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Is Migrant Integration Policy Converging in Europe? A Comparison of EU-12 and EU-15 States

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IS MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY CONVERGING IN EUROPE? A
COMPARISON OF EU-12 AND EU-15 STATES

by

STEVEN ZUARDO

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science
in the College of Sciences
and in The Burnett Honors College
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

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Thesis Chair: Dr. Mirilovic

ABSTRACT

Immigration issues have dominated the political discourse of liberal democracies around the world in the 21st century. Recent elections in the United States and the Netherlands focused extensively on migrant flows, illegal immigration and migrant integration. Upcoming elections in France seem to be operating within similar parameters. These occurrences underpin a larger critique about the perceived failure of liberal democratic institutions to contend with immigration trends and successfully integrate migrants within their societies. Nowhere has this critique been more prevalent than within the public and political discourse of the European Union, the institution of focus for this paper.

As the EU member states struggle to cope with their migrant issues, scholars are increasingly looking to the larger EU governmental structure to anticipate how the region will handle these challenges. Accordingly, much of the scholarly work done on subjects such as integration policy within the EU are mainly focused upon the perceived convergence of policy amongst member states. The intent of this thesis therefore, is to evaluate the validity of claims that migrant integration policy is converging amongst EU member states, and to explain why this may be the case. This was accomplished via a cross-comparison of policy outcome scores, (provided by the Migration Integration Policy Index), over time between EU-15 and EU-12 states. The convergence of policy in the EU is a topic that has been routinely addressed by scholars, but by examining the potential trends amongst the traditionally ignored EU-12 states, this thesis hopes to contribute to the academic discourse by providing a different perspective.

DEDICATIONS

To my family, for obvious reasons

To my friends for less obvious reasons

And to the many hours of sleep I've lost writing this thesis

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would be wrong of me not to acknowledge my entire thesis committee who have waited an unnecessarily long time for my work to materialize. Thank you all for your assistance during this process, and your many kind words. It made writing this paper that much easier, and gave me confidence when I was worried I would fail. To Dr. Mirilovic, you have waited the longest, and to you I owe the biggest thank you. Without you I would not have signed up for this thesis, and I most certainly would not have completed it. Your guidance has been invaluable even if I was not the most receptive of students. Finally, to Anjali, thank you for reading over my work at all hours of the day even when I was embarrassed to show it to you.

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INTRODUCTION

Migrant integration policy in the European Union is not converging as rapidly as many scholars in the field seem to think. Too much credit is being given to the ability of the EU to drive quick, demonstrable change in this field. While the EU has made great strides in economic interdependence and the creation of a single market, aspects of migrant integration policy still remain loosely in the hands of the member states. Migrant integration policy refers to

“a range of policies and actions involving a wide variety of actors across governance (subnational, national and international) that focus on forms of adaption (socially, culturally, politically, economically) by both migrants and host societies.”¹

There is an evident distinction between policy fields such as anti-discrimination or naturalization laws; the EU is much more effective at exercising its influence in the former rather than the latter field. In the case of anti-discrimination policy, similar policies have been enacted across Europe, in no small part due to mandates by the EU governing structure. This has proven more difficult in the case of citizenship or naturalization laws where the EU has had a difficult time mandating policy prescriptions to members who still associate citizenship with an ethnic or national identity. These distinctions in policy amongst member states are important to note because they are crucial to identifying the speed with which convergence is (or is not) occurring. Policy convergence is defined in this paper as “any increase in the similarity between one or

¹ Geddes, Andrew, and Peter Scholten. "Policy Analysis and Europeanization: An Analysis of EU Migrant Integration Policymaking." Taylor and Francis Online. November 19, 2013. Accessed April 03, 2017. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2013.849849>.

more characteristics of a certain policy across a given set of political jurisdictions over a given period of time.”²

Another blow to the theory that policy is swiftly converging among the EU member states is the differences between the older EU-15 states and the more recent EU-12 states. There exists a divide between the two groupings in several policy areas, a divide which has received relatively little attention in the academic literature. There exists a tendency in the prevailing literature to focus almost exclusively on states such as the Netherlands, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, all of whom have traditionally received high levels of migrants and are members of the EU-15. The EU-12 states migrant integration policies receive very little attention. They were not included in most of the discussions that took place regarding the fall of multiculturalism, yet it was repeatedly claimed that multiculturalism was failing across the whole of the EU, not simply the EU-15 or Western Europe. It was statements such as those that prompted the initial interest in this research. Could scholars be oversimplifying the internal dynamics of the EU by ignoring the twelve newest member states? Throughout the course of this research, it was clear that the answer to that question was unfortunately, yes. There are a few explanations as to why scholars ignore the EU-12 states; historically they have faced lower levels of immigration than did the EU-15 until very recently.³ Second, there has been less available data for the EU-12 states, which can hinder research. The final reason the EU-12 is ignored is because of a somewhat dismissive view that migration policy is determined largely by the EU-

² Geddes, Andrew “The European Union” pg. 435, in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Third Edition. 3rd ed. Edited by James F. Hollifield, Phillip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014.

³ Howard, Marc Morjé. *The politics of citizenship in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 168.

15. The fact remains, however, that there is an overabundance of academic literature on the state of migrant integration policy in EU-15 states, and it is routinely used to make assumptions for the broader EU. This paper seeks to address that profound deficiency in logic by providing a thorough and demonstrable analysis of the differences between the EU-15 and EU-12 states in particular policy areas.

The most efficient way to do that was to operationalize policy prescriptions and track their movement over time. This was accomplished by use of data provided by the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX hereafter). Data from MIPEX was used for five key policy areas: Anti-Discrimination, Family Reunion, Permanent Residence, Access to Nationality and Political Participation. That data was translated into tables for both the EU-12 and EU-15 states from the years 2007-2014 and trends were highlighted. These policy areas were chosen due to their prominence in integration debates and because of action the EU has taken in each area. Data from MIPEX was utilized due to the exhaustive and unique nature of their research (for more on MIPEX's research process please see the Appendix).

