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## European Migration and the Far-right: 2011-2017

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EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND THE FAR-RIGHT:  
2011-2017

by  
LAUREN E. WILSON-FAIX

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science  
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## ABSTRACT

This study investigates the relationship between the current migration crisis in Europe and the escalation of far-right voting which has been witnessed since it's beginning. In order to do so this study utilized correlation experiments and detailed case studies to explore the relationship between legislative vote shares and asylum applications for the years 2009-2017 in the EU member states of Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK. Control variables of GDP, unemployment and terrorist attacks have also been utilized to measure alternative causes of far-right voting. Results of these experiments vary quite a bit from state to state - finding differing potential causal factors in each case study. Germany, France and the UK show results which indicate that an increase in asylum applications potentially influence far-right voting habits. Greece does not show this type of result, but does show correlation with control variables. Hungarian experiments however do not produce correlation with any variables tested, but has the strongest presence of far-right activity which may indicate that Hungarian far-right success is attributed to their long history of far-right activity.

## DEDECATION

For Henry.

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## INTRODUCTION

The Middle Eastern North African (MENA)<sup>i</sup> Migration crisis is one that has seen the largest movement of individuals across European borders since the end of WWII (Kingsley, 2017). At the peak of the migration crisis, in 2015 alone, 1,046,599 migrants reached Europe by both land and sea (“Mixed Migration”, 2015). Fifty percent of these migrants were Syrian (“Mixed Migration”, 2015), fleeing the ongoing Syrian Civil War. Though migration slowed somewhat in 2016 and 2017, these years still saw unprecedented amounts of human traffic reaching Europe in the hundreds of thousands – at 390,432, and 186,768, respectively (“Migration Flows”, 2018).

While most individuals fleeing conflict and economic instability first find their way to surrounding MENA states like Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, conditions there seldomly provide them with better circumstances, and therefore they attempt to reach Europe in hopes of safety and a better life (Kingsley, 2017). Migrants face various obstacles while trying to emigrate to Europe, including political opposition, physical barriers, and EU regulations. These regulations dictate how member states should accommodate asylum seekers. In fact, it was just after World War II (the last great European migration of this magnitude) that the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees; which established many of the regulations that currently exist regarding the treatment of migrants (and the sub-category of “refugee”) within the European Union (Park, 2015).

Since 2011, refugees have been arriving primarily from the Middle Eastern states of: Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and from Africa, the regions of: Eritrea and sub-Saharan Africa (Kingsley, 2017). Other countries of origin include the nations of Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan (Park, 2015). The Migration Crisis began, in 2011, with a massive inpouring of Tunisian refugees to Italy (Park, 2015). While the crisis began in 2011, the migration *surge* began in 2014, and it was at this time which Europe began to feel the effects of Migration, as large numbers of

Syrians, Afghan, Eritreans and sub-Saharan African refugees increased following the Arab Spring.

Thus far, Europe has seen over a million individuals from the MENA region immigrate since the beginning of the migration crisis in 2011; some of which have been welcomed by EU member states like Germany and Sweden; while others have been largely rejected, by states like Hungary, France and Greece (DeSousa, 2016; Hoel, 2015). While the political attitudes of individual member states surely factor into the acceptance or rejection of immigrants fleeing conflict zones like the MENA region, it may also be argued that due to a lack of burden-sharing and early coordination on behalf of EU decision making bodies, many of the participating EU nations are largely unprepared. Still, *all* EU states (regardless of resources) are (at least in theory) held to the standards of the 1951 UNHR Convention; among other EU regulations, like the Schengen Agreement, which allows for the free movement of peoples within the EU (Kingsley, 2017).

Individual immigration policies of destination states in Europe combined with their adherence, or lack thereof, to the aforementioned EU law regarding asylum, greatly affects the likelihood of successful relocation of migrants from the MENA conflict regions to a safer Europe (Hoel, 2015; Kingsley, 2017; Park 2015). However these are not the only factors which influence successful immigration. Europe has for decades witnessed some support for far-right parties which espouse anti-immigration rhetoric among topics of nationalism and xenophobia (Betz, 1991). Though recent emergence of popular far-right parties in European parliaments which historically has little to no far-right legislators (like UKIP the UK or AfD in Germany) indicates winds of change. Because far-right or nationalist parties can surely influence legislative matters, it is important to consider how the recent increase in immigration to Europe which we call the

“migration crisis” may influence popular and electoral support for these parties. Therefore, this study seeks to determine the effect of the migration crisis on far-right voting in Europe.

In order to investigate the relationship between migration and far-right voting this thesis first explores differing theories on why people vote for right wing parties. Next, it examines patterns of increased far-right wing voting in recent decades and reviews the immigration response efforts of five European destination states in the European Union. Their political response in terms of party rhetoric, civilian response and asylum policies come under scrutiny. In order to test the central question of this thesis which asks how migration may affect far-right voting; data from the legislative elections of five case studies (Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK) is analyzed along with asylum applications for these five nations. Alternative causal variables are also explored as this legislative data is also compared to unemployment, GDP, and security concerns like acts of terrorism.

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## LITERATURE REVIEW

### THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FAR-RIGHT WING IDEOLOGY

The current refugee crisis can and should be viewed as just some of many factors of the bigger picture of the rise in far-right wing ideology. Just as the issue of migration did not simply begin in 2011, with the mass exodus of Middle Easterners fleeing the Syrian Civil War, the rise in far-right parties did not begin with the Migration Crisis, but has been a process which began in the late 60's and gained visibility in the 90's (Betz, 1994). Therefore, it is helpful to understand how factors within and surrounding the Migration Crisis fit into the overall narrative of far-right philosophy.

It must first be said that far-right politics/philosophy and immigration seem to be inextricably tied. In the various definitions of the far-right explored, each includes the preservation of the national population (i.e. nativism); an ideal which is logically diluted by immigration (Betz, 1991; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Roodujin, 2015). The effect of immigration is not debatable – the influx of foreign nationals *will* dilute the culture of a native population by injecting it with foreign cultural practices; bringing in new languages, religions, and social norms (Roodujin, 2015). In reality the question becomes; are the far-right feelings about national identity *valid*? – for a long time, preserving national identity *was* a valid excuse to disavow the tired, poor, huddled masses; asking for assistance – but this time has long since past; leaving far-right rhetoric at essentially pre-1951 Refugee Convention Standards; backwards by about 70 years (Kingsley, 2017).

An observation of far-right wing politics, is the extreme noncyclic device with which it galvanizes support from a rural, or “grassroots”, base by identifying with said base (Roodujin, 2015; Betz 1991) and using issues which are close to the hearts of these individuals, in order to obtain power. Whether the leaders follow through on their promises varies, if and when their power increases, parties of the radical right are more equipped to impose traditionalist and nationalistic agenda.

### *Populism*

Populism may be broken down into two categories; inclusionary and exclusionary. Inclusionary populism (like it sounds) aims to extend benefits and rights to marginalized populations, while exclusionary populism aims to exclude certain groups (marginalized populations) from these benefits and rights (Golder, 2016, pg. 3). Far-right campaigns tend to utilize the latter.

Emotional issues are central to a populist campaign (Postelnicescu, 2016), and it is populism which is associated with a grassroots “base”. Therefore it is difficult to pin down exactly what topics will be of importance to a particular campaign, without considering the context of the public (Postelnicescu, 2016). As emotional beings, this becomes very useful in galvanizing support the radical right agenda, which often panders to both material concerns, like employment; as well as non-material values, such as immigration and national identity. One emotional response which has been extorted by far-right parties in the wake of the migration crisis is fear of the unfamiliar – this fear mongering and the lack of a united European identity has impacted the European response to the Migration Crisis (Postelnicescu, 2016). has been central in the effectiveness of populist politics, in that populist politicians wish to convince their

constituency that the political process has been exhausted beyond repair, and that there is no alternative to their extreme methods (Postelnicescu, 2016).

Populism can be thought of as less a message, with common symbols (such as *nationalism* within the far-right message), and more of a tool. An example of how populism can pick and choose its message to fit its base within the current migration crisis, is the tendency for far-right parties to link Euroscepticism and a disdain for the open borders created by the EU. This is not true in Belgium however, where the population is heavily dependent on the economic advantages of the EU (Roodujin, 2015), and therefore parties are careful to criticize an institution which provides this economic advantage. In examples like this it can be seen how populist parties use tactics like fear mongering or messages like Euroscepticism when politically beneficial and may omit this tactic when it is not.

Within populist politics, the use of the “false Messiah” (Postelnicescu, 2016) presents a charismatic political actor who will “fix everything” – obviously very appealing to a disenchanted European public, in the wake of the financial crisis. However, this comes at the cost of democracy, in terms of increased authoritarian rule (Postelnicescu, 2016). A “false Messiah” can be seen in the current Migration Crisis in Hungary, as the current extreme right government of Victor Orban has taken several authoritative steps (which contradict EU regulation) like erecting fences to stop the flow of individuals, utilizing racial profiling of Middle Eastern individuals, and even encroaching on land surrounding their boarder with military (Hoel, 2015).

The lack of a shared European identity may seem trite in the face of factors like xenophobia, however the divisiveness among Europeans has definitely contributed to the overall



shortcomings in European response to increased migration (Postelnicescu, 2016). Since the formation of the EU in 1950, there have been radically different ideas among European nations – and even within the founding six members – about what the EU should look like (Olsen and McCormick, 2017). Why is it important to have a common identity? – with a common identity comes a common sense of responsibility, and with a shared sense of responsibility, comes the possibility of agreement of response tactics to the migration crisis – and as long as the far-right can keep Europe divided into separate nations, the chances of agreement on these issues remain diminished (Postelnicescu, 2016).

### *Euroscepticism in the Populist Message*

As discussed above, far-right parties pander to those voters skeptical of European identity, the European Union, and the open borders which come along with it, in order to advance an anti-immigration agenda (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). If authoritarianism is added to the mix, we have what have been identified as Populist Right Parties (PRP) (Roodujin, 2015, pg. 2). However not all extreme right parties need be Eurosceptic (Roodujin, 2015).

For larger, more economically sound states like Germany and the UK, it makes sense that the populist right in these nations would be Eurosceptic, in an effort to discontinue the supplementing of poorer member states which they financially support. However, as discussed in regards to populism as a tool) Euroscepticism is not present in the Belgium's far-right party (Roodujin, 2015) – which is not surprising as Belgium is highly dependent economically on the EU, and was present at its establishment. It is in this, and similar caveats that we can see how the extreme right can prey on the nationalistic sentiments of a nation when it is in their best interest, and how this (seemingly consistent in other instances) factor can be easily omitted.

In order to appeal to voters skeptical of entrenched politicians and their handling of economic issues, extreme right populists sell themselves as an “outsider”. This portion of the PRP is often poorer, possibly less educated, and susceptible to rhetoric which suggests immigrants will worsen a job market. Contrary to this, these politicians are actually often very experienced. By clearly selling themselves as something opposite than the truth, PRP’s show their ulterior motives (Betz, 1993; Roodujin, 2015).

### *Nationalism in the Far-Right Agenda*

Nationalism and nativism and (rarely) fascism are the central tenants of extreme right-wing philosophy. While populism and Euroscepticism surface in far-right parties across Europe as tools for mobilization, it is these elements which exist varying degrees across far-right parties. In this ideology, exclusion of individuals nearly *always* depends on culture, religion or ethnicity (Golder, 2016, pg. 4).

Considering the far-right goal of cultural preservation, unsurprisingly, nationalist rhetoric is a central in far-right philosophy and their ability relate to a population who fears the loss of national culture. Various definitions of nationalism exist, but what is central in all of them is the goal of keeping the population “native” or *pure*, for functions ranging from; preserving cultural identity, to homogeneity as the cure for societal ills (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Roodujin, 2015) – therefore nativism often emerges as central in far-right wing philosophy as well. Both are key tools in communicating the extreme right message.

