George Liska's Realist Alliance Theory, And The Transformation Of Nato

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ABSTRACT

In many aspects, political theory forms a subjective structure of this abstract science. Perhaps, it is due to the fact that unlike natural sciences or mathematics, social sciences often lack the privilege of testing the theories in absolute and unadulterated conditions. Nonetheless, such nature of the science allows for a certain degree of flexibility, when applying political theories to real-world phenomena.

Alliances and coalitions in international relations form the backbone of the theory, concerning IR scholars with two main questions: Why do alliances and coalitions form? And, what keeps alliances and coalitions together? As the core of my research, I examined NATO, as the most prominent and long-lasting alliance of our time, through the prism of alliance formation and cohesion theory introduced by George Liska. In particular, I explored the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over the term of its existence, and sought to determine whether Liska’s principles still apply to the contemporary situation, and in particular, how may the variables have altered the application of this scholar’s theory to our future understanding of alliances.
In its essence, this is a comparative study of the same alliance during the different stages of its existence. In particular, the comparison dissect such aspects of alliance theory as alignment, alliance formation, efficacy, and reasons for possible dissolution.

As a result, the study led to a conclusion, that despite the permutations around and within NATO, the basic realist principles that may explain the mechanism of this alliance’s formation and cohesion still apply to the contemporary organization.
This work is dedicated to my wife Roxanna, my extended family, and all those who saw me through my academic ordeal. To you, this is my sincere and genuine ‘Thank You!’
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has come under the examining eye of many scholars of international politics. Since the formation of this alliance on April 4th, 1949, its members have set their sights on protecting the interests of all the nations in the North Atlantic region. This was seen as an appropriate response to the expanding influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Those goals were mainly of a security and strategic character, but the focus of NATO has expanded over the years to directly and indirectly include political and economic parameters as well. The demise of the Soviet Union in the early 90’s rendered a majority of the organization’s goals and objectives obsolete. Gone was the threat of the Soviet invasion into the Western Europe, gone was the Eastern European buffer zone, which existed for nearly half a century, however the NATO started seeking to fill the Eastern and Central European power vacuum by allowing a number of former Warsaw Pact states to join its ranks. Today, NATO expansion debates are no longer limited to the discussion of strategic alignments, but have acquired a broader nature. The role of NATO is also being discussed in the context of international policy, macroeconomics, and its relationship with the European
Union. Many scholars ask a simple and straightforward question: Since the primary focus of the NATO’s strategic mission (which was the Soviet Union) has disappeared, what is the purpose of the alliance’s existence, let alone, its expansion?

This question of enduring cohesion among NATO’s member-nations presents an interesting challenge to alliance theory introduced by George Liska, which particularly focuses on polarities and dynamics of alignment, when major core powers attract weaker countries into an alliance\(^1\). The author’s logic regarding alignment in alliance formation is clear: a weaker state seeks protection from a stronger state, in response to a potential threat from an adversary, whereas a stronger state acts in self-interest, protecting the resources of the weaker state from incursion by the foe. The appeal of joining an alliance is furthermore shaped by the perceived balance between the benefits and liabilities for individual members. If the burdens prove to be in excess of the aggression or threat thereof, an alliance becomes unlikely. In addition, the efficacy of any particular alliance (aside from threat deterrence) also lies in its ability to prevent conflict and improve relations among participating states, as well as its capacity to provide tools of consultation for those involved.

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Thus, the nature of an alliance is clearly defined as a product of a polarity system, with clearly identifiable ‘poles’. That, not being the case in the contemporary world, leads one to assume that either NATO has transcended its role as a traditional defensive alliance, or Liska’s theory is due for revision.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE

OVERVIEW

Considering the theoretical nature of this research, basic research assumptions need to be established, which will be further elaborated later in this chapter. First and foremost, the nature and internal relations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be examined prior to the events of the pre-Iraqi war divisions. This approach is not due to the scientific negligence, but rather is for the sake of simplifying the research project. Regardless, NATO’s internal affairs following September 11th of 2001 reflect the endurance of the alliance furthermore. Second, the theoretical basis for this research would follow the principles, established by George Liska, where:

a. Weaker states align themselves with core powers for the sake of protecting themselves from a potential adversary, achieving status, and stability.

b. Defensive alliance formation (e.g. NATO) is often rationalized through the function of common ideology.

c. The efficacy of alliances lies in their capability to always deter the common threat.

d. Key reasons for alliance dissolution lie in unequal distribution of costs and benefits (gains and
responsibilities), as well as the disappearance of the common threat.
This explanation, albeit simple, serves as the underpinning for overviews of previous research in this field.

Since the nature of this research incorporates a theoretical and comparative perspective, theoretical sources form the backbone of this research project, and therefore heavy emphasis was placed on selecting publications that were both established, in terms of academic value, as well as modern enough to have taken the contemporary global situation into account. George Liska’s Nations in Alliance has won recognition among IR scholars worldwide. This 1962 publication discusses the main governing principles of alliance alignments, cohesion, dissolution, and effectiveness, as well as the future perspectives of alliances. The particular appeal of Liska’s work lies in relative simplicity and universality of its theories. Despite its relative age, the level of acknowledgement that this work has received establishes it as a useful foundation for any IR theoretical research work. Considering the nature of Liska’s text, and the focus of this research, the author’s work is directly related to the hypothesis of this project. Methodologically, any conclusions regarding the application and temporal stability of Liska’s theories would be
impossible to maintain, given that no alternative means of explaining alliance formation were examined. Therefore, a number of supporting theoretical texts were chosen, in order to test possible future hypotheses.

The Origins of Alliances\(^1\) written by Stephen M. Walt presents an interesting alternative to the previously discussed text. As the central hypothesis for his work, the author challenges the widely accepted theories of alliance alignment, based on exhibition of power, as well as ideological similarities as discussed by George Liska and Hans Morgenthau. He proposes that the proponents of the traditional approaches rarely systematically test their theories, and thus fall short in terms of explaining real-world circumstances. Particularly, Liska and Morgenthau discuss alliance matters in terms of balance of power, albeit their applicability of this concept is somewhat different. Stephen Walt argues that Hans Morgenthau’s work primarily utilizes subjective evidence to support its points in the IR cornerstone text Politics among Nations, and reiterates the necessity of balance of power functions in a system of several states\(^2\). In addition, Walt interprets Morgenthau’s arguments as suggestive of ideological solidarity as a valid aligning factor, and arguing that the more similar


\(^2\) Ibid, p.7
two states are, the more likely they are to ally\textsuperscript{1}. Despite Walt’s disagreement with Morgenthau’s and Liska’s work over the lack of focus, the author’s premise for alliance formation argues that balancing power against potential foes is far more acceptable than ‘bandwagoning’, and ideological solidarity is usually a stronger factor when a high level of international security threat exists, thus borrowing and narrowing down the broader concepts of the aforementioned scholars\textsuperscript{2}. Stephen Walt’s publication is indispensable to this project from a dual perspective. The theoretical arguments of his research helped me develop a more diverse view of the seemingly similar approach to alliance theory. In addition, it later served to support my findings, in terms of universality of the neorealist alliance approach.

Michael Sullivan’s *Theories of International Relations: Transition vs. Persistence* was a valuable theoretical source, and includes an alternative outlook on the field of IR theory by challenging the neorealist theoretical approaches in international relations theory, which dominate the field. Sullivan suggests that the neorealist and neoliberalist theories of today are not as universal in their application, as their proponents may assume. To be precise, Sullivan broaches the

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid, p. 263
topic of ‘chameleon’ dependent variables\textsuperscript{1}, arguing that many contradicting scholars simply ignore the fact that different theories are based on different sets of variables. Therefore, theories in IR would be better suited for their particular conditions and circumstances, versus arguing a consistent and unchanging dogma. In terms of contribution to this project, Sullivan’s work was similar in suitability to Stephen Walt’s work. The author’s interpretation of processes that lead to alliance formation expanded the range of my theoretical understanding. Yet, in contrast, Sullivan’s principles of ‘chameleon’ variables neither supported nor undermined my findings.

Contending Theories of International Relations by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is a well-known theoretical text, which was intended for use as a comprehensive textbook for advanced IR classes. The textbook includes an introduction and an overview of numerous approaches to IR theory, as well as an overview of contemporary approaches to international relations theory. Although the majority of the material in the textbook is not highly detailed and exhaustive, the text helped me set the stage for my work, by juxtaposing a

\textsuperscript{1} See Michael P. Sullivan, \textit{Theories of International Relations}, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 5
number of theoretical ideas, and explaining some of the basics in IR theory (i.e. polarity theory).

Since the focus of my research is to conduct a systematic test of alliance theories, this publication is vital to my work. Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen are the scholars responsible for collecting one of the most comprehensive compilations of essays on alliances within one single publication. Their text *Alliance in International Politics* is separated into three specific sections, which include the introduction to alliance theory, general theory, and aspects of alliances. The series of essays include work from such distinguished scholars as Hans Morgenthau, Christopher Bladen, Mancur Olson, and Karl W. Deutsch, as well as a number of other authors. For the purpose of examining traditional perspectives on alliances from a number of angles, this text comes second to none. The essay, particularly useful to this research, was an excerpt from Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations*, which laid out the precepts of the scholar’s theory on alliance formation.

Morgenthau viewed alliances as a necessity for maintaining balance of power in the international multi-state system. According to that hypothesis, states seeking to improve their own power standing on the world arena could resort to three
options: a build-up of armaments, adding their influence to that of other states, or preventing the adversary from obtaining the power of other states. Regardless of the choice between the latter two of the options, states that choose either one of those paths will pursue an alliance-oriented policy. Furthermore, Morgenthau made a distinction between collective security, and balance-of-power alliances. Where the balance-of-power systems place individual national interests before any joint action, collective security establishments are intended to protect collective interests, regardless of individual national interests. Morgenthau’s contribution to IR field of political science is immeasurable, due to the impact that it had on shaping realist thinking in the field of alliance theory.

Morgenthau’s work allowed me to direct the focus of my work towards a neorealist approach, and use Morgenthau’s arguments as a backdrop for Liska’s theory. In that manner, the article deepened my understanding of the matter beyond the material available in George Liska’s work.