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MIGRATION

As a region, no single entity in the world receives as many migrants in absolute terms as the European Union does, and the EU-15 receives the majority of that burden.⁴ Migration is not new to the continent; extensive guest worker programs in the aftermath of WWII saw high levels of migration to a then war-torn Europe. A substantial number of those migrants actually never left and instead remained to start families and reside within the host states. Migrant, in the most basic sense, can be defined as “any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country.”⁵ The current high inflow of migrants to the EU has led to a number of difficult challenges for member states, even those who have had a history of accepting higher levels of migrants. These challenges are compounded in part by expansive and inclusive policies generally pursued by liberal democratic regimes, of which the EU is exclusively comprised.⁶ As a rule, liberalism and democracy have proven themselves to be inherently vulnerable to issues regarding migration. Economic interests tend to demand an increase in immigration despite general public opposition or security concerns, and an expansion of rights in contemporary democracies protects migrants from widespread deportation, entry refusal or job discrimination.⁷ This means that not only are large numbers of migrants entering the EU, but they are also finding it easier to remain there.

⁴Joaquin Arango, “Early Starters and latecomers” pg 45 in Okólski, Marek. *European immigrations: trends, structures and policy implications*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013.

⁵ Directorate, OECD Statistics. “OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - EU15 Definition.” OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - EU15 Definition. Accessed April 04, 2017. <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6805>.

⁶Zimmermann, Klaus F. 1995. pg 881 in “Tackling the European Migration Problem.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1995. 45. JSTOR Journals, EBSCOhost

⁷James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius, “The Dilemmas of Immigration Control” pg 7-8, in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Third Edition*. 3rd ed. Edited by James F. Hollifield, Phillip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014.

It follows then, that in Europe, states are increasingly dealing with the issue of integrating migrants who are already within their borders. One example of an integration policy pursued by states is the long-contentious policy of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is premised on the notion that the integration of minorities should be pursued by officially recognizing the culture of that minority group.⁸ Officially recognizing the culture of a minority group in practice means establishing state-sponsored programs to pursue that goal. For example, the Netherlands for a time offered state funding for education taught in minority languages.⁹ The debate around multiculturalism attracted a lot of attention in the public eye, especially after the assassinations of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh. For several years, the academic literature on European migrant integration was dominated by pieces that cited a Europe-wide retreat from multiculturalism and stated that “national models of dealing with immigrants are giving way to convergent policies of civic integration.”¹⁰ This supposed trend away from multiculturalist policies was used as evidence to suggest both a general convergence of integration policy as well as a trend towards more restrictive policy prescriptions across Europe. The analogy was made of Europe as a fortress, with states adopting similar restrictive policies to limit migration and force assimilation.¹¹ This of course was overly simplistic and somewhat blatantly ignores the EU-12.

⁸ Joppke, Christian. (2004), The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy1. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 55: 237–257. doi:10.1111/j.1468 4446.2004.00017.x.

⁹ Koopmans, Ruud. "Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective"

¹⁰ Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics*, 59(2), 243-273. doi:10.1353/wp.2007.0022

¹¹ Geddes, Andrew "The European Union" pg. 433-451, in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Third Edition. 3rd ed. Edited by James F. Hollifield, Phillip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EU-12 AND EU-15

EU-12 States

The EU-12 states, or the accession-12 as Howard refers to them, are: Cyprus, Malta, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.¹² With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in 2007, the rest of the states became full members of the EU in 2004. Still relatively new members in an organization that has lasted decades, these states share similarities besides the timing of their entrance into the EU. Just like the EU-15 states, the EU-12 states share a common history of values, ideology, economic and political systems.

Historically, the EU-12, with the exception of Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia, fell directly within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, EU-12 states did not become democracies until about the time the Soviet Union collapsed, which is much later than those in the EU-15. It was not until after the process of democratization completed itself that migrant patterns in these states begin to reflect trends shown in other democratic states.¹³ Migration trends were very different for the EU-12 while the Soviet Union was an influential actor. It was not rare that EU-12 members were lacking in any semblance of integration policy whatsoever prior to becoming democracies. Slovakia only recently enacted its first real policy on the issue in 2009.¹⁴ Even with the introduction of capitalist markets and the increasing permeability of borders, the EU-12 states have not yet seen levels of migration comparable to those of the EU-15

¹² Howard, Marc Morjé. The politics of citizenship in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 168.

¹³ Joaquin Arango, "Early Starters and latecomers" pg 45-46 in Okólski, Marek. European immigrations: trends, structures and policy implications. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013.

¹⁴ "Slovakia | MIPEX 2015." Www.mipex.eu. Accessed April 05, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/slovakia>.

states. Eight of the EU-12 states are facing net losses in migration due to their high levels of emigration.¹⁵ This is a markedly different trend from the EU-15, which faces both large amounts of migration and lower numbers of emigration. Another interesting distinction between the EU-12 and EU-15 states are their perspective on nationals from outside of the EU. Figures 1&2 show that both states have rather high degrees of anti-migrant sentiment, but the EU-12 has much less in the way of positive feelings towards migrants.

The EU-12 states share less distinction amongst population size, migrant flows and regional variances than do the EU-15. Tables 1&2 depict population statistics as of January 2016, and among the EU-12 the only state to have more than eleven million people is Poland. The EU-15 have several states with populations in the tens of millions. In addition the only noticeable difference in regional variation is in the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia, which as will be shown later, remain decidedly more restrictive than the rest of the EU-12 in most instances. This most likely has to do in some part with the previous Soviet annexation and the large numbers of ethnic Russians residing in the state. With that exception noted, there are very few other notable variations amongst the EU-12.

¹⁵ Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015), Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).




Figure 1: Feelings Toward Migrants in EU-12 States




Figure 2: Feelings Toward Migrants in EU-15 States

EU-15 States

The EU-15 states are Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, Belgium and the U.K. These states share a long history of democratic governance and liberal market policies. They also share the distinction of being EU members for several decades. All facets of migrant policy have been more contentious in the EU-15 than in the EU-12. This is most likely because many of the EU-15 states have historically received high levels of migration, dating back to the end of WWII and the massive guest worker programs undertaken to help rebuild Europe.¹⁶

The EU-15 states demonstrate greater variation than the EU-12 in terms of policy choices, regional variation and demographics. As mentioned previously, table 2 shows the population size for most EU-15 states is much greater than the EU-14, but it also shows that almost all of the EU-15 are facing net positives in migration. Regional variation plays significantly more of a role in the EU-15, with distinguishable differences in migrant trends in Northern and Southern Europe. Southern European states consisting of Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain have only recently attracted substantial levels of foreigners, whereas the northern states have been on the receiving end for years.¹⁷ Interestingly, of the newer countries of immigration, all but Italy have suffered net losses of migrants over the last five years.¹⁸

¹⁶ Zimmermann, Klaus F. 1995. pg 47 in "Tackling the European Migration Problem. "The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995. 45. JSTOR Journals, EBSCOhost

¹⁷ Peixoto Joao, Joaquin Arango, Corrado Bonifazi, Claudia Finotelli, Catarina Sabino, Salvatore Strozza, Anna Triandafyllidou, "Immigrants, markets and policies in Southern Europe; The making of an Immigration model?" pg. 107, in Okolski Marek. European immigrations: trends, structures and policy implications. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013.

