

2016

Iranian Nuclear Program: Domestic Implications

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IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM:

DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS

by

MANUEL ANTONIO SERRANO

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science
in the College of Sciences
and in The Burnett Honors College
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term 2016

Thesis Chair: Dr. Houman Sadri

ABSTRACT

The intent for this thesis is to explain and inform the process of the Iranian Nuclear Program throughout the last decades. The stand of the Islamic Republic of Iran has brought very delicate issues and confrontations to the international community. This thesis discusses the history of key countries that play an important part into developing the Iranian nuclear program. These countries being the United States, Israel, Russia and other countries part of the UN Security Council. This thesis also attempts to analyze and focuses on the domestic policies the government of Iran and its people have interacted with the nuclear deal. The nuclear deal between the UN Security Council members and the Islamic Republic of Iran have shown an array of acceptance and rejection within, specially, the United States, Arab countries in the region and Israel. The implementations of the solution to future confrontation are probably the main ideal to a healthy international community who can adapt to new measures and policies to a safer world. Using classical realist theory, based on Hans J. Morgenthau realist theory, the Iranian nuclear program could be explained with a different perspective. There are other international relations theories that could help explaining Iran's government behavior and how it interacts with the international community. Iran's move in the past years has shown progress towards the international community and has lowered the potential military action against Iran. Some countries like Israel continue on the dissatisfaction against the nuclear deal signed by Iran and the UN Security Council member countries. This thesis will show the behavior the country of Iran has had towards other countries based on their domestic policy.

DEDICATION

For a better world of diplomacy and for our nations to always use dialogue before war.
For my family, friends and professors who always motivated me into finishing this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Sadri for his role as a mentor and his different points of view that have contributed to my way of thinking over the international relations field. I also give special thanks to both Dr. Nikola Mirilovic and Professor Hadi Abbas for their valuable intellectual input towards this thesis, for their great patience and support over these past years. I thank my family, specially my mother Luz, who has been an inspiring light and her encouragement to push myself to higher levels in life, regardless of our obstacles and necessities we have had during our lives.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Thesis

The Iranian nuclear program has maintained political unrest and insecurity for the United States, for the state of Israel and other Arab nations in the Middle East. On this thesis, I will focus on the hypothesis to prove viable ways to avoid a major conflict to this troubled area of the Middle East. Countries in the international arena should adhere to a diplomatic view of the current issue of Iran possibly acquiring a nuclear weapon. The study of this issue will be examined through political theory, in this case classical realism, which can explain Iran's recent behavior.

Significance

The significance of this topic is to bring a meaningful understanding of a subject area that is perhaps viewed by the American public as an unsolvable problem which in reality has a solution and that does not have to be the solution of an armed conflict. In theory Iran can choose not to create a nuclear weapon or if they have it, they could face retribution from the international community. Based on the research presented in chapter V, Iran, due to the heaviness of sanctions imposed by the UN has its economy deteriorated. The government of Iran might know that if choosing the nuclear option, they could face retribution. A policy that the International community could adapt to this particular issue against Iran could be, by closing its international stand and leaving the country isolated just as the same case of North Korea. For Iranians, especially the Supreme leader and his cabinet would not be a good decision; this will bring instability to the already unhappy population who made demonstrations during the Green

revolution (Goldstone 103). Another instance of alienation to Iranian citizens would probably create an uprising, an issue that the president of Iran and the Ayatollah could not afford and that will put their regime in danger. Thus the Iranian government is aware that both internal and external pressures are present and that every move should be carefully calculated and promising of understanding to both sides. Throughout the past decades Iran, The U.S. and the other countries part of the UN Security Council have worked into a possible solution to this matter, The American side wants almost all nuclear facilities to be dismantled and the rest of the Security Council member countries think the same and favor of higher economic sanctions towards Iran. Therefore, we can analyze as to why countries like Israel believe that the only way to this solution is by bombing all of Iran's nuclear sites. Is the U.S., a secure ally of Israel, going to be dragged again into another war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. afford another war and put American lives on the line again for a problem that can have an alternative solution? This thesis would try to explain different alternatives to one of the most important international problems that countries like the U.S., the international community and countries around Iran are facing this very moment.

Literature Review

There has been numeral literature works that surround this very subject and that entails extensive research presented by scholars of every profession. The most recent of these publications presented in the earliest of years possible that contain the most recent material. Like that of Jack Caravelli in January, 2011 who writes on "Beyond Sand and Oil: The Nuclear Middle East" this book refers straight into the dilemma of the Middle East and how each nation

was trying to acquire nuclear missiles and ways to use these weapons against other nations.

Countries like Pakistan were able to obtain nuclear weapons in response to India. This book also looks into the different relations countries like Iran have had with other western powers like U.S., U.K. and the Soviet Union or Russia to our modern times (Caravelli 2011).

Beyond Sand and Oil also gives a detailed interaction of how countries around Iran have responded towards Iran's Nuclear Program. It goes into detail how countries like Israel have reacted towards Iran's Nuclear Policy (Caravelli 2011).

On July, 2011, Will Fulton & Ariel Farrar-Wellman discuss on the iranatracker.org the situation with Iran and its foreign relations with countries especially in the Middle East, the US and European countries part of the Security Council. The website shows numerous and up to date information about the Iranian Nuclear deal and contributes with special evidence putting the Islamic country of Iran in center stage and the many implications this deal has brought the Iranian political power and to the people of Iran. For its high relevance of information and the keeping of current events of this issue, this website contributes as a source of credible information helping into bringing an outcome to the Iranian Nuclear deal.

On 2012, Joachim Krause and Sharam Chubin, edits on "Iran's Nuclear Programme". This book provides a different perspective of what could be the results if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon and to what extent there could be a solution (Krause 2012).

The book focuses on the events that prompted the nuclear enrichment of Iran with its nuclear material. Countries around Iran have showed concerned and possibilities of diplomatic distortion due to the stand Iran has taken over its nuclear program (Krause 2012).

Furthermore, it shows examples of International Relations theory that have also represented and explained the behavior of the country of Iran through the recent events that have marked its relations towards European countries, the U.S. and other countries in the region (Krause 2012).

On 2012 Viotti, Paul R. & Kauppi, Mark. *International Relations Theory-5th*. In this book, well presented by the two authors from Georgetown University and the University of Denver, explain the importance of Realism which does references to how States react to the balance of Power. I intend to implement the authors views on the use of power by the country of Iran regarding the Realism approach, concentrating on the defensive realist approach, which is central to what most of the scholars regarding Political Science see the countries around the world and those countries intend to spread power on a regional level or international level. (Viotti and Kauppi 2012).

On 2014 Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolutions: A Very Short Introduction*. This book promise to bring a short but detailed information about the 1979 Iranian revolution and how the power of the new Iranian regime was stablished and their view of their surrounding world and to why the inclusion of other countries as enemies of Iran.

On 2015, James De Fronzo. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. This book brings a more detailed of how the Iranian revolution started and compares it to other revolutions at the time. The purpose for this book if to bring a more detailed research and to elaborate as to why Iran has nuclear ambitions and to what purposes they would like to use this technology. De Fronzo explains other revolutions that happened through the past decades but surely presents a

detailed observation of the Mullahs and their supreme leaders actions in the past decades (De Fronzo 2015).

My Research

The comprehensive process into explaining such a sensitive subject has brought great importance to my understanding in to what position the government of Iran is playing towards its citizens and to the rest of the world. Based on outside literature and American literature stand point, I intend to show the factual relation of the Iranian nuclear program issue, which has been a highly debatable subject in American society and American politics.

Most of the research will be based on written literature by many scholars and experts, which were previously mentioned, of the Iranian issue that has been confronted in the past decade and which doesn't find a final solution to it. Going step by step on a chronological procedure I expect to show as much detail as possible to maintain the specific correlations the people of Iran has with the people of many other western countries, who opposed or approve the political movements the government of Iran has established in the past years following the Iranian revolution.

Based on the research already presented by many scholars and experts in this area, I will present a different perspective driven by the opinions of the Iranian government. Using international relations theory, I will try to explain the behavior the country of Iran and other key governments into Iran's nuclear program and possibly predict future behaviors these countries would have depending on the government of Iran's reaction towards the nuclear deal.