A number of more recent articles regarding realism/neorealism theory have been published in scientific journals, such as The Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Organization, and World Politics. Stephen Brooks’ article

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2 Ibid, p. 92.
“Dueling Realisms” offers an in-depth perspective on theoretical differences between realist and neo-realist schools of IR thought. In particular, the focus is not on structural similarities, but rather on differences in regards to assumptions about state behaviors. To be precise, Brooks argues that “realism diverges regarding whether the mere possibility of conflict conditions decision making as neorealism assumes, or whether actors decide between policy options based on the probability of conflict, as postclassical realism asserts”\(^1\). This article does not primarily deal with Liska’s theory, but allows for multi-lateral examination of state behavior in regards to NATO within the field of realism in IR. Despite the slight difference in topics, I found to be the article helpful in understanding the two different camps of realist thought, and the subject of their divergence. Brooks' article helped to make the link between the NATO’s transformation, and the applicability of neo-realist alliance ideas to its longevity. After all, if the neo-realist perspective holds true, and perception of the threat is a valid reason for state alignment, then the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Russia would do nothing to alter the potential conflict conditions (since Russia still looms as a formidable threat).

Perhaps, one of the most interesting articles in the field of realist theory, and its relation to alliances was written by Dan Reiter, and published in the July 1994 issue of *World Politics*. Reiter’s article “Learning, Realism, and Alliances” serves as a comparative study of realist theory and learning theory, and the application of those theories to the principles of alliance formation in International Relations. Throughout the article, author seeks to prove several important points: not only that the weaker, smaller states use historical experiences as their ‘rule of thumb’ for alliance choices, but levels of threat (a predominant alliance formation explanation among realists) serves only as a minor factor in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, Reiter points out that one should not discard basic realist assumptions regarding decision-making by states, but rather use his findings as “an enlightened version of realism”\(^1\). What makes Reiter’s work useful in my case is his approach to state decision-making in alliance formation, and offers an alternative to Liska’s view. It is indirectly linked to the my analysis of constraints existing within NATO.

The issue of NATO transformation, following the break up of the Soviet Union becomes the next point of interest. *NATO Transformed* by David Yost is a text that discusses the post-Cold

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War transformation of this organization, and the modern challenges that it faces in maintaining itself, as well as following its primary goals. Understanding the organizational challenges and perspectives during the process of transformation is an important goal of the secondary step of this research, and the author makes an interesting case for the evolution of this alliance. Yost’s text was paramount to this research work, not only in the terms of its usefulness as a historical reference, but also as a book that expanded on the topics of NATO’s structural designs and transformation.

Sean Kay’s *NATO and the Future of European Security* is an analytical examination of contemporary circumstances surrounding the organization. The author uses empirical evidence to argue that despite the transformation of Europe after the Cold War, this region is still in need of NATO, as a balancing force for stability in the region. His concluding comments that NATO will continue to exist until the region reaches its goal of guaranteed peace offers an optimistic perspective, regarding this organization’s future. Although Kay’s work was similar to Yost’s in applicability to this project, the author offered a more analytical and subjective approach to the subject of NATO transformation, examining the variables of internal stability. Moreover, Kay’s reasoning and conclusions were very similar to
the conclusions of this project, and underlined the relative suitability of the latter.

Gale Mattox and Arthur Rachwald edited an outstanding collection of essays, regarding the issue of NATO enlargement, and the changing face of this organization under the title of *Enlarging NATO: the National Debates*. What makes this publication stand out is its multi-national approach. Articles, written by a world-wide array of scholars, touch upon the topic of enlargement from the perspectives of NATO members, potential members, as well as outsider-states, who are affected by the process. Such design allows for a number of viewpoints, in regards to professional perception of changes, which take place within and around the alliance. The collection of articles helped to expand the issues of this research beyond theoretical matters, by offering a number of diverse views and opinions on the matter. The diversity of this publication gave essence to the enlargement debate, and described how various scholars viewed the role of NATO, and the reasons for its persistence. The viewpoints above all gave this work the subjective material, needed to build upon my arguments on NATO’s persistence.

Journal articles have approached the topic of my research from diverse perspectives. Since I intend to examine the transformation of NATO, as well as transformation of the United
States as a core power, the articles selected address those particular topics.

One of the most fascinating pieces, in regards to theory and NATO expansion, is “Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core”, written by Todd Sandler in The Journal of Conflict Resolution. The article uses a simple cooperative game theory, vastly used in IR simulation, and applies several variables to modern day NATO. Despite its highly specialized nature, through the use of cost-benefit (gain-burden) analysis, the article arrives at some interesting conclusions, which can be related to Liska’s alignment theory, as well as general alliance theory. Sandler uses the analysis of mutual defense game as benefit-based approach, concluding that the share of separate gains among allies varies greatly depending on the size, location, and border attributes of each alliance member. That, in turn, influences the position and role of the members within the alliance. In particular, the author uses Germany as an example, arguing that this state is left at a bargaining disadvantage, as opposed to Belgium, or Luxembourg, much due to the nature of its location as an ‘outside’ ally. As such, Germany is left carrying a much higher defensive burden, as opposed to the latter members of NATO. What makes this piece relevant to my research is its approach to the subject of NATO
internal interactions and burden-gain sharing. Sandler, in a way, rationalizes Liska’s alignment and alliance formation concepts through game theory.

Robert J. Art’s “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO” is an analytical essay, published in the Spring 1996 issue of Political Science Quarterly. Like many of his fellow scholars, Art joins the debate on the realities of NATO’s transformation from a tool of collective anti-Soviet security into an active ‘security blanket’ over Western Europe. Furthermore, Art elaborates on the specific role of the United States within NATO: “America’s balancing role is a principal instrument that helps keep both external threats and internal fears from corroding Western Europe’s cohesion”. In many respects, Art’s article touches upon the same topics as Sean Kay’s piece. What makes it different and so useful for my research is the take on the role of the United States in the alliance. Art’s take on the U.S. role in NATO, coupled with Liska’s concepts of internal checks and balances shaped my understanding of intra-NATO politics, and aligning factors, before and after Soviet disintegration.

Robert McCalla’s “NATO’s Persistence after Cold War” unifies a number of topics within this research project. First of all, it debates NATO’s possibilities for action, following the break-up of Soviet Union, citing a number of historical events, which led to transformation of alliances. Next, McCalla turns to theoretical arguments of NATO’s persistence, arguing that alliance theory scholars have generally limited their scope of interest to reasons for alliance formation and cohesion, rather than reasons for alliance dissolution. Stepping away from the non-realist approach, McCalla turns to a ‘two-table’ analysis, exploring the internal constraints of the NATO members, besides just the external constraints, so familiar to the realist school of thought. The internal constraints, which McCalla addresses, are domestic policy pressures, exerted on the makers of foreign policy by their domestic political organizations and factions. Next, the author examines the application of organizational theory, and realist theory to NATO’s evolution, explaining the factors and outcomes which occurred according to those theories. As a result, McCalla’s examination of post-Cold War NATO contributed to understanding of the neorealist paradigm, supplementing it, rather than

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1 See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 446
rejecting its canons. In terms of applicability to my research, McCalla’s work is the most relevant piece of all, which helped me gain understanding of domestic pressures on NATO from a practical world perspective. Besides, since the topics of McCalla’s work and this research are closely related, it served as a reference on final findings and conclusions.

A number of other articles have been reviewed, and used to supplement my existing knowledge of the subject, rather than branching the existing knowledge. However, if one had to summarize the current level of understanding in my area of research, the outcome would be as follows:

a. George Liska’s work is recognized for its contribution to alliance theory; however, numerous alternative theories and views exist. Many scholars affirm that realist/neorealistic theory lacks flexibility, and could be improved by supplementing various circumstantial variables.

b. NATO has defied theoretical canons by continuing to exist in the absence of threat, but a new interpretation of alliance theory suggests that the narrow scope of realist theory is to blame for such miscalculations. McCalla’s and Sandler’s articles expand on the existing
theoretical knowledge by supplementing the theory with outside (non-realist) perspectives.

C. The role of the United States and the state’s strategy for NATO participation are inseparable from the fate of NATO. While some see the US as a military balancing power, others see its presence as beneficial to economic and diplomatic stability within Western Europe.
Although it may seem logical to overview strictly George Liska’s theory of alliances, it is quite unwise to take his realist premises out of context. Therefore, it is paramount that another side of IR theory be addressed – that being the structural-realist systems theory and the concepts of systemic polarity within systemic structures. Dougherty et al addresses systemic IR and political theories in great detail, and defines systemic polarity as the amount of political actors, and the “distribution of capabilities among them”. According to this notion, the specific polarity implies the structure of the system itself, and therefore would dictate actions within the system, which would further indicate how the actors within the system align along the poles. To be precise, polarity theory elaborates that major actors-antagonists tend to separate the international system into a number of sectors, whether ideologically, politically, or geographically. Those sectors and their capacities, in turn, dictate the amount of power that a certain state can impose on the other actors within the

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1 See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 100
Therefore, the systemic distribution of state capacities would also dictate its need to align itself with other actors in the system, which would then increase its influence among the major actors within the system.

Karl Deutsch and David Singer contribute a critical piece of knowledge to polarity theory by theorizing that an bipolar systems are more prone to war than multipolar systems, simply because the actors within the multipolar international system have more freedom to interact with other actors outside the confines of alliances, than those that are bound by blocs of coalitions imposed by the bipolar system. Simply put, more poles in the multipolar system maximize the number of potential interactions, but also reduce the intensity and range of conflicts, when those occur between the actors. Deutsch and Singer’s model also cites the potential for instability, due to lack of interaction, and thus reduced number of “cross-cutting loyalties that reduce hostility between any single dyad of nations”. The contribution made to the polarity theory by Edward Mansfield was also quite important to understanding the role of alliances and the nature of alignment in International Relations. This scholar suggested that there are implications in this field of theory that reach far beyond the number of

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1 See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 119
2 Ibid, p. 119
poles in the system, and related particularly to the
distribution of power among the actors in the system. In
particular, that relates to the stability of the system due to
equal distribution of power among major actors, and the
equilibrium is strictly dependent on the ability of one major
actor or the other to increase its capabilities, or form
alliances with lesser actors\(^1\). Understanding of polarity theory,
as it relates to modern day NATO is quite important, considering
that NATO was a stability-generating counterweight to Warsaw
Pact imbalance between the two major actors in the bipolar
system – the same principle, suggested by Mansfield.