¹⁸ Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015), Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).

Table 1: Population and Population Change in EU-12 States

Population and population change

(thousands)

	Population , 1 January 2015	Live births	Deaths	Natural change ⁽¹⁾	Net migration and statistical adjustmen t ⁽²⁾	Total change between 1 Januar y 2015 and 2016	Population , 1 January 2016
EU-12							
Bulgaria	7,202.2	66.0	110.1	-44.2	-4.2	-48.4	7,153.8
Czech Republic	10,538.3	110.8	111.2	-0.4	16.0	15.6	10,553.8
Estonia ⁽³⁾	1,313.3	13.9	15.2	-1.3	4.0	2.7	1,315.9
Cyprus	847.0	9.2	5.9	3.3	-2.0	1.3	848.3
Latvia	1,986.1	22.0	28.5	-6.5	-10.6	-17.1	1,969.0
Lithuania	2,921.3	31.5	41.8	-10.3	-22.4	-32.7	2,888.6
Hungary	9,855.6	92.1	131.6	-39.4	14.4	-25.1	9,830.5
Malta	429.3	4.3	3.4	0.9	4.2	5.1	434.4
Poland	38,005.6	369.3	394.9	-25.6	-12.8	-38.4	37,967.2
Slovenia	2,062.9	20.6	19.8	0.8	0.5	1.3	2,064.2
Slovakia	5,421.3	55.6	53.8	1.8	3.1	4.9	5,426.3

⁽¹⁾ Live births minus deaths.

⁽²⁾ Total change minus natural change.

⁽³⁾ Break in series.

⁽⁴⁾ Due to a lack of data on migration, the demographic balance is based exclusively on the natural change.

⁽⁵⁾ Demographic balance: 2014.

⁽⁶⁾ Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

Table 2: Population and Population Change in EU-15 States

Population and population change

(thousands)

	Population , 1 January 2015	Live births	Deaths	Natural change (¹)	Net migration and statistical adjustment (²)	Total change between 1 Januar y 2015 and 2016	Population , 1 January 2016
EU-15							
Belgium (³)	11,209.0	122.3	110.5	11.7	69.1	80.9	11,289.9
Denmark	5,659.7	58.2	52.6	5.7	41.9	47.5	5,707.3
Germany	81,197.5	738.0	925.0	-187.0	1,151.5	964.5	82,162.0
Ireland	4,628.9	65.9	30.0	36.0	-6.4	29.6	4,658.5
Greece	10,858.0	91.9	120.8	-29.0	-35.5	-64.5	10,793.5
Spain	46,449.6	417.3	420.0	-2.8	-8.4	-11.1	46,438.4
France (³)	66,415.2	800.8	600.1	200.6	45.8	246.5	66,661.6
Italy	60,795.6	485.8	647.6	-161.8	31.7	-130.1	60,665.6
Luxembourg	563.0	6.1	4.0	2.1	11.2	13.3	576.2
Netherlands	16,900.7	170.0	147.0	23.0	55.4	78.4	16,979.1
Austria	8,576.3	84.4	83.1	1.3	122.9	124.2	8,700.5
Portugal	10,374.8	85.5	108.5	-23.0	-10.5	-33.5	10,341.3
Finland	5,471.8	55.5	52.5	3.0	12.6	15.6	5,487.3
Sweden	9,747.4	114.9	90.9	24.0	79.7	103.7	9,851.0
United Kingdom	64,767.1	777.2	602.8	174.4	399.7	574.1	65,341.2

(¹) Live births minus deaths.

(²) Total change minus natural change.

(³) Break in series.

(⁴) Due to a lack of data on migration, the demographic balance is based exclusively on the natural change.

(⁵) Demographic balance: 2014.

(⁶) Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE, THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES

Governing Bodies of the EU

The EU exists as an entity distinct from, yet wholly connected to its 28 member states. It does not operate as a typical federal system as most probably think, yet its functions are devolved nonetheless. Instead, the EU functions as a constantly changing multilevel system of governance whose powers are based upon treaties of which the member states agree to adhere to.¹⁹ The EU does have the power to enforce binding treaties and resolutions, meaning that member states are facing some reduction in their ability to unilaterally pursue their own goals. Usually this reduction in sovereignty is voluntarily undertaken, and in turn the member states increase their capacity to achieve a particular goal. Geddes refers to this process as “sovereignty bargains.”²⁰ The process to join the EU initially is itself a sovereignty bargain; states are knowingly entering into a supranational organization with rules and regulations in order to maximize their own benefits.

Decision making within the EU is multi-tiered and depends upon the support of member states. The most important bodies are the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, the Council of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the EU. These represent the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government for the EU. EU Parliament members are directly elected every five years, and are allocated for countries on a proportional basis. Policy can be enacted by either the Council or the Parliament, both per the

¹⁹ Geddes, Andrew “The European Union” pg. 433, in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Third Edition. 3rd ed. Edited by James F. Hollifield, Phillip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014.

²⁰ Ibid.

advice of the Commission.²¹ Policies can typically be classified as either hard or soft in terms of the requirements associated with the policies. Hard policies bear legal provisions on how the policy must be implemented, whereas soft policy refers to “the forms of coordination facilitated by the Commission and initiated and promoted through member state agreement.”²² In this way the EU has slowly been influencing domestic policy for several decades now. As of 2013, policies that originated in the EU political sphere were the majority of member states’ new domestic legislation.²³

EU Involvement in the Convergence of Policy

Even with the above noted expansion of EU influence, migrant integration had largely remained outside of the scope of EU policy until relatively recently. The EU instead prioritized increased economic cooperation amongst its members, which makes sense considering that it began as an organization primarily focused on trade. As Andrew Geddes puts it, “it is the pursuit of economic objectives that has been and continues to be fundamental to the shape and form taken by European integration.”²⁴ This pursuit of economic objectives has led to the creation of a single European market, a common currency, and the allowance of free-movement for EU citizens amongst member states. The integration of economic policy has by and large occurred in for EU states, both EU-12 and EU-15 alike. It wasn’t until 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam

²¹ "EU institutions and other bodies." European Union website, the official EU website - European Commission. March 31, 2017. Accessed April 05, 2017. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en.

