Postcolonial Public Administration: A Critical Discourse Analysis

Esteban Santis
University of Central Florida

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POSTCOLONIAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: 
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

by

ESTEBAN L. EONARDO SANTIS
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2012
M.P.A. University of Central Florida, 2020

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Doctoral Program in Public Affairs
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Major Professor: Staci M. Zavattaro
ABSTRACT

Four years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a group of Public Administration scholars met in New York’s Adirondack Mountains to discuss the future of the field. At this gathering, the Minnowbrook I Conference, scholars acknowledged the need for social equity. Today, more than fifty years later, there is still a need for social equity. There is still a need to understand the history and role of oppression within Public Administration. Apropos, in this dissertation, I interrogate oppression, by way of postcolonialism and critical discourse analysis, to learn about the field’s darkness and splendor. This project aims to help administrators reimagine a field and democracy for all. This dissertation is both an exercise in self-reflection and an invitation to become self-conscious about colonialism in our discourse. Explicitly, this project’s central research question is: Does the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD) exhibit colonial discourse as a basis of power? Herein, discourse means a set of relationships between people, institutions, language, and rhetorical practices within Public Administration in the United States, post-1968. To answer the main research question, I used qualitative content analysis to analyze, via NVivo12, a purposive sample of 38 vital journal-length texts from the field. To inform and guide my study, I developed a deductive coding frame for colonial discourse. The frame includes three main categories and seven subcategories: Eurocentrism (Historicism, Developmentalist Fallacy and the Cult of Progress, Parochiality of Scientism, and Orientalism), the Civilizational Mission (Didactic Despotism and Neocolonial Prosperity Mission), and the Colonial Difference (Binarism). Per my qualitative content analysis, across the sample, colonial discourse is commonplace and taken for granted. While several texts challenge colonial discourse, they are often ambivalent in that they attack one dimension of colonial discourse while reinforcing another.
a quienes he amado, amo y amaré—y a mis antepasados desconocidos

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As an undergraduate, I spent my time reading about otherness by way of Anzaldúa, Borges, Césaire, Fanon, Márquez, Plath, and Said, just to name a few. All the while, I met Dr. Cecilia Rodríguez Milanés, a mentor who encouraged and helped me apply to the university’s Ronald E. McNair Post-Baccalaureate Achievement Program. As a McNair scholar, I met Mr. Michael Aldarondo-Jeffries and Mrs. Arlene Ollivierre, who, alongside colleagues like Lilian Milanés (now Dr. Milanés), and Drew Fedorka (now a doctoral candidate at NYU), prepared and inspired me to pursue a doctorate. Although I can trace my doctoral aspirations to my loving admiration for my grandparents, Dr. Hernán Santis Arenas and Dr. Mónica Gangas Geisse, it was not until meeting Dr. Rodríguez Milanés and joining McNair that my aspirations became somewhat tangible.

I say “somewhat” because, albeit prepared, I still needed help. Fortunately, I found assistance in the Florida Education Fund’s McKnight Doctoral Fellowship, the University of Central Florida’s College of Graduate Studies’ McNair Doctoral Fellowship and the Dean’s Dissertation Completion Fellowship, UCF’s Doctoral Program in Public Affairs, and UCF’s School of Public Administration. I also found support in exemplary professors like Dr. Thomas Bryer, Dr. Lynette Feder, Dr. Su-I Hou, Dr. Qian Hu, Dr. Naim Kapucu, Dr. Lawrence Martin, Dr. Matt Nobles, and Dr. Robyne Stevenson. Moreover, I found inspiration and mentorship in my dissertation committee.

I do not remember the exact date, but it had to be a Wednesday evening in the fall of 2016 because that is when Dr. Zavattaro’s advanced seminar in public administration met. Although I do not recall the details of the class discussion, whatever it was, I remember we had a lively, thought-provoking, and energizing conversation. Afterward, I was eager to
continue the conversation. On our way out, Dr. Zavattaro was kind enough to listen as I shared my views, drew my attention to new ideas, and offered keen theoretical insights. Then, overjoyed by the entire experience, I drove home. As a sequence of events, there is nothing unusual about this memory (I am sure that many doctoral students would feel the same way after attending a dynamic class or having a fascinating discussion with a superb professor). However, I hold on to this event as a pivotal and meaningful moment in my academic career because it symbolizes the beginning of Dr. Zavattaro’s mentorship. Since then, Dr. Zavattaro has consistently taken the time to listen, to offer new ideas, and to illuminate my scholarly pursuits. I would not have started this project nor finished it without Dr. Zavattaro at the helm of my committee.

Along with my memory of Dr. Zavattaro’s mentorship, I recall first meeting each one of my committee members because each initial encounter shaped my scholarly outlook. In the spring of 2015, Dr. Connolly Knox attended my advanced public management course, as a guest speaker, and talked to us about Jürgen Habermas, critical theory, and discourse, and how it can all inform public policy analyses. At the time, I knew very little about critical theory in public administration. To me, Dr. Connolly Knox’s presentation inspired me to look into what administrators could learn from other theoretical traditions. Apropos, a year later, in the spring of 2016, I enrolled in Dr. Anderson’s social inquiry and public policy course. I have fond memories of the class due to Dr. Anderson’s openness and student-centered pedagogy and advocacy, as well as Dr. Anderson’s lessons about the philosophy of science and politics of research. To me, these lessons helped me understand the complexity of research designs and processes while guiding me to establish my own critical subjectivity as a scholar.
Later that year, in the fall of 2016, Dr. Zavattaro invited Dr. Marshall to speak at our advanced seminar in public administration via Skype. Dr. Marshall talked to us about the value of critical theory and also mentioned Jacques Derrida and the utility of deconstruction in public administration. After class, I wanted to learn more and proceeded to read Dr. Marshall’s work and reach out via email. Since then, Dr. Marshall has consistently been a supportive guide and, much like Dr. Zavattaro, a source of new ideas and theoretical insights. Finally, in the spring of 2019, while preparing a literature review about postcolonialism in public administration, I found Dr. Gould, one of the few scholars who has written about colonial discourse in the field. In time, I reached out to Dr. Gould, shared the preliminary parameters of my dissertation, and asked if they would be willing to be part of my committee. To my benefit, Dr. Gould agreed and, since then, has helped me make critical adjustments and strengthen this project.

Throughout this doctoral journey, my parents, siblings, friends, and colleagues have helped me tremendously. I am particularly thankful for Viviana Tobar Espejo, Renato Santis Gangas, Fedora Santis, Miguel Santis, Renata Santis, Viviana Herrera, Drew Fedorka, Kevin Mercer, Kristian Steele, Mark Batchelor, Jennifer Sanguiliano Lonski, and Kenan Sualp. They have helped me cope with episodes of impostorism. They have listened to esoteric and, occasionally, nonsensical theoretical arguments. They have reminded me that it is okay to take breaks—if only for an hour or two. Lastly, I must thank Caitlin E. Pierson, my wife, who has been a steadfast partner, editor, colleague, grammar consultant, and confidant.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

About two decades ago, Denhardt (1999) listed the trends that he thought would call into question Public Administration’s ability to manage increasingly complex and dynamic socio-political and cultural conditions effectively. Denhardt’s (1999) prescription for the future of the field was to “put the needs and values of citizens first” (p. 286). Denhardt and Vinzant Denhardt (2000) complement this vision in asserting that “in a democratic society, concerns for democratic values should be paramount in the way we think about systems of governance” (p. 557). Denhardt’s (1999) prescription sought to address the field’s future challenges not as a matter of efficiency but as a matter of democracy. However, as Rice (1999) noted in response, Denhardt (1999) only mentioned diversity and multiculturalism in passing. This is a problematic oversight because, above all other trends, the growing visibility of differences in society exposes the limits of American democracy. That is, democracy “creates unity through exclusion” (Catlaw, 2007, p. 13).

About a decade later, Stivers (2008) called into question Public Administration’s governance in “dark times”—i.e., events like the September 11 attacks, the United States’ military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Hurricane Katrina (see also Stivers, 2004). Accordingly, Stivers (2008) argued that the main obstacle all administrators face is the erosion of active and vibrant public spaces wherein “citizens engage with the issues of the day” (p. 3; see also Nabatchi, Goerdel, & Peffer, 2011). To manage dark times, Stivers (2008) implored administrators to be mindful, critical, and committed to freedom (p. 153). Nabatchi’s (2010) assertion that public administrators ought to “work toward (re)discovering the public” complements this vision (p. S311). Stivers’s (2008) prescription sought to instill a sense of urgency, and, like Denhardt (1999), underscore the importance of democracy.
In these prescriptions, a fundamental supposition is that, by working toward (re)establishing democracy, public administrators can effectively manage dark times and be mindful of differences. This is a difficult pill to swallow if one considers that today’s dark times lose their luster or darkness when compared to the expulsion of Indigenous peoples from their native land(s) and slavery in both colonial America and the newly independent United States. Indeed, the erosion of active and vibrant public spaces is hardly surprising if one considers the exclusion of African, Indigenous, and women voices from the colonial and post-1776 American public sphere. Even discussions about climate change today tend to neglect the global impact colonization had on surface air temperatures due to the death of 55 million Indigenous peoples across the Americas (Koch, Brierley, Maslin, & Lewis, 2019). This is all to say that while public spaces in the United States have incrementally become more inclusive,¹ the field’s language about the promise of democracy, as a bastion of civic freedom and engagement, obscures the wicked history of exclusion in American democracy.

As these prophecies and prescriptions show, a standard solution in American Public Administration is a return to or a call for more democracy, usually without a discussion about the violent history of exclusion in the United States. Alas, the idea of (re)discovering, (re)establishing, or (re)turning to idyllic democratic values is problematic because it obfuscates a dark historical reality. Since its inception, American democracy has perpetuated colonial systems of oppression (e.g., African slavery) and functioned through a logic of exclusion (e.g., rendering Indigenous peoples invisible and exterminating them to usurp territory). As an ideal, American democracy is a limitless and inclusive utopia (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 164-169).

¹ Some of the key events that have made the American public sphere more welcoming include the re-founding of the nation through the Reconstruction Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments) following the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Unfortunately, in practice, American democracy has been “bathed in tears and blood” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 167). This is not to say that democracy (as an ideal) ought to be abandoned. Instead, American democracy ought to be remembered in all its darkness and splendor to help Public Administration and public administrators imagine a democracy for all.

This is not an unheard-of prospect for the field. Four years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “a group of public administration scholars in the United States met [in New York’s Adirondack Mountains] to reflect on the implications of the social and environmental circumstances for our discipline” (Blessett, Dodge, Edmond, Goerdel, Gooden, Headley, Riccucci, & Williams, 2019, p. 283). At this meeting (the Minnowbrook I Conference), scholars recognized the importance and want of social equity in Public Administration (see Frederickson, 2010; Gooden & Portillo, 2011; O’Leary, Van Slyke, & Kim, 2010). At the time, Frederickson (2010) argued that “the procedures of representative democracy … operate in a way that either fails or only very gradually attempts to reverse systematic discrimination against disadvantaged minorities” (p. 7). Hence, Frederickson (2010) called for a Public Administration committed to changing “policies and structures that systematically inhibit social equity” (p. 8).

Today, more than fifty years after Minnowbrook I, Blessett et al. (2019) argue that “as a discipline and practice, we have not adequately anchored social equity to the foundation of public administration, and thus a call to action is warranted” (p. 283). Social equity continues to be a critical need and aspiration in Public Administration, a need and want that is tied to a democratic future for all. Johnson and Svara (2011) posit that social equity “embodies the goal that the members of all social groups will have the same prospects for success and the same opportunity to be protected from the adversities of life” (p. 3). Social equity, then, is a matter
of remembering American democracy to rectify its broken promises. It follows that without an emphasis on social equity, American democracy will continue to be haunted by its ignoble past. In all of this, Public Administration plays a vital role because public administrators, as Frederickson (2005, 2010, pp. 50-54) and Johnson and Svara (2011, pp. 6-12) affirm, are responsible for carrying out laws for and on behalf of the public. Therefore, the field has an essential duty to uphold, to research, to teach, and to practice social equity. Apropos, Blessett et al. (2019) offer a “Social Equity Manifesto” with seven duties to promote social equity in Public Administration, notably five through seven, directly from the manifesto:

V. **Violations of equity are contrary to democracy.** As researchers, we should be more conscious of the questions we ask, the paradigms/frameworks/theories we use and propose, and the implications of our research as it pertains to equity. As practitioners, a democratically responsible administration includes passionate action that is equitable, inclusive, intentional, person-centered, and encapsulated by an ethos of care. (p. 296)

VI. **As a whole, academic programs of public administration are not currently equipping or preparing the future of public administrators for the practical work of equity in public service.** Public administration programs need core courses focused centrally on equity that are not relegated to “special topics” courses or electives. In addition, equity concepts, processes, issues, and outcomes should be incorporated within every core class in public administration curricula. (p. 296)

VII. **Practitioners are fundamental actors in extending democracy and promoting equity.** Administrators must be committed to and manifest the ideals of democracy, justice, and equity for all citizens through their actions, professional development, and engagement with all individuals and communities. As practitioners, the upper levels of management with promotion authority need to create pipelines to promote social equity at the higher levels of government. (p. 296)

The connection between social equity, democracy, and Public Administration is clear. Blessett et al. (2019) affirm that the “challenge now is to deliver action with all deliberate speed” (p. 297). The challenge is to uphold, to research, to teach, to foster, and to practice social equity.

This dissertation answers this call. More than fifty years after Minnowbrook I, this project sets
out to interrogate colonial oppression in the field’s discourse and, in turn, consider new possibilities for social equity.

This dissertation focuses on the legacy of European modernity and colonialism in American Public Administration, with an emphasis on the field’s discourse and intellectual history after Minnowbrook I (i.e., post-1968), to elucidate colonial dilemmas in the field if any. This postcolonial deconstruction of the field means to unearth and understand dimensions of colonial discourse and oppression across 38 key journal-length texts through qualitative content analysis. Colonial discourse solidifies the position of presumed Euro-American-superiority over supposed Non-Euro-American-inferiority. Today, understanding colonial discourse is essential and prompt because public administrators must answer difficult questions about the politics of inclusion and exclusion in American democracy.

### A Matter of Discourse

Specifically, this dissertation interrogates the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD) vis-à-vis colonialism (or colonial discourse), which has important implications for how extant public administrators uphold, research, teach, foster, and practice social equity. *Discourse*, as Fairclough (2013) argues, is a:

> Complex set of relations including relations of communication between people who talk, write and in other ways communicate with each other, but also, for example, describe relations between concrete communicative events (conversations, newspaper articles, etc.) and more abstract and enduring complex discursive “objects” (with their

---

2. For example, who does the public interest represent? Who does “We the People” exclude? What does it mean to reduce unfairness, injustice, and inequality? These are far from inconsequential questions. Consider, for instance, contemporary far-right extremism underpinned by an ideology of white supremacy, attacks against groups like the LGBTQ+ (e.g., the Pulse Nightclub shooting) and the Latinx communities (El Paso shooting), the mass incarceration of African Americans, and the imprisonment of children, in cages, at Migrant Detention Centers.
own complex relations) like languages, discourses and genres. But there are also rela-
tions between discourse and other such complex “objects” including objects in the
physical world, persons, power relations and institutions, which are interconnected
elements in social activity or praxis. (p. 3)

Essentially, discourse is a set of relationships between people, institutions, language, and
power. Moreover, discourse is a social process because when people communicate, they do so
in ways that are socially shaped and socially shaping—in other words, discourse is “meaning,
and making meaning” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 3). Discourses, as Fairclough (2013) adds, “are
ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” (p. 93). This view of
discourse builds from Foucault’s (1969/1972, 1976/1978) notion that power relations mediate
the production of discourse and (re)create norms about what can be and cannot be said and
known. Ultimately, these norms effectively (de)limit imagination and praxis in the form of
“orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 26).

Conceptually, orders of discourse outline what is (in)appropriate within a community
of knowledge, and, in turn, compliance (re)affirms the orders of discourse. This tautological

3. It is important to note that Public Administration scholars also approach discourse by way of Jürgen Habermas.
As Connolly Knox (2013) notes:

Habermas clearly distinguishes between action and discourse in his theory of communicative
rationality [emphasis added]. When individuals engage in discourse, they consciously and
unconsciously bring into the discussion their assumptions, values, and beliefs, and rely on a set of
normative expectations; yet, the majority of them cannot provide reasons for their values, beliefs,
and norms if so prompted (de Haven-Smith, 1988). Discourse is a form of communication “removed from
contexts of experience and action” and in which all motives “except that of the cooperative search for truth are
excluded” [emphasis added] (Habermas, 1975, pp. 107-108). (p. 271)

This view of discourse emphasizes the search for truth through cooperation, which leads to a kind of
emancipation that is without deception, self-deception, and domination (see Connolly Knox, 2013, p. 271). The
difference between this view of discourse and this project’s own use of discourse, by way of Fairclough (2013)
and Foucault (1969/1972, 1976/1977, 1976/1978), is that it denies the possibility of excluding all forms
deception, self-deception, and domination. Instead, this project interprets discourse as an ongoing power struggle
(or process) that may lead to liberation through a self-conscious commitment to constantly (re)assess power
dynamics. Although there is a distinction, it is also important to note that, ultimately, both projects envision
possibilities for emancipation or liberation in how people communicate.
process mediates social dynamics within a community of knowledge. Considering this view of discourse, and for this dissertation, the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD) ought to be understood as a complex web of communicative relations and events within and between:

- stakeholders (i.e., individual actors, “social subjects”) talking, writing, or finding other ways to communicate about Public Administration in the United States;
- institutions of Public Administration like professional associations, including the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), and the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA), and academic journals, all mainly concerned with Public Administration in the United States;
- the language in communicative exchanges, which in American Public Administration is predominantly English; and
- “power,” which one can understand as naturalized (or taken-for-granted) meanings and practices.

In APAD, power implies naturalized conventions, which, as Fairclough (2013) argues, function to foster a group’s dominance, or hegemony, over social interactions. To elaborate and evoke Fairclough (2013), APAD can be said to embody specific knowledge and beliefs about the types of social subjects (e.g., stakeholders like scholars and students talking, writing, or finding ways to discuss Public Administration in the U.S.) that participate in the practice of Public Administration. In addition to social subjects, APAD includes specific views about the relationships between categories of participants (e.g., between practitioners and citizens, politicians and practitioners, and academics and students).

These established beliefs—call them discursive formations, orders of discourse, or simply discourse conventions—are neither benign nor apolitical, rather, they are “a most effective mechanism for sustaining and reproducing cultural and ideological dimensions of hegemony” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 128). Without disruptions or attempts to denaturalize or
replace existing taken-for-granted conventions, it follows that APAD will continue to foster the dominant ideology or ideologies currently in place. Apropos, this dissertation interrogates whether colonialism is one of these ideologies.

On Becoming Self-Conscious

By now, to invoke Farmer (1999), “it should be relatively uncontroversial that our own individual patterns of thinking are largely shaped by the style of a discipline, an era, or a geographical era” (p. 306). Broadly, this dissertation is an exercise in what Farmer (1999) calls a “self-conscious style.”

PA [Public Administration] discourse should become even more self-conscious about style, as a ground-clearing step in facilitating thinking about complex problem areas … The PA writer, actor, and reader should be conscious (self-conscious) of the significance and implications of the recognizable styles in which claims are made and acts are done. The style of PA discourse is no less significant than, for example, styles of teaching, of playing games, and of practicing medicine. Furthermore, a self-conscious style opens up the prospect of reshaping and broadening the scope and functioning of traditional PA—beyond, for instance, a micro, rationalizing, and efficiency mechanism that serves the power interests in society. (p. 303)

What Farmer (1999) calls “styles” could be reframed as discourses vying for power (i.e., naturalization, ossification, or to be taken for granted). The PA writer, actor, and reader is one of the many stakeholders (or social subjects) that takes part in American Public Administration. Moreover, the act of “open[ing] up the prospect of reshaping and broadening the scope and functioning of traditional PA” is a matter of denaturalization (Farmer, 1999, p. 303). All in all, the value of a self-conscious approach to APAD is that it offers a holistic view of complex social problems.
Against the backdrop of the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD) and Farmer’s (1999) advocacy for a self-conscious style, this dissertation interrogates the role of colonialism by way of colonial discourse. Of course, the act of examining colonial discourse in APAD presupposes a conceivable link between colonialism and APAD, an assumption that raises critical conceptual questions: (1) What is colonial discourse? (2) Is there a historical or theoretical basis for an analysis of colonial discourse in APAD? (3) Is colonialism, by way of colonial discourse, harmful today in a post-colonial era? Here, it is essential to note that colonial discourse is but one style that may or may not inhibit/inhabit APAD.

What is Colonial Discourse?

While this project owes conceptual gratitude to both Stivers’s (1993, 1995, 2000, 2002) feminist approach and postmodern analyses of language (Farmer, 1995, 1999), this dissertation is also rooted in Edward Said’s (1979) assertion that the United States is like Britain and France since it uses “Orientalism” to position itself above others. Accordingly, Said (1979) defines “Orientalism” as:

A library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply a positive doctrine [emphasis added]. (p. 42)

Orientalism is both theory and political praxis. It is a family of durable ideas, a set of values that imposes limits about what can and cannot be said and known about the non-Occidental,
non-European, non-Western other. Furthermore, it affirms the presumed inferiority of the East or South and the supposed superiority of the West or North.

Orientalism alludes to a complex web of communicative relations and events within and between “supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles [emphasis added]” (Said, 1979, p. 2). It is a discourse “whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’)” (Said, 1979, p. 43). In short, Said’s (1979) Orientalism is an example of colonial discourse.4 Concerning the significance of colonial discourse in contemporary scholarship, Said (1979) argues that:

There is no avoiding the fact that even if we disregard the Orientalist distinctions between “them” and “us,” a powerful series of political and ultimately ideological realities inform scholarship today. No one can escape dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist; on the contrary, contemporary Orientalism teaches us a great deal about the intellectual dishonesty of dissembling on that score, the result of which is to intensify the divisions and make them both vicious and permanent. (p. 327)

Thus, in colonial discourse lie rhetorical strategies that help to solidify the colonial position of presumed Euro-American-superiority over supposed Non-Euro-American-inferiority.

4. Note that Said (1979) also argues that American, British, and French Orientalist scholarship (i.e., social subjects talking, writing, or finding ways to talk about the “Orient”) perpetuates Orientalism. In other words, the use of colonial discourse is commonsensical among these scholars. Concerning the American context, Said (1979) claims that, since World War II and the Arab-Israeli wars, the United States has become the preeminent global imperial power—an imperium that deploys colonial discourse in the form of popular images like cartoons, films and television, books and articles, and social science reports to position itself above the Arab Muslim (Said, 1979, pp. 284-328). This is all to say that in one form or another (whether it is scholarship or popular culture), colonial discourse carries on.
As Gould (2007) points out, the U.S. began as a colonial possession of England, and, post-independence, it proved its colonial patrimony by fighting France and Spain for control of North America. After that, the U.S. justified the occupation and annexation of Indigenous lands through claims of manifest destiny. Arguably, colonialism has had a genuine impact on the United States, and, as Said (1979) argues, avoiding colonial dilemmas may intensify and ossify colonial discourse.

In Public Administration, several scholars do acknowledge the impact of colonialism on administrative praxis. Accordingly, colonial-era decisions about human resources, leadership, and bureaucratic structures have had a profound effect on post-independence (or post-colonial) administration in Ghana (Haruna, 2004), Malaysia (Haque, 2003), Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2015; Smith, 1972), Singapore (Cheung, 2006), Zambia (Lungu, 1982), and several other African and South Asian countries (Haque, 2007; Ikeanyibe, 2016; Jreisat, 2010). Scholars also note that public policies like Australia’s Redfern-Waterloo redevelopment efforts in Sydney (Morgan, 2012), the plan to restore the state of Louisiana following the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe (Gould, 2007), the United States’ “Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere” (HOPE VI) initiative to offer more mixed-income housing (Fraser, Burns, Bazuin, & Oakley, 2012), and American local governments’ diversity programs (Harris, 2012), can perpetuate colonialism.

Given the impact of colonialism on administrative praxis and public policies, scholars also raise the need to decolonize or disrupt and replace colonial conventions. Case studies from Bolivia (Bomberry, 2008), Canada (Nelles & Alcantara, 2011), and the United States (Cantzler
& Huynh, 2016; Madrigal, 2001) all highlight examples of decolonization efforts. Nevertheless, while the scholars above all acknowledge the impact of colonialism, colonial discourse in Public Administration scholarship—i.e., a project akin to Said’s (1979) study of Orientalist scholarship—is still unexamined.

**Is Colonial Discourse Harmful Today in a Post-Colonial Era?**

As shown in Table 1, *post-colonial*, as used throughout this dissertation, is meant to signal a state of independence. As such, the “post-” in post-colonial is a temporal marker that points to a shift from colonial occupation or domination to autonomy and self-governance. However, post-colonial is not synonymous with *post-colonialism*, a term which implies decolonization after colonial rule. Which is to say that post-colonial governance does not beget the end of a colonial mindset. Post-colonialism, then, sees resistance even after the colonial fact.

In contrast, the unbroken terms *postcolonial* and *postcolonialism* abandon historical markers and shift the focus to the immediate impact of colonialism. As Gandhi (2019) explains, whereas post-colonialism implies a “decisive temporal marker of the decolonising process, others fiercely query the implied chronological separation between colonialism and its aftermath—on the grounds that the postcolonial condition is inaugurated with the onset rather than the end of colonial occupation [emphasis added]” (After Colonialism section). This dissertation uses post-colonial to denote a chronological shift (i.e., from colonial occupation to independence in governance) and postcolonial(ism) to mean theories and arguments, beginning at the onset rather than the end of colonial rule, antithetical to colonialism and colonial discourse.
Table 1: Making sense of the “post” in “post-colonial,” “post-colonialism,” and “postcolonialism”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Usage and Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonial</td>
<td>• The hyphenated “post-” is a chronological or historical marker that denotes the shift from a state of colonial oppression (the “colonial”) to a state of independence (the “post-colonial”).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Post-colonialism           | • The hyphenated “post-” is a chronological or historical marker that denotes the need to counter colonial practices or theories (“colonialism”) after the moment of independence (“post-colonialism”).  
• This is decolonization after the colonial moment. |
| Postcolonial & Postcolonialism | • The unbroken or unhyphenated “post” in “postcolonial” and “postcolonialism” abandons chronological or historical markers. These terms denote the need to go beyond colonial oppression, practices, and theories, beginning at the onset of colonial occupation and into the state of independence.  
• Unlike the hyphenated terms, the unbroken terms call for decolonization before, during, and after the colonial moment. |

So, is colonialism harmful in a post-colonial era? As an issue of semantics, a post-colonial period points to a shift in governance. It does not lead to the end of colonialism nor colonial discourse. The harm of colonialism, by way of colonial discourse, in a post-colonial period is that it is easy to treat it as a problem of yesteryears, such that it both remains obscure and taken for granted and intensifies and ossifies. Therefore, Gandhi (2019) defines postcolonialism as a “theoretical resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath [emphasis added]. It is a disciplinary project devoted to the academic task of revisiting, remembering, and, crucially, interrogating the colonial past” (After Colonialism section).

The several scholars that interrogate colonialism in Public Administration are all engaged in postcolonialism. Postcolonialism, as a project, is refusing to allow colonial dilemmas to persist unnoticed. Per Said (1979), if colonial discourse continues to play a role in the United States, “then we must be prepared to note how in its development and
subsequent history Orientalism [or colonial discourse] deepened and even hardened” (Said, 1979, p. 42). Extant scholars have started the postcolonial conversation by interrogating colonial praxis. However, this revolutionary push to disrupt colonial discourse may remain incomplete without a self-conscious assessment of the field’s relationship with colonialism.

**Research Questions**

Colonialism, by way of colonial discourse, may or may not have power in APAD. While scholars have shown an association between administrative praxis and colonialism, the usage of colonial discourse in APAD is still uncharted territory. Consequently, this dissertation plans to start this journey. Of course, this is more than a rhetorical exercise, as Stivers (2002) notes, “altering the composition of the public administration ‘choir’ will do little unless its members become conscious of the need to sing different tunes from the ones currently in the repertoire” (p. 13). Indeed, part of adopting Farmer’s (1999) self-conscious style means realizing that orders of discourse can limit:

- the way administrators think about their role in American governance and political life,
- the field’s scholarly dialogue,
- conventional wisdom in administrative agencies,
- administrative norms, and
- administrators’ sense of “what it might be possible to think, say, and do about administrative governance in the future” (Stivers, 2000, p. 3).

*Power* (i.e., naturalized meanings and practices) in APAD can make it so “the same old issues [are] discussed in the same old ways they [have] been for years, with the same old positions
being taken and miscommunicated … as the only possibility for [the field’s] discourse” (McSwite, 1997, p. 6). If colonial discourse has power in APAD and if it has ossified or congealed, then the stakeholders, the institutions, and the language of American Public Administration may remain limited to the same old colonial positions and possibilities. In effect, the field may remain confined to practices that further marginalize individuals based on colonial rhetorical practices. In other words, if a colonial discourse is active in APAD, and if it has been obscured or forgotten, then it is likely that colonial dilemmas have both hardened over time and suppressed postcolonial possibilities for social equity in Public Administration.

how language about gender can impact and limit knowledge production and performance in the field.

According to Stivers (2002), “gender is tied to race and class; gender’s importance is not as the sole source of domination but as a lens that enables one to see things that other lenses miss” (p. 5). In addition to illuminating things that other lenses miss, another benefit of using different critical lenses is that pluralism increases “the range and flexibility of our disciplinary thinking, permitting more success in thinking about multifaceted and complex issues” (Farmer, 1999, p. 317). Thus, to build on Stivers’s (1993, 1995, 2000, 2002) work, and to contribute to pluralism in the field, it is pertinent to consider what a postcolonial lens can reveal about APAD. Whereas Stivers (1993, 1995, 2000, 2002) elucidates dilemmas of gender in American Public Administration, the purpose of this dissertation is to illuminate colonial dilemmas, if any, in APAD by way of the following main- and sub-research questions:

1. Does the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD) exhibit colonial discourse as a basis of power?
   a. What are the colonial orders of discourse (as in themes, patterns, and rhetorical strategies) in APAD?
   b. Does APAD challenge, reinforce, or ignore colonial discourse?

Answers to these questions are far from inconsequential. Instead, they function as disrupters and efforts to denaturalize the possible influence of colonial discourse. Because, without disruptions, it follows that APAD may continue to foment colonial dynamics, all of which raises critical issues for American administrative consciousness and praxis vis-à-vis social equity.
About the Questions

Following Marshall and Rossman’s (2016) recommendations for qualitative inquiry, this dissertation’s guiding research questions are general enough to warrant exploration but focused enough to frame the scope of analysis: colonial discourse. Furthermore, Agee (2009) suggests that qualitative research questions ought to “articulate what a researcher wants to know about the intentions and perspectives of those involved in social interactions” (p. 432). As mentioned, within the framework of APAD, power functions to solidify a group’s dominance over social interactions. Hence, APAD can be understood to embody durable ideas about the types of stakeholders that take part in the practice of American Public Administration as well as the relationships between stakeholders. This dissertation’s research questions interrogate whether power in APAD includes colonialism.

Specifically, this dissertation’s research questions are exploratory and liberatory in scope. Exploratory questions, according to Marshall and Rossman (2016), set out to investigate little-understood phenomena, discover important categories of meaning, and generate hypotheses for future study. While there is a connection between colonialism and administrative praxis, the role of colonial discourse in APAD and its grammar is still unexamined. Consequently, for this investigation, it is apropos to ask exploratory questions to develop a detailed description of colonialism in APAD and its grammar, if any.

Marshall and Rossman (2016) also mention that, in terms of purpose, “the researcher can assert taking action as part of the intention of the proposed study … [they] can assert empowerment … as a goal, but [they] can only, at best, discuss how the inquiry may create opportunities for empowerment” (p. 78). If the goal is to create opportunities and the will to
engage in social action, Marshall and Rossman (2016) suggest using *emancipatory* questions. Although this project aims to explore colonial rhetoric, all of which may effectively open the door to new opportunities for empowerment in APAD, the research questions should not be labeled “emancipatory” at face value. Mignolo (2007) argues that the “concept of ‘emancipation’, as Dussel implies, belongs to the discourse of the European enlightenment and it is used today within that same tradition” (p. 454). This is problematic because projects linked to the Enlightenment often do not see modernity’s colonial baggage (an issue discussed in Chapter 2). Due to this project’s postcolonial intentions, the research questions should be understood primarily as *liberatory* in that they set out to disrupt and denaturalize colonial thinking.

**Sample**

This dissertation looks at APAD vis-à-vis colonial discourse, with an emphasis on the field’s discourse and intellectual history after Minnowbrook I (i.e., post-1968). This project uses qualitative content analysis to analyze, via NVivo12, a purposive sample of 38 key journal-length texts from the field, published between 1968 and 2012, to answer this study’s research questions. This is a postcolonial project to revisit, remember, and interrogate the legacy of colonialism in American Public Administration. Per the initial framework, APAD is a complex web of communicative relations and events. Due to APAD’s complexity, it is possible to use countless approaches to investigate the multifaceted dynamics of discourse, and it is possible to use many theoretical lenses, methodologies, and foci.
Notably, in Farmer’s (1995) *The Language of Public Administration: Bureaucracy, Modernity, and Postmodernity*, the focus is on “the canon or set of literature accepted by the public administration discipline” (p. 29). Moreover, Farmer’s (1995) goal is to disrupt “the set of assumptions and social constructions that constitute the theoretical lens through which [stakeholders] see” and speculate about administrative alternatives (p. 12). Similarly, in *Legitimacy in Public Administration: A Discourse Analysis*, McSwite (1997) scrutinizes texts representative of the field’s intellectual history and disrupts naturalized meanings and practices, typified by the “men of reason” rhetoric, about administrative legitimacy in democratic governance (pp. 152-237). Lastly, Stivers’s (2000, see also 1995) feminist critique of texts from the New York Bureau of Municipal Research is another example of just how diverse the study of APAD can be.

**Plan of Inquiry**

In any social science like Public Administration, there are “various ontological, epistemological, and methodological bases for conducting research” (Riccucci, 2010, p. 51). As Raadschelders (2011) explains, ontological suppositions implicate the nature of reality, epistemological suppositions implicate the philosophy of what people can know, and methodological suppositions involve the “practice of how we can know and thus [focus] on methods” (p. 918). Ontology, epistemology, and methodology are profoundly interconnected (Raadschelders, 2011; Riccucci, 2010), such that: “ontology generates theories about what can be known (epistemology), how knowledge can be produced (methodology), and what research practices can be employed (methods)” (Raadschelders, 2011, p. 920). It follows that in any
research project, there ought to be symbiosis and transparency about ontological, epistemological, and methodological suppositions. Therefore, to answer this dissertation’s research questions, this project embraces a dynamic-plural-immanent-relational ontology, which supports a philosophy of knowledge rooted in interpretivism and social constructionism, as the basis for a Critical Discourse Analysis (methodology) via qualitative content analysis (method).

*Ontological Supposition: Differentiated Relational Ontology*

Stout (2012) explains that ontologies are “theories of existence that generally stem from philosophy, religion, or physics” (p. 389; see also White, 1999, pp. 11-12). According to Stout and Love (2015), ontologies can be either: static or dynamic, whole or plural, transcendent or immanent, and individualistic or relational (see also Stout, 2012, p. 389):

In regard to state of existence, *static state* means that existence simply is (Being), while *dynamic state* means that existence is continually becoming (being). In regard to source of existence, *transcendent* means that the source of being is beyond that which exists, while *immanent* means the source of being is within that which exists. In regard to expression of existence, *singular* means that the source of being is complete (One)—It cannot be broken apart in some way, while *plural* means that there are many sources of being (Many). (Stout & Love, 2015, p. 451)

Furthermore, *individualistic* means that being is contained within itself, and *relational* means that separate beings are connected (Stout, 2012, p. 389). Germane to this dissertation’s plan of inquiry, it is important to note that an assumption of a static existence begets foundationalism and, therefore, requires rational empiricism (Stout & Love, 2015, p. 454). In foundational ontologies, generalization (about the One) is possible because people are either presumed to be imperfect-individual-copies (beings) of the same complete-whole-source (One) or related
representatives of the whole such that “the source of being (One) is both beyond and within all beings (one)” (Stout, 2012, p. 390). The role of the researcher, then, is to approximate the capital T-Truth (i.e., the complete-whole-source) by way of logic or “systematic observation of the natural world, for example, evidence” (Stout & Love, 2015, p. 455).

In contrast, an assumption of a dynamic existence begets anti-foundationalism (or antiessentialism) and looks for coherence, outside of presumed capital T-Truths, in lower t-truths or, to an extreme, in nothing. In anti-foundationalist ontologies, generalization can be possible given an important caveat: lower t-truth can be “coherent [only] within a given place and point in time; it is situation dependent and socially constructed” (Stout & Love, 2015, p. 455). Ultimately, this dissertation adopts a dynamic/plural/immanent/relational ontology, what Stout (2012) calls a “differentiated relational” ontology that supports anti-foundationalism, interpretivism, social constructivism, and context-dependent generalizations.

Epistemological Supposition: Interpretivism and Social Constructionism

As noted, a belief in a dynamic existence supports anti-foundationalism and an understanding (instead of discovering) of lower t-truths derived from human (inter)actions. This dissertation’s epistemological position favors an interpretive approach (see Schwandt, 1998; Yanow, 2000). According to Yanow (2000), interpretive philosophies (e.g., hermeneutics) “contend that human meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings are embodied in and transmitted through artifacts of human creation, such as language, dress, patterns of action and interaction, written texts or built spaces [emphasis added]” (p. 14). Hence, interpretivists argue that it is possible to study (or interpret) human artifacts (e.g., language, music, art, literature, architecture,
acts and interactions, physical objects) to understand the “intentions underlying actors’ practical reasoning in particular situations” (Yanow, 2000, p. 23). It is important to note, as Schwandt (1998) does, that interpretivism started as a reaction to “the effort to develop a natural science of the social” (p. 236), i.e., the misapplication of the natural science model in the social sciences (as in Public Administration; see Raadschelders, 2011, p. 918). As such, interpretivism is an umbrella term for various anti-foundational epistemological positions (see also Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2018; Schwandt, 1998).

One such position, in line with Yanow’s (2000) interpretivist public policy analysis with a hermeneutical bent, is social constructionism. Per social constructionism, life is pluralistic in “the sense that reality is expressible in a variety of symbol and language systems” (Schwandt, 1998, p. 236). Life is also plastic in “the sense that reality is stretched and shaped to fit purposeful acts of intentional human agents” (Schwandt, 1998, p. 236). Additionally, Schwandt (1998) notes that social constructivists “assume that what we take to be self-evident kinds (e.g., man, woman, truth, self) are actually the product of complicated discursive practices [emphasis added]” (p. 236). This perspective assumes that what can be known is accessible through language and discourse. Moreover, any form of communication, due to its connection to language, is open to situational interpretation. Hence, this project embraces social constructionism, as a kind of interpretivism with a strong hermeneutical inclination, to guide what can be known about colonial discourse in Public Administration.
Methodological Supposition: Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis

In Public Administration, interpretivism and social constructionism found a home in the work of postmodern scholars throughout the 1990s (see Bogason, 2001; Burnier, 2005; McSwite, 2000; Spicer, 2005) and, after that, in narrative inquiry (see Dodge, Ospina, & Foldy, 2005; Feldman, Sköldberg, Brown, & Horner, 2004; Ospina & Dodge, 2005a, 2005b). In narrative inquiry, researchers seek to interpret people’s stories to understand why they told the story and what they, the storyteller, meant (Feldman et al., 2004, p. 148). From a social constructionist standpoint, narrative inquiry:

Operates at different and connected levels. At one level, such constructionism takes in the interactional co-constructions that operate between stories within any one text, including, perhaps, between stories of different kinds, and even perhaps between conscious and preconscious or unconscious stories (Hollway and Jefferson, 2004). The power relations that are played out within stories (Phoenix, 2008) are also considered as part of co-construction processes. By addressing stories as co-constructed, or dialogically constructed (Bakhtin, 1981), this constructionist approach stresses the constantly changing elements in the construction of narratives rather than reading them as finished products of particular circumstances that may change over time. (Esin, Fathi, & Squire, 2014, p. 205)

Therefore, what is important is that narratives are co-constructed (by the interplay between interpersonal, social, cultural, and power relations) and can help researchers:

i. understand some phenomenon from the perspective of the person/people experiencing it (Dodge et al., 2005, p. 291),

ii. surface tacit knowledge or shared theories in use (Dodge et al., 2005, p. 291),

iii. enhance practice or draw lessons from practice (Dodge et al., 2005, p. 291),

iv. unveil implicit shared meanings (Dodge et al., 2005, p. 291), or

v. offer alternative interpretations of accepted views (Dodge et al., 2005, p. 291).

These options, as Dodge et al. (2005) explain, highlight just how varied narrative inquiry is.

Ospina and Dodge (2005a) affirm narrative inquiry (regardless of its intent, i-v above) focuses
on "narratives and stories as they are told [emphasis added], implicitly or explicitly, by individuals or groups of people, not on texts that are independent of the tellers or institutions where they are scripted" (p. 145).

Of course, one could argue, as White (1999) does, that "all research is fundamentally a matter of storytelling or narration. Any type of knowledge … that we might have about public administration is basically a story grounded in language and discourse and expressed in narrative form through conversations" (p. 6). If all communication is rooted in language and discourse, then all communicative acts (e.g., telling a story, or writing a research report, or taking a photograph) are open to interpretation. Consequently, it is possible to go beyond stories-and-narratives-as-text toward texts-as-stories-and-narratives to: (i) understand some phenomenon from the perspective of the writer, (ii) surface tacit knowledge or shared theories, (iii) enhance practice or draw lessons from practice, (iv) unveil implicit shared meanings, or (v) disrupt accepted views.

It is this social constructivist nuance (all texts-as-stories-and-narratives), with strong hermeneutical and anti-foundationalist tendencies, that takes this dissertation’s methodological suppositions toward narrative inquiry à la Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA goes beyond stories-and-narratives-as-text to include all forms of semiotic practices, including any “semiotic practice in other semiotic modalities such as photography and non-verbal (e.g., gestural) communication” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 91). While both narrative inquiry and CDA accept that discourse is socially shaped and constitutive, CDA assumes that:

a) Because systems of meaning are caught up in political, racial, economic, religious, and cultural formations which are linked to socially defined practices that carry more or less privilege and value in society, they [discourse] cannot be considered neutral … Critical approaches to discourse analysis recognize that inquiry into meaning making is always also an exploration into power. (Rogers, 2011, p. 1)
b) Critical discourse analysts begin with an interest in understanding, uncovering, and transforming conditions of inequality. The starting point for the analysis differs depending on where the critical analyst locates and defines power. Critical discourse analysts locate power in the arena of language as a social practice. Power, however, can take on both liberating and oppressive forms. (Rogers, Malanchrurul-Berkes, Mosley, Hui, & Joseph, 2005, p. 369)

In CDA, *structural processes* (e.g., political, racial, economic, religious, and cultural) are connected to *relations of power* that perpetuate socially defined positive and harmful practices, with varying degrees of *privilege* (i.e., ideology), through subtle and routine discursive practices (the *process of hegemony*). Overall, regardless of method, the goal of a CDA methodology, and this dissertation, is to interpret lower t-truths about structural and social processes, power, ideology, and hegemony through/in language and discourse (specifically, APAD). However, whereas critical discourse analysts (e.g., Fairclough, 2013) tend to assume a (neo-)Marxist perspective (see Wood & Kroger, 2000, pp. 20-25), this dissertation considers colonialism a credible source of power, ideology, and hegemony in APAD.

*Method: Qualitative Content Analysis*

This dissertation intends to interrogate the relationship between Public Administration scholars and colonial discourse. To do so, and in line with the ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions mentioned before, this dissertation employs a qualitative content analysis. It is important to note, as Riccucci (2010) does, that:

The question of the strengths and limitations of qualitative and quantitative research approaches is perhaps at the core of the dissension among public administrationists as to what methods are most appropriate for theory building in the field … [However] all research traditions add value to public administration; the relevancy of qualitative or quantitative tools depends on the research question and the underlying epistemologies and ontologies. (p. 58)
This dissertation uses qualitative content analysis precisely because it is flexible enough to be modified to explore this project’s central research question and because it aligns with this project’s underlying research suppositions. It is noteworthy that content analysis started as a quantitative research method. As a quantitative method, content analysts would mine for predetermined codes within a text to show frequencies or counts (Mayring, 2014, p. 17). The intent of quantitative content analysts was not to infer meaning but to account for manifest content (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). Their goal was to underline (code) the appearance of a word without interpretation.

This is not to imply that qualitative content analysis does not, or cannot, use predetermined codes nor counts. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) and Morgan (1993) agree that a distinguishing feature of all content analytical methods is the use of codes to reduce a large amount of information into fewer categories (see also Weber, 1990). The key difference between quantitative and qualitative analysis, then, comes down to their respective positivist and interpretivist assumptions. Quantitative content analysis is, as Wood and Kroger (2000) argue, a “mechanical process of categorization, [that] neglects the possibility of multiple categorizations, and aims to quantify the relationship between coding categories” (p. 33). A qualitative content analysis uses a coding frame to focus systematically on a specific aspect of meaning (e.g., colonial discourse) and reduce the data accordingly. Qualitative content analysis is sensitive to the underlying meanings of words and calls for interpretation to both create a coding matrix (as in a deductive approach), modify it to fit the data, code the texts, and clarify the findings (Elo, Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pöllki, Uttriainen, & Kyngäs, 2014; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2014; Morgan, 1993; Schreier, 2012, 2014).
The defining feature of qualitative content analysis is the coding frame or matrix, which an interpreter can construct inductively or deductively (Bengtsson, 2016; Elo et al., 2014; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In deductive qualitative content analysis, researchers identify key concepts or variables, informed by prior research or existing theory, as preliminary categories constitutive of the coding matrix before reviewing the texts (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). Furthermore, the coding matrix can be *unconstrained* such that, as the researcher reviews and codes, new categories are considered, following inductive principles, and added, all within the bounds of the original coding matrix (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 111). For this dissertation, this project uses a deductive qualitative content analysis method with an unconstrained coding matrix to understand colonial discourse in APAD.

**Dissertation-as-Bricolage**

This dissertation is a bricolage. *Bricoleur* and *bricolage* are French terms that encapsulate a pragmatic do-it-yourself spirit. In French, “bricoleur” (masculine n.) and “bricoleuse” (feminine n.) translate to “handyman” and “handywoman” who perform odd jobs or tinker (*bricole*). *Bricolage*, then, is the product of a do-it-yourself job. Lévi-Strauss (1962/1966) used the term bricoleur to describe someone who is:

Adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks … His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand,’ that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions. (p. 17)
The bricoleur or bricoleuse is a jack-of-all-trades who makes do with whatever is at hand. They are a professional do-it-yourself individual who uses tools and materials, leftover from previous constructions or deconstructions, to create a bricolage (see Denzin, 2010, pp. 35-37). A bricolage that is elastic and “changes and takes new forms as different tools, methods and techniques are added to the puzzle” (Denzin, 1994, p. 17).

Apropos, Denzin and Lincoln (2018) note that qualitative researchers may be considered bricoleurs/bricoleuses, such that:

The interpretive bricoleur understands that research is an interactive process shaped by one’s personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity and those of the people in the setting. Critical bricoleurs stress the dialectical and hermeneutical nature of interdisciplinary inquiry, knowing that the boundaries between traditional disciplines no longer hold (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 683). The political bricoleur knows that science is power, for all research findings have political implications. There is no value-free science. A civic social science based on a politics of hope is sought (Lincoln, 1999). The gendered, narrative bricoleur also knows that researchers tell stories about the worlds they have studied. Thus, the narratives or stories scientists tell are accounts couched and framed within specific storytelling traditions, often defined as paradigms (e.g., positivism, postpositivism, constructivism). (pp. 45-46)

Although bricoleurs/bricoleuses wear many hats, all of them acknowledge the plasticity of being and the politics of knowledge (Kincheloe, McLaren, Steinberg, & Monzó, 2018). They all compose critical and introspective “multi-“ projects: i.e., multi-perspectival, multi-theoretical, multi-methodological, and multi-disciplinary ways of making sense of the world or phenomenon under study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Kincheloe, 2005; Kincheloe et al., 2018; Rogers, 2012). Finally, as Kaomea (2019) argues, bricoleurs/bricoleuses, and bricolages can perform liberation by “seeking insight from the margins of Western societies and the ways of knowing of non-Western peoples” (p. 18).

Bricoleurs/bricoleuses compose a “complex, quilt-like bricolage, a reflexive collage or montage, a set of fluid, interconnected images and representations … a performance text,
a sequence of representations connecting the parts to the whole” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, p. 46). The interpretive bricoleur/bricoleuse is a storyteller who employs an eclectic array of perspectives, theories, methodologies, methods, and disciplines to tell their story: the bricolage. Conclusively, this is all to say: This dissertation is a bricolage.

**Bricolage and Chapter Outlines**

This project assumes that all research (and knowledge) about Public Administration is a story “grounded in language and discourse and expressed in narrative form through conversation” (White, 1999, p. 6). Moreover, all research, per the idea of bricolage, is an ongoing “multi-” (multi-perspectival, multi-theoretical, multi-methodological, and multi-disciplinary) process of construction and deconstruction. From this perspective, all research is a story about a story (about a story … ad infinitum). Thus, as a bricolage, this dissertation embraces strategies of storytelling and narration, which align with this project’s ontological, epistemological, and methodological suppositions. Additionally, Kincheloe (2001) asserts that:

A key aspect of “doing bricolage” involves the development of conceptual tools for boundary work [emphasis added]. Such tools might include the promotion and cultivation of detailed reviews of research in a particular domain written with the needs of bricoleurs in mind. Researchers from a variety of disciplinary domains should develop information for bricolage projects. Hypertextual projects that provide conceptual matrices for bringing together diverse literatures, examples of data produced by different research methods, connective insights, and bibliographic compilations can be undertaken by bricoleurs with the help of information professionals. Such projects would integrate a variety of conceptual understandings, including the previously mentioned historical, contextual, and contemporary currents of disciplines [emphasis added]. (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 690)

Indeed, the purpose of this bricolage is to tell the story of colonialism in APAD. This project develops a coding frame that integrates diverse kinds of literature, histories, and connective
insights from within and outside of Public Administration to tell this story. This bricolage is boundary work.

Although colonial discourse includes binaries, Young (2016) argues that colonial discourse “has never been fully theorized, or indeed historicized” (p. 385), and “many books that use the term, even in their titles, never seem to feel the need to enquire what the ‘colonial discourse’ they are discussing might be” (p. 394). As previously noted, Said’s (1979) Orientalism is an example of colonial discourse that (re)affirms a presumed Euro-American-superiority over a supposed Non-Euro-American-inferiority. However, there is no ready-made tool (e.g., conceptual matrices) to excavate the durable ideas that perpetuate colonial differences. Thus, in place of a prefabricated set of colonial discourse tools for boundary work, this dissertation embraces the do-it-yourself spirit of bricolage to develop such a toolkit, with attention to Public Administration.