Despite a wide acceptance of the basic premises of polarity
theory, many scholars disagreed on the efficacy of the Deutsch-
Singer paradigm on higher stability of the multipolar IR system.
In particular, the key criticism contends that with fewer major
actors and a higher level of confidence in the diplomatic
relations between the major actors, the possibility of conflict
among those actors would decrease due to a lower chance for
misunderstanding between the actors\(^2\). Scholars, such as Ronald
Yalem, had the opportunity to examine the emergence of China as
a third superpower, and further elaborated the implications of
multipolarity as a source of instability. By increasing the

\(^1\) See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International
Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 120

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 120
number of bilateral interactions the possibility for conflict would exponentially increase, therefore trusting the fate of international stability to each pole’s ability to prevent bipolar alignment against it, as well as resist the temptation to enter into such an alignment against another actor\(^1\). Studies, conducted by Singer and Melvin Small, could to prove or disprove a correlation between the principles of polarity and likelihood of war, thus rendering the debate unfruitful.

However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave scholars an opportunity to track changes in the structural composition of the international system. Particularly outspoken in regards to unforeseen changes has been John Mearsheimer, who contended that the disappearance of the bipolar division in Europe was the key reason for Balkan wars of the 1990s: “Although the particular wars that broke out had specific and unique cases and origins, it was the power imbalance that permitted such factors to lead to the outbreak of hostilities.” According to his theory, this transformation, coupled with re-emergence of the united Germany and the decline of US influence in the region, led to power instability due to establishment of a multipolar regional political system, previously deterred by military equality.

\(^{1}\) See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p.120
between the two key players in the region (Soviet Union and the US)\textsuperscript{1}.

The analysis of the neorealist-structural realist debate on the efficacy of polarity theory, as well as its iterations is not the focus of this work. Nonetheless, recognition of the principles of this theory would lead one to understand alignment principles further set forth in Liska’s alliance theory, and would give a keener eye for analyzing discrepancies in the theory, as applied to modern-day NATO, once set against the background of realist polarity theory. With that in mind, moving on to an assessment and analysis of George Liska’s theory would be most plausible.

\textbf{ALLIANCE ALIGNMENT THEORY}

In many ways, scholars are oftentimes concerned with the manner in which states formed an alliance, how it operated, or why it was dissolved, oftentimes omitting a key inquiry into how, specifically, the states wound up in a position favorable to alliance formation. After all, formation of alliances would not occur without specific pre-conditions, which necessitate

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} See Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. \textit{Contending Theories of International Relations}. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997), p. 123}
states’ movement towards a limiting union. In his theoretical work, George Liska identifies state alignments and realignments as primary intra-systemic movements of actors within the international system. By far, key factors for such movements are identified by the scholar as conflicts. When the security of the state becomes the chief concern of its leadership, and the conflict is sufficiently intense, the latter becomes the chief determining factor in alignment movements\(^1\). A critical reader may argue that economic and trade priorities often top conflict factors as key aligning causes, however, one must remember that this analysis targets a specific military alliance (NATO), and moreover, the staying power of trade factors is weaker, being restricted by fears of economic dependence and opportunities for outside trade\(^2\). Therefore, for the purposes of establishing theoretical basics, alliances are created against someone, and therefore, exist for someone’s specific purposes, with cooperation between states being a result of conflicts with rival states. Liska illustrates the dynamics of alignments between states through giving an example of a bipolar system, where core-power states are surrounded by weaker states, where the latter are consequently pulled into alliances. Albeit, such a move is nothing new to the international community, the

\(^1\) See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 14
factors underscoring such movement may be quite different from popular perception. In fact, the core states’ appeal does not stem from their ability to flex the iron muscle, since in its essence superior power does not attract. In fact, alignment between a core power and weaker states would come only as a result of a conflict (or a threat thereof) of the latter with another strong power. As a matter of fact, alignment without a conflict is unfavorable for either the strong or the weak state, stretching the resources and commitments of the former and threatening individuality of the latter. Thus, the influencing attraction of the superior power of a core state comes as a result of repulsion of the weaker state by another core state, and in its turn, the core state benefits from getting access to weaker state’s resources and from restraining its adversary from those resources. Obscuring this reason for alignment and alliance formation are the accessibility factors: “For such tendencies and objectives to result in alignment, the lesser state must be accessible to the potential ally directly or at least indirectly”. Simplifying this notion, Liska reaffirms that indirect access could be as limited as the stronger state’s ability to exert political or military pressure on the weaker

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state’s adversaries, and does not necessitate geographic proximity between the two potential allies.

Conflicts, which lead to alignments, may manifest themselves on a number of different scales: global, regional, and domestic. The emerging patterns in alignment will reflect not only the constraints imposed on actor-states by the dominant conflict (one, which is likely to change the entire system), but also will be shaped by conflicts that are key to specific subsets of nations. Liska underscores that in many ways those non-dominant conflicts reveal themselves in regional politics, and serve to ‘fill out’ the alignment patterns, and determine global alignments\(^1\). Therefore, conflicts such as the ever-ongoing Middle Eastern turmoil may not always be the dominant global focal point, but its regional significance to the global system has led to continuing involvement of powers from the outside of the region (like the United States, and Soviet Union in the 1960s). As influential as regional sub-systems can be on the terms of alignments, one should not lose sight of domestic factors as well. When a nation is subject to an internal conflict, the conflicting sides attempt to involve outside forces (read, core powers) in order to add feasible credibility.

\(^1\) See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) pp. 18 & 20
to their actions. Thus, when two or more internal parties to a conflict align themselves with different outside forces, the internal conflict becomes a part of an international system. If only one party to a conflict aligns itself then the opposing sides will seek to either neutralize the group’s influence and activity on the domestic scale, or will seek alignments with outside forces themselves\(^1\). One may ask the reason for such detailed explanation of alignment scales, but it is significant not to lose sight of three main questions of alignment and alliance formation: “why?”, “with whom?”, and “how much?” (in regards to strength of commitment). Since this chapter has already touched upon the questions of “why?” (threat deterrence is key), and “with whom?”, the explanation of conflict scales serves to explain the last question of “how much?”, as well as provide additional explanation to the previous questions.

As a recap of alignment reasons, allow me to touch upon the key points of this portion of Liska’s theory:

a. Alignments are the means for balance-of-power adjustments. According to Liska “alliances aim at maximizing gains and sharing liabilities”\(^2\).

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\(^1\) See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 21
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 26
b. States enter into alliances in order to prevent or reduce the influence of an opposing power, by maximizing their own capabilities, and are driven by national interests.

c. Alignments are performed between a core power, and weaker states, each side experiencing limited benefits from mutual security and shared resources.

d. Geographical proximity between allies is not a key factor, and deficiencies can be supplemented by ideological, cultural, or economic interests. What matters most is mutual ‘accessibility’ between allies, however subjective it may be.

e. Various scales of alignment (global, regional, domestic), as well as scales of conflict (dominant or non-dominant) affect the nature of the alignment and the amount of commitment to a specific alliance, resulting from an alignment.

Speaking generally, those five points summarize the basic premises of Liska’s alignment theory. It would be most sensible to move forth to a discussion of how and why alliances stay together after they form, and the theories of their efficacy.
GEORGE Liska’S PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE COHESION

Since it has been established by realist dogmas, as manifested in Liska’s work, that alliances operating within a systemic framework of international relations seek alignment with like actors for purposes of maximizing mutual capabilities and serving as a collective deterrent to potential aggression, it becomes necessary to examine underlying factors, which allow an alliance to perform its functions, cooperate, and remain united in doing so. Simply put, it is an examination of how gains are achieved, liabilities are distributed, and participation is enforced.

As a part of elaboration of cohesive factors in alliance theory, ideology serves as the primary focus of George Liska’s work on the topic. The author summarizes the goal of his inquiry: “If allies are to stay together despite setbacks, the grounds for alliance must be rationalized”¹. Naturally, this rationale seeks its foundation in ideology – a form of political ‘glue’, validating states’ reasons for constraining themselves in a union. Furthermore, Liska argues, the presence of common ideology serves to transform a previously cumbersome union into an operational social institution by outlining the foundation and limits of the alliance’s shared aims, so as to give separate

¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 61
states a common incentive for joint action, as well as to outline the character, intentions, and capacity of common threats and rationales for uniting against them\(^1\).

By and large, the characteristics of ideology, which underscore an alliance, vary according to their primary purpose. For example, offensive alliances are oftentimes driven by perspectives of mutual gain, overrun by ideological hegemony of the core state, whereas defensive alliances tend to use ideology as means of uniting the citizens of participating states into a fabric of friendship and common interest. Key to a successful transformation of perspective common goals into a working ideology is the core state capacity to stress common gains and interest, and downplay or ignore existing differences among the potential allies\(^2\). After all, efficacy of any alliance is strictly dependent upon its ability to carry out joint goals with minimal disagreement among members. Another goal of successful ideological implementation must address the two different positions – nationalist or associationist -- that potential allies may assume, when alliance is constructed. The nationalist position dictates that alliance ideology is a smart disguise for attempts at hegemonic rule over the allied states

\(^1\) See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 62  
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 62
by the strongest ally, as well as the resulting conclusion that such rule would be equally as unbearable as one imposed by the enemy¹. Associationist position is by far more pragmatic, which follows a somewhat impromptu approach to cooperation, which may or may not result in cooperation, which, in turn, may or may not become formalized. The two contrasting positions characterize not only the nature, which the alliance would assume, but also pre-conditions alliance cohesion and dissolution principles. In many ways, the nationalist approach has been characteristic of states without immediate and imminent threats to security (i.e. United States), and has galvanized important policy agenda within those alliances that such states did enter:

a. “[T]he struggle with the adversary must not be allowed to obscure the duty of self-assertion within the alliance.”²

b. “Once in the alliance... [the] power strives for supremacy, under the cover of solidarity, and practices expediency under the cover of principle.”³

The author also comments that the nationalist ally should be expected to leave the alliance first, or as soon as he can; oftentimes, separate peace arrangements, or redistribution of

¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 64
² Ibid, p. 64
³ Ibid, p. 64
liabilities will take place, in order to make such exit possible.

Associationist ideology, on the other hand, takes a more deliberate approach to establishment of formalized ties. The tendency of such allies to wait for special considerations from the stronger ally, ones that allow them to avoid triggering conflicts of interest with the other states. Most importantly, the manifested necessity for participation in alliance is reaffirmed by an associationist state through firm belief in making the alliance function\(^1\).

Clearly, the different approaches to ideology and alliance participation characterize the nature of the alliance itself, giving one an opportunity to make assumptions in regards to the future of the particular union. Moreover, the particular ideological approach to the matter of alignment and participation in an alliance, also condition the manner in which ‘business’ is conducted within the alliance; to be specific, the diplomatic style would vary according to the manner, in which a specific ally perceives its role within the alliance. Formal style generally pertains to a state, careful as not to demean its role and status within the alliance, where “informality is a

\(^1\) See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 66
luxury for the secure”¹, characteristic of states, which possess a greater level of security.