²² Mannin Michael, “Europeanization and European Politics” pg 13 in. *The Europeanization of European politics*. Bretherton, Charlotte, and Michael L. Mannin New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Geddes, Andrew, “The European Union” pg 438, in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Third Edition. 3rd ed. Edited by James F. Hollifield, Phillip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014.

that the EU took an active role in immigration policy and embedded immigration into a chapter in the treaty and linked it to free movement in the EU.²⁵ Following that treaty, numerous directives on migration were released. These directives deal with anti-discrimination provisions, family reunion, and even attracting high-skilled workers.²⁶ Some, like the anti-discrimination provisions, are binding. These binding provisions then had to be adopted by any prospective EU states, thus influencing their policy prescriptions.

Based on the stance the EU has taken on economic issues or freedom of movement, it's clear that EU legislation and directives play some role in influencing the policy of member states. This however is a rather top-down view of the manner in which influence flows in the EU that is, from the governing bodies of the EU itself down to the member states. This top-down approach to the dissemination of influence in the EU is referred to as the "Europeanization" of policy.²⁷ This is in contrast to certain more state-centric views on the manner in which influence flows in the EU, from the member states up to the EU governing bodies. This has ignited a debate over the relevance of national/state models of migrant integration policy. Some academics, such as Christian Joppke, believe that national models are outdated and becoming increasingly irrelevant.²⁸ Some, like Bauböck, highlight the enduring role of state-centric models

²⁵ Ibid. 433

²⁶ Mavrodi, Georgia, "Common EU policies on authorities immigration: past, present and future" IDEAS / London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015 <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/36115>

²⁷ Andreas Ette and Thomas Faist "The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Research, Questions and Concepts" pg 3 in *The Europeanization of national policies and politics of immigration: between autonomy and the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007

²⁸ Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics*, 59(2), 243-273. doi:10.1353/wp.2007.0022

in areas such as citizenship acquisition even in the face of an expanding EU.²⁹ This debate is simply a retooling of the now classic state-sovereignty versus supranational compulsion argument. The EU as a supranational organization does occasionally face blow back from its member states for the perceived infringement upon their sovereignty. This was seen in part by “Brexit”, and some of the policies enacted in response to the ongoing refugee crisis. It may also explain in some part why some EU member states pursue the particular policies they do.

²⁹ Baglioni, Edited By Lorenzo Grifone. "The Citizenship in Today's Europe: An Interview with Rainer Bauböck." SocietàMutamentoPolitica. Accessed April 03, 2017. <http://www.fupress.net/index.php/smp/article/view/18281>.

EVIDENCE OF CONVERGENCE?

Utilizing MIPEX

The data used in this research to evaluate proof of convergence relied heavily upon the extensive work done by the Migrant Integration Policy Index. MIPEX operates in conjunction with the Migration Policy Group and the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, and also receives funding from the European Commission.³⁰ No other organization offers as in-depth an analysis on integration regimes across as many variables as MIPEX does. Their analysis compares 38 countries across 167 indicators in eight key policy areas: Family Reunion, Health, Permanent Residence, Anti-Discrimination, Labor Market Mobility, Education, Access to Nationality and Political participation.³¹ The 167 different indicators are specific questions about components of key policy designed to produce numerical values in each policy area. Each question has three options, with a maximum of three points awarded when policies meet the highest standard for equal treatment.³² In that way, MIPEX quantifies the answers to all of their questions and can assess scores to the countries in the dataset. The standards MIPEX uses to assess equal treatment are a combination of input from scholars and institutions focused on integration, and UN and EU directives.³³ In short, it is a thoroughly accredited organization that goes through painstaking detail to prevent error or bias, and this is an extremely useful tool in

³⁰ Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 Huddleston, Thomas; Bilgili, Ozge; Joki, Anne-Linde and Vankova, Zvezda (2015)

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

comparing integration regimes. More information about MIPEX, their research process and their policy indicators can be found in the Appendix.

Methodology

For the purposes of this paper, EU-12 and EU-15 states were compared from the years 2007-2014 across five policy areas: anti-discrimination, family reunion, permanent residence, access to nationality, and political participation. For example, tables 4&5 depict the total scores of both the EU-12 and EU-15 states from the period 2010-2014. The “Total Score” is an average of the scores obtained by a state in all eight of the policy areas MIPEX provides. The graphs are color coded according to a MIPEX hierarchy of scores, also depicted below in table 3. More information about MIPEX’s methodology can be found in the Appendix.

In this format, it is relatively easy to track trends for each grouping across time. An increase in score would indicate more favorable policies towards integration whereas a decrease would indicate less favorable policies. An average shift over time would demonstrate that policy is moving in a particular direction, and if both the EU-12 and EU-15 states’ average values are moving in the same direction over the same period of time, then it would be reasonable to assume some commonality in policy outcomes. A notable shift in a particular direction over time would indicate convergence of that policy indicator. Large and consistent differences in scores would indicate that there is a significant policy gap between the two states, and scores moving in opposite directions would indicate convergence is not taking place. The same process described above was repeated for five more categories: Anti-Discrimination, Family Reunion, Permanent Residence, Access to Nationality and Political Participation. Using this method, data supporting convergence was found in the Anti-Discrimination, Family Reunion and Permanent Residence

categories, while significant variation remained in the Access to Nationality and Political Participation categories. As mentioned previously, additional information about the policy indicators is located in the Appendix

Table 3: Legend

<u>Legend</u>
Favorable 80-100
Slightly Favorable 60-79
Halfway Favorable 41-59
Slightly Unfavorable 21-40
Unfavorable 1-20
Critically Unfavorable 0