### *Inclusionary vs. Exclusionary Nationalism*

Like populism, nationalism can be categorized as civic, and *inclusionary* nationalism; or ethnic, and *exclusionary* nationalism (Golder, 2016, pg. 4). Civic nationalists will accept those willing to assimilate, whereas ethnic nationalists will not.

In a study of the role of nationalism on far-right voters, it is found that nearly all far-right voters are nationalists, but not all nationalists are far-right voters (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017).

Therefore nationalism, in its various measures, is a necessary condition for far-right voting, but not a sufficient one. Meaning that one must have national pride to vote right wing, but just because one has national pride does not mean one will vote far-right (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017). Extreme right wing parties know this and therefore utilize nationalism to galvanize support.

Nationalism is a useful identifier when trying to describe the far-right voter, but it is a bit more complicated than just a measure of national pride. Ethnic nationalism consists of ideas about genealogy and birthright, and the latter consists of the willingness of individuals to “play by the rules” of a nation. Therefore it is important to distinguish that higher levels of ethnic nationalism coincide with higher levels of far-right voting as opposed to civic nationalism (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). In a study on nationalistic attitudes, in a choice between the nation, Europe, world, etc; “people who picked the nation as most important to belong to are found to be more likely to vote for the radical right.” (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017) . This gravitation toward ethnic nationalism is evident in the far-right’s targeting of ethnic minorities, even when an effort is made to assimilate.

## *Nativism*

Similar to nationalism, which seeks to maintain a nation's identity, nativism seeks to preserve a nation's native population (Roodujin, 2015). Where a nation may form out of multiple cultural groups, nativism favors a population which has been native to that land, and excludes those who are not (Roodujin, 2015). Therefore it is unsurprising that nativism can be described as nationalism in addition to xenophobia (Golder, 2016, pg. 4). While nationalism is central in extreme right-wing ideology; nativism, in combination with authoritarianism and populism finds its place as a central tenet in 'populist radical right' ideology (a subset of extreme right parties) (Roodujin, 2015). It is important to consider nativism as an identifying factor in describing far-right voters, as it is nativism which naturally holds an anti-immigration attitude at its core and somewhat explains the anti-immigration attitudes which can be found across the populist radical right.

In recent decades proudly claiming outright xenophobia has lost its appeal and been replaced with *ethnopluralist* nativism. In order to appeal to the sensibilities of the public, far-right parties have toned down what was once extremely racist rhetoric, while pushing the same sentiments (Golder, 2016; Roodujin, 2015). The concept of *ethnopluralism* is essentially the old *separate but equal* trick, where these extreme right-wing philosophers view separate cultures as unable to live harmoniously, and should therefore be kept separate, rendering homogenous populations (Golder, 2016). Another important characteristic of nativism which must be discussed (as it is inherent in both nativism and far-right philosophy), which is its strong authoritarian tendencies. As both wish to keep the national population heterogeneous and traditional, a strong law or military presence is encouraged. With these sentiments in mind, it could be said that out of all

facets of far-right philosophy discussed within these summaries, nativism may be *most* central. Unlike nationalism, which provides sufficient, but not necessary conditions for far-right party identification; it could be argued that to be a nativist (and wish your population heterogenous) is both a necessary and sufficient condition for far-right wing identification.

### *Demand Side Theories on Far-Right Voting*

Multiple demand side theories are discussed which attempt to explain the recent increase in far-right voter participation. The *demand* for far-right wing parties is considered in terms of grievances from the national population. Demand-side theories are organized into three groups, grievances due to; modernization, economy, and culture (Golder, 2016).

The variance in these theories really exemplifies how the extreme right base is actually made up of a variety of demographics, which come to the extreme right for a variety of reasons, and therefore a multitude of factors may explain the rise in the far-right (for example: poorer supporters can be analyzed through Betz's theories on globalization (Betz, 1994). Participation of traditionalists may be explained by theories regarding the increase in electoral volatility and the rise of autonomy and the reduction of authority (Minkenberg, 2000). While *all supporters* could be analyzed culturally, through social identity theory, which states that individuals wish to surround themselves with others like themselves, as this reinforces self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

While demand is obviously necessary for a far-right party to gain power, it is equally important to look at those who are selling this ideology to the public (Golder, 2016). Supply side theories

of extreme right-wing voting include political opportunity structure, party organization, and ideology (Golder, 2016).

### *Economic Voting and the Far-Right*

Non-material influences on far-right success like identity, national pride and xenophobia are prevalent in the coverage of the extreme right message. In addition, materialistic concerns of wealth and employment cannot be underestimated as variables in the support of far-right parties.

Theories of economic voting state that incumbent parties are held accountable for the current economic state of a nation, and therefore economics drive voter choice (Hart, 2018). However, a more complex take on this theory is that under certain economic conditions (be they good *or* bad) a campaign can utilize these circumstances to win votes (Hart, 2018). It is in this way that we see how it is possible for far-right parties to utilize poor economic circumstance to win votes.

The economic variable of unemployment plays a large role in partisan voting in Europe. A case study of the 2009 German legislative elections are a wonderful example of this. With both right and left parties sharing power (and therefore both held responsible as the incumbent party during a financial crisis), it may be observed which side of the spectrum voters lean toward during an economic crisis (Trein, Beckman & Walter, 2017). In the 2009 German elections, as the unemployment rate increased, support for the Social Democratic Party (a center left party) decreased among voters who identify as Social Democrats (Trein, Beckman & Walter, 2017). In terms of voter perception of economic stability, as economic stability increases so does support for right wing parties (Trein, Beckman & Walter, 2017).

### *Security Concerns*

Not dissimilar to the fear created by a shrinking labor market, or of a loss of cultural “purity” that comes with immigration, far-right parties often focus on security concerns to inflame anti-immigration rhetoric. Security concerns such as terrorism have been established as influencing factors of far-right party success (Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Kibris, 2011). Acts of terrorism within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has sparked much interest regarding the effects of terrorism on voting behavior. It has been found that an increase in terrorism within Israel results in greater support for far-right wing parties (Berrebi & Klor, 2006). Likewise, the voting population of Turkey has been found to be highly sensitive to acts of terrorism (Kibris, 2011). Individuals who reside in countries which experience an increase in acts of terrorism generally hold their government accountable for these actions (Kibris, 2011), similar to theories on economic voting. This translates into increased support for far-right parties which are traditionally less sympathetic to terrorists and make fewer concessions to terrorist groups (Kibris, 2011).

### *Supply Side Theories on Far-Right Voting*

One supply side theory of extreme right-wing voting considers the role of the media and parties in the rise of the extreme right (Ellinas, 2010). As competition among media outlets has increased, far-right parties have resorted to more and more sensational subject matter, in order to make headlines (Golder, 2016). This phenomenon of capitalism is very interesting, as you could suppose that *any* party rhetoric or activity which draws an emotional response would be favored by the media. However, as previously discussed, it is a well-documented tenant of extreme right-wing populism to utilize emotional rhetoric to inspire a population. Therefore, whether a specific news outlet takes a dismissive, accommodative, or adversarial position on a particular far-

right factor or party, far-right parties in general are more attractive to news outlets due to their sensational nature, and therefore may have an increased media platform. Therefore, this theory is really a condition, under which all parties operate, but just happens to favor the far-right parties due to their shared sensationalist nature and emotional content.

Other supply side causal theories favor competition as causation for the distribution of far-right philosophy. This may be the most obvious causal factor in terms of supply of far-right wing rhetoric. As previously explored, far-right parties use populism and emotional issues because they work, as we are emotional creatures. As competition increases, parties would gravitate to extreme strategies. However this strategy only works when the mainstream parties are not preoccupied with these issues (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2011; Kitschelt, 1997; Spies & Franzmann, 2011).

Broad observations of the supply/demand theory analysis of the rise in extreme right voting, are that it takes both sides to result in a successful far-right party, however with no demand for far-right parties, they cease to exist. However this does not account for the possibility that demand could be low because what are typically considered far-right issues are being taken over by larger parties (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2011; Spies & Franzmann, 2011).

The characteristics discussed above, in part, provide the makeup of the far-right parties gaining momentum in European parliaments today. Within these legislative bodies, exists the ability to make or break the chance of a safer European future for millions of individuals still arriving on European shores fleeing conflict in MENA regions. Some European governments have welcomed refugees in the face of the far-right strategy; while some European states have been unaccommodating but contain populations of civilians which defy the policies of their own



governments to help migrants in need (Kingsley, 2017). Therefore, a closer look at the party rhetoric, governmental response and public response of European host nations is merited. The five European nations of Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK have been chosen to examine the European response to increased migration. These nations contain a variety of histories of far-right party involvement in their political processes. They have differing resources and geographies which make some nations more exposed to the crisis and left with more responsibility; and yet the emergence or strengthening of far-right parties has been observed in each nation – perhaps a closer look at these most different cases will illuminate their shared features and differences.

## THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN FIVE EUROPEAN DESTINATION STATES

### *Hungary*

By 2015, the top nationalities which Hungary was reported to have received were; (primarily) Syrian, as well as Iraqi, Afghans and Kosovo nationals (Frontex). Those approaching Hungary today will find a razor-wire fence along its southern border with Serbia. Those individuals who *were* able to enter Hungary, did so via the “Western Balkan Route” (Hoel, 2015, ch 4.1.2) Like France, Hungary cites the Dublin Agreement as cause to deem crossing the Hungarian border “illegal”, and as reason to deny responsibility<sup>ii</sup>.

In order to get to this Western Balkan Route, migrants will have taken either; the Bulgarian-Turkish or Greek-Turkish Route (Hoel, 2015, ch. 4.1.2). Individuals taking the Greek-Trukish route are primarily Afghani and Syrian (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017). Interest in Hungary as part of the Western Balkan Route stems from the relaxation of visa restrictions within five Balkan nations

(Frontex). In 2013, Hungary recorded receiving 20,000 “illegal” migrants (Frontex). By 2015, this number increased dramatically and Hungary reported 764,000 “illegal boarder crossings” (Frontex). This is compared to 2010’s 2,000 border crossings (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017). Within this time, Hungary received 54,123 asylum applications from Syrians alone, between 2014 and 2015 (Hoel, 2015, ch. 4.1.2). Unlike Italy, migration to, or ideally through, Hungary did not become wildly popular until 2014-2015. Increased popularity has also been attributed to the increased knowledge of the danger of crossing the Mediterranean (Kingsley, 2017) which prompted a massive shift to the Greek-Turkish rout by those who could afford it.

One trend which is emerging unsurprisingly, it that migrants of more means, and possibly more education (ex. Syrians) experiment with different routes and have changed their plan of action; where as less wealthy groups continue to take the same routs they have taken for generations, (ex. sub-Saharan Africans leaving Libya, which locals claim has occurred for decades, and is not a result of recent, but long-term destabilization (Kingsley, 2017).

Hungary’s attitude toward migration can be summed up as *unnecessarily* “restrictive”. Though Italy and Greece have been classified as restrictive as well, the xenophobic rhetoric and extreme measures taken by Hungary exceeded explanation by economic means (Hoel, 2015). While economic factors clearly contribute to the willingness of a state to accept refugees (as in this case it is the poorer European states which show less favor for refugees), it does not entirely explain the actions xenophobic actions of Hungary (DeSousa, 2016) - in fact, internal party politics likely play a larger role.

To physically stop the flow of migration from Serbia to Hungary, in 2015 the Hungarian Parliament approved the building of a 175 km fence along the border with Serbia (Hoel, 2015).

To further legally impede refugees from entering Hungary, a law was soon passed which sentenced those who damage the fence - as can happen in border crossing - to deportation, or imprisonment; in violation of the Schengen Area (Hoel, 2015). Another legal obstacle which Hungary has installed is the changing of the Asylum Act, which allows Hungarian authorities to engage in profiling to reject asylum applications from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, if these individuals had passed through countries which they deem “safe”, without applying for asylum - a perversion of the Dublin Agreement (Hoel, 2015). And possibly most disturbing – the Hungarian Parliament has allowed the Hungarian military to use non-lethal force against migrants to “protect the borders” (Hoel, 2015).