Each chapter serves a dual-purpose. First, each chapter intends to meet the traditional sequential requirements of a dissertation: i.e., introduction, literature review, research methodology, discussion of the collected results, and conclusion. Second, each chapter means to be a puzzle piece and, in turn, depicts a critical dimension of the colonial discourse and APAD story told throughout this project. The story begins with the concept of modernity because public administrators are familiar with it. However, Chapter 2 does not dwell in the familiar. The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct the project of modernity, show its Eurocentric tendencies, and tie it to the project of colonialism. After that, Chapter 3 begins with a historical overview of Spanish, English, and North American colonialism, all with an emphasis on administrative issues and standard colonial practices. Then, the focus is on the coloniality of power, which speaks to the legacy of colonialism after independence. Together, these
chapters supply the historical, philosophical, and theoretical materials to construct a coding frame for colonial discourse in Chapter 4. Hence, the goal of Chapter 4 is to synthesize modernity and colonialism to build a coding frame for colonial discourse with clear descriptions, coding rules, and anchor examples from the APAD sample. Then, Chapter 5 conveys the results and the grammar of colonial discourse in APAD. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the entire bricolage and questions for future postcolonial bricolages in Public Administration. Although each chapter can be read as a separate moment (as a standalone puzzle piece) in a traditional dissertation sequence, it is crucial to note that with each additional piece, the story unfolds, it gains clarity, richness, and meaning.

*About the Bricoleur: The “I” in this Dissertation*

Impersonal writing, as Hyland (2001) points out, remains a “hallowed concept for many, a cornerstone of the positivist assumption that academic research is purely empirical and objective [emphasis added], and therefore best presented as if human agency was not part of the [research and writing] process” (p. 208). However, all writing conveys information about the author and their relationship(s) to their arguments, discourse communities, and readers. The presence or absence of self-mentions (i.e., explicit author references or personal projections through the use of first-person pronouns and possessive adjectives) is not a matter of subjective writing versus objective writing. Instead, it is merely a choice, by the author, about their authorial identity and the (dis)appearance of detachment. As such, Hyland (2003) explains that self-mention is a rhetorical tool that can help writers promote themselves, highlight their
contribution to an argument, and develop scholarly identities (see also Hyland, 2001; Hyland 
& Tse, 2004).

In light of this, and considering my research suppositions, the use of self-mention (e.g.,
“I,” “me,” and “mine”) is a means to self-reflect, which is a central part of establishing
trustworthiness in social constructionism, CDA, qualitative content analysis, and bricolage
(Denzin, 2010, pp. 26-45). Throughout this dissertation, I limit self-mentions to moments of
introspection at the end of each chapter. These moments of introspection are there to
showcase my understanding during, before, and after the research experience. In other words,
these moments showcase my critical subjectivity (Denzin, 2010, p. 27). Moreover, these
moments begin with “blackout” poetry inspired by Kleon’s (2010) collection of redacted
newspaper poems. The intention of these blackout poems, and my bricolage, is to highlight
the value of reflexivity, artistic concentration, discovery, narrative “truth,” transformation,
compression, understanding of craft, and emotional verisimilitude by facilitating moments of
introspection (see Denzin, 2010, p. 88). My use of blackout poetry and my use of poetry within
the coding frame (Chapter 4) is meant to disrupt the reading flow. My intention is to stop the
reader, encourage them to interrogate that moment, and explore its significance to this
bricolage. To me, each poem is an exercise in artistic self-reflection, transformation, and
compression. To craft each one, I had to find the words, sentences, blackouts, and line breaks
that would capture the essence of each chapter, concept, or moment. I hope that the reader
will do the same. Lastly, although my authorial voice is present throughout this bricolage, I

5. As Kleon (2010) explains, “what’s exciting about the poems is that by destroying writing you can create new
writing” (p. xv).
have chosen to limit self-mention as not to detract from the story, that of colonial discourse in APAD.
CHAPTER 2: MODERNITY

According to Raadschelders, Wagenaar, Rutgers, and Overeem (2000), the “core business of Public Administration can only be grasped as a historical phenomenon” (p. 773). In other words, the historical context of Public Administration matters. Given the importance of history to Public Administration (Raadschelders et al., 2000), Raadschelders (2000b) defines administrative history as “the study of structures and processes in and ideas about government as they have existed or have been wanted in the past and the actual and ideal place of public functionaries therein [emphasis added]” (p. 7). Administrative history is useful because it helps the development of practical knowledge about ever-changing public dynamics (e.g., administration vis-à-vis society). In turn, this practical knowledge can effectively contribute to solutions to current administrative dilemmas (Raadschelders, 2000b, p. 12). The administrative past, as Raadschelders (2010) argues, is an account of successive and geographically bound human motivation and action. The critical question, then, is: Where does contemporary American Public Administration find its purpose and roots?

Many consider Wilson’s (1887) “The Study of Administration” the foundation of contemporary American Public Administration. In retrospect, it is undeniable that Wilson’s (1887) oft-cited essay epitomizes the zeitgeist of American Public Administration in the early twentieth century. The article, as Kettl (2000a) asserts, was a declaration: “administration matters—and careful analysts can devise principles to guide its study and practice” (Kettl, 2000a, p. 8). A declaration that breathed life into an administrative machine whose appendages would come to be Weberian bureaus, its core Taylorism, and its vision would be progress uninhibited by political meddling. By 1940, this machine “had acquired remarkable prestige and self-confidence within political science and … in the practice of government” (Kettl,
This was the field’s renaissance, an epoch of prestige and self-confidence, a golden age (see Hughes, 2012, pp. 17-43). To an extent, 1887 is a logical beginning to the study of American Public Administration because it is a portal to the traditions that built today’s field (see Henry, 1975, pp. 379-380).

It is also conceivable to start one-hundred years before with a conversation about the role of Public Administration and the Constitution of the United States. A return voyage to 1787, to the “founding of the Republic to see what congruence we might find between what the framers envisioned and what we know today as the administrative state” (Rohr, 1986, p. 5). Although the Constitutional School has its critics (e.g., see Spicer, 2007; Spicer & Terry, 1993), scholars like Rohr (1986) have established a connection between contemporary Public Administration and constitutional principles. Nevertheless, beyond Hamiltonian, Madisonian, and Jeffersonian legacies in the field (Kettl, 2000a), all roads converge upon 1887. Here, a footnote in Waldo’s (1948) *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* is instructive: “Even [though] the Founding Fathers devoted essays to administrative problems … Wilson’s [1887] essay inaugurates the period in which public administration was gradually to become conscious of itself as a distinct activity and inquiry” (p. 4).

Indeed, 1887 marks a beginning with an impressive pedigree dating back to the founding of the Republic. Wilson’s (1887) essay is a usable genesis. However, there are others. Other administrative practices from the colonial era up until now (Raadschelders, 2000a). Other histories and traditions. There are other beginnings. Yes, the history of contemporary American Public Administration has roots in 1887 and 1787, but several roots are still buried:

We need to recognize that American public administration did not come into being in the 1880s. Neither Wilson’s essay nor the Pendleton Act represents the beginning of
our field. The history of American public administration is at least as old as the attempts of Euro-Americans to govern their communities on this continent, and we probably should begin to include the history of Native American governance as well as the history of European governance [emphasis added]. (Luton, 1999, p. 216)

Above, Luton (1999) echoes Schachter’s (1998) argument that “public administration has a diminished historical consciousness” (p. 16), and, for this reason, “it almost seems as if Woodrow Wilson’s celebrated article … emerges from a vacuum” (Schachter, 1998, p. 18). It did not. The history of American Public Administration, as Luton (1999) argues, could be framed as the meeting of early Euro-American, Native American, and European governance. So, the question remains: Where does contemporary American Public Administration find its purpose and roots?

Raadschelders (2000b) asserts that “with the advantage of hindsight we could say that the roots of modern administration in the Western world [including the United States] go back as far as the 1200s” (p. 115). Similarly, in a discussion about the prevalence of technical rationality in the Progressive Era (ca. 1896-1920), Adams (1992) highlights the “intellectual strands of modernity [which] reach back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (p. 363). Farmer (1995) also points out that “public administration is a paradigm case of modernity” (p. 48). Relatedly, Spicer (2001) argues that “a considerable part of public administration as a field of enquiry has been shaped by a particular vision of politics and the state” (p. 2), a vision with “roots in practice and thought [going] back for more than four centuries to the Reformation” (p. 16). Clearly, in and around the history of modernity and Europe lies a significant dimension of American Public Administration.

Public Administration’s relationship with modernity, its “enthrallment” as Adams (1992) calls it, is vital to the story of colonial discourse in APAD. As Mignolo (2018) attests:
Surrounding the idea of modernity (in the period 1500 to 2000) is a discourse that promises happiness and salvation through conversion, progress, civilization, modernization, development, and market democracy. This discourse is tied up with the logic of coloniality, which circumscribes the progression of modernity within all the domains used to categorize and classify the modern world: political, economic, religious, epistemic, aesthetic, ethnic/racial, sexual/gender subjective. (p. 141)

In modernity lie significant dimensions of colonial discourse. In exploring the history of modernity and its relationship to colonialism, it is essential to acknowledge the story being told. As such, the purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) This chapter aims to unpack the concept of modernity by way of Public Administration scholars, with an emphasis on postmodern dialectics precisely because of their preoccupation with modernity. (2) This chapter introduces an alternative view of European modernity that considers: (a) the discovery of the “plane of immanence” (Hardt & Negri, 2000), (b) the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and (c) Columbus’s arrival to modern-day America in 1492. Finally, (3) this chapter concludes with a brief discussion about the language of modernity vis-à-vis colonialism, a conversation that continues in Chapter 3.

**Dialectics of Modernity**

**Defining Modernity**

Critical discussions about modernity in American Public Administration emerged out of the 1990s with the rise of interpretivist, particularly postmodern, reinterpretations of the field (e.g., Adams, 1992; Bogason, 2001; Farmer, 1995; Fox & Miller, 1995; Marshall & White, 1989; McSwite, 1997, 2000; Raadschelders, 2000a; White & Adams, 1995). Accordingly, modernity, as defined by Public Administration scholars, is:
1. The culmination of a centuries-long process of modernization. Intellectual strands of modernity reach back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but as the defining characteristic of our own culture, modernity coalesced only within the past century. Modernity describes a social, political, and economic world increasingly characterized by “… secularization, the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the differentiation of various spheres of the life-world, the bureaucratization of economic, political, and military practices, and the growing monetarization of values” (Turner, 1990, p. 6). (Adams, 1992, p. 363)

2. The distinctive core of assumptions and beliefs about the power and nature of the human subject and human reason (and to related issues) that have constituted the dominant mind-set of the West for the last five hundred or so years, a period of so many technological, social, political, and economic “miracles.” (Farmer, 1995, p. 5, see also pp. 34-48)

3. Weber’s (1958) iron cage metaphor … used here in its usual sense, to refer to what he and others consider to be the deleterious side effects of modern society’s increasing rationalization, capitalism’s privileging of economic-technical efficiency or instrumental rationality … The iron cage metaphor points toward the effects on humans of the form, the prevalence and the dominance throughout modern society of bureaucratization, a manifestation of rationalization. Weber was concerned with our fate in what he saw as an age of bureaucratic domination. The metaphor also points toward Weber’s other concerns about modern society, such as the irrationality of a mean-ends culture … For Weber, it requires of us a Faustian bargain, whereby we sacrifice our “full and beautiful humanity” in return for a narrow vocation where we are “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart” in a rationalized and disenchanted world (p. 182). Bureaucracy in this technocratic context is seen as entailing an oppressive dehumanizing of humanity (parceling out of the soul), including bureaucracy’s employees and customers. (Farmer, 1999, pp. 300-301)

4. Prussia under the rule of Frederick the Great, the most well-known and influential of the so-called enlightened despots of modern Europe … Frederick was among the first of the European monarchs to think of himself self-consciously as the head of a nation-state, as opposed to simply a ruler of a piece of territory owned by him, and he used his bureaucracy in a purposeful and aggressive fashion for the enhancement of state interest and power. The Prussian bureaucracy under Frederick the Great may be seen from this perspective as, in many ways, a prototype of the modern administrative state. (Spicer, 2001, p. 33)

5. The period where science and reason shaped life and social structures and coincided with the Enlightenment (bringing light, through science and reason, to the darkness) and industrialism/capitalism. (Simrell King, 2005, p. 519)

6. The project of modernity was evidenced beginning in Europe in at least the sixteenth century. It was encouraged by revolutionary scientific discoveries, such as those of Isaac Newton. It can be described in terms of the philosoper, reaching
a culmination in France in the Enlightenment … The project of modernity, the project of the Enlightenment, maintained that more and more reason means more and more morality and more and more human happiness. (Farmer, 2010, p. 93)

7. An institutionalized cognition … modernity was buttressed by a dominant ethic of organizational rationality set to the tasks of caring for and controlling all aspects of nature and life. Ambitious and arrogant, the modern episteme was largely self-validating … In other words, modern systems assume for themselves potentially an all-encompassing God’s-eye, or Archimedean standpoint, under which all can be rendered amenable to that system or metanarrative … Another way of putting it is that there is in modern thought an indefatigable urge to universalistic monism, accompanied by an unrelenting instrumental rationality. (Miller & Fox, 2015, p. x)

It follows that modernity appears in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, over the last five hundred years or so, in the Prussian experience, in the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. It is a totalizing process of instrumental rationalization and bureaucratization. It is ambivalent insofar as it aims (or promises) to bring about human happiness, but it is also dehumanizing. It is a European phenomenon. Furthermore, it is assumed that American public administrators “have inherited a coherent and distinctive Western heritage of ideas and attitudes” (Farmer, 1995, p. 44). Although Dussel (2000) is not a Public Administration scholar, he sums up the idea of modernity elaborated above perfectly:

[This] concept is Eurocentric, provincial, and regional. [Here] modernity is an emancipation, a Kantian Ausgang, or “way out,” from immaturity by means of reason, understood as a critical process that affords humanity the possibility of new development. In Europe, this process took place mainly during the eighteenth century. The temporal and spatial dimensions of this phenomenon were described by Hegel and commented on by Jürgen Habermas in his class work on modernity (1988, 27). Habermas’s narrative, unanimously accepted by contemporary European tradition, posits, “The key historical events for the creation of the principle of [modern] subjectivity are the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.” As can readily be observed, a spatial-temporal sequence is followed here. Furthermore, other cultural processes are usually added to this sequence as well, from the Italian Renaissance and the German Reformation to the Enlightenment. In a conversation with Paul Ricoeur (1992, 109), Habermas suggested that the English Parliament should also be included. Thus the sequence would run from Italy (fifteenth century) to Germany (sixteenth to eighteenth century) to England (seventeenth century) to France (eighteenth century). I label this perspective “Eurocentric,” for it indicates intra-European phenomena as the starting point of modernity and explains its later
development without making recourse to anything outside of Europe. In a nutshell, this is the provincial, regional view that ranges from Max Weber (I have in mind here his analysis on “rationalization” and the “disenchantment of worldviews”) to Habermas. For many, Galileo (condemned in 1616), Francis Bacon (Novum Organum, 1620), or Descartes (Discourse on Method, 1636) could be considered the forebears of the process of modernity in the seventeenth century. (pp. 469-470)

This is not to condemn or to say that all discussions about modernity in Public Administration are blindly Eurocentric, but rather to point out that prominent Public Administration theorists understand modernity as mainly a European phenomenon.

Arguments

Moreover, this is not to imply that Public Administration theorists only romanticize modernity. Farmer (1999), for example, is emblematic of criticism against rationalization and its tendency to marginalize:

There are marginalized groups such as women, minorities, the economically disadvantaged, those with policed sexualities, the colonized, and others. As is well known, such marginalizations are considered harmful not only for the marginalized members but also for the function from which the members are excluded. An example is the patriarchal or masculine nature that has been described for modernist PA thinking (e.g., Ferguson, 1984; Stivers, 1993); to the extent that this is the case, the advantages of the nonpatriarchal perspective are excluded. Marginalization, as Foucault (1977, 1980) and others have noted, can also occur from hegemonic arrangements privileging reason and language. We can easily see that a privileging of the rational, as is the case in economic analysis, marginalizes consideration of unconscious motivations. (pp. 313-314)

In response, De Zwart (2002) is skeptical and contends that the “wrongs of PA listed by Farmer, however, result from administrative practice, not from rational inquiry” (p. 488). To be clear, both Farmer (1999) and De Zwart (2002) agree that Public Administration has flaws. Both acknowledge the “hegemonic” (Farmer, 1999) or “ideological” (De Zwart, 2002) predispositions of modernity. However, as De Zwart (2002) argues, they differ in their
opinions about the culprit: reason, on the one hand (Farmer, 1999), administrative praxis on the other (De Zwart, 2002). Yet, the distance between Farmer (1999) and De Zwart (2002) comes down to semantics. That is, if Farmer’s (1999) postmodern argument is reframed as one of critical social theory, then the professed distance between them shrinks significantly.

As Box (2005) points out, critical social theorists consider reason “a symbol of the way the Enlightenment project of creating a better world with rational thought has been twisted into means-ends instrumental reason, used to maintain social conditions that benefit a few at the expense of others” (p. 17). The problem is that “modern reason [is] Enlightenment gone bad [emphasis added]—reason that had served the goal of freedom [has] become a force for protecting the damaging features of advanced capitalism” (Box, 2005, p. 18). The wrongs listed by Farmer (1999) showcase hegemonic arrangements that bestow privilege on specific individuals at the expense of others. This is not an argument against reason. This is an argument against the opportunistic and corrupt use of reason without any room for other perspectives. It is also an argument to improve the rational by including the excluded perspectives—a case that resembles critical theory in that it sets out to *salvage* reason.

De Zwart’s (2002) aversion to postmodernity and his optimism about Herbert Simon’s legacy is evocative of Habermas’s (1997) claim that “we should learn from the aberrations which have accompanied the project of modernity and from the mistakes of those extravagant proposals of sublation, rather than abandoning modernity and its project” (p. 51). Arguably, De Zwart’s (2002) position challenges the skepticism of postmodernity but fails to address its affirmative character evocative of critical theory, typical in Public Administration.⁶

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⁶. As Raadschelders (2005) observes, “Farmer (1995) and Fox and Miller (1995) [are] representative authors of an affirmative postmodernism that wishes to augment the scientific approach with attention for interpretations, values, judgment, feelings, and emotions [emphasis added]” (p. 606; see also Bogason, 2001).
All in all, De Zwart’s (2002) criticism of Farmer (1999), with its emphasis on the politics of epistemology (and the implicit resurrection of *Enlightenment-good*), is a model of the typical (post)modern conversation in the field. The conversation tends to showcase the merits of modern thinking, alongside its dead ends, and the benefits of going beyond, as opposed to going outside. Thus, the “post-” in postmodern Public Administration is not necessarily a rejection, but an addition: *modernity+*. Not all discussions about modernity in the field are romantic, but they tend to be limited to alternatives from within the modernity-as-the-Enlightenment model.

Very early on, in their postmodern reading of the Blacksburg Manifesto, Marshall and White (1989) pinpointed what would become the field’s story about modernity:

> We hope it is clear from our characterizations that the Manifesto does not reflect a postmodern sensibility. Rather, we would describe the Manifesto as an argument made from the stance of *high modernism*. It is *modern* in the faith that it obviously puts in administration as a means of creating progress, solving social problems and bringing about better conditions in society. Its central commitment is to *reason*, as reflected in the public interest and implemented by the public agency. It is a *high* form of modernism in that it goes beyond the anachronistic scientism and rational instrumentalism of classical administrative thought. Rather, it offers *process*, a structured form of interaction or dialogue that *evokes* reason—that is a vehicle for it—rather than claiming to *embody* reason, as classical rational instrumentalism does. In this, the position it takes is quite like that of Jurgen Habermas and his “ideal speech conditions” that are in principle evocative of liberated action and reasoned social policy. The Manifesto specifies its own version of the “ideal conditions” of process quite specifically. (p. 110)

Here, it is possible to substitute the “Manifesto” for “contemporary Public Administration” or “field” and approximate the general feelings about modernity in American Public Administration. Essentially, the ethos of modernity is akin to Habermas’s (1997) view of modernity as an incomplete project.

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7. For another discussion, it is worth revisiting Ventriss’s (1998; 2005) critique of Fox and Miller (1995; Miller & Fox, 2015) and Miller’s (2005a; 2005b) replies.
Within the fault lines of this unfinished project, as Farmer (1995) and McSwite (1997) argue, lies oppression. However, this oppression is considered an unfortunate byproduct of an unchecked and misguided emphasis on scientism and rational instrumentalism—i.e., *Enlightenment gone bad*. To this point, McSwite (1997) adds that “Men of Reason are not intrinsically evil; they are simply enacting the current operative principle of consciousness and social organization, and it happens to have some onerous side effects such as gender and other kinds of oppressions” (p. 262). Consequently, this version of modernity—a narrative starting with the Enlightenment—does not consider the possibility of a very much fulfilled and older project of dehumanization and genocidal evil. A project whose “administrative evil” is manifest in the atrocities of the twentieth century (Adams & Balfour, 2015), and the genocide, oppression, and silencing of Indigenous peoples, African peoples, and women.

In a critique of Fox and Miller’s (1995; Miller & Fox, 2015) postmodern stance, Ventriss (1998) mentions that “the political significance of postmodernism … is the manner in which it exposes the multiple forms of ‘otherness’ and ‘differences’ … It is this aspect that gives postmodernism its potential radical twist” (p. 94). This openness to otherness is in Farmer’s (1995) “alterity” (pp. 227-245), it is in McSwite’s (1997) “collaborative pragmatism” (p. 258), it is in calls for authentic dialogue and listening (Fox & Miller, 1995; Simrell King, Feltey, & O’Neill Susel, 1998; Stivers, 1994), and it is in calls to “unmask administrative evil” (Adams & Balfour, 2015). As McSwite (1997) explains:

The practical alternative to this is opening ourselves to one another. The practical starting place for this has been identified already by Camilla Stivers, by Fox and Miller (1995) on the last page of their book, and by David Farmer (1995) in his discussion of alterity. The alternative is to listen, to become hollowed out, and to receive the other as
oneself (Stivers, 1994). This reveals that what I am talking about here is not so much the end of reason as its transformation through the open acknowledgement and embrace of its own contradiction and terrible flaw. By making people and their lives an object in its contemplations, reason separates us from one another when the reality of the human condition is: *I am you* [emphasis added]. (pp. 276-277)

Yet, there is a thin line between a mutual union and cannibalism. McSwite (1997) assumes that the other can and is willing to offer themselves to the hollowed-out administrator. That the other will become whole through the grace of the administrator. And that the other wants to be the administrator: *I am you; therefore, you are me*. There is a fine line between *subjecthood* and *subjugation*. From the perspective of the modern administrator, critical questions arise: Who is the other? And, can the modern self be another? If the answer is contingent on “listening,” becoming “hollowed out,” and “receiving” the other, then the burden is placed on the other and their ability to talk and give. What is the modern self’s burden? McSwite (1997) asks administrators to contemplate reason and to acknowledge and embrace its contradictions and terrible flaw. But what exactly are these contradictions and terrible flaws? And, more importantly, is it all worth embracing?

*The Eurocentric Fallacy in Modernity*

Ventriss (1998) is partly correct; the political significance of postmodernity is that it exposes otherness and differences, but it stops short. In another response to Fox and Miller, Ventriss (2005) accentuates “the need for a theory of an elenchic citizenship … predicated on the values of dissent, non-compliance, and normative questioning of society’s most cherished belief systems” (p. 556). Although postmodern Public Administration is open to this kind of
elenchic thinking vis-à-vis modernity, its radical twist is limited by what Dussel (1993) calls the *Eurocentric fallacy*:

Modernity is, for many (for Jürgen Habermas or Charles Taylor, for example), an essentially or exclusively European phenomenon ... modernity is, in fact, a European phenomenon, but one constituted in a dialectical relation with a non-European alterity that is its ultimate content. Modernity appears when Europe affirms itself as the “center” of a World history that it inaugurates; the “periphery” that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition. *The occlusion of this periphery* (and of the role of Spain and Portugal in the formation of the modern world system from the late fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries) *leads the major contemporary thinkers of the “center” into a Eurocentric fallacy in their understanding of modernity*. If their understanding of the genealogy of modernity is thus partial and provincial, their attempts at a critique or defense of it are likewise unilateral and, in part, false [emphasis added]. (Dussel, 1993, p. 65)

Modernity’s genealogy, as told thus far, is an exclusively European phenomenon without any mention of its non-European alterity nor its incipient “destructive and genocidal side” (Dussel, 1993, p. 75). Modernity, as the definitions above indicate, is traced back to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and to the heart of Europe (Germany, France, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries) without mention of Eastern Europe, the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal and Spain), nor colonialism (Dussel, 1993, p. 71). This version of modernity does not consider administrative evil a force within modernity, but instead sees it as an unfortunate by-product of corrupted modernity—*Enlightenment gone bad*.

For example, according to Adams and Balfour (2015), “the modern age, with its scientific-analytic mindset and technical-rational approach to social and political problems, enables a new and bewildering form of evil—administrative evil” (p. 8). The concept of *administrative evil*, as Adams and Balfour (2015) explain:

Has its roots in the genocide perpetrated by Nazi Germany during World War II. While the evil—the pain and suffering and death—that was inflicted on millions of “others” in the Holocaust (Glass, 1997) was so horrific as to almost defy our comprehension, it was also clearly an instance of administrative evil. Here we refer to administrative evil as unmasked (although much of it was masked at the time), and we suggest that identifying administrative evil is easier today because the Holocaust was
perpetrated by the Nazis (and others complicit with them) and because it occurred well over half a century ago. (p. 4)

While Adams and Balfour (2015) showcase the violence of modernity, their view that administrative evil is a new and bewildering form of evil is blemished due to its Eurocentric fallacy. The atrocities of the 20th century (in Europe) were bewildering and defied “our” (the descendants of Eurocentric modernity) comprehension because the genocide of Indigenous peoples, the oppression and captivity of Africans, the silencing of women, and the wholesale erasure of non-European cultures remained at the periphery of European modernity. To say that administrative evil is easier to identify today because of the Holocaust is to imply that evil matters because it happened in Europe. Instead, what was bewildering about the atrocities of the 20th century was that modernity’s peripheral monster had come home. This was not a new and bewildering form of evil. It was the continuation of unresolved administrative wickedness.

Thus, missing from Farmer’s (1995) “alterity” (pp. 227-45), from McSwite’s (1997) “collaborative pragmatism” (p. 258), from calls for authentic dialogue and listening (Fox & Miller, 1995; Simrell King et al., 1998; Stivers, 1994), and from calls to “unmask administrative evil” (Adams & Balfour, 2015), is a critical and symmetrical look at the other of Eurocentric modernity. In a footnote, Dussel (1993) unmasks why this is necessary:

When Rorty argues for the desirability of “conversation” in place of a rationalist epistemology, he does not take seriously the asymmetrical situation of the other, the concrete empirical impossibility that the “excluded,” “dominated,” or “compelled” can intervene effectively in such a discussion. He takes as his starting point “we liberal Americans,” not “we Aztecs in relation to Cortés,” or “we Latin Americans in relation to a North America in 1992.” In such cases, not even conversation is possible. (pp. 75-76; see also Dussel, 1996, pp. 103-119)

The political significance of postmodernity, its radical twist, is expunged by the occlusion of the other of modernity. Yes, within the narrative of modernity in Public Administration there are calls for mutual recognition, all with a Hegelian tinge (or Habermasian, or Rortyan) of
Alas, this is accompanied by a limited sense of what it would take for the other to join the conversation or what the other would say—can they be an us?

Unmasking the Myth of Modernity: Toward anOther Modernity

As told thus far, the idea of modernity in Public Administration is Eurocentric. In turn, the Eurocentric fallacy obscures a critical feature of modernity: “Modernity itself is defined by a crisis” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 76). To appreciate the significance of the other version of modernity, in Public Administration, it is vital to address this crisis—or rather, crises. These crises can be framed as (1) an ontological crisis, (2) an existential crisis, and (3) a spiritual/humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, these interconnected frames are marked by three critical events: (a) The rise and fall of the “plane of immanence” (Hardt & Negri, 2000), (b) The fall of Constantinople in 1453, and (c) Columbus’s “discovery” of America in 1492. Arguably, these three frames are necessary to unmask the role of administrative evil in modernity and, pertinent to this bricolage, the role of colonialism in APAD.

Ontological Crisis

One way to frame the crisis that defines modernity is through its ontological suppositions, i.e., theories of existence, being, or reality. Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that at the beginning of modernity:

Knowledge shifted from the transcendent plane to the immanent, and consequently, that human knowledge became a doing, a practice of transforming nature … What is
revolutionary in this whole series of philosophical developments stretching from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries is that the powers of creation that had previously been consigned exclusively to the heavens are not brought down to earth. This is the discovery of the fullness of the plane of immanence. (pp. 72-73)

This transformation made humans “masters of their own lives, producers of cities and history, and inventors of heavens” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 70). This newfound singularity of humanity shattered the dualistic consciousness of medieval times that split humans between a transcendent Heaven and immanent Earth.

The paradigm shift from a dualistic consciousness to a human singularity is not simply a theoretical exercise, as Stout (2012) affirms, ontology “suggests the possibility and/or correctness of only certain political forms” (p. 390). Once humanity became immanent to itself, once individuals accepted that “the source of being is within that which exists” (Stout, 2012, p. 389), the politics of the multitude (e.g., individualist anarchism, atheism, polytheism, social anarchism, humanism, pantheism) confronted the politics of the One (e.g., monism, statism, and monotheism). Far from a theoretical exercise, the clash between the plane of immanence and transcendence was at the heart of a revolution:

Modernity’s beginnings were revolutionary, and the old order was toppled by them. The constitution of modernity was not about theory in isolation but about theoretical acts indissolubly tied to mutations of practice and reality. Bodies and brains were fundamentally transformed. The historical process of subjectivization was revolutionary in the sense that it determined a paradigmatic and irreversible change in the mode of life of the multitude. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 74)

Once humanity discovered the plane of immanence, its singularity, there was no going back.

In this modernity, humans and human desires were positioned at the center of history (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 74). This is humanism par excellence, modernity as biophilia (i.e., love for life).8

8. Inspired by Fromm’s The Heart of Man, in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire (1968/2005) uses the terms “necrophilic” and “biophilic” to describe a situation of control and oppression (necrophilia) and a situation of
Regarding administrative history, Raadschelders (2000b) highlights the theories of John of Salisbury (ca. 1115/20–1180), Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274), and Marsilius of Padua (ca. 1275–1342), all of which showcase the tension between immanent and transcendent authority throughout the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Similarly, Hardt and Negri (2000) refer to William of Occam (ca. 1285–1348) and Marsilius of Padua to showcase how these political theorists sought to redefine authority “on the basis of a human universal and through the action of a multitude” (p. 73).

The confrontation between immanent and transcendent authority raised an important question: Should the church, the emperor, or the state rule on behalf of the multitude? Raadschelders (2000b) describes the situation as such:

Now that the papal state had lost the battle for power from the secular lords, who in turn had effectively curtailed the influence of the Emperor in their territory, the most important problem became defining who is sovereign and how sovereignty could be limited [emphasis added]. (p. 197)

Thus, modernity as biophilia opened the door to the politics of the multitude (individualist anarchism, atheism, polytheism, social anarchism, humanism, pantheism). In response, as Raadschelders (2000b) points out, people like Niccolò Machiavelli (ca. 1469–1527) advocated for control through transcendence, i.e., the politics of the One (absolutism, monism, statism, and monotheism). As Hardt and Negri (2000) claim:

This new emergence [biophilic modernity] … created a war. How could such a radical overturning not incite strong antagonism? How could this revolution not determine a counterrevolution? There was indeed a counterrevolution in the proper sense of the term: a cultural, philosophical, social, and political initiative that, since it could neither return to the past nor destroy the new forces, sought to dominate and expropriate the force of the emerging movements and dynamics. This is the second mode of modernity, constructed to wage war against the new forces and establish an

love and freedom (biophilia). The former denies (or suppresses) agency and the latter upholds freedom and creativity. If modernity as biophilia is rampant human desire, then modernity as necrophilia is a politics of command and control.
overarching power to dominate them. It arose within the Renaissance revolution to
divert its direction, transplant the new image of humanity to a transcendent plane,
relativize the capacities of science to transform the world, and above all oppose the
appropriation of power on the part of the multitude. The second mode of modernity
poses a transcendent constituted power against an immanent constituent power, order
against desire. The Renaissance thus ended in war, religious, social, and civil war. (p.
74)

The Machiavellian desire to control the multitude stood in opposition to biophilia (human
freedom and creativity) by instituting a new transcendence. An example of this new
transcendence is what Spicer (2001) calls the “purposive state.” Accordingly, in a purposive state,
“what is required … is that individuals conform their own actions and their own ends to the
achievement of a common shared end or set of ends” (p. 18). Effectively, the creation of a
shared purpose came to displace the immanent individual in favor of a transcendent goal. In
other words, the ontological crisis of modernity and its political repercussions had to be tamed.
Modernity had to be pulled away from chaos by offering something more significant than the
individual.

Throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, biophilic modernity had to be
controlled. Going into the eighteenth century, Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the “primary
task of … Enlightenment was to dominate the idea of immanence without reproducing the
absolute dualism of medieval culture by constructing a transcendental apparatus capable of
disciplining a multitude of formally free subjects” (p. 78). It is in the Age of Enlightenment
that the triad vis-capiditas-amor (strength-desire-love), i.e., biophilic modernity, is displaced by a
triad of mediation and negation. Such that “Nature and experience are unrecognizable except
through the filter of phenomena; human knowledge cannot be achieved except through the reflection
of the intellect; and the ethical world is incommunicable except through the schematism of reason”
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 79).
All of this was to undermine the impulses of the multitude, to separate the individual from the world, and institute mediations to delimit what people could and could not know and do. Failure to comply (i.e., to understand phenomena, to be intellectual, to use reason) meant negation—it meant a denial of humanity. In doing so, Enlightenment modernity—the usual starting point for American Public Administration—suppressed immanent humanism. It replaced biophilia with necrophilia. Arguably, one of the most destructive and dark byproducts of necrophilic modernity was the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum* (“I think, therefore I am”), which Grosfoguel (2011, 2013) calls the *point zero* of Eurocentric Theo-politics (i.e., wherein the attributes of God are within Western Man). Cartesian dualism presumed that reason was independent of the body. In turn, having a corporeal body was not enough to be a human or claim humanity. Instead, a proper human had to be reasonable by Western (European) standards. Ultimately, the Cartesian dualism deified the Western Man as the founder of knowledge.

In effect, Cartesian dualism added a modern necrophilic dimension to an “anthropological machine” (Agamben, 2002/2004). A machine that, as Agamben (2002/2004) and Catlaw and Holland (2012) argue, continues to run today. Per Agamben (2002/2004), the machine separates and excludes life accordingly:

On the one hand, we have the anthropological machine of the moderns. As we have seen, it functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from itself, that is, by animalizing the human, by isolating the nonhuman within the human: *Homo alalus*, or the ape-man. And it is enough to move our field of research ahead a few decades, and instead of this innocuous pale-ontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the non-man produced within the man…

The machine of earlier times [ancient] works in an exactly symmetrical way. If, in the machine of the moderns, the outside is produced through the exclusion of an inside and the inhuman produced by animalizing the human, here the inside is obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced by the humanization of an animal: the man-ape, the *enfant sauvage* or *Homo ferus*, but also above all the slave,
the barbarian, and the foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form. (Agamben, 2002/2004, p. 37)

So, Cartesian dualism added another dimension to a machine (a transcendental apparatus) that was already in place in ancient times. In ancient times, human beings could be excluded because they had become animals: The slave, the barbarian, the foreigner, all started as humans and, over time, lost their humanity as they transformed into animals. In necrophilic modernity, the inverse is true: The nonhuman (i.e., the animal) is already within the individual, the modern slave, barbarian, and foreigner are becoming human. This distinction empowers a dark logic. If nonhuman peoples are in the process of becoming human, and they have not achieved this by themselves (as determined by an external “human” judge), a more advanced society could justify their sovereignty over them until they become human—i.e., until they can understand phenomena, be intellectual, and use reason. In short, until they become civilized.

Existential Crisis

The ontological crisis described above, which pinned biophilic modernity against necrophilic modernity starting in the thirteenth century, found its necrophilic transcendent

9. Throughout the Renaissance, humanists invented the “Middle Ages” to showcase the glory of European “modernity” by connecting it to an “ancient” Classical world. Wickham (2016) explains that:

The word [“medieval”] has a curious history; it was a negative word from the start, and has often remained one. From the Roman republic onwards, people regularly referred to themselves as “modern” – *moderni* in Latin – and to forebears as *antiqui*, “ancient.” In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, a handful of intellectuals, whom we call humanists, began to restrict the word “ancient” to the classical writers of the Roman empire and its predecessors, whom they saw as their true forebears, with the supposedly inferior writers of the intervening millennium relegated to what was increasingly, by the seventeenth century, called the “middle age,” the *medium aevum*, hence “medieval.” This usage was picked up above all in the nineteenth century, and it then spread to everything else: “medieval” government, the economy, the church, and so on, to be set against the concept, also nineteenth-century, of the Renaissance, when “modern” history supposedly started. The medieval period could thus be seen as a random invention, a confidence trick perpetrated on the future by a few scholars. But it has become a powerful image, as more and more layers of “modernity” have built up. (Wickham, 2016, p. 3)
champion in the eighteenth century with the Age of Enlightenment. Alongside an ontological crisis, European subjecthood underwent a radical existential crisis, with particular attention to Europe after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. It is important to note that the idea of modernity used in Public Administration (mostly a necrophilic Eurocentric eighteenth-century modernity) assumes a cohesive European genealogy. It assumes a lineage that tends to start with the Greek world, then the Pagan and Christian Roman world, to the Medieval Christian world, and finally the modern European world (Dussel, 2000, p. 468). The issue with this genealogy, as Dussel (2000) argues, is that it is an ideological invention:

Today, this is considered to be the standard, traditional sequence. Few consider this to be an ideological invention that first kidnapped Greek culture as exclusively western and European and then posited both the Greek and Roman cultures as the center of world history. (p. 468)

Historically, what becomes modern-day Europe existed outside of Greece’s horizon. Situated northwest of Classical and Hellenistic Greece, it was considered “the uncivilized, the nonpolitical, the nonhuman” (Dussel, 2000, p. 465; see also Champion, 2000). Whereas the Greeks spoke Greek, the Western peoples of the Roman Empire in the Italian Peninsula spoke Latin. As the Roman Empire expanded eastward and, in 196, proclaimed itself to be the “liberator of the Greek cities from the Hellenistic kings” (Lintott, 2005, p. 7), the Romans adopted Greek traditions and sought to insert themselves into Greek myth (Champion, 2000; Hose, 1999).\(^\text{10}\) Clearly, the Romans admired Greek culture, but, as Jones (1963) notes, their admiration was not entirely reciprocated:

Some Greeks might admire the political wisdom of the Romans and all were impressed by their military power, but they never ceased to regard them culturally as barbarians [emphasis added]. The Greeks were supremely satisfied with their own language and

\(^{10}\) Thus begins Ball’s (2016) history of Rome in the East: “The ghost of Alexander seems always to haunt those who venture east, the Romans no less than the Crusaders no less than Napoleon. The Romans too considered themselves heirs to Hellenism. But they also suffered an inferiority complex” (p. 1).
literature, and, except for a few antiquarians like Plutarch, who were curious about Roman history and institutions, felt no call to learn the barbarous Latin tongue or read its uncouth and imitative literature. (p. 3)

Under Roman rule, Greek cities were “free (ἐλευθεροί), in possession of their own laws (ἀυτονομοί), free from garrisons (ἀφεντηρετοί) and from tribute (ἀφορολόγετοί)” (Lintott, 2005, pp. 36-37). As such, the official language of the Roman Empire in the eastern provinces remained Greek—for example, edicts were published in Greek, and court proceedings were conducted in Greek as well (Jones, 1963, p. 4).

In 330, Constantine intensified the Latin-West (what is now France, Spain, Italy, North Africa, Britain) and Greek-East (what is now the Balkans, Turkey, the Levant, Egypt) divide by founding a new capital for the Roman Empire in the Greek city of Byzantium, which, in turn, was renamed Constantinople (the City of Constantine, now Istanbul). Wickham (2016) postulates that the decision to “rule the empire in two separate halves for logistical convenience, might itself have done harm to imperial coherence and its ability to respond to threat” (p. 23). This is all to say that the founding of Constantinople was a decision that certified the split between the Latin-West and Greek-East in 395:

Down to 395 A.D. Constantinople was usually, although not continuously, the residence of at least one of the Emperors if the supreme office was temporarily divided. In that year [395], the death of Theodosius I, the last ruler of the united Empire, led to the definite separation into the Western Empire (ruled by his son Honorius from Ravenna) and the Eastern Empire (ruled by his elder son Arcadius 11). According to Davis (1931):

Such a city immediately became “great” in fact as well as in name. The presence of one of the most elaborate and extravagant courts which ever existed, the command or the moral compulsion by the Emperor upon the Senatorial nobility to follow their master; the great opportunities offered trade and industry in the new capital; the amusements of the circus and theater, and the wholesale corn doles offered the proletariat; the more legitimate attractions of living at the center of the best intellectual and aesthetic life of the age; also the great advantage of extreme physical safety at a time when invasions were imperiling the Empire—these were some of the elements combining to swell the population of Constantinople. Probably its inhabitants far outnumbered those of the older Rome some decades before that fatal 410 A.D. when Alaric’s Goths gave an irreparable blow to the aging Mother of Empires. (p. 3)
from Constantinople), which divisions became practically permanent. Henceforth an “Augustus” dwelled regularly by the Bosphorus, save when he was waging foreign wars or making peaceful progresses through his dominions. (Davis, 1931, pp. 3-4)

While the Byzantine Empire endured for another millennium after the founding of Constantinople, the West fell in the fifth century. The Visigoths’ capture and pillage of Rome in 410 are indicative of western demise at the hands of Germanic “barbarians,” as the Romans called them (Pirenne, 1939/2001, pp. 24-25; Ward-Perkins, 2005, pp. 42-48).

It is possible that the invasion and settlement of Germanic peoples did not completely end the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century in and of itself. Indeed, while the capture and sack of Rome in 410 signals an important moment in Roman history, Pirenne (1939/2001) argues that up until 800, Western Roman culture endured because of its connection to the East via the Mediterranean and because of Germanic admiration for Roman culture. According to Pirenne (1939/2001), what effectively signaled the end of Western Roman culture was Islam:

The cause of the break with the tradition of antiquity was the rapid and unexpected advance of Islam. The result of this advance was the final separation of East from West, and the end of the Mediterranean unity. Countries like Africa and Spain, which had always been part of the Western community, gravitated henceforth in the orbit of Baghdad. In these countries another religion made its appearance, and an entirely different culture. The Western Mediterranean, having become a Musulman lake, was no longer the thoroughfare of commerce and of thought which it had always been. (p. 284)

Following Pirenne’s (1939/2001, 1925/2014,) thesis, without the Mediterranean, the Romanized Germanic peoples of the Italian Peninsula lost connection to the East (see also Said, 1979, pp. 70-73). As such, the center of Germanic commerce and culture was pushed north, away from the Mediterranean, away from the Byzantine Empire, toward modern-day France and Germany, where Roman culture was not as influential. At this time, “Germanism began to play its part in history. Hitherto the Roman tradition had been uninterrupted. Now
an original Romano-Germanic civilization was about to develop” (Pirenne, 1939/2001, p. 234). These conditions positioned the Franks (a tribal confederation of Germanic peoples) to unite Western and Central Europe under the rule of Charlemagne, who would become Holy Roman Emperor in 800. Pirenne (1939/2001) notes that this “consecrated the break between the West and the East, inasmuch as it gave the West a new Roman Empire—the manifest proof that it had broken with the old Empire, which continued to exist in Constantinople” (p. 285).

However, it is also possible that as Wickham (2016) argues, Pirenne’s (1925/2014, 1939/2001) thesis is wrong, mainly because “the western Mediterranean had already lost its economic unity before the seventh century” (Wickham, 2016, p. 54). As a counterargument, Wickham (2016) adds that “what the Arab conquest created was a third major player in western Eurasia, one which was more powerful than the previously dominant one, the (eastern) Roman empire, and one with which everyone would have to deal in the future” (p. 54).

Whereas the Eastern Roman Empire confronted the Arab Muslim world in the seventh century (Dussel, 2000, p. 466; Wickham, 2016, pp. 43-60), the new Latin Roman Empire inaugurated by Charlemagne’s ascendance—and, as Pirenne (1925/2014, 1939/2001) argues, fueled by the spread of Islam across the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa—confronted the Muslim world in 1096 with the First Crusade to recapture the Holy Land. Dussel (2000) describes the importance of this confrontation as a self-defining moment for the West:

For the first time, [Medieval Latin] Europe differentiated itself from Africa and from the Eastern world (especially from the Byzantine Empire and from the Middle East). In this context, the Crusades can be seen as the first attempt of Latin Europe to impose itself on the eastern Mediterranean. They failed, and Latin Europe remained isolated by the Turkish and Muslim world, which extended its geopolitical domination from Morocco to Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Mogul Empire of northern India, the mercantile
kingdoms of Melaka, and finally, in the thirteenth century, to Mindanao Island in the Philippines. Thus, Muslim “universality” reached from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Latin Europe was a secondary, peripheral culture and up to this point had never been the “center” of history. (Dussel, 2000, p. 466)

Although the crusades ultimately failed, they helped to solidify the Latin-West/Greek-East divide further.¹²

It is not until the fall of Constantinople in 1453 that the Latin-West and Greek-East are forced together (mainly around Italy). Whereas Clogg (2013) argues that the fall of Constantinople and the establishment of Tourkokratia (Turkish rule) isolated the Greek world; Dussel (2000) posits that with the fall of Constantinople “a novel coming together of heretofore independent cultural processes took place: the western Latin world joined the eastern Greek world, and they subsequently confronted the Turkish world” (p. 467). Throughout the Renaissance, the forced union of the Latin-West/Greek-East added another dimension to modernity’s ontological crisis, existential fear of the Ottomans, and the Arab Muslim world. An existential crisis that gave Europeans a vision of Ottoman barbarism vis-à-vis European civilization (Bisaha, 1999; Denton, 2015; Vitkus, 1999).

This is by no means a comprehensive history of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, or the so-called Middle Ages (see footnote 9). Instead, this brief history of Greco-Roman relations, alongside Islam, is meant to highlight several vital contradictions in Enlightenment thinking about European modernity: (1) What becomes modern Europe always existed alongside (not within) the Classical Greek world, even when Roman rule unified them. (2) Given this separation, the traditional sequence (Greek to Pagan and Christian Roman to Medieval Christian to Modern Europe) is disingenuous insofar as it obscures the Latin-

¹². Prior to the First Crusade, the East-West Schism of 1054 did not help the differences between Eastern Orthodox Greek churches and Western Catholic churches.
West/Greek-East divide. (3) Classical and Hellenistic Greek heritage does not belong to modern Europe alone. As Dussel (2000) points out, Classical and Hellenistic Greek culture also influenced the Arab Muslim world (It is telling that upon conquering Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II declared himself Caesar). (4) Colonial discourse about the Orient is not exclusive to eighteenth-century colonialism. Rather, it is a constitutive part of European subjectivity. And (5) the fall of Constantinople and the “threat” of the Ottoman Empire meant that Europeans would have to sail west to trade with Asia. This was a decision that would inaugurate a world system wherein Europe could take center stage (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992; Wallerstein, 2004).

**About the Enlightened Genius of European Culture**

In the Age of Enlightenment, modernity espouses the genius of European culture. A culture with a direct connection to the Classical and Hellenistic Greek world. A culture that overcame the ignorance of the Middle Ages through regimes of science and reason to become the center of world history. However, this glorious origin story is incomplete and insincere. It effectively disregards European fragmentation, violence, paranoia, and exploitation, in addition to undervaluing the achievements of non-European peoples. Here, Weber’s (1905/2005b) Introduction to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is instructive:

> A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural

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13. The existential crisis of modernity is about confronting and overcoming the following realities: (1) The gulf (historical and geographical) between the Latin-West and the Greek-East; (2) Europe’s (with an emphasis on the Latin Roman Empire) peripheral status vis-à-vis the Muslim world; (3) The power and influence of the Muslim world, which, over time, forced the Latin Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire together; And (4) the prospect of spreading a European civilization to the New World.
phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.

Only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize today as valid. Empirical knowledge, reflection on problems of the cosmos and of life, philosophical and theological wisdom of the most profound sort, are not confined to it, though in the case of the last the full development of a systematic theology must be credited to Christianity under the influence of Hellenism, since there were only fragments in Islam and in a few Indian sects. In short, knowledge and observation of great refinement have existed elsewhere, above all in India, China, Babylonia, Egypt. But in Babylonia and elsewhere astronomy lacked—which makes its development all the more astounding—the mathematical foundation which it first received from the Greeks. The Indian geometry had no rational proof; that was another product of the Greek intellect, also the creator of mechanics and physics. The Indian natural sciences, though well developed in observation, lacked the method of experiment, which was, apart from beginnings in antiquity, essentially a product of the Renaissance, as was the modern laboratory. Hence medicine, especially in India, though highly developed in empirical technique, lacked a biological and particularly a biochemical foundation. A rational chemistry has been absent from all areas of culture except the West.

The highly developed historical scholarship of China did not have the method of Thucydides. Machiavelli, it is true, had predecessors in India; but all Indian political thought was lacking in a systematic method comparable to that of Aristotle, and, indeed, in the possession of rational concepts. Not all the anticipations in India (School of Mimamsa), nor the extensive codification especially in the Near East, nor all the Indian and other books of law, had the strictly systematic forms of thought, so essential to a rational jurisprudence, of the Roman law and of the Western law under its influence. A structure like the canon law is known only to the West. (pp. xxviii-xxix)

Weber’s (1905/2005b) introduction showcases modernity’s existential crisis to the extent that it struggles to affirm the uniqueness and singularity of European civilization and situate it above all others. According to Weber (1905/2005b), Western civilization is at a unique and enlightened stage of development in comparison to other cultures. Only in the West, Weber (1905/2005b) argues, does “science” exist. Yes, philosophy, epistemology, ontology, and theology have existed elsewhere (e.g., in India, China, Babylonia, and Egypt), but the pinnacle of knowledge and refinement is a European reality. Even when Weber (1905/2005b) acknowledges the feats of other cultures, he does so to set up a debt to the Greek world or
champion the superiority of the West. In claiming the Greek world, Weber (1905/2005b) asserts a European singularity and takes credit for the accomplishments of other cultures. The introduction mentions Classical Greece, the Hellenistic period, Roman law, and the Renaissance to vindicate the uniqueness of European civilization. However, Weber (1905/2005b) fails to mention the Latin-West/Greek-East divide, the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Middle Ages, the Muslim world, or the Islamic Golden Age (from the eighth century to the fourteenth century; Renima, Tiliouine, & Estes, 2016).

Lastly, Weber (1905/2005b) implies that there is a universal line of development—a global standard—that all cultures follow. Accordingly, European civilization is the most developed, while all other cultures are becoming developed (i.e., like Europeans). The issue with this developmentalist fallacy, as Dussel (1996) explains, is that it promulgates European hegemony through a Eurocentric invention of time and history (see also Mignolo, 2011, pp. 149-180). Per the developmentalist fallacy, all non-European cultures are in the before-stage of civilization (in the past), a stage that Europeans have already attained. Yet, this pernicious view of progress and development ignores the fact that the history of European civilization is neither linear, nor cohesive, nor a universal paradigm. The feats of Europeans are not independent of all other cultures—an ex nihilo heroic genesis does not exist.