Table 4: Total Score, EU-12

Country	Total Score EU-12				
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria	41	42	42	44	44
Cyprus	36	36	36	36	36
Czech Republic	42	42	44	43	45
Estonia	48	48	49	49	49
Hungary	45	45	45	45	46
Latvia	32	33	33	34	34
Lithuania	37	38	38	38	38
Malta	37	37	38	38	39
Poland	38	38	43	43	43
Romania	44	45	45	45	45
Slovakia	38	38	38	38	38
Slovenia	48	49	49	49	48
Average per year	40.5	40.917	41.667	41.833	42.083

Table 5: Total Score, EU-15

Country	Total Score EU-15				
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	45	48	48	48	48
Belgium	68	67	68	69	70
Denmark	49	51	54	55	59
Finland	69	71	71	71	71
France	53	53	54	54	54
Germany	60	60	62	62	63
Greece	48	48	48	44	46
Ireland	50	50	50	51	51
Italy	57	57	57	58	58
Luxembourg	58	60	60	60	60
Netherlands	69	65	64	62	61
Portugal	79	79	79	79	80
Spain	61	62	61	61	61
Sweden	80	80	80	80	80
U.K	62	61	57	56	56
Average per year	62.1667	62.1667	61.9167	61.5	61.75

IDENTIFYING TRENDS

Total Scores

In the case of the tables 4&5, the EU-12 states have maintained a twenty point difference from the EU-15 states from the years 2010-2014, while improving their score by about two points. From this we can observe that EU-12 integration policies tend to be more restrictive than those of the EU-15. Another notable observation is that there is an ever slight positive trend for the EU-12 states, not nearly large enough to demonstrate policy convergence, but it does provide a useful example for later tables. At face value it would appear that EU-12 and EU-15 states are not engaging in the same policy prescriptions as one another, hence the large difference in scores. However, when the scores are broken down further into their various policy indicators the results present a much more nuanced scenario.

Table 6: Legend

Legend
Favorable 80-100
Slightly Favorable 60-79
Halfway Favorable 41-59
Slightly Unfavorable 21-40
Unfavorable 1-20
Critically Unfavorable 0

Table 7: Anti-Discrimination Scores, EU-12

Anti-Discrimination Scores, EU-12								
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria				87	89	89	89	89
Cyprus	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Czech Republic	24	24	48	48	48	48	48	48
Estonia	17	17	32	32	32	32	32	32
Hungary	81	81	81	81	83	83	83	83
Latvia	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Lithuania	38	43	43	43	43	43	43	43
Malta	37	37	37	38	38	51	51	51
Poland	27	27	28	48	52	52	52	52
Romania				78	78	78	78	78
Slovakia	54	70	70	70	70	69	72	72
Slovenia	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Average per year	42.9	45	49	56.333	57	58	58.25	58.25

Table 8: Anti-Discrimination Scores, EU-15

Anti-Discrimination Scores, EU-15								
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	38	51	55	55	57	57	57	57
Belgium	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
Denmark	43	43	46	46	46	46	46	50
Finland	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	77
France	77	76	76	76	76	76	77	77
Germany	54	56	56	56	56	58	58	58
Greece	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	60
Ireland	61	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
Italy	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Luxembourg	48	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Netherlands	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
Portugal	88	88	88	88	88	88	88	88
Spain	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Sweden	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
U.K	82	82	82	87	87	85	85	85
Average per year	67.333	67.916	67.916	68.333	68.333	68.333	68.416	69

Anti-Discrimination Trends

Anti-discrimination is the policy area in which MIPEX claims the most positive strides have been made since MIPEX has started its research.³⁴ The identifiable trend in both of the graphs depicted above is a slight positive increase in anti-discrimination scores in every year for which data is available. Several states in the EU-12 grouping have even moved up in MIPEX's categorical assessments, from slightly unfavorable to halfway favorable. Estonia and the Czech Republic in particular seem to have made the most strides in the EU-12 in 2009. For the Czech Republic's part, they implemented part of the Racial Equality Directive of the EU in this year, and that probably made the difference in their score.³⁵ The states that seem to be stalling the most are Estonia and Latvia, and this most likely reflects the issues they have historically faced with ethnic Russians, who both countries disenfranchised and marginalized after reforming in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.³⁶ The data depicted in tables 7&8 indicates a variation between the EU-12 and EU-15 states, and a very slight positive trend.

Table 9: Legend

Legend
Favorable 80-100
Slightly Favorable 60-79
Halfway Favorable 41-59
Slightly Unfavorable 21-40
Unfavorable 1-20
Critically Unfavorable 0

³⁴ Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 Huddleston, Thomas; Bilgili, Ozge; Joki, Anne-Linde and Vankova, Zvezda (2015)

³⁵ "PROGRESS programme (2007-2013)." News RSS. Accessed April 24, 2017.
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=327>.

³⁶ Howard, Marc Morjé. The politics of citizenship in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 175

Table 10: Total Family Reunion Scores, EU-12

Family Reunion Scores EU-12								
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria				56	61	61	64	64
Cyprus	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
Czech Republic	62	62	62	62	62	62	57	57
Estonia	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Hungary	60	60	61	63	61	61	61	61
Latvia	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55
Lithuania	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59
Malta	49	47	47	47	47	47	47	48
Poland	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	65
Romania				67	67	67	67	67
Slovakia	56	56	56	56	56	58	56	56
Slovenia	79	79	79	79	84	84	84	80
Average per year	58.9	58.7	58.8	59.4167	60.083	60.25	59.917	59.833

Table 11: Total Family Reunion Scores, EU-15

Family Reunion Scores EU-15								
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	49	49	47	48	50	50	50	50
Belgium	76	76	76	79	73	73	70	72
Denmark	37	37	37	28	32	40	42	42
Finland	68	68	68	68	68	68	68	68
France	52	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Germany	60	60	57	57	57	57	57	57
Greece	51	51	53	53	53	53	53	55
Ireland	38	48	36	36	37	37	38	40
Italy	80	78	73	73	72	72	72	72
Luxembourg	45	64	64	64	65	65	65	65
Netherlands	60	60	67	62	56	54	56	56
Portugal	84	84	89	86	86	88	88	88
Spain	78	78	90	90	90	90	90	90
Sweden	80	80	80	78	78	78	78	78
U.K	49	47	47	44	45	35	33	33
Average per year	62.083	64.083	64.583	63.5	63.167	62.333	62.417	62.75