Methodology

The methodology used for this thesis is based on the assumption that the country of Iran acts as a rational state. Based on the previous idea we can expect, using classical realist theory, how history, international laws and the response taken by political leaders of the different countries involved with Iran's nuclear program behave based on their exchange of policies. Every assumption made during this thesis, would help to explain the international relations between the nations involved on this issue and how it perhaps, affect their domestic or regional policies.

Research Design

The procedures of this research will be divided adequately into areas of important research that are mostly or perhaps represented on how this specific governments and international organizations, such as the UN, interact with the country of Iran based on its nuclear program.

U.S. Relations: this chapter reflects the very essential policies the United States has had with Iran in the past century till present. The chapters cover an array of issues that affected the relations between the U.S. government and the Iranian government during the Shah's regime and after the Iranian revolution.

Israel and Iran: a controversial topic that is a most to the purpose of this research is that of the relations between Iran and Israel. Here most of the work will be pointing at the events that made Israel and Iran become such enemies and what are the effects of Iran having nuclear technology. The possible full military conflict is at turn of every corner, Israel ready to attack

any possible major threat that comes from Iran. Another important section to this chapter will be the interrelation Iran has to play with Israel and the international help for a secure peace.

Russian relations: In this chapter the diplomatic and nuclear ties the country of Russia has with Iran would be exposed. Russia plays one of the most important roles for the wellbeing of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its way of opposition towards the west.

UN Sanctions: This chapter will be focusing on the many sanctions Iran has endured through the past years due to the increments of undesirable actions. A purpose for this chapter will be to show clarity to the many sanctions that hold the Iranian economy.

Domestic relations: perhaps the most intriguing part of the research as it embarks into the discussion on how Iranians view the nuclear program. Many see it as negative approach towards creating economic development and others see it as a right to create clean energy for public consumption. Using classical realism theory, I would argue why Iran is behaving in such conditions with its nuclear program and towards the rest of the international community.

Conclusion

The conclusion will summarize each of the chapters emphasizing the importance of policies and key issues faced during each historical moment. I would point out the possible outcome or outcomes the Iranian nuclear program will have following previous and current historical events based on the nuclear deal of Iran and the UN Security Council member countries. The importance of describing these events and the decisions made by each of the countries involved would have reflected classical realist theory. Finally, based on the research presented, this thesis will explain Iran's domestic implications with its nuclear program

CHAPTER II: U.S. RELATIONS

1950-1969

The whole concept of the Iranian nuclear program starts here with the help of the United States of America. In 1957 with the Atoms for Peace Program, Iran was introduced to nuclear technology as other countries in the region, with the help of President Truman (Caravelli 81). The United States made an agreement with Iran into the research of the use of atomic energy in a peaceful manner. The purpose for this move from the U.S. was to open a market of investments in Iran's civilian nuclear industries including the medical field (Caravelli 81). The plan also included a favorable business to the U.S. who leased Iran 13.2 pounds of low enriched uranium for purposes strictly on research (Caravelli 81). The United States understood that the country of Iran had a strategic location as it bordered the Soviet Union. The U.S. also counted with the help of the Shah who was a strong supported against communism (Caravelli 81).

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was the son of Reza Khan, later Reza Shah, who was a general in the Iranian army. On the year, 1921 Reza Khan overthrew the shah, and later in 1925 took the title of shah (king) for himself (Goldstone 99). He then ruled from 1921 to 1941, which then was pushed out by the British and Russians for siding with Germany who was an enemy of the allied forces during World War II (Caravelli 81). Eventually Reza Shah gave way to his son who was favored by the external powers mentioned before (Caravelli 81).

The new Shah who was educated in Switzerland understood little of what the Iranian people wanted something that will later cost him a lot of trouble (Caravelli 81). In the year 1949 the Communist Tudeh party, engineered an assassination attempt (Caravelli 82). After this incident, the Shah had to use some other methods to keep a more solid position in power, which gave way into strict martial law. In response to this measure, instability and the rise of new

political power like that of Mohammed Mossadeq who with the help of his National Front political coalition led by the Majles (Parliament) voted to nationalize Iranian oil on March 15, 1951 (Caravelli 82). Western countries did not see this too well as they had heavily invested in Iran's oil industry, countries like the United Kingdom soon started to look for solutions to Mossadeq actions (Caravelli 82).

The British government then imposed a boycott on the import of Iranian oil, thus creating difficulties to the new Iranian government and Iranian oil revenues were minimized (Caravelli 82). Regardless of this action by the British government and the decreased of oil revenue, Iranians still found Mossadeq as their legitimate leader and by the end of year 1952 Mossadeq had broken any diplomatic connection to the United States and the United Kingdom (Caravelli 82). An important point was clear, after many years of external influence the people of Iran wanted to be left alone, something that still echoes to this very day (Caravelli 82).

Later a major event happened that would cause the bipolar relation of the United States and Iran as we see today. The British government had convinced the U.S. government to use their Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) into an operation later known as Operation Ajax to form a coup against Mossadeq by using the Shah and some of his loyal followers (Caravelli 82). This first attempt of August 1953 failed, as Mossadeq discovered it. Then the Shah decided in fleeing the country for fear of retribution from Mossadeq in helping the British and Americans. Soon after the incident, the United States and British government planned several demonstrations within the Iranian population to remove Mossadeq from power (Caravelli 83). Later Mossadeq was removed from power and was later tried and convicted of treason but he was allowed to live under house arrest (Caravelli 83).

The Shah then returned to power knowing that without the help of foreign powers none of his plans could have come into existence. It was clear then for Iranians that the help of the U.S. backed the Shah's power and that his safety was secure by the might of the American military power. The U.S. now had destroyed the previous positive view it had from the Iranians compared to the external powers of United Kingdom and Russia (Caravelli 83).

Continuing this great relationship, the Shah imposed a series of key policies that enhance Iran's international image. He started by building a modern economy, which favor many of the American interests. With the favor of the U.S. government on his side, the Shah began into moving towards the nuclear cooperation and made it a permanent relationship between the U.S. and Iran (Caravelli 83).

By establishing the Tehran Nuclear Research Center part of the Tehran University in 1959, the Shah welcomed American nuclear technology. The United States supplied the research reactor and the reactor fuel. Iran had to adhere to international community's nonproliferation objectives, which made a must the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty around July of 1968 and later in 1970, the Majles (Parliament) ratified the treaty (Caravelli 83).

1970's

The Shah had big plans with his nuclear program, by 1974 he established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to drive Iran's nuclear development. Just around this time what was left of the high oil prices made by the instability of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, helped the Shah finance his nuclear ambitions. What the Shah wanted was to create a totally energy self-sufficient Iran and to export its oil to higher more profitable international markets (Caravelli

83). The Shah could not do this alone; he acquired the help of India in 1975, a country who had tested successfully a nuclear artifact the year before. Other deals made with nations such as France and Germany. However, why did Iran have to go to other countries for help? The United States understood the Shah's plans and began on restriction on the supply of nuclear technology; to this, the Shah had to look to other options. French firms such as Framatome, which helped build the 950-MW pressurized water reactor at Darkhovin, south of the town of Ahvaz. Around 1974 Iran also signed a contract with German company Kraftwerk (a subsidiary of Siemens) for the construction of two 1200-MW power plants near the coastal city of Bushehr, city which is later known as to have one of the functionality in creating a supposed nuclear weapon (Caravelli 83).

The next year the Massachusetts Institute of Technology made agreements with Iranian officials to train AEOI employees. Countries like France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Great Britain also helped Iranian personnel in various operations of training including reactor training and other contracts (Caravelli 83). All contracts signed by Iran focused on different areas of nuclear technology assistance, including the production of nuclear power plants that followed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which committed Iran to be transparent to its nuclear development. During this time, Saddam Hussein was taking a closer look at Iran after knowing of the close relation Iran was having with the U.S. government and their interest on developing specific nuclear technology (Caravelli 84).

