Roads to peace

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Since time immemorial, the world’s major religions, from Hinduism and Buddhism to Christianity, have preached nonviolence and enjoined man, “Thou shalt not kill.” Yet actually even those who otherwise practiced their religious beliefs accepted and even condoned the use of force when necessary for self-defense. Depending on circumstances, such resort to force, again and again, has been interpreted as legitimate defense of individual, tribe, or nation.

In the 20th century we, who have wrested so many secrets from nature, who believe that man has the capacity to control his environment, who dream of landing on the moon, are still no better prepared than the Neanderthals to remove the threat of ultimate resort to force; and this in spite of the prospect that today force, involving nuclear weapons, could wreak destruction beyond any experienced in history.

Assuming that all human beings, whether Communists or non-Communists, want to avoid an apocalyptic clash, what new roads can we find to avoid the ultimate catastrophe of war?

our three-level world
In this search, we must realize that the world we live in, like drama in a modern theatre, is operating on a three-level stage. The three levels are (1) the nation-state; (2) the regional organization, politi-
cal, economic, or military—NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, the Warsaw Pact which holds together the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern European satellites, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the proliferating European agencies, notably the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Agency; and (3) the world community, represented by the United Nations and the specialized international agencies, notably the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

At each level, each of these three groups seeks to make decisions on the same problems, frequently with little or no attempt to consult the others. What often results is the kind of snarl which would occur at any large city’s busy intersection if all cars, trucks, bicycles, and pedestrians insisted on moving ahead at the same time in whatever direction they chose, disregarding the signals of harassed policemen. Yet the very variety of these multi-level operations makes for flexibility in the search for peace.

from Berlin—
Examples of this variety are all around us. For instance, the problem of West Berlin has, at one and the same time, been discussed by the Western powers with each other; by their ambassadors in Moscow individually with the Soviet government; by the U.S.S.R. with East Germany; formally by NATO; and informally in the corridors of the UN, of which neither West nor East Germany is a member. Meanwhile, it has been suggested by Moscow that West Berlin be placed under the guarantee of the UN, and by Washington that some international agency supervise access to that city.

to South Vietnam—
Or take another problem which many observers have regarded as an even greater threat to peace than Berlin—South Vietnam. This nation was carved out of the former French colony of Indo-China in 1954 at an international conference in Geneva where Communist China, whose government is not recognized by Washington, was present alongside the United States. At this conference Vietnam,
one of the three Indo-Chinese states (the two others are Laos and Cambodia), had been divided into Communist-controlled North Vietnam and non-Communist South Vietnam by an agreement Washington did not sign, but its NATO allies Britain and France did. The conferees also set up an international commission composed of India, Canada, and Poland which was to insure that no additional foreign military personnel or material other than those maintained by France would be sent into South Vietnam. Neither Laos nor Cambodia was to join in military alliances or to permit their territories to be used for foreign military bases, and both sides in Vietnam were also prohibited from doing so.

When it became apparent in 1961 that Communist forces from North Vietnam were infiltrating into South Vietnam as guerrillas in a “war of liberation” which Moscow regards as legitimate, the United States started to send military personnel to Saigon. These military were supposed only to train South Vietnam troops for guerrilla warfare without participating actively in military operations, but it was feared that they might eventually become engaged in combat.

The presence of these military was opposed by the international commission, but its opposition was not heeded by Washington, which took the view that without American military aid South Vietnam might be overwhelmed by Communist forces, and that its conquest would not only spell the same fate for Laos and Cambodia, but open the way to Communist penetration of Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia and the disintegration of SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Yet neither South Vietnam, nor Laos, nor Cambodia is a member of SEATO. And the United States did not think it necessary to bring the Vietnam war, which Peking threatened to enter, before the UN although Cambodia and Laos are UN members.

to Cuba

Or take still another instance of a menace to world peace. The revolution staged in Cuba by Fidel Castro was regarded by the United States as a threat not only to its security, but also to that of the OAS. Yet without consulting the OAS, Washington in 1961 sponsored, armed, and transported to Cuba an invasion force of
Cuban exiles which was expected to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime but found it impossible to perform the task.

When it became increasingly apparent that Castro was trying to spread his ideas to other countries of Latin America, the United States sought to win the support of the OAS for strong measures against Cuba. At the Punta del Este, Uruguay, conference of January 1962, however, Washington succeeded in obtaining the unanimous agreement of Latin American countries only for the view that Cuba's Marxist-Leninist system was incompatible with that of the Western Hemisphere and barely obtained the necessary vote (14 to 1 with 6 abstentions) to a resolution providing for exclusion of the Castro government from the OAS. Although, in Washington's opinion, a Communist-dominated Cuba endangered world peace, the United States opposed discussion in the UN of the OAS action on Cuba, as demanded by Moscow and its satellites, and won the support of all the other Latin American countries, which oppose intervention in OAS affairs, as well as of some African and Asian nations.

In these, and many lesser crises, the three possible paths to peace—national, regional, and international—have criss-crossed each other with no clear demarcation between them and often with serious danger of collision. Yet each road, if well-marked and delineated, serves a useful purpose in the search for peace.