In their innate nature, alliances are a complex political structure: not in the terms of international politics, but in the terms of internal operations. To this extent, consultation becomes an important cohesive tool, and serves as an indicator of the type of relations between the allies. In some respects, consultation is similar in nature to negotiations, however, the amount of confidence in outcomes of a particular negotiation is oftentimes much higher than that for a consultation. Sharing similar goals with negotiations (that of settling a particular controversy to avoid direct conflict), consultation, however, is a more intricate process, which is characterized by a sense of community between allies². The notion of community is brought about through an arrangement of joint action within an alliance, and therefore, allowing the process to serve as a reflection of solidarity among allies, and cohesion within the alliance. On the other hand, the role of consultation as a form of restraint among allies also characterizes it as means of upholding mutual security. In a sense, in a formal security arrangement, which calls for unilateral collective action, allies place faith in consultation as a means of maintaining peace by preventing

¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 69
² Ibid, p. 70
individual member-states from jeopardizing the arrangement through unsolicited endeavors. As a result, consultation could serve as means of reassurance among members that the structure they belong to is based upon firm precepts of solidarity. Nonetheless, just like negotiations, consultation is a direct method for resolving differences among alliance members.

The result of any successful consultation, unless it is strictly formalistic, or serves strictly as means of information exchange, is a compromise. Essentially, compromise becomes an operational assurance of solidarity and cohesion within the alliance, and illustrates that partners in alliances will sacrifice some of the national interests for the good of the union. Cohesion of the alliance is then further promoted, when implicit compromises are established, and allies are willing to concede to each others unilateral decisions. Liska writes on this matter:

[T]he cohesion of an alliance grows as it develops the capacity to absorb fait accomplis, especially if previous consultation accomplished little or nothing.¹

However, when allies cannot come to an acceptable compromise, the alliance community can follow several patterns

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¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 86
of coercive behavior. One of the least obvious challenges that precede compromises (or their lack) is the ability of consensus building, not only among the members, but also on the domestic scale. Certainly, such circumstances would be dependent on the nature of the compromise, as well as on the particular system of domestic governance of the state in question: it is much more difficult to build consensus on an issue in a democratic state than in an autocratic one. Limits of cohesion are furthermore stretched in times of instability or in dire circumstances. When internal pressures overwhelm the domestic system, member-state may ‘lag’ in accepting certain actions or performing necessary feats. External pressures also play an important role in determining the course of action for a particular state, however, in a democratic system, internal pressures oftentimes overwhelms external influences. When compromises or tacit and formal agreements fail, fellow allies may exert pressure upon the ally in question by realigning themselves within the union, therefore threatening to isolate the one, responsible for the conflict.\footnote{See George Liska, \textit{Nations in Alliance}, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 112}

Matters of alliance cohesion are complex and difficult to assess, however, theoretical assessment would be easier to
follow if some basic principles of alliance cohesion are summarized, as follows:

a. Ideology defines the foundation of an alliance, rationalizing the need for its existence. Nationalist or associationist approaches to ideology define the nature of relations within the alliance.

b. Beyond ideological precepts, alliances are guided by formal agreements, tacit accords, as well as formal and informal consultations.

c. Internal and external pressures dictate states’ actions, elaborated by their commitment to the cause of an alliance.

d. When a member-state fails to perform its functions within the alliance due to pressures or fear thereof, other members can exert pressure by realigning themselves within the alliance, and therefore, posing a threat of isolation to a deviant state.

As a sum, cohesion of alliances is a diplomatic matter far more refined than any relations among the adversaries, requiring diplomatic balance and skill for lasting prosperity of the union.
Liska’s Theory on Efficacy of Alliances

“To be efficacious, alliance policy must fit the prevailing environment and the trends perceptible in it”¹, said George Liska in his assessment of the contemporary international system. More or less, this judgment establishes and defines the practical side of Liska’s theoretical foundations of alliance efficacy. His discussion of alliance efficacy particularly targets defensive alliances (as opposed to alliances formed for possible aggressive action), and examines the conditions, which dictate the way allies deter the common enemy, control the measure of the conflict, as well as restrain and coerce each other².

As discussed previously, reasons for alignment and ideological underpinnings will include joint capacities and increased capabilities, which in turn would serve to promote alliance cohesion. However commonsense those may be, the author warns of the counter-effects of such ideological approaches as prohibitive of any alternative measures of achieving their goals of national security (whether, in alternative arrangements, or on their own)³. Another externality of excessive measures of cohesion would manifest itself in decreasing national ‘face

¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 161
² Ibid, p. 116
³ Ibid, p. 117
value’ in the international political arena: bloc-voting in the UN on matters other than the immediate security concerns of the alliance would make the best example. The concerns of military integration versus independence dominated the political discourse among Western allies, challenging standing understandings regarding the level of involvement among allies and their capacity for individual actions, when national interests prevail. Nonetheless, Liska outlines three particular areas, which could be successfully integrated without entirely limiting individual national interests:

a. Military field command, coordinated through mutual consultation among allies.

b. Transportation, communication, and logistics facilities, once again, ruled by mutual consultation and command.

c. At last, specialization in individual contributions to the joint effort, to the best of nations’ abilities¹.

The author also underscores the importance for mutual consultation in strategy development among nations, drafting premises for evaluating measures of cooperation in the face of judging policy decisions. The characteristics, favored as cohesive factors, seemingly falter before the challenges of the

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¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 118
modern day diplomatic status quo. Size of alliances seems to matter less than their capacity for efficient operation, national self-assertion among allies, as well as their ability to be flexible in realizing their strategic goals as a part of the alliance. In a sense, where a realist approach sees the modern system as restrictive towards choices of alignment (few powers to align to), it gives way to intra-alliance flexibility, in regards to carrying out internal goals. Liska coins that particular approach as ‘selective or dual-purpose integration’, attributing to it greater capacity, simply because allies are driven to act together not because they absolutely must, but because they wish to do so\(^1\). Thus, the level of commitment towards a common goal, as well as level of alliance integration serves to control the span of potential or existing conflicts, as well as the adversary. Selective integration operates in select periods of activity, and can become an effective deterrent, demonstrating the ability of allies to raise levels of commitment, depending on the intensity of the conflict. Moreover, such matters serve to prolong the life of an alliance, giving it temporal durability in the face of conflict, and provocations from an adversary.

\(^1\) See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 134
Efficacy of dual-purpose integration is furthermore promoted by the arrangement’s ability to serve as an intra-alliance restraint, covering all three matters of alliance restraining function (adversary, conflict, and allies). Although formal provisions for consultation prior to conflict escalation have been common among allies, allowing foreign bases on national soil served as an efficient means of restraint among allies. Oftentimes, by imposing limits on numbers of foreign troops on its soil, a state can control its fellow allies’ ability to escalate a conflict with an adjacent nation. Although it does seem like a far cry from effective conflict prevention, and may give way to dissent among alliance members, military base regulations may compel compromises, strategic consultation, and restraint within an alliance.

Overall, the efficacy of alliances is a multifaceted matter, outlining alliance functions in regards to restraint of the adversary, conflict, and fellow allies, but it could be summarized in three of Liska’s precepts:

a. Alliances deter common adversaries by practicing flexibility, and protecting national interests on the world scale. Flexibility and durability of any alliance could be a successful deterrent in its own right.
b. States limit the scope of the conflict by deterring the adversary, as well as by effectively deterring other members of an alliance from escalating the conflict by means of consultation, compromise, and coercion.

c. States channel the actions of other member-states through controlling the amount of commitment to a particular issue, managing military resources, and contributing to joint military goals.

Having discussed the issues of alliance alignment, cohesion, and functional efficacy, it would be best suited to observe George Liska’s theoretical principles for alliance dissolution. After all, the volatile nature of modern day political systems serves to showcase best that dissent among members and potential dissolution may face just about any arrangement, regardless of speculated levels of commitment, and similarity in ideological constraints.

GEORGE LISKA ON ALLIANCE DISSOLUTION

The decrease in cohesion among allies due to the advances in warfare (less dependence on other allies) did not bring about the expected outcomes of multipolarization. In effect, the claims for multipolarity could be attributed to the changing
political situation, which somewhat decreased military
dependence among allies, however, Liska states that “adversary
alliance systems remain the key factors in the contemporary
international system”\(^1\). In many respects, Liska’s analysis of
the contemporary politics could be attributed to the nature of
IR politics in the 1960’s, when his work was published; however,
stipulations of future outcomes among alliances in the 1960’s
outline his premises for alliance de-alignments in general. As
a comparative examination of the Warsaw Pact and western
alliances, Liska stresses the important capacity of Western
allies to find premises for existence beyond those of the
autocratic ideological character\(^2\). That attribute could also be
added to the ability of Western nations to integrate their
military capabilities in the field – a feat that was
unsuccessful among Eastern allies. Therefore, the comparison
underscores the ability of Western nations to follow the
doctrine of alliance alignment and formation: the ability to
evenly or justly distribute gains and responsibilities. Thus,
an alliance (no matter how strong it is ideologically) may
suffer debilitating strains, or even disintegrate, when
distribution of gains and responsibilities no longer stays even.

When the situation is further complicated by internal restraints

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\(^1\) See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 169

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 170
among allies, and the balance of gains to responsibilities in thrown off, the organization will face a serious crisis\(^1\). The crisis, furthermore, could take several different patterns:

a. If the major restraining force or actor is the core power, that power may have to relax the restraints, or face the restrained nation’s ‘shake off’ of the restraints through the balance of military capabilities.

b. The ensuing international conflict (followed by relaxation of restraints) may be enough to cool off a deviating ally. If the ally pursues the conflict, rupture or complications are imminent.

c. If the adversary is not attractive to the restrained state, a conflict will take toll on both the core power and the restrained power. If the adversary has some means of attracting the lesser power, it is unlikely to sacrifice its national security to the strains of the restrictive alliance\(^2\).

As a result of his analysis of the Western and Eastern alliance systems, George Liska concludes that alliances in future diplomatic relations would face the need to accommodate growing national capacities, and find means of relieving strains

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\(^1\) See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 190

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 192
and controls among their fellow member-states without exerting rupturing force, which can bring about dealignment. On the other hand, relaxation of ties between allies should not allow the adversary to be able to divide and alienate them for the sake of future conflicts\(^1\).