Hungary’s government has pledged to take in 30 refugees – in comparison to the thousands promised to it’s EU neighbors, though in terms of *ability* to take in refugees, Hungary is entirely capable to accept refugees, with more available land, and a lower population density than the average EU member state. Therefore a lack of resources cannot explain Hungary’s xenophobic rhetoric or low recognition rate (DeSousa, 2016, pg. 22). Hungary recognizes by far the lowest asylum seekers of all EU states, with 9% in 2014 to nearly zero percent in 2015 (DeSousa, 2016).

Alongside policy examination, content analysis has been utilized to interpret reputable news sources in order to examine the rhetoric coming from member states (Hoel, 2016). This allows us to “hear” opinions of government officials and any civilian that might be interviewed or investigated. However, this *does* limit subject matter to persons/subjects of interest to a news source. From this method of analysis, we can see Hungary’s extreme xenophobia, along with rhetoric of other EU nations, which will be addressed later.

This content analysis, in addition to a review of Hungary's legal obstacles categorizes Hungary's response as "restrictive" and "is founded on xenophobia and anti-immigration policies and seeks to complicate the arrival of new asylum seekers" (Hoel, 2015). Tactics include physical, legal and social barriers. Rhetoric of the country's leader, PM Viktor Orbán, is particularly telling of Hungary's restrictive stance, as he claims that letting in Middle Easterners (note that he does not distinguish "Syrian" in this case), will lead to terrorism, homophobia and anti-Semitism (DeSousa, 2016; Hoel, 2015;). In this case it is important to state that Hungary is not dictatorial, and that this leader and his party has received popular support from Hungarians, indicating at least to some extent, the support of these opinions by the Hungarian population.

In terms of party rhetoric, Hungary possibly leads the EU in objection to immigration. Which both Victor Orbán and his far-right party Fidesz are vehemently opposed, and incite sensationalist and divisive rhetoric when possible. In one example of this, Orbán's government sent out a survey regarding the migration crisis, with leading wording; stating: "Do you agree that mistaken immigration policies contribute to the spread of terrorism?" and "Do you agree with the government that instead of allocating funds to immigration we should support Hungarian families and those children yet to be born?" (Hoel, 2015, ch. 4.1.2). It is actions like this which elevate Hungary to the status of *unnecessarily restrictive*. In addition to supplying the population with leading questionnaires intended to incite fear (Hoel, 2015), Orbán has erected billboards and signs which tell migrants that they cannot take Hungarian jobs (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017). This aggression can be somewhat explained by party politics (Kingsley, 2017). Though Victor Orbán leads a far-right party, even farther to the right lies the JOBBIK party. Therefore, in order to retain his conservative base, Orbán must seem hard line on immigration (Kingsley, 2017, ch 7).

## *Germany*

In terms of immigration policy, Germany has a history of accommodating immigrants. In the early 90's immigration to Germany peaked around 800 thousand individuals – due to the civil wars and unrest in former Yugoslavia and African countries. Throughout the mid 90's and into the early 2000's, German immigration declined. The Global Financial Crisis changed this, and in 2009/2010, German immigration began to increase once again – at this point, mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). In 2014 Germany began to see the effects of the Arab Spring and the subsequent Syrian Civil War, as the numbers of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghani individuals increased (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). In 2015, the number of immigrants to Germany peaked again at 1.1 million for this year alone, however this number began to decrease in 2016 slightly (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). Asylum applications decreased in 2017 to 17,000. The reasoning behind this, though not yet empirically proved, is thought to be due to the closing of the Western Balkan Rout (by Hungary) and the EU/Turkey deal in March of 2016 (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).

Throughout the late 80's and 90's, far-right parties in Germany began to find success – peaking in 1993 – comparable to German voter behavior in recent federal and state elections in the aftermath of waves of refugees (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).

During the far-rights earlier success causation cannot be attributed to political and labor market channels, as the naturalization process of this time in Germany and work permit regulations rule this out. However there is evidence to support welfare channels in terms of causation, as Germans were concerned about the redistribution of aid (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). Evidence

also points to non-economic channels. This includes factors like immigrant children attending schools and community involvement (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).

In terms of policy, Germany is known as the leader in efforts to aid the victims of the migration crisis. In terms of accommodations, Germany has been very welcoming – with a major decision to ignore the Dublin III Agreement (Kingsley, 2017). A slightly shadier move on behalf of the German government were the threats made by the EU (facilitated by Germany) to bomb Libya if it did not control its borders (Kingsley, 2017). Though there was no threat of violence, Germany essentially bribed Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to shut the gate to the Western Balkan Route, disallowing Syrians access to the Western Aegean, or the Northern Bulgarian Routes to Europe. Just one result of this deal is the arrest of over 80,000 Syrians trying to leave the Turkish coast for Greece in an attempt to immigrate to Europe (Kingsley, 2017). Therefore German behavior is not without criticism.

If Germany is analyzed regionally, it is found that votes for the far-right are lower in areas with an increased number of foreigners where areas of little diversity result in higher support for the far-right (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). This is especially evident in Eastern Germany, where support for the AfD is the highest (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017), though in this study there is the possibility of endogeneity, as immigrants may avoid areas of little diversity. When looking strictly at voting over time, without regard to regional variation, there was a strong correlation between the voting intention for the AfD and the number of asylum applications, especially in the years 2015 & 2016 when the crisis peaked (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). Other comparisons may be drawn to the 90's in terms regards to how poorly institutions provide; efficient bureaucracy, and accommodations to manage the influx (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).

In terms of party politics, the German Alternative for Deutschland (AFD) is the first far-right party to enter the German Bundestag (Parliament) (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). In the 2017 elections, the AFD campaigned heavily against immigration and won 13% of the vote, a big win. Their campaign, like those of the 90's focused on asylum abuse, much as politicians focus on the "welfare abuse" in the United States (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).

Individuals in Germany generally support the route Chancellor Merkel has taken in the Refugee Crisis, though this support is complicated. More than half of Germans associate more risk than reward with immigration, however 81% believe in admitting refugees fleeing persecution in accordance with international law/ EU law (Gerhards et. all, 2016). This survey describes a selfless population, who is willing to do what is right and not what is easy or comfortable.

### *France*

Unlike the porous border states of the EU, France has the luxury of 1. the ability to police it's borders, and 2. *decide* how many refugees it wishes to accept – unlike, say. Italy or Greece who must accept the individuals washing up on their shores. In 2015, France stated that they would accept 24,000, and then increased this promise to 30,000 refugees - as opposed to Germany's 500,000 (DeSousa , ch 3, 2016). Frances regulations regarding refugees are therefore defined as "selective entry" as opposed to Germany's "unrestricted entry". France, unlike the extreme examples of Germany/Sweden and Hungary, accepts a limited number of refugees and provides moderate accommodations. (DeSousa, 2016). In terms of Syrian Asylum Applications alone, France has received 20,348 as of 2016 (UNHCR). In 2017, France received 74,180 asylum-seekers many of which have family in France (UNHCR).

The migrants which continue to arrive on Italian shores today are primarily African at this point; hailing mostly from Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia and others (Beardsley, 2017). Those who can afford to do so, avoid the Libyan springboard to Italy due to instability in the region and the danger of the Mediterranean Sea. This means that it is these, less wealthy nationalities which primarily continue to use France as an alternative to the Western Balkan Route.

As previously described, the number of Syrians crossing the Mediterranean has decreased in 2014, though this has done little to ebb the flow of migration by this route. The nationalities of individuals have somewhat returned (on this route only) to pre-2011 demographics – meaning primarily African, though the number of individuals seems to remain steady (Kingsley, 2017).

### *The French/Italian Border Crisis*

One point of entry to France which has drawn quite a bit of media attention is the border that France shares with Ventimiglia, Italy. This particularly tense event at this French-Italian border town, concerned the movement of African migrants in 2015. French police were documented stopping individuals from crossing (EuroNews, 2015; Radio France Internationale, 2015). While this was quite the media event (especially as it documents the plight of African migrants, as opposed to focusing on Syrian's exclusively), there is no real evidence that this practice is stopping.

In this particular circumstance about a dozen French policemen were blocking about 100 African migrants due to lack of paperwork (which obviously isn't an EU criteria for crossing borders). French Authorities were given permission to do this by a Prefect Adolphe Colrat. It must also be stated that during this time that the Italian Red Cross was distributing limited aid. In this instance



the border remained open to other travelers, and just discriminated against these 100 or so African migrants, 1,439 individuals were detained by French authorities, and 1,079 were sent back. Colrat is also responsible for "tightening" security at the Nice train station (EuroNews, 2015; Radio France Internationale, 2015).

In fact, France can be considered one of the very first countries to defy EU regulation, when in 2011, it stopped a train coming from Italy filled with African migrants, coming from Ventimiglia (Guardian, 2011). In this context, it is unsurprising the lack of humanity shown to African migrants by the French government in 2016.

Not only are migrant's being arrested, but French nationals have been arrested for transporting migrants. In this way, the French government seems to be using an approach similar to the Greek government – discouraging individuals from helping individuals; with threat/or actual arrest for people smuggling. This police activity began after France declared a state of emergency after the Charlie Hebdo in 2015 (Rippingale, 2017).

Like Hungary, France has seen a rise in the far-right politically (DeSousa, 2016). The growing extreme right party in France is the Front National. In 2014, they won 21 of 74 seats in the local/supranational elections, and “358 of 1758 Regional Council Spots” (DeSousa, ch 3, 2016). However this rise of the French National Front is unlike the success found by the Hungarian Jobbik Party, as the National Front is not the ruling party nor does it compete with the ruling party, cannot introduce legislation, and has failed to push legislation which has affected the recognition rate (whereas the Jobbik party can be seen as a legitimate cause for Hungary's zero percent recognition rate) (DeSousa, 2016).

The French *State of Emergency* declared after the events of Charlie Hebdo in 2015 is one of, if not *the* largest contributing factor to France's police activity toward migrants. This "state of emergency" permits stop-and-frisk-style searches and allows French authorities to deport migrants back to Italy. This protocol also extends French jurisdiction of this authority 20 miles past the French border into places like Ventimiglia, Italy (Rippingale, 2017).

France has also established special "outposts" – Police Aux Frontieres – at which French police deport migrants back to wherever they came; in violation of the Schengen Area (Rippingale, 2017).

One subtlety that must be pointed out; migrants from Africa tend to seek asylum in the European countries of their language (ex; those from Chad seek France, while Eritreans seek England), these also happen to be their colonizers. Eritreans in particular flee due to forced military service (at 15) and war (Rippingale, 2017).

In order to enter and pass through France, migrants utilize the European train system. Trains from Milan to France, like the Menton station, are often patrolled by French police (Kingsley, 2017). For those who can afford it, trains and hired cars may provide a safer and less cumbersome way to enter the country, as the French police are arresting and sending back migrants who they simply assume have previously been in Italy (Kingsley, 2017). Like Hungary, France has justified this behavior by invoking the Dublin Regulation.

Not all (or even most) African migrants can afford the monetary cost nor the legal risk of the train systems, and therefore resort to walking. Some do so through the well-known region of Ventimiglia, Italy; however as these routes have become increasingly monitored by French

police, new routes spring up. Migrants who wish to avoid the French police have been taking an alternative route through the Alps (Sharp, 2018). This has resulted in over 1500 individuals choosing to undertake this dangerous and snowy route from about October 2017 – Jan 2018, though only about 12 reach France each day. This leaves aid workers to speculate that many Africans are dying along the way and will not be discovered till the snow thaws (Sharp, 2018).

Though many refugees *do* seek asylum in France, it is by now notorious for its selective entry program and therefore it is often used as a throughway to Germany and/or Scandinavia from Italy. This path is not necessarily intuitive, as Switzerland/Austria is more of a direct route, however those wishing to avoid being fingerprinted by police in these less accommodating member states, will utilize the Western coast of France to Nice (Kingsley, 2017).