This technology would help Iran separate the already processed plutonium and increased their investments in uranium enrichment. During this same time, the U.S. government with the Nixon administration was stunt with the nuclear test set up by India in 1974, which at this time

was an ally. In that same year, the Shah of Iran declared that Iran would be acquiring a nuclear weapon. Later in Paris, the Shah announced at the main French Newspaper Le Monde that it was not very smart for countries to have nuclear weapons because they would not have any use and would only produce hostility towards other neighboring nations (Caravelli 84). In a contradicting move, the Shah repeated this same behavior later in 1975 and argued that Iran was not taking any nuclear weapons. For the U.S. the comments made by the Shah during this time were not taken to a very important degree. It was clear that the whole nuclear project relied heavily on the Shah and his personality, if the Shah should fall many others near the possession of power in Iran wouldn't have been able to obtain such nuclear technology or even worst terrorist groups could have gained this technology. With this Iran could have become the most powerful nation in the region (Caravelli 84).

Following the Nixon administration, President Ford took power around August of 1974 after Nixon's resignation. The U.S. committed itself to continue its support to its allies in the region. President Ford tried to play two sides of the policy, as he wanted to take on the non-nuclear proliferation stand while also helping Iran getting rid of its nuclear used material (Caravelli 85). This would also be an advantage for the U.S. as it found a different way of acquiring spent fuel rods from the Iranians reactors, thing that Secretary of State at this time Kissinger became worried about the buyback deal (Caravelli 85).

Iran on the other hand saw the deal promising, even the chairman Akbar Etemad who described the deal a great opportunity for Iran to find a good exchange with the U.S. and bring even greater cooperation with the Ford administration. This bilateral cooperation soon will see its end as soon as President Carter took over power, as he was highly regarded for nonproliferation

policy and a supporter of humanitarian action in the world. Carter started cooperating with Iran by selling 6-8light water reactors but Iranian politics would change and bring U.S. relations to a halt (Caravelli 85).

A series of events would transform Iran into a civil confrontation. Iran's oil wealth built impressive military capabilities while serving as a continuing source of wealth for privileged few. The Shah instituted land reform as part of his "White Revolution" even though he ruled very strongly, but with U.S. advice allowed the opposition, the National Front, to reenter Iranian politics. Suffrage for women was established and promoted reforms in education. These changes were seen as good progress by the international community but not good enough for other Iranians (Caravelli 86).

Around 1963 a not well-known cleric named Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini started to show flaws inside the Shah's government. Later this cleric helped with the ending of the Shah's rule (Caravelli 86). With a series of cassettes who were distributed helped spread the critiques of Khomeini, which many Iranians started to side on what the Ayatollah was depicting the Shah's regime, which based on his point of view, a corrupted government that disregarded the poor. These actions were a response to the presence of Americans around Iran who were working closely with the Shah's regime (Caravelli 86). Khomeini also disliked the SAVAK who was the Shah's secret police, which a majority of citizens disliked for its brutal procedures against opposition sympathizers of the Shah (Caravelli 86). Following the year having many demonstrations against the regime, the Shah decided to travel to the U.S. to treat his cancer. He left the country on January 19, 1979 and on February 1, 1979 Khomeini took advantage of the Shah's departure and walked into Tehran received by the thousands as the nation's leader.

Iranian Revolution

We can compare the 1979 Iranian revolution with other revolutions of previous times. Like the revolution in Nicaragua where a king like regime of the Somozas as dictators created a government, where only one man decided any important action of the country. Analyzing these very events, the Iranian Revolution brought the importance of Religion to power where Ayatollah Khomeini brought fundamentalism and promoted Islamic virtue (Goldstone 101). Many in Iran saw the Shah's abusive power especially the clergy. Few leaders rose and promoted new ideas that united the people of Iran. Like Khomeini with the help of the National Front helped distribute his sermons to Iran from his place of exile in Najaf, Iraq, and persuaded the clergy to form "Komitehs" or committees to spread his idealisms (De Fronzo 267). When protests started to erupt, the Shah answered with brutality and killed many unarmed civilians. At that time, President Jimmy Carter warned and ended any aid to the Shah's regime. After many demonstrations, the Shah went to Egypt showing he had nothing else to do with the responsibility of Iran and the Khomeini returned to Iran and established a president after the Iraqi invasion (De Fronzo 268).

Here the revolution brought great confrontation to U.S. relations and to the other many nations that surrounded Iran. With decisions of Ayatollah Khomeini Iran went back on its ambition for different source of power, this being the nuclear option again. After the incident with the Shah going to the U.S. for his cancer treatment and following his death the following year, the relations between the U.S. and Iran started to switch drastically (Caravelli 87). Due to the sanctions imposed by the U.S. towards Iran on their nuclear ambitions, Khomeini rounded the people to protest against the U.S. embassy in Tehran, which followed a hostage crisis and a

definitive rupture between U.S. government and Iran's new government (Caravelli 87). Perhaps an important contradiction towards the Shah's nuclear aspirations did not see eye to eye with the fundamentalist regime. For Ayatollah Khomeini the nuclear energy option, which he saw as "unIslamic", perhaps considered for him a way to defy the international community and especially the U.S. (Caravelli 87).

1980's Until Present

The view of acquiring nuclear technology changed in the mid-1980s. Iranian officials during this time and all the way to our present day have said to have no interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. Another issue during this time was the attacks perpetrated by the Iraqi government using different chemical weapons against the Iranians (Caravelli 87). This indiscriminate use of this weapon started in mid-1982 again by the Iraqis against the Iranians. Since Iran was already isolated, there was no help from the international community and Iran had to fight alone. In the need of survival this attacks prompted Iran to follow their nuclear program backed by Khomeini. Around October 1988 Hashemi Rafsanjan, then speaker of the Iranian parliament, met with the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and gave information on how the war with Iraq shaped Iran's views on acquiring WMD (Caravelli 87).

During the 1990s Iran and the U.S. continued their level of animosity. Knowing the U.S. had defeated Iran's long time enemy, Iraq, their relations continued only in the oil business area. Some U.S. oil companies received permission to buy Iranian oil but only if they sold that same oil outside the U.S. (De Fronzo 281).

Following the 90s, the years 2000s were troubled for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to the international impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the U.S. with the Bush administration declared Iran and the countries of Iraq and North Korea, as President Bush said, the “axis of evil”. What was rare is that Iran was also cooperating with the U.S. against the Taliban. Iran was protecting the Shia minority in Afghanistan that was being attack by the Taliban. Iran helped the war in Afghanistan by helping the Northern Alliance who was supporting the U.S. military in operations against the Taliban (De Fronzo 283).

Right around the year 2002, Iran was inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and discovered that Iran had manufactured 4,000 centrifuges inside a building that could hold up to 50,000 (Rubin 2008). Right away the U.S. relations with Iran took an even darker turn when the hardliner or Islamic fundamentalist, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005, perhaps due to the increase of the military campaign the U.S. had in Iraq, the Iranians felt unsecured and opted for someone with a more aggressive approach (De Fronzo 283). Ahmadinejad supported very strongly the Iran’s nuclear program and the U.S. saw this as a very dangerous option (De Fronzo 238). The U.S. created its first sanction against Iran, due to their nuclear proliferation and missile testing activities in the year 2005. This executive order 13382, involved individuals, companies and organizations that were supporting the nuclear program (Starr & Ighani 2010-2016). The U.S. has hundreds of sanctions to almost every sector in Iran, this includes Missile arms industry, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the nuclear industry, the energy/ petroleum industry, banking, shipping industry, international trade and insurance (Starr & Ighani 2010-2016).

When President Barack Obama took office back in 2008 diplomatic relations started to change. Obama stated that the U.S. relations with Iran were going to change and that diplomacy was necessary into intervening with the escalating issues. Nevertheless, issues were still there as long Ahmadinejad instigated more problems and rejected the conditions the U.S. government was imposing towards Iran's nuclear program (De Fronzo, 284).

Things only changed after the elections of 2013, where a moderate cleric and current president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad was not allowed to run for a third term. Rouhani brought a new dawn into relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world; he has focused on national growth opposing any extreme ideas, compared to Ahmadinejad. Rouhani has consolidated a more stable relation with the U.S. government than any other recent president in Iran (De Fronzo 287).