**CRITICAL REVIEW OF GEORGE LISKA’S THEORY**

Although the systemic-realist theory of George Liska was by far one of the most well developed, and reflective theories of its time, the academic community of IR scholars continued the elaboration of his premises, as well as the creation of new ideas on the subject. A prime example of such elaboration came in the shape of a growing debate about the nature of realism, and the diverging paths that neorealism and postclassical realism takes. Although this debate does not directly focus on the specific aspects of alliance formation and alignments, it does weigh heavily on the issues of state roles and views, and their resulting actions in the world arena.

An article by Stephen G. Brooks published in 1997 in *International Organization* summarizes the key ideas of this

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dispute among scholars. First and foremost, Brooks differentiates between the two branches of realism by explaining how conflict conditions state actions: in the case of postclassical realism, states’ actions are believed to be conditioned by the probability of aggression, whereas in the case of neorealism, the same actions are conditioned by the possibility of conflict. In addition, differences exist regarding the precepts of temporal constraints on state decisions: neorealists argue that states, conditioned by their worst-case scenario decision-making, prefer short-term military concentration, and base their decisions on those short term goals; postclassical realists, on the other hand, see the trade-offs of short-term and long-term effects, and interchange them equally. Finally, the pessimistic approach to decision-making, favored by the neorealists, contends that military preparedness will always dominate the policy-making process. Postclassical realists argue, however, that states weigh the risks associated with potential security losses versus economic gains, and make rational choices accordingly.¹

In a nutshell, this serves to illustrate that Liska’s theory, which focuses so heavily on security risks and threats

strictly follows the neorealist path, omitting the detailed analysis and explanation of economic principles in alliance formation and alignment. In addition, such differentiation between the two branches of realism alone poses an interesting dilemma: can one single theory of alignment be applied to such a dynamic environment, or can this divergence serve as an explanation of a multi-systemic structure of European allied governance, manifested through the co-existence of the European Union and NATO?

Game theories, used by William Riker and Glenn Snyder, sought to illustrate the process that states go through, in search of security, trading off for potential encroachment by the allies. Nonetheless, Stephen M. Walt in *The Origins of Alliances* debated the reliability of their arguments, reflecting on the Snyder’s and Riker’s neglect of geographical and ideological factors in their pay-off analysis.¹

In a sense, Walt sought to further elaborate Liska’s aging theory in a publication, which would be more reflective of the recent political structures and behavior. Walt examines the alignment and alliance formation as a result of two different motions and initiatives by the actor-states. Alliance building, as a balancing behavior, could be seen as an explanation,

similar to Liska’s concepts of balance of power. On the other hand, Walt further elaborates on state behavior by introducing the concept of bandwagoning behavior, which he explains by the attractions of strength and potential spoils, where states join either for the sake of conciliation, or in hopes of potential gains. In addition, ideological initiatives may impose catalytic effects on alignment of weaker states to a stronger state, where the social and ideological structure of the state is easily penetrable\(^1\). To a degree, this may serve to explain the behavior of the states within NATO, if one were to juxtapose their level of cohesion to the principles of the alliance and their social and ideological penetrability.

In a sense, the greatest challenge of this research topic was to focus on the ability to explain the existing conditions, without practical potential to forecast the future developments in theory, as a result of world events. Michael P. Sullivan, in *Theories of International Relations*, writes:

Theory and ‘real world’ constantly badger and hound each other, the former straining to corral the latter, and the latter racing away, producing a necessary

tension in an ‘interactive’ mode because both dimensions...are dynamic\(^1\).

Being able to find the fine balance within this work between the numerous theoretical constraints and real world facts would mark the ability to test the hypothetical questions for either success or failure.

\(^1\) See Michael P. Sullivan, *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 16
Considering the turmoil of the 20th century international relations and diplomacy, few would disagree that no alliance or alignment has proven more enduring than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Established in mid-20th century, the alliance has seen its share of internal and external pressures, but has maintained and even expanded its power over the years. That survival has served as a factor for attracting numbers of scholars, seeking to explain the shifting character of NATO.

The years following the end of World War II were filled with challenges and tribulations for all parties to the conflict. The victors buried their dead and struggled to rebuild whatever was left of their shattered infrastructures. Solidarity in victory gave hope for new beginnings in diplomatic relations between countries, which were on the opposite sides of the ideological sphere. Those hopes were short lived. In Europe, external pressures for formation of a defensive alliance developed at a frightening pace. Following disagreements over zones of influence in post-war Germany, it became painfully evident that the path chosen for post-war development by the Soviet Union was far different from those of its former Western
allies. The expansionist ideological policies of the Soviet Communist Party, and the control that it had imposed on its Eastern European neighbors generated well-grounded fears in regards to Soviet Western expansion into the North-Atlantic states.

As a result, five Western European nations (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) settled on establishing a common defense system, and furthermore, promoting their international ties in economic, political, and cultural spheres, which would allow them to resist Eastern ideological, political, and military threats. The effective starting point for this alignment was formalized in the March 1948 Treaty of Brussels, which brought up adding seven other nations (Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Norway, the United States, and Canada) into this budding alliance. This was finally formalized in April 1949 in the Treaty of Washington, which effectively secured the North Atlantic European and North American community from the threat of Soviet aggression. Turkey and Greece entered into the Treaty in 1952, shortly followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. The commitment was to distribute the benefits and responsibilities of collective security among member-states. Furthermore, the

\footnote{The historical background of the NATO inception and development was obtained from the lastest edition of the NATO Handbook (See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), ch. 1-2)}
treaty restricted those states from entering any other alliances or agreements, which would conflict with the interests of this newly-established union.

The basis for the establishment of the alliance has been discussed in its historical context. However, from the perspective of theoretical means, the contributors to the alliance sought to create a universal security establishment, which would reach farther than that of just an anti-Soviet security blanket. Specifically, the NATO Handbook avers that “[t]he fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on the indivisibility of their security”\(^2\). The affirmations of mutual security, nonetheless, include individual sovereignty, and the freedom of the states, and establish mutual security guarantees in the meantime. Having established the conditions for cooperation among the members, NATO found it essential to move on to the discussion of the principles of mutual cooperation among member-states, by focusing on the benefits, responsibilities, and mechanisms of cooperation.

Although the NATO Handbook appears to be one of the most exhaustive publications on the matters of the alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4th, 1949 is the cornerstone for

\(^1\) See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 29-30
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 30
all NATO publications, which introduces one to the principles of this organization. The document consists of 14 articles, which discuss the official bases for alliance formation, goals, responsibilities, and cooperation.

First and foremost, the Treaty requires all of its undersigned members to the best of their ability to resolve all of their international conflicts through peaceful means, thus avoiding the danger of armed confrontation, as well as promote the ideological understanding of their democratic processes, as a means for promoting international stability. Second, the treaty categorically states that consultation among parties is required, when there is a credible threat to territorial security of any of the alliance members. Third, the Treaty obliges its parties to take part in individual or collective use of force, when armed attack on any of its parties occurs, however, the Treaty does indicate that the UN Security Council shall have ultimate power over any security matters in the region. Fourth, the Treaty establishes its priority over any previous arrangements between members and third parties, as well as bars its members from entering into any arrangements, which may potentially hinder its operation. And at last, the Treaty establishes a mechanism for its revision (10-year waiting period, following its ratification), and for official detachment
of its members (following a 20-year waiting period from the Treaty’s ratification), as elaborated in the Treaty’s text. Further elaboration of NATO’s foundation is available in the NATO Handbook, which addresses the concerns discussed in the North Atlantic Treaty as those of mutual security, consultation, deterrence, and defense\(^1\). The inter-governmental structures of the alliance (i.e. The North Atlantic Council, The Defense Planning Committee, etc.) were charged with the important task of carrying out those goals through constant consultation, coordination, and democratic means, and the nature of those establishments is dictated purely by their purpose.

Security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is perceived as a matter far more complex than simple preservation of members’ sovereignties. Essentially, the interpretation of security by NATO members is that of mutual stability, transparency and understanding among them, which in turn decreases potential threats from outside coercion or influence. Achievement of the security objectives is seen as a matter of effective crisis management, and far-reaching partnerships in various spheres\(^2\). Consultation (a matter so closely examined as a tool of efficacy by George Liska), as a means for extended cooperation and mutual assurance of collective defense terms, is

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\(^1\) See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 31-32

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 32
seen as an essential method for avoiding conflict among members, when defense and deterrence agreements need to be made. Over the period of five decades, the structure of the alliance has grown more complex, yet the primary goals for their existence remained similar.

DECONSTRUCTING THE PRE-NATO ALIGNMENT

Not considering all of the policy and structural permutations that took place within the alliance in the post-Soviet period, NATO was, in fact, a near-perfect example of Liska’s theory in action. Here, the questions of ‘why?’, ‘how strong?’ and ‘with whom?’ in regards to alignments in Western Europe of the post-World War II era clearly indicate that objective alliance principles apply. If one dissects the alignment, cohesion, and efficacy factors and variables, the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization falls well within the dogmas of objective alliance theory almost perfectly. Alignment of the future members could be seen as a textbook example of balancing of power within the region. In his introduction to reasoning on power-balance alignments George Liska states that “no abstract criterion can supply reliable guidance in either making or analyzing alignments without
reference to concrete conditions and conflicts”¹. Considering the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, following the division of post-war Germany, such conditions can be easily identified as a catalytic factor for pre-NATO alignment.

The matter of maximizing gains and sharing liabilities in national security matters of participating members echoes in the NATO Handbook’s chapter on Fundamental Security Tasks of the alliance: “NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means...”², as well as “[t]he fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among member states, based on the indivisibility of their security”³. Here, the excerpt from the NATO Handbook echoes some of the workings of the ‘gains-liabilities’ model: in particular, the existence of protective mechanisms, addressing the primary objective (protection), as well as an allusion to cooperation for the greater good, which, undeniably, aims at addressing issues of regional stability, and wide-scale pooling of resources. That shifts the focus from the reasons for the alignment, towards the mechanisms of the impending organization. It is now a matter of addressing how strong this alliance should be, as well as which members the alliance should include. The

¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 26
question of how much alliance cohesion is considered necessary, in order for it to fulfill its purpose thereafter would allow for a test of the feasibility of George Liska’s theory with a 50-year run of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Factors of gains and liabilities serve as prime indicators of the strength of aligning factors, since the higher level of security, economic, and geopolitical gains would always lead to a stronger alliance than a lower level, according to objectivist alliance theory. Addressing the issues of gains and liabilities Liska writes: “Stability is threatened by material and political burdens and strains flowing from alliance, while gains consist in economies pooling of resources and in material and moral supports by allies”¹.