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The developmentalist fallacy thinks that the “slave” is a “free lord” in his youthful stage, and like a child (“crude or barbarian”). It does not understand that the slave is the dialectical “other face” of domination: … the “other-part” of the exploitative relation. The peripheral world will never be able to be “developed,” nor “center,” nor “late.” Its path is another. Its alternative is different. (p. 5)
In the early history of modernity, the fifteenth century sets the stage for European hegemony. As mentioned, the fall of Constantinople in 1453 helped to redefine and unite, albeit forcefully, what later becomes modern Europe (the West). Considering the existential threat of Muslim hegemony, the successful Reconquista of Portugal in 1249 and of Spanish Granada in 1492, and, in turn, the expulsion of Arabs and Jews “in the name of blood purity” from the Iberian Peninsula, are significant modern European events (Grosfoguel, 2002, p. 210). These events, as Grosfoguel (2002) mentions, instituted an “internal border” at the same time that the Spanish Empire founded an “external border” in the New World. The importance of the Reconquista, however, is both augmented and eclipsed by Columbus’s voyage (funded by Spain’s Catholic Monarchs). According to Dussel (2000), 1492 also marks the establishment of the first modern European state, Spain:

Spain, as the first “modern” nation, had the following attributes: a state that unified the peninsula, a top-down national consensus created by the Inquisition, a national military power (since the conquest of Granada), one of the first grammars of a vernacular language (Antonio de Nebrija’s Castilian Gramática in 1492), and the subordination of the church to the state, thanks to Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros. All of these attributes allowed Spain to begin the first stage of modernity: world mercantilism. The silver mines of Potosí and Zacatecas (discovered in 1545-46) allowed the Spaniards to accumulate sufficient monetary wealth to defeat the Turks at Lepanto in 1571. The Atlantic circuit replaced the Mediterranean. For me, the centrality of Latin Europe in world history stands as the fundamental determination of modernity. The other determinations, such as constituent subjectivity, private property, or freedom of contract, all took shape around the centrality of Latin Europe. The seventeenth century (as exemplified in the work of Descartes and Bacon) must then be seen as the result of one-and-a-half centuries of modernity: it is a consequence rather than a starting point. Holland (which gained emancipation from Spain in 1610), England, and France would expand the path opened by Spain. (p. 470)

Up until 1492, what becomes modern Europe was itself “peripheral to and dependent on the Islamic world” (Dussel, 1993, p. 74). It was not until the founding of the New World that the
possibility of a new periphery and an external border relative to Europe emerged. It is in the New World that modernity undergoes a spiritual and humanitarian crisis.

Hernandez (2001) affirms that from “the time Columbus landed in Hispaniola in 1492 to 1550-1551, when the Valladolid debate took place, the Spaniards had been divided in regards to the rationality and Christianization of the Indians” (p. 97). The treatment and administration of the inhabitants of the New World were heavily contested (Góngora-Mera, 2012; Hanke, 1937; Hernandez, 2001). Antonio de Montesinos’s 1511 sermon sheds light on this issue:

I am the voice crying in the wilderness … the voice of Christ in the desert of this island … [saying that] you are all in mortal sin … on account of the cruelty and tyranny with which you use these innocent people. Are these not men? Have they not rational souls? Must not you love them as you love yourselves? (as cited in Hernandez, 2001, p. 95)

A year later, in 1512, the Spanish Crown issued the Laws of Burgos, “the first concrete regulations to govern Indian-Spaniard relations. The laws … stipulated that Spaniards who benefited from forced Indian labor, or the encomienda system, would diligently see that their subjects be properly instructed in the Holy Faith” (Hernandez, 2001, p. 97). The Laws of Burgos, as Góngora-Mera (2012) notes, point to the monarchy’s “protective measures to impede annihilation of the Indians (which could jeopardize its imperial economic objectives, based on Indigenous labor in mines and plantations)” (p. 17). Under the Laws of Burgos, encomenderos had to implement periods of work and rules of rest, maternity leave, and occupational safety and health for the peoples of the New World (Góngora-Mera, 2012, p. 17). Not surprisingly, these regulations received substantial opposition, and, to avoid uprisings from slave-owners, colonial authorities and administrators did not enforce or implement the laws (Góngora-Mera, 2012, p. 18; Hernandez, 2001).
Given noncompliance and abuse in the New World, after receiving a letter from Julián Garcés, the Dominican Bishop of Tlaxcala in New Spain (Mexico), and an in-person testimony from Bernadino de Minaya, another member of the Dominican Order (Hanke, 1937), Pope Paul III issued the bull *Sublimis Deus* in 1537. In it, Paul III “proclaimed in the most solemn and exalted terms the absolute spiritual equality and brotherhood of *all men* [emphasis added]” (Hanke, 1937, p. 73; see also Hernandez, 2001). The 1537 papal bull decreed that the peoples of the New World were rational and, in effect, capable of understanding and receiving Christianity. While Paul III may have issued the *Sublimis Deus* to protect the inhabitants of the New World, it is also conceivable that “this shrewd and tenacious ruler also intended the bull to be the opening wedge for a more aggressive papal program in the affairs of the Indies” (Hanke, 1937, p. 73). Alongside the *Sublimis Deus*, the pope issued the *Pastorale Officium* brief, which added: “the penalty of excommunication for those who violated” the Spanish Emperor’s (Charles V) “declaration against enslaving the Indians and despoiling them of their goods” (Hanke, 1937, p. 73). As mentioned, modernity’s ontological crisis raised an important issue about European politics: i.e., whether the church, the emperor, or the state ought to rule on behalf of the multitude. The pope’s paternal humanitarianism not only challenged the *encomienda* system and the spirituality of Spain’s colonial enterprises in the New World, but it also tested Charles V (r. 1516 to 1556), the Spanish Holy Roman Emperor, and his ecclesiastical authority in the colonies.

Consequently, after the *Sublimis Deus*, Charles V confronted Paul III and asked the pope to revoke the bull and subsequent brief. According to Hanke (1937):

It would seem that the history of the whole controversy concerning Paul III and the American Indians becomes the story of the successful vindication by Charles V of his ecclesiastical privileges in the new world, and it should be emphasized that when Charles V prevailed upon Paul III to issue the brief of revocation, he was not moved
by any unfriendly attitude toward the American Indians for, as was noted above, he shortly afterward issued the famous New Laws in 1542 designed to advance their interests. Nor did Charles wish to hinder the attempts of ecclesiastics to protect the Indians, for in 1546 he requested the pope to issue a brief authorizing all ecclesiastics to give information, without thereby incurring any irregularity, concerning all cases of ill treatment of the natives. (p. 96)

As Hanke (1937) states, in 1542, after confronting the pope, Charles V issued his laws—the New Laws of the Indies for the Good Treatment and Preservation of the Indians, or “New Laws”—to protect the peoples of the New World. Unfortunately, like the 1512 Laws of Burgos, the 1542 New Laws were met with resistance and noncompliance. This was the case in Peru wherein the New Laws “provoked an insurrection of settlers headed by Gonzalo Pizarro” (Bataillon, 1963, p. 47). While the Crown eventually quelled Pizarro’s rebellion, starting in 1545, Charles V “made important concessions; in particular, he revoked the law calling for the suppression throughout the Indies of the encomiendas or repartimientos, that is, the allotments of Indians granted to conquistadores or favorites of the court” (Bataillon, 1963, p. 48).

The ontological crisis that spread throughout Europe and positioned the politics of the multitude (biophilia) against the politics of the One (necrophilia) merged with a spiritual/humanitarian crisis in the New World. To be clear, the Spanish settlers and administrators involved in the encomienda system in the Americas did not advocate for biophilia. They were not humanists against the oppression of the Church or the Spanish Empire. Their noncompliance was not on behalf of humanity, but rather a strategy to secure their sovereignty to exploit and oppress the inhabitants and riches of the New World. When the Dominican Order, perhaps the first humanists of the Americas and founders of a counterdiscourse against the administrative evil of necrophilic modernity (see Dussel, 1996, p. 135), pushed the Spanish
monarchy and the Catholic Church to intervene by decreeing the human rights of Indigenous peoples, Spanish settlers and administrators were defiant and noncompliant.

This situation reached a climax in 1550, when “the most powerful man, Charles V, leader of the most powerful nation in the world, Spain, suspended all wars of conquest until a group of intellectuals grappled with the morality of Spain’s presence and enterprises in America” (Hernandez, 2001, p. 95; see also Brunstetter & Zartner, 2011). The Valladolid debate, which began in 1550, put into question the legitimacy of conquest and the behavior of Spaniards in the New World (particularly their cruelty): “On the one side was … Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, a prominent humanist and Greek scholar who justified conquest and evangelization by war. His opponent, fray Bartolomé de Las Casas … was a staunch advocate of peaceful and persuasive conversion” (Hernandez, 2001, p. 95). While there is no record of a winner, it seems that the legacy of Sepúlveda’s argument continued in the practice of colonialism after that, while Las Casas’s writings:

Were soon applied to local European anti-colonialism, being translated into Dutch during the revolts of the Netherlands against Spanish rule which began in 1566. By the eighteenth century, his arguments had been developed into a fully-fledged political discourse of theories of equality and human rights that formed the basis for anti-colonial sentiment within Europe, particularly in France. (Young, 2016, p. 76)

Ultimately, Spain’s spiritual/humanitarian crisis came down to the legitimacy of cruel enterprises vis-à-vis human rights in Europe’s new external border: the Americas. In spite of passing laws to protect the peoples of the New World, neither the crown nor the church could implement them among noncompliant colonial administrators, conquistadors, and encomenderos.

What effectively curved the exploitation of Indigenous peoples in the Americas was not Spanish benevolence, salvation, or humanism, but rather death, greed, and strategic
planning. Although Spain’s colonial ventures (e.g., pillaging, mineral mining, and the production of commercial crops like sugar cane) were extremely profitable, their ongoing success hinged on forced labor. Considering the diminishing supply of Amerindians due to “excessive mortality in the face of disease, war, and the social disruption that accompanied [Spanish] conquest” (Phillips, 2011, p. 331), and royal decrees like the Laws of Burgos and the New Laws, the colonial machine had to pivot away from Amerindian slavery toward African slavery. A decision that, as Phillips (2011) argues, “assured the development of the transatlantic slave trade” (p. 332). The success of the Spanish (and Portuguese) colonial apparatus and slave system would later inspire the British, French, and Dutch (among others) to claim colonies of their own—or, as Young (2016) puts it, the possibility of appropriating some colonial booty of their own to challenge Spanish dominion (p. 21). Then, like the Spanish Empire before them, they too would have to address the spirituality and humanity of colonialism in a capitalist world system (see Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992; Wallerstein, 2006, pp. 23-41).

**Modernity and Colonialism**

Where does contemporary American Public Administration find its purpose and roots? As outlined throughout this chapter, American Public Administration is indebted to and enthralled by European modernity (Adams, 1992). While scholars have interrogated the legacy of modernity in the field, the political significance of their primarily postmodern arguments is limited by the occlusion of the other modernity—i.e., modernity in crisis. This other version of modernity includes a series of ontological, existential, and spiritual/humanitarian dilemmas. This other version of modernity appears from decisions
(mainly administrative decisions) to subdue the multitude, define humanity and its proper relationship with the world, fabricate a heroic version of European exceptionalism and development, control the past, and profit from the oppression of non-Europeans. The thread that connects these decisions and typifies the other version of modernity is the “justification of an irrational praxis of violence” (Dussel, 2000, p. 472). In this other version of modernity, human sacrifice engenders its profound darkness.

Admittedly, the other modernity—i.e., modernity’s “dark side” (Mignolo, 2011) or “underside” (Dussel, 1996)—cannot be understood in isolation as only an intra-European phenomenon. Instead, European modernity always exists alongside an exterior, whether it is the Arab Muslim world, the Ottoman Empire, or the New World. This is why Said (1979) argues that the major component of European culture is “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures [emphasis added]” (p. 7). The other modernity is necrophilic, Orientalist, and colonial. Indeed, it is colonial because, as Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) claim, the socio-cultural hierarchy of European and non-European became a reality through the colonialization of the New World (the setting for new possibilities, new futures, new Europeans, and a new form of colonialism).

First Moment of Introspection

modernity is fundamentally about conquest
the large regulation of human identity
colonial discourse
Eurocentrism and
European dominance of the world affected through imperial expansion
The concept of modernity is about conquest and regulation. So, as I began to research the idea of modernity in Public Administration, it dawned on me that the post in postcolonial and postmodernity are the same. This was an exciting and daunting revelation. On the one hand, this opened the door to the possibility of studying and contributing to postcolonial and postmodern conversations in the field (as in Santis, 2018; Santis & Zavattaro, 2019). On the other hand, this meant that my colonial discourse frame (Chapter 4) would have to incorporate both modernity and colonialism.

Consequently, I had to reassess my original literature review, which only included colonialism by way of a conversation about postcolonialism in Public Administration. My solution was to draft two new chapters to unpack and deconstruct modernity and colonialism (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively). Furthermore, I dissected my original literature review and repurposed several passages to fit postcolonial theory throughout my bricolage.

For this chapter, my mission was to learn as much as I could about modernity in Public Administration. To do so, I knew I would have to study postmodernists like Farmer (1995), Fox and Miller (1995), and McSwite (1997), all with attention to their treatment of modernity.

15. The original passage by Ashcroft et al. (2013) reads:

The concept of modernity is therefore significant in the emergence of colonial discourse. Modernity is fundamentally about conquest, “the imperial regulation of land, the discipline of the soul, and the creation of truth” (Turner, 1990: 4), a discourse that enabled the large regulation of human identity both within Europe and its colonies. The emergence of modernity is coterminous with the emergence of Eurocentrism and the European dominance of the world affected through imperial expansion. In other words, modernity emerged at about the same time that European nations began to conceive of their own dominant relationship to a non-European world and began to spread their rule through exploration, cartography, and colonization. Europe constructed itself as “modern” and constructed the non-Europeans as “traditional,” “static,” “prehistorical.” (p. 161)
or the idea of modernity. In my studying, it became clear to me that modernity, in Public Administration, is an ideology and a historical event whose point zero tends to be the Age of Enlightenment, somewhere in Western Europe. Given the importance of ideology and history in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), I decided it was essential to trace the idea of modernity through language and history, going as far back as Classical Greece. The value of this chapter is that it adds an ideological and historical foundation for the entire bricolage and coding frame. A fundamental assumption in CDA, as Meyer (2001) explains, is that “all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context” (p. 15). To me, this meant that if the origins of colonial discourse are within modernity and colonialism, then, I needed to build a contextual base that included a meaningful review of modernity’s discursive and historical moments (vis-à-vis administration) to refer to throughout the bricolage.

Concerning lessons learned and my vision, with this chapter, I hope to amend the story of modernity in Public Administration, even if it is only an asterisk in the archive. My goal was to unmask modernity’s dark dimensions and internal conflicts, all to bridge modernity and colonialism. In doing so, I came to see modernity as a struggle between a politics of immanence and a politics of transcendence, a (con)quest for identity, and the start of a world system with a center and a periphery. It is possible that earth-shattering events like the (re)establishment of transcendental politics in Europe, the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and the so-called “discovery” of the “New World” in 1492, all contributed to the triumph of transcendental necrophilia, Eurocentrism, and colonial oppression.

A note about the New World, in discovering non-Europeans, the Spaniards also found the limits of European-ness (or the European). As such, Quijano (2000) argues that “America
was constituted as the first space/time of a new model of power and global vocation, and both in this way and by it became the *first identity of modernity* [emphasis added]” (p. 533). I think the New World gave Europeans an opportunity to displace biophilia and overcome ontological and existential dilemmas at home by shifting their gaze toward a newfound periphery, the exception to the European. As I have written elsewhere:

> To exclude is to possess the power to define and redefine the limits of existence—of belonging and nonbelonging—by articulating and rearticulating exceptions to presumed normal life. The exception begets a sense of belonging-through-exclusion to the extent that people fathom their sense of belonging only in relation to the excepted/excluded Other. (Santis, 2018, p. 131)

Arguably, from the subject-position of a European standing at the center of a brand-new world system, the discovery of the exception also instituted a sense of normalcy at home and a sense of abnormality elsewhere. So, with the invention/invasion of the non-European exception came imperial expansion/exceptions and the regulation of human life, globally.

To conclude this moment of introspection, the following two definitions of modernity are important to me because they inspired me to (re)assess what I knew about modernity:

- Modernity is a phenomenon originally European—and it is evident that its sources date back to the Egyptian, Babylonian, Semitic, Greek worlds, but that only in the 15th century it reached worldly implementation; and that it constitutes and reconstitutes itself simultaneously by a dialectical articulation of Europe (as center) with the peripheral world (as a dominated sub-system) within the first and only ‘world system.’ Modernity *originates* in the Europe of free cities (within the context of the feudal world) from the 10th century on, approximately, but is *born* when Europe constitutes itself as center of the world system, of world history, that is inaugurated (at least as a limit date) with 1492. The medieval crusades are a frustrated attempt. The Viking “discoveries” in the North Atlantic and the Portuguese in the African Atlantic in the 15th century are its antecedents, but only with the “discovery” (by Europe) or “invasion” (in a non-eurocentric view of the peripheral peoples) of the “New World” will Europe (a particular “ecumene” without evident comparative advantages up to then) enjoy a true springboard that will allow it to supersede and overcome all other ecumenes, regional or provincial systems (especially that of China). In this manner, from 1492 (and not before), “world history” begins as worldly: that is to say, the history of all civilizations or former provincial ecumenes are placed in an effectively empirical relation. The
Persian, Roman, Mongolian, Chinese, Aztec, Inca, and other empires were provincial or regional ecumenes more or less disconnected, all of them ethnocentric “navels of the world,” whose boundaries divided “human beings” from “barbarians”—the Aztecs, for instance, denominated the barbarians “Chichimecas.” All the great neolithic cultures were “centers” of civilizing subsystems with their own peripheries, but without any historically significant connection with other ecumenes. Only modern European culture, from 1492 onwards, was a center of a world system, of a universal history that confronts (with diverse types of subsumption and exteriority) as _all the other cultures of the earth_: cultures that will be militarily dominated as its periphery. (Dussel, 1996, p. 132)

- “Modernity” is a complex narrative whose point of origination was Europe; a narrative that builds Western civilization by celebrating its achievements while hiding at the same time its darker side, “coloniality.” Coloniality, in other words, is constitutive of modernity—there is no modernity without coloniality. Hence, today’s common expression, “global modernities” implies “global colonialities” in the precise sense that the colonial matrix of power is shared and disputed by many contenders. (Mignolo, 2011, pp. 2-3)
CHAPTER 3: COLONIALISM

The dark side of modernity invites a conversation about the administrative evil of the colonial apparatus. This evil goes beyond controlling the politics of the multitude. It goes beyond hijacking a glorious past and vilifying the Muslim and Ottoman others. And it goes beyond economic exploitation and human sacrifice. It could be argued that these conundrums—these modern dilemmas—set the stage for justified (if not necessary), albeit deluded, acts of violence against non-Europeans via colonialism. From the moment the Spaniards set foot on the so-called New World, administrative evil became an integral part of European modernity:

The Spanish and Portuguese expansion to the Americas built racial categories that would be later generalized to the rest of the world (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992). Nobody defined themselves as Blacks in Africa, Whites in Europe, or Indians in the Americas before the European expansion to the Americas. These categories were invented as part of the European colonization of the Americas (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992). The formation of the international division of labor occurred simultaneously with the formation of a global racial/ethnic hierarchy. As Quijano states, there was no “pre” nor “post” to their joint constitution. The superiority of the Westerners/Europeans over non-Europeans in terms of a racial narrative of superior/inferior peoples was constructed in this period. (Grosfoguel, 2003, pp. 22-23; Grosfoguel, 2002, p. 210)

Amid ontological, existential, and spiritual troubles, the construction of an “inferior” other made European hegemony possible. This colonial difference, as Mignolo (2002) calls it, is the defining feature of modernity’s dark side, and it is an administered difference. Whereas Chapter 2 sought to unmask modernity’s dark dimensions and internal conflicts, this chapter focuses on the story of the colonial administrative state. As such, alongside Chapter 2, the hope is that by connecting modern administration to colonialism in the Americas, it will be possible to construct a framework for colonial discourse in Chapter 4.
According to the Real Academia Española’s (n.d.) Dictionary of the Spanish Language, “balduque” is a “cinta estrecha, por lo común encarnada, usada en las oficinas para atar legajo” [narrow tape, usually red, used in offices to bind files]. The use of balduque originated in the sixteenth century, under the reign of Charles V (r. 1516 to 1556), the Spanish Holy Roman Emperor, to “bind critical government documents requiring … immediate action. Red symbolized royal power and wealth (the dye was exorbitantly expensive). Routine administrative dossiers, in contrast, were bound with plain cloth ribbon” (Dickson, 2014, p. 176). After that, the balduque crossed the Strait of Dover. In England, red tape was used to tie up important legal documents (Kaufman, 2015, p. 22)—King Henry VIII, for example, “sent Pope Clement VII eighty petitions to annul his marriage to Spanish-born Catherine of Aragon, all wrapped in bright red ribbon” (Dickson, 2014, p. 176). Three centuries after the reign of Charles V, “Civil War veterans’ records were bound with a red tape that made the files hard to open, sealing its dubious reputation for making life unnecessarily difficult” (Dickson, 2014, p. 176). Today, as Kaufman (2015) observes, the use of literal balduque or red tape has long disappeared, “but the hated conditions and practices it represents continue, keeping the symbol alive” (p. 22). For this chapter, the story of red tape functions as an analogy for the colonial administrative state beginning with the Spanish colonial machine, followed by English colonialism, and, finally, American neocolonialism.
As soon as the Spaniards arrived in the so-called New World, administrative questions and possibilities arose. Upon crossing the Atlantic, the Spanish conquerors left behind an old continent and entered a new one. Its inhabitants notwithstanding, in the open newness of what they considered vast virgin territory unmarked by past construction, the Spanish conquerors came to embrace a “rationalizing vision of an urban future, one that ordained a planned and repetitive urban landscape and also required that its inhabitants be organized to meet increasingly stringent requirements of colonization, administration, commerce, defense, and religion” (Rama, 1996, p. 1). It is here, at the onset of Spanish colonialization, that Waldo’s (1948) utopia—the “heavenly city of the twentieth-century public administrators”—materialized, unbeknown to the author:

Here, at last man has become captain of his destiny and has built a civilization commensurate with the needs and aspirations of the human frame. It is a civilization primarily industrial and urban—it could hardly be otherwise for ‘city’ and ‘civilization’ are related logically as well as etymologically, and the maintenance of a city nowadays requires industry. It is, of course, a mechanical civilization, for it is the machine that has enabled man to lift himself above his environment and to extend the blessings of civilization to all the members of society for the first time in history. It is quite obviously a ‘planned’ society; such magnificent zoning, for example, would require great imagination in conception and thorough effort and strict obedience in execution. About all we can tell about the form of government must follow from the obvious fact of the planning: it may be ‘democratic,’ but the range of government control is unquestionably large and the machinery of administration extensive. (Waldo, 1948, p. 66)

In the New World, the Spanish conquerors demonstrated their mastery of nature through ordered cities meticulously planned and executed. These cities had to be rational, and they had
to convey a vision of the future, of social order, and, as such, had to be built using reason (precisely, geometric principles). The result, as Rama (1996) observes, “was the ubiquitous checkboard grid that has endured practically until the present day” in Spanish America (p. 5); As well as a circular design, which, like the checkboard plan, symbolized “unity, planning, and rigorous order reflecting social hierarchy” (Rama, 1996, p. 5). In Spanish America, cities had to be imagined, they had to be planned and documented, and they had to be approved before being built. As a result, the urban centers of Spanish America were ordered “fortress cities, port cities, pioneer cities on the frontier of civilization, but most importantly, they were seats of administrative authority [emphasis added]” (Rama, 1996, p. 17). Indeed, as Anderson (2006) notes, from the very beginning, the Spanish American territory was divided into administrative units (p. 52).

*Letters, Letrados, and Bureaucracy*

To maintain order, the Spanish Empire instituted “rigid procedures for founding new cities and then extended them methodically across vast stretches of time and space” (Rama, 1996, p. 6). The myriad administrative requirements of the empire gave rise to a specialized class of lettered functionaries (*letrados*) responsible for wielding pen and paper on behalf of the Spanish colonial machine. In the New World, Spanish conquerors needed a *letrado* (sometimes a scribe, a notary, a chronicler) to draft notarial documents and “give witness or ‘faith’ to the acts they recorded” (Rama, 1996, p. 6). Given that the *letrados* were vital to the colonial enterprise, the empire dedicated tremendous resources to train them (Rama, 1996, p. 29).
The role of Public Administration and the Spanish *letrados* in colonial America is noteworthy because it exhibits the modernity of Waldo’s (1948) anachronistic utopia: i.e., Spain’s colonial administrative state. According to Weber (1922/2019), modern administration demands rationally oriented statutes and implementation, obedience to a public authority, and an administrative hierarchy (pp. 342-345). Considering these requirements, modern administration requires a cadre of officials trained and qualified to exercise legal rule (Weber, 1922/2019, pp. 346-347). Additionally, Weber (1948/2005a, 1922/2019) maintains that extensive record-keeping fuels modern administration:

a) The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (“the files”), which are preserved in their original or draught form. There is, therefore, staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials actively engaged in a “public” office, along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, make up a “bureau.” (Weber, 1948/2005a, p. 197)

b) The principle that all administrative work is done *in writing* is maintained, even when oral discussion is the actual rule, or even a requirement, at least for preliminary discussion and submissions, and the final decisions. Dispositions and instructions are made *in writing*. Together, paperwork and the continuing conduct of business by officials create the *office* as the focal point of the action taken by any modern organization. (Weber, 1922/2019, p. 345)

Indeed, the Spanish colonial machine had officials (the *letrados*), offices (administrative buildings and planned cities), and a plethora of files (and red tape) to safeguard order and profits.

*Peninsulares and the Non-European*

Through administration, the Spanish Crown was able to institute social and administrative hierarchies throughout its empire. The *letrados* represented the Crown’s sovereignty and, thus, were mostly *peninsulares* (Spaniards born in the Iberian Peninsula), as
opposed to criollos or creoles (Spaniards or Europeans born in the Americas). 

Concerning the social and administrative possibilities afforded to criollos, Anderson (2006) explains that “the accident of birth in the Americas consigned him [the criollo] to subordination—even though in terms of language, religion, ancestry, or manners he was largely indistinguishable from the Spain-born Spaniards” (pp. 57-58). While the criollos were subordinate to peninsulares, under the Spanish castas (mixed-race colonial categories), they ranked above castizos (the offspring of a white Spaniard and a mestiza), mestizos (the offspring of a white Spaniard and an Amerindian woman), mulatos (the offspring of a white Spaniard and an African woman), indios (Amerindians), and negros (descendants of Africans brought to the Americas as slaves), among others. In the Spanish colonial administrative state, the invention and use of racial categories helped enforce the power of peninsulares and the quintessential difference between Europeans and non-Europeans.

Colonial Fiscal Management

It is important to mention that Spain’s colonial venture was ecumenical and financial. As Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) affirm, Spain’s voyage to the New World occurred immediately after the Reconquista. At this point, Spain “was only beginning the process of creating a strong central state” (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992, p. 553). The Spanish colonial


The pattern is plain in the Americas. For example, of the 170 viceroyos in Spanish America prior to 1813, only 4 were creoles. These figures are all the more startling if we note that in 1800 less than 5% of the 3,200,000 creole ‘whites’ in the Western Empire (imposed on about 13,700,000 indigenes) were Spain-born Spaniards. On the eve of the revolution in Mexico, there was only one creole bishop, although creoles in the viceroyalty outnumbered peninsulares by 70 to 1. And, needless to say, it was nearly unheard-of for a creole to rise to a position of official importance in Spain. (pp. 56-57)
machine, then, had to contend with modernity’s *existential crisis* vis-à-vis the Arab Muslim world and its *ontological crisis* of immanent (multitude) versus transcendent (One) politics. From the start, the Spanish colonial machine inherited the spirit of the crusades. Moreover, the colonial machine offered an opportunity to uphold the sovereignty of the Crown (see Young, 2016, p. 21); Which, during the sixteenth century, “continued the centralization of the state with a seigniorial model of power, while destroying the autonomy, the democracy, and the production of the bourgeoisie in order to subordinate them to the rule of the noble courtiers” (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992, p. 553).

Furthermore, the spirit of the *Inquisition*—which “legitimated the expulsion of Mozarabite and Mudijar cultivators and artisans, as well as of Jewish merchants and financiers” (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992, p. 553; see also Grosfoguel, 2002, p. 210)—positioned the Spanish Crown against the merchant and entrepreneurial classes. Throughout Spain’s *Siglo de Oro* (Golden Age, ca. 1492–1659) this was a non-issue because the injection of immense metallic wealth alongside the “virtually inexhaustible free labour of colonial America” helped to offset the enormous costs of both stifling local production and expanding its dynastic sovereignty and prestige across Europe (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992, p. 553). However, as Spain’s local production continued to suffer, the empire had to transfer more and more wealth to “British, French, Dutch, and Flemish industrialists and merchants” (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992, p. 553). Additionally, in the quest to boost its dynastic sovereignty and prestige, Spain “spent its booty on its war machine in Europe, thus conveniently distributing the new cash widely” (Young, 2016, p. 21). While the Bourbon Dynasty, mainly under the reign of Charles III (r. 1759–1788), “imposed new taxes [in colonial America], made their collection more efficient, enforced metropolitan commercial monopolies, restricted intra-hemispheric trade of
its own advantage, centralized administrative hierarchies, and promoted a heavy immigration of *peninsulares*” (Anderson, 2006, p. 50), this was not enough to secure Spain’s hegemony across Europe. Instead, it contributed to the fragmentation of the Spanish American empire (Anderson, 2006).

**English Colonialism**

**Ascension and Objections**

Up until the seventeenth century, Spain was the preeminent colonial power in the New World. As such, the Spanish empire reaped substantial metallic wealth to support its diminishing local production, fuel its war machine, and, due to inadequate domestic production, deposit it across Europe. Throughout the seventeenth century, however, the English (as well as the Dutch and French) set up permanent settlements in the Americas. Unlike the Spanish empire, English colonialism was an unsystematic venture underpinned by economic and social motives. English colonialism offered an opportunity to “export people on the grounds of economic and political stability” (Young, 2016, p. 22). Hence, new colonies offered an outlet for a surplus population of unwanted (usually unemployed and/or criminal) peoples (Arneil, 1996a). By exporting its excess population, English colonialism “had the doubly beneficial effect of removing an apparent drain on resources as well as establishing new colonies with which the mother country could develop trade” (Young, 2016, p. 22).

Although the English had clear economic and social motives to acquire colonies of their own without the burden of the crusades, this is not to say that religion was absent. For
example, after asserting the need to settle plantations (i.e., colonies) in America, the First Charter of Virginia (1606) calls for:

Propagating of Christian Religion to such People, as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages, living in those parts, to human Civility, and to a settled and quiet Government. (par. 3; see also Arneil, 1996a, pp. 65-66)

Over time, the Christian mission became “secondary to the other objectives of [English] national glory or private gain” (Arneil, 1996a, p. 66). As more and more settlements were formed in America, the “conversion of heathens was often coupled with the expansion of England’s [bourgeoning] empire” (Arneil, 1996a, p. 66). The expansion of English power, which called for trade domination, meant to challenge the sovereignty of other European empires like the Spanish and Dutch.

Whereas the Spaniards established a colonial administrative machine to help the Crown achieve its imperial goals, English colonialism started haphazardly. Young (2016) asserts that “colonization in the early period up to the nineteenth century was rarely the deliberate policy of metropolitan governments … it tended rather to be the haphazard product of commercial interests and group settlements” (p. 23). The establishment of the English North American colonies, for example, was not part of a concerted effort to promulgate Christianity or English imperialism to the New World. Instead, it all began with “private enterprises [e.g., Virginia Company] that were given a monopoly to trade by the monarch [James I, r. 1603–1625]” (Young, 2016, p. 23). Of course, while there was no uniform plan about the acquisition of colonies, England did impose restrictions on colonial trade to secure its commercial interests. For example, the imposition of trade restrictions like the Navigation Acts prohibited the North American colonies from trading with other European countries.
Like the Spaniards before them, the English had to answer difficult questions about colonialism. While the Spaniards debated the legitimacy of colonialism vis-à-vis the human rights of Indigenous peoples, the English had severe concerns and debates about the economic value of colonialism and the property rights of Indigenous peoples in America. The second half of the seventeenth century, as Arneil (1996a) points out, was a time of economic hardship in England. The Anglo-Dutch Wars, the Great Plague of London, and the Fire of London, among other economic difficulties, contributed to England’s financial turmoil. As such, people in England were skeptical and considered ongoing colonization a drain on economic resources. In addition to the economic objection, there was the question of property rights:

At the very outset, the projectors of American settlement were confronted with the same question of right and title that has challenged modern imperialists. ‘The first objection is,’ declared the Rev. Robert Gray in a sermon of 1609 blessing the Virginia project, “by what right or warrant we can enter into the land of these Savages, take away their rightfull inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their places, being unwronged or unprovoked by them.” (Craven, 1944, p. 65)

The answer, as Craven (1944) claims, was unoriginal to the English. The justification for usurpation was that the “English did not seek to dispossess the Indians, but rather share with them the resources of a rich country and at the same time confer upon them the benefits of a better life” (Craven, 1944, p. 66). Like the Spanish, the English needed to address colonialism’s spiritual and humanitarian crisis and, in effect, find a way to substitute brutality for benevolence. As Arneil (1996a, 1996b) mentions, the English (as exemplified by John Locke’s views on property rights in the New World) also argued that Indigenous peoples were not entitled to the land because they did not enclose it nor cultivate it—ergo, it was considered new land.17 In turn, the land could be justly appropriated by English settlers because they could

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17. Vaughan (1978) points out that:
enclose and cultivate it, all to the benefit of supposedly “idle” Indigenous peoples and of English coffers (Canny, 1973, p. 596-597). As such, worries about the economic value of colonialism and the property rights of Indigenous peoples were interconnected colonial dilemmas insofar as the ability to usurp and settle the New World meant an opportunity to bolster the English economy by founding new trade monopolies.

As noted, the English imposed restrictions on colonial trade to safeguard their commercial interests. Moreover, England also preferred a “concentration of population given that it assumed the duty of protecting the colony from foreign powers. This was one reason for the prohibition against the American colonists expanding westwards” (Young, 2016, p. 79). Although England used these rather direct and coercive tactics to protect its interests, these strategies had an anti-English effect. Not only did they fuel economic objections against colonialism in favor of liberal arguments for free trade, but, much like the Spanish American taxes and regulations imposed by the Bourbons, they also fueled independence movements (mainly the American Revolution, 1765-1783).

From the beginning of their colonial movement Englishmen held ambivalent and sometimes contradictory views of the American Indian. On the one hand, they perceived him as a fit prospect for conversion to Christianity and a desirable partner in trade; accordingly, the champions of colonization advocated settlement near sizable native populations. On the other hand, Englishmen recognized the Indians as potential enemies. Even the most ardent imperialists predicted that at some point Indian resistance was inevitable. It must not, however, thwart England’s other objectives. As early as 1585 the elder Richard Hakluyt candidly stated the prevailing English position: “The ends of this voyage [to America] are these: 1. To plant Christian religion. 2. To trafficke. 3. To conquer. Or, to doe all three. To plant Christian religion without conquest will bee hard. Trafficke easily followeth conquest: conquest is not easie.” But the solution was clear. "If we finde the countrey populous, and desirous to expel us ... that seeke but just and lawfull trafficke, then by reason that we are lords of navigation, and they are not so, we [can] ... in the end bring them all in subjection and to civilitie." (pp. 58-59)

18. As Young (2016) explains, according to Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* (1776), English colonialism was unprofitable because: (1) it stifled free markets by imposing trade monopolies, (2) the costs of protecting these monopolies offset the presumed economic benefits of colonialism, and (3) the costs of the Atlantic slave trade were unsustainable (these costs were obscured due to the massive profits from sugar and tobacco plantations, which, over time, would slow down).
Young (2016) affirms that the loss of the North American colonies continued to haunt the English well into the nineteenth century. Between 1860 and 1900, as the geographical area of the empire more than quadrupled due to incessant colonial expansion (Young, 2016, p. 34), the memory of the North American settler revolt inspired free trade policies and conversations about a “federation of self-governing Anglo-Saxon dominions made up of settlers of the same race: Greater Britain [emphasis added]” (Young, 2016, p. 34). For the English, becoming the greatest colonial power in history meant becoming a “decentralized military and administrative machine that was increasingly hard to control” (Young, 2016, p. 34). As such, it “was assumed that settler colonies [like the North American colonies] could not be ruled directly from London, and that they would seek to become self-governing autonomous dominions” (Young, 2016, p. 35). Thus, it was necessary to (1) the substitute direct and coercive policies of the past (e.g., the Navigation Acts) for more liberal tools and (2) substitute animus toward settlers for pride in “a common culture among peoples of the same race dispersed all over the world” (Young, 2016, p. 36). The idea of Greater Britain, as Bell (2007) and Young (2016) explain, relied on a uniform English race:

Greater Britain was underpinned, so it was thought, by a common race, where race was defined primarily by the beliefs, traditions, institutions, and behavioral characteristics associated with being “English” (or British or “Anglo-Saxon”). These were, in general, mutable and shaped by history rather than nature—although the space opened up by this mutability was (usually) implicitly delimited by the boundaries of “whiteness.” (Bell, 2007, p. 209)

The logic behind the Greater Britain ideology was simple: If settler-colonial autonomy is inevitable, then it is crucial to develop a shared mission and vision for all English peoples. Greater Britain was not a fringe idea; prominent academics, businessmen, lawyers, politicians,
and journalists supported it (Bell, 2007). Institutions like the Colonial Society (founded in 1868, now known as the Royal Commonwealth Society) and the Imperial Federation League (1884 to 1893) supported it. Dilke’s best-selling travelogue *Greater Britain* (1868) and Seeley’s influential *The Expansion of England* (1883) are but two representative examples of a vast archive of books, pamphlets, speeches, and essays published in leading periodicals of the days supporting it (Bell, 2007; Young, 2016). Hence, faced with the existential threat of losing their empire to settler independence movements, the English used race to foment Anglo-Saxon camaraderie.

Of course, not all colonies were *settler colonies*—i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, parts of South Africa, and the North American colonies—some were *exploitation colonies*: “that is, colonies where there was minimal settlement and colonial occupation was effected for the prime purpose of economic gain (India would be the outstanding example here)” (Young, 2016, p. 32). Whereas settler colonies offered an opportunity to export English peoples and create peripheral trade outposts, the English established exploitation colonies for the sole purpose of extracting riches. These two models had distinct administrative challenges. In nineteenth-century settler colonies (that is, settler colonies after the American Revolution), the English opted for more liberal and racist administrative policies (Greater Britain) to quell antipathy among Anglo-Saxons. In nineteenth-century exploitation colonies, especially after the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (also known as the “Indian Mutiny”), the English opted for direct, coercive, and racist imperial control to manage antipathy among subject races (i.e., non-Anglo-Saxons). Young (2016) affirms that all “colonial powers tended … to have in practice two distinct kinds of colonies within their empires, the settled and the exploited, the white and the black, which would be treated very differently” (Young, 2016, p. 19). From an
administrative lens, this meant English governance without government in settler colonies and direct government in exploitation colonies.

White Man's Burden and the Mission Civilisatrice

The management of settler and exploitation colonies gave rise to a critical colonial dilemma: How could the English advocate for autonomous democratic rule in settler colonies and despotic coercive control in exploitation colonies (see Young, 2016, pp. 36-41)? Once again, the English had to justify the brutality of exploitation. To do so, the English had to substitute brutal despotism for didactic despotism (brutality for benevolence):

Seeley therefore resolves the contradictions in the government of empire by reformulating despotic rule as a form of moral responsibility [emphasis added]: not the mission civilisatrice, but duty, the white man's burden [emphasis added]. It was to Seeley's contention that the despotic rule of people with whom the British shared 'no community of race or of religion' found justification in the 'almost intolerable' moral responsibility that it incurred, which was to facilitate the further expansion of empire under the ideological guise of paternalistic duty. (Young, 2016, p. 38)

The empire’s paternalistic duty—its didactic despotism—was to “exploit for the benefit of others (‘the civilized world’) the available raw materials that would otherwise be left unused, and then to extend the culture of civilization to the society being exploited” (Young, 2016, p. 40). It is important to note that English didactic despotism embodies modernity’s developmentalist fallacy (Chapter 2), all of which resolves the tension between despotism and democracy by turning the English into saviors. Accordingly, if all non-European peoples are in the before-stage of civilization (i.e., a childish or immature state), they need Anglo-Saxons to help them, to teach them, and to watch over them and their resources as they mature (or become English-like). This is the foundation of the “White Man’s burden,” which Rudyard
Kipling (1899) illustrates in the following stanzas imploring the United States (Anglo-Saxons per the Greater Britain ideology) to annex the Philippines (from “The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands”):

Take up the White Man's burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child. (1-8)

....

Take up the White Man's burden—
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard—
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light: —
"Why brought he us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?" (33-40)

...

Take up the White Man's burden—
Have done with childish days—
The lightly proferred laurel,
The easy, ungrudged praise.
Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers! (49-56)

Kipling (1899) beseeches the United States to send “forth the best ye breed” to “better,” “guard,” and bring “toward the light” the “half-devil and half-child” in the Philippines. Per
Kipling (1899), this is a “thankless” task. A “service” met with “blame” and “hate.” A heavy burden and a solemn sacrifice made on behalf of “new-caught, sullen peoples.”

Nandy (1983) argues that “colonialism minus a civilizational mission is no colonialism at all. It handicaps the colonizer much more than it handicaps the colonized” (p. 11). The Spaniards had the Christian mission, the English had White Man’s burden, and the French had the mission civilisatrice, all to substitute brutality for benevolence. Regarding the French mission civilisatrice, while the English considered themselves custodians, the French considered themselves models. The French preferred the doctrine of complete assimilation. Thus, they demanded “that the colonized subject renounce his or her own culture and religion in order to benefit from them” (Young, 2016, p. 30). This is not to say that the English White Man’s burden was more open to non-European cultures. Instead, the English relied on what they perceived as primitive people’s inability to assimilate as the basis for perpetual occupation. The French, in contrast, sought to erase different cultures, languages, and institutions. Differences aside, the European civilizational mission meant to exonerate European colonizers—a kind of ablution through blood—and force conquered peoples to renounce their culture, mimic Europeans, and feel shame and guilt over their presumed lack of civilization (Nandy, 1983; Young, 2016).

19 In Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad (1902/1990) offers a poignant description of this process through Marlow:

The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to. (p. 4)
American Imperialism and Neocolonialism

A New Empire

Hardt and Negri (2000) note that the North American settler revolt heralded a “moment of great innovation and rupture in the genealogy of modern sovereignty [emphasis added]” (p. 160). In contrast to the modern European transcendental politics of the time (the politics of the One versus the Multitude), the U.S. Constitution combined monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic power (via the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative Branches) to institute checks and balances (limits and equilibria) on behalf of the multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 161). As such, the U.S. Constitution inaugurated a self-regulated government for the People, by the People. Given that American sovereignty is constituted for and by and multitude, Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that American sovereignty is fundamentally rooted in production. Accordingly, “the emancipation of humanity from every transcendental power is grounded on the multitude’s power to construct its own political institutions and constitute society [emphasis added]” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 165). At its core, American sovereignty is subordinate to the creative moment; it is subordinate to continuous reinvention. This is not without contradictions, or a “dialectical ballet” of creation/negation (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 165-166): Internally, the creative moment must confront its limits, it must face a stopping point and control or negate the creative power of the multitude—i.e., an internal transition from immanence to transcendence (from by the People to “We the People”). American sovereignty must look beyond its internal limits, toward an external sense of plenitude, to resolve this dialectical ballet:
After having recognized these internal limits, the new U.S. concept of sovereignty opens with extraordinary force toward the outside, almost as if it wanted to banish the idea of control and the moment of reflection from its own Constitution … Although the text of the U.S. Constitution is extremely attentive to the self-reflective moment, the life and exercise of the Constitution are instead, throughout their jurisprudential and political history, decidedly open to expansive movements, to the renewed declaration of the democratic foundation of power. The principle of expansion continually struggles against the forces of limitation and control. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 165-166)

In 1809, six years after the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Jefferson penned a letter to James Madison wherein he states: “[and] I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire [and] self government” (Jefferson, 1809). Indeed, as Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall later affirmed in *American Insurance Company v. Canter* (1828): “The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently that government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty.” The new U.S. concept of sovereignty opened with an astonishing force. In 1787, the U.S. extended from the Atlantic to the Mississippi River, and, by 1848, with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the country extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from sea to shining sea.

Although American sovereignty is expansive by necessity, Hardt and Negri (2000) contend that it is different from European imperialism. Accordingly, the “difference is that the expansiveness of the immanent concept of sovereignty is inclusive, not exclusive” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 166). Thus, as an ideal, U.S. sovereignty “does not annex or destroy the other powers it faces but on the contrary opens itself to them, including them in the network” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 166)—ergo, the metaphor of the U.S. as a melting pot. Conclusively, Hardt and Negri (2000) call this new form of immanent sovereignty *Empire*:

The idea of sovereignty as an expansive power in networks is poised on the hinge that links the principle of a democratic republic to the idea of Empire. Empire can only be
conceived as a universal republic, a network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, nor with those state organisms designed for conquest, pillage, genocide, colonization, and slavery. Against such imperialisms, Empire extends and consolidates the model of network power. Certainly, when we consider these imperial processes historically … we see clearly the expansive moments of Empire have been bathed in tears and blood, but this ignoble history does not negate the difference between the two concepts. (pp. 166-167)

This idyllic new imperialism is always open and determined to absorb others into its melting pot to avoid its internal conflict (its dialectical ballet, its process of immanent creation, and transcendent negation). As such, in Empire, the frontier cannot exist, rather, overcoming the frontier is a condition of possibility for liberty: “every difficulty, every limit of liberty is an obstacle to overcome, a threshold to pass through” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 169). Therefore, unlike the Spanish and English settlers who fought to control and institute limits on behalf of a transcendental authority, American sovereignty eschews limits in favor of a universal republic, a boundless and inclusive utopia. Thus, the American Empire signals a shift away from the Western European obsession with territorial inscription.20

Alas, as Catlaw (2007) points out, “the People, rather than being a universal category or unity, in fact, is characterized by a logic of exclusion; it creates unity through exclusion” (pp. 29-30). To imagine a boundless space without frontiers, to expand from sea to shining sea, Americans had to erase Indigenous peoples. Although the Spaniards and English also imagined new and empty land, they debated the humanity and property rights of Indigenous peoples. Their solution was to cast Indigenous bodies as less-than Europeans, deficient in

20 Here, the image of a palimpsest (i.e., a manuscript wherein inscriptions are made after the original writing has been effaced, although traces of the original remain) is powerful in that it describes a quintessential colonial pathology: i.e., imagining an “empty space” and using cartography (mapping), naming, and fictional and non-fictional narratives to colonize others (Ashcroft et al., 2013, pp. 158-160).
faith, maturity, work ethic, and civilization. In contrast, the Americans conceived Indigenous peoples as a subhuman element of the natural environment:

Just as the land must be cleared of trees and rocks in order to farm it, so too the terrain must be cleared of the native inhabitants. Just as the frontier people must gird themselves against the severe winters, so too they must arm themselves against the Indigenous populations. Native Americans were regarded as merely a particularly thorny element of nature, and a continuous war was aimed at their expulsion and/or elimination. Here we are faced with a contradiction that could not be absorbed within the constitutional machine: the Native Americans could not be integrated in the expansive movement of the frontier as part of the constitutional tendency; rather, they had to be excluded from the terrain to open its spaces and make expansion possible. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 169-170)

This conception of Indigenous peoples adds an even darker dimension to the anthropological machine of necrophilic modernity (recall Chapter 2: Unmasking the Myth of Modernity, Ontological Crisis section). That is, while the nonhuman is already within the Indigenous body, instead of waiting to become human (i.e., the condition that Spanish, English, and French colonialists used to justify their brutality), it has already turned nonhuman such that it is indistinguishable from nature. Therefore, per this pernicious logic, Indigenous bodies were not suited for inclusion, so they were left to occupy, displace, and destruct.

While Indigenous peoples were denied humanity and excluded from the American Empire, peoples of African ancestry had to be included in the U.S. Constitution:

Black slavery, a practice inherited from the colonial powers, was an insurmountable barrier to the formation of a free people. The great American anticolonial constitution had to integrate this paradigmatic colonial institution at its very heart. Native Americans could be excluded because the new republic did not depend on their labor, but black labor was an essential support of the new United States: African Americans had to be included in the Constitution but could not be included equally. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 171)

Thus, the framers of the anticolonial constitution had to quantify the value of different races, all with important implications for representation and taxation:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. (U.S. Constitution, Article I)

Indigenous peoples were excluded (becoming zero-bodies, nonhuman), and peoples of African lineage who were forced to labor were included and counted as only “three fifths of all other Persons,” i.e., three-fifths human. Black slavery, and the exclusion of Indigenous bodies, exemplifies the United States’ colonial inheritance, an evil patrimony that is directly at odds with the idealized Empire of boundless expansion, inclusion, and liberty. So, by 1848, the Empire stood from sea to shining sea, for some, despite others. Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the U.S. Constitution had to address this contradiction, and so it happened at the end of the American Civil War (1861–1865).

*About Settler Colonialism and Privilege*

The post-colonial moment in settler colonies, like the North American colonies, does not automatically institute decolonization and freedom for all. The post-colonial moment is not always postcolonial. In newly independent settler colonies, like the United States, power was handed down to the settlers (of European descent) while the “Indigenous peoples [were] offered no possibility for self-realization and often, in fact, [found] themselves subjected to worse conditions than those under imperial rule, as was largely the case in the Americas and Australasia” (Young, 2016, p. xiii). Although the American settler rebellions of the eighteenth century were anticolonial, their post-colonial governance often included a “new regime of an internal colonialism which itself then required a second war of liberation or a Civil Rights
Movement” (Young, 2016, p. 79)—examples of postcolonial resistance in post-colonial times include the American Civil War (1861–1865) and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. This is all to say that settler colonies were not immune to colonial thinking simply because they followed anti-colonial settler rebellions. In fact, as Young (2016) argues, oftentimes, settler colonialism was more racist, ruthless, bloodthirsty, and colonial than the previous imperial rule. As Walsh (2018) adds, “in the America of the North (now Canada and the United States), settler colonialism came later, exercising its system of violence and power to accomplish similar expansionist goals” (p. 16).

In relation to the Indigenous peoples and peoples of African descent in North America, the English settlers all had varying degrees of privilege. Indeed, throughout the European colonies, settlers found an advantage at the expense of non-European peoples:

If his [the colonizer’s] living standards are high, it is because those of the colonized are low; if he can benefit from plentiful and undemanding labor and servants, it is because the colonized can be exploited at will and are not protected by the laws of the colony; if he can easily obtain administrative positions, it is because they are reserved for him and the colonized are excluded from them; the more freely he breathes, the more the colonized are choked. (Memmi, 2013, Portrait of the Colonizer section)

In post-colonial times, independence does not mean the end of colonial privileges. The new Americans, for example, continued to exploit, usurp, and oppress non-European peoples. In fact, as Blauner (1969) and Gutiérrez (2004) argue, the experience of African Americans and Chicanos in the U.S., as well as other non-Europeans, to this day, could be framed as a matter of ongoing internal colonialism.
Enter Neocolonialism

The Reconstruction Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments) implemented after the American Civil War (1861-1865) did not signal the end of contradictions and tensions in the United States. Whereas the oppression of peoples of African descent, as well as the destruction of Indigenous peoples, shook the foundation of American democracy internally, as the nation expanded westward, its logic of boundless expansion had to confront external geographical limits. Thus, U.S. sovereignty had to come to terms with its boundaries and, as Hardt and Negri (2000) explain, reimagine territorial expansion. The solution, as embodied by Theodore Roosevelt’s views, was to adopt goals and methods reminiscent of old European imperialism:

This led to the colonialist experience of the United States in the Philippines. “It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism,” Roosevelt proclaimed, “to see that they are freed from their chains.” Any concession to liberation struggles that allowed uncivilized populations like the Filipinos to govern themselves would thus be “an international crime.” Roosevelt, along with generations of European ideologues before him, relied on the notion of “civilization” as an adequate justification for imperialist conquest and domination. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 175)

Roosevelt answered Kipling’s call to take up the White Man’s burden, as exemplified in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (see Roberts, 2019). Whereas the doctrine inaugurated by James Monroe (in 1823) sought to keep the New World separate from the Old World and safeguard against European colonization and intervention, the “Roosevelt Corollary” (1904) asserted that:

If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence,
to the exercise of an international police power. (Roosevelt, 1904, December 06, Fourth Annual Message)

In reimagining the vast utopia of the multitude, U.S. sovereignty had to overcome geographical barriers by asserting its role as watchman: i.e., becoming an “international police power” and castigating “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society.”