Later in that same year on November 24 2013, the Iranian nuclear agreement was announced. The agreement was to help lift the sanctions imposed by the U.S. over the past years. Iran had to follow all regulations and inspections and reduced its enrichment of uranium to a 5 percent level. After lifting the sanctions, Iran could have started to earn up to \$4.2 billion dollars of its oil sales and import airplane parts and machinery for its industry (De Fronzo 288).

It took almost two years for the agreement to pass as the U.S. Congress was having difficulties trying to decide if to approve or disapprove the nuclear deal. Around September 17, 2015, the U.S. Senate had a 58-42 votes in favor, much of the Republican Senators were not in favor of the nuclear deal (The Final Tally: How Congress Voted on Iran 2015). The U.S. was working together with the U.N. Security Council which included the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany.

Finally, on January 16, 2015, President Obama gave the executive order to lift all sanctions given to Iran that affect its nuclear program. With the help and certification of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdogs the U.S. government was sure that Iran was following inspections and its responsibilities over the lowering of its nuclear enrichment. The following are the executive orders that were lifted: 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645. Other sanctions concerning support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities would stay in effect till Iran meets all their particular requirements (Implementation Day: Obama Lifts Sanctions 2016).

Analysis

Based on the international relations theorist, Kenneth Waltz, we can argue that perhaps the U.S. has guided its own state interest and has taken a diplomatic approach towards the country of Iran with a defensive realist stance. The U.S. has tried to keep their security in an international arena they might see as a threat. On the other hand, the country of Iran has maintained a classical realist approach towards its neighboring countries and to the rest of the international community. Based on Hans J. Morgenthau, also an international relations theorist, Iran finds its place showing its drive for power not internationally but regionally. (Viotti and Kauppi 63).

Relating the previous historical material on this chapter, the classical realist theory has showed how the country of Iran has interacted with the U.S. We can see the defensive realist stand by the U.S. against Iran; the U.S. has responded towards the classical realist stand of Iran and maintains a diplomatic approach for the moment. Iran reacted by how international politics have worked against their policy but also how the domestic policy and its politicians have acted specifically and on this thesis, towards their nuclear program. Therefore, based on the

documented history in this chapter, the only realist theory approach appropriate on this case is classical realism based on Hans J. Morgenthau (Viotti and Kauppi 51).

We can also appreciate the behavior between the U.S. and Iran which both had a win-win situation and in some areas lose-lose situation. For the government of Iran on the winning side was able to keep their nuclear facilities but perhaps, could not go further into being able to construct a nuclear bomb, this could be their respective lose situation, only if the option to create a nuclear weapon was on the Iranian government's agenda. Although, the U.S. was able to make Iran dismantle their powerful enrichment of uranium and plutonium making this a win situation for the U.S. For the lose situation we can appreciate that the U.S. was not able to make Iran dismantle all of their nuclear facilities which what was aimed at the beginning of the deals back in Washington based on the research on this chapter. Iran was able to keep their nuclear facilities for the purpose of energy production.

CHAPTER III: RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979

The relationship between Iran and Israel has been in the past few decades more of a troubling some. We can say that diplomatic relations before the Iranian revolution of 1979 were mostly friendly. The Shah at that time had good economic and diplomatic relations with the Israeli government. Being both allies of most European countries and the U.S. enjoyed great relations and the easiness in acquiring weapons of all sorts. After the Shah left Iran in 1979, the Islamic Republic was established and Ayatollah Khomeini, the former Supreme Leader, made it central that Israel was seeing as an enemy of the state (Fulton & Farrar-Wellman 2011).

After Iranian Revolution

The Israeli-Iranian relations in most of its views has been a confrontation with no end since their disputed ideologies of how Israel has the right to be in the land that belongs to them and how the Iranians say that belongs to the Palestinians and to all the Muslims around the world. As both nations hold different ideologies, clashes of words and the divide of support, has incremented tensions so prominent that during the presidency of former Iranian president Ahmadinejad, the possibility of airstrikes towards some or all Iranian nuclear facilities were proposed by the Israeli government. Nevertheless, before the troubles that occur during Ahmadinejad's presidency we would have to separate the different areas were the two countries have their strongest oppositions (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Diplomacy

We can start by saying that, as many people who perhaps do not know how politics work, both Israel and Iran have a diplomatic exchange. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries really took a very wild turn when the newly elected back in 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad escalated the confrontation by declaring that the country of Israel was “doomed to be wiped of the map” and also claimed that the Holocaust was a “myth” (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Of course, the state of Israel did not take this very easy and prompted to deteriorate the diplomatic relations it had with Iran’s government during this time. By the end of the year 2007, Iran position itself on the side of the Palestinians by accusing Israel of promoting violence against the Palestinian people, here the Iranian government voted against Israel in the Resolutions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict on the 62nd Session of the General Assembly (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Seeing the effects of the animosity between these nations, one must ask why Iranians support the state of Palestine. Even though both states share a different vision of Islam, Iran which is mostly Shi’a and Palestine mostly Sunni, doesn’t intervene on the support of Iran towards Palestine, I can suggest that perhaps above all, Palestine is consider part of the Muslim holy areas like Jerusalem, and thus it holds an important religious value to any Muslim around the world. Following the increase of tensions, during the year of 2009, the Israeli- Iranian relations saw an increase of tensions due to the visit of Ahmadinejad who publicly criticized Israel’s use of force against Palestinian territories. These remarks made in company of Hamas’ political chief Khalid Mashaal, recognized as a terrorist organization by most countries in the international community, gave the Israeli government grave security concern (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Other important issues covered this same year in July, Israeli navy deployed two Saar-class missile boats and a Dolphin-class nuclear-capable submarine to the Red Sea for military exercises, later an Israeli official said that it was just to send a “message” to Iran. Around that same period, the Iranian Intelligence Minister Gholam Hossein Mohsen Ejeie accused Israel of planning to assassinate Ahmadinejad after his controversial reelection in June 2009. The intelligence minister assured that there were meetings at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt and in Paris to assassinate Ahmadinejad (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Then after the incident, the Israeli government accused the government of Iran of continuing the support of Hamas and Hezbollah militants with money and weapons (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Later on, the same year Iran conducted a test-fired missile that put Israel in proximity of strike. These missiles had ranges of approximately 850 to 1,250 miles, and could possibly be able to strike Israel (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). However, looking at the Iranian maneuver is that of a probably retaliation knowing that Israel also possesses missiles who can reach great areas. In addition, Israel posted the seized of a vessel carrying hundreds of weapons around 100 miles off the Israeli coast and supposedly had come from an Iranian port and then picked up at an Egyptian seaport (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Iran blamed Israeli and U.S. intelligence forces for the January 2010 bombing in Tehran that killed Iranian physics professor Massoud Ali-Mohammadi. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded against the supposedly Israeli Zionist actions to stop Iran’s nuclear program (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). The U.S. government rejected any of the accusations, meantime Iranian officials also accused the attack on the exiled opposition party, the

People's Mujahedeen, who by Iran's information work for the American and Israeli governments (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Later in Amman, Jordan, the Jordanian intelligence agency found a relation on the January 2010 assassination of Iranian Physics Professor Massoud Ali Mohammad in Tehran with a thwarted bombing of an Israeli delegation (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Jordan's General Intelligence Department said that Iran most likely had paid for the thwarted attack to al Qaeda sympathizers (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Furthermore, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made inflammatory comments at a meeting with Mauritanian President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz, which the Ayatollah invited Islamic nations to join the fight against Israel and to be viewers of its destruction (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Furthermore, the Israeli government found about the arms deal between Iran and Russia, of Iran possibly acquiring long-range missiles known as S-300 from Russia. Israeli prime minister went tried to block the deal by meeting with Vladimir Putin. Putin assured Netanyahu that Russia would never sell any armament that could break the balance of military power in the region (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Aside of the animosity between Israel and Iran there were some instances where the two nations had conversations based on a report done by an Israeli source. Iran denied such meeting. The report pointed out on how the two tourist ministers agreed on tourism being a fundamental venue to provide peace to the two countries (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Following incident like the previous one, a report referred to Iranian officials had detained seven people who were supporting unrest after the elections where president

Ahmadinejad won reelection the previous year. The Israeli government did not make a comment after these arrests and accusations (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

During this same year president, Ahmadinejad reassured the support to Lebanon's Hezbollah with their fight against Israel. Ahmadinejad maintained communications with Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Iran's president wanted to remind Israel that Iran was ready to support Hezbollah in case of any confrontation (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman, 2011).