The forefathers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have addressed this matter on several fronts. Certainly, the matters of economic gains and provision of economic stability, based upon those of collective regional defense are self-evident; however, the matters of liabilities are delicately addressed as to allow the participants in this organization the flexibility of political choice and participation, which would assure a reduction in material and political burdens, as discussed by Liska. Here, the focus of the NATO principles

¹ See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 30
shifts towards a democratically open model: “It is an intergovernmental organization, in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence”\(^1\), as well as “[t]he resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”\(^2\).

However, the alignment that led up to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization cannot provide us with sufficient detail, explaining the enforcement mechanisms within the alliance, but can serve as a helpful indicator of strength of the intent among the future members to form this alliance. Practically speaking, the origins of the alliance could not describe the ensuing mechanism that endured far past its intended lifetime.

The matters of gains and liabilities that were established as a part of the Treaty of Washington have been foreshadowed by the Treaty of Brussels, which was signed a year prior between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain\(^3\). Here, the groundwork has been established by declaring the parties willingness to seek cooperation in matters of democratic, political, and socio-cultural development. A model

\(^1\) See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 31  
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 31  
\(^3\) Ibid, p. 20-26
for military cooperation between the Treaty members, and principles of subordination to the UN Security Council were later borrowed and expanded for its inclusion into the Treaty of Washington. The checks-and-balances mechanisms of consultation (Consultative Council), and response to military aggression were adopted as well.

To a large extent, the circumstance, which led to the alignment of states towards co-operation and signing of the 1949 Treaty of Washington, and the required gains as well as the capability to carry the load of responsibilities, established the candidacy of future members in the alliance. The participants of the Treaty of Brussels have understood the necessity for a defensively stronger alliance, since the threat of the Soviet expansion was far greater, and the force far more formidable, than their initial goals of curbing any possible future German aggression. In that sense, the United States became a pivoting point for the organization of what has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Certainly, the United States were not the only member to complete this expansion of the Treaty of Brussels (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal completed the expansion). However, U.S. military capabilities, coupled with its new nuclear weapon capacity, and expansive resource base made U.S. participation eminent.
In addition, if we follow through with Liska’s principles of alignment to a core power, Liska’s model requires the existence of a conflict between the threat and a core power, so that weaker states find sufficient cause for a move towards a restrictive union. In the case of the Treaty of Brussels, Great Britain could be seen as the core power, with the majority of the mainland European participants in the union still rebuilding following the war. The conflict over the division of control over the post-war Germany, as well as the provocative Soviet chess game in Eastern Europe proved to be a sufficient enough cause to shift the role of the core power towards the United States. In addition, the conflict between the two core world ideologies (democratic and Communist) created a rivalry of global proportions, making the conflict (in terms of Liska’s theory) a dominant one, first on regional, and later on a global scale.

Having discussed the matters leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Washington, as well as the factors which influenced the character of the organization that formed as a result, allow me to examine the matters of cohesion and efficacy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Generally, the matters that serve as aligning factors among nations tend to carry their weight towards promoting alliance cohesion. Here, a growing antagonism between former wartime allies was rooted deeply in ideological terms, and disagreements over the spoils of the war. The bonds that existed and were strengthened between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain during their meeting in Yalta were no match for ideological disparities of the post-war period. Growing anti-Communist sentiment was fueled by the division of Germany, and the Soviet ideological and military expansion into Eastern Europe. Here, the ideological differences between the East and the West acted as a catalyst for search of common interests among those with similar ideological understandings.

Therefore, Liska’s primary factor for alliance cohesion—that being rationalization, on ideological grounds—appears early in NATO’s history. The matters of ideology are pre-eminent in NATO’s purpose to such an extent, that their importance is reflected within the first few lines of the Treaty of Washington, as a part of its preamble. The preamble assures that parties to the Treaty of Washington intend to live in peace

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1 See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 61
with other nations and “are determined to safeguard their freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”\textsuperscript{1}. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Liska’s understanding of ideology is not only that of ties that bind, but also that of measures taken to turn an alliance into a ‘living’ social institution, which may relieve some of the burdens, imposed by the alliance, and create a wider justification for uniting against a common threat\textsuperscript{2}.

By encouraging and promoting open political dialogue among the members of the alliance, as well as strengthening of socio-cultural and economic ties, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intended not only to promote stability based on common ideological principles, but also to offset the liabilities of being a part of this alliance by expanding the range and nature of its gains. By establishing a Council with equal representation for members, the Treaty of Washington utilized the ideological principles that its signatories set out to protect, thus promoting ideological causes even further.

Ideological constraints were made strong for a number of reasons. First of all, the allies established the reason for cooperation between each other. This proved to be beneficial to

\textsuperscript{1} See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 527
\textsuperscript{2} See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 62
the good of the alliance from two perspectives: stronger allies received reassurance that the weaker allies would adhere to their commitment, as long as their national democratic process prevailed, whereas the weaker allies were safeguarded against the possible hegemony by stronger allies through democratic checks and balances. Second of all, the participants’ reliance on democratic principles that found its reflection in the 11th Article of the Treaty of Washington secured the United States as a major ally by giving national democratic processes an upper hand over commitments to the Treaty: “This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes”. In a manner, that stance provided leeway for America’s usual isolationist tactics, and allowed greater solidarity among allies. The United States tried its utmost to transfer the majority of liabilities associated with this new alliance to Western European shoulders.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the United States led the way in promoting creation of West German armed forces, as an attempt at decreasing their share of the burden. Such armed forces generated ferocious opposition from the European side, particularly, at the hands of France. However, after a number of

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revisions, the framework for a restricted West German army was devised, and later ratified. By the beginning of the 1950’s, the Western European community strengthened their mutual defenses by inviting Greece and Turkey into the union. Uneasy and reluctant first steps establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization turned into a firm commitment from all of its participants in great part due to rising tensions between the Communist and the democratic world. The Soviet interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and – later – in Afghanistan served to strengthen the Parties’ resolve, and commitment to common goals. The issue of nuclear deterrence, oftentimes overlooked as a cohesive factor, played an integral part in the alliance’s development. David Yost’s *NATO Transformed* touches upon this issue: “[A] primary issue throughout the Cold War was the credibility of what came to be known as U.S. ‘extended deterrence’”\(^1\). As opposed to ‘central deterrence’ (or deterrence of threat to the U.S. itself), ‘extended deterrence’ was based upon the notion that U.S. nuclear capability, coupled with the nation’s commitment to the Treaty of Washington would curb any threats of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies in the face of possible U.S. nuclear retaliation. Although, the multilateral nuclear cutbacks of the early 1990’s limited the

type of European-based nuclear munitions to gravity bombs, extended deterrence still serves as a valuable cohesive factor within NATO.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, theoretically, alliance cohesion is a matter of ideological foundations, diplomatic agreements and accords, and the balance of gains and liabilities. Therefore, the ideological foundations, reinforced by Soviet expansionist tactics served as the primary cohesive factor. Provisions of Article 11 (‘provisions carried out by Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes’) of the Treaty reduced the liabilities. Alliance gains, sought in collective defense, were secured in Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense … will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith…such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”\(^1\).

All of the aforementioned facts meet and exceed Liska’s expectations for alliance cohesion. The Treaty of Washington

\(^1\) See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), p. 528
was composed in perfect balance, and succeeded in establishing a lasting union of mutually-involved nations, based upon principles of solidarity and democracy.

**PRINCIPLES OF EFFICACY IN NATO’S OPERATIONAL STRATEGY**

NATO’s strength and operational efficacy as a defensive alliance greatly supports the notions put forth in Liska’s work. Particularly, the counter-effects of cohesive factors have become self-evident over a period of years. The scholar’s observation, regarding the decrease in national identity of nations involved in highly structured and cohesive alliances manifested itself in NATO’s UN voting practices, and other world matters. In part, such behavior became an indicator of solidarity among the allies on world matters, but on the other, served as a sign of subtle coercive pressure from the core power’s side.

Such a coercive push, as you may recall, set in motion a number of activities within NATO’s early history. In many ways, there were attempts by the United States to shift its share of the burden further onto Europe’s shoulders. To some extent, such U.S. behavior echoed its traditional isolationist policies, but largely reflected the US domestic political attitudes
towards any substantial involvement into the alliance. David Yost, in his recollection of NATO’s early years, quotes Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s response to the Senate committee hearing on whether there would be substantial material commitment by the US to European collective defense: “The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute ‘No’”\(^1\). Such a climate, certainly, supported any existing conception of national freedom to make sovereign choices and decisions in matters of foreign policy.

However typical those notions have been, the mood changed with the 1950 North Korean invasion, which was seen as nothing less than another Soviet expansionist move. The political shift brought about organizational changes among new allies. The proposal by the United States of the European Defense Community (finally established in 1954), as well as Dwight Eisenhower’s appointment as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe were the first steps in establishing efficacious organizational structures within NATO\(^2\).

Liska’s theory on alliance efficacy outlines three key areas of integration, which have little interference with national interests of alliance parties: military field command, transportation and logistics, and individual specialization of


member-nations\textsuperscript{1}. In a sense, the integration of military resources was the primary item on the agenda of this defensive alliance. For this purpose, the Military Committee was formed, which included Military Representatives (acting on behalf of respective Chiefs of Defense, who constitute the highest military representative level in NATO) from all participating member-states. The responsibilities of the Military Committee include making decisions with regards to defense issues, and recommending defensive strategies and plans of action to NATO’s Strategic Commanders in NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe\textsuperscript{2}. Military and civil subordination within NATO is highly reflective of the goals and principles indicated in the Treaty of Washington. In particular, the structural dependence on the power of national authorities underscores any organizational behavior within the alliance. According NATO’s civil and military structure, the national authorities have the ultimate say in all final policy decisions of the alliance’s councils and committees, as reflected in the illustration below\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{1} See George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 118
\textsuperscript{2} See NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: 2001), pp. 239-240
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid, p. 517
Streamlining of the policy decisions from specialized committees to national authorities became the first symbol of NATO’s efficacy in performance of its primary duties.