Roosevelt’s idea of an international police power sets the foundation for new colonialism. A colonialism that is far less concerned with territorial inscription and, instead, favors ideological influence and economic control, with or without physical occupation. In a letter from Roosevelt to Henry L. Sprague, Roosevelt (1900) expresses the spirit of this new colonialism: “I have always been fond of the West African proverb: Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”

Expansion, whether physical or ideological, is integral to U.S. sovereignty. In its ideal form, American sovereignty upholds the politics of the multitude, and it is biophilic. However, its internal and external contradictions undermine its biophilia. This contradiction is part of American expansion, per Quijano and Wallerstein (1992):

(1) The violent territorial expansion that permitted the US to double its area in less than 80 years, absorbing the “Indian” territories in the West plus half of Mexico; (2) the imposition of a quasi-protectorate over the countries of the Caribbean and Central America, including the “rape” of Panama and the building and control of the Panama Canal, as well as of the Philippines and Guam; (3) the imposing of economic and political hegemony over the rest of Latin America following the First World War; (4) the imposition of world hegemony after the Second World War, which integrated the US in a world power structure. (p. 555-556)

The post-colonial period and anticolonial sentiment in the Americas did not mean the end of colonialism. Post-colonialism in the Americas, primarily in the U.S., meant transfiguration, it
meant colonialism without colonies, it meant “imperialism dressed in anti-imperialist clothing” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 177-78).

Although this colonial transfiguration is not exclusive to the U.S., the American example is, as Nkrumah (1965/1966) posits, symbolic of neocolonialism today (see also Ashcroft et al., 2013, p. 146). Neocolonialism, as Nkrumah (1965/1966) defines it, is imperialism in its final and most treacherous stage, it is an empire without colonies. The essence of neocolonialism, writes Nkrumah (1965/1966), is “that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty,” but, at the same time, it is economically and politically directed by external powers (p. ix). Post-colonial independence, then, obscures economic and political dependence: “The implication of this situation, therefore, is that national sovereignty is effectively a fiction, and that the system of apparently autonomous nation-states is in fact the means through which international capital exercises imperialist control” (Young, 2016, p. 46). To sum it all up, Nkrumah (1965/1966) affirms that:

Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protections against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism neither is the case. (p. xi)

Neocolonialism displays the “necessity of incorporating the rest of the world into the realm of modernity, that is, the western economic system” (Young, 2016, p. 49), all without having to answer the spiritual or humanitarian questions of old European colonialism. Conclusively, despite its newness, neocolonialism and its language of economic underdevelopment,
development, and prosperity is simply another manifestation of the colonialism of yesteryears. It is a twentieth-century phenomenon hundreds of years in the making.

**About the Colonial Difference**

Quijano (2000) argues that “as America emerged, so did—for the first time in known history—some entirely new elements and experiences that led to a unique, original, new historical world” (p. 216). In this brave new world, the colonial apparatus dehumanized people to exploit them, erase them, and institute the supremacy of the West. In this brave new world, for the first time in history, the colonial apparatus gave rise to the “idea of ‘race,’ as biologically structural and hierarchical differences between the dominant and dominated” (Quijano, 2000, p. 216). There is nothing natural about colonial racism, like other colonial differences and fabrications, racism was meant to justify Western supremacy and oppression. As Memmi (2013) explains, colonial racism is based on “one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist; three, the use of these supposed differences as standards of absolute fact” (Portrait of the Colonizer section). Colonial racism, like other colonial differences, is a necessity.

Colonialism, as Césaire (1955/2000) describes it, is “thing-ification” (p. 42). It is rooted in “relations of domination and submission which turn the colonizing man into a class-room monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the Indigenous man into an instrument of production” (Césaire, 1955/2000, p. 42). In effect, colonialism turns non-Western peoples into objects of oppression and Western peoples into objects for cruelty. At
its core, colonialism is a ruthless project that dehumanizes all involved, oppressor and oppressed alike (see Freire, 1968/2005, p. 44).

Colonialists had to set up and exploit systems of differentiation, like race, to support colonialism’s project of thing-ification. Bhabha (1985) points out that the “exercise of colonialist authority … requires the production of differentiations, individuations, identity effects through which discriminatory practices can map out subject populations that are tarred with the visible and transparent marks of power” (p. 153). Through various modes of discrimination, the colonial apparatus disallows a sense of collectivity (Bhabha, 1985, p. 153). This refusal is necessary because:

As the oppressor minority subordinates and dominates the majority, it must divide it and keep it divided in order to remain in power. The minority cannot permit itself the luxury of tolerating the unification of the people, which would undoubtedly signify a serious threat to their own hegemony. Accordingly, the oppressors halt by any method (including violence) any action which in even incipient fashion could awaken the oppressed to the need for unity. Concepts such as unity, organization, and struggle are immediately labeled as dangerous. (Freire, 1968/2005, p. 141)

Therefore, the management of differences is a vital strategy to quell any resistance. Moreover, this gives the impression that a few settlers represent the colonized majority. Lastly, this also incites a sense of dependency among the colonized.

As mentioned, colonialism needed an ontology and epistemology that would vindicate its violence. In making Europe the paragon of civilization and the Non-European the savage, the colonial machine could espouse the rhetoric of salvation and progress. Again, there was nothing natural about colonial differences. These differences were a necessity—as long as there were colonial differences, colonialists could claim a civilizational mission (e.g., evangelizing the barbarian-other, educating ape-man) and reframe their brutality as benevolence. Alas, by its very nature as a self-serving operation, the colonial civilizational
mission is never-ending. Its telos could not be the eradication of differences because, without colonial differences, colonialists would have had to confront their illegitimacy. Under European colonialism, the imposition of colonial differences, of an ontology of dehumanization, and of an epistemology of erasure, could never end. The goal, as Bhabha (1984) posits, was a perpetual state of mimicry:

Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, thus, the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation, and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power. (p. 126)

Overall, the management of differences and mimicry, frequently cloaked by a civilizational mission, are critical components of European colonialism and its inheritance to the United States.

Colonial differences did not disappear in the United States with the founding of the New Nation. As Feagin (2010) notes, the Constitution of the United States was explicit, in at least seven sections (see pp. 4-5), about the continuation of slavery (e.g., Article 1, Section 2, which counts slaves as three-fifths of a person). Beyond the Constitution, Feagin (2010) also points out that:

Indeed, in the first two centuries of the new country most European Americans, in spite of a professed ethic of liberty, implemented or accepted the brutal subordination of black Americans and the driving away or killing of Indigenous peoples. Religious leaders like Cotton Mather, the famous Puritan, and William Penn, a Quaker and founder of Pennsylvania, owned black Americans. The founder of U.S. psychiatry, Dr. Benjamin Rush, owned a black American. Men of politics like Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, Benjamin Franklin, John Hancock, and Sam Houston enslaved black Americans. Ten U.S. presidents (Washington, Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, John Tyler,
James Polk, Zachary Taylor, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. Grant) at some point enslaved African Americans. (p. 7)

Systematic racism in the United States exhibits the legacy of European colonialism and its colonial difference (Feagin, 2010; Mills, 1997). And, as Feagin (2010) observes, the United States’ colonial patrimony undoubtedly touched Public Administration because it affected the Constitution of the United States. It also played a role in the failure of the Freedmen’s Bureau following the Civil War (Du Bois, 1903). And, Today, as Mills (1997) argues, “we live in a world which has been *foundationally shaped for the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination and the gradual consolidation of global white supremacy*” (p. 20).

**The Coloniality of Power**

*The Colonial Matrix of Power (CMP)*

Regardless of the “heterogeneity of history, geography and administrative models, from the point of view of the colonized society, colonization of all forms brought about similar disruptive consequences” (Young, 2016, p. 24). In other words, while the distinct histories, geographies, and administrative tools of Spanish, English, and American colonialism are significant, at the end of the day oppression is oppression is oppression. What is undeniable, regardless of the colonial regime, is that global European colonialism (inaugurated in 1492) and post-colonial twentieth-century American neocolonialism are both connected to a project of modernity and, in turn, dehumanization.

As Grosfoguel (2011) imagines it, from the position of an Indigenous woman in the Americas, at the moment of colonization, a European-capitalist-military-Christian-Patriarchal-
white-heterosexual-male arrived and, immediately, baptized “in time and space several entangled global hierarchies” (pp. 7-8). These global hierarchies embody the underlying colonial ideology of modernity, its coloniality. As such, there is no modernity without coloniality. They are two sides of the same coin. In post-colonial times, historical European colonialism ends, but its coloniality, its system of oppression, endures. Coloniality, as a system of oppression, can be operationalized as a colonial matrix of power (CMP), i.e., a “complex structure of management and control composed of domains, levels, and flows” (Mignolo, 2018, p. 142; see also Mignolo, 2011, pp. 8-21; Quijano, 2000). The genesis of the CMP gave rise to:

a) A new mental category to codify the relations between conquering and conquered populations: the idea of “race,” as biologically structural and hierarchical differences between the dominant and dominated. So those relations of domination came to be considered as “natural.” And such an idea was not meant to explain just the external or physiognomic differences between dominants and dominated, but also the mental and cultural differences. And since both terms of such a relationship were considered, by definition, superior and inferior, the associated cultural differences were codified as well, respectively as superior and inferior by definition. (Quijano, 2000, p. 216; see also Quijano, 2007, p. 171)

b) A global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileges European people over non-European people. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 8; Mignolo, 2011, p. 18)

c) A particular conception of the “modern subject,” an idea of Man, introduced in the European Renaissance, that became the model for the Human and for Humanity, and the point of reference for racial classification and global racism. (Mignolo, 2011, p. 19)

d) A particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labor (slavery, semi-serfdom, wage labor, petty-commodity production, etc.) were to coexist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market. This particular global structure originated in the sixteenth century. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 8; Mignolo, 2011, pp. 17-18)

e) An international world-economy and division of labor wherein the bulk of labor is allocated to a large lower stratum (the periphery) and a smaller middle stratum (the semi-periphery) for the benefit of an upper stratum (the core), which sustains
its influence through authoritarian means. (Wallerstein, 1974; Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 2011, p. 18)

f) An inter-state system of politico-military organizations controlled by European males and institutionalized in colonial administrations. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 8; Mignolo, 2011, p. 17)

g) A global gender/sex hierarchy that privileges males over females and European patriarchy over other forms of gender configurations and sexual relations. A system that imposed the concept of “woman” to reorganize gender/sexual relations in the European colonies, effectively introducing regulations for “normal” relations among the sexes and the hierarchical distinctions between “man” and “woman.” (Mignolo, 2011, p. 18; see also Oyèwùmí, 1997, pp. ix-xvii; Oyèwùmí, 2002; Lugones, 2007, p. 186; 2008; Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 8)

h) The categories “homosexual” and “heterosexual” … just as it invented the category “man” and “woman.” This invention makes ‘homophobia’ irrelevant for describing Maya, Aztec, or Inca civilizations, since in these civilizations gender/sexual organizations were cast in different categories, which Spaniards (and Europeans, in general, whether Christian or secular) were either unable to see or unwilling to accept. There was no homophobia, as indigenous people did not think in these types of categories. (Mignolo, 2011, p. 18; see also Lugones, 2007; Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 8)

i) A spiritual/religious hierarchy that privileges Christian over non-Christian/non-Western spiritualities was institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian (Catholic and later Protestant) Church; by the same token, coloniality of knowledge translated other ethical and spiritual practices around the world as “religion,” an invention that was also accepted by “natives” (Hinduism was invented as religion only in the eighteenth century). (Mignolo, 2011, p. 18; see also Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 8)

j) An epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies was institutionalized in the global university system, publishing houses, and Encyclopedia Britannica, on paper and online. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9; Mignolo, 2011, p. 19; see also Freire, 1968/2005)

k) A pedagogical hierarchy where the Cartesian western forms of pedagogy are considered superior over non-Western concepts and practices of pedagogy. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9; see also Freire, 1968/2005)

l) A linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages privileged communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and subalternized the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture, but not of knowledge/theory. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9; Mignolo, 2011, p. 19)
m) An aesthetic hierarchy (art, literature, theater, opera) that through respective institutions (museums, schools of beaux arts, opera houses, glossy paper magazines with splendid reproductions of paintings) manages the senses and shapes sensibilities by establishing norms of the beautiful and the sublime, of what art is and what it is not, what shall be included and what shall be excluded, what shall be awarded and what shall be ignored. (Mignolo, 2011, p. 19)

n) An aesthetic hierarchy of high art vs. naïve or primitive art where the West is considered superior high art and the non-West is considered as producers of inferior expressions of art institutionalized in Museums, Art Galleries and global markets. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9)

o) A media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the means of global media production and information technology while the non-West do not have the means to make their points of view enter the global media networks. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9)

p) An age hierarchy where the Western conception of productive life (ages between 15 and 65 years old) making disposable people above 65 years old are considered superior over non-Western forms of age classification, where the older the person, the more authority and respect he/she receives from the community. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9)

q) An ecological hierarchy where the Western conceptions of “nature” (as an object that is a means towards an end) with its destruction of life (human and non-human) is privileged and considered superior over non-Western conceptions of the “ecology” such as Pachamama, Tawhid, or Tao (ecology or cosmos as subject that is an end in itself), which considers in its rationality the production of life. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9)

r) A spatial hierarchy that privileges the urban over the rural with the consequent destruction of rural communities, peasants and agrarian production of the world-scale. (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 9)

Mignolo (2018) notes that “surrounding the idea of modernity … is a discourse that promises happiness and salvation through conversion, progress, civilization, modernization, development, and market democracy” (p. 142). This discourse and promise are tied to the CMP and its ethnic/racial (above: a, b, c), economic (d, e), political (f), sexual/gender (g, h), religious (i), epistemic (j, k), linguistic (l), aesthetic (m, n), media (o), age (p), ecological (q), and spatial (r) dimensions (Mignolo, 2018, p. 142). These dimensions are administered, managed, and controlled to convince people that “such-and-such a decision or public policy is for the
betterment of everyone” (Mignolo, 2018, p. 142), that is how the CMP is maintained. In essence, modernity needs coloniality and coloniality feeds modernity.

Public Administration Scholarship and Post-Colonial Times

From the Spanish colonial machine to the English settler and exploitation colonies, and finally the American empire without colonies, colonialism has been tied to questions about Public Administration. Scholars point out that colonial-era decisions about human resources, leadership, and bureaucratic structures had a direct impact on administrative capacities post-independence. For example, a prominent feature of the colonial bureaucracy in Zambia, and in several other African and South Asian colonies, was an overemphasis on top-down bureaucracy with rigid command and control mechanisms—a bureaucratic tradition that continued post-independence (Lungu, 1982, pp. 344-345). In Ghana, as in other countries, the colonial government, through its bureaucracy, “emphasized law and order and regulation of individual behavior at the expense of the public interest” (p. 196).

The endgame of colonial bureaucracy, then, was not efficiency alone, but the efficient oppression of colonial subjects, through the suppression of public interest and “stressing maximum hierarchical loyalty” (Haque, 2007, p. 1301), all to the benefit of colonial masters (also paving the way for dependency in neocolonialism). Alas, colonialism throughout Africa, as Jreisat (2010) mentions, left the governing leaders of the African states “unprepared or under-qualified” to manage the overdeveloped bureaucracies that had been traditionally “filled by loyalists and cronies of the autocratic political leaders” (p. 620). Although the expulsion of the colonial masters led to many newly independent peoples participating in the public sector
for the first time, their inexperience with managing the overdeveloped colonial bureaus proved to be challenging.

Moreover, to those loyalists and cronies of previous autocratic regimes, the expulsion of a colonial rule meant an opportunity to seize power for themselves. In Northern Nigeria, as Smith (1972) explains, “after independence, those to whom power had been handed by the colonial regime developed a power structure which perpetuated their own interests” (p. 107). In effect, colonialism “gradually transformed [colonial and post-colonial Public administration] into a collaborator [of power], sharing in the largesse of power and wealth” (Jreisat, 2010, p. 620; see also Ikeanyibe, 2016). Not surprisingly, the legacy of colonialism and the seduction of power paves the way for corruption in post-colonial times. In Nigeria, for example, Agbiboa (2015) argues that corruption in the Nigerian Police Force mirrors colonial police practices, which effectively placed native authority police as tools of oppression.

Like several African nations, governance in South Asia, under British colonial rule, sought “the modernization of the administrative system while overlooking … development in political institutions, which resulted in an overdeveloped administrative apparatus at the expense of political development” (Haque, 2001, p. 1408). As a result, post-colonial South Asian bureaucracies were overdeveloped while civic and political institutions were underdeveloped. Additionally, like in Africa, the expulsion of colonial rule left a power vacuum. Consequently, after independence, elites used public administration to perpetuate the rigid colonial hierarchical structure(s) and an unchangeable caste system to assert their power over the low-caste majority (see Haque, 2001, p. 1409)—as was the case in Malaysia (Haque, 2003). Not only did colonial practices have an impact on human resource capacity and corruption, but, as Haruna (2004) adds, colonialism also impacted Ghana’s private sector
because the colonial government “never allowed a market economy to flourish, with the result that Ghanaians were excluded from management and ownership” (p. 196). Cheung (2006) also explores how financial practices instituted by colonial rulers in Hong Kong and Singapore carried over to postcolonial practices.

Beyond conversations about colonial bureaucratic practices that carried over into newly independent states, the discussion in public administration also looks at how contemporary public policy decisions are evocative of colonial practices. In an exploratory study of local governments’ diversity programs, Harris (2012) finds that women and minorities, relative to White men, are disproportionately assigned to manage diversity programs without actual institutional support (i.e., funding). For many local governments, diversity programs are a symbolic act of support for minority communities, an action that benefits the organization but overburdens the employees assigned to run them. Consequently, if diversity programs fail, minority employees are blamed, effectively marginalizing them, and discouraging other organizations from instituting diversity programs. In other words, diversity programs often allow local governments to reap the benefits of “diversity,” while at the same time, marginalizing minorities.

Similarly, in their case study of the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI)—a U.S. program that, between 1993 and 2010, sought to transform public housing by demolishing developments and replacing them with mixed-income housing—Fraser, Burns, Bazuin, and Oakley (2012) find that neighbors (i.e., New Villagers) look at people living in Murphy Manor (i.e., HOPE VI residents) as a menace, “the ineluctantly other [emphasis in original] from whom the neighborhood must be wrested” (p. 550). So, while HOPE VI and other comparable government programs are used to ameliorate poverty
through mixed-income development, Fraser et al. (2012) argue that HOPE VI functions as a colonial strategy to isolate and discipline those living in poverty. Likewise, Gould (2007) notes that the plan and implementation of “Louisiana Rebirth: Restoring the Soul of America,” in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, is best understood as a “process of re-naming culture on colonialist terms for strategic economic gain” (p. 520). That is, to redefine Louisiana culture based on what is attractive to tourists and investors—i.e., the erasure of local culture for the benefit of administrators.

Apropos, in a study of Sydney’s (Australia) Redfern-Waterloo redevelopment efforts—an important center for the city’s aboriginal population—Morgan (2012) argues that plans to redevelop the area must consider postcolonial dynamics to avoid the colonialization (either through gentrification or the subversion of Aboriginal culture) of residents. Overall, colonialism in public policy is best understood as tactics used to marginalize people by managing where and when differences can exist: the diversity program, public housing, redevelopment plans looking to sell culture.

Second Moment of Introspection

The legacy of Europe— everywhere: traffic rules, grown-ups’ regrets, my school uniform, essays, poems, the so-called caste system, debates about love-match versus arranged marriages. Categories words borrowed European histories in our practices [blackouts are mine].21 (Chakrabarty, 2008, p. ix)

21. Chakrabarty’s (2008) original reads:
Coloniality is the legacy, the imprint of European colonialism and, oftentimes, lies in the mundane—sometimes in traffic rules, school uniforms, essays, poems, and everyday words. It lies in administration, in red tape, in everyday practices. In short, coloniality lies in plain sight. To fully grasp the significance of coloniality, I had to learn to separate colonialism from its aftershocks following the post-colonial moment. This journey began in 2018, before this bricolage, with the publication of “Archeology of Exclusion: Counter-Mapping Sites of Exclusion and Oppression in the Administrative State using GIS.” In writing that article, I came across Aníbal Quijano’s (1928-2018) notion of a “coloniality of power.” To me, this was nothing short of a paradigm shift. It opened my eyes to the interconnected dimensions of colonial oppression in post-colonial dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Although I incorporated the coloniality of power into that article, I felt uneasy because of how little I knew about Quijano’s (re)interpretation of modernity and its relationship to coloniality. Back then, I could tell that, to comprehend Quijano’s approach, I would need to know more about the historical and theoretical context of modernity/colonialism—this was a daunting prospect.

When I began writing this bricolage, I did not intend to write an entire chapter about colonialism, much less modernity. Instead, my intention was to focus on postcolonial theory and the coding frame. However, this was not meant to be. In the first few drafts, my approach raised more questions about colonialism, modernity, and coloniality than it could adequately answer. In effect, the story of colonial discourse felt incomplete without a serious review of

The legacy of Europe—of British colonial rule, for that is how Europe came into our lives—was everywhere: in traffic rules, in grown-ups' regrets that Indians had no civic sense, in the games of soccer and cricket, in my school uniform, in Bengali-nationalist essays and poems critical of social inequality, specially of the so-called caste system, in implicit and explicit debates about love-match versus arranged marriages, in literary societies and film clubs. In practical, everyday living “Europe” was not a problem to be consciously named or discussed. Categories or words borrowed from European histories found new homes in our practices. (p. ix)
colonialism and modernity. So, I began to write about it, which led to more writing, and, in time, to entire chapters.

For this chapter, my mission was to learn as much as I could about colonialism in the Americas, which meant researching the three main American colonial empires: Spain, England, and the United States. This is not to say that France and Portugal were inconsequential actors, far from it. Nonetheless, I decided to underscore Spain because of its leading role in the discovery and colonialization of the New World. I also looked at England because it possessed the North American colonies. And, lastly, the United States because of its role as a neocolonial entity and because it highlights the coloniality of power.

In writing, I came to appreciate the severity of coloniality, particularly the significance of racism to colonialism, regardless of the master. From the Spanish castas to the English Greater Britain, and then American post-colonial racism, colonial racial differences afforded settlers privilege and administrative power. In researching colonial privilege and administrative power, I came across Albert Memmi’s (2013) portrait of the naïve European who lands just by chance in a colony:

He must constantly live in relation to them [colonial differences], for it is this very alliance which enables him to lead the life which he decided to look for in the colonies; it is this relationship which is lucrative, which creates privilege. He finds himself on one side of a scale, the other side of which bears the colonized man. If his living standards are high, it is because those of the colonized are low; if he can benefit from plentiful and undemanding labor and servants, it is because the colonized can be exploited at will and are not protected by the laws of the colony; if he can easily obtain administrative positions, it is because they are reserved for him and not for the colonized; the more freely he breathes, the more the colonized are choked [emphasis added]. While he cannot help discovering this, there is no danger that official speeches might change his mind, for those speeches are drafted by him or his cousin or his friend. The laws establishing his exorbitant rights and the obligations of the colonized are conceived by him. As for orders which barely veil discrimination, or appointment after competitive examinations and in hiring, he is necessarily in on the secret of their application, for he is in charge of them. If he preferred to be blind and deaf to the operation of the
whole machinery, it would suffice for him to reap the benefits; he is then the beneficiary of the entire enterprise. (Does the Colonial Exist? section)

I found Memmi’s (2013) portrait of the naïve colonizer to be a powerful, albeit painful, description of a system that encourages neglect by offering high living standards, plentiful labor, undemanding servants, and administrative positions in return. In colonialism, the status quo is never neutral, privilege is *by, for, and of* the colonizer. The evil of coloniality is that the machine is masked by the assumption that the colonial status quo somehow ended with the post-colonial moment of independence. Yet, considering all the privileges afforded by the colonial position, a critical question must be answered: Do official speeches, laws, and discriminatory hiring practices automatically change after independence? In the United States, independence did not bring about such change for peoples of African descent or Indigenous peoples. So, when did colonial privilege end? To me, it seems more likely that some colonial privilege is still with us, camouflaged by the passing of time and the presumed neutrality of the post-colonial present.

Finally, concerning lessons learned and my vision, with this chapter, I hope to contribute to the postcolonial project in Public Administration. This is a project of refusal because it does not accept the post-colonial moment as the end of coloniality. This is a project of unmasking because it reveals the darkness of colonialism today. This is a project of critical self-awareness because it encourages a self-conscious outlook.
CHAPTER 4: A POSTCOLONIAL METHODOLOGY

The Postcoloniality of It All

As noted in Chapter 1, White (1999) posits that “all research is fundamentally a matter of storytelling or narration. Any type of knowledge … that we might have about public administration is basically a story grounded in language and discourse and expressed in narrative form through conversations” (p. 6; see also Denzin, 1994, pp. 22-23). If all communication is rooted in language and discourse, then all communicative acts are open to interpretation. It is this social constructivist approach that supports this dissertation’s methodology, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

CDA includes all forms of semiotic practices, including any “semiotic practice in other semiotic modalities such as photography and non-verbal (e.g., gestural) communication” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 91). Accordingly, CDA accepts that discourse is socially shaped and socially shaping, and it assumes that:

A. Because systems of meaning are caught up in political, racial, economic, religious, and cultural formations which are linked to socially defined practices that carry more or less privilege and value in society, they [discourse] cannot be considered neutral (see Blommaert, 2005; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) … Critical approaches to discourse analysis recognize that inquiry into meaning making is always also an exploration into power. (Rogers, 2011, p. 1)

B. Critical discourse analysts begin with an interest in understanding, uncovering, and transforming conditions of inequality. The starting point for the analysis differs depending on where the critical analyst locates and defines power. Critical discourse analysts locate power in the arena of language as a social practice. Power, however, can take on both liberating and oppressive forms. (Rogers, Malancharuvil-Berkes, Mosley, Hui, & Joseph, 2005, p. 369)

In Critical Discourse Analysis, structural processes (e.g., political, racial, economic, religious, and cultural dynamics) are interlinked by relations of power that maintain socially defined
practices that carry more or less privilege and value in society and are (re-)produced through subtle and routine discursive practices. Overall, method aside, the goal of a CDA methodology and, in turn, this dissertation is to interpret lower truths about structural and social processes, power, and discursive practices in the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD).

However, while critical discourse analysts (e.g., Fairclough, 2013) tend to adopt a Marxist position (see Wood & Kroger, 2000, pp. 20-25), this dissertation takes a postcolonial stance and interrogates the power of colonialism/coloniality in APAD.

Postcolonialists interrogate the legacy of colonialism. Following the Second World War, historians used “postcolonial” to denote a post-colonial state and underscore the chronological transition from colonial oppression to national independence. In contrast, throughout the 1980s, literary critics began using “postcolonial” to signify resistance against colonial myopia (see Ashcroft et al., 2013, p. 204). Postcolonialism, then, can be understood as a resistance against the mystifying and absolving amnesia of the colonial past, to elaborate:

If postcoloniality can be described as a condition troubled by the consequences of a self-willed historical amnesia, then the theoretical value of postcolonialism inheres, in part, in its ability to elaborate the forgotten memories of this condition [emphasis added]. In other words, the colonial aftermath calls for an ameliorative and therapeutic theory which is responsive to the task of remembering and recalling the colonial past ... In adopting this procedure, postcolonial theory inevitably commits itself to a complex project of historical and psychological “recovery.” (Gandhi, 2019, The Colonial Aftermath section)

This is all to say that the “post-” in postcolonialism is more than a chronological marker (see Chapter 1, Table 1). In fact, it is important to go beyond this usage because a chronological signpost may reinforce the idea that colonialism is an issue of times past. As it relates to the practice of administration, the chronological “post-” in postcolonialism is troubling because it assumes that colonialism, as a reality, has come to an end without any global and administrative repercussions (see Banerjee, 2003). When scholars write “postcolonialism” to mean after
colonialism (i.e., post-colonialism), they overlook the coloniality after the colonial fact. Instead, as Gould (2007) affirms, the “post-” ought to be read and written as a challenge to colonialism.

In this dissertation, postcolonialism is a project of remembrance, a project to undo the colonial knots in the fabric of the administrative body. Postcolonialism, per Gould (2007), “allows us to unmask the operation of [colonial] power and identify the role of [colonialism]” today (p. 517). This unmasking is a process of understanding how power works (see Thadhani, 2005, p. 976), it is a process of “problematiz[ing] issues arising from colonial relations” (Banerjee, 2003, p. 146). The endgame is not to eschew all Western traditions. The endgame is not destruction. Rather, the endgame is deconstruction:

The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. (Derrida, 1967/1997, p. 24; see also Spivak, 1988/2010)

To deconstruct coloniality, one must inhabit its structures in a certain way. The postcolonial critic operates with(in) the modern/colonial structures discussed thus far (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). The act of deconstruction is not a matter of dismantling the master’s house with the master’s tools, “for the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde, 2007, pp. 110-113). Instead, to deconstruct is to borrow the master’s tools, structurally and strategically, alongside other tools, to build new homes. Consequently, “when enough houses are built, the hegemony of the master’s house—in fact, mastery itself [emphasis in original]—will cease to maintain its imperial status” (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018, p. 7).
The Qualitative Content Analysis Process

The postcolonial aim of this project is to deconstruct colonial discourse in APAD, if any. Apropos, informed by postcolonialism and critical discourse analysis, this bricolage uses qualitative content analysis. Like ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, and historical research, qualitative content analysis is proper for textual analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In contrast to traditional content analysis (i.e., quantitative content analysis), a qualitative content analysis goes beyond counting word frequencies or manifest content. Of course, going beyond counting word frequencies does mean abandoning the quantitative roots of content analysis. In contrast, as Mayring (2014) argues, qualitative content analysis is a mixed-methods approach (pp. 6-15). As such, the main goal of this bricolage’s qualitative content analysis is to systematically examine language to classify large amounts of text into categories of meaning in a predefined colonial discourse coding frame. Additionally, this bricolage uses quantitative text mining procedures to effectively segment APAD material (see Procedures: Segmentation, Subsumption, and Pilot Phase section below). Ultimately, this project’s content analysis employs a systematic, albeit flexible, method to reduce and interpret latent content by way of coding to find themes and patterns (for discussions about content analysis, see Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Krippendorff, 2019; Mayring, 2014; Schreier, 2014, 2012).

In line with Mayring’s (2014) recommendations for qualitative content analysis, this project looks at 38 journal-length texts (see Sampling American Public Administration Discourse section below), representative of APAD, to study the authors’ language use, the plausible impact of their language use, and the connection, if any, to colonial discourse. This bricolage also follows systematic, albeit flexible, rule-bound procedures. These systematic rule-
bound procedures are flexible because they are unique to the study. For example, the colonial discourse frame was built deductively using prior postcolonial research and theory (see Preliminary Considerations section below), followed by inductive adjustments to better suit the material (see Procedures: Segmentation, Subsumption, and Pilot Phase section below).  

Furthermore, this study’s procedures are systematic because the interpreter had to decide in advance how to sample APAD, which parts of the 38 journal-length texts had to be analyzed and in what order, and the specifics of the colonial discourse coding frame (category definitions, coding rules, and anchor examples). Also, following Schreier’s (2012) recommendations, this study’s bricoleur (i) examined the APAD sample (the 38 journal-length texts) to determine whether the authors’ language and rhetorical strategies included colonial discourse, (ii) followed a basic sequence of steps, and (iii) checked for consistency or reliability by recoding several segments at different times.

Finally, this project focuses on the coding frame, which is the defining feature of qualitative content analysis and the central instrument of analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Elo et al., 2014; Bengtsson, 2016). The coding frame also contributes to the consistency or reliability of the analysis because it enables others to reconstruct or repeat the analysis.

22. This conforms with Mayring’s (2014) assertion that qualitative content analysis is a flexible method because it is not a “standardized instrument that always remains the same; it must be fitted to suit the particular object or material in question and constructed especially for the issue at hand” (p. 39).

23. The basic sequence of steps for this study included deciding on a research question, sampling APAD, building a colonial discourse coding frame, dividing the material into units of coding through segmentation, pilot testing the coding frame, evaluating and modifying the frame, and analyzing and presenting the material.
Kyngäs et al. (2011) observe that the most commonly used sampling strategy in qualitative content analysis is a purposeful sampling. According to Creswell (2007), in purposeful sampling, the interpreter “selects individuals and sites for study because they can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study” (p. 125). And it is not uncommon to use a combination of purposeful strategies—e.g., a combination of snowball sampling (the interpreter finds cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are information-rich), typical case sampling (the interpreter highlights what is regular or average), and stratified purposeful sampling (the interpreter identifies specific subgroups and facilitates comparisons). While purposeful sampling and qualitative content analysis offer flexibility, to increase trustworthiness, it is essential to develop a sampling strategy and describe it in detail (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 10; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 109).

This dissertation interrogates the role of colonial discourse in APAD, with an emphasis on the field’s discourse and intellectual history after Minnowbrook I (post-1968). The post-1968 moment in Public Administration is important because of the inclusion of social equity as a pillar in the field (see Frederickson, 2010; Gooden & Portillo, 2011; O’Leary, Van Slyke, & Kim, 2010) should mark a shift away or against colonial discourse. Per the introductory framework (Chapter 1), APAD is a complex web of communicative relations and events within and about Public Administration. Due to APAD’s complexity, it is possible to use countless approaches to investigate the multifaceted dynamics of discourse.
Indeed, à la Farmer (1995), McSwite (1997), and Stivers (2000), this bricolage focuses on key APAD texts and the use of colonial discourse, if any, in them. In terms of identifying key texts, Said (1979) affirms that beginning any textual analysis “involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point” (p. 16). The starting point for this dissertation includes authors and texts mentioned in three influential institutions of American Public Administration. First, Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs accredited by the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA). Second, Public Administration Review (PAR), the American Society for Public Administration’s (ASPA) flagship professional peer-reviewed journal. Third, Administration & Society (n.d.), a peer-reviewed journal that “has served as a leading forum for the exchange of ideas and information on current topics, research questions, and philosophical dilemmas of interests to academics in public administration and related disciplines” (Today’s Topics and Problems section). At one point or another, these institutions listed or debated about the authors and texts believed to be typical of the field.

Master of Public Administration (MPA) Introductory Course Syllabi

Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs accredited by NASPAA play a significant role in APAD. These programs affect communicative relations and events about Public Administration within academia that have far-reaching spillover effects. According to NASPAA’s employment and alumni data, approximately 47% of MPA graduates typically work for government institutions, 26% work for nonprofit organizations, and 19% work for
private industries (Wang, 2018, p. 10). This is all to say that decisions about MPA curricula—decisions about what students ought to know about the field—carry over into the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. A standard tool used to assess what MPA programs consider important is the course syllabus. Concerning the advantages of reviewing syllabi, Sisneros and Nelson (1996) postulate that syllabi are windows on course design, execution, and elucidate much about course in question (p. 62). Indeed, a set of syllabi can reveal “a high level of tacit agreement in the profession about what we should teach, in terms of major topics, and how we should teach” (Straussman, 2008, p. 626). Of course, reviewing syllabi also has disadvantages because teachers may prefer a terse document and omit information which they cover orally or by later handouts, they may change part(s) of the syllabi (Sisneros and Nelson, 1996, p. 62), or there might be little overlap between the texts teachers assign (Straussman, 2008, p. 626). Nevertheless, scholars in the field have used syllabi to study:

- the extent to which Public Administration students are taught values and strategies to practice democracy in the United States (Gaynor & Carrizales, 2018),
- the extent to which American MPA programs incorporate female authors and address gender diversity (Hatch, 2018),
- the extent to which MPA students are prepared to meet the challenges and changes of an increasingly diverse society in the U.S. (Sabharwal, Hijal-Moghrabi, & Royster, 2014), and
- the selection of course content across MPA programs in the United States and China (Wu & He, 2009).

Syllabi are vital APAD artifacts that, at the very least, highlight what instructors think MPA students ought to know as professional public administrators. In turn, these decisions carry over into nonprofit, private, and public organizations.

This project looked at all American NASPAA (n.d.) accredited MPA programs and sorted them according to the number of degrees awarded between the 2013–2014 and 2017–
2018 academic years to establish a starting point. Unlike Hatch (2018) and Wu and He (2009), who focus on top-ranking MPA programs, this project considered the cumulative total of degrees awarded, regardless of rank. Hence, the focus was on the number of MPA degrees awarded because, arguably, this is an indicator of communicative relations and events within and between academia and the nonprofit, private, and public sectors. After sorting the American MPA programs (N=192) according to degrees awarded, American programs with less than 100 MPAs awarded (n=104), which were responsible for approximately 17% (5,091) of all degrees awarded, were dropped. The remaining MPA programs (n=88) were responsible for about 83% (24,857) of all degrees awarded in the United States between the 2013–2014 and 2017–2018 academic years (NASPAA, n.d.). Thereafter, the program websites were mined for information about (1) curriculum, (2) the core introductory Public Administration course, and (3) pertinent syllabi.

Hatch (2018) notes that core introductory courses represent the “first time future administrators start to develop their shared vocabulary and understanding” (p. 155). And Wu and He (2009) add that these courses not only “represent the students’ initial exposure to the field, but also … these courses are most likely to be taught by faculty members who are active in research and practice in the field of public administration” (p. S22). The core introductory Public Administration course helps to build a shared vocabulary and understanding or knowledge (i.e., APAD’s language and norms) among students, all informed by a network of members who are active in research and practice in the field. As such, this project focused on introductory Public Administration course syllabi to compile a list of required and recommended readings. Following Hatch’s (2018) methodology, case studies were excluded from the list of readings. Following Wu and He’s (2009) example, syllabi had to correspond
to core introductory courses in the areas of Public Administration or management. After mining each website and identifying core introductory Public Administration courses, additional Internet searches were conducted to collect the most current syllabi for each program (syllabi used before the 2013-2014 academic year were excluded). Per Appendix A (Table 11), a total of 29 syllabi (one syllabus per MPA program) were collected for review.

As stated, the syllabi were used to compile a list of required and recommended readings, excluding case studies. Like Hatch (2018), if an instructor asked students to read an edited volume like Shafritz and Hyde’s (2017) *Classics of Public Administration*, both the edited volume and the assigned chapters were included in the final list (Appendix A, Table 12). If an instructor only included the author’s last name without any indication of a specific text, the author was still counted. This process yielded a total of 659 reading assignments and 405 author combinations (i.e., sole author or co-author). Furthermore, authors had to be mentioned in at least three separate introductory course syllabi to be included in the final list. After review, at least five different instructors cited 22 authors, and 21 were mentioned three or four times (Appendix A, Table 12). These authors and their frequently assigned texts offer a snapshot of key texts in the field.

*Public Administration Review’s (PAR) 75 Most Influential Articles*

Studies of journal rankings in Public Administration consistently position *Public Administration Review (PAR)*—i.e., the American Society for Public Administration’s (ASPA) flagship peer-reviewed journal—among the best journals in the field (Colson, 1990; Forrester & Watson, 1994; Bernick & Krueger, 2010; Van de Walle & van Delft, 2015). As Perry (2015)
notes, *PAR* is constantly among top-ranked Public Administration journals in terms of prestige and citations. Alongside its prestige and reach (see Ni, Sugimoto, & Robbin, 2017), *PAR* is sponsored by ASPA, the leading professional group for public administrators in the United States. Like American MPA programs, *PAR* plays a significant role in APAD, and many of its articles could be considered key texts in the field.

Apropos, in 2013, for *PAR’s* 75th year of publication, the journal’s “Editorial Board and editorial team decided to spotlight [the field’s] intellectual history by selecting the 75 most influential articles in the journal’s history” (Perry, 2015, p. 6). According to Ni et al. (2017):

In March 2013, Editor in Chief James Perry wrote to members of the PAR Editorial Board requesting that they collectively identify the 75 most influential articles in the journal as a way to celebrate the journal’s 75th anniversary. Fifteen three-person teams were created, and each team was instructed to select the most influential articles published during a five-year period between 1940 and 2013 (e.g., 1940-45, 1946-50, 1951-55). The teams were provided with a data file containing 625 articles based on six influence indicators: average number of citations per year as calculated by WoS [Web of Science], number of citations (WoS), and number of citations according to Google Scholar, JSTOR downloads, PAR awards, and reprints. Teams submitted between 2 and 10 articles for each time period, from which the editor in chief made the selections that constitute the 75 most influential articles. (p. 498)

Ultimately, the 75 most influential *PAR* articles nominated by the Editorial Board offer valuable expert insight into APAD because fifteen three-person teams identified the articles (45 professionals). Out of 625 *PAR* articles, these individuals selected 75 key texts based on their knowledge and familiarity with the field, article citations, downloads, awards, and reprints (all communicative relations).24 The final expert sample included texts written between 1940 (when PAR was established) and 2013 (Appendix A, Table 13).

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The authors of the 75 articles represent an extraordinary group of scholars. They include recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, Herbert Simon and Elinor Ostrom. Presidents of four major professional associations—the American Political Science Association (APSA), American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), Academy of Management, and American Sociological Association—are among the authors. More than a dozen APSA and ASPA presidents are among the authors. Not

> Instead of an entire issue devoted to a given topic, [*A&S*] will devote a portion of each issue to an ongoing dialogue on a specific topic. An article or articles on a topic will appear in this section called Disputatio Sine Fine and, in succeeding issues, the DSF section will contain special responses solicited by the editor, rejoinders by the authors, and responses from you, the readers. (pp. 305-306)

Not only is *A&S* a top Public Administration journal (Colson, 1990; Forrester & Watson, 1994; Bernick & Krueger, 2010; Van de Walle & van Delft, 2015), but its DSF section also offers a record of important debates about APAD. For example, Van de Walle and van Delft (2015) recall that the 2012–2013 DSF “debate on ‘great books’ in *A&S* … sparked a major discussion about the impact of books vs. articles and about how to establish when and whether academic output is influential” (p. 91). germane to this dissertation’s sample of key texts, the *A&S* debate about great books has critical implications for APAD.

Wamsley (2000) explains that all DSF dialogues begin with articles that “have gone through the regular anonymous review process … and have been recommended by reviewers and the editor for publication [in *A&S*]” (p. 305). The great books debate started with Kasdan’s (2012) effort to expand Sherwood’s (1990) “The Half-Century’s ‘Great Books’ in Public Administration,” an article published in celebration of *PAR’s* 50th anniversary. Whereas

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surprisingly, the list also includes 17 recipients of the Dwight Waldo Award for career contributions to public administration. (p. 6)

In the introduction to Kasdan’s (2012) article, to highlight the purpose of the DSF section, Wamsley writes: “I wish every practitioner, academician, and ‘pracademic’ in public administration would read Professor Kasdan’s DSF contribution ... [it] raises so many questions about public administration and publishing that it should be read and argued about by all of us” (as cited in Kasdan, 2012, p. 625). True to the spirit of DSF, several scholars responded with their alternative lists of great books or with addendums to Kasdan’s (2012) list (Meier & O’Toole, 2012; Raadschelders, 2012; Stivers, 2012). Others responded with their views about influence, how to measure it, and the merits of such an endeavor (Bozeman, 2012;Goodsell, 2012; Meier & O’Toole, 2012). And others commented about the importance of “conversation and controversy about how to serve ... academics, practitioners, and students” (Rainey, 2013, p. 124). It is important to note that all DSF respondents were “carefully selected on the basis of reputation for being knowledgeable on the topic” (Wamsley, 2000, p. 305).

Therefore, the debate, like decisions about MPA introductory course readings and PAR’s expert sample of influential articles, offers an emic view, i.e., an insider’s perspective, of what constitutes a key text or author in APAD (Appendix A, Table 14).

Key Texts in APAD

The act of identifying a sample of key texts out of a great mass of material is open to bias and runs the risk of excluding relevant material. However, by cross-referencing MPA syllabi, PAR’s expert sample (with publications ranging from 1940 to 2013), and the A&SF debate about “great books” (with publications ranging from 1990 to 2010), it is possible to combine the strengths of reviewing syllabi and expert opinions to inform this study’s sample. Of course, this is not without limitations. For example, the use of MPA syllabi is not meant to show trends over time. Instead, syllabi can only offer snapshots of specific academic semesters. In effect, it is conceivable that a popular text or author may lose popularity in future semesters.

Moreover, some of the syllabi reviewed for this study’s sample were incomplete or too brief, with vague language about supplemental readings without any details. And, in terms of prestige, some might question the influence of “low-ranking” programs in comparison to “top-ranking” programs. Due to these limitations, it was important to also include PAR’s expert sample and the A&SF great books debate to tap into expert opinion in APAD. While these lists rely on subjective expert opinion, this dissertation’s emphasis on discourse—its emphasis on communicative relations which are socially shaped and socially shaping—favors an insider’s perspective.

Beginning, as Said (1978) notes, is not a matter of finding a “merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a way to enable what follows from them [emphasis added]” (p. 16). For this dissertation, it was important to find key texts and authors that play an important role in APAD. Here, importance ought to be understood
as being related to the number of times a text or author is invoked (whether it is assigned or recommended to MPA students, cited, nominated as influential, or considered great). This dissertation’s sample of key texts is primarily informed by MPA introductory course syllabi, supplemented by the cross-section of frequently assigned MPA readings vis-à-vis PAF’s list of 75 influential articles and the A&S great books dialogue.

Although the MPA introductory course syllabi used to inform this dissertation’s sample were implemented between 2013 and 2019 (Appendix A, Table 11), the majority of the frequently assigned readings were written in the 20th century (Appendix A, Table 12). At the cross-section of common MPA readings and the expert sample of 75 influential PAF articles, 15 authors appeared as either the sole author or a co-author, altogether responsible for a total of 18 influential PAF articles (Appendix A, Table 15). At the cross-section of common MPA readings and the books listed by Kasdan (2012), Raadschelders (2012), and Stivers (2012) for A&S’s great books debate, five authors appeared as either the sole author or a co-author, all responsible for 11 texts (Appendix A, Table 16). Lastly, at the cross-section of PAF articles and great books from A&S, seven authors appeared as either the sole author or a co-author, together responsible for 17 texts (Appendix A, Table 17).

Conclusively, this dissertation’s beginning, its sample of key texts, includes 38 texts representative of APAD post-1968, i.e., after Minnowbrook I (Appendix A, Table 18). As mentioned in Chapter 1, in 1968, Public Administration institutes social equity as a value and goal. This bricolage’s sample of key texts includes journal-length articles and book chapters to ensure consistency across the sample. Moreover, by looking at 38 key texts of comparable length, it is possible to increase variability (in terms of author voices). Finally, per the MPA
course syllabi, instructors often assign journal-length articles and book chapters, as opposed to entire book-length texts.

**Building a Coding Frame for Colonial Discourse**

**Preliminary Considerations**

The defining feature of qualitative content analysis is the coding frame, which can be built deductively (Bengtsson, 2016; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Elo et al., 2014; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For this bricolage, an interpreter listed key colonial concepts informed by prior postcolonial research and existing theory before reviewing the 38 journal-length texts. These colonial concepts became the foundation for the coding frame and included typical colonial binaries and terms related to colonialism. As shown in Table 2, this study’s first colonial discourse frame included dichotomies that, at first, covered the legitimacy and illegitimacy of colonial authority. Initially, to supplement the preliminary coding frame (Table 2) and guide the analysis, this study’s bricoleur also developed a list of legitimation statements informed by critical discourse analysts (Appendix B). However, upon further review of the main research question and the overall goal of the project, the bricolage moved away from issues of legitimacy to focus entirely on the dynamics of colonial discourse. Although the project abandoned issues of legitimacy, the bricoleur did not abandon the preliminary colonial dichotomies. Instead, it became clear that the frame also needed to include the historical and theoretical context of modernity (Chapter 2) and colonialism (Chapter 3).
Table 2:  
First iteration of the coding frame (ca. 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimate Colonial Power Source</th>
<th>Standard of Illegitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beautiful</td>
<td>Ugly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilized (Civilization; Reason)</td>
<td>Savage (Barbarism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialist or Colonizer (Oppressor; Elite)</td>
<td>Colonized (Oppressed; Subaltern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor (Savior)</td>
<td>Patient (Sick)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European (Western)</td>
<td>Non-European (Exotic; Native; Non-Western; Oriental; Other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-World (Europe; Center)</td>
<td>Third World (Other; Periphery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good (Savior; Civilizational Mission)</td>
<td>Bad (Damned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous (Sameness)</td>
<td>Heterogeneity (Difference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human (Humanity)</td>
<td>Animal (Beast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager (Master)</td>
<td>Laborer (Slave)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Abnormal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Mimic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pious (Christian)</td>
<td>Heathen (Non-Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress (Modern; Enlightened)</td>
<td>Underdeveloped (Backward)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Pupil (Student)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Non-White</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The research in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 added rigor to the frame and contributed to the creation of preliminary categories (Table 3). Specifically, from Chapter 2, the discussion about Eurocentrism, historicism, and the developmentalist fallacy informed two new groups (Eurocentrism and Historicism). And, from Chapter 3, the discussion about civilizational missions, neocolonialism, and the colonial difference also informed two new groups (Neocolonialism and Civilizational Mission). As shown in Table 3, the original binaries were sorted into these new categories, and all ungrouped binaries were listed under “Other.”
Table 3: Second iteration of the coding frame (ca. 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eurocentrism²</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European (Western)</td>
<td>Non-European (Exotic; Native; Non-Western; Oriental; Other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-World (Europe; Center)</td>
<td>Third World (Other; Periphery)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historicism</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progress (Modern; Enlightened)</td>
<td>Underdeveloped (Backward)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Mimic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human (Humanity)</td>
<td>Animal (Beast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilized (Civilization; Reason)</td>
<td>Savage (Barbarism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neocolonialism³</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress (Modern; Enlightened)</td>
<td>Underdeveloped (Backward)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilizational Mission⁴</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctor (Savior)</td>
<td>Patient (Sick)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pious (Christian)</td>
<td>Heathen (Non-Christian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Chaos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beautiful</td>
<td>Ugly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilized (Civilization; Reason)</td>
<td>Savage (Barbarism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialist or Colonizer (Oppressor; Elite)</td>
<td>Colonized (Oppressed; Subaltern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good (Savior; Civilizational Mission)</td>
<td>Bad (Damned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Pupil (Student)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other (remaining)⁵</th>
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<tr>
<td>Homogeneous (Sameness)</td>
<td>Heterogeneity (Difference)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manager (Master)</td>
<td>Laborer (Slave)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Abnormal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Chaos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superior</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Pupil (Student)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Non-White</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Chapter 2 offers research and theory related to “Eurocentrism” and “historicism,” especially in “About the Enlightened Genius of European Culture.”
3. Chapter 3 offers research and theory related to “Neocolonialism,” particularly in “Neocolonialism” and “A New Empire.”
5. The “Other” category includes concepts leftover from Table 1. These categories also speak to colonial differences (as in racial distinctions like white and non-white).