Right in the middle of June 2010, Israel sent a group of policymakers to China. The group showed the Chinese government evidence, based on Israeli intelligence, of Iran's nuclear program advancements and encouraged the Chinese government to increase sanctions against Iran (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Following the next year, 2011, Israeli officials reported on their discomfort of how Iran was intervening in the Maghreb region and was influencing countries like Egypt (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Furthermore, a commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) informed that Iran had the military capabilities of attacking with missiles any American bases in the region and Israel as well (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman, 2011).

The previous were reports of the diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel based outside the nuclear dilemma. Each reaction made by Israel reflected Iran's nuclear program, which will be shown in the following reports.

Nuclear

As early as November 2003, the Israeli government made sure that they were not going to tolerate a nuclear capable Iran and that will answer with air strikes against nuclear facilities. The

Israel Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that Israel was ready to strike at any moment (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Following two years later, the former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon gave the support for a preemptive strike. After negotiations between the U.K., France, Germany and Iran on Iran's nuclear program ended in bad terms, the former prime minister opted for such decision (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

During the year 2008, Israel also gave its support on the UN sanctions against Iran due to their nuclear program. Israel foreign ministry assured that such measures were necessary to stop Iran's advancements on its nuclear technology (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Following in the year of 2009, the National Security Advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Uzi Arad explained that Israel was ready to attack Iran without the help of its European or American counterparts. He focused on the Iranian nuclear program to be a great threat to Israel (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011). Later the Israeli navy had reported that had position three submarines in the Red Sea to strike Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Israeli defense minister pointed out again that Israel was ready to strike (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

During this same troubled year, the Israeli government stated that Israel was not likely to strike Iran's nuclear facilities and that the sanctions options against Iran were a more prominent solution than to a war scenario. This highly contradicted to the events previously mentioned; Israel was seeing other alternatives to the issue against Iran (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

On October 22, 2009 it was perhaps based on Israeli information that Iran and Israeli officials had a meeting during the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament, which was held in Egypt. Iran had denied the gathering, but Israel insisted on the meeting had taken place. It was the first time if we based the information on the Israeli side that the counties meet since the year 1979 (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Things did change after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took power. During this year, 2010, Netanyahu assured very strongly that Iran was not stopping its nuclear ambitions and that he was not in favor of what the international community led by the U.S. was treating the issue against Iran (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Following into the year 2001, Israel's chief of military intelligence Major-General Aviv Kochavi reported that sanctions against Iran were not stopping its nuclear advancements and that Iran was more than likely to produce nuclear bombs within two years (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

During this same year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the U.S. congress and pressed his issue of Iran probably being a great threat to humanity. He claimed that Israel had to right to defend itself and asked the U.S. to keep its promise and maintain Iran away from nuclear weapons (Fulton and Farrar-Wellman 2011).

Recently on March 2015 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses the U.S. Congress one more time about the issue on the nuclear program of Iran. He stated that the U.S. had to act against Iran and prevent the nuclear deal. Netanyahu again was criticizing the nuclear deal that concluded in the following months. This was perhaps the last action taken up to this date by Netanyahu to stop the nuclear deal the U.S. and Iran had come to terms (Daly 2015).

Analyzing the situation of both countries, Israel always seemed to be on the defensive and offensive stand towards Iran. Perhaps due to the bad relation it had when former Iranian president Ahmadinejad was in power. The possibility for an all-upscale war is always present and both Iran and Israel have the means to put a war scenario in place. It is then the responsibility of countries like the U.S. or any Security Council country to intervene and prevent any major conflict to an already devastated area like the Middle East.

Analysis

For the behavior of Israel and Iran throughout the past decades, one can argue based on the research that has been an offensive realist behavior, where both countries try to maximize their positions. Based on John Mearsheimer, also an international realist theorist who bases on offensive realism, we can appreciate that Israel looks for its best way to survive in a dangerous world. However, something should be considered, both countries have focused on their state issues and regard the individual or domestic politics. In this case, we should fall back to classical realism where the importance of domestic policy affects the response towards their struggle for power in the region. Based on Morgenthau we can argue that both courtiers concentrate in the domination of their human association within and outside their state. (Viotti and Kauppi 64).

The completion of the Nuclear deal brought a lose situation based on a zero sum game for Israel which wanted all of the nuclear facilities to be removed and to keep Iran with most or all sanctions. For Iran was a win situation as they could keep their nuclear power plants

infrastructure, and avoid pressure for the Israeli government since their program was backed the international community and specially by the U.S. a long Israeli ally.

CHAPTER IV: THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION

Diplomatic

For the past, few years the countries of Russia and Iran have built a strong relationship in their diplomatic and military areas, which is helping, fulfill their governments' plans. The Russian government during these past years has helped the Iranian government protect itself against any external attacks by introducing training and weapons to the Iranian military (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

According to RIA Novosti, a Russian news agency, as early as December of 2008, even though the report failed certification, Russia provided parts for the S-300 surface-to-air defense systems to Iran (Farrar-Wellman 2010). Following this incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contacted the Russian government and argued on the importance of terminating such business with Iran. The Russian president, Medvedev pointed out that Russia was not going to finalize such contracts but that Russia also needed to look after its interests and increase revenue (Farrar-Wellman 2010). Furthermore, following into the year 2009, President Medvedev assured that the sale of the S-300 system was going to proceed regardless of the recommendations made by that time Israeli prime minister, Shimon Peres (Farrar-Wellman 2010). reiterated his intention to reconsider the sale of the S-300 system during an August 2009 meeting with Israeli President Shimon Peres. According to the source, quoted by the World Tribune, Iran has concluded an agreement to purchase the air defense system with at least one former Soviet republic (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

In December 2008, the Russian government decided to work with the Iranian government on military exercises, which based on Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Organization for

Military and Technical Cooperation, Alexander Foumin, would bring success into securing their respective areas. Following into the year 2009, the Iranian government reassured the work committed by the two countries, that it will empower their cooperation with military strategy. The Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar corroborated this decision (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Both Russia and Iran have participated in multilateral forums, including the Caspian Sea states summits. Including this Caspian Sea states are Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, which focus on maintaining the influence of western policy outside their region. So far, Iran and Russia have performed naval exercises in the Caspian Sea (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Both countries continued their negotiations during the year 2009, even meeting privately in Russia during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran was acting as an observer during the meeting, the Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry, Sergei Ryabkov, emphasized on the importance of Iran being part of such event (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

In July 2009, during a meeting in Russia, American President Barack Obama and Russian President Medvedev discussed issues concerning the growing threat of Iran and the implementation of a missile defense system by the American government. For Russia, the missile system affected their already strategies with Iran, the Russian MP at the time, Aleksandr Babakov argued that the system was not aimed at Iran but at Russia's military presence in the region (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

In late December 2009, the Iranian government had a jet ready for the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to transport him to Russia in case the civil disturbances were out of control.