**THE NATION ROAD**

Of the three roads, that of the nation comes most naturally to all peoples, whatever their race, color, religion, ideology, or degree of economic development. It seems reasonable to most citizens that a nation should act in defense of what it regards as its interests, just as tribes fought with each other for survival before they grouped themselves into nations or as American frontiersmen once whipped out their guns in the wild West.

Yet today, as one hears the problems of various nations—problems once regarded as subject only to their sovereign decisions—as they are discussed in NATO or the OAS or the Common Market or at gatherings of the Communist bloc, and most of all in the UN General Assembly, one cannot help but wonder: Are nations per-
haps becoming obsolete? But then one sees 110 flags flying in the UN Plaza on New York’s East River. These flags make us sharply aware that not only are the nations of Western Europe and the New World still very much alive today, as one can see by the opposition of French President de Gaulle to supranational organizations, but nearly half of the UN’s members have emerged since World War II.

Far from being obsolete, nationalism shows greater vitality than ever as one people after another in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America demands its place in the world community. The old established great powers (both the democracies and the U.S.S.R.) often express alarm in the UN about the emergence of these newcomers—some with ancient histories and vast populations but weak economically, others tiny in size like Togo or Upper Volta in Africa. These newcomers, say both Western and Soviet critics, create a danger by their inexperience in world affairs and their alleged lack of responsibility. The great powers believe that it would be far better if they, who consider themselves responsible and experienced, were given a free hand with no interference by the weak and small.

The new nations, for their part, fear that the great powers (both the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc) may use their military and financial might in an irresponsible way and plunge the world, by design or by accident, into nuclear war. Great-power dominance, which the non-Western peoples once regarded as a dangerous attribute of Western powers, is now seen to be an attribute of all large and powerful nations, including those of the Communist non-Western sector—the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. But while both great and small nations are now involved in regional groups and in the UN, and to this extent accept certain limitations on their national sovereignty, all are reluctant to entrust their security to agencies outside their own borders and hold loyalty to the nation above concern for international organizations.

**what is nationalism?**

What is the essence of nationalism, stubbornly treasured by those who have it and sought with fierce determination by those who have yet to experience it? There are many ways of describing nationalism—in terms of geography, race, language, religion. At its
worst it can degenerate into violent racialism, as it did in Germany under the Nazis. At its best it represents a dedicated love of one’s fatherland or, as the French say, one’s *patie*; it is patriotism.

Nations may lack contiguous territory, like Pakistan; or for centuries even a geographic home, like the Jews now established in the state of Israel. They may have a single language or religion; but they may also include several races, languages, or religions, like India, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the multi-racial countries of East Africa. In essence, what makes a nation is a sense of common interests and traditions, a sense of belonging to a given people, of “national identity.” The French philosopher Renan uses the phrase “the soul of a nation.”
nationalism—heretical or parochial?

The "soul" of a nation is a precious asset not only to its people but also to the world community, provided it is used not as a weapon against other nations but as a point of departure for establishing shared relations with them, thereby enriching all. Today it is difficult to realize that when nation-states began to emerge after the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, nationalism seemed a heresy to those who believed in an all-embracing realm under the Church. George Bernard Shaw vividly portrayed this feeling in his play Saint Joan, where the French Bishop of Beauvais, Peter Cauchon, says: "But as a priest I have gained a knowledge of the minds of the common people; and there you will find another dangerous idea. I can express it only by such phrases as France for the French, England for the English, Italy for the Italians, Spain for the Spanish. It is sometimes so narrow and bitter in country folk that it surprises me that this country girl can rise above the idea of her village for its villagers. But she can. She does. . . .

"To her the French-speaking people are what the Holy Scriptures describe as a nation. Call this side of her heresy. Nationalism, if you will. I can find no better name for it. I can only tell you it is essentially anti-Catholic and anti-Christian, for the Catholic Church knows only one realm of Christ's kingdom. Divide that kingdom into nations and you dethrone Christ."

Now that the world has been divided into more than a hundred nations, far beyond the imagining of any medieval thinker, now that "self-determination of nations" flourishes everywhere, there is again a feeling that nationalism can become a danger unless it is woven into the fabric of larger units.

The danger today is that the world will become full of national entities so small and weak that they will be helpless to survive and may, as soon as they are freed from Western colonial rule, fall prey to the encroachments of Communist powers or of their own stronger neighbors. There is no doubt that the nation continues to serve essential purposes, both in the administration of the people and the resources within its borders and for the expression of the national genius. But in the increasingly complex world of our times, with the interweaving of science, technology, industry, and weaponry which laces across borders, the nation is no longer the
principal road to a people's security and prosperity. Even the most fervent nationalists realize that nations must seek aid and protection through collective solidarity, either in regional organizations, in the UN, or in both. Nationalism is no longer the heresy it seemed in the Middle Ages. But, like the village parochialism St. Joan defied, it is no longer sufficient for contemporary needs.