Table 2 and Table 3 show the preliminary iteration of this project’s colonial discourse coding frame. Additionally, this preliminary frame also informed the process of segmentation and subsumption described below.
Procedures: Segmentation, Subsumption, and Pilot Phase

Qualitative content analysis, per Schreier (2014), involves a vast amount of material. So much so that, as Elo and Kyngäs (2008) acknowledge, interpreters often feel overwhelmed by the daunting workload (p. 113). While it is impossible to bypass this, Schreier (2014) recommends lessening cognitive overload by systematically structuring the material into manageable segments. Segmentation is a matter of systematically dividing the material (e.g., this bricolage’s sample) into units that fit into a (sub)category of the coding frame (Schreier, 2014, p. 178). For this bricolage, the 38 journal-length texts were divided using formal segmentation such that the interpreter used the words, sentences, or paragraphs in the material as segments (Schreier, 2014). Specifically, for this bricolage, 500 paragraphs, each having a word or concept related to colonial discourse per Table 2 and Table 3, were set aside for coding. It is important to note that segmentation is not comprehensive coding. Rather, it is a strategy to bracket units to (re)assess, code, recode, and share with another coder—in effect, this was meant to promote dependability.

Per Mayring’s (2014) and Schreier’s (2014) insight, this dissertation’s coding frame and its main categories for colonial discourse are informed by the research, the history, and theory found throughout the preceding chapters. Schreier (2014) affirms that concept-driven (i.e., deductive) categories may miss important aspects of the material and, so, must include data-driven (i.e., inductive) subcategories specific to the material (Schreier, 2014, p. 176). Hence, to supplement this study’s main categories, it was essential to employ subsumption (a data-driven subcategorization strategy), using the 500 segments mentioned above, to further define each main category, find positive examples (or anchor examples, see Mayring, 2014, p. 95), and
outline coding criteria. Per the subsumption process, an interpreter read the material (the 500 segments across the 38 journal-length texts) until coming across a relevant concept (shown in Tables 2 and 3) and checked whether a subcategory existed for it. If so, the interpreter subsumed this under the proper subcategory. If not, the interpreter created a new subcategory. The bricoleur continued this process continued until a point of saturation, i.e., when no new concepts appear.

Informed by the research, history, and theory of this bricolage, the segmentation and subsumption procedures set the foundation for the pilot phase and a trial coding. According to Schreier (2014), during the trial coding, the “categories from the coding frame are applied to the material during two rounds of coding, following the same procedure that will be used during the main coding” (p. 179). For this bricolage’s pilot phase, about 50% of the material (n=19, about 351 segments) was coded twice—this consisted of one interpreter “coding and recoding the material within approximately 10 to 14 days” (Schreier, 2014, p. 179), in other words, at two different moments. The higher the consistency between the two rounds of trial coding, the higher the quality of the coding frame (Schreier, 2014, p. 179). The purpose of trial coding is to find issues and adjust, thus guaranteeing that the final coding process is smooth. Informed by the trial coding, this bricolage’s coding frame changed from a simple set of statements and a list of colonial binaries (see Tables 2 and 3; Appendix B), to the final coding frame below.

Concerning the coding frame, categories ought to be understood as groups of content that share a commonality. According to Krippendorff (2019), categories must be mutually exclusive to each other and, in effect, capture only one aspect of colonial discourse across the 38 journal-length texts. Although each category must be mutually exclusive and
unidimensional, the entire coding frame can be multidimensional. Schreier (2014) affirms that coding frames vary in complexity depending on the number of main categories and hierarchical levels—e.g., the number of sub-subcategories within subcategories. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) note that categories are described through subcategories and pose a significant empirical and conceptual challenge, “as categories must be conceptually and empirically grounded ... successful content analysis requires that the researcher can analyse and simplify the data and form categories that reflect the subject of study in a reliable manner” (p. 112). As Schreier (2014) suggests, to meet the empirical and conceptual challenges of building a coding frame—i.e., the main feature of this bricolage—this project includes: (i) a category name, (ii) a thorough description of what each name means, (iii) positive examples from the material (i.e., from the sample of APAD texts), and (iv) decision or coding criteria.

Given the interconnectedness of each chapter in this bricolage, the final coding frame for colonial discourse recalls earlier passages in this dissertation to introduce each category. However, these earlier passages are not standard block quotes. Instead, they are now poems. Here, the use of poetry is more than an exercise in reflexivity, artistic concentration, discovery, compression, and emotional verisimilitude (see Denzin, 2010, pp. 88), it is also a storytelling strategy that connects the coding frame to the history and theory of this bricolage.

Main Category: Eurocentrism

Eurocentrism, as Ashcroft et al. (2013) define it, is the “conscious or unconscious process by which [Western] Europe and [Western] European cultural assumptions are constructed as, or assumed to be, the normal, the natural or the universal [emphasis added]” (p.
In a Eurocentric universe, all (physical, pedagogical, psychological) roads lead to Europe: It is the end of history, and the Western-European is the last man. Wallerstein (1997) asserts that Eurocentrism is a “hydra-headed monster and has many avatars ... [consequently] if we are not careful [emphasis in original], in the guise of trying to fight it, we may, in fact, criticize Eurocentrism using Eurocentric premises and thereby reinforcing its hold on the community of scholars” (p. 22). The Eurocentric hydra has many heads or avatars like (i) Orientalism, (ii) historicism, (iii) the parochiality of scientism, and (iv) the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress. Together, these subcategories buttress Eurocentrism and, as such, perpetuate the presumed superiority of the heirs of the West over all others. Eurocentrism, as defined by the following subcategories, is an epistemological project.

Subcategory: Orientalism

Orientalism is

Theory and political praxis

A family of durable ideas—a set of values,

Limits about what can and cannot be said and known about

The non-Occidental, non-European, non-Western Other.

It affirms the presumed inferiority of the East and

The supposed superiority of the West.

A complex web of “supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship ...

even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.”

The difference between the familiar “us”
And them, a strange fetish.\textsuperscript{26}

Wallerstein (1997) defines Orientalism as a “stylized and abstracted statement of the characteristic non-Western civilizations” (p. 28). These stylized and abstracted statements are not meant to be exact descriptions. Instead, they are meant to display the superiority of the West. The advantage of the West is in claiming the authority to define the “East” and/or “non-Europeans” in their own words, and in choosing to incorporate specific “Eastern” and/or “non-European” stories, histories, and realities into a Eurocentric archive. In effect, Orientalism is a fetish or fetishization. An obsession to understand what European supremacy is by showing what it is not. Orientalism is not always a direct attack on “Eastern” or “non-European” peoples. Rather, it is withholding, keeping them from defining their own experience. Instead of making them agents, they become objects of Western construction. As a rhetorical practice, Orientalism is in:

a) claiming to know about non-European cultures without contextual nuance,

b) general descriptions about non-European peoples without contextual nuance,

c) using non-European examples (e.g., anecdotes, stories, or concepts) as case studies of complications, errors, and/or wrongdoing;

 d) using non-European examples (e.g., anecdotes, stories, or concepts) to confirm or vindicate European practices, and

e) using non-European references incorrectly (e.g., misspelling country names).

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of Orientalism look like:

• One last question about incremental politics: Is it true, as often suggested in the literature of political science, that democracies are for the most part committed to change by no more than incremental moves while authoritarian governments can move with bigger steps? It seems clear that authoritarian systems themselves

\textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 1, What is Colonial Discourse? Section.
ordinarily move by increments. Indeed, some authoritarian systems are relatively effective in suppressing political change of any kind. The pace of change in the Soviet Union, for example, incremental or other, is not demonstrably faster than in the U.S. and may be slower. On the other hand, authoritarian systems are at least occasionally capable—apparently more often than in democratic systems—of such nonincremental change as the abrupt collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union and the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China (as well as the Holocaust and the recent destruction of Cambodia's cities and much of its population). (Lindblom, 1979, pp. 521-522)

- Different solutions will be more or less effective in different contexts, or when employed by different managers with different skills. Answering the motivation question for California does not guarantee that you have answered it for Colorado, Connecticut, or Columbia [sic], or Cameroon, or Cambodia. (Behn, 1995, p. 322)

- For example, one of the requirements frequently advocated as a basis for trust in government is a subsidiary value, transparency. Currently, it is as close to being a universally advocated public value as one can find. The importance of transparency for trust to exist with nation and among nations was visible in China’s handling of the SARS crisis in early 2003. When the Chinese government attempted to conceal the spread of SARS in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and a number of other cities, trade, tourism, and business travel dropped precipitously. Considerable turbulence also occurred inside China. Distrust of the official reports threatened China’s emerging market economy and its internal stability (LA Times 2003). (Cooper, 2004, p. 400)

Subcategory: Historicism

In the Age of Enlightenment

Modernity espoused the genius of European culture.

A culture with a direct connection to the Classical and Hellenistic Greek world.

A culture that overcame the “ignorance” of the Middle Ages via science and reason.

A culture at the center of

A world history.

Only in the West, “science” exists.

Yes, philosophy, epistemology, ontology, and theology have existed elsewhere, but

The pinnacle of knowledge and refinement is
Chakrabarty (2008) affirms that “Historicism—and even the modern, European idea of history—one might say, came to non-European peoples in the nineteenth century as somebody’s way of saying ‘not yet’ to somebody else” (p. 43). Arguably, Eurocentric historicism is the pro-European end of a continuum wherein so-called “backwards-underdeveloped-barbarian-non-Europeans” are lost in the past, and the so-called “advanced-developed-civil Europeans” are in the present civilization, in the now. As such, the European is concurrently the end of history and the future of all non-Europeans. As a rhetorical practice, historicism is in:

a) affirmations of Europe’s cultural genius,
b) assertions about the ignorance or backwardness of times past,
c) claims of and references to the Classical and Hellenistic Greek world,
d) drawing a connection between the achievements of non-European peoples and Europeans, thus appropriating credit for them;
e) stressing the newness of present Western-challenges as different and separate from past non-European-troubles,
f) treating European epistemology as the end of knowledge, the only source of “truth;”
g) treating European history as the end of history, the end-all-be-all for all; and
h) treating European men as the end of humanity, i.e., what all people should aspire to emulate (voluntarily or by force).

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of European historicism look like:

- With the rapid development of information processing technology, the corporate and public decision-making processes are becoming immensely more sophisticated and rational than they were in past eras. If we require any proof for this, we need

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27. See Chapter 2, About the Enlightened Genius of European Culture section.
only compare the ABM debate (regardless of whether we like its outcome) with any debate on the Acropolis reported by Thucydides—for, for that matter, with any debate in the U.S. Congress in the first half of this century. (Simon, 1973, pp. 276-277)

- Men have always wanted to fly. Was the ambition to undertake unaided flight, devoid of any strategy for achieving it, ever a useful norm or ideal? Although the myth of Icarus stimulates the imagination, flying becomes a productive ambition only to those who accept the impossibility of flying without mechanical assistance and who entertain the thought of using fabricated wings and other devices. (Lindblom, 1979, p. 518)

- Concerns about citizenship and democracy are particularly important and visible in recent political and social theory, both of which call for a reinvigorated and more active and involved citizenship (Barber 1984; Mansbridge 1990; Mansbridge 1992; Pateman 1970; Sandel 1996). Of particular relevance to our discussion is Sandel's suggestion that the prevailing model of the relationship between state and citizens is based on the idea that government exists to ensure citizens can make choices consistent with their self-interest by guaranteeing certain procedures (such as voting) and individual rights. Obviously, this perspective is consistent with public choice economics and the New Public Management (see Kamensky 1996). But Sandel offers an alternative view of democratic citizenship, one in which individuals are much more actively engaged in governance. In this view, citizens look beyond self-interest to the larger public interest, adopting a broader and longer-term perspective that requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, and a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake (Sandel 1996, 5–6; see also Schubert 1957). (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 552)

Subcategory: The Parochiality of Scientism

Throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,

Biophilic modernity had to be controlled.

It is in the Age of Enlightenment that the triad *vis-cupiditas-amor*

*Strength-desire-love*

Biophilic modernity is

Displaced by a triad of mediation and negation:

“Nature and experience are unrecognizable except through the filter of phenomena;
Human knowledge cannot be achieved except through the reflection of the intellect;

The ethical world is incommunicable except through the schematism of reason.”

All of this was meant to undermine the impulses of the multitude, and institute Mediations.

To separate the individual from the world

To delimit what people could and could not know and do.

Failure to comply meant negation:

A denial of humanity.28

The parochiality of scientism, as Wallerstein (1997) claims, is the pseudo-religious notion that “there exist scientific truths that are valid across all of time and space” (p. 24). In Eurocentric universalism and scientism, the deified Western Man is the founder of knowledge and uses Newtonian-Cartesian science to “rationally” tame nature, control multitudes, and dissect secular phenomena. All other inquiry (i.e., ‘non-scientific’ inquiry) is “illogical,” “irrational,” “unscientific,” and “unreliable.” Thus, the parochiality of scientism establishes how people can, appropriately, understand and explain the world (including their own experiences). The Eurocentric parochiality of scientism is also a masculine reality, by necessity.

In modernity, non-Europeans and women are closely associated with nature, an element which the deified Western Man must tame. As a rhetorical practice, the parochiality of scientism is in:

a) assertions of “technical rationality,” which offer thinking and living through a scientific-analytic mindset, as well as a belief in “technological” progress, as the good life, or proper life (see Adams, 2011; Adams & Balfour, 2015);
b) espousing the need for more science and technical rationality,

c) undermining “non-scientific” and non-Western methods of connecting to the world,

d) using adjectives like “authentic,” “bright,” “brilliant,” “enlightened,” “intelligent,” “logical,” “rational,” “smart,” and “logical” to affirm a favorable opinion of technical rationality while also dictating what counts as such;

e) using adjectives like “authentic,” “bright,” “brilliant,” “enlightened,” “intelligent,” “logical,” “rational,” “smart,” and “logical” to describe a man (i.e., “a man of reason,” see McSwite, 1997), typically through masculine pronouns like “him,” “his,” or “he;” and

f) using highly specialized or technical language to force the reader to think in scientific-analytic or techno-rational terms.

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of the parochiality of scientism look like:

- New Public Administration advocates what could be best described as “second-generation behavioralism.” Unlike his progenitor, the second-generation behavioralist emphasizes the public part of Public Administration. He accepts the importance of understanding as scientifically as possible how and why organizations behave as they do but he tends to be rather more interested in the impact of that organization on its clientele and vice versa. He is not antipositivist nor antiscientific although he is probably less than sanguine about the applicability of the natural-science model to social phenomena. He is not likely to use his behavioralism as a rationale for simply trying to describe how public organizations behave. Nor is he inclined to use his behavioralism as a facade for so-called neutrality, being more than a little skeptical of the objectivity of those who claim to be doing science. He attempts to use his scientific skills to aid his analysis, experimentation, and evaluation of alternative policies and administrative modes. In sum, then, the second-generation behavioralist is less “generic” and more “public” than his forebear, less “descriptive” and more “prescriptive,” less “institution oriented” and more “client-impact oriented,” less “neutral” and more “normative,” and, it is hoped, no less scientific. (Frederickson, 1971/2017, p. 285)

- Some of us may think that these big questions are not all that important. Would it really have been worth ten billion dollars to build a 54-mile subatomic racetrack in Texas that could crash two beams of protons into each other hoping to smash them apart into their most elementary, component particles, that is, quarks? Theoretical physicists predict what these elementary particles are. Experimental physicists need high-speed accelerators to break down stable particles into these predicted elementary particles so that they can be observed (or so that some phenomena predicted by their existence can be observed) and thus verified. In this
time of budget deficits, a lot of us, and particularly those of us in the U.S. House of Representatives, did not think that answering this question warranted building the Superconducting Supercollider. That does not mean that the question is not a big one for physics. It simply means that the nonphysicists of the country would rather spend $10 billion on answering some other question, or perhaps on acting on the basis of some question to which (we think) we already have the answer. (Behn, 1995, p. 314)

Subcategory: The Developmentalist Fallacy and the Cult of Progress

The developmentalist fallacy:

“Thinks that the ‘slave’ is a ‘free lord’ in his youthful stage, and

Like a child (‘crude or barbarian’).”

All non-European cultures are in the before-stage of civilization.

Immature, infantile, almost but not quite—not yet!

Guilty and responsible for their arrested development,

Culpable.29

As Dussel (1992/1995) observes, in Kant’s (1784) “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?” the philosopher writes: “Enlightenment (Aufklärung) is the exit of humanity by itself from a state of culpable immaturity (verschuldeten Unmündigkeit) ... Laziness and cowardliness are the causes which bind the great part of humanity in this frivolous state of immaturity” (pp. 19-20; see also Dussel, 1993). Non-Europeans, then, are to blame for their non-European-ness, for their “backwardness,” “barbarism,” “immaturity,” and “underdevelopment.” Hence, the developmentalist fallacy is a guilty verdict, handed down by the West. The developmentalist fallacy does not directly celebrate European history. It does so indirectly by accusing non-Europeans of being lazy, or lack of progress, and lack of

29. See Chapter 3, White Man’s Burden and the Mission Civilisatrice section and Chapter 2, About the Enlightened Genius of European Culture section.
civilization. Whereas historicism underscores European perfection, the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress proclaims shame. Hence, the Eurocentric developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress is both diagnosis and verdict, a matter of underscoring conditions of “underdevelopment,” “backwardness,” and “immaturity” to offer a solution: Western “progress.” As a rhetorical practice, the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress is in:

a) assertions about the development and progress of Europeans,

b) employing adjectives like “backward,” “immature,” “rude,” “uncivilized,” and “underdeveloped,” as well as nouns like “Third World;”

c) statements that affirm economic efficiency or knowledge as a signpost and condition for progress,

d) statements that show the need to be a 
_**homo economicus** (an “economic man,” related to the “man of reason” underneath the parochiality of scientism) who strives for economic knowledge and efficiency;

e) undermining civil rights movements or social movements, led by non-Europeans and/or peoples living in dire conditions, as “immature,” “unsophisticated,” “rude,” or “inexperienced;”

f) undermining civil rights movements or new social movements because their members are “not ready” to lead, and

g) using non-European examples to highlight the past and European examples to refer to the present moment.

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress look like:

- Third, the scale of organization in our society has grown so large that only through large-scale organization does it seem possible to have a significant impact. This impression alone is enough to make individual people feel helplessly overwhelmed by huge, impersonal machines indifferent to their uniqueness and their humanity. In addition, however, some interests—notably those of Negroes and of youth—have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures. (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5)
A serious concern worth noting is that commitment to social equity is not frequently found in the documents we examined. Amy Chua (2004) argues persuasively that market economies coupled with emerging democratic political systems can be an explosive mix. If, as seems to be the case in many developing countries, the market is largely dominated by an ethnic minority, while the mass of the populace is moving toward democratic government, tension is created between political and economic access. Absent some commitment to social equity, these imbalances create enormous instability and unrest. (Cooper, 2004, p. 400)

*Main Category: Civilizational Mission*

The Spaniards had the Crusades,

The English had “white man’s burden,”

The French had the *mission civilisatrice*, and

The Americans had a “manifest destiny,”

All to substitute *brutality for benevolence*.

A self-serving operation:

A never-ending mission.30

If in a Eurocentric universe, all roads lead to Europe, the civilizational mission is the spark that ignites the expansion of European-ness, from the metropole to the periphery and back. The civilizational mission is the act of making others almost European, almost the same but not quite (see Bhabha, 1984). Within the civilizational mission is the urgent need to supplant colonial violence for a “greater good,” i.e., ushering civilization. Colonizers believe the civilizational mission is a gift—this is a leap of bad faith to vindicate colonial brutality. If colonialism minus a civilizational mission is no colonialism at all (Nandy, 1983), the same is true of neocolonialism. Hence, it is not surprising that throughout the early 1900s, as Roberts

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30. See Chapter 3, White Man’s Burden and the Mission Civilisatrice section and About the Colonial Difference section.
(2019) recounts, several important Public Administration programs and scholars advocated for colonial administration to deal with “less” civilized peoples (specifically in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Guam). The avatars of the civilizational mission include (i) didactic despotism and (ii) a drive to institute neoliberal democracies and prosperity across “less” civilized lands (a project connected to neocolonialism). Together, these subcategories undermine the experience of the Rest and uphold the authority of the West. The civilizational mission is much more than an epistemological project. It is an action plan or a call to arms.

Subcategory: The Neocolonial Prosperity Mission

In reimagining the boundless utopia of the multitude,

U.S. sovereignty had to overcome geographical barriers,

It had to assert its role as the watchman, the protector of democracy:

Becoming an “international police power” and

Castigating “chronic wrongdoing,

or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society.”

A new colonialism that is far less concerned with territorial inscription and,

Instead, favors ideological influence and economic control,

With or without physical occupation.31

Unlike European colonialism, neocolonialism, typified by the United States’ empire, is not fixated with a physical and limited occupation. The neocolonial project is not a project of cartography or limits, but a project of economic and democratic “development.” American sovereignty is inherently connected to the neocolonial project because American democracy

31. See Chapter 3, Enter Neocolonialism section and A New Empire section.
is meant to be a boundless and inclusive utopia. It is meant to overcome limits and instill liberty globally (and beyond). This mission is much more than a theoretical aspiration. It is a matter of policy. It is in Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 corollary and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1941 Atlantic Charter. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill met to discuss eight common principles to “base their hopes for a better future for the world” (Yearbook of the United Nations, n.d., para. 2). According to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill (Yearbook of the United Nations, n.d.), in a better post-war world, the United States and the United Kingdom would:

I. seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other (para. 3);

II. desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned (para. 4);

III. respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and ... see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them (para. 5);

IV. endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity (para. 6);

V. desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security (para. 7);

VI. after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny ... Hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want (para. 8);

VII. such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance (para. 9), and

VIII. Believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security,
that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They [the US and the UK] will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments (para. 10).

The Atlantic Charter is explicit about the end of old colonial practices (as in principles I and II), underscores the right to democratic liberties and economic prosperity (as in principles III, IV, V, VI), and affirms the need for world peace (as in principles VI, VII, and VIII)—a vision evocative of Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 Fourteen Points (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Hence, per Roosevelt and Churchill, in a better post-war world, democratic liberties, economic prosperity, and world peace, all interconnected and determined by the United States and the United Kingdom, should be global guiding principles. In 1944, this mission and vision acquired powerful tools with the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; U.S. Department of State, n.d.). To be terse, the neocolonial prosperity mission, then, is the becoming of an international police power who determines, calls for, and checks the development of democracies, markets, and world peace, globally. As a rhetorical practice, the neocolonial prosperity mission (i.e., democratic liberties, economic prosperity, and world peace) is in:

a) calls to institute or foster “authentic” democracy or participation,

b) calls for neoliberal strategies that verge on market fundamentalism, typified by what Williamson’s (1993, 2009) “Washington consensus,” to “develop” markets outside of the West (see Ashcroft et al., 2013, pp. 218-220);

c) statements that speak to (or of) a global “order” or “crisis,” concerning economic or democratic conditions, and the need to manage these issues through Western intervention or leadership; and

d) statements that underscore the need to help or aid “developing” countries and guide them.

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of the neocolonial prosperity mission include:
Certainly a concern for democratic citizenship and the public interest has not been fully lost, but rather has been subordinated. We argue, however, that in a democratic society, a concern for democratic values should be paramount in the way we think about systems of governance. Values such as efficiency and productivity should not be lost, but should be placed in the larger context of democracy, community, and the public interest. In terms of the normative models we examine here, the New Public Service clearly seems most consistent with the basic foundations of democracy in this country and, therefore, provides a framework within which other valuable techniques and values, such as the best ideas of the old public administration or the New Public Management, might be played out. While this debate will surely continue for many years, for the time being, the New Public Service provides a rallying point around which we might envision a public service based on and fully integrated with citizen discourse and the public interest. (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 557)

On the international level, state and even local governments are working directly with other nations to promote trade or attract foreign investment. Organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have taken a strong hand in shaping international relations. Ad hoc international structures have managed the world’s response to recent ethnic conflicts, from the Kosovo peacekeeping operation to the intense bombing campaign in Serbia. Foreign (or shared) command of American troops proved a hot domestic issue, but it has become increasingly common in the deployment of military forces. Other policy arenas that used to be domestic, from telecommunications to the environment, now have major international components. More decisions have flowed from the national to the international level—and at the international level, to both ad hoc and multinational organizations. Permanent organizations like the State Department have struggled to build the capacity to cope with these changes, while ad hoc ones never institutionalize. Maintaining national sovereignty while effectively pursuing international policy has become an increasingly difficult problem. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 489)

Subcategory: Didactic Despotism

The empire’s paternalistic duty—

Its didactic despotism—

Was to “exploit for the benefit of others.” If

All non-European peoples are in the before-stage of civilization:

They need Anglo-Saxons—the West

To help them;
To teach them;

To watch over them and their resources.

Until they mature—until they learn to change.

This is the “white man’s burden”

A heavy burden, a solemn sacrifice made on behalf of “new-caught, sullen peoples.”

So, Kipling (1899) beseeches the United States to send

“Forth the best ye breed” to

“Better,” “guard,” and bring “toward the light”

The “half-devil and half-child” in the Philippines.32

Essentially, in didactic despotism, the oppressor combines economic and pedagogical concerns to justify their control over colonized peoples and their resources. Therefore, the oppressor proclaims the responsibility of teaching the colonized how to be Western while also withholding their access to their own resources. In didactic despotism, oppressors consider Western education a gift, which transforms them into powerful experts, teachers, and saviors. All of which justifies the appropriation of resources. Freire (1968/2005) discusses didactic despotism as a process whereby:

The teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable. Or else he expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of the students. His task is to ‘fill’ the students with the contents of his narration—contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity. (p. 81)

The power of didactic despotism is rooted in the oppressor’s refusal to connect the oppressed to their own reality. Instead, the teacher’s lessons are intentionally strange, alien, and disconnected from the totality that engendered the students and could give them significance.

32. See Chapter 3, White Man’s Burden and the Mission Civilisatrice section.
In other words, the didactic despot’s lessons exist outside of the student’s world, which, in turn, helps to separate and erase the student’s world. Freire (1968/2005) calls this necrophilic relationship the “banking concept of education” because the teacher-subject (who has value) deposits information into the student-object (who has nothing or ought to have nothing). From the perspective of the colonizer, students are empty vessels, devoid of and denied any value, waiting to receive the gift of education. However, this gift is empty because it continues to shame the student into reminding them of their deficit and difference. Ultimately, didactic despotism, as a mission, justifies colonial control because the oppressors reassure others that colonialism is temporary and that they are waiting for the students to learn how to rule. As a rhetorical practice, didactic despotism is in:

a) calls to educate administrators and citizens (a pedagogical call to arms),

b) statements that refer to a “crisis” in education, or to how little people know;

c) statements that reinforce the banking concept of education by positioning public administrators (the teachers) in opposition to the public (the students), as in:

- the administrator acts, citizens have the illusion of acting through the administrator,

- the administrator chooses the program content, citizens (who are not consulted) adapt;

- the administrator confuses the authority of reason and knowledge (as in the parochiality of scientism) for their own professional authority, which they set in opposition to the citizen’s freedoms;

- the administrator knows everything, citizens know nothing;

- the administrator punishes, citizens are punished;

- the administrator talks, citizens listen;

- the administrator teaches, citizens are taught;

- the administrator thinks, citizens are thought about;
• the administrator is the Subject of all administrative processes, citizens are mere objects.

d) statements that reinforce the idea that education, knowledge, and information are finite resources that ought to be cultivated, strategically used, and/or traded.

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of the didactic despotism look like:

1. Citizens, administrators, and activists all agreed that participation is hindered by a lack of education, both informally within families and communities and formally in the schools. One administrator described how early childhood socialization prepared him for a life of participation:

   \[\text{"When I was a kid we would meet at the dinner table ... and that was the place that almost without fail we'd get around to political and neighborhood and church goings on ... that would be the basis for learning about and socializing into broader issues in the community.... The same thing was true for the neighborhoods. The adults used to gather on the front porches while their kids would play"}\]

   The demise of the neighborhood as an organizing and socializing system was described in the following way by one administrator: “People don’t talk to each other anymore ... the neighborhoods aren’t neighborhoods ... they used to be real tight-knit communities.” Isolation from others is detrimental to participation. (Simrell King, Feltey, & O’Neill Susel, 1998, p. 322)

2. The New Public Service demands that the process of establishing a vision for society is not something merely left to elected political leaders or appointed public administrators. Instead, the activity of establishing a vision or direction is something in which widespread public dialogue and deliberation are central (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Luke 1998; Stone 1988). The role of government will increasingly be to bring people together in settings that allow for unconstrained and authentic discourse concerning the direction society should take. Based on these deliberations, a broad-based vision for the community, the state, or the nation can be established and provide a guiding set of ideas (or ideals) for the future. It is less important for this process to result in a single set of goals than it is for it to engage administrators, politicians, and citizens in a process of thinking about a desired future for their community and their nation. (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 554)
To maintain “thing-ification”

Colonialism exploits the production differentiations—

“Discriminatory practices [that] map out subject populations ... Tarred with the visible and transparent marks of power.”

The colonial project relies on fabricating differences to distinguish the colonizer from the colonized. Colonial differences, like race, are meant to exonerate oppressors and reinforce the idea that colonized people are foreign, abnormal, and devoid of Western refinement. The colonial difference is othering, which Ashcroft et al. (2013) describe as the construction of the Western Self through the (re)articulation of the other. In other words, the gap between oppressor and oppressed, and the (re)articulation of this gap, helps the oppressor understand themselves and justify their privilege in relation to what they cast out. Ashcroft et al. (2013) note that othering involves (a) the act of projecting the Western Self (the oppressor) as having power over others, (b) the act of debasing non-Western others, and (c) the act of disallowing a sense of collectivity among non-Western others in favor of fragmentation. Given that othering disallows collectivity among non-Western peoples, it offers power in following rules and becoming part of the colonial apparatus. In this bricolage, the main avatar of the colonial difference is binarism.

Subcategory: Binarism

In colonial discourse

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33 See Chapter 3, About the Colonial Difference section.
Lie binaries

Have/Have-Not
Imperialist/Anti-Imperialist
North/South
Us/Them
Western/Oriental
White/Colored

To solidify the colonial position of presumed Euro-American-superiority over supposed Non-Euro-American-inferiority.\(^{34}\)

The colonial project needs to fabricate differences. Relatedly, *binarism* is a system of differences, which Ashcroft et al. (2013) call an extreme form of social structuring through binary (either/or) opposition. The binary opposition in colonialism (e.g., master/slave, white/black, man/woman, us/them) “suppress ambiguous or interstitial spaces between the opposed categories, so that any overlapping region that may appear … becomes impossible according to binary logic” (Ashcroft et al., 2013, p. 18). The impossibility of bridging the spaces in colonial binaries preserves the colonial status quo. As such, binarism is a matter of reinforcing colonial differences by proclaiming the impossibility of a *third space*, i.e., the in-between space (the dash between either/or) that elucidates ambivalence and destroys naturalized binary oppositions (see Bhabha, 1994, p. 37). Colonial binarism and the colonial difference endure because these differences are taken for granted. As a rhetorical practice, binarism is in:

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\(^{34}\) See Chapter 1, What is Colonial Discourse? Section.
a) language that positions the subject (usually an administrator or scholar, note the use of “we” or “us”) as different from other groups (e.g., “women,” “the poor,” or “them”);

b) statements that refer to different groups (e.g., “women,” “the poor,” or “them”) through a language of deficit including the use of nouns (also related adjectives) like “absence,” “failure,” “loss,” “shortfall,” “inadequacy,” “lack,” “need,” or “weakness;”

c) statements that separate the subject (usually an administrator or scholar, note the use of “we” or “us”) from others by using common colonial binaries like:

i. Civil/barbarian,

ii. Developed/underdeveloped,

iii. Doctor/patient,

iv. First World/third world,

v. Human/animal,

vi. Man/woman

vii. Mature/immature

viii. Normal/abnormal,

ix. Parent/child

x. Superior/inferior,

xi. Teacher/student

xii. White/black

d) statements that separate the subject (usually an administrator or scholar, note the use of “we” or “us”) from others by using common colonial binaries to chastise others and/or justify the need for Eurocentrism or the Colonial Mission.

In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), examples of binarism include:

1. In a revealing footnote Derthick concedes that there were other causes for failure as well: the relative inability of the poor to organize and assert their interests; the relative strength of local opponents of the program; and “the great difficulty of organizing cooperative activity on a large scale” (including the activities of
developers, lending institutions, school boards, and myriad federal agencies with at least some control over the surplus land and its disposition). (Bardach, 1977/2017, p. 323)

2. Some argue that the use of alternative service delivery can and should proceed regardless of the fiscal problems facing many local governments. And, with proper offsets or rebates most privatizing mechanisms can be adopted without hurting the poor. But another general equity issue can be raised, the potential effect on minorities and affirmative action. Government employment has been an especially valuable means of social and economic progress for minorities. Pascal reports, for example, that governments of many large cities have twice the proportion of minorities in their workforce as does the general economy. Since a basic purpose of privatization is the shift of jobs from the public to the private sector, how might this change affect minorities? (Morgan & England, 1988, p. 981)

3. A related normative anchor for public administrators flows from the concept of social equity. Social equity involves activities intended to enhance the well-being of minorities who lack political and economic resources. Frederickson argues that the obligations of public administrators are threefold: to provide services efficiently and economically while enhancing social equity. He suggests that the inclusion of social equity among the values served by public administrators helps to define the political nature of public administration roles. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 369)

**Limitations**

Broadly, from a positivist point of view, this bricolage suffers from limitations, all connected to common criticisms levied against qualitative inquiry, e.g., the fact that this bricolage is political, does not use a random sample, and cannot be generalized (see Denzin, 2010, p. 22). While these criticisms spell out valid concerns about the scientific merit of this study, they are based on a faulty premise: i.e., the idea that interpretivist inquiry and positivist inquiry can be or ought to be evaluated using only a positivist rubric. This bricolage’s merit is in its attention to social equity and postcolonialism such that the project is inherently (and by necessity) political. This bricolage’s focus on APAD, its methodology, and the use of content analysis support the use of purposive sampling, which is not only common in content analysis
but also favors the richness that comes from a targeted insider’s perspective. Also, while this project’s results may be generalizable only to the sample of 38 journal-length texts, it is possible to use and adjust this bricolage’s colonial discourse coding frame to study other APAD texts or build new coding tools. Lastly, this study’s use of qualitative content analysis, which, albeit flexible, is systematic and rule-bound (due to its genesis as a quantitative method), offers a step-by-step guide for others to repeat the study.

From an interpretivist point of view, Lincoln and Guba (1985, 1986; see also Guba, 1981) argue that interpreters ought to show trustworthiness by way of:

- **Credibility**: confidence in the “truth” or accuracy of the findings.
- **Transferability**: showing that the results have applicability in other contexts or situations.
- **Dependability**: assurance that the findings are consistent and could be repeated.
- **Confirmability**: the extent to which the data and not research bias shape the results.

In qualitative content analysis, scholars commonly use trustworthiness to evaluate studies (Bengtsson, 2016; Elo et al., 2014; Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). Consequently, transparency is vital, both in terms of process and interpretation. Concerning the former, this project deliberately outlines all research assumptions (see Chapter 1, Plan of Inquiry section), the sampling process (see Sampling APAD section above), and the evolution of the coding frame (see Building a Coding Frame for Colonial Discourse section above). Concerning the latter, this bricolage includes moments of introspection to convey the author’s intentions and thought process throughout the study, as well as detailed results and taxonomies in Chapter 5 to help the reader evaluate the author’s interpretative sufficiency (i.e., confidence that the work possesses depth, detail, emotionality, nuance, and coherence to build a critical consciousness; see Denzin, 2010, pp. 26-27).
It is important to note that in all interpretative work, the interpreter is limited by their own critical abilities and experiences. Although this bricolage is explicit about the author's process (both research and interpretative) and they (re)coded several segments more than once at different times (see Procedures: Segmentation, Subsumption, and Pilot Phase section above), this limitation is still applicable. Hence, this project is careful to build trustworthiness to make up for this limitation.

Third Moment of Introspection

The colonial world is a compartmentalized world. If we penetrate inside this compartmentalization we shall at least bring to light some of its key aspects. (Fanon, 1963/2004, p. 3)

With this chapter, my challenge was to make the connection between the coding frame and the entire bricolage clear. Additionally, I found it difficult to describe my approach to postcolonialism, critical discourse, and qualitative content analysis. Finally, I also struggled to make decisions about the best sampling plan. At my prospectus defense, my committee noted that my original plan of coding seminal APAD texts starting with Wilson’s (1887) “The Study

35. For interpretative work, it is also possible to use multiple coders and pertinent measures of intercoder reliability to assuage limitations related to solo interpretation. Nonetheless, this would not completely solve the issue, nothing will. Therefore, trustworthiness is critical.

36. Fanon’s (1963/2004) original reads:

The colonial world is a compartmentalized world. It is obviously as superfluous to recall the existence of “native” towns and European towns, of schools for “natives” and schools for Europeans, as it is to recall apartheid in South Africa. Yet if we penetrate inside this compartmentalization we shall at least bring to light some of its key aspects. By penetrating its geographical configuration and classification we shall be able to delineate the backbone on which the decolonized society is reorganized. (p. 3)
“of Administration” would raise critical complications (e.g., running out of time). Consequently, I had to reconceive my sampling strategy. With the help of all my committee members, I decided to start in 1968. As noted in Chapter 1, four years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a group of Public Administration scholars met in New York’s Adirondack Mountains to discuss the future of the field. At this gathering, the Minnowbrook I Conference, scholars acknowledged the need for social equity. To me, the Minnowbrook Conference is a moment akin to the post-colonial moment of independence, particularly in the United States. To me, the post-1968 is a moment of social equity, of hope, and of promise. However, as mentioned throughout this bricolage, the post-colonial moment of independence does not automatically mean the end of colonialism. With this warning in mind, returning to 1968 is an opportunity to interrogate if the post-1968 moment meant the end of colonial discourse.

I found it difficult to describe my approach to postcolonialism, critical discourse, and qualitative content analysis because I felt an obligation to be completely trustworthy and build interpretative sufficiency, representational adequacy, and authenticity. Moreover, I wanted to make it as easy as possible to apply my method and coding frame to other postcolonial critical discourse analyses. Consequently, I found myself obsessing over every detail—refusing to accept that I would undoubtedly miss something. These concerns carried over into my coding frame. With the coding matrix, I also struggled to connect the frame to the entire bricolage because I did not know how to best present it without being too redundant and terse. In my original coding scheme (see Table 2), I was not thorough, and I did not take into consideration all the requirements of qualitative content analysis. This was inevitable at the time. Back then, I did not fully appreciate that the coding frame would require a chapter on modernity and
colonialism to justify its historical and theoretical categories, nor did I appreciate that I would have to test the categories to finalize a frame suited for the material in question.

To construct the final coding frame, I had to learn about modernity and colonialism and tie this knowledge to the categories. As a story, I wanted to directly connect each category to its origin within the bricolage. Thus, I thought about injecting intertextuality by using my own block quotes, derived from the earlier chapters, as introductory epigraphs for each category. Furthermore, I thought about ending each category with anchor examples to also tie the categories to the chapters to come. Although I found block quotes useful, I found them redundant and too wordy. My solution was to transform each quote into a poem. To do so, I had to find meaningful passages and remove superfluous words. I also had to think about how each line break would affect the reader and their approach to each section. Lastly, I had to think about the essence of each category. In a few of the poems, I included new words and phrases to best convey my message and to evoke moments of ambivalence and mimicry—words that are *almost the same, but not quite* (Bhabha, 1984).

As I mentioned, to build the coding frame, I had to test and adjust it to best suit the material. I originally started coding manually, i.e., printing each journal-length text to then segment and code using highlighters, adhesive notes, and pencils. Although this was my preferred method as a literary scholar, in time, I realized that I had too many journal-length texts, too many segments, and too many notes and codes to manage effectively. In line with Mayring’s (2014) suggestion to use computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS; see pp.116-122), I decided to switch to NVivo 12, which allowed me to segment, write memos, and code while keeping everything organized and easily retrievable.
The result of this chapter—and the most important aspect of all qualitative content analyses—is the colonial discourse coding frame or matrix. And yet, this is only a start, a compass for another *bricoleur or bricoleuse*. Fanon (1963/2004) affirms that the colonial world is compartmentalized. According to Fanon (1963/2004), to “bring to light some of its key aspects” (p. 3), we must infiltrate its compartments (or categories). My hope is that this coding frame helps others do the same.
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND THE GRAMMAR OF COLONIAL DISCOURSE

Recently, Roberts (2019) asked a solemn question to public administrators: “if other voices are still largely excluded, what modern-day errors and prejudices go unchallenged?” (p. 32). Relatedly, this bricolage’s main research question aims to uncover possible modern-day colonial errors and prejudices. This is a postcolonial project to unmask the rhetoric of colonial discourse in APAD, if any, by way of 38 key journal-length texts. Concerning this project’s overall goal, Mayring (2014) affirms that in qualitative content analyses, interpreters can choose to either summarize, explicate, or structure the material in question. Apropos, in this bricolage, the purpose is to structure (i.e., to filter out colonial dynamics across) the 38 post-1968 journal-length texts according to the colonial discourse coding frame developed in Chapter 4. Elo et al. (2014) explain that results ought to be “reported systematically and carefully, with particular attention paid to how connections between the data and results are reported” (p. 6). This chapter presents exemplary segments for each of the seven subcategories. These subcategories correspond to one of three main categories: (1) Eurocentrism (sub: Orientalism, historicism, parochiality of scientism, developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress), (2) the civilizational mission (sub: neocolonial prosperity mission, didactic despotism), and (3) the colonial difference (sub: binarism).

Throughout the chapter, each subcategory introduces a set of exemplary segments chronologically and without any interpretation other than their grouping. The purpose of these opening segments (a total of 107) is to give the reader a chance to experience the material and interrogate the role of colonial discourse. Thereafter, each subcategory includes a taxonomy that divides the exemplary segments to show similar themes and rhetorical strategies. The
purpose of each taxonomy is to present a graphic organizer to guide the reader through each
discussion. Finally, each subcategory includes a discussion section that unpacks the colonial
rhetorical strategies across the sample of 38 journal-length texts by way of the exemplary
introductory segments. The title of each discussion section also poses a postcolonial question
with critical implications for social equity in Public Administration:

- When is the other allowed in?
- Do other histories matter?
- Are there other ways of knowing?
- Are there other norms for development?
- Whose prosperity matters?
- Who teaches who?
- Who is the other?

Although the discussion sections offer answers to these questions, this bricolage is only a
beginning. Therefore, these questions ought to be considered both within the frame and scope
of this project and in future postcolonial discourse analyses.

The Rhetoric of Orientalism

1. Get a group of paleontologists together, and they, too, will begin discussing the
big questions of their field: Why did the dinosaurs die out? When did humans get
to the American continents (Gutin, 1992)? One of the big questions for
paleontologists and paleoanthropologists is: How did human life evolve? At the
moment, there are two competing theories ... There is the regional continuity
theory: Homo erectus left Africa about a million years ago and evolved independently
into three different, modern populations of Homo sapiens originally based in Europe,
Asia, and the Middle East and Africa (Li and Etler, 1992). There is also the out of
Africa theory: we are all the direct descendants of a single Homo sapiens, a woman
called Eve, who lived in Africa only 200,000 years ago (Cann, Stoneking, and Wilson, 1987). (Behn, 1995, p. 314)

2. No single solution is part to be inherently superior to another (although some solutions, or at least their advocates, may be more elegant than others). Different solutions will be more or less effective in different contexts, or when employed by different managers with different skills. Answering the motivation question for California does not guarantee that you have answered it for Colorado, or Connecticut, or Columbia [sic], or Cameroon, or Cambodia. (Behn, 1995, p. 322)

3. Consider the case of Wen Ho Lee, arrested in December 1999 for mishandling classified nuclear secrets on his computer. Intelligence analysts concluded the Chinese government had captured the secrets of the W-88 warhead, America’s most advanced nuclear device. Either intentionally or by sloppy handling of secret data on his computer, the experts believe the Chinese had obtained the secrets from Lee. For two decades, Lee was an essential researcher at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Los Alamos nuclear laboratory. As an analyst in the secret ‘X Division,’ he had access to the top secrets and moved massive amounts of data—806 megabytes—to unsecured computers. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 489)

4. However, there was little evidence the restructuring would solve the Lee problem—if there was a problem, and if the problem were structural within the DOE. Lee himself was not a federal employee. He did not even work for a federal contractor. Rather, he was an employee of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a subcontractor to the University of California-Berkeley, which has conducted nuclear research there since World War II. Any disciplinary process was not a matter for the DOE but for the University of California. More important, to the degree that there was a problem, it lay in the DOE’s ability to manage its vast contractor organization—not in the way its headquarters was organized. Paul Light, for example, has estimated that there are 35 contract employees for every DOE worker (Light 1999). (Kettl, 2000b, p. 489)

5. The markets have become more important than national governments in setting the economic rules. Nations can choose to go their own way, but the markets exact retribution for policies that run afoul of the global marketplace. No country is exempt. It was a U.S. policy decision to rescue the Mexican peso in 1995, for example. But once the United States made the decision, it lost control over how to do so. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 490)

6. Some of the best practical writers, however, caution that leaders’ effects are only modest because of the great constraints and the inertia they face (Barnard [1938] 1987; Gardner 1989). The stories about Truman pitying the incoming Eisenhower because his orders would not be followed as in the Army, and Kennedy ordering the missiles out of Turkey only to find out during the Cuban missile crisis that they were still there, reflect this perspective. (Van Wart, 2003, p. 222)
7. The importance of transparency for trust to exist within a nation and among nations was visible in China’s handling of the SARS crisis in early 2003. When the Chinese government attempted to conceal the spread of SARS in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and a number of other cities, trade, tourism, and business travel dropped precipitously. Considerable turbulence also occurred inside China. Distrust of the official reports threatened China’s emerging market economy and its internal stability (LA Times 2003). A lack of transparency in this case appears to have had powerful negative effects that were understood only after China’s leadership was confronted with the resulting domestic and international problems. (Cooper, 2004, p. 400)

8. In the United States we generally have an ethos that obligation to family and friends cannot or should not supersede other ethical obligations of public servants. Yet in many other countries, in which the family or another social group remains the center of loyalty and values, Waldo points out, public servants choose family and friends over their other ethical obligations, making the creation of an effective government impossible. (O’Leary, 2006/2017, pp. 578-579)

9. In *The Middle Ground*, White (1992) shows how the French Crown managed its relations with Algonquian Indians in the Great Lakes region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries using a web of Jesuits (sent by the French Crown to conduct diplomacy with the Indians to convert them to Catholicism and to keep their souls from falling into the hands of Protestant missionaries sent by the British and the Dutch), traders who procured furs and other natural resources that would become a critical source of revenue for the French Crown, couriers and sailors transporting merchandise and fish, and royal officials from Quebec. While all parties acted on the official authority or charter of the French Crown, all of them made different promises and projections. Yet even while the middle ground lasted, it was shot through—indeed, sustained by—what you might call equilibrium misunderstandings. The French Jesuits introduced the Indians to Jesus as the ultimate god, but the Indians were accepting Jesus as just another manitous, an animal spirit. When a Frenchman was murdered by some young warriors from one village, the two sides saw to it that the punishment meted out fit both with Native American notions of justice (‘covering the dead’ by the giving of presents from the family of the killer to the family of the deceased) and the European/Christian notion of justice as demanding an arrest and a trial. Europeans and Indians saw no reason to think more deeply about these arrangements as long as some basic satisficing criteria (the stability of the alliance, beneficial cultural and economic exchange for both sides) were met. (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 28)

10. During the Meiji period in Japan (1868–1926), imperial naval officers engaged directly in national appeals and party politics, selling the uniqueness of the navy’s contributions with respect to the Japanese army (which traditionally had dominated Japanese military politics, especially in the nineteenth century ... ). The successful forging of an organizational reputation—which, as historians have noted, was in many respects a distinctively political act—resulted in the building
of independent and durable organizational naval power in Japan. (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 30)
Table 4: Taxonomy of Orientalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Exemplary Segment Excerpts</th>
<th>Main Category: Subcategory</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Rhetorical Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behn, 1995, p. 314</strong></td>
<td>“There is the regional continuity theory: <em>Homo erectus</em> left Africa about a million years ago and evolved independently into three different, modern populations of <em>homo sapiens</em> originally based in Europe [emphasis added], Asia, and the Middle East and Africa (Li and Etler, 1992). There is also the out of Africa theory: we are all the direct descendants of a single <em>homo sapiens</em>, a woman called Eve, who lived in Africa only 200,000 years ago (Cann, Stoneking, and Wilson, 1987)” (Behn, 1995, p. 314).</td>
<td>Eurocentrism: Orientalism</td>
<td>Modifying the Western experience</td>
<td>Statements that only use the non-West to introduce or give meaning (clarify) to the Western experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behn, 1995, p. 322</strong></td>
<td>“Answering the motivation question for California does not guarantee that you have answered it for Colorado, or Connecticut, or <em>Columbia</em> [sic], or <em>Cameroon</em>, or <em>Cambodia</em> [emphasis added]” (Behn, 1995, p. 322).</td>
<td>Eurocentrism: Orientalism</td>
<td>The empty other</td>
<td>Statements that only refer to the non-West without contextual nuance nor significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kaufman, 1969, p. 7</strong></td>
<td>“Nations can choose to go their own way, but the markets exact retribution for policies that run afoul of the global marketplace. No country is exempt. <em>It was a U.S. policy decision to rescue the Mexican peso in 1995 [emphasis added]</em>, for example. But once the United States made the decision, it lost control over how to do so” (Kettl, 2000b, p. 490).</td>
<td>Eurocentrism: Orientalism</td>
<td>Belittling the non-Western experience or other</td>
<td>Statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of inefficiency, helplessness, or mistakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kettl, 2000b, p. 490</strong></td>
<td>“Yet in many other countries, in which the family or another social group remains the center of loyalty and values [emphasis added], Waldo points out, public servants choose family and friends over their other ethical obligations, making the creation of an effective government impossible” (O’Leary, 2006/2017, pp. 578-579).</td>
<td>Eurocentrism: Orientalism</td>
<td>Belittling the non-Western experience or other</td>
<td>Statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of inefficiency, helplessness, or mistakes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaufman, 1969, p. 7</td>
<td>“One activist reportedly going so far as to predict that American universities will soon resemble Latin American institutions, in which students hire and fire professors and determine the curricula [emphasis added]” (Kaufman, 1969, p. 7).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of corruption, radical or dangerous behavior, and wrongdoing</td>
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<td>Kettl, 2000b, pp. 489-490</td>
<td>“When the Chinese government attempted to conceal the spread of SARS in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and a number of other cities, trade, tourism, and business travel dropped precipitously. Considerable turbulence also occurred inside China [emphasis added]. Distrust of the official reports threatened China’s emerging market economy and its internal stability (LA Times 2003)” (Cooper, 2004, p. 400).</td>
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<td>Cooper, 2004, p. 400</td>
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<td>Van Wart, 2004, p. 222</td>
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<td>Statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of corruption, radical or dangerous behavior, and wrongdoing</td>
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<td>Carpenter &amp; Krause, 2012, p. 28</td>
<td>“When a Frenchman was murdered by some young warriors from one village [emphasis added], the two sides saw to it that the punishment meted out fit both with Native American notions of justice … and the European/Christian notion of justice as demanding an arrest and a trial” (Carpenter &amp; Krause, 2012, p. 28).</td>
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<td>Statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of corruption, radical or dangerous behavior, and wrongdoing</td>
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<td>Carpenter &amp; Krause, 2012, p. 30</td>
<td>“The successful forging of an organizational reputation—which, as historians have noted, was in many respects a distinctively political act—resulted in the building of independent and durable organizational naval power in Japan” (Carpenter &amp; Krause, 2012, p. 30).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eurocentrism: Orientalism</td>
<td>Statements that refer to the non-West through a language of respect or admiration</td>
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<td>Colonial resistance or challenge</td>
<td>Statements that refer to the non-West through a language of respect or admiration</td>
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Orientalism is the power to define what ought to be known about non-Western peoples, without their input or care. Orientalism is seldom a direct xenophobic denunciation of non-Western peoples. Instead, it often comes in the form of brief statements about other cultures, histories, perspectives, stories, and traditions. In effect, these subtle statements objectify non-Western peoples by introducing them from a Western point of view—these are subtle statements that spell out what readers should know about others, and nothing more. In the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD), as represented by this bricolage’s sample of 38 journal-length key texts, instances of Orientalism are quite limited. However, the lack of Orientalism is not a triumph in and of itself because it also underscores the absence of non-Western mentions throughout the texts.