After the June 12th presidential election, Iran's security council was fearing for the worst towards their regime (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Following the year 2010, the U.S. President's Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction Gary Samore, made a statement that concerned Russia and Iran's plans on the advanced air defense system, which considered a dangerous move for Russia and its relations with the U.S. (Farrar-Wellman 2010). Furthermore, in July 2010, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani responded that Russia was to follow the agreements on delivering the S-300 air defense system based on the deal concluded before the U.N. Security Council sanctions to Iran. The weapons contract made back in 2007 and Iran wanted the delivery to be finalized (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Economic Relationship

Russia and Iran agreed in October 2008 to increase their cooperation in the energy sector. Due to both countries, being Russia the first and Iran the second, in having the world's natural gas reserves and second and fourth in oil reserves respectively, have agreed in pursuing an economic partnership. Both countries, adding Qatar, possess up to 40 percent of the planets natural gas reserves, cooperation also known as "gas troika" (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

In January 2009, Tehran and Moscow signed an agreement in response to their previous mention venue in their gas and oil cooperation. Furthermore, the Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko stated that Russia was ready to help Iran with the proper extraction of the gas and oil to increase their joint development (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

On that same year, Iran and Russia also increased their non-energy areas such as agriculture and telecommunications. These agreements based on the International Monetary fund have made them over \$3 billion back in 2007. The Russian minister of agriculture pointed out the importance of Iran contribution into deals where both countries can benefit (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Russia and Iran's economic agreements also involved some of their provinces. In July 2009, Sergey Marousov, the Governor of Russia's Olanovsk province, met with Iran's general consul in Kazan, Reza Baghban Kondori. The two pointed out the benefits for both countries, on one side Marousov added the possible sells of airplanes to Iran and Kondori added that Iran could send students and professors to the Olanovsk Aviation College (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Later in August 2009, Iran and Russia made another agreement where Tehran will purchase five Tu-204 passenger jets, with an option for thirty more. Deputy Head of Russian Federation's Union of Airplane Manufacturers Sergei Galperin stated that Russian aviation sales to Iran were very important for their economic partnership (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

On August 22, 2009 based on a Russian TV news report, Iran's Minister of Road and Transportation Hamid Behbahani considered purchasing Sukhoi Superjet 100s from Russia. Although during this same month, the Managing Director of Iran Air Tour Company Mehdi Sadeqi stated that the Iranian government was not handling the agreements accordingly. He also stated that Russia was not keeping with their agreements in providing the planes in a timely manner. There was also information that the Iranian government was acting differently towards Russia for their slow process in delivering the S-300 air defense systems (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

In addition, Russia Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia was taking precautions into the deal of providing Iran with the air defense system as promised. He made remarks based on the situation the international community was facing against Iran and its nuclear program during this time. He made clear that Russia did not want to destabilize the region and proceeded to follow instructions from other council member countries (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Despite Russia's support on the UN Security Council sanctions against Iran's nuclear program, the Russian government continues to help Iran with their nuclear energy sector. For example, Russia has helped Iran build and maintained their nuclear facilities in Bushehr (Farrar-Wellman 2010). For the past years, it seems that the Russian government has played a friend and foe card towards Iran, which in some ways has helped Iran in other areas of its economy, and still happens to this very day. Iran holds an important regional strategy for Russia's presence and influence (Farrar-Wellman 2010).

Analysis

We can expect that the relationship of Russia and Iran has being quite estrange on one side Russia supported sanctions against Iran but also helped them and still helps the Iranian government with their nuclear facilities. Based on Hans J. Morgenthau, one can say that both states act in a rational manner and struggle for power in their regional areas, which falls into classical realist theory (Viotti and Kauppi 41).

Based on the previous reports, both states interact respectably by the policies of their leaders into the international arena and both act accordingly in their drive for power and

producing a security competition in their regional and international areas. Iran and Russia do benefit from their bilateral negotiations responding once again on their states best interests (Viotti and Kauppi 63).

For both Iran and Russia, based on zero-sum game, is a win-win situation which both countries benefiting, Russia helps Iran with its nuclear program and Russia keeps a presence in the region playing hegemony around the area. Iran feels safe by the help provided by Russia and provides movement for their regional policy towards other countries in the region.

CHAPTER V: UN SANCTIONS

Iran's nuclear program discussions concluded on July 14, 2015, the accord was based on the removal or suspension of most sanctions that have been given to the country of Iran by the United States and the European Union. The accord is based on how Iran is going to respond to the regulations imposed to its nuclear program. Although, the accord also contains the removal of non-nuclear sanctions on some Iranian citizens and firms that had sanctions due to their involvement with regional and global terrorism, participation in Iran's ballistic missile program and violating human rights of other Iranian citizens (Kagan 2015).

The following are the UN Sanctions that were in place since the year 2006. These sanctions covered an array of Iranian citizens, firms, and government organizations (Caravelli 110).

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 - passed on July 31, 2006. This resolution was based on the reprocessing and enrichment techniques that the country of Iran with its nuclear program. The UN threatened Iran with sanctions (Caravelli 110).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 - passed on December 23, 2006, targeted towards a possible involvement of about 12 citizens and organizations from Iran. They were faced with creating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, which included the development of nuclear technologies. Furthermore, the resolution also made a call on the works of Iran with its ballistic missile area, which were highlighted as a great concern. This resolution, 1737, also made emphasis by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to warn other nations to avoid contact with the Iranian citizens involved in the WMD programs (Caravelli 110).

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 - passed on March 24, 2007. This resolution focused on the blocking of imports made by Iran that had relation with conventional weapons and imposed a freeze in assets owned by Iranians implicated with Iran's nuclear and missile programs, this included the well-known Bank Sepah of Iran (Caravelli 110).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 180 - passed on March 3, 2008. This resolution concentrated on financial sectors that were supposed to be cooperating with Iran's WMD. Up to 13 names added to the list of firms that were involved in the previous in the related program. Companies in the areas of commercial airlines and shipping were also affected (Caravelli 110).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835 - passed on September 27, 2008. This resolution continued the already mentioned restrictions given to Iran and confirmed the UN's Security Council plans against Iran (Caravelli 110).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 - passed on June 9, 2010. This set of new sanctions targeted directly into the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG), specifically to 15 companies that were known to have ties with the group. These sanctions also included bans on military equipment such as tanks and aircraft. Although the powerful S-300 missile system that Russia had planned to sell to Iran was not restricted, the situation was left in the hands of the Russian government. For the U.S. and the other European countries saw favorably the stance of both Russia and China on keeping their commitment and keep the push for the sanctions against Iran (Caravelli 110).

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984 - passed on June 9, 2011. This resolution with the support of council member countries prolonged the jurisdiction of experts, part of a panel, against Iran for over one more year (Kagan 2015).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2049 - passed on June 7, 2012. This resolution referred to Iran Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts and prolonged their jurisdiction for 13 months (Kagan 2015).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231- passed on July 20, 2015. This resolution based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, set out the suspension and the promptly removal of the UN sanctions against Iran (Kagan 2015).

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) presented the new resolutions that were to be implemented into new sanctions for Iran. The JCPOA has sided on the non-nuclear sanctions and the secondary sanctions, which will stay in place proposed by the U.S. administration. However, it was still uncertain as to how Iran was going to respond to the new resolutions. Both the U.S. Treasury Department and the E.U. control most of these restrictions, which affect mostly individuals and Iranian firms, and will continue to some years ahead (Kagan, 2015).

The U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 referred to the comprehensive deal between the Security Council member countries, with Germany, and Iran. This resolution makes the European Union and the United States to remove their sanctions imposed on Iran in a process with guarantees. JCPOA includes different sections such as section (Annex II) describing which sanctions will be lifted and a smaller section (Annex V), and explains how the sanctions will be

lifted over time. Putting the entire Annex together, we end up with six lists of Iranian citizens and firms. Also months later the Annex sections were changed to favor more of the U.S. and European policies (Kagan 2015).

The JCPOA favors Iran and sets the E.U. and the U.S. principally to finish some non-nuclear sanctions; this includes a total of 148 Iranian citizens and 693 firms or organizations. The plan also makes the E.U. and the U.S. to lift sanctions on 76 aircraft and 217 ships from Iranian companies (Kagan 2015).

The following represent the timeline for the JCPOA Implementation. These five dates show when the JCPOA sections would be given to the country of Iran (Kagan 2015).

- July 14, 2015 - Finalization Day: this is the day where the agreement was finished and shown to respective entities, it is included on Annex V, Section A (Kagan 2015).
- October 19, 2015 – Adoption Day: this shows the UN Security Council implementing its decision after 90 days, which started on the next day July 20, 2015, it is included on the Annex V, Section B (Kagan 2015). This Day the European Union terminated sanctions on many Iranian firms that included the banking, financial, transportation, oil, metals and many other sectors that supported Iranian economy (Kagan 2015).
- Fall 2015 – Implementation Day: this corresponded to the removal by the E.U. of people and organizations in sections pertaining Annex II. The U.S. only gave waivers to some of the sanctions and waited until October 19, 2023. This implementation also corresponded to the IAEA report verified by the agreements respecting Iran’s nuclear program, they are in Annex V, Section C (Kagan 2015).