Unlike the support found for refugees in Germany, the public opinion in France is more divided – though no where near the xenophobic levels found in Hungary. 55% of French are against Germany’s “unrestricted entry” though 69% are in favor of an EU-wide quota, which would ideally distribute the burden of refugees throughout Europe (DeSousa, ch 3, 2016).

Similar to Greek civilians, French nationals have been helping aid refugees in terms of medical care, lodging and transportation, though French police continue to arrest these individuals for their charity. This is however, in contradiction with French law which states that it is not illegal to help foreigners, as long as you do not receive payment. There seems to be a discrepancy among the interpretation of the law, or deliberate ignorance (Kingsley, 2017).

## *Greece*

Contrary to France, the origins of most individuals migrating to/or through Greece via the Aegean are primarily Syrian (Kingsley, 2017; Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). The doorway to Greece comes in the form of the Islands of Lesbos or Kos, which is one option, along with Bulgaria, as a first leg of the Western Balkan Route (Kingsley, 2017; Kousoulis, Ioakeim-Ioannidou & Economopoulos, 2017). However in order to get to Lesbos, migrants must walk the Western Turkish coast in order to reach Izmir, the Turkish “springboard” city, which sends migrants across the Aegean Sea, in overcrowded inflatable boats (Kingsley, 2017, ch 7). This ideally 20-30 minute trip is, while dangerous, much less so than the Mediterranean route from Libya or Egypt to Italy which can take days (Kingsley, 2017, ch 7). Therefore immigrants reaching Greece are, for lack of a better phrase, in better shape, than those emerging the Mediterranean.

This being said, the individuals arriving on Greek soil are still generally in very poor condition, which leaders of the far-right espouse will put undue stress on an already broken economy. By 2015, four times the refugees were entering Greece, with thousands arriving daily (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017). As Syrians discovered the Aegean Route, the Libya-Italy route became less and less popular.

Like concerned citizens in France and Italy, certain Greek’s have been known to aid incoming refugees. They either aid them while coming onto shore, with medical care or food or transportation (Kingsley, 2017). However, this has become problematic for these Samaritans, as the Greek government has made much of this activity illegal. They have made it illegal to drive any migrants the 40-mile trek to the refugee intake center in Moira. They also threaten those who

aid migrants with arrest for people smuggling – not unlike measures taken in France. Adding to this problem, Greek politicians on the far-right encourage rhetoric which brands those to help refugees as a causal factor in their arrival. This results in xenophobic residents taking up initiative to intimidate and harass local “helpers” (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017).

Far-right rhetoric within Greece mostly stems from the Golden Dawn. A party which was formed in the 80’s, but before 2012, gained no more than .05% of the legislative vote. In June of 2012, the Golden Dawn gained 21 seats out of 300 – winning 7% of the vote (Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016). During this time, the Golden Dawn focused the Greek economic crisis within their far-right message, resulting in another win in 2015 (6.3% of the vote) (Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016).

On Kos, one of the primary islands of first entry to Greece for migrants crossing the Aegean from Turkey (along with Lesbos), the accommodations for refugees have been evaluated as dismal (Kingsley, 2017). The Mayor of Kos can be heard urging residents to withhold aid to migrants in the statement that migrants should not even be provided a cup of water – the most basic of necessities (Kingsley, 2017). While far-right rhetoric is present in Greece, the poor treatment and slow processing of refugees is largely due to insufficient resources within the Greek government – as Greece has recently faced a financial crisis, leaving it unequipped to accommodate migrants appropriately (Kingsley, 2017, ch 7). It is this slow processing that keeps Syrians, and other refugees detained in situations like the one documented in Kos – where it is reported that hundreds of individuals have been held without water or access to toilets for over a day, maybe more (Kingsley, 2017).

Though Greece has been labeled restrictive, as far as individuals go, many have been documented willing to help. Among the population, much compassion is found for these

migrants who remind Greeks of their own ancestors, not long before (Kingsley, 2017, ch 7). The disparity in actions of government and civilians in both Greece and France may point to a government who's been stretched to the limit, looking for a way to burden share, *very poorly*.

Broad observations at this point are that the lack burden sharing initiatives among EU states has left members like Italy and Greece completely helpless in the wake of the current refugee wave. Greece may be placed somewhere in the middle of Italy and Hungary, in terms of their treatment of refugees.

## *UK*

The UK's is possibly the most challenging country for migrants to enter of the five cases studied here. Similar to the US (but to a lesser extent), the UK's island status provides a natural barrier with the rest of the EU – and migrants are forced to navigate French train systems to enter the UK. As discussed above in the French literature, this process has been made extremely difficult by French authorities and the tightening of security at French train stations (Kingsley, 2017).

Out of destination European states of UK, France, Germany and Sweden, the UK takes in the smallest number of refugees. However, it is (along with the US) the “largest single-state bilateral contributor of humanitarian aid for the Syrian crisis” (Ostrand, 2015, pg. 5). This contribution however does not necessarily replace their lack of willingness to accept refugees however, as 1. one cannot buy off the problem of migration, and 2. While the UK is the largest European donor; Germany, the top receiving country, is also a top contributor (Ostrand, 2015, pg. 15); along with Sweden (also one of the top receiving countries) (Hoel, 2015). Similar to the United States, the

United Kingdom has not specified a specific number of migrants which it promises to resettle (Ostrand, 2015, pg. 15).

The UK does not have a resettlement program. It has however “it introduced a vulnerable persons relocation scheme in January 2014 for “particularly vulnerable” Syrians” (Ostrand, 2015). An issue with this program is the vague phrase of “particularly vulnerable”. This program has granted humanitarian status to 143 Syrian asylum seekers, and plans to help several hundred more over the next three years – though again, “several hundred” is a vague statement (Ostrand, 2015, pg. 15).

In terms of anti-immigration rhetoric in the UK, the far-right party UKIP was particularly vocal in championing Brexit, the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union (Sampson, 2017). UKIP came to prominence in 1998, and campaigned heavily against immigration as early as 2000 (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). However it has taken them a decade to gain the momentum necessary (and the legislative seats) to achieve their ultimate goal of leaving the European Union (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). While migration did not cause Brexit, the issue of immigration within the Brexit discussion became fused during migration crisis. Leaving the EU would change many aspects of the UK’s economic relationship with the rest of Europe, but many far-right politicians primarily spewed rhetoric on the “dangers of immigration” and closing the UK’s open borders which are required by the EU’s Schengen Agreement. To be fair, many politicians espoused concerns about the UK carrying weaker states (an age-old argument of economics), many argued that getting out of the Schengen Area was essential national security (Sampson, 2017).

The results of the Brexit referendum shocked many. Though historically, the UK has had a contentious relationship with the EU since it reluctantly joined in the 1960's after the failure of EFTA, its own attempt at an economic union. Only after the demise of it's imperial status became painfully clear, and the establishment of its counter institution, EFTA, was only moderately successful in comparison, did the UK begin to consider the investing in the EU. EU member financial contributions are progressive. As one of the wealthiest nations, the UK ends up supplementing poorer nations within the EU – (which has been the basis of the economic argument to Brexit). Since then the 60's, UK has cooperated with varying levels of Euroscepticism never too far below the surface (Olsen & McCormick, 2017).

So why Brexit now? This cannot entirely be known. Contributing however was a shift in UK's "class structure" contributed which to the rise in conservatism. As the population shifted from primarily working class (Labor supporters) to college graduates (Conservative supporters), there was a shift in base populations (Ford & Goodwin, 2017).

Another contribution which set the stage for Brexit was the Labor Parties inadequacies to incorporate "left-behind", white, lower class individuals, which shifted their support to UKIP over the last ten years; along with growing identity crisis as ethnic cleavages have expanded (Ford & Goodwin, 2017).

The UK's referendum to leave the European Union took place on June 23, 2016 – passing with a narrow margin. Just 52% of the population voted to leave the EU (Ford & Goodwin, 2017; Sampson, 2017), presumably leaving nearly half of the nation unrepresented in this decision. Obvious implications of Brexit are economic and potentially disastrous, but due to the EU's Schengen Area (which allows for the free movement of people), the referendum cannot really be



separated from a piece of immigration policy – as this referendum essentially changes their border policy. In relation to Brexit, it must be noted that anti-immigration policies have emerged over the past 10-15 years in the UK, before the recent success of UKIP. This 10-15 year escalation in far-right influence can be traced through a number of policies which have negatively affected the status, livelihood and accommodations of and for refugees in the UK (Stewart & Mulvey, 2014).

### INCREASED FAR-RIGHT VOTING IN EUROPE

The five cases discussed above indicate that support for the far-right declined following World War II, but has displayed a creeping increase since the late 70's (Betz, 1994). The decrease in support for the far-right post WWII has been attributed to increased social and political stability in Europe, with the development of institutions like the European Union – creating welfare states which increased the wellbeing of individuals across Europe, leaving little room for extremist ideology (Betz, 1994). However when the European financial scene began to destabilize in the 70s, far-right voting began to increase in Western Europe – beginning in Austria (Betz, 1993). By the 90s, with increased migration and continued financial instability, the far-right gained a clear presence in the European political scene (Roodujin, 2015).

One theory attributes the recent success of the far-right to increased globalization (Roodujin, 2015). This theory proposes that as trade has increased, this has created “winners” and “losers” in the global market, and these “losers” gravitate toward a far-right philosophy in order to remove themselves from globalization (as if this were possible), by encouraging nationalism, to in their minds, protect national interests (Betz, 1993; Roodujin, 2015).

Another theory about the recent success of the far-right cites electoral volatility, meaning that voters have become less brand loyal (Roodujin, 2015). In the past voters were less likely to switch parties from election to election. This phenomenon has been witnessed recently and has been attributed to increased individualism and to increased distrust in institutions, as these institutions have been unable to meet the needs of a society (Betz, 1993; Roodujin, 2015).

As the far-right has regained its strength, it has been careful to separate itself from its fascist and Nazi ancestors, and has attempted to “detoxify” their image. This has been especially crucial for the success of the RPR (Roodujin, 2015, pg. 8). Due to the probability of continued migration, the Radical Populist Right will likely continue to be relevant, as immigration has proven to be a central (if not the most important) issue for those who vote radical populist right (Roodujin, 2015).

An additional framework from which to view the recent rise in the far-right, is through the activity of more traditional, stable parties (Roodujin, 2015). Extreme right wing parties (or third parties in general) have had the opportunity to flourish when the established center-left and center-right parties become *very* moderate in their beliefs and rhetoric in an attempt to encompass the beliefs of the masses (Roodujin, 2015). This has created political “space” for the far-right to pick up more extreme ideological issues, which still matter very much to the population (Roodujin, 2015).

Ethnic nationalism (which is tied to far-right voting) *does* vary across Europe (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017), so while far-right parties have gained seats in legislations across Europe – their success has been varied. In an analysis of 20 European Countries, and their parties, and said party share as of 2008, we can see that there is quite a bit of variation among European countries,

with the Switzerland's Swiss Peoples Party and Austria's Austrian Freedom Party at 21.0 and 18.7 shares of votes respectively; while Germany's National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) rests at 2.1 shares of votes (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). Though these numbers have obviously changed in the past 10 years – for example Hungary's JOBBIK party was placed at 3.1 shares of the vote (just above Germany), a number which has drastically increased, as the political influence JOBBIK has increased. Their success has been thought to push Hungary's ruling (far-right) party Fidesz further right, resulting in Hungary's restrictive reaction to the Syrian Crisis. These numbers are valuable in understanding recent far-right voting as part of the larger picture of far-right voting across Europe.

#### MIGRATION CRISIS PUSH FACTORS

Whether one considers the Arab Spring as a causal factor in the current migration crisis is a matter of perspective. From the perspective of the generations of individuals fleeing decades of continued conflict in the MENA regions, the Arab Spring can be viewed as an accelerator to a preexisting crisis; as migration from Libya to Italy is really an age-old tale (Kingsley, 2017). However, from the perspective of Europeans, migration became a crisis shortly after the 2011 Arab Spring, and therefore this event may be seen as a cause of the current crisis. Looking further back, another cause may be the current destabilization in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, rooted in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (Kingsley, 2017).