Family Reunion Trends

Average Family Reunion scores for EU-12 and EU-15 states are relatively similar. Both averages reside at the cusp of the slightly favorable range throughout the given time period, and neither saw its overall average decrease significantly in score during that same time. EU-15 states did demonstrate a greater variation amongst the scores of its member states; however, three EU-15 states remained in the Slightly Unfavorable category as of 2014 compared to one from the EU-12. The U.K. is also the biggest offender of the dataset, dropping sixteen points over the seven year period. According to MIPEX, the U.K. is currently implementing the least ‘family-friendly’ immigration policies in the developed world, including long delays and high fee levels prior to acceptance.³⁷ The average scores for family reunion in the EU-15 states are slightly lower than the previous scores in the anti-discrimination category for the EU-15. More states fall into the halfway favorable listing for family reunification. This suggests that EU-15 states are having a slightly more difficult time addressing this issue than anti-discrimination. Based on the data in tables 10&11, it is reasonable to claim that there has been a positive trend amongst most EU states, with the notable exception of the U.K.

³⁷ "Family Reunion | MIPEX 2015." Wwww.mipex.eu. Accessed April 05, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/family-reunion>.

Table 12: Legend

Legend
Favorable 80-100
Slightly Favorable 60-79
Halfway Favorable 41-59
Slightly Unfavorable 21-40
Unfavorable 1-20
Critically Unfavorable 0

Table 13: Permanent Residence Scores, EU-12

Permanent Residence Scores EU 12								
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria				61	64	64	67	67
Cyprus	57	57	56	51	51	51	51	51
Czech Republic	50	50	50	52	52	52	52	52
Estonia	73	73	71	71	71	71	71	71
Hungary	67	67	67	67	67	68	68	68
Latvia	47	47	53	53	53	53	53	53
Lithuania	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	59
Malta	63	63	63	50	50	50	50	50
Poland	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
Romania				54	57	57	57	57
Slovakia	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54
Slovenia	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Average per year	59.5	59.5	59.8	58.083	58.583	58.667	58.9167	59.083

Table 14: Permanent Residence Scores, EU-15

Permanent Residence Score EU 15								
<u>Country</u>	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	55	55	58	58	57	57	57	57
Belgium	80	80	80	80	80	86	86	86
Denmark	61	61	61	63	63	74	74	74
Finland	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
France	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
Germany	61	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
Greece	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	54
Ireland	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Italy	69	69	60	60	62	62	62	65
Luxembourg	62	64	64	64	64	64	64	64
Netherlands	57	57	57	56	56	60	59	55
Portugal	68	68	73	68	68	68	68	68
Spain	80	80	74	74	74	74	74	74
Sweden	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79
U.K	62	62	62	62	62	53	51	51
Average per year	62.917	63	62.167	61.667	61.833	61.4167	61.167	61.417

Permanent Residence Trends

Like the policies before it, the trend for both EU-15 and EU-12 states in permanent residence scores is toward slightly favorable policies. Both sets of averages are again similar, within just about three points of each other at any year. Interestingly, the two lowest scoring countries in the entire dataset are France and Ireland, both EU-15 members, and the U.K. is a close fourth. For the second time the U.K. is not following the trend of other states in the dataset. It has a clear three year trend of a more restrictive policy approach, and it dropped over ten

points in just three years. The EU-12 scores seem to be more static, with relatively little amounts of change over the given time period. Most remained at least halfway favorable.

Table 15: Legend

Legend
Favorable 80-100
Slightly Favorable 60-79
Halfway Favorable 41-59
Slightly Unfavorable 21-40
Unfavorable 1-20
Critically Unfavorable 0

Table 16: Access to Nationality Scores, EU-12

Country	Access to nationality scores EU-12							
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria				18	18	18	21	21
Cyprus	37	37	37	37	37	37	37	37
Czech Republic	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	49
Estonia	16	16	18	18	18	18	18	18
Hungary	29	29	29	29	31	31	31	31
Latvia	11	11	11	11	11	11	17	17
Lithuania	23	23	23	30	35	35	35	35
Malta	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Poland	26	26	26	26	26	56	56	56
Romania				34	34	34	34	34
Slovakia	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
Slovenia	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Average per year	28.2	28.2	28.4	28.583	29.1667	31.6667	32.4167	33.1667

Table 17: Access to Nationality Scores, EU-15

Country	Access to nationality scores EU 15							
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	27	27	27	27	26	26	26	26
Belgium	62	62	62	62	62	62	69	69
Denmark	36	35	35	35	35	35	42	58
Finland	57	57	57	61	63	63	63	63
France	61	61	61	61	61	60	61	61
Germany	60	60	66	66	66	66	66	72
Greece	17	17	17	57	57	57	34	34
Ireland	59	57	57	57	59	59	59	59
Italy	52	52	50	50	50	50	50	50
Luxembourg	34	68	68	68	68	68	68	68
Netherlands	68	68	68	68	68	68	66	66
Portugal	86	86	86	86	86	86	86	86
Spain	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
Sweden	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
U.K	62	62	62	62	61	62	60	60
Average per year	56.41	59.08	59.41	63.08	63.33	63.33	61.16	61.66

Access to Nationality Trends

Here is where the first direct evidence against convergence presents itself. The EU-15 states are largely more favorable towards access to nationality, with notable exceptions being Greece and Austria. The EU-12 however has much lower scores, and most states have not improved over the seven year period. Notable exceptions here are Poland, Lithuania and the Czech Republic. The average of the EU-12 scores is actually going up from the 2007-2014 time period, but that is largely due to Poland's 2012 Citizenship law, which liberalized its policies and drastically increased the overall score.³⁸ Estonia and Latvia again stand out as some of the worst scores in the dataset, again due to their history with the Soviets.

³⁸ "Poland | MIPEX 2015." Wwww.mipex.eu. Accessed April 05, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/poland>.