The moments of Orientalism outlined above point to a series of strategies concerning mentions of non-Western peoples, such as:

a) statements that only mention or refer to non-Western peoples to give meaning or clarify the Western experience,

b) statements that only mention or refer to non-Western peoples without any contextual nuance nor significance,

c) statements that only refer or describe non-Western peoples through a language of inefficiency, helplessness, or mistakes;

d) statements that only refer or describe non-Western peoples through a language of corruption, danger, or wrongdoing; and

e) statements that mention non-Western peoples to show respect or admiration.

For example, in Behn’s (1995) description of the regional continuity theory, the author writes: “Homo erectus left Africa about a million years ago and evolved independently into three..."
different, modern populations of *homo sapiens* originally based in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and Africa” (p. 314). Behn (1995) does not mention Africa beyond this segment. Here, Behn (1995) mentions Africa to explicate the possible origins of *homo sapiens*, the modern populations based in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and Africa. Behn’s (1995) list is not alphabetical, rather, it positions Europe as the first modern population of *homo sapiens*, ahead of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In another segment, Behn (1995) writes: “Answering the motivation question for California does not guarantee that you have answered it for Colorado, or Connecticut, or Columbia [sic], or Cameroon, or Cambodia” (p. 322). Here, Behn (1995) is not adding context to the European experience, but rather using non-Western examples, without any contextual significance, simply to build literary consonance. Beyond their consonant sound, these countries are devoid of meaning—Behn’s (1995) mention of a non-existent country, “Columbia [sic],” presumably a misspelling of “Colombia,” accentuates a lack of nuance and significance.

The Orientalist act of vilifying or belittling others is another strategy that appears in the texts. For example, Kettl (2000b) mentions China and the case of Wen Ho Lee (who, in 1999, was accused of “mishandling” top secrets and leaking them to China) to talk about issues related to “government’s management of its nongovernmental partners” (p. 489). However, throughout Kettl’s (2000b) retelling of the Wen Ho Lee case, the author reinforces the idea that China is a villain and that Wen Ho Lee was incompetent. Although Kettl (2000b) notes that investigators “could not even demonstrate that data had leaked—or whether the Chinese had somehow managed to replicate the design on their own” (p. 164), the preceding paragraph outlines the case against Wen Ho Lee and China and determines that data was indeed “mishandled.” Similarly, Cooper (2004) uses China’s “handling” of the SARS crisis in early
2003 to talk about issues of transparency and trust in government. Per Cooper (2004), the Chinese government “attempted to conceal the spread of SARS in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and a number of other cities” (p. 400). Like Kettl (2000b), Cooper (2004) only refers to China as a villain or a case study in “mishandling” situations.

As noted, Orientalism can be subtle. For example, when Van Wart (2003) refers to “Kennedy ordering the missiles out of Turkey only to find out during the Cuban missile crisis that they were still there” (p. 222), Turkey and Cuba are only mentioned as entities who refused to follow orders. In another subtle moment of Orientalism, O’Leary (2006/2017), citing Waldo, writes: “Yet in many other countries ... public servants choose family and friends over their other ethical obligations, making the creation of an effective government impossible” (pp. 578-579). Here, the reader must imagine the “other countries” wherein, in contrast to the United States, effective government is impossible. In another segment, Cooper (2004) writes: “It was a U.S. policy decision to rescue the Mexican peso in 1995” (p. 165). Here, Cooper (2004) mentions Mexico only to note that the United States had to rescue their currency. In these examples (Cooper, 2004; Kettl, 2000b; O’Leary, 2006/2017; Van Wart, 2004), the authors bring the non-Western other into the discussion only to show the reader cases of wrongdoing, transgression, or helplessness.

Finally, the moments of Orientalism in Carpenter and Krause (2012) reveal moments of ambivalence. Carpenter and Krause (2012) explain that French Jesuits introduced Jesus to the “Indians,” presumably Algonquian speaking, who “were accepting of Jesus as just another manitou, an animal spirit” (p. 28). Here, the shift from “Algonquian Indians in the Great Lakes” to “Indians” establishes a monolithic view of Indigenous peoples that exoticizes “Indian” beliefs by describing a manitou as an animal spirit instead of one of many “gods”—this word
is reserved for Jesus, the “ultimate god” (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 28). The authors then note that “when a Frenchman *was murdered by some young warriors from one village* [emphasis added],” the punishment had to follow both “Native American notions of justice” and the “European/Christian notion of justice” (p. 28). Here, “Native Americans” are portrayed as murderous young warriors, which conforms to both vilify and infantilize others (as in the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress). In contrast, Frenchmen are portrayed as victims (or guilty of only converting them to Catholicism to save their souls). Yet, in spite of this Orientalist segment, later in their article, Carpenter and Krause (2012) laud the Japanese navy’s “successful forging of an organizational reputation” which “resulted in the building of independent and durable organizational naval power in Japan” (p. 30)—a solitary challenge to the wrongdoing, transgression, or helplessness found in several other segments.

**The Rhetoric of Historicism**

1. With the rapid development of information processing technology, the corporate and public decision-making processes are becoming immensely more sophisticated and rational than they were in past eras. If we require any proof for this, we need only compare the ABM debate (regardless of whether we like its outcome) with any debate on the Acropolis reported by Thucydides—for, for that matter, with any debate in the U.S. Congress in the first half of this century. (Simon, 1973, p. 277)

2. Men have always wanted to fly. Was the ambition to undertake unaided flight, devoid of any strategy for achieving it, ever a useful norm or ideal? Although the myth of Icarus stimulates the imagination, flying becomes a productive ambition only to those who accept the impossibility of flying without mechanical assistance and who entertain the thought of using fabricated wings and other devices. (Lindblom, 1979, p. 518)

3. Much of the ambiguity and even controversy surrounding privatization relates to this four-fold distinction offered by Kolderie. For some, true privatization means getting the government out of both providing and producing—load shedding it is
4. The past two decades have brought enormous changes in the environment for public service. Beginning in the mid-1960s, public confidence in American institutions began a two-decade decline. Nowhere is the decline in public trust more apparent than in government. At the start of this last decade of the twentieth century, only one in four Americans expressed confidence in government to “do what is right.” (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 367)

5. The decline in public trust has precipitated a “quiet crisis” in the federal civil service. The recent report of the National Commission on the Public Service, more commonly referred to as the Volcker Commission after its chair, Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, recited a litany of shortcomings in the federal personnel system. Although no comparable evidence is available on the status of state and local government civil service systems, they no doubt have suffered problems similar to those experienced at the federal level. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 367)

6. In the face of these long-term trends and their associated consequences, political leaders have begun to call for a rebirth of the public service ethic. The 1988 presidential race was the first in over a decade in which bureaucrat bashing was not one of the favorite pastimes of the candidates. President Bush has been joined in his call for a renewal of interest in public service by other prominent public servants, including former Secretary of State George Shultz and former Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 367)

7. But feminism does appear to me to offer some different, potentially fruitful, ways of looking at the situation. For one thing, feminist theorists have argued that the importance of the idea of neutrality can be traced to liberal individualism’s insistence that the state maintain moral neutrality with respect to the preferences of autonomous persons. They suggest that the notion of a state—or a state of nature—made up of isolated individuals is an idea foreign to the experiences of most women, whose child bearing and child rearing responsibilities make them acutely aware of the extent to which human beings must depend upon each other to survive. If, instead, we had predicated the nature of modern state upon the essential interconnectedness of human beings, we might be able to conceptualize public values somewhat differently... We have yet, however, to develop a political understanding of interconnectedness, or community, which does not depend for its coherence on an explicitly apolitical view of traditionally feminine activities such as is reflected in the works of Aristotle and Rousseau, and thus on an implicitly masculine understanding of politics. (Stivers, 1990/2017, p. 483)

serendipity, plays a role either in revealing a key piece of information or in revealing a particularly simple solution." Sometimes, such serendipity helps scientists discover the answer to a question that they did not know they were supposed to be asking. In an effort to answer one big question, they may end up answering another. In 1826, Otto Unverdorben was attempting to produce a synthetic form of indigo but instead discovered aniline, an important molecule in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries (Messadié, 1991; 2, 18). (Behn, 1995, pp. 314-315)

9. Serendipity strikes a lot more frequently, however, than scientists recognize it. That is, most of the time the lucky observation of some revealing data produces no increase in knowledge; those who were blessed with the serendipitous data did not recognize its implications. After all, how many people over the millennia were bopped on the head by a falling apple before Isaac Newton discovered gravity? Every ancestor of Newton had watched objects fall; yet he was the first one, building on the ideas of Kepler and Galileo, who discovered the law of gravity. It takes a prepared scientist-someone who knows what the big questions are-to recognize when an answer to an unanswered question fortuitously presents itself. For serendipity to really work in science, the lucky scientist must simultaneously recognize both the answer and the question. (Behn, 1995, p. 315)

10. The role of participation in public administration has historically been one of ambivalence. Although the political system in the United States is designed to reflect and engender an active citizenry, it is also designed to protect political and administrative processes from a too-active citizenry. It is within this context that participation in the administrative arena has traditionally been framed. (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 318)

11. The focus group members compared an idealized past where civic participation was common and visible, to the present, where it is nearly impossible to fit participation into an over-crowded schedule. The past was seen as a time of economic security with stable employment where participation in community life was a given. As one administrator explained, “At least in my grandparent's generation they weren’t worried if Goodyear was going to be there. They knew they were. They were playing ball, going to Boy Scouts. Now ... it’s unusual if you have a bit of [worry-free] luxury in your life to participate.” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 322)

12. According to the older members in the focus group, younger community members are not pursuing an activist tradition. It is a constant challenge to community activists to get younger citizens to participate. One activist said, “We’re trying to replace people who were active in the block clubs with people who are from the young families to take over the reins of what the older citizens have been doing for years. That’s a hard thing to do.” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 322)

13. Our reluctance to recognize the importance of administrative evil as part of the identity and practice of public policy and administration reinforces its continuing influence and increases the possibility of future acts of dehumanization and
destruction, even in the name of the public interest. (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 555)

14. In the modern age, until recently, two main versions of ethics have dominated Anglo-American philosophical thinking, namely teleological (or consequentialist) ethics and deontological ethics (Frankena, 1973). Both share an interest in determining the rules that should govern—and therefore be used to judge—individual behavior as good or bad, right or wrong. Teleological ethics, based on utilitarianism and tracing its lineage to Bentham (1989, orig. 1789) and others, offers the overarching principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Oriented toward the results or consequences of actions, teleological ethics tends to elevate the ends over the means used to achieve those ends. Deontological ethics, founded in the thought of Kant (1959, orig. 1786) and his support of duty and order, reverses this emphasis, holding that the lower-order rules governing means are essential for the higher-order rules that concern the ends to be achieved. For our purposes, the important point is that both of these traditions have focused on the individual as the relevant unit of analysis. (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 555)

15. We have referred to the current fashion of contracting out government services to networks of largely nonprofit organizations (with some private firms included) as the hollow state. Hollow is a [sic] an adjective that has described many of the problems of the twentieth century—from T.S. Eliot's poem “The Hollow Men” to “Hollow Politics” (Economist 1996). (Milward & Provan, 2000, p. 362)

16. Recently, there has been a rebirth of interest in the idea of community and civility in America. Political leaders of both major political parties, scholars of different camps, best-selling writers and popular commentators not only agree that community in America has deteriorated, but acknowledge that we desperately need a renewed sense of community. Despite increasing diversity in America, or perhaps because of it, community is seen as a way of bringing about unity and synthesis (Bellah et al. 1985, 1991; Erzioni 1988, 1995; Gardner 1991; Selznick 1992). In public administration, the quest for community has been reflected in the view that the role of government, especially local government, is indeed to help create and support “community.” (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 552)

17. The nineteenth century was dominated by the notion of the “great man” thesis. Particular great men (women invariably were overlooked despite great personages in history such as Joan of Arc, Elizabeth I, or Clara Barton) somehow move history forward because of their exceptional characteristics as leaders. The stronger version of this theory holds that history is a handmaiden to men; great men actually change the shape and direction of history. Philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and William James firmly asserted that history would be different if a great man suddenly were incapacitated. Thomas Carlyle’s 1841 essay on heroes and hero worship is an early popular version of this, as is Galton’s 1869 study of hereditary genius (cited in Bass 1990). Such theories generally have an explicit class bias. (Van Wart, 2003, p. 216)
18. However, soon after the middle of the twentieth century, American society became increasingly diverse and increasingly assertive about its differentiated needs and preferences. Social movements and organized reform advocacy groups emerged in the late 1950s and with increasing intensity through the decades that followed. They engaged in the full panoply of social change strategies and tactics. The civil rights movement, the antipoverty movement, the new women’s movement, the environmental movement, the student movement, the disabled movement, the gay rights movement, the Chicano (later Latino) movement, and an array of other ethnic movements were all manifestations of a burgeoning of assertive diversity in American society. (Cooper, 2004, p. 403)

19. In sum, there have been repeated calls to public administration as a field to both fulfill its obligations in democracy and to pursue its self-interest by finding new ways to listen to the public’s voice through stakeholder and individual citizen participation in governance. We need, however, more guidance on how, when, and with whom to engage. Box (2001) cautions us that citizens who choose to participate may be a small percentage looking to shape public action for private purposes. This caution raises numerous questions. How can public administrators fulfill mandates to engage citizens and stakeholders in ways that enhance the legitimacy of governance? What are the forms and best practices for citizens and stakeholders to participate in the new governance? (Blomgren Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005, p. 549)

20. When placed within the context of an American public ethos, collaboration can be understood as a process that is rooted in two competing political traditions: classic liberalism and civic republicanism (Perry and Thomson 2004). Classic liberalism, with its emphasis on private interest, views collaboration as a process that aggregates private preferences into collective choices through self-interested bargaining. Organizations enter into collaborative agreements to achieve their own goals, negotiating among competing interests and brokering coalitions among competing value systems, expectations, and self-interested motivations. Civic republicanism, on the other hand, with its emphasis on a commitment to something larger than the individual (whether that be a neighborhood or the state), views collaboration as an integrative process that treats differences as the basis for deliberation in order to arrive at “mutual understanding, a collective will, trust and sympathy [and the] implementation of shared preferences” (March and Olsen 1989, 126). (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 20)

21. To better convey the joint challenges of “multiplicity,” “diversity,” and “complexity” surrounding the relationship between audience members and organizational reputation in the public sphere, we offer an illuminating historical case study provided by the eminent historian Richard White. In The Middle Ground, White (1992) shows how the French Crown managed its relations with Algonquian Indians in the Great Lakes region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries using a web of Jesuits (sent by the French Crown to conduct diplomacy with the Indians to convert them to Catholicism and to keep their souls from falling into
the hands of Protestant missionaries sent by the British and the Dutch), traders who procured furs and other natural resources that would become a critical source of revenue for the French Crown, couriers and sailors transporting merchandise and fish, and royal officials from Quebec. While all parties acted on the official authority or charter of the French Crown, all of them made different promises and projections. Yet even while the middle ground lasted, it was shot through—indeed, sustained by—what you might call equilibrium misunderstandings. (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 28)

22. In the military politics of the nineteenth-century British Empire, the durable and positive reputation of the regimental system—a set of semiautonomous units governed by a commanding officer—was responsible for the considerable discretion enjoyed by commanders. That discretion, as it turned out, led to a much more decentralized British army in the twentieth century than otherwise would have been the case. (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 30)
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Whereas Orientalism is the power to define what ought to be known about non-Western peoples, Eurocentric historicism is the power to magnify the importance of the Western experience. Historicism is rarely an ostentatious celebration of the West, rather, it often comes in the form of subtle statements that force the reader to know or learn about the West. In effect, these statements reinforce the importance of Western traditions in scholarship and silence all others. In APAD, per this bricolage’s sample of 38 key texts, historicism is more common than Orientalism. The moments of historicism point to a series of rhetorical strategies concerning the importance of the Western experience, such as:

a) language, references, or statements that force the reader to know, be comfortable with, or learn about the Western experience;

b) statements (or language) that overlook past struggles, historical traditions of social inequity, and/or non-Western peoples to claim the novelty (newness) of the contemporary Western moment;

c) statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront social inequity; and

d) statements (or language) that challenge one aspect of colonial discourse while reinforcing another.

In discourse, power lies in naturalization—in ossification, in congealment, in taken for granted-ness—exemplified by seemingly benign and subtle statements. This is all to say that, oftentimes, historicism in APAD looks trivial, as in:

- Simon’s (1973) recommendation to compare the “ABM debate (regardless of whether we like its outcome) with any debate on the Acropolis reported by Thucydides [emphasis added]” (p. 277);
• Lindblom’s (1979) assertion that “men have always wanted to fly ... the myth of Icarus stimulates the imagination [emphasis added]” (p. 518);

• Morgan and England’s (1988) explanation that “for some, true privatization means getting the government out of both providing and producing ... That was and still is the principal meaning in England, where privatization under Margaret Thatcher’s government has been associated with a reversal of state socialism [emphasis added]” (p. 980);

• Behn’s (1995) retelling of the serendipity and genius of Otto Unverdorben, Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, and Galileo Galilei (see p. 315);

• Adams and Balfour’s (1998/2017) note that “in the modern age, until recently, two main versions of ethics have dominated Anglo-American philosophical thinking, namely teleological (or consequentialist) ethics [as in Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism] and deontological ethics [as in Immanuel Kant’s ethics]” (p. 555);

• Milward and Provan’s (2000) simile of the “current fashion of contracting” as “the hollow state [emphasis added]” (p. 362). Milward and Provan (2000) explain that “hollow is a [sic] an adjective that has described many of the problems of the twentieth century—from T.S. Eliot’s poem ‘The Hollow Men’ to ‘Hollow Politics’ [emphasis added]” (p. 362);

• Thomson and Perry’s (2006) claim that “when placed within the context of an American public ethos, collaboration can be understood as a process that is rooted in two competing political traditions: classical liberalism and civic republicanism [emphasis added]” (p. 20); and

• Carpenter and Krause’s (2012) retelling of how the French Crown sent Jesuits “to conduct diplomacy with the Indians to convert them to Catholicism and to keep their souls from falling into the hands of Protestant missionaries sent by the British and the Dutch [emphasis added]” (p. 28). Also, in Carpenter and Krause’s (2012) description of the “military politics of the nineteenth-century British Empire [emphasis added]” (p. 30).

Throughout most of these segments, the authors use European examples as figurative language to encourage readers to imagine the text in a different way—e.g., to imagine the author’s arguments vis-à-vis the Acropolis, the myth of Icarus, Margaret Thatcher’s government, Otto Unverdorben’s creative process, T.S. Eliot’s “The Hollow Men,” and the French and British Empires. Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) and Thomson and Perry (2006) are the exceptions because they use European examples to directly trace the European lineage
of American Public Administration. Regardless of function, these examples force the reader to be familiar with the Western canon because to imagine the Acropolis or the myth of Icarus, the reader must know about the Acropolis or Icarus. In short, to imagine the West, the reader must know and learn about the West.

Aside from forcing the reader to imagine, to know, and to learn about the West, certain segments also erase other histories. Here, Cooper’s (2004) statements about the middle of the twentieth century are instructive:

However, soon after the middle of the twentieth century, American society became increasingly diverse and increasingly assertive about its differentiated needs and preferences [emphasis added]. Social movements and organized reform advocacy groups emerged in the late 1950s and with increasing intensity through the decades that followed. They engaged in the full panoply of social change strategies and tactics. The civil rights movement, the antipoverty movement, the new women’s movement, the environmental movement, the student movement, the disabled movement, the gay rights movement, the Chicano (later Latino) movement, and an array of other ethnic movements were all manifestations of a burgeoning of assertive diversity in American society [emphasis added]. (Cooper, 2004, p. 403)

What is problematic in Cooper’s (2004) account of diversity in American society is that it implies that diversity was not a problem before the middle of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the idea that the “social movements and organized reform advocacy groups” of the late 1950s “were all manifestations of a burgeoning of assertive diversity in American society [emphasis added]” erases past reform movements. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded in 1909, following the Springfield “race riot” of 1908. The Seneca Falls Convention launched the women’s suffrage movement in 1848. The Anti-Slavery Movement (i.e., Abolitionism) dates back to the early 1800s. This is all to say that the manifestations of the 1950s, and beyond, were not “burgeoning,” they were years in the making. In sum, Cooper’s (2004) language erases this history.
The same occurs when Perry and Recascino Wise (1990) describe the “decline in public trust [as a ‘quiet crisis’ in the federal service [emphasis added]” (p. 367), and the consequent “call for a rebirth of the public service ethic” (p. 367). The language of “decline” and “rebirth” implies that an idyllic past tradition of public trust and service exists and that it is worth returning to it. In effect, the language exonerates the past decades of oppression. The same applies to Denhardt and Vinzant Denhardt’s (2000) explanation that politicians, scholars, best-selling writers, and popular commentators:

Not only agree that community in America has deteriorated [emphasis added], but acknowledge that we desperately need a renewed sense of community [emphasis added]. Despite increasing diversity in America [emphasis added], or perhaps because of it, community is seen as a way of bringing about unity and synthesis. (p. 552).

Here, the language of “deterioration” and “renewal,” like Perry and Recascino Wise’s (1990) use of “decline” and “rebirth” (p. 367), and of “increasing diversity in America,” evocative of Cooper’s (2004) statements, re-write history to include an idyllic past without issues of diversity, participation, and trust—arguably, a past without the other. In their study, Simrell King et al. (1998) report the same idea: “The focus group members compared an idealized past where civic participation was common and visible, to the present, where it is nearly impossible to fit participation into an over-crowded schedule” (p. 322).

Lastly, the structure of these statements is also an issue. The language of deterioration and renewal (of decline and rebirth) paired with statements about increasing diversity is problematic because: (i) it juxtaposes the idea of decline alongside the idea of increasing diversity, (ii) offers or calls for a return to an idealized past when diversity was not a problem, and (iii) applauds the past without considering what the past meant to others. This language ignores or erases two critical questions: To whom does this past belong? And, historically, who has had the privilege of participation?
Although they are exceptional, there are moments of opposition to Eurocentric historicism. For example, Stivers (1990/2017) argues that:

We have yet, however, to develop a political understanding of interconnectedness, or community, which does not depend for its coherence on an explicitly apolitical view of traditionally feminine activities such as is reflected in the works of Aristotle and Rousseau [emphasis added], and thus on an implicitly masculine understanding of politics. (p. 483)

Although Stivers (1990/2017) refers to Aristotle and Rousseau, the author does not stop there—i.e., the language is not meant to force the reader to blindly imagine the Western canon. Instead, Stivers (1990/2017) underscores the inherent problem of a masculine understanding of politics derivative of the Western canon. As such, to say that “we have yet [emphasis added] ... to develop a political understanding of interconnectedness” outside of Aristotle and Rousseau (as symbols of the Western canon) is to encourage the reader to imagine a community from a different vantage point (e.g., from a feminist position).

The same occurs when Simrell King et al. (1998) acknowledge that “the role of participation in public administration has historically been one of ambivalence” (p. 318). It occurs when Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) state that “our reluctance to recognize the importance of administrative evil as part of the identity of practice of public policy and administration” (p. 555). And it occurs when Blomgren Bingham et al. (2005) posit that “we need ... more guidance on how, when, and with whom to engage [emphasis added]” (p. 549). In these examples, Simrell King et al. (1998), Adams and Balfour (1998/2017), and Blomgren Bingham et al. (2005), like Stivers (1990/2017), force the reader to think about “ambivalence,” “evil,” and lack of “guidance” within the historical praxis of administration, policies, and participation.
Finally, there are moments of ambivalence within a few segments. To evoke Wallerstein (1997) again, Eurocentrism is a hydra-headed monster, and “if we are not careful, in the guise of trying to fight it, we may, in fact, criticize Eurocentrism using Eurocentric premises ... thereby reinforcing its hold on the community of scholars” (p. 22). Considering this, Van Wart’s (2003) counter to the “great man” thesis is worth exploring:

The nineteenth century was dominated by the notion of the “great man” thesis. Particular great men (women invariably were overlooked despite great personages in history such as Joan of Arc, Elizabeth I, or Clara Barton) somehow move history forward because of their exceptional characteristics as leaders [emphasis added]. The stronger version of this theory holds that history is a handmaiden to men [emphasis added]; great men actually change the shape and direction of history. Philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and William James firmly asserted that history would be different if a great man suddenly were incapacitated. Thomas Carlyle’s 1841 essay on heroes and hero worship is an early popular version of this, as is Galton’s 1869 study of hereditary genius (cited in Bass 1990). Such theories generally have an explicit class bias [emphasis added]. (p. 216)

Here, Van Wart (2003) points out that the “great man” thesis overlooks women “despite great personages in history such as Joan of Arc, Elizabeth I, or Clara Barton [emphasis added]” (p. 216). Moreover, the author notes that in “stronger version of this theory ... history is a handmaiden to men [emphasis added]” (Van Wart, 2003, p. 216), i.e., a personal maid or female servant. Lastly, Van Wart (2003) affirms that “great man” theories also have an explicit class bias. Indeed, these statements force the reader to think about history vis-à-vis sexism and classicism, all to shake the foundation of the “great man” thesis. However, Van Wart’s (2003) counterexamples all come from a Western tradition: Joan of Arc (from France), Elizabeth I (from England), and Clara Barton (from the United States). In effect, the language supports a feminist deconstruction of the “great man” thesis that proclaims the value of both men and women with a warning: They must be Western.
The Rhetoric of the Parochiality of Scientism

1. New Public Administration advocates what could be best described as “second-generation behavioralism.” Unlike his progenitor, the second-generation behavioralist emphasizes the public part of Public Administration. He accepts the importance of understanding as scientifically as possible how and why organizations behave as they do but he tends to be rather more interested in the impact of that organization on its clientele and vice versa. He is not antipositivist nor antiscientific although he is probably less than sanguine about the applicability of the natural-science model to social phenomena. He is not likely to use his behavioralism as a rationale for simply trying to describe how public organizations behave. Nor is he inclined to use his behavioralism as a facade for so-called neutrality, being more than a little skeptical of the objectivity of those who claim to be doing science. He attempts to use his scientific skills to aid his analysis, experimentation, and evaluation of alternative policies and administrative modes. In sum, then, the second-generation behavioralist is less “generic” and more “public” than his forebear, less “descriptive” and more “prescriptive,” less “institution oriented” and more “client-impact oriented,” less “neutral” and more “normative,” and, it is hoped, no less scientific. (Frederickson, 1971/2017, p. 285)

2. Good design requires bringing the desired ends into effective relations with the available means. To design effective decision-making organizations, we must understand the structure of the decisions to be made; and we must understand decision-making tools at our disposal, both human and mechanical—men and computers. (Simon, 1973, pp. 271-272)

3. What sorts of parts go into this policy machine? Of course, the detailed answer to such a question would depend on a specification of what the machine was supposed to do and where it was to be located. A machine to alleviate mental illness is clearly a different machine than one that distributes agricultural subsidies or one that regulates the price of natural gas. A machine that services the nation as a whole is different from a machine that services Ohio alone or a machine that services Tulsa, Oklahoma, alone. Yet, at an intermediate level of abstraction, one can see that all such machines do look rather similar. (Bardach, 1977/2017, p. 318)

4. Analyzing cases to identify better and worse practice. Scientists search for “critical experiments.” Students of public management should seek to identify “critical experiences” that new public managers could live through vicariously and learn from. (Allison, 1980/2017, p. 399)

5. The study used a time-series design, involving repeated measurements of employee attitudes at fixed intervals, to assess the results of the merit pay intervention. Agencies were required to implement the new, objectives-based appraisal systems no later than October 1, 1980 and to award pay according to the results of these appraisals beginning in October 1981. Surveys were conducted at four points to
correspond with significant stages in the implementation process. (Pearce & Perry, 1983, p. 316)

6. In contrast, the organizational culture perspective does not assume that organizations are necessarily rational, goal-oriented entities. Whereas the mainstream perspectives tend to work with hard, tangible, quantifiable, organizational variables—often using computer models—the organizational culture perspective focuses on soft, less tangible, more ethereal variables such as basic assumptions, cognitive patterns, values, myths, and unspoken beliefs. Using another analogy, organizational culture is like ordinary air. Usually, it cannot be touched, felt, or seen. It is not noticed unless it changes suddenly. The mainstream perspectives of organizations are not comfortable with air-like variables and concepts. Computerized information systems and statistical, quasi-experimental research methods of the structural and systems perspectives are not designed to measure ethereal concepts. (Ott, 1989/2017, p. 468)

7. A second research need is the development of measurement methods that facilitate better understanding of how public service motivation contributes to organizational commitment and performance. A necessary component of efforts to advance understanding of the different aspects of public service motivation is a system for defining and measuring public service motives. The available literature does not provide operational indicators of these motives that can be used in research. Development of a psychometric instrument capable of measuring an individual's public service motivational structures along with a model that operationalizes the linkages between individual values, organizational environment and task structure, and outcome (such as commitment, performance, and job satisfaction) is a critical next step. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 497)

8. On the question of objectivity, feminists have criticized for their masculinity both linear rational thinking and the attempt to achieve unbiased knowledge by means of detached observation. To be sure, human systems organized according to and seemingly dependent upon this mode of thought have been historically male. Sandra Harding (1987) and Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) have each written compellingly in this vein. Keller's treatment of the Baconian metaphor linking the inductive acquisition of knowledge about nature with the act of taking a woman by force exemplifies this stream of thinking in a vivid way. (According to Bacon, the scientific method has "the power to conquer and subdue [Nature], to shake her to her foundations.") In an intensification of recent tendencies in the philosophy of science, Harding argues that there is no such thing as unbiased knowledge in the sense of knowledge unaffected by the characteristics of the knower. She suggests that feminist claims may actually be scientifically preferable because they originate in a more complete, therefore less distorting, social experience. (Stivers, 1990/2017, pp. 483-484)

9. The big questions about physics are what make it a science. Physics always has a number of big questions it is trying to answer, and it has a sense of how those questions should be answered. For some of the big questions, physicists have
satisfied themselves that they have the answers. The big-bang theory of the beginning of the universe is so widely accepted by cosmologists, that it is called ‘the standard model’ ... Although every six months the Berkeley Lawrence Laboratory publishes a list of literally hundreds of subatomic particles ... physicists generally agree upon a standard model for the structure of truly elementary particles: 24 bosons (including photons), 6 leptons (including the electron and the neutrino), and quarks. Baryons (including protons and neutrons) are each made up of 3 quarks, while mesons consist of 1 quark and 1 anti-quark. There are 18 different kinds of quarks: They come in 6 flavors (up, down, strange, charm, top, and bottom) as well as in 3 different colors (red, green, and blue). (Behn, 1995, p. 314)

10. Undertake systematic research to explore the descriptive questions on the network agenda. How much of managers’ time, effort, and contingencies lie in or are devoted to network contexts? Which kinds of managers, in which governments and policy fields, what shifts can be documented? What do managers actually do to deal with and seek influence within their network(s)? (O’Toole, Jr., 1997, p. 50)

11. Addressing the limitations of current participatory efforts requires that public administrators become “interpretive mediators.” They must move beyond the technical issue at hand by involving citizens in “dialectical exchange” (Fischer, 1993, 183) and by engaging with citizens in discourse (Fox and Miller, 1995), rather than simply getting citizens input. Then, the administrator becomes a cooperative participant, assisting citizens in examining their interests, working together with them to arrive at decisions, and engaging them in open and authentic deliberation. (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 320)

12. This paradox is starkly illustrated in the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Many of the administrators directly responsible for the Holocaust were, from the technical-rational perspective, effective and responsible administrators who used administrative discretion to both influence and carry out the will of their superiors. Professionals and administrators such as Eichmann, Speer, and Arthur Rudolph obeyed orders, followed proper protocol and procedures, and were often innovative and creative while carrying out their assigned tasks in an efficient and effective manner (Keeley, 1983; Hilberg, 1989; Harmon, 1995; Lozowick, 2000). Ironically, the SS was very concerned about corruption in its ranks and with strict conformance to the professional norms of its order (Sofsky, 1997). (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 557)

13. O’Toole and Meier (1999) provide a general model of managing problems and organizations on the following form:

\[ O_t = \beta_1 (H + M_1) O_{t-1} + \beta_2 (X/H)(M_3/M_4) + \varepsilon_1 \]

Where O is some measure of outcome; H is a measure of hierarchy normalized to range from 0 to 1; M denotes management, which can be divided into three parts—M1, management’s contribution to organizational stability through additions to
hierarchy and structure, M3, management’s efforts to exploit the environment, and
M4, management’s efforts to buffer environmental shocks; X is a vector of
environmental forces; ε is an error term; the other subscripts denote time periods;
and, β1 and β2 are estimable parameters. (Meier & O’Toole, Jr., 2003, p. 691)

14. An additional confounding factor in our list is the issue of proper definition, which
is ultimately a normative problem. Because science cannot solve normative issues
(Dahl 1947), this problem is central to the ability to build a body of work that is
coherent as research and applied use. The final technical problem is the effect of
observation and the observer. Even the “hardest” of the sciences has rediscovered
this problem (Kiel 1994), yet it is a particularly pesky dilemma in amorphous areas
such as leadership. One version of the predicament, simply stated, is that observed
phenomena change through the act of observation. A second version of the
problem is that because the observer determines the conceptual framework of the
issue, the methods to be used, and the context to be studied, the results are affected
far more by the investigators’ biases than might be supposed. (Van Wart, 2003, p.
215)

15. To learn from performance measures, however, managers need some mechanism
to extract information from the data. We may all believe that the data speak for
themselves. This, however, is only because we each have buried in our brain some
unconscious mechanism that has already made an implicit conversion of the
abstract data into meaningful information. The data speak only through an
interpreter that converts the collection of digits into analog lessons—that decodes
the otherwise inscrutable numbers and provides a persuasive explanation. And
often, different people use different interpreters, which explains how they can
draw very different lessons from the same data. (Behn, 2003, p. 592)

16. This is a question that has emerged from our assertively diverse society. During
the first half of the twentieth century, we found ourselves under the sway of the
Progressive reformers’ assumption that in order to treat everyone fairly, it was
necessary to treat everyone the same. This was a logical response to the dominance
of machine governments at the state and local levels, which provided unequal
treatment based on support for political bosses. If the problem was that some
streets were swept because someone had voted the “right way” in the last election,
and others did not because they had voted the “wrong way,” then fairness dictated
sweeping everyone’s streets in the same way. Standardized services were to be
delivered across a city by agencies that, “without fear or favor,” treated everyone
the same. (Ostensibly, that was the formula, although it is never the case that
everyone really does get the same street sweeping, or any other service.) The
Progressives found a nice congruence in their approach to reform between their
commitment to a science of administration and rectifying inequity. By delivering
services “scientifically,” which meant based on presumed scientific principles that
would apply to everyone in every place and every time, they could achieve
efficiency and provide fairness (Mann 1963; Wiebe 1967; Nelson 1982; Kennedy
1971; Haber 1964; Warner 1971; Ekirch 1974; Caro 1974; Croly 1965). (Cooper,
2004, pp. 402-403)
Ten practical suggestions emanating from a larger study of public management networks are offered here. Readers who wish to gain deeper insights into the workings of such networks will have to go beyond the limited pages of this overview. The issues are empirically derived from a grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In other words, it is an inductive study in which the theoretical findings emanate from field-based data. Thus, the methodology places heavy emphasis on the responses of the public managers themselves. Extended discussions were undertaken in the field on two separate occasions with more than 150 public officials, in addition to field observation and examination of network documentation. In essence, the managerial lessons that follow come from the managers themselves. Hopefully, these insights will not only contribute to the collaborative management literature but also will be of use to those who practice this form of management. (Agranoff, 2006, pp. 56-57)

Researchers should analyze the interactive effects of such factors using research designs and methods that treat the possibility of a contingency approach to implementing organizational change seriously. Especially useful would be the employment of multivariate statistical techniques and large-sample data sets of organizations at different levels of government and in different public management settings. Another immediate research need involves refining the general propositions offered here, synthesizing the various theories underlying them, and testing rival propositions. In the process, researchers must confront the challenge of analyzing the relationship between the content and process of change and such organizational outcomes as performance. Some designs will be very challenging and expensive, but researchers should seek ways to conceive and execute them, possibly through consortia of researchers (e.g., Huber and Glick 1993) and proposals for large research grants. Such an effort would be timely, important for both practice and theory building, and long overdue. (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006, p. 173)

There is a seductive but false hypothesis available that as modern information technology better discloses information about agency operations (about everything, really), the marginal effect of “reputation” as opposed to “facts” will decline. As we get better information, this thinking goes, the influence of reputation will go away. As more and more is transparent about these organizations, as more and more is publicized, and as information and search costs get lower and lower, reputation will not matter anymore because we all will know the true state of the world. Even under this type of quasi-rational, abundant-information policy-making environment, we remain highly skeptical of claims regarding the demise of organizational reputations as a catalyst for understanding public administration. This is because the overflow of information brought on by technological advances and “sunshine” procedures will result in modern citizens and societies having to wrestle with the dilemma of information overload. As a means of coping with the dilemma of abundant information in the presence of innate cognitive limitations, audience members will continue to rely on heuristics, or information shortcuts, intended to make understanding and inference regarding
agency behavior much akin to how voters make evaluations about candidates for elective office (e.g., Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 31)
Table 6:
Taxonomy of the parochiality of scientism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Segment Excerpts</th>
<th>Main Category: Sciencism</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Rhetorical Strategies</th>
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<td>Statements that only use masculine pronouns or examples to portray a scientific actor</td>
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<td>Techno-rational beings</td>
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“Addressing the limitations of current participatory efforts requires that public administrators become ‘interpretive mediators’ [emphasis added]. They must move beyond the technical issue at hand by involving citizens in ‘dialectical exchange’ (Fischer, 1993, 183) and by engaging with citizens in discourse (Fox and Miller, 1995) rather than simply getting citizens input. Then, the administrator becomes a cooperative participant, assisting citizens in examining their interests, working together with them to arrive at decisions, and engaging them in open and authentic deliberation [emphasis added]” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 320).
Are there Other Ways of Knowing?

If Orientalism is the power to decide what ought to be known about the Other, and historicism is the power to magnify the importance of the West, the parochiality of scientism is the power to decide how people ought to learn and experience the world. As a project, the parochiality of scientism reinforces modernity’s Theo-politics (wherein the attributes of God are within Western Man) by encouraging mastery over the lived-experience through Western standards of science. In and of itself, science is not an issue. Scientific fundamentalism (as in the parochiality of science), however, rejects all other epistemologies and promotes empowering knowledgeable experts over ignorant peoples. In APAD, per the sample of journal-length texts, the parochiality of scientism is more common than both Orientalism and historicism. In the texts, the parochiality of scientism is in a series of strategies that elevate the importance of scientific thinking and techno-rationality, as in:

a) statements that only use masculine pronouns or examples to portray scientific actors,

b) statements that equate the human experience to a mechanical and/or technological experience,

c) language that forces the reader to only think in scientific and quantitative terms and to perform/present their research in scientific and quantitative ways,

d) statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in the parochiality of scientism, and

e) statements (or language) that challenge one aspect of colonial discourse while reinforcing another.

Like Van Wart’s (2003) Eurocentric-feminist language against “great man” historical theses, Frederickson’s (1971/2017) call for social equity and a new behavioralism highlights
moments of colonial ambivalence. According to Frederickson (1971/2017), the second-generation behavioralist is:

- “Unlike his progenitor [emphasis added] ... emphasizes the public part of Public Administration” (p. 285),

- “He accepts the importance of understanding as scientifically as possible how and why organizations behave as they do but be tends to be rather more interested in the impact of that organization on its clientele and vice versa [emphasis added]” (p. 285),

- “He is not antipositivist nor antiscientific although be is probably less sanguine about the applicability of the natural-science model to social phenomena [emphasis added]” (p. 285),

- “He is not likely to use his behavioralism as a rationale for simply trying to describe how public organizations behave [emphasis added]” (p. 285),

- “Nor is be inclined to use his behavioralism as a face for so-called neutrality, being more than a little skeptical of the objectivity of those who claim to be doing science [emphasis added]” (p. 285), and

- “He attempts to use his scientific skills to aid his analysis, experimentation, and evaluation of alternative policies and administrative modes [emphasis added]” (p. 285).

Here, Frederickson’s (1971/2017) language suggests that the past and present subject-actor of Public Administration is a scientific man of reason. A man who is reasonable because, unlike his ancestor, he is not going to use science simply to describe organizations, nor will he accept neutrality and objectivity at face value. No. This man will use his scientific acumen for his analysis, experiments, and evaluations of different policies and administrative styles. So, while Frederickson (1971/2017) is fighting against a tradition that ignores the social impact of organizations, his description of the new administrator reaffirms that the future of the field is, in fact, masculine and scientific: a man of reason.

Relatedly, Simon’s (1973) assertion that “to design effective decision-making organizations … we must understand decision-making tools at our disposal, both human and
mechanical—men and computers [emphasis added]” (pp. 271-272), adds another dimension to the “men of reason” rhetoric. That is, the future of effective decision-making in organizations requires learning about the relationship between men (as representatives of humanity) and computers (technology); it requires masculine techno-rationality. Likewise, Behn’s (2003) language associates people’s thought processes with that of machines:

To learn from performance measures, however, managers need some mechanism to extract information from the data [emphasis added]. We may all believe that the data speak for themselves. This, however, is only because we each have buried in our brain some unconscious mechanism that has already made an implicit conversion of the abstract data into meaningful information [emphasis added]. The data speak only through an interpreter that converts the collection of digits into analog lessons—that decodes the otherwise inscrutable numbers and provides a persuasive explanation [emphasis added]. And often, different people use different interpreters, which explains how they can draw very different lessons from the same data. (Behn, 2003, p. 592)

Per Behn (2003), to learn from performance measures, managers require a mechanism, i.e., primarily a “piece of machinery” or a “process, technique, or system for achieving a result [emphasis added]” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), to “extract information from the data” (p. 592). Here, the author’s language affirms that managers need a machine to extract, i.e., “to draw forth (as by research)” or “pull or take out forcibly” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), meaning.

The author’s language is not only technical and surgical, but it also continues to claim that people have “buried in [their] brain some unconscious mechanism that has made an implicit conversion of the abstract data into meaningful information [emphasis added]” (p. 592). As such, Behn (2003) encourages the reader to imagine consciousness as a machine or, perhaps, an algorithm that converts and decodes “digits into analog lessons” and “inscrutable numbers [into] a persuasive explanation” (p. 592). Thus, by the end of the segment, the machine is within the human, buried (perhaps installed) into their consciousness. And, to say that data speak only through this machine is to imply that some people—those without these systems or
algorithms—do not have access to the same meaningful information, at least not like the techno-rational mind.

A similar metamorphosis occurs in Bardach’s (1977/2017) analogy of policy or program implementation as different machines: “A machine to alleviate mental illness is clearly a different machine than one that distributes agricultural subsidies or one that regulates the price of natural gas [emphasis added] ... Yet, at an intermediate level of abstraction, one can see that all such machines do look rather similar [emphasis added]” (p. 318). Here, the reader must imagine the administrator as either an engineer who, by necessity, must be techno-rational or a cog in a machine. The image of a cog in a machine is evocative of Carpenter and Krause’s (2012) argument that citizens and societies have “innate cognitive limitations,” which, considering “technological advances,” make them susceptible to “information overload” (p. 31). Arguably, to cope with information overload, “members will continue to rely on heuristics, or information shortcuts” (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 31). On the one hand, Carpenter and Krause’s (2012) language problematizes the possibility of techno-rationality, yet, on the other, it implies that people can only cope with technological advances. In effect, the author’s language denies human agency insofar as citizens and society are on the receiving end of technology, left to react instead of act.

Besides promoting men of reason and techno-rationality, several authors also use language that requires the reader to think in quantitative-scientific terms and perform quantitative research. While there is nothing inherently wrong about scientific language, the use of such language, and only that language, leaves the reader no other recourse, as in:

- Allison’s (1980/2017) belief that the development of public management should include seeking people’s experiences just like “scientists search for ‘critical experiments’ [emphasis added]” (p. 399);
• Pearce and Perry’s (1983) description of their study as a “time-series design [emphasis added], involving repeated measurements of employee attitudes at fixed intervals [emphasis added]” (p. 316);

• Perry and Recascino Wise’s (1990) declaration that the “development of a psychometric instrument capable of measuring an individual’s public service motivational structures along with a model that operationalizes the linkages between individual values, organizational environment and task structure, and outcome ... is a critical next step [emphasis added]” (p. 497);

• Behn’s (1995) assertion that “physicists generally agree upon a standard model for the structure of truly elementary particles: 24 bosons (including photons), 6 leptons (including the electron and the neutrino), and quarks. Baryons (including protons and neutrons) are each made up of 3 quarks, while mesons consist of 1 quark and 1 anti-quark. There are 18 different kinds of quarks” (p. 314);

• O’Toole, Jr.’s (1997) suggestion that, concerning networks, researchers ought to “undertake systematic research to explore descriptive questions on the network agenda” (p. 50);

• Meier and O’Toole, Jr.’s (2003) use of the formula: “\(O_t = \beta_1 (H+M_1)O_{t-1} + \beta_2 (X/H)(M_3/M_4) + \epsilon_1\)” (p. 691);

• Cooper’s (2004) claim that “the Progressives found a nice congruence in their approach to reform between their commitment to a science of administration and rectifying inequity [emphasis added]. By delivering services “scientifically,” which meant based on presumed scientific principles that would apply to everyone in every place and every time, they could achieve efficiency and provide fairness [emphasis added]” (Cooper, 2004, pp. 402-403); and

• Fernandez and Rainey’s (2006) view that “researchers should analyze the interactive effects of such factors using research designs and methods that treat the possibility of a contingency approach to implementing organizational change seriously. Especially useful would be the employment of multivariate statistical techniques and large-sample data sets of organizations at different levels of government and in different public management settings [emphasis added]” (p. 173).

Here, the reader must consider future research in quantitative terms (Allison, 1980/2017; Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; O’Toole, Jr., 1997; Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990), assess their own (in)ability to understand quantitative designs (Meier & O’Toole, Jr., 2003; Pearce & Perry, 1983), and think about science across different disciplinary and historical traditions (Behn, 1995; Cooper, 2004). There is nothing wrong with scientific language in and of itself. However,
when it becomes the only imaginable and taken-for-granted strategy to write about past, present, and future issues, then it excludes all other possibilities—then it becomes scientific fundamentalism.

Across the 38 journal-length texts, some authors did use language to either open the door to other forms of inquiry and/or challenge scientism directly. For example, in Agranoff’s (2006) explanation that, in the text, “issues are empirically derived from a grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1998) [emphasis added] ... an inductive study in which the theoretical findings emanate from field-based data [emphasis added]” (p. 57), the reader is encouraged to think about what it means to do “grounded theory” whereby findings are “theoretical” and “emanate” from “field-based data.” Nonetheless, there is a conceivable ambivalence here. On the one hand, Agranoff’s (2006) usage of “field-based data,” as opposed to “interviews,” may reassure the reader that findings come from an empirical and scientific process, thus vindicating qualitative inquiry because it is scientific and dressed in quantitative clothing. On the other hand, the author’s usage of “field-based data” may deconstruct science and data altogether, thus encouraging the reader to find value in all research pursuits.

In Simrell King et al. (1998), a similar moment of colonial ambivalence occurs. Accordingly, to fix the limitations of contemporary participatory efforts and improve the relationship between people and administrators, Simrell King et al. (1998) write:

*Addressing the limitations of current participatory efforts requires that public administrators become “interpretive mediators”* [emphasis added]. They must move beyond the technical issue at hand by involving citizens in “dialectical exchange” (Fischer, 1993, 183) and by engaging with citizens in discourse (Fox and Miller, 1995) rather than simply getting citizens input. Then, the administrator becomes a cooperative participant, assisting citizens in examining their interests, working together with them to arrive at decisions, and engaging them in open and authentic deliberation. (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 320)
The idea that administrators ought to become “interpretive mediators” is problematic because it implies that people need administrators to help them make sense of the world (e.g., examine their interests or come up with decisions) and access “open and authentic deliberation” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 320). Nonetheless, Simrell King et al. (1998) affirm that this ought to be a “dialectical exchange”—i.e., a moment and conversation of conflict with many voices (see Fischer, 1993, p. 183)—wherein all participants (e.g., administrators and citizens) come into confrontation with one another to extend the “horizons” of all participants (Fischer, 1993, p. 183). Admittedly, the language of cooperation and inclusion is democratic and defies the parochiality of scientism and the power of men of reason. However, the syntax of the segment also encourages the reader to envision the administrator as an active agent who addresses the limitations of ongoing participatory efforts, becomes an interpretive mediator, moves beyond technical issues, involves citizens in dialogue, becomes a cooperative participant, assists citizens and examines their interests, works with them to arrive at decisions, and engages them in deliberation. The citizen, in turn, must passively wait for the administrator.

Alongside these moments of ambivalence, other authors are more direct in their criticisms of the parochiality of scientism (e.g., Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017; Ott, 1989/2017; Stivers, 1990/2017). In a description of the organizational culture perspective, Ott (1989/2017) writes:

*The organizational culture perspective does not assume that organizations are necessarily rational, goal-oriented entities [emphasis added]. Whereas the mainstream perspectives tend to work with hard, tangible, quantifiable, organizational variables—often using computer models—the organizational culture perspective focuses on soft, less tangible, more ethereal variables such as basic assumptions, cognitive patterns, values, myths, and unspoken beliefs [emphasis added]. Using another analogy, organizational culture is like ordinary air. Usually, it cannot be touched, felt, or seen. It is not noticed unless it changes suddenly. The mainstream perspectives of organizations are not comfortable with air-like variables and concepts [emphasis added]. Computerized information systems and statistical, quasi-experimental research*
methods of the structural and systems perspectives are not designed to measure ethereal concepts [emphasis added]. (Ott, 1989/2017, p. 468)

Ott’s (1989/2017) language is poetic. Here, the author’s analogy urges the reader to ponder ethereal and mythical ideas, to consider air-like concepts that “cannot be touched, felt, or seen” (p. 468). Air, Ott (1989/2017) writes, “is not noticed unless it changes suddenly” (p. 468). The contrast between touching, feeling, or seeing and noticing sudden change is important. The former places the individual in a subject-position to touch, feel, or see an object, effectively separating them from the object of observation, presumably “hard, tangible, quantifiable, organizational variables” (Ott, 1989/2017, p. 468). In contrast, the latter places the individual within an ongoing and immediate (if not intimate) process of change, with or without their attention. Perhaps intuition, i.e., “the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), is as important as statistics and quasi-experimental research methods.