Matters of logistics, transportation, and material support were addressed through the organization of centralized means of material distribution and coordination. NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, and its Agency carry responsibility of managing armaments supplies and matters of maintenance in collective Allied arsenals. Linked with a number of groups and organizations, which are responsible for matters of military and production logistics, air defense and traffic management,
communication, electronic warfare, meteorology, education, and research and development, that portion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ensures that the efforts of collective defense are well backed and its supply lines are well-coordinated\(^1\). In a very direct way, such integration of defensive and diplomatic efforts within the alliance is a good demonstration of Liska’s principles of ‘dual-purpose integration’\(^2\). Here, the alliance members choose to act together, and are not driven to collective action through some sort of a coercive conflict. Through provision of instruments of consultation, such a system imposes democratic checks-and-balances upon its participants, thus limiting the scale and number of potential regional conflicts, and, nonetheless, offers quick reaction means for defensive cooperation, should the need arise.

Efficacy of any alliance is judged by its capacity to deter aggressive or coercive action by its adversary. As mentioned in the previous chapter, flexibility and durability of any alliance can serve as a successful deterrent, and therefore, establishment of flexible and durable organizational structures is paramount not only to the survival of an alliance, but also to its deterrence potential. In this matter, the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization overcame all odds. The limitations of the democratic checks-and-balances imposed by the consulting bodies, and ultimately, restricted by the national authorities effectively deter and coerce any members of NATO from escalating any external or internal conflicts. The best example of such operation would be the mitigation of the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

However complex the structure of NATO’s operational mechanism may be, it has been constructed with durability and flexibility in mind, yet provides enough leeway for successful conflict mitigation. In terms of Liska’s tools of alliance efficacy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents a diplomatic success story.
CHAPTER 5: THE BEGINNINGS OF TRANSFORMATION

The materials leading up to this point were concerned with outlining the theoretical background behind NATO’s inception, cohesion, and efficacy, as well as its historical premises and organizational principles. This chapter examines the transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its parts, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to apply the same theoretical principles to the newly-transformed structure, in order to test their applicability.

The post-Soviet capitalist world has experienced a major change in its security concerns, as well as shifts in its diplomatic posture. Many policy analysts argue that the world has finally entered a transitional phase, when force is no longer a prevailing factor, and the rule of law is used to resolve any or all disputes and disagreements. As an example of such shift, supporters of that theory cite the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, as the first step towards true European unification, whether in political, defensive, or economic matters. In a sense, that view displaces the Realist perspective, which insists that security and balance of power concerns are necessary, in order to maintain the status quo in contemporary
foreign policy. Particularly, the article by Robert J. Art stresses the tacit understanding among leaders of Western European nations that NATO is needed as a balancing and restrictive tool for parties in the alliance. The unification of Germany and its rapid economic growth raised concerns within the German government, regarding possible reaction against Germany by its neighbors (perhaps, an intra-NATO balancing realignment), as commented on by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1995. That particular comment convinced Art that Realist matters of power balance and security are still very pertinent in contemporary European politics. Art’s take on such unification moves, as debates on plausibility of the European Political Union (EPU) or the European Defense Identity (EDI) is clear: they only prove that European dependence on the unified, yet pluralistic security community is a manifestation of the European elites’ fear of disintegration of internal security arrangements. After all, history shows that the general efforts of the United States to unify Europe, for the sake of the greater good and economic ‘better’, served well to construct a balanced and secure Western European community, one which was

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3 Ibid, p. 2
previously riddled with nationalism and multilateral foreign policy initiatives. On the other hand, since the mission of NATO was to curb potential Soviet aggression towards the West, it has accomplished far more. It has created an internal bond and regulation, like that of a collective security arrangement, designed to mitigate conflicts between involved parties¹. From the standpoint of Edwin Fedder, in his book NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance in the Postwar World, the unique nature of the alliance created benefits and gains for all parties involved, including the U.S., which benefited from a stable a loyal Western European community.

Although, it would be foolhardy to assume that years of peaceful co-existence between such neighbors as France and Germany would immediately revert to nationalist violence, in the event of US withdrawal of its European presence. What does become possible, according to Art, is a spreading multilateralism in numerous areas of previous cooperation. This would lead to nothing less than the wasteful expenditure of national funds plus reversion to regional power politics². Thus, the entire principle of indivisibility of

regional security is abandoned, unless a core power from outside the region is present.

This is a paradox in itself, yet a paradox, for which there exists an explanation. First, the Realist perspective on importance of national security is apt, if one considers the historical prevalence of nationalist power plays in Western Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Second, the concepts of alliance cohesion and efficacy outlined by Liska find their niche in the contemporary European environment. Although, the matters of deterrence of outside threats still exist, the issues of internal balancing and alignment take charge. Where initially, NATO’s role as a Western European security blanket prevailed, this laid a foundation of continuing diplomacy for promoting continuing solidarity beyond the existence of a common threat. If one were to agree with such scholars as Robert Art, then Europe needs NATO now just as much as it did in 1949. To a very large extent, such a view supports traditional Realist view on alliances, although it shifts the focus from the existing arrangements from external threats to internal diplomacy. In addition, the theories put forth by Stephen Walt suggest that the mere perception of possible danger can be a cohesive or aligning factor. Sean Kay writes on NATO’s persistence: “Fear of instability and the unknown can be as much
a unifying factor as a clear and present danger.”¹ Here, once again fears of instability due to the growing influence of a united Germany come into play, while inclusion of some Central and Eastern European nations into NATO is seen as balancing Germany’s influence.

As an addition to the Realist emphasis on the importance of security as a strengthening factor, some analysts, such as Robert McCalla, add additional factors, reinforcing the NATO’s persistence following the demise of the Soviet threat. Particularly, McCalla points out that for alliances with a high organizational factor (such as NATO), the impact of a threat disappearance would be mitigated, by the existence of an organizational structure that supports the alliance. In addition, McCalla argues that the factors favoring dissolution would also be mitigated if an alliance performs other functions beyond its central goal of collective defense². Here, the author makes the case for institutionalism and its prevalence in contemporary international affairs: although NATO could happily claim that it has accomplished its goal, while its members expanded the range of their concerns, since there is the

possibility of utilizing a well-oiled and seasoned international machine to deal with any new threats.

The argument suggests that NATO could utilize existing methods and principles to deal with emerging security concerns, re-organize (if necessary), in order to meet new requirements, and use its diplomatic ‘weight’ in order to fulfill policy goals in its interaction with other actors\textsuperscript{1}. Thus, the high degree of organization and commitment to institutional principles becomes a sure sign supporting NATO’s longevity. In addition to the institutional component of this theoretical approach, McCalla proposes that a ‘regime’ nature of NATO’s external and internal policy attitudes, which reduce parties’ costs and liabilities by providing settled behavior patterns for all participating members, could also be a contributing factor to the organization’s durability\textsuperscript{2}.

Although it would be quite early to reach a conclusion with regards to NATO’s longevity, based upon a limited analysis of theoretical assumptions of policy scholars, without any practical assertions of their accuracy, those assumptions can be summarized nonetheless. As mentioned previously, in the analysis of Liska’s theory, alliance characteristics are

\textsuperscript{1} See Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 50-3 (Summer, 1996), p. 464
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid, p. 462
discussed according to its principles of alignment, cohesion, and efficacy.

In this specific case, fears of internal re-alignment become a critical matter for one of the allies, seeking to maintain NATO presence in Europe as a balancing tool. In addition, efficient organizational and institutional parameters, which were characterized in the previous chapter as signs of flexibility and durability of the alliance, are present, thus signifying that NATO was built to outlast its opponents. In addition, members of NATO may find (as institutional theory suggests) that maintaining, and restructuring the current union may be less costly than organizing a completely new structure. Therefore, theoretically, post-Soviet NATO is characterized by issues of internal security fears, organizational stability and durability, and, since internal security fears dictate a need for such an arrangement, significant cost-benefit advantages over completely new arrangements.

A new perspective on NATO’s organizational and institutional character arises, as that of an international institution, rather than simply a limited regional security arrangement. By characterizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a security institution rather than a security arrangement, this places a more formal nature upon the
organization’s practices, and generally identifies the institution as the one responsible for the security of its respective members. Therefore, institutionalism establishes NATO as a more long-lasting and encompassing arrangement than the previously seen unilateral defensive arrangement.

This offers a conflicting view from a traditional Realist approach, which considers institutional arrangements as more of a secondary factor, rather than a primary contributing factor to collective security. In lieu of power and economic competition among alliance members, even the strongest of former allies may come to odds on valid issues, which indicates that institutional arrangements alone would not serve to prevent such conflicts. However traditional that approach may be, proponents of institutionalism suggest that the true value of international institutions’ capacity to serve as a provision for international security can be readily tested and proven: their worth as security providers is assured by their establishment of norms of international cooperation beyond traditional rule of power. Historically, however, some of the most benignly conceived institutions failed to protect their members from aggression through collective action, the best example of that being the League of Nations. This was exemplified by the failure of the
organization to enforce its Articles upon Italy during the Italo-Ethiopian crisis of 1934-35\(^1\).

The nature of restructuring decisions within NATO, following the end of the Cold War, led many analysts to believe that the power of the institution was on the decline, as evidenced by its 'ad hoc responses to the changes in the international environment'\(^2\). The realist-institutionalist debate permeates the post-Cold War nature of the alliance, perfectly setting up the grounds for the analysis of its transformation.

**THE TRANSFORMATION IN ACTION**

David Yost dedicated his entire publication *NATO Transformed* to NATO’s shift from traditional security enforcement arrangement towards its new role in the future of Europe. Yost touches upon a number of similar concerns voiced by a number of his colleagues following the end of the Cold War: that of US involvement in the European security affairs, and that of balancing Germany’s influence, as well as maintaining interest in joint European defense planning, as opposed to nationalist efforts. However, the bulk of his work is dedicated


to NATO’s cooperation with Eastern European countries, matters of peace and security maintenance within and outside the region, as well as potential for the change in the nature of this security arrangement.

Besides those primary goals, the leadership of the alliance was faced with the collapse of the Soviet empire. It also sought to drastically reorganize its internal structure, in order to promote solidarity among the existing allies, as well as promote the emergence of the European Security and Defense Identity. A greater level of flexibility was also sought: one aimed at maintaining combat readiness in non-traditional NATO roles, such as crisis management, and co-operation with non-NATO countries.¹

Albeit such a shift in interests and structural characteristics might seem surprising to some, it indicates a number of very important movements, which took place within the organization. First and foremost, the move towards co-operation with former enemies also aims to promote stability. The standoff between former adversaries would no longer have the same effect that it did in the early years. In addition, making the friendly terms formal would establish an institutional relationship between the alliance and numerous non-aligned states. Second, the shift in the alliance’s defensive role,

towards a peacekeeping and crisis-management model maintained
the pressure on the allies to continue the organization by re-
defining the security threat. And at last, structural push for
solidarity and flexibility is aimed at promoting the alliance’s
durability, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, since
the staying power of the international organizations is very
often predicated on those simple characteristics. Allow me to
elaborate on those matters.