THE REGION ROAD
Since World War II, while building the UN, whose functions are yet to be fully developed, nations in all the continents have also created a wide variety of regional organizations. Some of these are built on the old pattern of military alliances that has existed since the dawn of history. NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, the Warsaw Pact, aside from the ideological content of their pronouncements, do not differ in essence from Greece's Delian League, the Triple Alliance of 1882 (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy), the Triple Entente of 1907 (Britain, France, Russia), or the Allies and the Central Powers of two world wars. All these, too, even before the existence of communism, had ideological connotations as well as military purposes.

An important difference today is that, if the provisions of the UN Charter for collective security can be made effective, these various alliances would presumably no longer be regarded as necessary or acceptable and might gradually fade away since there would be an international alternative to national military power. Meanwhile, one of the difficulties of existing military alliances is that, no matter how much their members try to endow them with other functions, it has proved difficult to transform instruments designed in the first instance for military defense into institutions for economic cooperation or for assistance to former colonial territories.

For example, African countries, upon attaining independence, had no desire to become aligned with NATO which to them still looks like a military bloc dominated by former colonial powers. Similarly, Yugoslavia, which in the days of Stalin came to the conclusion that a Communist great power can be as "imperialist" as a democracy, does not see the Warsaw Pact as a source of aid to its future development. Nor has it proved easy for either of the two
great power blocs, the West or the Soviets, to keep their respective members in line on matters military or ideological during a prolonged period of "coexistence" when, in the absence of mortal combat, alliances provide no cement for divided and sometimes conflicting interests.

**economics—yes; politics—no**

Far more successful than military alliances have proved efforts to build regional cooperation on the basis of common economic and scientific interests. In Western Europe the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Agency have demonstrated that three important practical needs—for trade, for industrial resources, and for atomic energy—could overcome profound national differences and jealousies, although not without sharp growing-pains.*

Europe's gradual economic integration has not only spurred the United States, Canada, and Britain to share in the anticipated benefits of a vastly enlarged market, but has inspired other regions to consider comparable developments for Africa and Latin America. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet bloc, through its economic organization, COMECON, has succeeded in marshaling the resources of agrarian and more or less industrialized economies both for mutual exchanges of goods and for joint aid to underdeveloped countries—although so far with major advantages for the U.S.S.R. But as each such economic organization has come into existence, nations not included in it have expressed grave concern about the possibility that economic regionalism might prove even more dangerous to their interests than the nationalism of nation-states, and that the world might soon break up into a few closed or semi-closed economies instead of expanding into a free world economy. Thus the members of the Commonwealth from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to countries of Asia and Africa have expressed concern about the participation of the United Kingdom in the Common Market.

The achievements of regional economic cooperation, slow and limited as they may appear to some, have had no counterpart in

*See *Forging a United Europe* by Robert L. Heilbroner, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 308, twenty-five cents.
political integration. Although a Council of Europe exists, there has as yet been no indication that even the technologically advanced countries of Western Europe and North America, which share common traditions and have comparable institutions, are ready to give this Council an important role or to join in an Atlantic Community; or that Moscow's Eastern European satellites, in spite of prolonged Communist indoctrination, common fear of Germany, and a common Slavic heritage in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, are willing to accept its dictation beyond the point of unavoidable necessity; or that the countries of Asia, the Middle East, or Africa are ready to come together under the leadership of a single power, be it India, Japan or Egypt, or Ghana or Nigeria. Those who are troubled by the slow growth of the UN might ask themselves why the politically democratic, highly educated, and technologically advanced Western nations have been unable to unite since the days of Charlemagne; and why Eastern Europe has been held together, in uneasy cohabitation, only by force.

In all continents, regional organizations, valuable as they may be for certain practical purposes, do not seem able to hold within bounds the larger aspirations of nations which are increasingly aware that trade and science, armaments and politics, not to speak of outer-space exploration, cannot be fully developed or controlled within a framework narrower than that of the world.

THE WORLD ROAD

In contrast to the nation-state and the regional organization, each of which has geographic and psychological limitations, the world community now in the making, as represented by the UN and other international agencies, aims to include all the peoples of the globe and, within the limits of their resources, to serve them all. Because of its potentially universal scope, the UN reflects most clearly the vast changes that are sweeping the world. At the same time its activities, modest as they are when compared to the objectives set forth in the UN Charter, foreshadow new paths to peace.

First of all, it is in the UN that the post-World War II change in relationships between the great powers and the small is most strikingly evident. The emergence of small nations has profoundly
altered the role, and thus the influence, of all great powers, Communist and non-Communist. Today the great powers can no longer dominate the UN as they did when the world organization was created in 1945 and when the Big Five (Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Nationalist China) obtained the right of veto in the Security Council in spite of strong opposition by the small nations. True, the United States and the U.S.S.R. can, if they wish, wield the ultimate weapon of nuclear arms. But if they want to achieve their objectives without resort to force, they must seek to win the support of large, although relatively weak, newly independent nations such as India; of nations not new, but now determined to exercise greater influence, such as Argentina and Mexico; and of the many small nations whose expanding ranks are making the walls of the Assembly hall bulge.