A slew of factors fall under the umbrella of European political causes. Since needy boats and feet have reached its soil en masse in 2014, both individual EU member states and EU as a whole have erected a variety of obstacles to individuals seeking shelter and prosperity in Europe. These include: inhumane detention across Europe, razor-wire fences, reduction in aid to Mediterranean

rescue, lackluster resettlement programs, and xenophobic rhetoric by political leaders (Hoel, 2015; Kelliher, 2016; Kingsley, 2017). Had Europe acted differently in the early stages of the 2014-2015 migration surge, it is likely that the ferocity of this continued humanitarian crisis could be mitigated (Kingsley, 2017).

### HYPOTHESIS 1

It is believed and supported by the literature that voters of the far-right ideology hold an anti-immigration stance, due to the central nature of ethnic nativism in far-right ideals. Therefore I hypothesize that as migration increases, that voters with a nativist/far-right ideology would be mobilized to vote – increasing support for the far-right.

H(0) – No correlation will be found between an increase in migration and an increase in far-right voting.

H(A) – A correlation will be found between an increase in migration and an increase in far-right voting.

### HYPOTHESIS 2

Far-right ideology seeks to preserve not only national culture but the natural population and ethnicity. Instances of racism and discrimination in France, Greece and Hungary against migrants coming from the MENA area due to ethnicity and religion lead to a second hypothesis which states; as migration of individuals from the MENA area (those affected by the migration crisis) increases, support for the far-right will increase.

H(0) – No correlation will be found between an increase in migration of individuals from the MENA region (affected by the migration crisis) and an increase in far-right voting.

H(A) – A correlation will be found between an increase in migration of individuals from the MENA region (affected by the migration crisis) and an increase in far-right voting.

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## METHODS

This small-N study will consist of five case studies of Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK. These five studies will explore the relationship between the current migration crisis and far-right voting in Europe, utilizing data from The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and Adam Carr's Electoral Database. In these studies, correlation experiments will be attempted in order to indicate whether these variables fall under an umbrella of potential causes of far-right voting. A P-value of .1 has been set to determine the significance of these results; and variables will be considered associated if found to have a correlation coefficient greater than or equal to .5 (or less than -.5, only in the case of the control variable of GDP). It must be said however, that these correlation experiments do not determine causation.

### THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable of far-right voting has been operationalized as the percentage vote share that has gone to far-right parties in a single legislative election, for each of the five case studies being explored. This variable will be obtained by dividing the number of votes cast to far-right parties by the total number of votes cast in a single legislative election.

The reasoning for utilizing "vote shares" as opposed to "number of parliamentary seats" or "percentage of parliamentary seats" to describe far-right voting in this study is because not all nations convert the percentage of the vote gained by a party into parliamentary seats in the same way. Many require a threshold which could mask the support given to some far-right parties. By choosing to represent far-right voting in percentage of the legislative vote, we can be more certain that this study describes the percentage of the voting population voting far-right.

In each experiment the x (asylum applications) and y (far-right vote share) values have been staggered by one year, as to see the possible effect of asylum applications on the following years elections. These experiments have been divided into “A” and “B” experiments, which examine (A) the role that migration plays over an entire election cycle, and (B) in the single year leading up to a legislative election. In both “A” and “B” experiments the dependent “y” variable of far-right vote shares in a single legislative election remains consistent.

### THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variable of migration has been operationalized as asylum applications to each of the five case studies, both in totality (1) which will test hypothesis 1, and of selected nationalities which have been identified by the literature as victims of the refugee crisis (2) which will test hypothesis 2. Once asylum applications have been gathered for each data subset per year, each will provide data points for two independent variables, one which represents migration over an election cycle (which will be known as “A” experiments), and one which represents recent migration, defined later in the paper, (which will be called “B” experiments).

Asylum applications have been chosen to operationalize the variable of migration for several reasons. One reason for choosing this representation is that an individual must physically be in a country to apply for asylum there, therefore we can assume that the number of applications will somewhat accurately represent at a portion of individuals which have been witnessed by voters entering a country. Number of applications has been chosen over the number of individuals which have been offered residency as the number of individuals offered residency status is often

only a small fraction of the individuals which enter a country. Therefore “border crossings” may seem an accurate representation of migration, however the number of individuals who cross over into a country is not well documented, in some cases migrants are specifically trying *not* to be detected for fear of being sent back to the previous country, therefore asylum applications are a much more well documented source for migration.

The discrepancy between asylum seekers and the number of migrants reported by each country is a valid concern, but unfortunately not one that may be addressed by this study. For example, the International Organization for Migration does not begin reporting migrant arrivals until 2015, four years after the beginning of the migration crisis – and even then, only by Italy and Greece. Because this study begins to look at how the arrival of migrants effects far-right voting as early as the beginning of the crisis in 2011, a more well documented source is necessary. For example, in the year 2015 Greece received 10,861 asylum applications, though the IOM reported 847,890 migrants arriving in Greece. It is clear that asylum applications do not document all individuals who pass through a country, as many of these migrants are in and out of Greece within a few days if allowed. Though they do represent the portion of the population which spends an extended amount of time within a country.

## CONTROL VARIABLES

The following control variables may influence extreme right wing voting besides immigration. As shown in the literature review above, factors of financial stability, unemployment, and the fear that accompanies security concerns such as acts of terrorism have been known to affect voting habits (Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Hart, 2018; Kibris, 2011; Trein, Beckmann & Walter, 2017). In the following experiments the financial stability of a nation has been operationalized as



GDP per capita in current (2018) US dollars. Unemployment has simply been operationalized as the unemployment rate in percentage of a workforce which are unemployed. Security concerns have been operationalized as the number of incidents of terrorism within a country in a year. GDP and unemployment rates have been sourced from the World Bank Database, while the START Global Terrorism Database has been utilized to gather incidents of terrorism for each case study.

The non-material variables of national pride, xenophobia and European identity prove difficult to operationalize, and are recorded less frequently and broadly than the material variables of GDP, unemployment and acts of terrorism, though no less important. Due to these factors, these variables have been omitted from this study with the recognition that they may very well be alternative potential causes of the far-right voting in. Future studies should attempt to find reliable data on these variables which have the ability to cover all five case studies and include them as additional control variables.

## A EXPERIMENTS

A experiments will utilize an x value which consists of asylum applications which span an average election cycle. In these experiments, asylum applications have been added to create a new x value which consists of the sum of asylum applications over the four years leading up to an election. A four-year period has been selected as this is the average time span between legislative elections for the five countries being studied. A experiments explore both total asylum applications over a four year period (labeled as A-1) and for selected nationalities (labeled as A-2).

## B EXPERIMENTS

B experiments will utilize an x value which represents of the number asylum applications that a country received in a single year prior to a legislative election. Like A experiments, B experiments explore both total asylum applications over a single year period (B-1) and applications from selected nationalities over a single year period (B-2). This second set of experiments which look at recent migration as opposed to migration over an election cycle have been implemented to account for the arbitrary timing of any election in a wave of migration and the volatile nature of voting habits. This reasoning is similar to why the control variables of GDP and Unemployment only consider a single year prior to an election as opposed to GDP or Unemployment over an election cycle. Suppose a legislative election is held in 2017, two years after the peak of the migration crisis. If we only consider migration over an election cycle, these peak migration numbers will be included in the x value, though it is possible that a massive number of migrating individuals may not be witnessed by voters in nearly two years. With this in mind, I believe it is important to consider how recent migration may affect far-right voting habits.

## C EXPERIMENTS

C experiments examine the effect that a change in GDP may have on far-right voting habits in the five cases being studied. These experiments utilize an x value, called CV1, which consists of GDP in current US dollars for the single year before a legislative election and a y value of the dependent variable (electoral shares of far-right parties). Where all other experiments seek a correlation coefficient greater than .5 to determine to which degree these variables are associated, because a decrease in GDP is expected to increase far-right voting, the variable of

GDP will be considered associated with the DV at -.5. Like B experiments, C experiments only look at a countries GDP in the single year prior to an election. The reasoning behind this choice is simply that individuals who vote in an election are not likely to care if their country was stable three years ago, if it is currently unstable, and therefore adding four years of GDP to create a variable of GDP over an election cycle may not be representative of the actual financial circumstance that voters are in when they cast their vote.

#### D EXPERIMENTS

D experiments utilize a nation's unemployment rate to determine the effect that unemployment may have on far-right voting habits. Unlike GDP, which measures the financial status of a country, the unemployment rate may shed light on the percentage of individuals who are feeling disenfranchised – a known contributor to populist and far-right voting. Like B and C experiments, D experiments utilize an x value (CV2) of the percentage of unemployment rate for the year prior to an election, and a y value of the dependent variable (electoral shares of far-right parties). The reasoning behind the choice to only look at the prior years' unemployment rate is very similar to why this study only examines the GDP of a single year before an election. For example, if the unemployment rate is relatively low, but then spikes right before an election, it is likely that large numbers of recently unemployed individuals will not be thinking of their prior financial situation, but rather their current diminished financial situation when voting.

#### E EXPERIMENTS

E experiments consider how the number of terrorist attacks that a nation experiences in a year may affect far-right voting. Acts of terrorism undoubtedly affect a nation's immigration policy.

We have seen examples of this in various European states (specifically France and the UK) and within the United States. The tightening of immigration policy directly aligns with the objectives of far-right parties, therefore it is important to consider whether acts of terrorism affect voting habits for the far-right. In order to explore this relationship, number of terrorist attacks over an election cycle (CV3-A) and number of attacks in the year prior to an election (CV3-B) are both utilized as x values, while the dependent variable (x value) of electoral shares gained by far-right parties remains constant for each case study.<sup>iii</sup>

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## DATA

### THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Data points for the dependent variable consist of vote shares (in percent of the total vote) for far-right parties. These vote shares have been gathered from Adam Carr's Electoral Database, which provides electoral results for legislative elections for the following case studies (Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK) among others.

For each case study, I looked at each legislative election which occurred after the start of the migration crisis in 2011, in addition to the legislative election which preceded the crisis, in order to determine a frame of reference as to what far-right vote shares looked like before the crisis began. For each election, all participating parties were researched in order to determine which parties identified as far-right. The following table displays these parties, the number of votes they received out of the total votes during that election year, and the % of the total vote which each party gained.

Table 1: Far-Right European Parties: 2009-Present

Year	Country	Party name	# of votes	total votes	% of vote
2010	Hungary	FIDESz	2,706,292	5,132,531	53%
2010	Hungary	Jobbik	855,436	5,132,531	17%
2014	Hungary	FIDESz-MPSz	2,135,960	4,795,757	45%
2014	Hungary	Jobbik	985,028	4,795,757	21%
2018	Hungary	FIDESz-MPSz-KDN	2,824,551	5,723,283	49%
2018	Hungary	Jobbik	1,092,801	5,723,283	19%
2009	Germany	N/A	0	43,371,190	0%
2013	Germany	AfD	2,056,985	43,726,856	5%
2017	Germany	AfD	5,877,094	46,506,857	13%
2007	France	National Front	17,107	20,406,785	0%
2012	France	National Front	3,528,663	25,952,859	14%

2017	France	National Front	1,590,858	18,176,177	9%
2017	France	DLF	17,344	18,176,177	0%
2009	Greece	LAOS	383,851	6,822,890	6%
2012	Greece	Independent Greeks	462,441	6,155,256	8%
2012	Greece	Golden Dawn	425,970	6,155,256	7%
2015	Greece	Independent Greeks	200,432	5,431,850	4%
2015	Greece	Golden Dawn	379,581	5,431,850	7%
2010	UK	UKIP	917,832	29,653,638	3%
2015	UK	UKIP	3,881,099	30,732,453	13%
2017	UK	UKIP	593,852	32,196,918	2%

Carr's database provides the percent of the total vote that each party won during each election.

