coefficient.

The empirical analysis component of this study faces some major limitations which opens the door to improvements with future research. For one, it is difficult to definitively calculate an individual's years of exposure due to discrepancies on the formal periods of interventions and there are also discrepancies on the minimum threshold for age on what counts or does not count as having "lived through" a major political event. Another important limitation of this research is the inability to adequately control for APC effects. The cross-country variation in the years of intervention does address this concern to a certain degree since there are respondents of different ages who were exposed for similar amounts of time. However, it would be ideal for there to be more variation in this component, and this is something that can be pursued as CIA documents related to post-Cold War interventions continue to be declassified. This would allow the analysis to examine significantly younger respondents who also lived through episodes of intervention and experienced equal amounts of years of exposure as older cohorts, while controlling for age.

The aggregate analysis indicates that exposure does have a positive relationship with anti-Americanism, especially when exposed to higher-degree interventions. This result brings nuance to the discussion of the long-term implications of U.S. foreign policy by showing that the degree of intervention matters. In addition, the findings provide some preliminary evidence to show that historical legacies can be a significant determinant of anti-Americanism at the individual level. Furthermore, this research sheds light on the impact of living through politically destabilizing events and how this individual-level experience can affect political attitudes in the long run. With all this being said, however, the individual country analyses also demonstrate that the relationship of interest does vary across the 18 countries in the sample. This presents what is arguably the most important takeaway of this research and that is that despite the shared experience with U.S. intervention, generalizing the relationship to all countries in Latin America misses important details in the analysis. Conversely, studying this relationship on a country-by-country basis produces a more complete picture and does not treat the region and its constituents as a monolith.

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