What we are witnessing on the world scene is a change comparable to that which occurred in the societies of Western Europe
as a result of the English, French, and American revolutions. Then the gradual extension of the vote to larger and still larger numbers of the population brought about political democratization and expansion of economic and social opportunities for more and more people. Through these changes the poor gradually became the equals of the strong and the rich—not necessarily in terms of material assets or physical power or influence, but in terms of the right of each citizen to cast one vote. The rich, the more highly educated, the more socially influential could still exercise greater influence than the poor. But if the few wanted to carry through the projects they favored, they had to enlist the political support of the many. They could not do so by casting, as individuals, more votes than the poor.

Today some of the great powers favor weighted voting in the UN. They would give more votes to those nations which have the largest populations or the richest natural resources or the most developed economies or the highest level of education. Such a system now prevails in the World Bank. In the broader sphere of the UN, however, these proposals have no more chance of success than the attempts made in some democratic societies to give special voting privileges to the rich or to the better educated or to those who are white instead of some other color.

**one nation, one vote**

True, a nation which represents a group of human beings cannot be compared exactly with an individual citizen. But until individual citizens can be directly represented on a voting basis in the UN or in regional political organizations like the Council of Europe, there is no unit to deal with except the nation. As a corporate entity acting on behalf of its citizens, the nation, for the time being, can be compared to the individual voter in the nation-state. In the world community, as within the modern nation-state, any attempt to set up first-class citizenship for a few, while relegating the many to second, third, or whatever other rank might be devised, will be rejected by the UN members affected as an intolerable discrimination. Those citizens of great powers who regard equality of voting in the UN as unfair are urged by Louis J. Halle, former member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, in his book *Men and*
Nations, “not to forget that the fifty non-sovereign American states are equally represented in the Senate of the United States, or that the twenty-two Swiss cantons are equally represented in the Council of States at Berne, just as the hundred or more members of the United Nations are equally represented in the General Assembly.” It may well be, as Mr. Halle points out, that voting arrangements for our Senate, and for the Swiss Council of States, “no longer represent an existing logic, but they do represent workability.”

Perhaps, eventually, it will seem advisable to alter representation in our Senate, and in the Swiss Council, and in the UN General Assembly. In human affairs nothing is eternal. If enough citizens in the United States, and enough nations in the UN, want to make changes, this should not prove beyond human capacity. The UN is not a static organization, any more than is our political system or the system of any nation. Many suggestions for changes in the UN structure are already being offered, but so far most of them are designed to broaden the participation of all members, rather than to strengthen the rights of the great powers.

Moreover, sooner or later the smaller nations, which when acting together will soon command a majority, may press for termination of the great powers’ special privilege, their veto in the Security Council—if the Big Five do not gracefully relinquish it of their own free will. Meanwhile, UN officials have recognized the need to broaden the representation of the new nations in the organs and on the staff of the world organization. In the future it may prove necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, hitherto dominated by the five permanent great powers, as well as of the Economic and Social Council whose influence may be expected to grow as problems of economic and social development in the non-Western areas assume increasing importance.

the “multilateral umbrella”

Critics of the UN also frequently argue that the new nations need the world organization far more than the great powers, implying that for this reason the smaller nations should in some way defer to the big ones. This contention is not supported by the realities of today’s world. As Andrew W. Cordier, former executive assistant to the UN Secretary General, has pointed out, the great powers
need the UN as much as the small. In his words, the UN serves as a "multilateral umbrella" for world diplomacy, under which the great and small can thresh out and adjust their differences.

**neither—nor**

There is a second aspect of the UN that points to the future—and that is the picture of the world mirrored in the debates of the General Assembly. These debates, in which all members of the UN participate, reveal the realities of the international situation more accurately than negotiations between nations or within regional organizations, which are often obscured by old concepts whose reiteration over the years blocks the initiation of new policies.

Viewed from the United States, two main factors appear to rend the world community: the ideological struggle between communism and democracy; and a continuing conflict between what is left of Western colonialism and the aspirations of newly liberated colonial peoples and peoples still struggling for independence. Seen in this light, the world seems menaced by a head-on collision between the two great-power blocs of the West and the Communists; and the Communists might win ultimate victory by obtaining the support of non-Western peoples who are believed to be dominated and guided by an anti-colonialism which has produced anti-Westernism.

But seen from the UN forum, the outlook is vastly different. There it becomes clear that there are many degrees of liberty and authoritarianism. What becomes evident in the UN is that neither Western democracy nor communism has won a clear-cut victory in the non-Western areas; and that the largest segment of the world, as yet neither democratic nor Communist, is in a fluid state, subject to many unpredictable changes in the years ahead. Nor—judging by the votes cast in the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, and even the Security Council—do the new nations slavishly follow the directions of the U.S.S.R., any more than they do those of the Western powers.