Table 18: Legend

Legend
Favorable 80-100
Slightly Favorable 60-79
Halfway Favorable 41-59
Slightly Unfavorable 21-40
Unfavorable 1-20
Critically Unfavorable 0

Table 19: Political Participation, EU-12

Political Participation, EU 12								
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria				13	13	13	13	13
Cyprus	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
Czech Republic	3	3	4	18	18	18	18	21
Estonia	20	20	20	21	21	21	21	21
Hungary	29	29	29	29	29	23	23	23
Latvia	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
Lithuania	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	16
Malta	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
Poland	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Romania				0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Slovenia	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Average per year	17.5	17.5	17.6	17	17	16.5	16.5	16.833

Table 20: Political Participation, EU-15

Political Participation EU 15								
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38
Belgium	59	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
Denmark	59	59	56	56	56	56	58	64
Finland	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79
France	52	52	52	53	53	53	53	53
Germany	61	61	61	61	63	63	63	63
Greece	25	25	25	39	39	39	30	30
Ireland	73	74	74	75	73	73	73	73
Italy	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
Luxembourg	72	72	74	74	81	81	81	81
Netherlands	72	72	72	72	72	66	52	52
Portugal	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74
Spain	54	54	54	54	57	54	54	54
Sweden	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71
U.K	49	49	51	51	51	51	51	51
Average per year	61.666	61.75	62.083	63.416	64.25	63.5	61.5833	61.583

Political Participation Trends

The colors alone should demonstrate that convergence is clearly not crossing the divide between EU-12 and EU-15 states for the political participation of migrants. Not a single state in the EU-12 dataset scores over twenty-five points; Romania has five straight years at a score of zero. Each yearly average for the EU-12 falls in the unfavorable range, whereas the EU-15's averages have fallen in the slightly favorable range for the seven year time period. Eleven states in Central Europe deny non-EU migrants the ability to join a political party or vote in local

elections.³⁹ This would most likely include Austria because it scored along similar lines to several of the EU-12 countries.

³⁹ "Political Participation | MIPEX 2015." Www.mipex.eu. Accessed April 05, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/political-participation>.

IS CONVERGENCE OCCURRING?

Anti-Discrimination, Family Reunion and Permanent Residence

MIPEX data indicates strong commonalities between EU member states in the policy areas of Anti-Discrimination, Family Reunion and Permanent Residence. The data also indicates that in these three policy areas there is a slight positive trend common across both the EU-12 and EU-15 states. This would support the theory that integration policy is converging, albeit at a slow rate. The most reasonable explanation for this convergence is the increasing role of the EU in shaping member states policies around common goals. Having secured greater freedom to work on migrant issues in legislation such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has coerced states into modifying their policies to fit within the parameters set by the EU through binding and nonbinding measures.

Following the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has passed numerous Council Directives specific to integration policy. Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/E focused on protection from discrimination.⁴⁰ Provisions in the resolutions included banning discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin, religion or belief in both the public and private spheres.⁴¹ This was followed by a similar directive in 2008 with provisions to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, religion or gender.⁴² Similar directives were passed regarding the rights of non-EU citizens in member states, family reunion and permanent residence. Since these were

⁴⁰ Mavrodi, Georgia, "Common EU policies on authorities immigration: past, present and future" IDEAS / London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015 <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/36115>

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "EUR-Lex Access to European Union law." EUR-Lex - 2008_140 - EN - EUR-Lex. Accessed April 05, 2017. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/197196#2009-06-18_OPI_byCOR.

binding resolutions, both current and potential EU members were forced to implement laws that satisfied EU requirements. A disproportionate impact was felt by the EU-12 states when they joined because most of those states did not have preexisting institutions in place to deal with those types of issues.⁴³

It is also extremely plausible that the EU wields the most influence in these three particular policy areas because they are the most related to the economic assimilation of migrants. Migrant workers would be most directly affected by discrimination, family reunion and permanent residence. Coincidentally, those three areas are fields where the EU has been more effective in liberalizing member-state policy. In contemporary Europe, a worker does not need the ability vote in elections to hold their job, nor does he need citizenship to remain in a member-state. It would then be logical that these policies would bear the fruit of EU policy prescriptions more than political participation or naturalization laws, since as discussed earlier the EU has wider latitude when covering economic policy.

It would not be unreasonable for someone to claim based on the data provided in the tables above that convergence is occurring. It is important to keep in mind that it is clear the EU is still having a difficult time influencing state policies. For most years in the tables above, the data moves incrementally if at all. Presuming that the EU as a liberal democratic institution is attempting to liberalize its migrant integration policy, as is more generally the case for the EU-15 states and liberal democracies in general, it is clear that the EU-12 are presenting something of a

⁴³ Geddes, Andrew, "The European Union" pg 445, in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Third Edition. 3rd ed. Edited by James F. Hollifield, Phillip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014.

problem. It could be that their new experiences with higher levels of immigration are making it less appealing for these states to give up more sovereignty to the EU to handle issues such as these. It could also be that they are much younger on the scale of democracy than say some of the EU-15 states are.

EXPLAINING POLICY VARIATION

Access to Nationality and Political Participation

Distinct variation in the policy areas of political participation and access to nationality demonstrate the convergence is not all-encompassing as of yet. The nation-state still plays a role in determining policy prescriptions in certain areas such as citizenship. The assertion that citizenship regimes are moving in a direction of liberalizing access is not borne out by the data at all.⁴⁴ It might be a reasonable argument for some states in the EU-15, but for the majority of the EU-12 it does not, and that distinction demonstrates again that the EU is having less of a direct impact on this area than is typically claimed.

States are still exercising large amounts of influence over their citizenship policy. Greece's citizenship laws have historically been based around an ethno-nationalist policy, and combined with extremely high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, their policy seems to follow a more restrictive bend, contrary to what the EU would prefer.⁴⁵ Estonia and Latvia are also examples of states diverging from what the EU would prefer. The two states share a common history in their forceful annexation by the Soviets and in their treatment of ethnic Russians. Both states adopted a zero tolerance policy for citizenship after the Soviet dissolution, and this meant that.⁴⁶ They are not unique in attempts of this kind in the EU-12. Bulgaria also seems to use ethnicity as a basis for limiting access to citizenship.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Joppke, Christian, "Immigration and the identity of citizenship: the paradox of universalism." (2008) *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 6: 533-546. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 4, 2017).

⁴⁵ "Greece | MIPEX 2015." www.mipex.eu. Accessed April 05, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/greece>.

⁴⁶ Baubock, Rainer. "The three levels of citizenship within the European Union." *German Law Journal* 15, no. 5 (2014): 751-64. Accessed April 4, 2017. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/34260>.