- October 19, 2023 – Transition Day: on this day after 8 years, both the E.U. and the U.S. will remove Iranian citizens and firms listed in attachment 4 of Annex II, on the U.S. decision and on the E.U. decision persons and firms that were in attachments 1 and 2 of Annex II. In addition, these procedures only follow that Iran has followed all the regulations made by the IAEA. This is included on Annex V, Section D (Kagan 2015).
- October 19, 2025 – Termination Day: this marks the final day for the JCPOA agreements regarding any sanctions against Iran after 10 years of Adoption Day, this section is included on Annex V, Section E (Kagan 2015).

Members of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) who represented each country member of the Security Council were the following:

- China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi.
- France’s Foreign Minister, Fabius Laurent.
- Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
- European Union’s High Representative, Federica Mogherini.
- Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif.
- Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov.
- United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary, Phillip Hammond.
- United States’ Secretary of State, John Kerry.

Analysis

Based on the proceedings made by the United Nations, I was able to determine and assume that Iran responded in a welcome approach towards the policies of the most important

organization of countries in the world. Looking back at the policies made by Iran on previous chapters, we can expose that previous presidents like Ahmadinejad, who was consider part of the hard liners in the Iranian government, promoted some difficult relations towards the UN and its Security Council member countries.

By taking the theory of Morgenthau into perspective, one can describe, based on classical realism, that the new government of Iran after 2013, with president Rouhani, showed a different approach towards the sanctions imposed by the E.U. and the U.S. The way Iran reacted towards this issue was based on Rouhani's approach towards the international community and for the benefit of his government, which contributed to reconstructing Iran's relations with the west.

CHAPTER VI: DOMESTIC RELATIONS OF IRAN

The Iranian government divides itself into three different structures that mandate the everyday affairs of the country; they are the president, Council of Ministers, and parliament. The country of Iran has very peculiar government if compared with other western states. We can start with the Iranian presidency, where the president is responsible for choosing ambassadors, signs any sort of treaties and legislations and gives approval to foreign ambassadors. The president is also responsible for the choosing the ministers that make part of the Council of Ministers and supervises the executive branch. Following, the president has the power to remove any ministers at any time but parliament can only remove ministers with approval of a vote session. Since 1989 after the Iranian constitution was revised, the position of a prime minister was removed, which mean that Iranian legislature does not chooses a prime minister based on the current political system in Iran (Kagan 2009).

We can say that the Iranian government works with a combination of political systems. If compared to the American political system, the Iranian government has an opposite relation on this case, the Iranian president answers to the Iranian parliament. The Iranian parliament plays an important role, and is able to call the president and any of the president's ministers to answer questions or participate in parliamentary meetings and terminate any of the ministers at any given time. Thus, we can describe the function of the Iranian president as that of prime minister in some areas. In contrast, the Iranian president is chosen by a direct election and not by a majority vote from legislatures (Kagan 2009).

Furthermore, The Iranian president has also limited power based on Iran's form of government. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, plays the role of commander in chief of

any Iranian armed forces. For both the president and defense minister are not part of Iran's military chain of command. The Supreme Leader is responsible directly to give the commands to the top generals of the regular armed forces and separate commands to the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps or IRGC. The Supreme Leader is also in charge of any activity the Quds Force happens to be involved, a special unit within the IRGC, which answers directly to the Ayatollah Khamenei. In addition, to what limitations the president has, one of them, he cannot veto any legislation, something similar as being a prime minister. Also the Iranian president is denied the call for new elections by parliament, something similar to a presidential type government (Kagan 2009).

If compared the Iranian parliament in some extent can be related to a system similar to that of the U.K. Based on the struggle between the monarch and parliament, the Iranian government similar to the British parliament is responsible in collecting taxes and finding the best way to manage the money collected and to be invested into the country's best interest. The Iranian parliament is the different in the sense that its fiscal power is limited, compared to the system of the British government (Kagan 2009).

Furthermore, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei manages different religious foundations also known as bonyads. These charitable organizations do not answer to the parliament, the ministers or the president. The foundations or bonyads employ about 5 million people and play a crucial place in Iran's economy; they are also part of large corporations that operate around the entire country. Organizations such as Martyrs Foundation were selected by the U.S. Treasury Department to be involved in some of Iran's weapons program. Foundations like this one are chosen as suspicious and the U.S. has decided to include it on the sanctions list.

Although aside of the Supreme Leader the rest of the political apparatus controls up to 60% of Iran's revenue and expenses. The other organizations respond to the Ayatollah Khamenei and accordingly to the Ayatollah's chosen agents who run these organizations (Kagan 2009).

Based on how the foundations work, we can reiterate that they are there to somehow influence on the power a president of Iran can have. It is a constant that a president cannot overpower the decision made by the Supreme Leader. Those who perhaps may pose a threat to the Ayatollah's power are already part of the same organizations who contribute to the cause represented back in the Iranian revolution. However, the other parts of the Iranian governing body still hold a great importance in the country's decisions. Both the president and parliament have effects towards how Iran is seen in the international arena. Recent events have shown that the Iran's politics are highly diverse and that their ministers, parliament and president interact in some cases in strong debates about Iran's policy and its implications. To some extend Iranian politics may play a confusing game towards other countries and how or who really is in power. The Supreme Leader indeed, oversees the political process but also lets the other areas of government take important decisions, such as the nuclear deal with the UN and Security Council member countries. We can also appreciate that there is some sort of balance of powers and each section is accounted for and definitely pursues Iran's best interests (Kagan 2009).

Although most countries that use parliamentary system, separate church and state, in Iran's case is the opposite and Iran is consider for some scholars as a theocracy (Kagan 2009). The regime may be seen as absolutist or autocratic but in reality both the representative powers and that of the Supreme Leader work together into providing what is best for the people of Iran (Kagan 2009). However, to understand Iran even more we have to look into how it's religion,

who represents the majority, Shi'ism, plays an important role (Kagan 2009). The Iranian regime has always included a group of semi-autonomous centers that even the Supreme Leader has no jurisdiction. In practice they contribute to the thinking of Iran based on religion. On the other area, Shi'ism has a different perspective compared to Sunni Islam (Kagan 2009). It promotes a system of hierarchy where the leader, in this case, Ayatollah Khamenei responds with discretion towards the political behavior of the country. To be able to understand some of the Islamic Republic behavior a thorough research must be presented on the area of Shi'ism (Kagan 2009). Iran acts very different compared to its neighboring Sunni majority countries and to why Ayatollah Khomeini decided to create the Islamic State of Iran (Kagan 2009). For the purpose of this thesis this area will be omitted, it holds great importance but it differs from the political theory stand point already argued.

The Nuclear Issue

Iran has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants. Iran has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also accepted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), making its nuclear program subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification. (Caravelli, 113)

Iran's first nuclear power plant, Bushehr I reactor was complete with major assistance of Russian government agency Rosatom and officially opened on 12 September 2011. The Russian engineering contractor Atomenergoprom said the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would reach full

capacity by the end of 2012. Iran has also announced that it is working on a new 360 MW nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin, and that it will seek more medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the future. (Caravelli, 114).

As of 2015, Iran's nuclear program has cost \$100 billion in lost oil revenues and lost foreign direct investment because of international sanctions (\$500 billion, when including other opportunity costs). (Caravelli, 115). Iran has another nuclear power plant this known as The Darkhovin Nuclear Power Plant (also known as Esteghlal Nuclear Power Plant) is a planned nuclear power plant located about 70 kilometers south of Ahvaz, Iran at the Karun river. One reactor is firmly planned. (Caravelli, 115). And Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) is a uranium enrichment facility located 20 miles (32 km) northeast of the Iranian city of Qom, near Fordow village. The site was revealed in September 2009. It is the second Iranian uranium enrichment facility, the other one being that of Natanz. (Caravelli, 115).