**"no alternative to decolonization"**

As for the alleged enmity of former and present colonial nations toward the West, it is true that nations which were only yesterday ruled by Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, or are
still ruled by Portugal and Spain, have a vivid consciousness of their grievances, past or present, against their foreign rulers. This should come as no surprise to Americans. It has taken nearly two hundred years for descendants of the American colonists to overcome their opposition to colonialism as practiced by Britain—and it has been achieved only because the colonial powers have recognized since 1945, as the French newspaper *Le Monde* put it in 1962, that there is “no alternative to decolonization.” To expect that, in contrast to Americans, the Asians, Africans, and Arabs can shed their memories of colonial experience within months, or even years, is unrealistic. Let us bear in mind, too, that the American rebels were of the same origin, color, and economic and social background as the colonizers and were thus spared the psychological tensions of racial discrimination which have been the harshest feature of colonial rule.

**persisting memories**

To the black and brown peoples of these nations, colonialism still means rule by whites over men and women of color—and they see this system still very much alive today in Angola and Mozambique, in the Rhodesias, in South Africa, and until yesterday in Algeria. To them the colonialism imposed by the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe, or by the Chinese in Tibet, has not hitherto had the same poignant significance as the rule of whites over non-whites. (And for our part we must admit that in the United States there has been far more indignation about Russia’s treatment of the Hungarians than about France’s treatment of the Algerian Muslims.) It is only when Asians, Africans, and Arabs are seen to be treating each other no less ruthlessly than whites have treated non-whites in their overseas colonies (for example as the Chinese have done in Tibet or Moise Tshombe in the Congo) that the emotions previously roused by Western colonialism are stirred also against non-Western oppression. And we must bear in mind that Americans who invoked the spirit of our revolution in supporting the anti-colonialism of non-Western peoples had done far more to shake the foundations of Western empires before World War I than the Communists, not yet then in power in Russia or China, had been able to do.

Only when all remaining vestiges of Western colonialism have
been eradicated, or are seen to be definitely on the way to extinction, will it be possible for the new nations to refocus their attention and become as concerned with Communist colonialism as they have been in the past with that of the West. But even so, the Arab-Asian-African countries in the UN have already displayed more restraint in discussing the role of Portugal in Africa, the future of the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundii, and even discrimination against Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa than some Americans have shown when our economic interests have been challenged in Egypt, or Cuba, or Brazil.

**development of all by all**

The third important trend revealed by the experience of the UN is that while efforts to achieve political solidarity are often frustrated, cooperation between nations in economic, social, and scientific development has proved not only feasible but highly successful.

In its short history the UN has put far more emphasis on economic and social development than on political activities. As of 1961, some 16,000 UN staff members out of a total of 18,000 were working in economic and social affairs and on technical assistance, and 85 per cent of the UN’s modest funds was expended on these activities in “ordinary times”—that is, when the Congo was not in a critical situation. But if development is not merely to widen the rapidly growing gap between the rich nations and the poor nations (which means between the technologically advanced and the technologically backward), it must be carried forward on a much larger scale. And it must not be directed primarily by individual great powers or by groups of great powers, but through the UN by all for all.

For it is not only the great, technologically advanced powers, whether of the West or of the Soviet bloc, which can contribute funds, money, raw materials, food, scientific experience, and technical know-how to those nations which are latecomers to the Industrial Revolution. The small and the weak can also contribute special products or special skills or special experience. Israel, India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and other non-Western nations have demonstrated this by the aid they have given to still less developed lands of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
There is no doubt that competition in aid to the developing countries by the West and by the Soviet bloc has many advantages for the recipient countries which are thus placed in the novel and favorable position of being able to play one side against the other. This competition, however, has been deeply colored by the cold war. By contrast, technical and financial aid given by the UN, whose officials strive to remain above the cold war and on the whole succeed in maintaining a dispassionate attitude, can be granted and accepted without regard to ideological or political considerations.

It may only be realistic to expect that in the visible future individual nations will insist on giving a considerable portion, if not the bulk, of the funds and skills they have available for foreign development either directly to recipient countries or through regional con-
sortiums, thus deriving the satisfaction of having their aid identified as "Gift of the U.S." or "Gift of the West" or "Gift of the U.S.S.R." Yet if the technologically advanced nations, irrespective of ideologies, could be persuaded to pool their resources and to place, if not the total, at least a larger portion than in the past, under the administrative supervision of the UN, three gains would be achieved.

**advantages of pooled aid**

First, the pooled aid could be allocated to the nations which seek it in an orderly way, on a long-term basis (instead of year by year as is now done by the United States), with some concern for national long-term plans which many governments have either already adopted or are being urged to adopt. Witness our ten-year Alliance for Progress program for Latin America.) The psychological and political tensions now created by the recurring need for developing nations to go, hat in hand, to Moscow or Washington, London or Bonn, for one kind of aid or another, and the resulting temptation to blackmail the great powers engaged in the cold war by threatening to seek aid from the other side would be eliminated. Thus, over the years to come—and economists estimate that aid to the developing countries, if it is to prove effective, should be planned for at least fifty years—a genuine partnership between the "haves" and the "have nots" could be forged.