Like Ott (1989/2017), Stivers (1990/2017) also challenges the parochiality of scientism and refers to incompatibility between detached observation and nature (e.g., air). Accordingly:

On the question of objectivity, feminists have criticized for their masculinity both linear rational thinking and the attempt to achieve unbiased knowledge by means of detached observation [emphasis added]. To be sure, human systems organized according to and seemingly dependent upon this mode of thought have been historically male. Sandra Harding (1987) and Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) have each written compellingly in this vein. Keller’s treatment of the Baconian metaphor linking the inductive acquisition of knowledge about nature with the act of taking a woman by force exemplifies this stream of thinking in a vivid way. (According to Bacon, the scientific method has “the power to conquer and subdue [nature], to shake her to her foundations.”) In an intensification of recent tendencies in the philosophy of science, Harding argues that there is no such thing as unbiased knowledge in the sense of knowledge unaffected by the characteristics of the knower. She suggests that feminist claims may actually be scientifically preferable because they originate in a more complete, therefore less distorting, social experience. (Stivers, 1990/2017, pp. 483-484)
Stivers (1990/2017) notes that Eurocentric scientism (typified by the Baconian or scientific method) does not only place the individual in a position of “detached observation” (p. 483), but it also promotes “the act of taking a woman by force” (p. 483). This is a powerful and violent image that forces the reader to (re)assess the history, masculinity, and moral objectivity of scientism from the point of view of a woman, i.e., the other (see binarism). The author further disarms the parochiality of scientism by questioning its scientificity, writing that because “there is no such thing as unbiased knowledge ... unaffected by the characteristics of the knower ... feminist claims may actually be scientifically preferable because they originate in a more complete [emphasis added], therefore less distorting [emphasis added], social experience” (Stivers, 1990/2017, pp. 483-484). Similarly, Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) also use a violent image (the Holocaust) to challenge the parochiality of scientism and the merits of technical-rationality vis-à-vis “professional,” “effective,” “efficient,” “responsible,” and “innovative” genocide (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 557).

The Rhetoric of the Developmentalist Fallacy and the Cult of Progress

1. Third, the scale of organization in our society has grown so large that only through large-scale organization does it seem possible to have a significant impact. This impression alone is enough to make individual people feel helplessly overwhelmed by huge, impersonal machines indifferent to their uniqueness and their humanity. In addition, however, some interests—notably those of Negroes and of youth—have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures. Rather than wait for admission to these structures—where, incidentally, they are likely to encounter larger, more experienced, well-entrenched organizations opposed to them—these groups, while continuing to strive for recognition in the older institutions, have adopted a strategy of deriding those institutions and seeking to build new ones in which they can have greater, perhaps dominant, influence. (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5)
2. A house is a tangible commodity that can be manufactured and distributed through the usual market mechanisms; housing is a bundle of services provided by a dwelling in the context of a neighborhood, with schools, streets, shopping facilities, and a pattern of social interaction among the inhabitants. However complex it may be to define the qualities of a house, narrowly conceived as a structure, it is far more complex to define the qualities of housing, in the sense of a situation that creates and supports a pattern of social activity. (Simon, 1973, p. 269)

3. Many references cite differences between public and private organization which are related to involvement or lack of involvement with the economic market as a source of resources, information, and constraints. As a source of revenues and resources, it is argued, the market enforces relatively automatic penalties and rewards, and thus provides incentives to cost reduction, operating efficiency, and effective performance. On the other hand, organizations which obtain resources through an appropriations process in a political context are less subject to such influences; cost reductions might be avoided or deemphasized on a number of bases, such as political influences or a number of multiple, vague criteria of a “public interest” nature. (Rainey, Backoff, & Levine, 1976, p. 236)

4. Much of the argument for private service delivery has an economic rationale at its core. Although the concept of privatization can take on several meanings, Bailey insists that a clear unifying thread can be identified—maximizing efficiency. Such devotees are committed to the presumed advantages of the market. They contend that the "private sector is inherently more efficient" than the public sector, primarily because it brings increased competition and reduces governmental bureaucracy and red tape. Others are less sure, although their arguments are more wide ranging and more diffuse at times. Most of those who are skeptical if not hostile do agree that the privatization movement has implications that go beyond economic considerations. Among these, some will not concede even on the efficiency issue. Starr, for example, asserts that "conservatives who favor privatization" ignore impressive examples of inefficiency, waste, and corruption in the American experience with defense, construction projects, and health care—all mostly produced privately with public dollars. Others worry that privatization contributes to a further unfortunate blurring of the distinction between public and private. Moe maintains that economic considerations should not be paramount, that decisions on the delivery of public services must be made primarily on the basis of whether or not the function necessarily involves powers inherently reserved to the sovereign. He concludes that "... ultimately activities of a purely public and governmental character exist that may not be assigned or delegated to private parties." Sullivan expresses another fundamental misgiving—that because private firms generally are not subject to constitutional restraints privatization poses a major threat to constitutional protections. "In the end privatization and protection of civil liberties may prove to be mutually exclusive goals." (Morgan & England, 1988, p. 979)
5. Children must crawl before they walk, walk before they run. They also must develop through a sequence of levels of moral reasoning ability (Kohlberg, 1968, 1969) and psychological or intellectual development (Piaget, 1973) ...

The development of schools of organization theory appears to go through analogous stages. The organizational culture perspective will need to pass through a sequence of developmental steps before it achieves its full potential or becomes a mature perspective. Reaching agreement about what organizational culture is, is the first level—akin to an infant crawling. A definition does not accomplish very much in and of itself, but just like crawling before walking, it is a necessary precondition for advancing to the second developmental level, the level at which organizational cultures can be identified other than through lengthy participant observation. (Ott, 1989/2017, p. 469)

6. At least two developments of recent years, one intellectual and one practical, call into question the strength of a public service ethic. One is the rise of the public choice movement, which is predicated on a model of human behavior that assumes that people are motivated primarily by self interest. According to this view, because self interest is at the root of human behavior, incentives, organizations, and institutions must be designed to recognize and to take advantage of such motivations. A related development, this one arising within government, is the growing popularity of monetary incentive systems, especially at top organizational levels.6 Extrinsic rewards controlled by one’s supervisor are now seen as a major means for directing and reinforcing managerial and executive behavior. These related trends stand in opposition to the view that public service motives energize and direct the behavior of civil servants. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 367)

7. Potentially important theoretical work has been developing from economics as well. One variety is game theory, discussed above. Another is transaction costs economics, which is beginning to receive attention in public administration (Maser, 1986; Thompson, 1993; and Horn, 1995). A third is public choice, where provocative work is being done by scholars like Elinor Ostrom (1990). (O’Toole, Jr., 1997, p. 49)

8. Some citizens feel their concerns will be heard only if they organize into groups and angrily protest administrative policy decisions (Timney, 1996). NIMBYs (Not In My Backyard groups) have challenged administrative decisions on a variety of different issues in recent years (Fischer, 1993; Kraft and Clary, 1991), creating no end of trouble for people trying to implement administrative decisions. Citizens involved in these protest groups are confrontational in their participatory efforts because they believe administrators operate within a "context of self-interest" and are not connected to the citizens (Kettering Foundation, 1991, 7). (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 319)

9. For all these reasons we believe that the clear principal-agent relationship, which we termed "direct, nonfragmented external control," between a state and a large
monopoly provider helps to explain why one mental health system was the best performing network in our study (Provan and Milward 1995). This agency, in addition to running the network, was a community mental health center that was the largest service provider in the community. It had the power to veto state contracts with other local agencies. Thus it had power as a principal and legitimacy as a provider. It could punish defection and, as the largest provider in the network, the state could hold it responsible for the type and quality of services it provided, not just what it contracted for with other providers. As a principal, the agency was in the position to evaluate the costs of many of the services it contracted for with the other providers, since they also produced many of the same services. Because those in the agency knew the cost of production, they were able to negotiate hard with providers. This, not the hidden hand of the market, pushed the network toward efficiency and effectiveness. (Milward & Provan, 2000, p. 367)

10. Probably the most critical stakeholder group that must be satisfied is customers, and this view has formed the basis of the quality movement in recent years (Deming 1986). By satisfying customers and by maintaining a customer-driven focus, the organization will presumably be effective, not only to its customers and clients, but also to other stakeholders, such as suppliers, shareholders, and employees, all of whom stand to benefit by reaping the rewards that accrue to a customer-driven organization. (Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 415)

11. Nevertheless, it is disingenuous to assert (or believe) that people no longer seek to control the behavior of public agencies and public employees, let alone seek to use performance measurement to help them do so. Why do governments have line-item budgets? Today, no one employs the measurements of time-and-motion studies for control. Yet, legislatures and executive-branch superiors do establish performance standards—whether they are specific curriculum standards for teachers or sentencing standards for judges—and then measure performance to see whether individuals have complied with these mandates. After all, the central concern of the principle-agent theory is how principles can control the behavior of their agents (Ingraham and Kneedler 2000, 238-39). (Behn, 2003, p. 589)

12. Also historical in its approach, this body of thought generally views the citizen’s role in the American political tradition as providing the normative foundations for public administration. It is the area in which I have focused my efforts to contribute to the ethics literature. The public administrative role is viewed as derived from that of the citizen, thus making administrators representative citizens, professional citizens, fiduciary citizens, or citizens in lieu of the rest of us. Public administrators hold the role of citizen in trust as they conduct the public business previously done by citizens, but now handed over to professional citizens who have the time, technical training, and resources to carry it out. (Cooper, 2004, pp. 396-397)

13. Frederickson (1991) identifies five theories of the public for public administration: the public as interest group (pluralist), consumer (public choice), represented voter (legislative), client, and citizen. Direct individual citizen participation in
governance as we contemplate it here does not appear to be included in any of these other than the public as citizen, although earlier works in which Frederickson and others participated (such as the Minnowbrook conference of 1969) did discuss this possibility (Marini 1971). Much of the literature of the last 20 years that views the citizen as client also seems to view the public as passive, existing on the receiving end of services or representation. As Radin and Cooper put it, the client conception is, at best, “a benign form of paternalism” (1989, 167). (Blomgren Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 2005, p. 549)

14. Axelrod (1984) , for example, found that tit-for-tat reciprocity in prisoner’s dilemmas games, when accompanied by repeated interaction, can lead to collective action, and Ostrom (1998) concludes that evidence from laboratory experiments shows that a large proportion of the population in these experiments believes that others will reciprocate, making collective action possible. These findings, however, do not conform to Olson’s (1971) prediction that whenever participation in collective action is voluntary, the members whose marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of participating will stop contributing before a group optimum is reached. (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 28)

15. The key to sustained network involvement is performance, and the key to performance is adding public value (Moore 1995) by working together rather than separately (Bardach 1998, 8). In the 14 public management networks studied, four types of public value were queried, and managers found substantial benefits in each dimension. The first benefit is the value added to the manager or professional, such as learning new ways to collaborate, intergovernmental skills, and how to network, along with enhanced technical and information and communications technology skills. Second are the benefits accruing to the home agency, such as access to other agencies’ information, programs and resources; access to information and communications technology; cross-training of agency staff; and most important, enhanced external input into the internal knowledge base. (Agranoff, 2006, p. 58)
Table 7:  
Taxonomy of the developmentalist fallacy & the cult of progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Segment Excerpts</th>
<th>Main Category: Subcategory</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Rhetorical Strategies</th>
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<td>Ort, 1989/2017, p. 469</td>
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<td>Becoming mature and civil</td>
<td>Statements that set up norms of (im)maturity or (in)civility and who is an adult/child</td>
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<td>Eurocentrism: Developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress</td>
<td>Economic beings</td>
<td>Language that forces the reader to only think in economic terms or know economic theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Toole, Jr. &amp; Montjoy, 1984, p. 495</td>
<td>“Potentially important theoretical work has been developing from economics as well. One variety is game theory, discussed above. Another is transaction costs economics [emphasis added]” (O’Toole, Jr., 1997, p. 49).</td>
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<td>“By satisfying customers and by maintaining a customer-driven focus, the organization will presumably be effective, not only to its customers and clients, but also to other stakeholders, such as suppliers, shareholders, and employees, all of whom stand to benefit by reaping the rewards that accrue to a customer-driven organization [emphasis added]” (Provan &amp; Milward, 2001, p. 415).</td>
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<td>Behn, 2003, p. 589</td>
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<td>Cooper, 2004, p. 397</td>
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<td>Thomson &amp; Perry, 2006, p. 28</td>
<td>“Axelrod (1984), for example, found that tit-for-tat reciprocity in prisoner’s dilemma games [emphasis added], when accompanied by repeated interaction, can lead to collective action” (Thomson &amp; Perry, 2006, p. 28).</td>
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<td>Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 979</td>
<td>“Most of those who are skeptical if not hostile do agree that the privatization movement has implications that go beyond economic considerations. Among these, some will not concede even on the efficiency issue. Starr, for example, asserts that ‘conservatives who favor privatization’ ignore impressive examples of inefficiency, waste, and corruption in the American experience with defense, construction projects, and health care—all mostly produced privately with public dollars [emphasis added]” (Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 979).</td>
<td>Eurocentrism: Developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress</td>
<td>Colonial resistance or challenge</td>
<td>Statements (or language) that forces the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in economic thinking</td>
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<td>Blomgren Bingham et al., 2005, p. 549</td>
<td>“Much of the literature of the last 20 years that views the citizen as client also seems to view the public as passive, existing on the receiving end of services or representation. As Radin and Cooper put it, the client conception is, at best, ‘a benign form of paternalism’ (1989, 167) [emphasis added]” (Blomgren Bingham et al., 2005, p. 549).</td>
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Are there Other Norms for Development?

Eurocentrism is a politics of epistemology or a series of decisions about what people ought to know. Hence, Orientalism is the power to decide what ought to be known about others. Historicism is the power to amplify the importance of the West by making the reader think in Western terms. The parochiality of scientism is the power to perpetuate technorationality and delimit what proper science and research look like. It follows that the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress is also concerned with what people ought to know. The developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress is based on a belief that all people and nations fall in a universal continuum of (under)development. In effect, the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress assumes that the West exemplifies the final stages of development, with the Rest catching up, both in cultural and economic terms. The developmentalist fallacy highlights the universal (under)development continuum and calls for progress in the form of efficiency tied to economic knowledge and civil behavior. In this continuum, the West is the norm, economic know-how is necessary to achieve results, and people must act under standards of good behavior. In APAD, per the sample, the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress is more common than Orientalism and historicism but matches the parochiality of scientism. Across the journal-length texts, the developmentalist fallacy and cult of progress appears in a series of linguistic strategies that elevate the importance of development toward economic efficiency and civil behavior, as in:

a) statements that set up norms of (im)maturity or (in)civility and who is an adult/child,

b) language that forces the reader to only think in economic terms or know economic theory, and
c) statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in economic thinking.

Although the immature/mature dichotomy is not too common in the sample, a handful of authors do turn to it to undermine what they consider cases of immaturity tied to incivility. For example, consider Kaufman’s (1969) language:

The scale of organization in our society has grown so large that only through large-scale organization does it seem possible to have a significant impact. This impression alone is enough to make individual people feel helplessly overwhelmed by huge, impersonal machines indifferent to their uniqueness and their humanity. In addition, however, some interests—notably those of Negroes and of youth—have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures [emphasis added]. (p. 5)

In this segment, Kaufman (1969) proposes that:

A. Given the size and scope of organization in “our society [emphasis added],” only “through-large scale organization does it seem possible to have significant impact” (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5).

B. Considering the possibility of “A,” many “individual people [may] feel helplessly overwhelmed by huge, impersonal machines indifferent to their uniqueness and their humanity [emphasis added]” (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5).

C. As a contradictory addendum to the sequence (i.e., A leads to B), “however, some interests—notably those of Negroes and of youth—have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures [emphasis added]” (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5).

The use of however (the intended usage seems to be “in spite of that: on the other hand;” Merriam-Webster, n.d.) separates proposition A and B from C. In other words, the people who may feel helpless vis-à-vis mechanical organizations indifferent to their “uniqueness” and “humanity” are not represented by the “interests” of “Negroes and of youth.” Additionally, while the author connects “our society” to “individual people,” thus outlining a vague personal connection to an unknown individual subject, Kaufman (1969) does not refer to “Negroes” and “youth” as individuals nor as members of “our” society. Instead, the author introduces them as an aside between em dashes to clarify whose homogenous or monolithic interests
“have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources” (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5).

Though Kaufman’s (1969) language is historicist insofar as the author (i) assumes that dehumanization is a new problem in his society, (ii) does not mention how organizations have historically marginalized people of color, and (iii) implies that African Americans have always had “political resources,” the segment is primarily about “Negroes” and “youth” and their supposed past inability to mobilize and ignorance regarding political structures. On a related note, the idea of framing people’s political approach—and resistance to political structures—as a fledgling or ignorant movement is problematic because it alludes to a universal (in)correct relationship between people and government. This occurs in Simrell King et al. (1998) when the authors describe “NIMBYs (Not In My Backyard Groups)” and participation:

- Some citizens feel their concerns will be heard only if they organize into groups and angrily protest administrative policy decisions (Timney, 1996) [emphasis added]. NIMBYs (Not In My Backyard groups) have challenged administrative decisions on a variety of different issues in recent years (Fischer, 1993; Kraft and Clary, 1991), creating no end of trouble for people trying to implement administrative decisions [emphasis added]. Citizens involved in these protest groups are confrontational in their participatory efforts because they believe administrators operate within a "context of self-interest" and are not connected to the citizens (Kettering Foundation, 1991, 7) [emphasis added]. (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 319)

- Citizens believe that greater participation is needed, but they are rendered cynical or apathetic by vacuous or false efforts to stimulate participation that ask for, yet discount, public input. As a result, citizens find themselves moving from potentially cooperative to confrontational situations that pit administrators against citizens in an adversarial way. Why are we in this paradoxical conundrum? One reason may be the way participation is currently framed, the point to which we now turn. (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 319)

Here, the authors note that some groups (e.g., NIMBYs) believe that, to be heard, they must “angrily protest.” In doing so, they create “no end of trouble for people trying to implement administrative decisions” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 319). The authors frame this as a
“confrontational” mode of participation. Accordingly, “false” efforts to inspire participation beget cynicism, apathy, and confrontational situations. The language connects the idea of genuine or authentic participation to a cooperative relationship between administrators and citizens and false or inauthentic participation to confrontational situations like protests. An issue with this dichotomy (false/real or inauthentic/authentic) is that it positions emotions like anger, cynicism, and apathy as the byproduct of false participatory arrangements, instead of a very real starting point for change. Instead of “deriding” institutions (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5), people ought to turn to administrators who, in turn, will “mediate” their concerns and offer an authentic experience (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 320). There is ambivalence in all of this. Indeed, there is nothing colonial about wanting mindful and open cooperation between people and administrators, however, to paint people as angry and confrontational troublemakers is to divest them of options (e.g., being angry or apathetic) and delimit their behavior (e.g., protesting).

Relatedly, along with the language of (im)maturity, in a few of the texts, some authors refer to youth and children in relation to non-Western subjects or critical theory (see Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 28; Kaufman, 1969, p. 5; Ott, 1989/2017, p. 469; Wright, 1974/2017, p. 3). This occurs in Ott’s (1989/2017) analogy of the organizational culture perspective—which, per Ott (1989/2017), “[is] based on assumptions about organizations and people that depart radically from those of the mainline perspectives” (p. 465)—as a child. According to Ott (1989/2017):

- “The organizational culture perspective has many problems that reflect its \textit{youthfulness} [emphasis added]” (p. 467),

- “The perspective’s problems and limitations of \textit{youthfulness} remain today [emphasis added]. Minimal consensus exists about much of anything concerned with organizational culture, even among its proponents” (p. 467);
“Children must crawl before they walk, walk before they run” (emphasis added). They also must develop through a sequence of levels of moral reasoning ability (Kohlberg, 1968, 1969) and psychological or intellectual development (Piaget, 1973)” (p. 469);

“The development of schools of organization theory appears to go through analogous stages. The organizational culture perspective will need to pass through a sequence of developmental steps before it achieves its full potential or becomes a mature perspective (emphasis added). Reaching agreement about what organizational culture is, is the first level—akin to an infant crawling (emphasis added). A definition does not accomplish very much in and of itself, but just like crawling before walking (emphasis added), it is a necessary precondition for advancing to the second developmental level, the level at which organizational cultures can be identified other than through lengthy participant observation” (p. 469); and

“While a child is in an early stage of moral development, he or she cannot comprehend moral reasoning from more advanced stages—it is beyond the child’s mental grasp (Kohlberg, 1968, 1969) (emphasis added). Likewise, not enough is known yet about organizational culture and its perspective to appreciate their full potential and, thus, to grasp all that we do not know about them” (p. 469).

Considering Ott’s (1989/2017) challenge to the parochiality of scientism, here, the author’s analogy supports the distinction between a mature and immature body and the expectation that an individual will develop into a mature being. Ott (1989/2017) associates youthful, i.e., “of, relating to, or characteristic of youth” or “being young and not yet mature” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), with “problems” (p. 467), “limitations” (p. 467), and the inability to “comprehend moral reasoning” (p. 469). Accordingly, development begets someone’s full physical, psychological, and intellectual potential. Arguably, Ott’s (1989/2017) language about youthfulness (a language of problems, limitations, and unformed moral reasoning) adds ambivalence to the author’s criticism of the parochiality of scientism—so, the colonial hydra lives.

37. Recall Kant’s (1784) “Enlightenment (Aufklärung) is the exit of humanity by itself from a state of culpable immaturity (verschuldeten Unmündigkeit) … Laziness and cowardliness are the causes which bind the great part of humanity in this frivolous state of immaturity” (in Dussel, 1995, pp. 19-20; see also Dussel, 1993).
Finally, the language of (im)maturity belittles children and young people because it denies their ability to connect with the world in their own terms. In effect, the language of (im)maturity affirms that the only valid and reasonable experience is the “adult” experience—or, from a Eurocentric standpoint, a Western-adult-experience. Also, the language of (im)maturity, embodied in Ott’s (1989/2017) assertion that “children must crawl before they walk, [and] walk before they run” (p. 469), rejects the lived experiences of subjects that are physically different—i.e., bodies that may not satisfy taken-for-granted standards of physical development or maturity. Conclusively, what happens if a person cannot run? Would astasia (“muscular incoordination in standing,” Merriam-Webster, n.d.) or abasia (“inability to walk caused by a defect in muscular coordination,” Merriam-Webster, n.d.) impede maturity?38

The developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress is not exclusive to language about (im)maturity and (in)civility, far from it. In fact, across the sample of key journal-length texts, strategies to elevate the importance of development tied to economic efficiency were more common. For example, Simon’s (1973) description of houses—a segment that is reminiscent of Charles Tiebout’s (1956) seminal “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”—urges the reader to see a house, a neighborhood, a community, in relation to the market:

*A house is a tangible commodity that can be manufactured and distributed through the usual market mechanisms [emphasis added]; housing is a bundle of services provided by a dwelling in the context of a neighborhood, with schools, streets, shopping facilities, and a pattern of social interaction among the inhabitants [emphasis added]. However complex it may be to define the qualities of a house, narrowly conceived as a structure, it is far more complex to define the qualities of housing, in the sense of a situation that creates and supports a pattern of social activity [emphasis added]. (Simon, 1973, p. 269)*

38. Adams and Balfour (1998) explain that “in addition to Jews, the Nazis murdered hundreds of thousands of other victims, including homosexuals, the handicapped, Gypsies (Roma), and many political prisoners from Russia and other Eastern European countries” (p. 55). It is not surprising that the dark side of modernity, typified by the Holocaust, excludes and exterminates bodies according to artificial norms of desirability and ability (or able-ness). In short, there is also ableism in Eurocentrism.
The reader must understand the idea of a “tangible” commodity (versus an intangible asset) and visualize manufacturing and distribution in a market. Simon’s (1973) language transforms a person’s neighborhood, schools, streets, shopping facilities, and social interactions into a “bundle of services” and, in doing so, makes them impersonal. By the end of the segment, the author confirms that housing is a situation (a bundle of services) that creates and supports a pattern of social activity. Thus, Simon (1973) frames people’s social experiences as market realities. By the end of the segment, home is not where the heart is, home is where a bundle of services creates and supports social activities.

While economic language can be cold and impersonal, there is nothing characteristically problematic or colonial about (re)framing social life as a market reality if other possibilities are considered. However, it is important to note that the sole use of economic concepts and theories tied to conversations about public effectiveness and efficiency can amplify the volume of a market perspective while silencing all other options. Reliance on economic thinking and forcing the reader to (re)imagine the field in economic terms, alone, may become a problem because it denies non-economic alternatives.39 Exemplary segments based on economic thinking include:

- O’Toole, Jr. and Montjoy’s (1984) assumption about interorganizational implementation that “the added constraints on and paucity of inducements to cooperation mean that interorganizational implementation will be difficult. Overall, we expect, ceteris paribus, more delay and a higher failure rate than in the case of intraorganizational implementation [emphasis added]” (p. 495);

- O’Toole, Jr.’s (1997) claim that “potentially important theoretical work has been developing from economics as well. One variety is game theory [emphasis added] ...

39. Another aspect of colonialism is the commodification of life (Mignolo, 2011). Ontology under European colonialism is tied to the advent of a capitalist world system (see Gandhi, 2019; Quijano, 2000); an economic transformation whereby human capital could be exploited for the benefit of a metropole. What makes this transformation significant is the beginning of a system of accumulation and reinvestment of wealth (Mignolo, 2011). As such, this economic transformation points to the dispensability (or expendability) of human life and the environment (life in general)—which leads to an economy of necrophilia.
Another is *transaction costs economics* [emphasis added] ... A third is *public choice* [emphasis added]” (p. 49);

- Milward and Provan’s (2000) belief that a “clear *principal-agent relationship* [emphasis added], which [they] termed ‘direct, nonfragmented external control,’ between a state and a *large monopoly provider* helps to explain why one mental health system was the best performing network in [their] study [emphasis added] ... This, not the *hidden hand of the market* [emphasis added], pushed the network toward *efficiency and effectiveness* [emphasis added]” (p. 367);

- Provan and Milward’s (2001) assertion that “probably the most critical stakeholder group that must be satisfied is *customers* [emphasis added], and this view has formed the basis of the quality movement in recent years (Deming 1986). *By satisfying customers and by maintaining a customer-driven focus* [emphasis added], the organization will presumably be effective, *not only to its customers and clients* [emphasis added], but also to other stakeholders, such as *suppliers* [emphasis added], shareholders, and employees, *all of whom stand to benefit by reaping the rewards that accrue to a customer-driven organization* [emphasis added]” (p. 415);

- Behn’s (2003) observation that “today, no one employs the measurements of time-and-motion studies for control. Yet, legislatures and executive-branch superiors do establish performance standards ... and then measure performance to see whether individuals have complied with these mandates. After all, the central *concern of the principal-agent* [sic] *theory is how principles* [sic] *can control the behavior of their agents*” (p. 589);

- Cooper’s (2004) description of “the public administrative role ... as derived from that of the citizen, thus making administrators representative citizens, professional citizens, *fiduciary citizens* [emphasis added], or citizens in lieu of the rest of us. Public administrators hold the role of citizen in trust as they *conduct the public business* previously done by citizens [emphasis added], but now handed over to professional citizens who have the *time, technical training,* and *resources* to carry it out [emphasis added]” (p. 397);

- Thomson and Perry’s (2006) summary: “Axelrod (1984), for example, found that *tit-for-tat reciprocity in prisoner’s dilemmas games* [emphasis added], when accompanied by repeated interaction, can lead to collective action, and Ostrom (1998) concludes that evidence from laboratory experiments shows that a large proportion of the population in these experiments believes that others will reciprocate, making collective action possible. These findings, however, do not conform to Olson’s (1971) prediction that *whenever participation in collective action is voluntary, the members whose marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of participating will stop contributing before a group optimum is reached* [emphasis added]” (p. 28); and

- Agranoff’s (2006) advice for public managers working networks, “the key to performance is adding *public value* (Moore 1995) by working together rather than
The first benefit is the *value added* to the manager or professional, such as learning new ways to collaborate, intergovernmental skills, and how to network, along with enhanced technical and information and communications skills. Second are the *benefits accruing* to the home agency, such as access to other agencies’ information, programs and resources, access to information and communication technology; cross-training of agency staff; and most important, enhanced external input into the internal knowledge base” (p. 5).

Segments like these require the reader to (re)imagine administration and management as an economic reality. Indeed, by using terms like “*ceteris paribus*” (O’Toole, Jr. & Montjoy, 1984, p. 495), “game theory” (O’Toole, Jr., 1997, p. 49; see also Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 415), “marginal costs” and “marginal benefits” (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 28; see also Agranoff, 2006, p. 62), “principal-agent” (Behn, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; see also Behn, 1995, pp. 235-36), “prisoner’s dilemma” (Thomson & Perry, 2006), “public choice” (O’Toole, Jr., 1997, p. 49; see also Rainey, Backoff, & Levine, 1976, pp. 235-36), and “transaction cost economics” (O’Toole, Jr., 1997), the authors expect the reader to comprehend economic concepts (see also Wamsley & Zald, 1973, pp. 66-67), or, at the very least, familiarize themselves with the economic lexicon. Moreover, using terms like “customers” or “clients” to describe people (as in Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 415), or words like “fiduciary citizens” to describe public administrators (Cooper, 2004, p. 397), frames the entire public experience as an economic reality, a strategy evocative of Simon’s (1973) language about houses.

While there are no direct challenges to the (im)maturity side of the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress, some authors do counter insular economic thinking by forcing the reader to (re)imagine different options. Morgan and England (1988) and Blomgren Bingham et al. (2005) both use language that undermines the presumed prowess of economic thinking. For example, Morgan and England (1988) use words like “inefficiency,” “waste,” and “corruption” to describe privatization, pointing out that some consider privatization a
“major threat to constitutional protections” and that privatization and the “protection of civil liberties” may be mutually exclusive goals (p. 979). Blomgren Bingham et al. (2005) point out that some consider the “client conception … at best, ‘a benign form of paternalism’” (p. 549). It is this idea of “benign paternalism” that conveys the image of an economic-minded parent watching over their child, waiting for them to economically mature.

**The Rhetoric of the Neocolonial Prosperity Mission**

1. Others with a pragmatic view are more concerned with the question of whether privatization can deliver on its promise of providing public goods and services more economically than can be done under traditional government auspices. Still others believe that the movement reached its zenith under the Reagan Administration and will surely wane in the 1990s. Then there are those who argue just the opposite, that privatization will continue to grow not only in the United States but throughout the world. Regardless of what happens in Washington, most assuredly local governments, which face seemingly unremitting fiscal pressures, will likely remain interested in certain versions of privatization for some time to come. In fact, proponents of contracting out can already point to more and more successful examples of how cities have saved money by the use of this particular alternative to municipal monopolies. (Morgan & England, 1988, p. 979)

2. The second face of privatization represents the downside of the movement. The primary argument here is that the dominant face of privatization may pose adverse consequences for two classical democratic values: citizenship and community. To draw attention to how these values might be affected by privatization, a circuitous route seems useful. The argument in broad outline goes like this. Certain recent social and economic trends in the United States have weakened the sense of social obligation. Local government, a primary locus for the civic culture, have likewise been impaired by these developments. Now comes privatization, which in excess may further weaken the local political order and accelerate the decline of citizenship and community. (Morgan & England, 1988, p. 982)

3. Frederickson and Hart suggest that the central motive for civil servants should be the patriotism of benevolence. They define patriotism of benevolence as “an extensive love of all people within our political boundaries and the imperative that they must be protected in all of the basic rights granted to them by the enabling documents.” They go on to suggest that the patriotism of benevolence combines love of regime values and love of others. Although Frederickson and Hart argue
that the patriotism of benevolence represents a particular moral position, it also
may be understood to describe an emotional state. In fact, the type of moral
“heroism” envisioned by Frederickson and Hart may be attainable only through
an emotional response to humankind, which brings with it a willingness to sacrifice
for others. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, pp. 493-494)

4. The entrepreneurial model offers a good description of reality but creates an
ethical problem: It is in "apparent conflict with democratic theory." This, writes
Diver, creates a dilemma: "The entrepreneurial model seems, to many at least, the
more faithful image of reality, yet it is morally unacceptable. The engineering
model is ethically preferable, but unrealistic." To resolve this dilemma, Diver also
offers two approaches: "Make the engineering model more realizable or
rehabilitate the ethical status of entrepreneurship." Most of the effort has gone
into the first strategy, whose success, notes Driver, is "severely limited by some
rather intractable realities." Thus, he suggests that it might be better "to elevate the
ethical status of the entrepreneurial strategy." (Behn, 1995, p. 317)

5. Where once two great nation-states defined the parameters of the world’s political
and economic systems, we now find instead a constantly shifting balance of powers
in the relationships between nation-states, between these states and super-markets
(such as NAFTA and the European Union), and between states, supermarkets,
and super-empowered individuals (Friedman, 1999). Old boundaries no longer
restrict movement as the world moves toward greater integration of markets,
nation-states, and technology. These developments have created phenomenal
opportunities to create wealth and prosperity, but have also opened the doors to
new conflicts and to deepening poverty among those who lack access to these new
opportunities. (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 559)

6. For many reasons, governments around the world have chosen networks of
providers—some governmental, some nonprofit, and some private firms—to
deliver taxpayer funded services. What is so astonishing about this worldwide
movement away from government provision to government procurement of these
services is that there is little evidence that governments or academics know much
about how to govern or manage networks. General Accounting Office reports,
headlines in newspapers, and special television reports on fleecing the taxpayer
regularly report failure of federal government agencies to effectively monitor and
control their contractors. Our fondness for decentralization and local initiatives
may be fueled by the fear that huge national programs, like Food Stamps,
Medicare, and Medicaid, are too bureaucratic to manage efficiently. (Milward &
Provan, 2000, p. 361)

7. In many cases, governments and government agencies have succeeded in
privatizing previously public functions, holding top executives accountable for
performance goals, establishing new processes for measuring productivity and
effectiveness, and reengineering departmental systems to reflect a strengthened
commitment to accountability (Aristigueta 1999; Barzelay 1992; Boston et al. 1996;
Kearns 1996). The effectiveness of this reform agenda in the United States, as well
as in a number of other countries, has put governments around the world on notice
that new standards are being sought and new roles established. (Denhardt &
Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, pp. 550-551)

8. We argue, however, that in a democratic society, a concern for democratic values
should be paramount in the way we think about systems of governance. Values
such as efficiency and productivity should not be lost, but should be placed in the
larger context of democracy, community, and the public interest. In terms of the
normative models we examine here, the New Public Service clearly seems most
consistent with the basic foundations of democracy in this country and, therefore,
provides a framework within which other valuable techniques and values, such as
the best ideas of the old public administration or the New Public Management,
might be played out. While this debate will surely continue for many years, for the
time being, the New Public Service provides a rallying point around which we
might envision a public service based on and fully integrated with citizen discourse
and the public interest. (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 557)

9. Government had quietly been transformed, and Congress-along with the rest of
government-struggled to get a handle on governmental programs. The
transformation has followed two courses: globalization and devolution. On the
international level, state and even local governments are working directly with
other nations to promote trade or attract foreign investment. Organizations like
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have taken a strong hand in shaping international relations.
Ad hoc international structures have managed the world's response to recent
ethnic conflicts, from the Kosovo peacekeeping operation to the intense bombing
campaign in Serbia. Foreign (or shared) command of American troops proved a
hot domestic issue, but it has become increasingly common in the deployment of
military forces. Other policy arenas that used to be domestic, from
telecommunications to the environment, now have major international
components. More decisions have flowed from the national to the international
level-and at the international level, to both ad hoc and multinational organizations.
Permanent organizations like the State Department have struggled to build the
capacity to cope with these changes, while ad hoc ones never institutionalize.
Maintaining national sovereignty while effectively pursuing international policy has
become an increasingly difficult problem. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 489)

10. Debates about "globalization" have ranged from French complaints about
McDonald's "burger imperialism" to agricultural giant Monsanto's decision to
withdraw "terminator" seeds (which yield large crops without pesticides but cannot
be replanted) from the market (Rubin 1999). London School of Economics
director Anthony Giddens (1999) notes that globalization "has come from
nowhere to be almost everywhere." In the early 1990s, the term was little used. By
2000, no speech was complete without it—even if those who used the term agreed
on little more than the fact "that we now all live in one world." "Globalization" is
poorly defined. Most often, the term is synonymous with the galloping expansion
of the global marketplace. However, globalization is much more. It includes
political, technological, and cultural forces. It is more than a description—it is an ideology that defines basic expectations about the roles and behaviors of individuals and institutions. Giddens suggests, in fact, that globalization is about "action at a distance": the increasing interpenetration of individual lives and global futures. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 490)

11. A serious concern worth noting is that commitment to social equity is not frequently found in the documents we examined. Amy Chua (2004) argues persuasively that market economies coupled with emerging democratic political systems can be an explosive mix. If, as seems to be the case in many developing countries, the market is largely dominated by an ethnic minority, while the mass of the populace is moving toward democratic government, tension is created between political and economic access. Absent some commitment to social equity, these imbalances create enormous instability and unrest. (Cooper, 2004, p. 400)
Table 8: Taxonomy of the neocolonial prosperity mission

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<td>“Where once two great nation-states defined the parameters of the world’s political and economic systems [emphasis added], we now find instead a constantly shifting balance of powers in the relationships between nation-states, between these states and super-markets (such as NAFTA and the European Union) [emphasis added], and between states, supermarkets, and super-empowered individuals (Friedman, 1999). Old boundaries no longer restrict movement as the world moves toward greater integration of markets, nation-states, and technology [emphasis added]” (Adams &amp; Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 559).</td>
<td>Civilizational Mission</td>
<td>Western neoliberal leader</td>
<td>Statements that position the United States or the West as the global leader of a neoliberal world order</td>
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<td>Kettl, 2000b, pp. 489-490</td>
<td>“Others with a pragmatic view are more concerned with the question of whether privatization can deliver on its promise of providing public goods and services more economically than can be done under traditional government auspices [emphasis added]. Still others believe that the movement reached its zenith under the Reagan Administration and will surely wane in the 1990s. Then there are those who argue just the opposite, that privatization will continue to grow not only in the United States but throughout the world [emphasis added]” (Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 979).</td>
<td>Civilizational Mission</td>
<td>American historicism and prosperity</td>
<td>Statements (or language) that project the American experience as a universal example of prosperity</td>
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<td>Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 979</td>
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<td>Denhardt &amp; Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, pp. 550-551</td>
<td>“The effectiveness of this reform agenda in the United States, as well as in a number of other countries, has put governments around the world on notice that new standards are being sought and new rules established [emphasis added]” (Denhardt &amp; Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, pp. 550-551).</td>
<td>Civilizational Mission</td>
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<td>Milward &amp; Provan, 2000, p. 361</td>
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<td>Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 982</td>
<td>“Certain recent social and economic trends in the United States have weakened the sense of social obligation. Local government, a primary locus for the civic culture, have likewise been impaired by these developments. Now comes privatization, which in excess may further weaken the local political order and accelerate the decline of citizenship and community [emphasis added]” (Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 982).</td>
<td>Civilizational Mission: Neocolonial prosperity mission</td>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
<td>Statements (or language) that challenge one aspect of colonial discourse while reinforcing another</td>
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<td>Behn, 1995, p. 317</td>
<td>“We argue, however, that in a democratic society, a concern for democratic values should be paramount in the way we think about systems of governance. Values such as efficiency and productivity should not be lost, but should be placed in the larger context of democracy, community, and the public interest [emphasis added]” (Denhardt &amp; Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 557).</td>
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<td>Adams &amp; Balfour, 1998/2017, pp. 558-559</td>
<td>“If, as seems to be the case in many developing countries, the market is largely dominated by an ethnic minority, while the mass of the populace is moving toward democratic government, tension is created between political and economic access [emphasis added]. Absent some commitment to social equity, these imbalances create enormous instability and unrest” (Cooper, 2004, p. 400).</td>
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<td>Denhardt &amp; Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, pp. 557</td>
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Eurocentrism is a politics of epistemology that dictates what proper knowledge is, all with a Western bias. Civilizational missions are not as concerned with epistemology, mainly because these missions are already based on Eurocentric beliefs; rather, they are a matter of praxis. If Eurocentrism is about telling people what they ought to know, the civilizational mission is the practice of justifiable oppression to make others accept colonialism. Apropos, the novelty of the American neocolonial prosperity mission is that it substitutes the brutality of economic exploitation and dependency (with or without physical occupation) with rhetoric of democratic prosperity. While the neocolonial prosperity mission relies on economic thinking like the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress, the mission highlights neoliberal tools, what Williamson (1993, 2009) originally called the “Washington consensus,” and market fundamentalism. Whereas the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress reinforces economic thinking, the neocolonial prosperity mission highlights the need for neoliberal market strategies, led by nations like the U.S., to foster democracy worldwide. Across the sample of 38 journal-length texts, the neocolonial prosperity mission is in:

a) statements that position the U.S. or the West as the global leaders of a neoliberal world order;

b) statements (or language) that project the American experience as a universal example of prosperity,

c) statements (or language) that challenge one aspect of colonial discourse while reinforcing another.
Unlike colonialism, which virtually all the authors in the sample ignore, several authors across the 38 journal-length texts describe neocolonialism, although not by name (i.e., “neocolonial”). For example, Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) and Kettl (2000b) all highlight neocolonial dynamics in contemporary global conditions:

- Where once two great nation-states defined the parameters of the world’s political and economic systems [emphasis added], we now find instead a constantly shifting balance of powers in the relationships between nation-states, between these states and super-markets (such as NAFTA and the European Union) [emphasis added], and between states, supermarkets, and super-empowered individuals (Friedman, 1999). Old boundaries no longer restrict movement as the world moves toward greater integration of markets, nation-states, and technology [emphasis added]. These developments have created phenomenal opportunities to create wealth and prosperity, but have also opened the doors to new conflicts and to deepening poverty among those who lack access to these new opportunities. (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 559)

- Debates about "globalization" have ranged from French complaints about McDonald’s "burger imperialism" to agricultural giant Monsanto’s decision to withdraw "terminator" seeds [emphasis added] (which yield large crops without pesticides but cannot be replanted) from the market (Rubin 1999). London School of Economics director Anthony Giddens (1999) notes that globalization "has come from nowhere to be almost everywhere." In the early 1990s, the term was little used. By 2000, no speech was complete without it—even if those who used the term agreed on little more than the fact "that we now all live in one world." "Globalization" is poorly defined. Most often, the term is synonymous with the galloping expansion of the global marketplace. However, globalization is much more. It includes political, technological, and cultural forces. It is more than a description—it is an ideology that defines basic expectations about the roles and behaviors of individuals and institutions [emphasis added]. Giddens suggests, in fact, that globalization is about "action at a distance": the increasing interpenetration of individual lives and global futures [emphasis added]. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 490)

Considering that civilizational missions and Eurocentrism are related, Adams and Balfour’s (1998/2017) reference to the European Union, as well as Kettl’s (2000b) references to French complaints and the London School of Economics, are appropriately historicist. Nonetheless, in these segments, the emphasis is on neocolonialism. Recall that neocolonialism, unlike

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40. There is one trivial exception in Kaufman (1969) when the author writes: “Thus, for example, our earliest political institutions at all levels can be interpreted as reactions against executive dominance in the colonial era [emphasis added]” (p. 3).
European colonialism, is not about occupying territory. The neocolonial project is a project of economic and democratic development and dependence at a distance. Arguably, in Kettl’s (2000b) declaration that “globalization is about ‘action at a distance’: the increasing interpenetration of individual lives and global futures [emphasis added]” (p. 490), “globalization” and “neocolonialism” are interchangeable. Although subtle, Kettl’s (2000b) use of “futures” is also worth noting. As a noun, futures can be understood as: “(a) time that is to come, (b) what is going to happen,” and as “an expectation of advancement or progressive development” or “something (such as a bulk commodity) bought for future acceptance or sold for future delivery” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Thus, Kettl’s (2000b) language implies that globalization is: (i) a universal phenomenon that changes all individuals and all things to come, (ii) and/or all advancement or progressive development, (iii) and/or all commodity exchanges.

Similarly, Adams and Balfour’s (1998/2017) language forces the reader to see the world as moving “toward greater integration of markets, nation-states, and technology” (pp. 558-559). In this brave new world, states, supermarket like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the European Union, and super-empowered individuals have the potential to create phenomenal prosperity or create conflicts and exacerbate poverty “among those who lack access to these new opportunities [emphasis added]” (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 559). There is ambivalence in Adams and Balfour’s (1998/2017) language because, on the one hand, the authors highlight the role of power in neocolonialism (as in the authors’ use of “power,” “super-,” and “empowered”) and the potential to worsen poverty or engender refugee crises (p. 559). On the other hand, the language (re)affirms the neocolonial belief that access to market opportunities begets prosperity. From a neocolonial standpoint, this kind of language justifies intervention to bring about prosperity.
Aside from the language of globalization, some authors refer to privatization, one of Williamson’s (1993, 2009) tools under the “Washington consensus,” and its potential to bring about universal prosperity from the United States to the entire globe. As Morgan and England (1988) point out:

Others with a pragmatic view are more concerned with the question of whether privatization can deliver on its promise of providing public goods and services more economically than can be done under traditional government auspices [emphasis added]. Still others believe that the movement reached its zenith under the Reagan Administration and will surely wane in the 1990s. Then there are those who argue just the opposite, that privatization will continue to grow not only in the United States but throughout the world [emphasis added]. Regardless of what happens in Washington, most assuredly local governments, which face seemingly unremitting fiscal pressures, will likely remain interested in certain versions of privatization for some time to come. In fact, proponents of contracting out can already point to more and more successful examples of how cities have saved money by the use of this particular alternative to municipal monopolies. (Morgan & England, 1988, p. 979)

While Morgan and England’s (1988) are aloof in reporting that “others with a pragmatic view are more concerned with the question of whether privatization and deliver on its promise of providing public goods and services more economically [emphasis added]” (p. 979), the authors’ language refers to a common concern in the field concerning the promise of prosperity in neoliberalism. Moreover, the authors refer to a belief that privatization is quintessentially an American and a universal reality/future. As Morgan and England (1988) observe, “others” believe “the movement reached its zenith under the Reagan Administration [emphasis added],” and “others” believe it “will continue to grow not only in the United States but throughout the world [emphasis added]” (p. 979). Arguably, the language supports the idea that neoliberal prosperity spreads from the U.S. (i.e., the center) to the rest of the world (the periphery).

The neocolonial projection of the American experience with privatization as a worldly experience also occurs in Milward and Provan (2000) when:
A. The authors begin by acknowledging that “for many reasons, governments around the world have chosen networks of providers [emphasis added] ... to deliver taxpayer funded services” (p. 361);  

B. Then call the phenomenon an “astonishing ... worldwide movement” (p. 361), and  

C. Continue to write that “our fondness for decentralization and local initiatives may be fueled by the fear that huge national programs, like Food Stamp, Medicare, and Medicaid, are too bureaucratic to manage efficiently” (p. 361).  

By the end of the segment, Milward and Provan (2000) do not qualify “our fondness” as strictly an American experience (e.g., in the United States, “our fondness for...”). In effect, the vague use of the determiner “our” implies that American attachments (as in “fondness”) and fears are universal, or worldwide, realities. Likewise, Denhardt and Vinzant Denhardt (2000) note that positive experiences with privatization “in the United States, as well as in a number of other countries, has put governments around the world on notice that new standards are being sought and roles established [emphasis added]” (p. 551). Once again, the authors’ language positions the United States as the universal standard and obligation for others.  

In comparison to the Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) segment discussed above, there are several instances of ambivalence in segments about neocolonial prosperity mission. Ambivalence occurs when authors try to challenge one aspect or avatar of colonial discourse while reinforcing another. To demonstrate, Morgan and England (1988) challenge the rhetoric of the neocolonial prosperity mission by encouraging the reader to imagine the drawbacks of privatization, which “may further weaken the local political order and accelerate the decline of citizenship and community [emphasis added]” (p. 982). However, Morgan and England (1988) use the language of “decline” common in Eurocentric historicism.  

Similarly, Cooper (2004) challenges the rhetoric of the neocolonial prosperity mission by raising the possibility of “enormous instability and unrest” in market economies. However, Cooper’s (2004) language supports the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress insofar
as the author articulates that this is a problem in “emerging democratic political systems” or “developing countries” wherein “the market is largely dominated by an ethnic minority” who are not committed to social equity (p. 400). The author’s language assures the reader that in mature (vs. emerging), developed (vs. developing), and free (vs. largely dominated) democracies, without a corrupt ethnic minority, instability, and unrest are not as problematic. In effect, Cooper’s (2004) challenge to the neocolonial prosperity mission only applies to new, non-Western, democracies (if only these democracies were more like established democracies).

Cooper’s (2004) assumption, much like Denhardt and Vinzant Denhardt (2000), is that market thinking (neoliberalism) and democracy are compatible but often face issues when democracy, community, and the public interest are lost. So, a solution seems to be to fix or “elevate” the economic model (see Behn, 1995, p. 317). All of these statements showcase issues in neoliberal thinking, but they continue to proclaim the possibility of prosperity through a “proper” connection between markets and democracy. The reader is left to imagine a way to “fix” this connection rather than interrogate whether these are compatible; or whether these are only foreign issues (of bourgeoning democracies) or domestic issues.