For each election, percent vote shares of the far-right parties which were identified were added to create a total percent of far-right support for each election to create the dependent variable data points. The following figure shows the percentage of the legislative vote that went to far-right parties in each case study, per year.




Figure 1: Far-Right Legislative Vote Shares (DV)

In the case of Greece for the 2012 and 2015 elections two data points are available; as in both years two elections were held due to the failure to produce a successful governing alliance with the results of the first election. In these cases, the second, successful, election was utilized to create the data point for that year.

## THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Data points for the independent variables consist of asylum applications to each of the five countries being studied, retrieved from the United Nations Refugee Agency Database. Figure 1, below, shows total asylum applications to each of the five countries beginning in 2001, labeled as Independent Variable 1 (IV1).




Figure 2: Total Asylum Applications (IV1)

According to the literature (Kingsley, 2017; Park, 2015) nationalities coming primarily from the Middle East and northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa have been identified as victims of the refugee crisis. In order to see how the immigration of these affected groups may have impacted far-right wing voting in particular, applications from these selected nationalities, labeled as Independent Variable 2 (IV2), were gathered in Figure 2 below.






Figure 3: Applications of Selected Nationalities (IV2)

Two data points were then created from both IV1 (total applications) and IV2 (selected applications). For each subset of data (IV1 and IV2), one datapoint was created by summing the four years of asylum applications prior to an election in each case study to represent migration over an election cycle. These data points participate in “A” experiments and constitute points IV1-A and IV2-A. For example, in order to obtain data points for Hungary’s 2010 election, applications for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 were added for both total and selected asylum applications, to create the 2010 IV1-A and IV2-A data points.

While A experiments consider migration over an average election cycle, B experiments consider how recent migration may affect far-right wing voting in a single legislative election utilizing the

data subsets IV1 and IV2. Using the same example of Hungary's 2010 election, to represent migration in the year prior to this election, total and selected applications for 2009 were gathered to create the 2010 IV1-B and IV2-B data points.

#### *Control Variable 1 – GDP*

Data points for GDP per capita (CV1) have been collected from the World Bank database, and measured in current (2018) US dollars, for each country of study. CV1 constitutes the x values for C experiments. The figure below displays this data for the years 2000 to 2017. This control variable, among others, serves a possible alternative economic explanation for changes in far-right voting. A strong negative correlation would be intuitive based on the conventional wisdom that economically disadvantaged voters are a large portion of the far-right base, meaning that as GDP decreases, far-right vote shares would increase. In this case, the variable of GDP will be considered associated at a correlation coefficient of -.5 or less.




Figure 4: GDP per Capita (CV1)

### *Control Variable 2 – Unemployment*

Data points for unemployment (CV2) were gathered from the World Bank database.

Unemployment is measured in percentage of the population which is not employed but wished to be working. Unemployment rates have been collected for each of the five case studies for the years 2000 to 2017. CV2 constitutes the x value for D experiments and the following figure displays this data.




Figure 5: Unemployment Rates (CV2)

### *Control Variable 3 – Acts of Terrorism*

In order to determine the potential influence of security concerns on far-right vote shares, instances of terrorist attacks have been gathered from the START, Global Terrorism Database, for the years 2000 to 2017 for each of the five case studies. The following figure displays this data. Unlike C and D experiments which look only at the year prior to a legislative election, E experiments look at how terrorist attacks over an election cycle (CV3-A) *and* in the single year prior to an election may affect far-right voting (CV3-B). While financial circumstance may improve, leaving a voter in an immediately better or worse circumstance than the year before, terrorism thrives on lingering fears. This is why this study looks at the potential effects of both terrorism over an election cycle and recent attacks.




Figure 6: Incidents of Terrorist Attacks (CV3)

## EXPERIMENT RESULTS

The following tables show how dependent and independent variables were organized for analysis in each case study along with the results of their correlation experiments, where “r” represents the correlation coefficient and the years indicated are the years in which legislative elections were held in each nation. These tables also include control variables, along with their correlation experiment results and p-value findings.

Table 2: Hungary Results

Year	IV1-A	IV2-A	IV1-B	IV2-B	CV1	CV2	CV3-A	CV3-B	DV
2010	11,770	2,430	4,287	1,387	13,029.88	10.03	3	1	69.39
2014	23,320	8,946	18,122	6,072	13,667.70	10.18	0	0	65.07
2018	246,085	164,153	3,239	2,964	14,224.85	4.33	3	0	68.33
<b>r</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>-0.96</b>	<b>-1.00</b>	<b>-0.27</b>	<b>-0.30</b>	<b>0.97</b>	<b>0.69</b>	
<b>P-value</b>	<b>0.85</b>	<b>0.84</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.52</b>	

Table 3: German Results

Year	IV1-A	IV2-A	IV1-B	IV2-B	CV1	CV2	CV3-A	CV3-B	DV
2009	84,957	31,566	20,701	10,807	45,699.20	7.52	13	3	0
2013	176,533	79,897	63,928	25,856	44,065.25	5.38	17	5	4.7
2017	1,444,652	945,980	721,778	559,938	42,232.57	4.12	122	44	12.63
<b>r</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>0.94</b>	<b>-0.99</b>	<b>-0.96</b>	<b>0.94</b>	<b>0.94</b>	
<b>P-value</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.21</b>	

Table 4: France Results

Year	IV1-A	IV2-A	IV1-B	IV2-B	CV1	CV2	CV3-A	CV3-B	DV
2007	194,901	47,392	30,048	8,837	36,442.62	8.45	112	34	0.08
2012	174,426	61,903	51,398	18,388	43,790.74	8.81	33	8	13.59
2017	261,270	122,877	70,240	38,600	36,870.22	10.06	95	26	8.84
<b>r</b>	<b>-0.06</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>0.67</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>-0.88</b>	<b>-0.93</b>	
<b>P-value</b>	<b>0.96</b>	<b>0.78</b>	<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.76</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.25</b>	

Table 5: Greece Results

Year	IV1-A	IV2-A	IV1-B	IV2-B	CV1	CV2	CV3-A	CV3-B	DV
2009	65,955	22,561	19,421	6,881	31,997.28	7.76	96	53	5.62
2012	53,399	17,407	8,762	2,762	25,916.29	17.86	227	11	14.43
2015	34,466	17,306	8,875	4,459	21,760.98	26.49	113	26	10.67
<b>r</b>	<b>-0.47</b>	<b>-0.90</b>	<b>-0.91</b>	<b>-1.00</b>	<b>-0.66</b>	<b>0.61</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>-1.00</b>	
<b>P-value</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.05</b>	

Table 6: UK Results

Year	IV1-A	IV2-A	IV1-B	IV2-B	CV1	CV2	CV3-A	CV-B	DV
2010	112,744	65,697	28,963	18,017	38,262.18	7.54	88	39	3.09
2015	111,843	45,660	31,377	14,878	46,783.47	6.11	341	103	12.62
2017	136,655	63,116	37,370	16,218	40,412.03	4.81	369	15	1.84
<b>r</b>	<b>-0.61</b>	<b>-0.97</b>	<b>-0.34</b>	<b>-0.76</b>	<b>0.94</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.32</b>	<b>0.99</b>	
<b>P-value</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.78</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>0.79</b>	<b>0.10</b>	

## FINDINGS

When viewing the results of correlation tests between IV1-A and the DV, IV1-B and the DV, IV2-A and the DV and IV2-B and the DV in totality, without regard to country, each shows a slight negative correlation. A possible explanation can be a general low level in support for far-right parties in the nations which received the most asylum applications, like Germany, France and the UK, in comparison to generally high levels of support for the far-right, in nations which received comparatively less asylum applications, like Hungary and Greece. However, when looking at each case study individually different patterns emerge. It must be said however, that the following correlation results do not determine causation, but rather illuminates *possible* causes of far-right voting in Europe. These results may only - indicate association of variables.

P-values found in this study are relatively high, possibly due to the very small *n*. Therefore this study cannot reject the null hypothesis and focusses this Findings section on the interpretation of association found between possible causal variables (IV's) and the dependent variable.

## HUNGARY

In Hungary there are two parties which have been identified as belonging to the far-right; FIDESz (the ruling party) and JOBBIK, a party which entered Hungary's political scene in 2010. JOBBIK lies even further right on the political spectrum, and competes with FIDESz for the far-right constituency. Together these parties have constituted 25% in 2006, 40% in 2010, 50% in 2014 and 33.33% of the total ballot. This indicates that far-right parties are on the rise in Hungary. These percentages also indicate a generally strong presence of far-right parties, in comparison to other cases in this study.



In the case of Hungary, A experiments look at how a sum of asylum applications over four years (the average length of an election cycle in these case studies) effects far-right voting in a single election. Results show a weak positive correlation for both total asylum applications at 0.24 with a p-value of .85; and for selected nationalities at 0.25 with a p-value of .84. Correlation coefficients show no evidence to support Alternative Hypothesis 1 or 2, indicating that over an election cycle an increase in asylum applications in totality or of specific victims of the migration crisis, does not associate with an increase in far-right voting. P-values do not fall under .1 and do not allow the rejection of the Null Hypotheses.

B experiments, which observe how the single year's applications prior to an election effect far-right voting show a strong negative correlation for total applications at -0.96 with a p-value of .19; and for selected applications at -1, with a p-value of .06. Therefore, in terms of recent migration, correlation coefficients do not produce association and Null Hypothesis 1 and 2 are not rejected. It appears that in this case study there is little evidence to support the notion that an increase in migration has any effect on an increase in far-right votes.

Shortcomings in the analysis of Hungary in particular reside in the operationalization of migration in asylum applications. It has been well documented in the literature that Hungary is a country which most migrants wish to pass through to reach countries which offer a more hospitable resettlement program, therefore we must assume, especially in the case of Hungary, that asylum applications only represent a portion of individuals which travel through Hungary. However, these correlation experiments are still relevant. Hungary does show a spike in asylum applications in 2015, the documented peak of the migration crisis, and following this a decrease

in far-right voting. Therefore if the number of individuals was increased by a perfect representation of migration, the negative correlation found may very well be even stronger.

Control variable 1, which tests the impact of GDP per capita on far-right voting produces a weak negative correlation (-.27), with a p-value of .82. Correlation results indicate that change in GDP has little impact on far-right voting in Hungary. Like GDP, the second control variable of unemployment (CV2) produces a weak negative correlation of -.30 with a p-value of .8, indicating that changes in the unemployment rate cannot be proven to have an effect on far right voting in Hungary. However, control variable 3-A and 3-B which measures (A) the impact of terrorist attacks over an election cycle and (B) in the single year prior to an election on far-right voting do produce strong positive correlation coefficients of significance (at .97 and .69) with p-values of .15 and .52, indicating that as acts of terrorism increase, so does far-right voting. However these results of significance must be taken with a grain of salt. Hungary, unlike the other cases being studied, witnesses an extremely low number of terrorist incidents – the most over an election cycle being 3, whereas all other cases at some point experience attacks in the triple digits over an election cycle. Therefore, either this correlation may be a coincidence or Hungarians are extremely sensitive to acts of terrorism.

## GERMANY

Germany did not see the emergence of a far-right party until 2013 when the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) entered the German Parliament, therefore this is the only party which has been identified as far-right in the German case study. In terms of ballot composition, far-right parties consisted of 0% in 2005 and 2009, 11.1% in 2013, and 12.5% in 2017. Therefore, we can

see that while the presence of far-right parties in Germany has increased, they constitute a relatively small portion of the ballot. These numbers also show that Germany does not have a long history of far-right party presence in the legislature.

In the case study of Germany, A experiments show a strong positive correlation between far-right voting and total applications at 0.95, with a p-value of .2; and for the applications of selected nationalities at 0.95, with a p-value of .21. While correlation experiments show association, due to p-values, the Null Hypotheses cannot be rejected. The correlation coefficient indicates that an increase in migration in total and of individuals identified as being victims of the migration crisis over an election cycle correlates with an increase in support for far-right parties in Germany.