Second, the pooling of aid would permit long-term planning on a national as well as on a regional basis. This would eliminate the dangers of duplication between requests for aid, competing individual projects, and nationalistic demands for undertakings which may contribute to a country's prestige but not enhance its over-all development, or strengthen one nation only while neglecting the development of the region in which it is located.

Third, administration of aid by the UN would permit strict supervision of the use made by each recipient country of the funds allocated for its development. Such supervision is essential to the honest and efficient operation of all aid programs. When exercised by the UN, it could not be denounced by the recipients as "imperialism" or "intervention" or "strings attached"—accusations which are often made against individual contributing nations. Impartial bookkeeping scrutiny by the UN could also check at their inception
such wastage and mismanagement of millions of dollars in aid as has frequently occurred when aid has been regarded as a weapon in the cold war.

Growing acceptance of the value of economic assistance through the UN and other international agencies would spur comparable cooperation in social development.

It is clear even to the non-specialist that today no one nation can rely solely on its own scientific resources, and that all would benefit by cooperative use of the discoveries of all. If isolation ever seemed an advantage in the past, today it can spell stagnation or decline with a resulting political discontent that might spark new revolutions. The most dramatic example of the need for world cooperation in science was the orbiting of the earth by both American and Soviet astronauts. The achievements of Glenn and Titov gave new hope to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which had been inactive since its creation in 1959 because of Moscow's objections to the composition of its membership. Now composed of 28 members, the Committee was spurred to activity by the pledges of both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to collaborate in this sphere. Cooperation in less dramatic but equally important fields such as the prevention and cure of various diseases was urged by both President Kennedy and former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The exchange of ideas among the world's many cultures is encouraged by UNESCO. And the UN's Technical Assistance Program offers a pool of experience on which all nations can draw.

**arms and mankind**

But while men look to outer space, the most difficult problem on earth remains that of armaments, including nuclear weapons. The UN Charter had provided for the establishment of a Military Committee of the great powers and the allocation by each member nation of contingents of armed forces as well as air units to the UN through bilateral treaties. Such cooperation, however, has hitherto been blocked by the failure of the great powers, aligned against each other in the cold war after 1947, to agree about the reduction of armies, navies, and air forces. The double goal set forth in the UN Charter of regulating and controlling national armaments and
at the same time assuring the security of all members of the UN through an international force has so far proved unattainable.

As a result of this failure to establish a system of collective security, UN members have invoked Article 51 of the Charter which permits individual or collective self-defense in case of attack. The Soviet bloc in the late 1940's went ahead and formed its Warsaw military group; and the Western nations, in response to Communist encroachments in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, organized NATO, SEATO, CENTO (the former Baghdad pact), and ANZUS. Meanwhile, the United States and the Latin American countries continued to rely on the OAS for their hemispheric defense arrangements.

**future of nuclear weapons**

These already thorny problems were made more difficult by the complex task of averting nuclear war through such measures as a ban on further nuclear tests, control and inspection agreements that might be made to enforce a test ban, and methods of disposing of all nuclear bombs now stockpiled by the great powers. In the UN, the overwhelming majority of member nations neither possess nor have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. They have, therefore, expressed a deep concern about these weapons which could, without their participation or consent and without any discussion in the UN forum, be unleashed by the three powers which have the capability to produce nuclear bombs on a large scale—the United States, Britain, and the U.S.S.R.

The prolonged negotiations of the Big Three in Geneva and the resumption of nuclear testing by the United States in April 1962, following Moscow's September 1961 test series, heightened the realization that, as time passed and scientific knowledge became more widespread, other nations might enter the nuclear race. Among them are France, which has already tested nuclear bombs in the Sahara, and Communist China, which is expected to manufacture bombs within two or three years, not to speak of smaller nations which might also make a bid to enter the nuclear "club."

We must realize that as long as the struggle for power continues, the nations which possess the most effective weapon will seek to improve it and to accumulate a stockpile against future emergen-
cies. It is understandable that the United States and Britain want controlled inspection to prevent the U.S.S.R. from secretly conducting tests while it officially accepts a test ban treaty. It is also understandable that the U.S.S.R., which at least until 1961 lagged behind the United States both in technology and in nuclear capability, should feel uneasy about the prospect that controlled inspection might have the result of freezing its armaments at a level lower than that of the United States, and particularly that of the United States allied with West Germany.

No practicable solution of the problem of armaments is as yet in sight. From the time man first appeared on earth the possession of arms has been regarded as a symbol of power and a safeguard of security for the individual, the tribe, and the nation. As Adlai E. Stevenson has pointed out, “General and complete disarmament envisages a degree of national restraint and of international intervention in the affairs of states, which are absolutely unprecedented.”