⁴⁷ "Bulgaria | MIPEX 2015." www.mipex.eu. Accessed April 05, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/bulgaria>.

Political participation also is a difficult area for the EU to exercise influence over. Historically the right to vote in elections either local or national has been tied to citizenship. EU citizenship, which is granted to individuals who hold the citizenship of a member state, does not guarantee one the right to vote in member states elections. Some states in the EU are allowing permanent residents to vote in local elections, but most are not, and of those that aren't most are in the EU-12. Another issue for the EU-12 in political participation could be that since most allocate citizenship by blood rather than by birth, this would exclude a large number of permanent residents from voting in any type of election and thus lower their score substantially.

CONCLUSION

This research has clearly demonstrated significant commonality amongst EU member-state policy on migrant integration. The commonalities are especially strong in the policy areas of Anti-discrimination, Family Reunion and Permanent Residence, but to claim that Europeanization is driving the convergence of migrant integration policy in a singular direction would be to misinterpret the data provided in this paper. There is evidence of slight positive trends in policy scores where commonality is present, but the gains are incremental and in some cases, outliers such as the U.K. or Greece repeatedly go against the grain. It is important not to mistake policy commonality exclusively for policy convergence. Still, it could be reasonable for one to make the case that along these three policy areas convergence is occurring, and largely in a less restrictive light as opposed to the “Fortress Europe” theory.

There seem to be three key factors driving the slight convergence identified by the MIPEX data, the first being Europeanization. It is impossible to deny that the EU’s use of binding and non-binding legislation has been somewhat effective in influencing policy, if not always reliable. The second factor is the tendency of all liberal democracies to pursue expansionist migration policies. This has been challenged by some in recent years with the rise of the far-right in Europe, but it still largely holds true. Finally, it appears likely that the EU wields more influence over policy areas that have a large economic component attached to them. This was the case with the three policy areas that demonstrated some amount of convergence.

This paper also does not support the theory that national or state models have become irrelevant in the face of an expanded EU government. It seems clear that the distinct histories and

culture of each state are still playing a major role in certain policy areas, especially in the EU-12 states. The relevance of state models has certainly shifted in the face of the EU; control has been ceded in certain areas, but state interests still heavily determine policies regarding citizenship acquisition and the political participation of migrants. So, when determining why EU states are pursuing policies options, it is overly simplistic to strictly look through the top-down approach of Europeanization. It is important to consider methods that account for the interests of member-states, such as Andrew Geddes' sovereignty-bargaining concept. The sovereignty-bargaining framework is also well suited to explain variations of policy within the EU. The U.K.'s recent restrictive turn on family reunification laws is a prime example. National interests in that state supplanted EU norms and dictated policy that did not resemble the rest of the EU regardless of preexisting policy.

The last important conclusion to draw is that the EU-12 states are considerably less favorable than the EU-15 states in almost every category by MIPEX. This may be informed by their more negative view of non-EU migrants, but if one prescribes to Freeman's perspective on the impact of perceptions on policy regarding immigrants, then that suggestion is not feasible. Regardless, the distinction between the two groupings are apparent, and scholars should focus more on the different causal factors associated with this distinction. In the future, scholars should focus on EU-12 states as a means of assessing the effects of Europeanization. A more exhaustive study may also find it useful to divide the EU into geographic regions, as MIPEX data demonstrated some commonalities in this regard. Studies may also find using MIPEX to be extremely beneficial as well. Tracking trends over time is an extremely simple process to replicate across policy areas with their available data.

**APPENDIX: MIPEX, INDICATORS OF INTEGRATION POLICY
OUTCOMES**

MIPEX, Indicators of Integration Policy Outcomes

Below is a picture from MIPEX'S "Who Benefits Outcome and Beneficiaries Indicators" documentation which depicts the manner in which the different policy areas are scored among policy outcome indicators.⁴⁸ Each of the various policy areas, Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion etc. are then further divided into policy outcome indicators which are each individually defined on the MIPEX website.⁴⁹ The policy outcome indicators are all manifestations of quantifiable equations so that MIPEX can derive a numerical value for the outcome indicator. For example, the in-work poverty gap is equal to the in-work poverty rate of low-educated non-EU foreign-born divided by the in-work poverty rate of low-educated native born.⁵⁰ There are too many definitions and formulas for each policy indicator to provide here, so those seeking more information should refer back to the methodology section on MIPEX's website.

MIPEX has divided integration policy into 8 specific policy areas.⁵¹ From there it has divided the 8 policy areas into 167 policy indicators (distinct from the policy outcome indicators mentioned in the Appendix). These policy indicators are simply questions with three possible answers each that allow MIPEX to score policies on a 0-50-100 scale for their standards of treatment. 100% being an answer most favorable to migrant integration. Then those scores are then averaged within each of the 8 policy areas, to give that specific policy areas score, and then those policy area scores are averaged together to give an overall score for a country. More

⁴⁸ "METHODOLOGY | MIPEX 2015." www.mipex.eu. Accessed April 24, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/methodology>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "METHODOLOGY | MIPEX 2015." www.mipex.eu. Accessed April 24, 2017. <http://www.mipex.eu/methodology>.

information about how MIPEX determines its scores can be found here:

<http://www.mipex.eu/methodology>

Indicators of integration policy outcomes

Main topic	Indicators	Disaggregations currently possible with available data
8. Labour Market Mobility	Employment rate Employment gap	CoB (Country of Birth): - gender - age - educational attainment
	Over-qualification rate Over-qualification gap (ISCED 5-6)	CoB: - gender - age
	In-work poverty rate In-work poverty gap (ISCED 0-2)	CoB: - gender - age
9. Family Reunion	Non-EU family reunification rate	CoC (Country of Citizenship): -citizenship of sponsor
	Dissimilarity Index	CoC: -citizenship
10. Education	-Share Low achievers mathematics level (PISA) -Low achievers in mathematics gap	CoC/CoB: -1 st generation -2 nd generation
11. Political Participation	Political Participation Political Participation gap	CoB: - educational attainment
12. Permanent residence	Share of Permanent permits	CoC:
	Dissimilarity Index	CoC: -citizenship
13. Access to nationality	Naturalisation rate	former citizenship: - gender
	Dissimilarity Index	former CoC: -age -gender -previous citizenship
14. Discrimination	Access to Justice	Grounds: -Race/Ethnicity -Religion/Beliefs

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