Politics

After several years working on its nuclear program and going off and on with the IAEA, the Iranian parliament finally comes to terms after the nuclear deal made with the U.N. Security council members. Iran's parliament voted to approve a resolution permitting the government to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). On October 11, 139 lawmakers voted in favor of the bill's general provisions, with 100 lawmakers against and 12 abstaining. And on October 13, Parliament approved the details of the bill, with 161 lawmakers in favor and 59 against. (Parliament Approves Nuclear Deal, 2015).

We must then take out what are the strengths and weaknesses of the deal. The following are the most important points which the government of Iran has stipulated. (Parliament Approves Nuclear Deal, 2015).

Strengths:

- Six U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran to be removed.
- Iran would reserve the right to keep its heavy water reactor in Arak as well as the enrichment facility in Fordow.
- Iran could continue to develop its missile program without restrictions.
- Economic sanctions on Iran would be lifted.

Weaknesses:

- The JCPOA would require Iran to do more than other countries who are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Iran would not be able to rapidly resume its nuclear program due to required technical changes, such as limiting the number of centrifuges.
- Inspection of military sites would create security risks.
- The deal may leave Iran more vulnerable to foreign intelligence.
- Certain sanctions would not be terminated until eight years after implementation of the deal.

The resolution, known as the Iranian Government's Reciprocal and Proportional Action Bill, specifies that the Iranian administration is to follow all he argued measures to make the agreement viable for the benefit of the people of Iran and their rights as citizens. The resolution also pointed out the importance of Iran's security and the protection of confidential material when the inspections are being conducted (Parliament Approves Nuclear Deal 2015).

With the help of the political coalition known as the technocrats, sponsored by president Rouhani, was able to win support against the traditional conservative group known as hardliners. With this, president Rouhani has been able to promote his agenda and finally make a promising nuclear deal with the UN and its Security Council member countries (Kagan 2015).

Analysis

The Iranian nuclear deal has brought great importance to the new way of how Iran must evolve itself into the international arena. The Iranian government as shown before, has had many issues confronting countries like the U.S., Israel and others due to their nuclear program and to what some countries around the world see as threat to security.

Here is where this Thesis may contribute to a different perspective, based on the information provided, we can expect that Iran has moved away from its previous stand as a confronting nation due to its hard line leaders like former president Ahmadinejad. After the election of present Iranian president, Rouhani, we can say that the international stand of the Islamic republic of Iran has changed into a friendlier behavior. Iran has probably moved to this stand due to its very nature of existence, knowing that a possible military action could be adapted by countries like the U.S., Israel and any other allied nations who probably see Iran as threat.

We can predict that future relations of Iran and the U.S. are of good understanding. Iran needs to behave accordingly to what the nuclear deal has put on to agreement. Again, it is a necessary behavior for the wellbeing of the Iranian government to continue with its transparency towards its nuclear program. Iran also needs to work on the other sanctions, which are related to other issues who are still being watched by many other countries. If the Iranian government wants

to become part of the international community, it must continue its work towards transparency and maintain the decisions both President Rouhani and with the help of his foreign minister, Mohammad Zarif had put in place in accordance with the U.N. and its Security Council members countries.

Concluding, we can say that Iran has maintained a classical realist approach towards its behavior; Iran keeps its state issues most important but also worries about its individuals and its domestic policies, which have reflected into its decision making. Based on Hans J. Morgenthau we can argue that Iran's international policies are the reflection of its own domestic policies, which reflect the struggle for power (Viotti and Kauppi 51). In another context we could argue that, based on Kenneth Waltz, if Iran possess a nuclear weapon it will iron or cover their image towards other states (Krause and Chubin 98). Above else, Iran seeks to maintain their security in a world they perhaps see as a threat to their regime (Viotti and Kauppi 63). However, realist ideas presented by Waltz do not accept the domestic policies and implications Iran carries when confronting the nuclear dilemma. In this case, Morgenthau's classical realist theory best represents the behavior of Iran. Domestic policies and the change of relations between Iran thanks to its recently elected president, Rouhani, have move Iran into the area of dialogue and diplomacy and not into the area of war.

Furthermore, based on a zero-sum game we can determine that Iran has maintained a win-win situation for its people and granted an economic boom after the nuclear deal was signed. Iran may see I bright future ahead and is already playing a major role in its surrounding area towards other local powers.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

Covering each chapter, we have appreciated the many situations in which the Islamic republic of Iran has faced the numerous implications in the international arena. We can start with the interesting relations it has had with the United States. In the early beginnings Iran had the support of countries like the United States to conduct its nuclear research and excel into what it has today. At the very beginning as shown on Chapter II, with the help of the Atoms for Peace Program, Iran got ahead in many areas of alternative energy. The Shah was a great ally of the U.S. as he was against communist ideologies and the pressure of the USSR. It was until the Iranian revolution that relations between the countries ended, and continue to be quite distant even when facing the nuclear issue. Chapter II also reflects on the classical realist international political theory, which explains the behavior of Iran and the U.S. have had recently concerning Iran's nuclear program.

As shown on Chapter III the relations with Israel during the Shah's time were at a very good paste. Both Countries enjoyed of trade and economic ties to many of its programs. But again it changes after the Iranian revolution took control of the country, since then the Iranian and Israeli relations have been up to the point of a possible military engagement and the support of Israel to every single sanction given to Iran. Things did really change around the time of Ahmadinejad as president of Iran, both him and Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were engaged into verbal battles and threats of annihilating each other's nations. Things have change in a minor way with presidency of Rouhani. Rouhani has focused more into trying to get Iran pass its nuclear inspections and reduced the tensions it had with Israel. Regardless of the approval by the international community of Iran's nuclear program, Israel insist that the whole

purpose of the Iranian nuclear program is to create weapons of mass destruction or nuclear bombs and destabilize the whole region. Chapter III reflects on the influence of how classical realist theory explains the behavior between the two countries. The two imposing their regional power based on their domestic agenda.

Another aspect also taken in consideration was the relation Iran has with Russia for the past decades. On Chapter IV, Russia plays both the good and bad sides of politics as it has helped Iran in constructing its nuclear reactors, like the one at Bushehr, which was finished very recently. On the other hand, Russia has supported many of the sanctions given by the UN Security council as being part of its security member states. It is quite contradicting the relation Russia has with Iran but at the end, both countries have benefited from each other since the Shah left power. Classical realism reflects on how their domestic policies and partnership have influence their domestic policies toward each other

Following the UN Sanctions on Chapter V, we can appreciate the numerous obstacles Iran had into becoming free of some of its nuclear sanctions and the numerous meetings that had to be postponed due to Iran's lack of compromising to the many regulations the IAEA had given to Iran for its government to follow. Thanks to the talks between Iran's foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his counterpart U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and the other foreign ministers of the UN Security Council member countries. They came to an agreement and signed the nuclear deal which Iran is hoping will bring back its economy and help with their national struggle. Based on classical realism we could see that Iran reacted based on its domestic policies towards the UN, in this case being the policies of president Rouhani.

The domestic implications of Iran were followed by how the nuclear program interacted with the government of Iran. Based on Chapter VI we can assume that Iran has change its internal politics in order to meet the nuclear deal regulations and even has change its stand towards the world specially towards other countries who it sees as enemies, like the US. One way to understand this process is not only that the supreme leader Khamenei decision affects the whole nation of Iran, but also how much president Rouhani and many of his party leaders have influenced the supreme leader into accepting the nuclear deal. After all, accepting the nuclear deal is the best decision Iran has taken in the last few years. After lifting the sanctions Iran will enjoy a better economy and can now take imports and repair its airplanes and machinery. Perhaps this may help the hard liners in Iran to cross to the side of Rouhani and become moderate politicians. In my perspective, men like Rouhani hold the key to a better Iran, an Iran that can be reasoned with and accepts international norms in some of its national areas, like the nuclear program. Still Iran is a country that needs to work on other issues, which still receive sanctions. Countries like The U.S. and perhaps other European countries hope for Iran to come to terms and change its many other policies.

Based on Morgenthau's classical realist theory countries like Iran will hold in great importance how its domestic policies play towards their international policies. Perhaps thanks to the political changes made after president Rouhani came to power, Iran was able to succeed into signing the nuclear deal with the UN Security Council member countries and showed the world that the diplomatic route sometimes holds a great opportunity to avoid a major conflict.

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