German B experiments also show a strong positive correlation between total applications and far-right voting at 0.95, with a p-value of .2 and for selected nationalities and an increase in far-right voting at 0.94, with a p-value of .22. In these experiments, strong positive correlation results can be interpreted to mean that migration immediately preceding an election both in total and of selected nationalities can be associated with an increase in far-right voting.

Unlike Hungary, Germany has been viewed by migrants as one of, if not *the*, ideal destination country due to its massive resettlement program (only being surpassed by Sweden), and general accommodating attitude. Therefore, in the case of Germany utilizing asylum applications as a representation of migration is likely very accurate.

In the case of Germany, C experiments which test CV1 (GDP per capita) and the DV (far-right vote shares) produce a very strong negative correlation of significance at -.99%, with a p-value

of .07. This indicates that as GDP decreases, far-right voting increases – therefore GDP per capita cannot be discounted as a cause of far-right voting in Germany. Like CV1, CV2 of unemployment when tested with the DV produces another strong negative correlation coefficient of significance at -.96 with a p-value of .19. This disassociation indicates that as the unemployment rate decreases far-right voting increases. However unlike the German C experiments, the result of German D experiments are counter intuitive to what one would expect, as the more people that are employed the more votes the far-right receives. The German E experiments which consider how acts of terrorism may affect far-right voting both over an election cycle (CV3-A) and in the year prior to an election (CV3-B) both produce a strong, positive correlation coefficient of significance at .94 with p-values of .21. Association found in correlation results indicate that as acts of terrorism increase, so does support for the far-right.

## FRANCE

In France, far-right parties which have been identified for study are the National Front and Debout la France (DLF). The National Front is by far the most prominent far-right party, while DLF has existed for some time, only began to pull noticeable support in 2017. Far-right parties have constituted 11.1% in 2007, 10% in 2012, and 20% in 2017 (with the entrance of the DLF) of the French legislative ballot. While France does show a history of far-right parties, like Germany, their presence is modest in comparison to those of Hungary or Greece.

In the case study of France, A experiments show a very weak negative correlation between a sum of total asylum applications per election cycle and far-right voting at -0.06, with a p-value of .96; however selected applications over an election cycle shows a medium strength, positive

correlation at 0.34 with far-right voting, with a p-value of .78. These results do not meet the standards for significance at .5, and therefore the Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected. However these findings are somewhat interesting, as they differ so greatly from the results of experiment 1A. The results of A experiments indicate that there may be some difference in the impact of selected nationalities and that of migration as a total on far-right voting behavior over an election cycle.

B experiments show a significant positive correlation between total applications from a single year and far-right voting at 0.67, with a p-value of .54; and a nearly significant correlation between selected applications for a single year and far-right voting at 0.47, with a p-value of .69. While positive association is found, p-values do not allow the rejection of the Null hypotheses. This indicates that an increase in both total and selected applications in a single year prior to and election is associated with an increase in far-right voting. Because these results differ so greatly from that of A experiments, I am inclined to believe that recent migration of individuals may have a greater effect on far-right voting in France, than that of migration over an election cycle.

French C experiments (testing the effects GDP per capita on the DV) produce a strong positive correlation coefficient of .80 with a p-value of .41. This result is counter intuitive to an economic theory of voting. This means that as GDP per capita rises (indicating more financial stability), so does the support for the far-right similar to the results of German D experiments. It is a notable observation that far-right voting is associated with unemployment but not GDP, as both are economic indicators. Results of French D experiments which test how the unemployment rate may effect French support for the far-right. This experiment produces a weak positive result

which does not meet the standard of significance at .37, with a p-value of .76. Therefore the unemployment rate is rejected as possible factor for French far-right support.

E experiments test the possible effect of terrorist incidents on far-right voting over an election cycle (CV3-A) and in the year prior to an election (CV3-B) and produce strong negative correlation coefficients of -.88 and -.93, with p-values of .31 and .25, respectively. Correlation results show that as acts of terrorism decrease, support for the far-right increases. This result is very interesting as it is covered in the literature review that much of French anti-immigration actions stem from the “state of emergency” that was declared after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Though I must point out that a state of emergency is declared by the executive, and not a legislative matter, therefore not necessarily supported by the civilian population by far-right support.

## GREECE

Greece has both a history of the presence of far-right parties and much volatility in the success of these parties. In Greece the parties LAOS, the Independent Greeks and the Golden Dawn have been identified as belonging to the far-right. LAOS was the primary far-right party until the June election of 2012, in which it failed to make the ballot. The Golden Dawn did not gain noticeable support until Greece’s May 2012 election, however by January of 2015 had become the leading far-right party. The Independent Greeks have been identified as far-right due to their nationalist and populist rhetoric and like the Golden Dawn, did not enter the ballot until the June 2012 legislative elections. While they initially attracted more supporters than the Golden Dawn, this advantage decreased by 2015. Far-right parties have constituted 20% in 2007, 16.6% in 2009, 20.5% in May of 2012, 14% in June of 2012, 33.3% in January of 2015, and 37.5% in September

of 2015 of the legislative ballot. Like Hungary, an overall increase in the presence of far-right parties can be observed as well as a generally strong presence at nearly 40% of the ballot in 2015 (the height of the migration crisis).

Legislative results from the second (successful) elections of both 2012 and 2015 were utilized as dependent variable data points – as the first elections of those years resulted in failing governments. The difference in support for far-right parties within these relatively short periods of time deserves some discussion. In May of 2012, far-right parties received 20.5% of the vote, while one month later in the June 2012 elections, support for far-right parties decreased to 14.4%. This discrepancy may be related to the exodus of the LAOS party and the entrance of two new, lesser experienced, far-right parties. Therefore the volatility in far-right support, which fell nearly six points, cannot be discounted. However, the January 2015 elections show that far-right parties gained 11% of the vote, while the September 2015 elections show the far-right receiving 10.7% of the vote. These elections, while nine months apart show very similar results. This stability could be due to both the Independent Greeks and the Golden Dawn being better established at this point.

In the Greek case study, A experiments show a nearly significant negative correlation between total asylum applications and far-right voting at -0.47, with a p-value of .69; and a strong negative correlation between an increase in applications of selected nationalities over an election cycle and far-right voting at -0.90, with a p-value of .29. The results of these correlation experiments do not allow us to reject the Null Hypotheses – meaning that there is no evidence to support the theory that an increase in asylum applications in total, or of individuals identified as

victims of the refugee crisis, has any effect on an increase in far-right voting in Greece over an election cycle.

Greek B experiments which investigate the effect recent migration on far-right voting, show even stronger negative correlations between total applications and far-right voting at  $-0.91$ , with a p-value of  $.27$  and for selected nationalities and far-right voting at  $-1$  with a p-value of  $.01$ . The results of these correlation experiments do not allow the rejection of the Null Hypotheses. This indicates that there is no evidence to support the claim that an increase in recent migration is associated with an increase in far-right voting in Greece.

Like Hungary, Greece is a nation in which many migrants wish to pass through in order to reach nations with, in this case, a more stable economy which could provide better opportunities. Greece is far less restrictive than Hungary, and arguably more accommodating and has for roughly the past ten years been slowly recovering from a financial crisis. This has left it's government with far fewer resources than many other EU member states to accommodate incoming migrants. Therefore Greece is not an ideal destination country for most migrants. With this in mind, the analysis of Greece may suffer the same shortcomings as Hungary in terms of the operationalization of migration in asylum application – which may skew the result of these experiments – as asylum applications may represent only a portion of the individuals which migrate to Greece.

The results of the Greek C experiment produces a correlation coefficient of  $-.66$  with a p-value of  $.54$ . This negative level of significance indicates that as GDP per capita decreases, levels of far-right support increase in Greece. This is the expected result from an economic voting theory standpoint. In the case of Greek D experiments which test how the unemployment rate may



effect far-right voting, a positive, significant correlation is found at .61, with a p-value of .58 – meaning that as the unemployment rate rises, so does the support for far-right parties in Greece. Therefore unemployment is excluded as a possible contributor to far-right voting in Greece. Experiments which look at how incidents of terrorism may effect far-right support produce some very interesting results. When CV3-A, which tests attacks over an election cycle (four year period) is tested against the DV, finds a strong positive correlation of significance at .88, with a p-value of .31. This indicates that as attacks over an election increase, so does support for the far-right. However when CV3-B (which looks at the single year prior to an election) is tested against the DV, a strong negative correlation is found at -.1 with a p-value of .05. Given the very small p-value found in test CV3-B, it is possible that acts of terrorism have a lasting effect on the voting habits of Greek citizens.

## UK

Only one party has been identified as belonging to the far-right in the UK in this study. The UK Independence Party, or UKIP is not a new party but has recently found its first notable success in the UK's 2010 legislative election. Far-right parties constituted 9.1% in 2005, 7.1% in 2010, and 7.7 % in 2015, and 8.3% of the ballot in 2017. While participation far-right parties are not foreign to the UK, they represent a modest portion of the ballot, akin to Germany and France. There is little variance in far-right party participation, as UKIP continues to constitute between 7 and 9 percent throughout four elections. However unlike Germany, it can be said that the UK does have a history of far-right party participation.

In the UK case study, A experiments show a significant negative association between total asylum applications over an election cycle and an increase in far-right voting at -0.61, with a p-

value of .58; and a strong negative correlation between the applications of selected nationalities and an increase in far-right voting at -0.97, with a p-value of .14. Results of these correlation experiments do not allow us to reject Null Hypotheses. This indicates that there is no evidence to support the claim that an increase in migration in total or of selected nationalities over an election cycle can be associated with an increase in far-right voting.

B experiments (which measure recent migration) produce negative correlations as well with a medium negative correlation between total asylum applications and an increase in far-right voting at -0.34, with a p-value of .78; and a strong negative correlation between an increase in the applications of selected nationalities in the year prior to an election and an increase in far-right voting at -0.76, with a p-value of .45. Like A experiments, B experiments produce negative correlations in which we cannot reject the Null Hypotheses.

The results of both A and B experiments, like the Greek experiments, show that for both total and selected nationalities, and for both long term and recent migration, there is no evidence to support the notion that an increase in migration has any effect on an increase in far-right voting in the UK.

C experiments (GDP per capita and changes in far-right voting habits of UK) produce a very strong, positive correlation of .94, with a p-value of .22. This means that in the UK as GDP rises, so does support for the far-right. This, like results in Germany and France cannot be explained by economic theories of voting. The UK D experiment which looks at the possible effects of unemployment on far-right voting produces a weak, positive correlation of .08, with a p-value of .95, and therefore cannot be considered as a possible explanation for far-right voting habits in the UK since the beginning of the migration crisis in 2011. When testing the CV3-A against the

DV, a weak positive correlation of .32 is found, along with a p-value of .79. Therefore like unemployment rates in the UK, terrorist incidents over an election cycle are not associated with an increase in far-right voting. However when looking at the single year prior to a legislative election (CV3-B), a stronger correlation of significance of .99 is found, with a p-value of .1. Therefore it is possible that citizens of the UK are more strongly influenced to vote for the far-right by recent terrorist events and therefore the security concern of recent terrorist incidents cannot be excluded as a potential cause for far-right voting in the UK<sup>iv</sup>.

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## CONCLUSION

Due to high p-values, in no cases was this study able to reject the Null Hypothesis, however some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the associations found in correlation experiments. The following table summarizes the results of these case studies in terms of significant or insignificant association (SA/IA) between independent and dependent variables for both A (migration over an election cycle) and B (recent migration) experiments.

Table 3

Results of Hypothesis Testing

	Hungary A	Hungary B	Germany A	Germany B	France A	France B	Greece A	Greece B	UK A	UK B
H1	IA	IA	SA	SA	IA	SA	IA	IA	IA	IA
H2	IA	IA	SA	SA	IA	SA	IA	IA	IA	IA

The above results show that Germany was the only case study in which both A and B experiments produce significant correlation. This indicates that in Germany, an association is found between a rise in migration and a rise in far-right voting. What is notable about these results is that Germany received by far the most applicants out of the five case studies and has the least history of far-right parties.