The Rhetoric of Didactic Despotism

1. The movement is not confined to public agencies; it reaches into colleges and universities, where students, often by direct action, have been asserting a claim to participation in the policies of these institutions—one activist reportedly going so far as to predict that American universities will soon resemble Latin American institutions, in which students hire and fire professors and determine the curricula. (Kaufman, 1969, p. 7)

2. Educators have as their basic objective, and most convenient rationale, expanding and transmitting knowledge. The police are enforcing the law. Public-health agencies lengthen life by fighting disease. Then there are firemen, sanitation men,
welfare workers, diplomats, the military, and so forth. All are employed by public agencies and each specialization or profession has its own substantive set of objectives and therefore its rationale. (Frederickson, 1971/2017, p. 282)

3. But, beyond this, those who have committed most of their lives to public service—advisers on public policy, practitioners sworn to faithful execution of the laws, and educators of present and future administrators—feel a special obligation to preserve the values that have so long contributed to an effective and progressive social order. They particularly appreciate the absolute necessity of integrity of the leaders in every branch of government—legislative, executive, and judicial. Without such integrity, government cannot gain and retain the confidence of the people it serves. (Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 332)

4. Ultimately, the assurance of high standards of ethical behavior depends upon the people who aspire to and gain public office, and more particularly upon the system of values they have internalized. The panel reiterates its urging, in the Introduction to this report, that the educational institutions around the nation, especially those professional schools which provide significant numbers of public officials, focus more attention on public service ethics. (Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 338)

5. Whatever else it is, a policy- or program-implementation process is an assembly process. It is as if the original mandate, whether legislative or bureaucratic or judicial, that set the policy or program in motion were a blueprint for a large machine that was to turn out rehabilitated psychotics or healthier old people or better educated children or more effective airplanes or safer streets. This machine must sometimes be assembled from scratch. (Bardach, 1977/2017, p. 318)

6. The routes by which people reach general management positions in government do not assure that they will have consciousness or competence in management. As a wise observer of government managers has written, “One of the difficult problems of schools of public affairs is to overcome the old-fashioned belief—that skills of management are simply the application of ‘common sense’ by any intelligent and broadly educated person to the management problems which are presented to him. It is demonstrable that many intelligent and broadly educated people who are generally credited with a good deal of ‘common sense’ make very poor managers. The skills of effective management require a good deal of uncommon sense and uncommon knowledge.” (Allison, 1980/2017, p. 398)

7. Students of public management should seek to identify “critical experiences” that new public managers could live through vicariously and learn from. Because of the availability of information, academics tend to focus on failures. But teaching people what not to do is not necessarily the best way to help them learn to be doers. By analyzing relative successes, it will be possible to extract rules of thumb, crutches, and concepts, for example, Chase’s “law”: wherever the product of a public organization has not been monitored in a way that ties performance to reward, the introduction of an effective monitoring system will yield a 50 percent
improvement in that product in the short run. GAO's handbooks on evaluation techniques and summaries suggest what can be done. (Allison, 1980/2017, p. 399)

8. For example, teachers and other instructional personnel have often been able to maintain their positions and even increase in number, although schools are more frequently under attack for their cost to taxpayers. The ratio of instructional personnel in schools has continued to rise despite the decline in the number of school-age children. This development supplements general public support for the view that some street-level bureaucrats, such as teachers and police officers, are necessary for a healthy society. (Lipsky, 1980/2017, p. 404)

9. Finally, attention must be paid to the practical wisdom of the public administrative practitioners whose action is circumscribed by internal considerations of checks, balances, and administrative and political pressures generally. Individual public administrators are often called upon to integrate the three approaches to public administration and much can be learned from their experience. (Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 429)

10. Citizens and administrators must work as partners in the establishment of democracy schools or learning centers, and, according to one subject matter expert, "they should be learning the same skills." Educating people, according to one activist, "is having people feel confident and informed ...directing their energies towards a specific goal instead of sitting there being angry with their situation.... Empowerment [comes from] education” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 324)

11. And public servants might not so easily wear the mask of administrative evil when their role entails a critically reflexive sense of the context of public affairs, and a duty to educate and build an inclusive and active citizenry. Our argument in this book thus offers no easy or sentimental solutions; offers no promise of making anything better; but only offers an inevitably small and fragile bulwark against things going really wrong—those genuinely horrific eruptions of evil that modernity has exacerbated very nearly beyond our willingness to comprehend. (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 564)

12. To realize a collective vision, the next step is establishing roles and responsibilities and developing specific action steps to move toward the desired goals. Again, the idea is not merely to establish a vision and then leave the implementation to those in government; rather, it is to join all parties together in the process of carrying out programs that will move in the desired direction. Through involvement in programs of civic education and by developing a broad range of civic leaders, government can stimulate a renewed sense of civic pride and civic responsibility. We expect such a sense of pride and responsibility to evolve into a greater willingness to be involved at many levels, as all parties work together to create opportunities for participation, collaboration, and community. (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 555)
13. This is also a problem of education. Many, perhaps most, of the nation’s schools of public affairs, public administration, and public policy have not adjusted themselves to cope with the challenges well under way in public institutions. Consequently, future public servants, who will pursue the public interest both within and outside the government, might well fail to receive the education they need. Increasingly, the pursuit of public value occurs in the nongovernmental institutions that manage many of government’s programs. It is also increasingly the case that the careers of many public affairs program graduates take them, at least for part of their professional life, into nongovernmental organizations. Public affairs education needs to broaden its perspective to the emerging tools of government action-and to the transforming environment in which managers use them. (Kettl, 2000b, p. 495)

14. If leaders should not exercise significant discretion or be too activist, then they should not play a substantial change role but should focus more on management issues. In a contrary position, many in the New Public Management school echo the mainstream school of the 1980s in asserting that public administrators are uniquely qualified to play a large role, which otherwise would leave a critical leadership vacuum. Another element in the proper focus discussion that is robust in the public-sector literature adds—or sometimes substitutes altogether—the inclusion of customers/clients/citizens and the public good generally. Although the different schools disagree rather caustically about the way to frame these notions and the proper terms to use, there tends to be rather impressive agreement that external constituencies and the common good are a fundamental focus of public-sector administrators that is not to be taken for granted. (Van Wart, 2003, p. 223)

15. Thus, there is discussion of the importance of being responsive to citizens, encouraging their participation, being accountable to them, viewing them as the locus of ultimate administrative loyalty, respecting the dignity of the individual, fostering reasoned deliberation, and encouraging civic virtue and concern for the common good. Administrators may be employed by the police department, the water department, the health department, or the public schools to undertake certain specialized tasks, but they work in those places on behalf of the citizens they represent. Administrators work in bureaucratic organizations where hierarchical bonds and obligation are important, but they also need to cultivate horizontal bonds and obligations among the citizenry for whom they are surrogates. (Cooper, 2004, p. 397)

16. Public affairs education needs to do more to prepare public administrators for this complexity. These new governance processes can help them build partnerships with citizens and stakeholders to do the work of government. There is surely enough to go around. Citizens can and must play an important role in public policy and decision making. Citizens have the right to decide what is important to them and how they can best achieve their objectives. Existing quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial new governance processes provide ways to engage individual citizens, the public, and organized stakeholders in the work of government. Public
administration practitioners and scholars must reengage the public in governance, recognize the special duty we have to citizens, and move our research and teaching agendas in a direction that supports these new governance processes to address the fundamental imperatives of democracy. (Blomgren Bingham et al., 2005, p. 555)

17. One lesson can be taken away from this review: Don’t collaborate unless you are willing to thoughtfully consider and educate yourself about the nature of the process involved. Collaborating for collaboration’s sake or to achieve only individual goals is likely to result in failure given the complexity of the collaboration process. This is largely because collaboration is costly. (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 28)

18. Allocate time to meet with students and provide a bridge between classroom studies and the realities of public service. (O’Leary, 2006/2017, p. 578)

19. Lesson 6: Collaborative decisions or agreements are the products of a particular type of mutual learning and adjustment. Despite a form of organization that resembles a nonprofit organization, networks rarely follow parliamentary procedure. First, because all networks do not really make decisions, it is preferable to refer to many of their deliberative processes as “reaching agreements” rather than “decisions,” as the latter normally connotes the action of implementation. In collaborative bodies, decisions and agreements are necessarily based on consensus, inasmuch as participating administrators and professionals are partners, not superior – subordinates. (Agranoff, 2006, p. 59)

20. Doing so, however, is not easy. Armenakis, Harris, and Feild (1999) have developed a model for reinforcing and institutionalizing change. According to the model, leaders can modify formal structures, procedures, and human resource management practices; employ rites and ceremonies; diffuse the innovation through trial runs and pilot projects; collect data to track the progress of and commitment to change; and engage employees in active participation tactics that foster “learning by doing.” (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006, p. 169)
Table 9:
Taxonomy of didactic despotism

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<th>Sources</th>
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<td>Civilizational Mission: Didactic despotism</td>
<td>Banking model of education and salvation</td>
<td>Statements that support one-sided pedagogical arrangement whereby the student is nothing more than an empty receptacle, a vessel waiting for the teacher's blessing or salvation</td>
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<td>Frederickson, 1971/2017, p. 282</td>
<td>“Educators have as their basic objective, and most convenient rationale, expanding and transmitting knowledge [emphasis added]. The police are enforcing the law. Public-health agencies lengthen life by fighting disease. Then there are firemen, sanitation men, welfare workers, diplomats, the military, and so forth. All are employed by public agencies and each specialization or profession has its own substantive set of objectives and therefore its rationale” (Frederickson, 1971/2017, p. 282).</td>
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<td>Civilizational Mission: Didactic despotism</td>
<td>The duties of the Public Administration educator in a democracy (some colonial resistance and ambivalence)</td>
<td>Statements (or language) that affirm the pedagogical duties of public administrators</td>
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<td>Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 324</td>
<td>“Citizens and administrators must work as partners in the establishment of democracy schools or learning centers, and, according to one subject matter expert, ‘they should be learning the same skills’ [emphasis added]. Educating people, according to one activist, ‘is having people feel confident and informed ...directing their energies towards a specific goal instead of sitting there being angry with their situation.... Empowerment [comes from] education’ [emphasis added]” (Simrell King et al., 1998, p. 324).</td>
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<td>Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 338</td>
<td>“The educational institutions around the nation [emphasis added], especially those professional schools which provide significant numbers of public officials, [should] focus more attention on public service ethics [emphasis added]” (Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 338).</td>
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<td>Civilizational Mission: Didactic despotism</td>
<td>Curriculum (some ambivalence)</td>
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<td>Allison, 1980/2017, p. 399</td>
<td>“Finally, attention must be paid to the practical wisdom of the public administrative practitioners whose action is circumscribed by internal considerations of checks, balances, and administrative and political pressures generally [emphasis added]” (Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 429).</td>
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<td>Kettl, 2000b, p. 495</td>
<td>“Collaborative decisions or agreements are the products of a particular type of mutual learning and adjustment [emphasis added]. Despite a form of organization that resembles a nonprofit organization, networks rarely follow parliamentary procedure. First, because all networks do not really make decisions, it is preferable to refer to many of their deliberative processes as ‘reaching agreements’ rather than ‘decisions,’ as the latter normally connotes the action of implementation. In collaborative bodies, decisions and agreements are necessarily based on consensus, inasmuch as participating administrators and professionals are partners, not superior – subordinates [emphasis added]” (Agranoff, 2006, p. 59).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilizational Mission: Didactic despotism</td>
<td>Statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in didactic despotism by mentioning active learning or cooperative teaching practices</td>
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<td>Agranoff, 2006, p. 59</td>
<td>“According to the model, leaders can modify formal structures, procedures, and human resource management practices; employ rites and ceremonies; diffuse the innovation through trial runs and pilot projects; collect data to track the progress of and commitment to change; and engage employees in active participation tactics that foster ‘learning by doing’” (Fernandez &amp; Rainey, 2006, p. 169).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active learning and critical pedagogy</td>
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Didactic despotism, like the neocolonial prosperity mission, vindicates oppression by turning brutality into salvation through education. The role of the teacher, then, is to bestow students with the gift of knowledge. However, in this one-sided arrangement, the student is nothing more than an empty receptacle or vessel waiting for the teacher’s blessing. Due to the student’s ignorance, the teacher must take control and save them. Then, someday, the student should be learned enough to justify independence. Until that day arrives, the teacher must continue to make all decisions—this is their burden and duty. Didactic despotism, or the banking model of education (Freire, 1968/2005), hides dehumanization behind benevolence and deludes participants into thinking the ends (learning) justify the means (oppression or dehumanization). In the sample of 38 journal-length texts, didactic despotism is in:

a) statements that support one-sided pedagogical arrangements whereby the student is nothing more than an empty receptacle or vessel waiting for the teacher’s blessing or salvation,

b) statements (or language) that affirm the pedagogical duties of public administrators with or without colonial ambivalence,

c) recommendations concerning curricula, and

d) statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in didactic despotism by mentioning active learning or cooperative teaching practices.

The banking model of education, or didactic despotism, typifies traditional classroom arrangements in the United States. Consequently, when authors use language that supports didactic despotism, it is often subtle, and without elaboration, it simply just is. This occurs when Kaufman (1969) writes:
The movement is not confined to public agencies; it reaches into colleges and universities, where students, often by direct action, have been asserting a claim to participation in the policies of these institutions—one activist reportedly going so far as to predict that American universities will soon resemble Latin American institutions, in which students hire and fire professors and determine the curricula (Kaufman, 1969, p. 7). Kaufman’s (1969) Orientalism aside, the segment refers to one activist’s hyperbole that “American universities will soon resemble Latin American institutions, in which students hire and fire professors and determine the curricula” (p. 7). Here, Kaufman’s (1969) language, by way of hyperbole, suggests that a public education system in which students have decision-making authority is not only outlandish but also foreign to the American university—it is the stuff of monolithic Latin American legend. The author’s language supports the notion that American students (should) have no decision-making authority in policies, staffing, and curricula to save them from firing and hiring professors at will.

Frederickson’s (1971/2017) language is just as subtle when the author claims that public “educators have as their basic objective, and most convenient rationale, expanding and transmitting knowledge” (p. 282). This is a brief assertion, but it packs a lot of didactic despotism. Per Frederickson (1971/2017), the essential (“basic objective”) and most convenient (“suited to personal comfort or to easy performance” or “suited to a particular situation;” Merriam-Webster, n.d.) purpose of education is to expand and transmit knowledge. The role of the educator is to transmit, i.e., “to send or convey from one person [the educator] or place [the educator’s classroom] to another [the student]” or “to cause or allow to spread [as in expand]: such as (1) to convey by or as if by inheritance or heredity, (2) to convey (infection) abroad or to another” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). In Frederickson’s (1971/2017) language, the educator’s natural responsibility is primarily to themselves (because teaching ought to be suited to personal comfort) and to convey what
they already know to the students (a unilateral process). So, the infection of didactic despotism hides behind the promise of inheritance.

Beyond the role of the educator as a didactic despot, some authors also refer to the promise of salvation, as in Bardach (1977/2017) and Mosher et al. (1974/2017):

• Whatever else it is, a policy- or program-implementation process is an assembly process. It is as if the original mandate, whether legislative or bureaucratic or judicial, that set the policy or program in motion were a blueprint for a large machine that was to turn out rehabilitated psychotics or healthier old people or better educated children or more effective airplanes or safer streets [emphasis added]. This machine must sometimes be assembled from scratch. (Bardach, 1977/2017, p. 318)

• But, beyond this, those who have committed most of their lives to public service [emphasis added]—advisers on public policy, practitioners sworn to faithful execution of the laws, and educators of present and future administrators [emphasis added]—feel a special obligation to preserve the values that have so long contributed to an effective and progressive social order [emphasis added]. (Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 332)

Bardach (1977/2017) outlines a machine whose purpose, per its blueprint, is to produce rehabilitated psychotics, healthier old people, better-educated children, more effective airplanes, and safer streets. Here, Bardach’s (1977/2017) syntax and use of adjectives stresses a hierarchy of desirability/undesirability, alludes to problems that need planned solutions, and confirms the role of policies and programs like public education as tools for salvation. Explicitly, Bardach’s adjectives (e.g., rehabilitated, healthier, better educated) signal an improvement in the wellbeing of psychotics, old people, and children. The language presumes that these people are vulnerable (i.e., unrehabilitated, sick, or poorly educated) and need a machine (e.g., public education) to save them. In other words, a carefully planned machine can bring about salvation through education—yet, it is unclear what this kind of education entails.

Relatedly, Mosher et al. (1974/2017) note that educators of present and future administrators feel an “obligation to preserve the values that have so long contributed to an effective and progressive social order” (p. 332). The authors’ language promotes a
duty to the status quo (vs. change), efficiency (vs. inefficiency), progress (vs. no progress), and order (vs. disorder). However, the language is vague, and the authors take for granted the meaning of “progress” or “social order” or what preserving the status quo entails. Similarly, there is ambiguity in Lipsky’s (1980/2017) observation that people generally consider that “some street-level bureaucrats, such as teachers and police officers, are necessary for a healthy society [emphasis added]” (p. 404). Like Bardach (1977/2017) and Mosher et al. (1974/2017), Lipsky (1980/2017) uses a discourse of desirability/undesirability (i.e., healthy vs. unhealthy) to refer to the power of educators while taking for granted the meaning of “healthy,” who decides what “healthy” is in the first place, and the pedagogical practices that beget “healthiness.”

In addition to language that supports the banking model of education and language that supports the vague promise of salvation in education, other authors are explicit about the responsibilities or duties of educators in a democracy. For example, Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) ask public servants like public school teachers to develop a “critically reflexive sense of the context of public affairs, and a duty to educate and build an inclusive and active citizenry [emphasis added]” (p. 564). Relatedly, Cooper (2004) asks public administrators like public school teachers “to cultivate horizontal bonds and obligations among the citizenry for whom they are surrogates [emphasis added]” (p. 397). Also, Blomgren Bingham et al. (2005) ask scholars to “reengage the public in governance [emphasis added], recognize the special duty we have to citizens [emphasis added], and move our research and teaching [emphasis added]” in that direction (p. 555).

On the one hand, educators are meant to “educate” and “build” an inclusive and active society (Adams & Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 564), “cultivate” horizontal bonds and obligations
(Cooper, 2004, p. 397), “represent” citizens as their surrogates (Cooper, 2004, p. 397), “reengage” the public, “recognize” the special duty they have to citizens, and “research” and “teach” to support this special duty (Blomgren Bingham et al., 2005, p. 555). In turn, the citizen/student must follow the administrator’s lead. In other words, the administrator/teacher acts while the citizen/student follows. On the other hand, the authors underscore the importance of an inclusive society, representation, and the administrator’s duty to the people or the “common good” (Van Wart, 2003, p. 223), which challenges necrophilic didactic despotism. A challenge that also appears when Simrell King et al. (1998) call administrators and citizens to “work as partners in the establishment of democracy schools or learning centers [emphasis added]” (p. 324), and in Denhardt and Vinzant Denhardt’s (2000) call to “all parties [to] work together to create opportunities for participation, collaboration, and community” (p. 555).

Alongside language about didactic despotism, redemption in education, and calls for democratic teaching practices between administrators and citizens, several authors make direct recommendations concerning curricula, as in:

- “The educational institutions around the nation [emphasis added], especially those professional schools which provide significant numbers of public officials, [should] focus more attention on public service ethics [emphasis added]” (Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 338);

- “Students of public management should seek to identify ‘critical experiences’ that new public managers could live through vicariously and learn from [emphasis added]. Because of the availability of information, academics tend to focus on failures. But teaching people what not to do is not necessarily the best way to help them learn to be doers [emphasis added]” (Allison, 1980/2017, p. 399);

- “Finally, attention must be paid to the practical wisdom of the public administrative practitioners whose action is circumscribed by internal considerations of checks, balances, and administrative and political pressures generally [emphasis added]. Individual public administrators are often called upon to integrate the three approaches to public administration and
much can be learned from their experience” (Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 429);

• “Public affairs education needs to broaden its perspective to the emerging tools of government action [emphasis added]—and to the transforming environment in which managers use them” (Kettl, 2000b, p. 495).

The language in Mosher et al. (1974/2017) and Kettl (2000b) is neutral insofar as the authors simply underscore curricular needs like paying “more attention on public service ethics” (Mosher et al., 1974/2017, p. 338), or broadening the field’s “perspective to the emerging tools of government action” (Kettl, 2000b, p. 495). Finally, there is some ambivalence in Allison’s (1980/2017) and Rosenbloom’s (1983) call to pay more attention to the critical experiences of practitioners. Although the authors embrace lived experiences as worthwhile lessons (a challenge to the parochiality of scientism and didactic despotism), they do not explicitly embrace all lived experiences, only those tied to critical or expert people.

The distinction of what constitutes a meaningful experience comes up in Allison’s (1980/2017) reference:

As a wise observer of government managers has written, “One of the difficult problems of schools of public affairs is to overcome the old-fashioned belief—still held by many otherwise sophisticated people—that the skills of management are simply the application of ‘common sense’ by any intelligent and broadly educated person to the management problems which are presented to him. It is demonstrable that many intelligent and broadly educated people who are generally credited with a good deal of ‘common sense’ make very poor managers. The skills of effective management require a good deal of uncommon sense and uncommon knowledge.” (Allison, 1980/2017, p. 398)

Allison (1980/2017) highlights that a wise observer (someone with knowledge) understands that schools of public affairs hold an “old-fashioned belief,” held even by “sophisticated” people, that management is the application of “common sense” by any intelligent or broadly educated person. However, Allison (1980/2017) adds that common sense and education typically make for poor management. So, on the one hand, Allison (1980/2017) demystifies
the idea that education alone is all that is needed for good management by arguing that even educated people make poor managers. On the other hand, the entire acknowledgment underscores the importance of being wise or knowledgeable and further separates the “common” person from the “uncommon” functions of management. While the segment can be interpreted as a shift away from traditional schooling (notice the use of “old-fashioned”), it is unclear if an uncommon education is more liberatory than the banking model of didactic despotism.

Ambiguity aside, Allison’s (1980/2017) use of “uncommon sense” and “uncommon knowledge” does inspire the reader to (re)imagine the limits of didactic despotism. The same occurs in Agranoff’s (2006) assertion that collaborative decisions “are the products of a particular type of mutual learning and adjustment [emphasis added]” (p. 59), which encourages the reader to see the benefits of mutual cooperative learning (vs. one-sided pedagogical arrangements). The same applies to Fernandez and Rainey’s (2006) reference to “learning by doing” (p. 169), which encourages the reader to think about strategies that empower students or learners by putting them in control of their learning. Finally, O’Leary’s (2006/2017) recommendation to “allocate time to meet with students and provide a bridge between classroom studies and the realities of public service [emphasis added]” (p. 578), (re)imagines the role of the educator not as one of power in the classroom but as one of service to the students.

The Rhetoric of Binarism

1. Third, the scale of organization in our society has grown so large that only through large-scale organization does it seem possible to have a significant impact. This impression alone is enough to make individual people feel helplessly overwhelmed by huge, impersonal machines indifferent to their uniqueness and their humanity.
In addition, however, some interests—notably those of Negroes and of youth—have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures. (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5)

2. The development of schools of organization theory appears to go through analogous stages. The organizational culture perspective will need to pass through a sequence of developmental steps before it achieves its full potential or becomes a mature perspective. Reaching agreement about what organizational culture is, is the first level—akin to an infant crawling. A definition does not accomplish very much in and of itself, but just like crawling before walking, it is a necessary precondition for advancing to the second developmental level, the level at which organizational cultures can be identified other than through lengthy participant observation. (Ott, 1989/2017, p. 469)

3. Clearly, it was not a strong enough incentive to compensate many of the localities for costs other than the price of the land that they would have had to bear. For instance, the federal government could do little or nothing to compensate the prospective neighbors to the New Towns sites, in a good many of the cities, who feared the influx of low-income, and quite probably black, residents. (Bardach, 1977/2017, p. 323)

4. In a revealing footnote Derthick concedes that there were other causes for failure as well: the relative inability of the poor to organize and assert their interests; the relative strength of local opponents of the program; and “the great difficulty of organizing cooperative activity on a large scale” (including the activities of developers, lending institutions, school boards, and myriad federal agencies with at least some control over the surplus land and its disposition). (Bardach, 1977/2017, p. 323)

5. The poorer people are, the greater the influence street-level bureaucrats tend to have over them. Indeed, these public workers are so situated that they may well be taken to be part of the problem of being poor. Consider the welfare recipient who lives in public housing and seeks the assistance of a legal services lawyer in order to reinstate her son in school. He has been suspended because of frequent encounters with the police. She is caught in a net of street-level bureaucrats with conflicting orientations toward her, all acting in what they call her “interest” and “the public interest.” (Lipsky, 1980/2017, p. 404)

6. The political approach to public administration tends to view the individual as part of an aggregate group. It does not depersonalize the individual by turning him or her into a “case,” as does the managerial approach, but rather identifies the individual's interests as being similar or identical to those of others considered to be within the same group or category. For example, affirmative action within the government service is aimed at specific social groups such as blacks and women without inquiry as to the particular circumstances of any individual member of these broad and diverse groups. Similarly, farmers growing the same crops and/or
located in the same national geopolitical subdivisions are considered alike, despite individual differences among them. The same is true in any number of areas of public administration where public policies dealing with people are implemented. This is a tendency, of course, that fits the political culture well—politicians tend to think in terms of group, e.g., the “black” vote, the “farm” vote, labor, and so forth. (Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 425)

7. Second, issues of allocation and distribution do not lend themselves well to a market solution. Extreme inequality in income is an obvious but hardly solitary example of the problem. In the United States the interest in distributational matters has been eclipsed recently by a revitalized concern for economic growth and competitiveness. Nonetheless, disparities between rich and poor or many blacks and some whites are as pervasive if not as ominous as ever. (Morgan & England, 1988, p. 981)

8. Democratic politics is often dominated by wealthy or well organized constituencies and interest groups. The poor, the most vulnerable, the unorganized, the children, and future generations may not be well represented in the electorate. This approach gives public servants no moral resources to rectify such limitations. They are not permitted to inject fiduciary judgments on behalf of those not represented or to encourage the nonparticipants to make themselves heard. (Dobel, 1990, pp. 357-358)

9. A related normative anchor for public administrators flows from the concept of social equity. Social equity involves activities intended to enhance the well-being of minorities who lack political and economic resources. Frederickson argues that the obligations of public administrators are threefold: to provide services efficiently and economically while enhancing social equity. He suggests that the inclusion of social equity among the values served by public administrators helps to define the political nature of public administration roles. (Perry & Recascino Wise, 1990, p. 369)

10. New Public Service suggests that government should not first or exclusively respond to the selfish, short-term interests of "customers." Instead, it suggests that people acting as citizens must demonstrate their concern for the larger community, their commitment to matters that go beyond short-term interests, and their willingness to assume personal responsibility for what happens in their neighborhoods and the community. After all, these are among the defining elements of effective and responsible citizenship. In turn, government must respond to the needs and interests of citizens. Moreover, government must respond to citizens defined broadly rather than simply in a legalistic sense. Individuals who are not legal citizens not only are often served by government programs, they can also be encouraged to participate and engage with their communities. (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 555)
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<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Segment Excerpts</th>
<th>Main Category: Subcategory</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Rhetorical Strategies</th>
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<td>“In addition, however, some interests—notably those of Negroes and of youth—have recently begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures [emphasis added]” (Kaufman, 1969, p. 5).</td>
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Table 10: Taxonomy of binarism
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<td>Colonial Difference: Binarism</td>
<td>Binary voyeurism</td>
<td>Statements that only mention binaries as case studies without problematizing them – they are taken as-is.</td>
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<td>Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 981</td>
<td>“In the United States the interest in distribational matters has been eclipsed recently by a revitalized concern for economic growth and competitiveness. Nonetheless, disparities between rich and poor or many blacks and some whites are as pervasive if not as ominous as ever [emphasis added]” (Morgan &amp; England, 1988, p. 981).</td>
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<td>Dobel, 1990, pp. 357-358</td>
<td>“Democratic politics is often dominated by wealthy or well organized constituencies and interest groups. The poor, the most vulnerable, the unorganized, the children, and future generations may not be well represented in the electorate [emphasis added]” (Dobel, 1990, pp. 357-358).</td>
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<td>Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 425</td>
<td>“For example, affirmative action within the government service is aimed at specific social groups such as blacks and women without inquiry as to the particular circumstances of any individual member of these broad and diverse groups [emphasis added]” (Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 425).</td>
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<td>Adams &amp; Balfour, 1998/2017, p. 559</td>
<td>“This perspective treats perceived differences in men’s and women’s behavior as largely a side effect of societal sex roles and argues that, by opening up existing arrangements to women, such differences, or at least our feelings that they are important, will largely disappear [emphasis added]” (Stivers, 1990/2017, p. 481).</td>
<td>Colonial Difference: Binarism</td>
<td>Colonial resistance or challenge</td>
<td>Statements (or language) that forces the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in binaries.</td>
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<td>Denhardt &amp; Vinzant Denhardt, 2000, p. 555</td>
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Colonial binarism is a system of differences that supports privilege and oppression. Colonial binaries (e.g., master/slave, white/black, man/woman, us/Them) deny similarities and support the pernicious notion that differences are both natural and insurmountable. Consequently, colonial binaries strengthen the supposed incongruence between people as the basis for colonial privilege. In the sample of 38 journal-length texts, binarism is in:

a) statements (or language) that refer to different groups (e.g., “women,” “the poor,” or “Them”) through a language of a deficit,

b) statements that only mention binaries as case studies without questioning them (i.e., taking them for granted),

c) statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in binaries.

Throughout this entire chapter, several colonial binaries have already been unpacked. The mature/immature and the adult/child dichotomies introduced under “The Rhetoric of the Developmentalist Fallacy and the Cult of Progress” support a system wherein immature groups and children must surrender. These dichotomies are often introduced through a language of deficits, as in Kaufman’s (1969) claim that “Negroes” and “youth” have just “begun to develop the organizational skills to mobilize their political resources only to find that it takes time to build channels of access to political structures” (p. 5). These groups must surrender themselves to waiting because they have been unable to mobilize in the past and have not yet built channels of access to political structures in the present. Kaufman’s (1969) language focuses on the deficits of these groups as opposed to their strengths (The same occurs in Ott’s (1989/2017) language about children).
In addition to the mature/immature and the adult/child binaries, authors also evoke the rich/poor, majority/minority, and men/women binaries to underscore issues of powerlessness. For example, Bardach’s (1977/2017) language about “the relative inability of the poor to organize and assert their interests” [emphasis added] is similar to Kaufman’s (1969) to the extent that the authors (re)affirm the deficit of certain groups (i.e., “Negroes,” “youth,” or “the poor”) while keeping their rhetorical distance. The authors do not describe these groups as “our neighbors” nor as part of a collective “we” or “us.” Instead, these groups are cast out and characterized by their “inabilities” and their problems. Likewise, Perry and Recascino Wise’s (1990) definition of social equity as “activities intended to enhance the well-being of minorities who lack political and economic resources” [emphasis added] underscores the deficits of “minorities.” This is not to say that pointing out social injustice is not important. However, if the only mentions of these groups portray them as outsiders and underscore their faults, then the reader must imagine them as helpless. The same occurs with the banking model of education.

Alongside statements that refer to different groups through a language of a deficit, authors also mention binaries as case studies without questioning them as a kind of binary voyeurism. For example, Bardach’s (1977/2017) statements about a situation when the “federal government could do little or nothing to compensate the prospective neighbors of the New Towns sites, in a good many of the cities, who feared the influx of low-income, and quite probably black, residents” [emphasis added]” (p. 323). Here, the language reinforces that image of low-income residents as black residents (cf. high-income white residents) without challenging or questioning this binary. To a degree, the same occurs when Morgan and England (1988) mention extreme income inequality in the U.S. and the “disparities between rich and poor or many blacks and some whites” [emphasis added]” (p. 981). On the one hand, Morgan
and England (1988) elucidate issues of income inequality, but in doing so, also reaffirm the rich/poor and white/black dichotomies. The same occurs in Dobel (1990).

In colonial binarism, resistance is a matter of disrupting the seemingly incongruent divide between binaries. When Adams and Balfour (1998/2017) mention the refugee “as a constant reminder of how anyone can be overtaken and made superfluous by the dynamics of the new global system [emphasis added]” (p. 559), the assertion that anyone can be a refugee (i.e., “overtaken” or “made superfluous”) encourages the reader to imagine themselves as a refugee. Denhardt and Vinzant Denhardt (2000) redefine citizenship to include “individuals who are not legal citizens [emphasis added]” (p. 555), once again encouraging the reader to think in less binary ways. Rosenbloom’s (1983) language uses a different resistance strategy by simply highlighting that monolithic social categories such as “blacks” and “women” often ignore the circumstances of the individual members (p. 425).

**Fourth Moment of Introspection**

1. The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, the bulk of mankind votes.

To know the public mind of this country, one must know the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of Irishmen, of Germans, of negroes. One must influence minds cast in every mould of race, minds inheriting every bias of environment, warped by the histories of a score of different nations.
In June 2018, I presented “De eso se trata, de ser o no ser salvajes: Civilization, Barbarism, and the Good Society” at the Public Administration Theory Network’s (PAT-Net) annual conference. My intention, per my abstract proposal (Appendix C), was to interrogate the idea of the city as a symbol of civilization and citizenship in Public Administration through Sarmiento’s (1845/1993) *Facundo o civilizacion y barbarie*. Due to Sarmiento’s (1845/1993) use of civilization and barbarism, I found it important to incorporate postcolonial theory into my thematic analysis and my presentation. For one of my key points, I wanted to compare Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) language in his seminal essay, “The Study of Administration,” to Sarmiento’s (1845/1993). It was in “The Study of Administration” that I found the paragraphs quoted above at the beginning of this moment of introspection. As a student and scholar of Public Administration, I was familiar with Wilson’s (1887) call for a “science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to *make its business less unbusinesslike* [emphasis added]” (p. 201). I was familiar with his assertion that “it is *getting harder to run a constitution than to frame one* [emphasis added]” (Wilson, 1887, p. 200). And I was familiar with

41. Wilson’s (1887) original reads:

> Even if we had clear insight into all the political past, and could form out of perfectly instructed heads a few steady, infallible, placidly wise maxims of government into which all sound political doctrine would be ultimately resolvable, *would the country act on them?* That is the question. The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes. A truth must become not only plain but also commonplace before it will be seen by the people who go to their work very early in the morning and not to act upon it must involve great and pinching inconveniences before these same people will make up their minds to act upon it.

> And where is this unphilosophical bulk of mankind more multifarious in its composition than in the United States? To know the public mind of this country, one must know the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of Irishmen, of Germans, of negroes. In order to get a footing for new doctrine, one must influence minds cast in every mould of race, minds inheriting every bias of environment, warped by the histories of a score of different nations, warmed or chilled, closed or expanded by almost every climate of the globe. (Wilson, 1887, p. 209)
his explanation that if he saw a “murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly [emphasis added],” he could “borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it” (p. 220). Yet, in my experience, nobody talked about Wilson’s (1887) xenophobia and racism in that seminal essay. So, I decided to dissect it using the passage quoted above.

Back then, I did not have a coding frame—all I had was a postcolonial theme: civilization and barbarism (which, in this bricolage, would fall under the colonial difference). Nonetheless, in my analysis, I offered just enough interpretative richness to stir up a discussion. Two of my future committee members were in attendance, Dr. Staci Zavattaro (my chair) and Dr. Gary Marshall. Amid their questions, I recall someone (I am not sure who) asked me what comes next, after a postcolonial reading. I answered that maybe what comes next is decolonization, but I could not say with any certainty what that would entail. Almost two years later, I find myself asking the same question: What now? And, so, I return to Wilson’s (1887) words. Wilson’s (1887) language excludes the “unphilosophical bulk of mankind” (i.e., “Irishmen,” “Germans,” and “negroes”) from the, presumably, philosophical “Americans of the older stocks” whose minds have not been “warped.” In 2018, I used these words to display Wilson’s (1887) binarism about barbarism/civilization as unphilosophical/philosophical. Then I stopped. However, today, in the same words, I have found another way, an exit. I have found a way to deconstruct Wilson’s (1887) xenophobia and racism, to borrow his words, structurally and strategically, to build new postcolonial homes:

2. Even if we had clear insight into all the political past, and could form out of perfectly instructed heads a few steady, infallible, placidly wise maxims of government into which all sound political doctrine would be ultimately resolvable, would the country act on them?
A truth must become not only plain but also commonplace before it will be seen by the people who go to their work very early in the morning; and not to act upon it must involve great and pinching inconveniences before these same people will make up their minds to act upon it. [blackouts are mine]. (Wilson, 1887, p. 209)

As I have discussed throughout this chapter, colonial discourse continues to exist in several rhetorical strategies across journal-length texts in the American Public Administration Discourse. Colonialism, by way of colonial discourse, is subtle but commonplace. However, as Wilson (1887) notes, this is not enough to effect change. Colonial discourse must also be plain. When the “truth” of colonial discourse becomes plain and commonplace to the field, then “it will be seen by the people who go to their work very early in the morning” (p. 209). Then, they may act upon it. Yet, this is not enough, because even if the avatars of colonial discourse become plain and commonplace, we still must ask ourselves: “Would the country act on them?” (Wilson, 1887, p. 209). Or, would the field of Public Administration act on them?
CHAPTER 6: POSTCOLONIAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Dissertation-as-Bricolage: A Synopsis

The post-1968 moment in Public Administration was a moment of promise. A promise to uphold social equity and democratic principles in administration. Today, more than fifty years following Minnowbrook I, Blessett et al. (2019) affirm that social equity is not yet moored to the foundation of public administration (p. 283). It is important to have serious conversations about the management of inclusion and exclusion in administration and democracy to anchor social equity to the foundation of the field. This dissertation, or bricolage, was an attempt to do just that by interrogating the role of colonialism in the field’s language after 1968.

Colonialism is a logical starting point for all conversations about inclusion and exclusion in American society because the United States is a post-colonial nation. A nation that fought for its independence and drafted a glorious anticolonial Constitution. An anticolonial Constitution haunted by its colonial progenitor. An anticolonial Constitution that continued to uphold the dehumanization of peoples of African ancestry, the erasure of Indigenous bodies, and the silencing of women. As noted in Chapter 3, newly independent settler colonies are oftentimes more ruthless, bloodthirsty, and racist than their earlier masters. This precipitates the need for other moments of liberation, such as the American Civil War (1861–1865) and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Given that Minnowbrook I came at the heels of such a moment of colonial liberation, 1968 was a logical starting point to assess the power of colonialism in the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD).
As explained in Chapter 1, *discourse* means a set of relationships between people, institutions, language, and naturalized rhetorical practices. Arguably, in APAD lie powerful naturalized rhetorical practices that limit scholarly conversations, conventional wisdom in administrative agencies, administrative norms, and the way administrators conceive their roles (see Farmer, 1999; McSwite, 1997, p. 6; Stivers, 2000, p. 3). This project set out to interrogate the role of colonialism as the ideological basis of such rhetorical practices by asking three interconnected questions:

1. Does the American Public Administration Discourse (APAD) exhibit colonial discourse as a basis of power?
   
a. What are the colonial orders of discourse (as in themes, patterns, and rhetorical strategies) in APAD?

b. Does APAD challenge, reinforce, or ignore colonial discourse?

To answer these questions (discussed in the following section), this bricolage used qualitative content analysis and built a colonial discourse coding frame to structure a sample of 38 key journal-length texts (see Chapter 4).

Building the coding frame was an iterative exercise that followed systematic and rule-bound procedures while still being open to adjustments. As noted in Chapter 4, this study’s coding frame began as a series of colonial dichotomies informed by prior research and postcolonial theory (Table 2). Thereafter, the completion of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 added categorical nuance to the coding frame (Table 3), both before pilot testing and after. Additionally, to show intertextuality, the bricoleur transformed and compressed several passages from these chapters into introductory poems for the coding frame categories. As outlined in Chapter 4, the final tool (i.e., the colonial discourse coding frame) included detailed definitions of each (sub)category, offered specific coding rules, and displayed anchor examples from the material. Conclusively, this tool helped the bricoleur compartmentalize key colonial
rhetorical strategies across the sample (see the taxonomies in Chapter 5), and, more importantly, answer the research questions.

Answering the Research Questions

A First Glance

Across the sample of 38 journal-length key texts, colonial discourse has power. In other words, per the sample, authors take for granted several dimensions of colonial discourse. In effect, even after 1968, several dimensions of colonial discourse remain active in the field’s language. According to this bricolage’s coding frame, colonial discourse includes three avatars, Eurocentrism, the Civilizational Mission, and the Colonial Difference. Together, these main categories describe an epistemological, ontological, and administrative project that (re)affirms the power of the West over all others. The coding frame also divides Eurocentrism into four subcategories (Orientalism, historicism, the parochiality of scientism, and the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress), the Civilizational Mission into two subcategories (the neocolonial prosperity mission and didactic despotism), and the Colonial Difference into one subcategory (binarism). These subcategories help unpack the differences between the three main categories and outline different sources of colonial dilemmas.

Given that Eurocentrism has the most subcategories, it is not surprising that, across the sample, Eurocentric rhetorical strategies were the most common—especially the parochiality of scientism and the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (the Dialectics of Modernity section), Public Administration scholars
have already critiqued the role and influence of scientism and techno-rationality in the field. Which is to say that these issues have both been clear to scholars and manifest in the field. According to this bricolage’s results (Chapter 5), the language of the parochiality of scientism and the developmentalist fallacy and the cult of progress was common across the sample—a finding that supports earlier research in the field (e.g., Farmer, 1995; McSwite, 1997).

Authors also take the language of historicism, typified by language that frames the West as the end of history and future of all people, for granted. While Public Administration scholars like Adams and Balfour (2015) and Stivers (2000, 2002) have interrogated the impact of historical omission in the field, this bricolage’s findings show that various practices of Eurocentric historicism are unnoticed. Lastly, Orientalism was not as common as the other sides of Eurocentrism. Nevertheless, as argued in Chapter, the absence of Orientalism is not a triumph in and of itself because it may simply point out that non-Western references are missing from the conversation.

Across the sample of 38 journal-length texts, the Civilizational Mission, divided into the neocolonial prosperity mission and didactic despotism, was also common. However, by and large, the neocolonial prosperity mission was not as evident as didactic despotism. Before the 1980s, the neocolonial prosperity mission was not a prominent avatar of colonial discourse. This may be because it was not until the early 1990s that discussions about neoliberal customer-driven administrative practices started to gain popularity among scholars (see Hood, 1991, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).42

42. Another explanation as to why the neocolonial prosperity mission was not as prominent as didactic despotism may be based on the field’s Eurocentric neglect of non-Western countries altogether (e.g., Latin American nations) wherein neoliberal tools were being imposed on administrative systems prior to the 1990s. As noted in Chapter 4, the IMF was created in 1944, almost fifty years before the managerial turn of the 1990s.
Didactic despotism was common across several sample segments. The goal of didactic despotism is to perpetuate the power (or taken-for-granted-ness) of unilateral arrangements which dehumanize students and sanctify teachers (i.e., the necrophilic banking model of education). While there were moments that supported the banking model of education, several authors used language that was ambivalent toward it (i.e., challenged it while reinforcing another avatar of colonial discourse) or language that was outright against it. A plausible explanation as to why didactic despotism was common may be that the scholars across the sample wanted to show the practical side of their research, which may include recommendations for other educators.

Finally, the Colonial Difference, characterized by dynamics of binarism, appeared throughout the sample. As the findings show (Chapter 5), there are colonial binaries in every main category. However, Colonial Difference is its own standalone category because it refers to an entire system of binaries as opposed to one or two (e.g., Orientalism).

Regarding the first sub-question (i.e., what are the colonial orders of discourse in APAD?), this study found seventeen rhetorical strategies that support colonial discourse across the sample:

1. statements that only use the non-West to introduce or give meaning (clarify) to the Western experience,
2. statements that only refer to the non-West without contextual nuance nor significance,
3. statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of inefficiency, helplessness, or mistakes;
4. statements that only refer to the non-West through a language of corruption, radical or dangerous behavior, and wrongdoing;
5. language, references, or statements that force the reader to know, be comfortable with, or learn about the Western experience;
6. statements (or language) that overlook past struggles, historical traditions of social inequity, and/or non-Western peoples to claim the novelty, the newness, of the contemporary Western moment;

7. statements that only use masculine pronouns or examples to portray a scientific actor,

8. statements that equate the human experience to a mechanical and technological experience,

9. language that forces the reader to only think in scientific and quantitative terms and to perform/present their research in scientific and quantitative ways;

10. statements that set up norms of (im)maturity or (in)civility and who is an adult/child,

11. language that forces the reader to only think in economic terms or know economic theory,

12. statements that position the United States or the West as the global leader of a neoliberal world order,

13. statements (or language) that project the American experience as a universal example of prosperity,

14. statements that support one-sided pedagogical arrangement whereby the student is nothing more than an empty receptacle, a vessel waiting for the teacher’s blessing or salvation;

15. statements (or language) that refer to different groups (e.g., “women,” “the poor,” or “them”) through a language of a deficit,

16. statements that only mention other groups as case studies without contextual nuance nor significance other than to show differences, and

17. statements (or language) that force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in binaries.

These seventeen rhetorical strategies point to different ways APAD exhibits colonial discourse across the sample of 38 journal-length texts. Moreover, these seventeen statements should offer guidance about what a postcolonial self-conscious style is up against. Concerning the question of whether APAD reinforces, challenges, or neglects colonial discourse, the answer is complicated. Yes, APAD reinforces colonial discourse (see the seventeen rhetorical
strategies above), but there are moments of resistance and moments of ambivalence. Across the sample, moments of resistance include five rhetorical strategies that:

1. refer to the non-West through a language of respect or admiration,
2. force the reader to imagine or confront social inequity,
3. force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in the parochiality of scientism,
4. force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in economic thinking, and
5. force the reader to imagine or confront faults or problems in didactic despotism by mentioning active learning or cooperative teaching practices.

Finally, moments of ambivalence (i.e., when an author challenges one aspect of colonial discourse while upholding another) occur in historicism, the parochiality of scientism, the neocolonial prosperity mission, and throughout didactic despotism.

*A Second Glance: More Questions than Answers*

Each journal-length text in this bricolage’s purpose sample is meant to evoke an important voice in the field of Public Administration. Yet, the 38 journal-length texts used for this study, as well as the findings, are not definitive. That is, the texts, the study, and the findings are a beginning rather than an end. The entire bricolage is an invitation to interrogate these texts and their language, to think about language in other texts, and to consider the impact of colonialism on the field’s discourse. Although the findings answer the main research question by highlighting or exhibiting moments of colonial discourse across the sample, the entire project raises more questions than it can possibly answer, questions like:

- Does APAD exhibit colonial discourse as a basis of power in texts published before 1968?
Does APAD exhibit colonial discourse as a basis of power in texts published after 2012?

Do MPA and PhD programs challenge, reinforce, or ignore colonial discourse in their courses?

Do public policies challenge, reinforce, or ignore colonialism?

What can Public Administration learn about colonialism and colonial discourse from other fields (e.g., art history, history, literature, or philosophy)?

What can Public Administration learn about social equity from postcolonialism?

What can Public Administration learn about social equity from administrative practices currently at the margins of the West?

How can scholars, practitioners, teachers, and students practice a postcolonial self-conscious style? And,

What does a postcolonial self-conscious style look like?

Recently, the National Academy of Public Administration (n.d.) released their grand challenges for the future, one of which is fostering social equity. These questions take this challenge seriously and, among other critical perspectives, should help foster social equity in public policy, administration, teaching, and writing.

A Final Moment of Introspection: Implications

My intention in this entire bricolage is not to shame scholars for what they have written nor to condemn the field. The sample of 38 key journal-length articles, as well as this bricolage’s list of references, includes authors I admire and respect, whose research has inspired me to be critical. My intention is not to destroy but to deconstruct. This is a project of refusal and critical self-awareness to inspire a postcolonial and self-conscious evaluation of how we write and convey our research. Consequently, in addition to the authors in this
chapter, I thought it was important to return to my first publication and use the coding frame I used to analyze the authors in the sample. Although my first publication relied on postcolonialism and issues of inclusion and exclusion, I found a moment of Eurocentrism:

This notion of perpetual danger alludes to the precarious subject-position of belonging, it points to a fragile sense of membership, and it vindicates the relentless, inherently Sisyphean, affirmation and reaffirmation of legitimacy [emphasis added]. At its core, the administrative state’s sense of self is artificial, yet, it refuses to acknowledge its own artificality and cleaves for legitimacy. (Santis, 2018, p. 133)

My description of a fragile sense of membership as “Sisyphean” forces the reader to imagine or know the myth of Sisyphus, a Greek king who was punished for all eternity, by Greek gods, to carry a boulder up a hill only for it to roll down as Sisyphus approached the top. My choice to use the myth of Sisyphus was not inherently problematic—to this day, I think the figurative language offered a rich image—and my intention was not consciously Eurocentric, far from it. However, as I continue to write, I admit that I will have to be more self-conscious about these dynamics because if the only figurative language readers come across is Eurocentric, then our discourse possibilities will become limited to colonial discourse.

I do not think the authors across the sample of key journal-length APAD texts intentionally wrote colonial discourse, nor do I think the individuals who recommend or assign these texts favor colonialism. What I find problematic, however, is choosing to be intentionally unaware—or intentionally choosing to be comfortable. Concerning old words, I think it is okay to feel remorse, but paralysis or shame is not an end. To fulfill the promises of social equity in APAD, we must be intentionally self-conscious about our actions, our impact, our words. In short, we ought to be critical of our discourse.
APPENDIX A:
SERIES OF TABLES ABOUT THIS BRICOLAGE’S SAMPLE
Table 11: NASPAA-accredited MPA programs and introductory course syllabi

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Table 12: Authors and texts mentioned in MPA introductory course syllabi

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<th>Title of Most Frequently Assigned Publication</th>
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<td>“Notes on the Theory of Organization” (Ch. 14)</td>
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<td>“Toward a New Public Administration” (Ch. 29)</td>
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<td>Graham</td>
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Selections from Academic Peer-Reviewed Journals

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**Selections Assigned from Shafritz and Hyde’s (2017) *Classics of Public Administration***

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**Selections from Academic Peer-Reviewed Journals**

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Table 15: Cross-section of *PAR* authors and those mentioned in MPA program syllabi

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Table 16:
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Table 17: Cross-section of PAR authors and A&S’s “great books” debate

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Table 18:
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APPENDIX B:
PRELIMINARY CODING FRAME SUPPLEMENT, ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY (CA. 2018)
Description of Legitimacy in APAD. Regarding description(s), my focus is on the individual texts: I intend to investigate how the authors establish legitimacy and authority using van Leeuwen’s (2007; 2008) model of legitimation clauses. Additionally, Fairclough (1989) suggests that by looking at vocabulary, grammar, and textual structures it is possible to describe how power functions within a text. Van Leeuwen (2007; 2008) breaks down the textual strategies used to assert legitimacy using the following components:

1. **Legitimation in authorization** (i.e., legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and or/persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested)
   
   a. Personal Authority (utterances of authority based on personal status or role)
      
      - “Because I [a PhD or Professor] say so”
   
   b. Expert Authority (may be stated explicitly by mentioning credentials or citing experts)
      
      - “Because [Woodrow Wilson, or a City Manager] says so”
   
   c. Role Model Authority (utterances about following an example based on a role model or opinion leader)
      
      - “Because [insert role model or public figure] does so”
   
   d. Impersonal Authority (utterances about laws, rules, guidelines, policies, and regulations)
      
      - “Because the law says to do so”
   
   e. Authority of Tradition (utterances about traditions, practices, customs, habits)
      
      - “Because this is the way we always do so”
   
   f. Authority of Conformity (utterances about what everybody else does)
▪ “Because that is what most people do so”

2. **Legitimation in moral evaluation** (i.e., moral value, evaluative adjectives, naturalization, abstraction, analogies)

   a. Moral Value and Evaluate Adjectives (covert utterances, through adjectives, that attribute moral value)
      ▪ “Healthy, normal, natural, useful, effective, efficient, equitable, etc.”

   b. Naturalization (utterances that deny morality and replace moral orders with the natural order)
      ▪ “Public administrators look after the People”

   c. Abstraction (utterances about practices in abstract ways that ‘moralize’ them by linking them to moral values)
      ▪ Instead of “the leader divided the workers into groups,” one says, “the leader takes up cooperation and teamwork” (the practice of groups is legitimized in terms of cooperation and teamwork)

d. Analogies
   ▪ Positive or negative comparisons, “government should be like a business, efficient and effective”

3. **Legitimation in rationalization** (i.e., legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action and to the knowledge that society has constructed to give them cognitive validity)

   a. Instrumental rationality (legitimizes practices by reference to their goals, uses, and effects (or potentials)
- An action that can be linked to a discourse of values and, therefore, moralize it. “Smooth” connotes a discourse of efficiency, and so to say that an “act was smooth,” it implies that the action unfolded in an orderly manner, without friction, without hitches, without disturbance.

- An action is legitimate if it is founded on some kind of truth (on ‘the way things are’) — it provides explicit representations of ‘the way things are,’ which sets this apart from naturalization.

  1. Definitions (one activity is defined in terms of another moralized activity).

  2. Explanations (describe general attributes or habitual activities of the categories of actors in questions)

  3. Predictions

4. **Legitimation in mythopoesis** (i.e., legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions)

**Description of Roles in APAD** (ideational function). In terms of description(s), the focus is on individual texts: Using open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), I will read each text and label (or code) passages (paragraphs) that speak to the functions/responsibilities/roles of public administrators (practitioners) and public administration (field). These passages will be labeled and then grouped into emergent categories.

**Interpretation of Legitimacy and Roles in APAD.** In terms of interpretation(s), my focus is on the legitimation of knowledge, authority, and roles across the 21 seminal texts vis-à-vis the colonial issues discussed in Chapter II: (1) the colonial heritage of bureaucracies in
postcolonial nation-states; (2) the coloniality of public policies; and (3) decolonization. I will compare findings about authority and power and administrative roles with colonial themes.

**Explanation.** Lastly, in terms of explanation(s), I will include a discussion about the relationship(s) between the texts and the American colonial consciousness. This is a comparison of APAD’s ideational and interpersonal functions vis-à-vis colonial power.
APPENDIX C:
PAT-NET 2018 PROPOSAL ABSTRACT (SENT DEC. 15, 2017)
Proposal Abstract

Arguably, the field of Public Administration (PA) in the US is limited because it exports principles to academies across the globe, while importing close to nothing from non-English speaking establishments. By and large, public administration suffers from an insular understanding of different governance traditions and issues. Apropos, this paper is an invitation to overcome US isolationism by bulldozing the disciplinary walls that isolate the US. As a start, I turn to the city as a symbol of civilization and citizenship—a connection that Waldo (1948/2007) makes in his discussion of the field’s “Good Society.” However, I look at this symbol, at the Good Society, as it appears in Sarmiento’s (1845/1993) *Facundo o civilizacion y barbarie*, “the first Latin American [literary] classic . . .” (Echevarría, 2003, p. 1). This thematic analysis of *Facundo* uses art to broach the limits of civilization and citizenship, and, in turn, stimulate PA theory beyond the US.

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