It is a step forward, however, that nuclear negotiations under the UN’s sponsorship were resumed in 1962 by an eighteen-nation conference instructed to seek “general and complete disarmament under effective international control.” This conference consisted of the three Western nuclear powers and Canada (France refused to attend); five Communist countries; and eight neutralist nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America which are not directly associated either with NATO or with the Warsaw Pact. The discussions of this conference, although inconclusive, at least afforded an opportunity for nations other than those which now manufacture nuclear weapons to present their views about possibilities of reducing the danger of nuclear war:

**UN peace force**

It is customary to describe all efforts to regulate or reduce weapons by the term “disarmament.” In actuality, the goal of those concerned with the development of a workable world community is not complete disarmament—that is, the abolition of all weapons and weaponeers—but the creation of conditions under which it would prove possible to place all then existing weapons and armed forces under the supervision of the UN, leaving limited contingents of security forces in the member nations for internal security only.
This ultimate goal assumes that even if the world’s governments agree some day to forbear from the use of force to protect their interests, the world organization would still need armed forces and weapons to carry out a variety of peace-keeping operations. Some of these operations will be the policing of disputed areas to prevent clashes between contending states, such as that performed since 1956 in the Gaza strip between Israel and Egypt by a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) composed of units contributed by ten nations, seven of them neutralist including India, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, and since 1958 by a UN group in Kashmir, along the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan. Others may be far larger in scope, such as the UN military operation in the Congo (ONUC), which was designed to restore peace in a newly liberated colony, prevent civil war, and avert the possibility that the two great-power blocs might become involved in the struggle between Congolese leaders.

Some speak of a UN police force; others use the phrase Peace Force. Whatever its name, it would be designed to perform for the world organization the same function that a police force performs within nation-states.

But, some ask, would disarmament, even in limited form, prove a blessing or a curse?

Some economists in nation-states have been concerned over the prospect that reduction of armaments, let alone complete disarmament, might precipitate a catastrophic decline in national economies which have come to rely on arms production. However, a UN committee of experts from ten nations of both East and West reported early in 1962 that complete world disarmament could lead to wide development and prosperity rather than to economic depression if governments planned for it adequately in advance. In their opinion, “the achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind.”

paying for peace

The experience of the UN has revealed a fifth aspect essential for the making of peace. This is that for all its operations, small and large, the UN needs funds. In the past the UN has had a nearly perfect record of obtaining regular assessments from its members—
100 per cent for the four years 1956-59, and close to 95 per cent for 1960 as shown by collections at the end of 1961. As Walter Lippmann has pointed out, "All this goes to show that the normal and conventional activities of the UN are financially sound and that they have the support of the whole membership—West, East and neutral."

Yet in 1961 the UN's budget showed a serious deficit. This deficit was caused not by regular budget expenditures but by two special operations: the UN Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip, consisting of 5,000 men, and costing $20 million a year; and the Congo force, which as of January 1962 consisted of 16,000 soldiers contributed by 21 countries, whose average cost since July 1960 has been about $10 million a month. These two operations are not part of the regular budget, and thus the member nations which objected to them could avoid making contributions without fear of losing their vote in the General Assembly. The U.S.S.R. refused to pay for either the Gaza Strip or the Congo operation. So did the Arab countries. France, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa refused to pay for the Congo force. Some others, among them Latin American countries, made no contributions to the special operations and were also in arrears on their annual budget assessments. The United States supported both operations, and in the case of the Congo, paid 40 to 50 per cent of the cost. The U.S.S.R. has refused to pay assessments on special operations on the ground that everything the Security Council and the General Assembly have done in organizing armed forces is illegal. But the Charter (Article 17) states that "expenses of the organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly."

**UN bond issue**

To put an end to this situation, which would have left the UN with a dangerous deficit and made it impossible for it to undertake future peace-keeping operations opposed by any of its members, the General Assembly in 1961 requested the opinion of the International Court of Justice as to whether the costs of these operations could be regarded as part of the UN's regular expenses. By a 9 to 5 vote the court ruled on July 20, 1962, that all members were obligated to pay all of the UN assessments, but its opinion was
advisory, and penalties for non-payment, if any, would have to be imposed by the General Assembly.

**U.S. experience**
The selective method of paying for the expenses of an organization of states should be familiar to Americans who remember this nation's experience under the Articles of Confederation. At that time it soon became apparent that requisitions on states by Congress would not yield the sums needed for the proper operation of the Confederation. In the first two years under the Articles, Congress asked for ten million dollars and received less than 1.5 million. During the entire period of the Confederation, the amount realized from requisitions barely met the government's operating expenses, leaving nothing over to be applied to interest on the debt. In 1786 New Jersey—not unlike the governments of some UN members—resolved not to pay its quota until Congress was given exclusive power to regulate foreign trade. It was then jealous of New York and Pennsylvania which obtained revenue from foreign trade on goods destined for New Jersey. Congress sent a commission to New Jersey in an effort to persuade that state to comply with its requisitions, but the commission's efforts proved fruitless.

Today the UN is still at the stage where it is a loose confederation of nations, each of which insists on maintaining its national sovereignty and asserts the right to support UN operations when it wishes and to withhold its support from operations it finds unpalatable. The UN is as yet far from being "the Federation of the World" envisaged by Alfred Lord Tennyson in his poem *Locksley Hall*, let alone a world government.