For members of NATO, collaboration with Eastern European
nations signified a new phase of European development. However
stable the Soviet Union could have seemed, its presence is no
longer a factor in NATO’s security policies, and prompted a
search for new definition for Europe’s vision of stability and
peace. The general objectives of “just and lasting peaceful
order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees”\(^1\),
as addressed by the Harmel Report lost its mark, with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, re-unification of Germany, and
the process of democratization in Eastern Europe.

Seemingly, the number of opinions on the future of NATO
outnumbered the number of realistic solutions. However, the
general attitude of solidarity prevailed: NATO could accomplish
the same feat of integration in Eastern Europe in the early

\(^1\) See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International
1990's, as it had done in the Western Europe during the early 1950’s\(^1\).

Moreover, NATO members maintained their focus on their traditional matters even more vigorously, curbing any possibility that the disappearance of the collective threat may allow the re-emergence of historical Western European power arrangements. Yost comments on this subject: “That the Allies are in fact aware of such risks, intend to hedge against them, and wish to sustain the Alliance’s traditional functions while undertaking new missions has been evident”\(^2\).

For the first time, since the establishment of NATO in 1949, the Kantian formula of indivisible security re-emerged in negotiations between Russia and NATO in 1997, aimed at grounding that formula in common democratic values, norms, and commitments\(^3\). Organizations, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace reached out beyond NATO’s traditional scope of cooperation, providing vehicles of collaboration for NATO members and their non-NATO partners. Among those organizations, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) has seemingly reached its vast range of goals, which were

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\(^2\) Ibid, p. 93


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not limited to simple defense cooperation, but also incorporated humanitarian issues, as well as disaster management, and search and rescue.

Nonetheless, NATO’s push for stability re-emerged once more, when the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed its commitment to consult on the matters of security with any PfP participant, whenever there is a perceived direct threat to that partner’s security or independence. In practice, PfP was able to achieve enormous levels of cooperation, including combat and crisis readiness among the partners through logistical integration of communications, collective defense planning, and burden sharing among partners in the matters of bringing the new partners up to the standard level of readiness.

Enlargement of NATO became the culmination of the efforts of the alliance and the world community to promote stability in Europe, as well as to promote cooperation among former adversaries¹. Although the advocates of enlargement were highly diverse, the general rationales for such a move were grounded in promoting democracy in the reforming Eastern European community, as well as establishing common standards for collective efforts among former adversaries, in order to bring the latter to the level of consultation, exemplified by their Western European

counterparts. However long-winded such analysis of NATO’s efforts for cooperation with former enemies may be, only one particular goal characterizes the alliance’s efforts: lasting pan-European stability.

Although, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a deterrent of the Soviet aggression and coercion became non-existent with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation remained a factor in reconfiguring the new security arrangements. Prior to that, alliance doctrine limited the scope of NATO’s security engagement to the territories and forces of the NATO members. However, mainly due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, redefinition of that doctrine and the limitations of NATO’s engagement occurred. Particularly, the focus has shifted towards establishing and maintaining stability and security in Eastern and Central Europe, and preventing any internal and external conflicts in the region. The potential for an armed conflict growing beyond the borders of the initial engagement, and spilling over into NATO territories forced the change in NATO’s defensive strategies. As a result of this policy shift, the alliance’s involvement in the early 1990’s Yugoslavian crisis was the first actual test of the new arrangement. When all diplomatic attempts at containing
and pacifying the conflict failed, NATO got involved in establishing peace in former Yugoslavia in 1992. Those efforts were not simply directed at maintaining NATO’s prestige in the eyes of the world community, but also became direct means for the conflict containment and regional stabilization that has been NATO’s forte for several decades, and now in a new era.

The role of Russian Federation in the conflict is paramount. In the earlier period of the conflict, Russian policy indicated a full support of Western efforts in the region. Swayed by internal pressures, the Russia’s accommodating tone has changed to a neutral position, and established a pro-Serbian attitude. Such likely shifts in Russia’s foreign policy have prompted concern from the European community, and to some extent, they allowed for a continuation of NATO’s role as a balance-of-power mechanism.

When it became evident that crisis management and peace operations were now the added challenge, NATO proceeded to reorganize its assets and structures into more flexible and independent entities. In particular, the establishment of the new Combined Joint Task Forces as an attempt to separate the burdens of various engagements between allies and to avoid maintaining a single complex system. The key phrases have now

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become "timely response" and "flexibility", and "separable but not separate military capabilities".¹

The growing desire among Western European nations (France, in particular) to establish a European Security and Defense Identity was an attempt to improve the balance of the European-American diplomatic relations. It has encountered a number of hurdles, such as the lack of European logistical capabilities and debates on the role of ESDI, most of which have already been overcome by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This, therefore, serves as an assurance that NATO has slowly, but steadily assumed its new role as the guarantor of stability in the European region, and possesses a greater capacity and success potential than any of its potential successors.

However contentious the issue of NATO succession has been, the prospects for further integration into the fabric of the European community are positive from numerous perspectives: its role as a balancing organization has effects internally as well as externally. NATO is reforming to meet new security challenges, and seeking to promote regional stability. All of those matters meet with various levels of support from a majority of the participants in the debate over NATO’s feasibility, its enlargement, and its future. Gale Mattox, in

an essay analyzing the NATO debate, concludes: “Reaching out to those countries not formally members, it has the ability to stabilize and secure peace on the continent”¹.

If NATO intends to follow through with its intended goals, and faces its challenges, in spite of continuing criticism, several different avenues for its efforts should be addressed. Those encompass its reduced focus on collective defense matters, continuing participation of the United States in European affairs, understanding of limitations of NATO’s involvement in collective defense affairs, and a clarification of NATO’s goals while following the traditional defense doctrine, as well as the new security track².

To a large extent, the challenge of downgraded focus on collective defense has been addressed. In the absence of direct threat, NATO leadership has successfully redefined the alliance’s role in European stability. However, the limitations that the new threat of instability poses, in turn, impose limits on the practical potential of members’ involvement in security matters. The best example of such limitations could be seen in US reluctance regarding its initial ground involvement in the Yugoslavian crisis. In particular, that crisis indicates that

the new doctrine, however current it may be, does not achieve those solidarity levels reminiscent of the ones that characterized the Soviet threat. In that sense, the US role and its level of involvement in NATO’s peacekeeping and crisis management endeavors serves as an indicator of NATO’s future and its capacity to uphold its goals, since intermittent and reluctant participation of the US in those matters significantly weakens the alliance. Such reluctance could be drastically reduced by clarifying the new divergence of doctrine foci, prompted by the disappearance of the key threat, and confirming new grounds for collective defense: those of European stability in the face of the emergence of new nations; the potential for the re-emergence of Western European power plays; and, future need to perform potential collective defense functions. Although the chance still stands that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will go through substantial policy and structural changes, in order to meet the new challenges, its steadfast commitment to solidarity and cooperation in the European region meets the current challenges head on. David Yost confirms the effectiveness and durability of the alliance in the conclusion to his work: “NATO remains the single most effective institution
for combining the political-military assets of the Western powers, and its effectiveness must be preserved..."¹

CHAPTER 6: A VISION FOR NEW NATO

In five decades of its existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has passed through a number of phases, and boldly entered a new era of international politics as a seasoned tried and true establishment of collective defense. Previously, bound by stringent ties of solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat, the great alliance in the new era has accomplished its transition and performed a searching inventory of its strengths and weaknesses, aiming at continuing its successful existence. The expansion of its cause to new levels of cooperation in the European region points out the fervent desire of the organization’s leadership and participants to reassure their respective populations and constituencies of continuing stability in the political and economic arenas. Although the new branches and organizations that sprouted in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet regime have indicated that alternative means and tools of stabilization exist, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization maintained its lead. Even though the shared responsibilities of the NATO participants gradually increased as the membership grew, and new goals were drawn up, the parties to the Treaty maintained their solidarity in pursuit of crisis management and peacekeeping with little variation.
Such an outcome is viewed from a number of perspectives. On one hand, the internal mitigation and conflict resolution mechanisms become more important than ever, and the role of NATO as a collective security arrangement is paramount to organizational stability. On the other hand, the relative instability of Russian foreign policy, as characterized by domestic policy of non-accommodation to the Western ideology\(^1\), reinforce NATO’s role as a balance-of-power tool.

Having introduced the principles of George Liska’s realist theory on alliance cohesion, alignment, and efficacy, I have illustrated the applicability of those principles to formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its operating doctrine, and structure. Then, I aimed at illustrating the transformation of NATO’s cause, immediate and long-term goals, and the continued applicability of realist principles to NATO’s affairs.

The sole intention of such progressive illustration was to reaffirm that, in practice, although the key security threat to an alliance may have dissolved, NATO maintained its commitment to a common goal by re-shaping its prerogatives. The flexibility and institutional nature of NATO has created a diplomatic legacy, or a political regime, which now dictates a

\(^1\) Roger E. Kanet, Edward A. Kolodziej. *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996), p. 60
political framework of its own. In a sense, the institution that was solidified through NATO’s enduring existence provides a sufficiently stable and predictable European political environment that would be hard to replace, if it were to become defunct. Therefore, the precept that was addressed in the first chapter is correct: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through its institutional transformation has transcended its role as a traditional defensive alliance.

Certainly, any comprehensive analysis of a complex collective defense mechanism, such as NATO should reach beyond realism, and incorporate institutional theory, and perhaps, neo-objectivist approaches to international theory. In that sense, attempting to predict NATO’s future behavior, solely using the method and information utilized in this work, will yield one-dimensional results. A single-theory approach does not possess the full breadth necessary for understanding all policy and institutional changes.

However, it is important to reiterate the key research question of this work: Do realist and neo-realist theories of alliance formation and cohesion, as outlined by George Liska, explain the constraints of NATO’s cohesion throughout its term of existence? The answer to this question is a complex, yet a well-founded, yes. If one were to strip down any realist or
neo-realist approach down to its bones, the key principle of cooperation between states is a security threat, or a mere possibility thereof, to the states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, or their forces. Beyond all doubt, it is evident that Liska’s realist approach is still useful in interpreting the permutations of modern-day NATO.
LIST OF REFERENCES