**what kind of UN?**
The basic question which confronts us is whether the UN is to continue to be a loosely organized Concert of the World, comparable on a global scale to the Concert of Europe of the 19th century. Or should the UN be relegated to the background, and
should the United States support instead a "Concert of Free Nations" of the Atlantic area, as urged by Senator J. William Fulbright? Or is the UN to become a close-knit federation composed of nation-states, whether or not grouped in a variety of regional organizations, endowed by its members with the authority to act on their behalf on a wide range of subjects, from economic developments to arms control, from social welfare to prevention of armed clashes in disputed areas?

**static or dynamic?**

This fundamental problem was stated with clarity and force by the late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in his annual 1961 report on the UN, made public after his death in Ndola, Rhodesia. In this report, which constituted his last testament, discussing different concepts of the UN, Mr. Hammarskjöld wrote:

> On the one side, it has in various ways become clear that certain Members conceive of the Organization as a static conference machinery for resolving conflicts of interests and ideologies with a view to peaceful co-existence, within the Charter, to be served by a Secretariat which is to be regarded not as fully internationalized but as representing within its ranks those very interests and ideologies.

> Other Members have made it clear that they conceive of the Organization primarily as a dynamic instrument of Governments through which they should also try to develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf of all Members, and aiming at forestalling conflicts and resolving them, once they have arisen, by appropriate diplomatic or political means, in a spirit of objectivity and in implementation of the principles and purposes of the Charter. . . .

> The first concept can refer to history and to the traditions of national policies of the past. The second can point to the needs of the present and of the future in a world of ever-closer international interdependence where nations have at their disposal armaments of hitherto unknown destructive strength. The first one is firmly anchored in the time-
honored philosophy of sovereign national States in armed competition of which the most that may be expected in the international field is that they achieve a peaceful co-existence. The second one envisages possibilities of inter-governmental action overriding such a philosophy, and opens the road towards more developed and increasingly effective forms of constructive international cooperation.

dynamic—and dispassionate
Mr. Hammarskjold’s analysis of the UN in the sixth decade of this century left no doubt of his own belief that the world organization should play a role that would be both dynamic and dispassionate. In his view it should look beyond the horizons of nation-states, which in an interdependent world have become relatively as narrow as those of medieval villages, and at the same time should serve all nations through a Secretariat of “an exclusively international character.” This Secretariat should be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, but should not be designed to give “a balanced representation of trends or ideologies,” such as had been urged by the U.S.S.R. which wanted the UN to be directed by a troika of three executive officers representing respectively the Western, Communist, and neutralist nations.

“the house” as world’s shelter
It will take time for nation-states to become accustomed to the idea of a strong world organization—perhaps as long as it took for the barons and princes of feudal Europe to accept a strong national executive representing the interests of all and acting on behalf of all within the state’s geographic boundaries. But as more and more nations enter the UN, they are becoming gradually accustomed to think of the world organization, which French-speaking people call “the house” (la maison—a term applied to the place of one’s employment) not as an alien institution to be viewed with suspicion, but as the best shelter yet devised for mankind. Acceptance of this attitude toward the world community is not easy. It involves a sort of international weightlessness—an adaptation of body and mind to a new dimension in human affairs.
ROAD TO THE FUTURE

This adaptation has already been made by many of the newly emerged nations, which upon achieving independence insisted on adopting a policy of non-alignment with either the Western bloc or the Soviet bloc. Non-alignment does not mean, as is often assumed, that the non-aligned countries refuse to accept commitments to the UN. On the contrary, many of them, from India to Nigeria, from Ghana to Ethiopia, from Tunisia to the Sudan, have contributed military personnel, administrators, technicians, and hospital facilities for UN operations in Korea or the Gaza Strip or the Congo.

The significant point is that the non-aligned countries have undertaken commitments not to military alliances of contending blocs, but to the world community represented in our time by the UN. By doing so they have blazed a road to a new relationship among nations, a relationship in which the joint defense of all would become the responsibility not of a few, but of all; in which all nations would be both non-aligned and committed—committed not to one great power or another, but to the world community. Some Westerners, particularly in the United States and France, still believe that there must be a choice between national or regional arrangements and the development of a world organization. The issue is not one of "either—or" but of making effective use of all the roads available to mankind.

toward a multi-patriotism?

No thoughtful person is so brash as to assert unhesitatingly that history will follow this or that course—and dogmatists who have done so have found their predictions challenged in their own lifetime by actual events. But there is a growing awareness throughout the world that we are at a turning-point such as must have been reached when nation-states emerged at the end of the Middle Ages in Europe—a turning-point toward larger organizations of human beings than the nation. And this sense of larger organizations in the making also brings a sense of a world community where the individual will have several loyalties—not only to his own nation, but to a regional group such as Europe or the Organization of
American States, and to the still vaster group which today embraces most of the peoples of the world and which tomorrow may embrace them all. We would all then have more than one *patrie* and more than one patriotism. But these various loyalties would not need to conflict any more than we now find a conflict in the United States between the loyalty of each of us to our family, to our state, to the various organizations with which we are associated in work and civic responsibilities, and to the nation which embraces them all.
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