While the case study of Germany found association between IV1 and 2 and the DV, indicating that increased asylum applications may affect far-right voting in Germany, alternative variables of interest may also affect far-right voting habits. Decreased GDP per capita and increases in

incidents of terrorism cannot be excluded from the list of potential contributors to far-right voting habits in Germany.

France, the second largest application receiving country after Germany, does find association between IV's and the DV in B experiments, indicating that recent migration may have some effect on an increase in far-right party support. The results of control variable experiments show that French voting habits are not explained by economic theories on voting, as an increase in GDP correlates with an increase in far-right support. Therefore increased GDP per capita cannot be excluded from consideration as a potential cause of the increased far-right support in France.

Besides these findings, both A and B experiments in Hungary, Greece and the UK all find no evidence to reject the null, though alternative causal factors have been identified as potential causes of far-right voting.

In the majority of the experiments in this study, no association was found; though some interesting findings have come to light. Countries with relatively little previous support for the far-right, such as Germany and France, do show a correlation between an increase in asylum applications (migration) and an increase in support for far-right parties. This is evident when looking at both total asylum applications and at the applications of individuals which have been identified by the literature as being victims of the migration crisis, though selected applications do not seem to have a noticeable increase or decrease in correlation in comparison to total applications.

Countries which have a stronger history of far-right electoral support, such as Hungary or Greece, do not show a correlation between an increase in asylum applications and an increase in far-right voting, in fact, the correlations are overwhelmingly negative and strong, suggesting that,

if anything, and increase in asylum applications may be associated with a *decrease* in far-right voting. However when examining how the control variables of GDP per capita, unemployment rates, and incidents of terrorism; results in Hungary and Greece begin to differ. Results in Hungary find no association with either economic control variable tested in this study. While a strong correlation between terrorist incidents was found, these results must be taken with a grain of salt, as number of terrorist attacks are so relatively small in comparison to other studies, being 0 in many years. The most telling indicator of far-right voting in Hungary seems to be their relatively strong history of far-right support.

Greece however does show association with economic control variables. A decrease in Greek GDP along with an increase in unemployment both produce correlation coefficients of significance. Likewise terrorism over an election cycle also produces a strong correlation of significance. These findings lead me to the conclusion that the recent far-right voting in Greece may have more to do with Greece's financial hardships and security concerns than an increase in asylum applications.

Success of far-right parties in recent years in the UK falls somewhere between the low/moderate success in Germany/France and extreme popularity seen in Greece and Hungary. This study finds an overwhelmingly negative correlation between an increase in asylum applications and an increase in far-right voting and therefore cannot reject the null. However, like Greece, association control variables suggest alternative causal variables, which require investigation. Like Germany and France, this study does not find association with economic variables – as an increase in GDP correlates strongly with an increase in far-right voting. Likewise, recent incidents of terrorism strongly correlates with far-right voting in the UK.

These results lead me to the conclusion that in the case of countries examined in this study which already have a history of and strong far-right presence, fluctuations in asylum applications have no influence on voters' support for far right parties , while countries with a lower success and/or history of far-right parties are more susceptible to find a stronger correlation between the two variables.

## LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Asylum applications were chosen to operationalize the variable of migration due to multiple factors. One benefit is that asylum applications are well documented and easily obtained for research; another is that it is reasonable to assume that this number will represent at least a portion of individuals which enter a country (which is witnessed by the public), as asylum must be applied for in person. However, this operationalization has drawbacks as well. One issue with this operationalization is that not all migrants apply for asylum, in fact it is well documented that migrants wish to pass on through many European countries to reach an ideal destination country with better accommodations, like Germany or Sweden. For example, many of the individuals which enter Hungary and Greece do not wish to stay there, and therefore do not apply for asylum. Therefore a better measure of migration could be “border crossings”, however this phenomena is not well documented, as these instances are not systematically recorded. One assumption that could be made is that this study may be the most accurate in cases in which the country is a final destination country.

However let us assume that each person applied for asylum in each country they pass through – making asylum applications a more perfect representation of migration. This would leave application numbers about the same in the ideal destination countries of France and Germany

(the only countries in which the null hypothesis was not rejected). However in Hungary and Greece, this would greatly increase application numbers. So what would this look like for the correlation experiments? – with application numbers increased, the slight to strong negative correlation found between asylum applications and increased far-right voting would be even stronger. Therefore while asylum applications is not as accurate for countries which migrants pass through, it would not change the outcome of hypothesis tests for these case studies.

Contrast this with the likely more accurate results in France and Germany. French and German correlation experiments found that migration could not be excluded as a potential causal variable for far-right voting do to positive correlations found between asylum applications and far-right voting. While this is very different from the results found in Hungary and Greece, if it can be reasoned that an increase in asylum applications would not change the results of experiments A and B, then this limitation cannot account for the discrepancy in results found among cases.

Another limitation in this analysis is the general lack of electoral data; as legislative elections are infrequent, and only occur about every four years. Infrequent elections result in fewer datapoints. As seen in the case of Greek elections, electoral support for far-right parties can shift dramatically in the span of just one month, therefore one datapoint every four years cannot monitor minute changes in far-right support which happen within a constituency on a monthly or yearly basis.

Another issue which contributes to a lack in data points is that the migration crisis in Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon, as it only began in 2011. This means that with the frequency of European elections in mind, there have only been three or four elections since the beginning of this crisis, resulting in only three or four dependent variable data points per case study. This issue of a very small  $n$ , in addition to the multiple alternative causal variables tested, may factor in to



p-value results and the inability to reject the null. Therefore as time goes on, elections continue, and migration continues; it is imperative to collect more y-values and improve the reliability of results. This should be a doable task as European elections are a regular occurrence and the effects of migration in Europe will not be ending anytime soon.

The limitations that few datapoints (resulting in a small  $n$ ) places on this study may very well affect p-value results, therefore it is essential for future works to increase the sample size (with time, and more European elections) so that reliability findings may be improved.

The association found with economic variables and far-right voting comes as no surprise. It is well documented that in times of economic crisis voters look to the left and the right for support. Though this study did not always find association with economic variables, looking forward I believe it would be worth considering economic factors as a possible lurking variable necessary for increased far-right voting. While voters of the far-right have been found to hold nationalist (xenophobic) views, these voters may only be mobilized during times of economic crisis.

Therefore better a better operationalization of economic voting may be necessary as well.

Another consideration for future works should be the history and strength of far-right parties as a possible causal variable, considering the discrepancy found between countries with a long or short history of far-right parties.



## APPENDIX: VARIABLE DATA

Table 7: Total Asylum Applications (IV1)

Year	Hungary	Germany	France	Greece	UK
2001	9,146	87,791	46,490	5,214	70,810
2002	6,047	70,353	50,081	5,398	102,348
2003	2,059	49,711	58,660	7,786	59,276
2004	1,203	34,899	57,940	4,028	39,848
2005	1,218	26,492	48,253	8,611	29,717
2006	1,715	19,935	30,048	11,768	26,986
2007	3,017	17,829	28,513	24,597	27,071
2008	2,751	20,701	34,513	19,421	29,724
2009	4,287	26,886	41,347	15,472	28,963
2010	2,094	40,620	47,168	9,744	21,217
2011	1,296	45,099	51,398	8,762	25,034
2012	1,808	63,928	54,712	9,124	26,550
2013	18,122	108,996	59,884	7,705	28,882
2014	40,929	172,514	58,404	8,875	31,377
2015	174,026	441,364	73,742	10,861	39,026
2016	27,891	721,778	70,240	49,556	37,370
2017	3,239	215,105	90,740	65,370	40,771

Table 8: Asylum Applications – Selected Nationalities (IV2)

Year	Hungary	Germany	France	Greece	UK
2001	6,127	33,607	14,711	3,692	33,770
2002	4,832	23,135	16,118	7,906	55,503
2003	1,014	13,784	15,928	4,871	29,538
2004	126	8,944	12,458	1,971	18,853
2005	98	7,155	10,169	2,260	14,388
2006	230	6,036	8,837	3,816	15,625
2007	364	7,568	8,899	9,604	14,550
2008	449	10,807	13,781	6,881	17,505
2009	1,387	13,958	13,859	5,359	18,017
2010	926	18,621	15,875	2,405	9,992
2011	850	21,462	18,388	2,762	10,010
2012	1,098	25,856	18,970	3,129	9,637
2013	6,072	41,341	21,139	3,346	11,135
2014	16,980	88,117	25,852	4,459	14,878
2015	124,707	256,584	37,286	6,372	20,885
2016	19,502	559,938	38,600	37,432	16,218
2017	2,964	138,159	45,448	40,470	17,896

Table 9: Asylum Applications – Selected Nationalities (IV2)

	Hungary	Germany	France	Greece	UK
2005		0			0.0223
2006	0.414				
2007			0.0008	0.0379	
2008					
2009		0		0.0562	
2010	0.6939				0.0309
2011					
2012			0.1359	.2047/.1443	
2013		0.047			
2014	0.6507				
2015				.1103/.1067	0.1262
2016					
2017		0.1263	0.0884		0.0184
2018	0.6833				

Table 10:Country GDP per Capita (CV1)

Year	Hungary	Germany	France	Greece	UK
2000	4,633.31	23,718.75	22,364.03	12,042.95	27,982.36
2001	5,283.03	23,687.34	22,433.56	12,538.18	27,427.59
2002	6,665.96	25,205.16	24,177.34	14,110.31	29,785.99
2003	8,423.35	30,359.95	29,568.39	18,477.58	34,173.98
2004	10,296.34	34,165.93	33,741.27	21,955.10	39,983.99
2005	11,205.97	34,696.62	34,760.19	22,551.77	41,732.64
2006	11,477.82	36,477.87	36,442.62	24,801.16	44,252.32
2007	13,907.50	41,814.82	41,508.43	28,827.33	50,134.32
2008	15,739.74	45,699.20	45,334.11	31,997.28	46,767.59
2009	13,029.88	41,732.71	41,575.42	29,710.97	38,262.18
2010	13,092.23	41,785.56	40,638.33	26,917.76	38,893.02
2011	14,118.12	46,810.33	43,790.74	25,916.29	41,412.35
2012	12,888.31	44,065.25	40,874.72	22,242.68	41,790.78
2013	13,667.70	46,530.91	42,592.95	21,874.82	42,724.07
2014	14,201.45	48,042.56	43,008.65	21,760.98	46,783.47
2015	12,483.87	41,323.92	36,613.38	18,070.77	44,305.56
2016	12,820.09	42,232.57	36,870.22	17,881.53	40,412.03
2017	14,224.85	44,469.91	38,476.66	18,613.42	39,720.44

Table 11: Unemployment Rates (CV2)

Year	Hungary	Germany	France	Greece	UK
2000	6.56	7.92	10.22	11.25	5.56
2001	5.67	7.77	8.61	10.46	4.7
2002	5.61	8.48	8.7	9.97	5.04
2003	5.79	9.78	8.31	9.41	4.81
2004	5.83	10.73	8.91	10.31	4.59
2005	7.19	11.17	8.49	9.99	4.75
2006	7.49	10.25	8.45	9.01	5.35
2007	7.41	8.66	7.66	8.4	5.26
2008	7.82	7.52	7.06	7.76	5.62
2009	10.03	7.74	8.74	9.62	7.54
2010	11.17	6.97	8.87	12.71	7.79
2011	11.03	5.82	8.81	17.86	8.04
2012	11	5.38	9.4	24.44	7.89
2013	10.18	5.23	9.92	27.47	7.53
2014	7.73	4.98	10.3	26.49	6.11
2015	6.81	4.62	10.36	24.9	5.3
2016	5.11	4.12	10.06	23.54	4.81
2017	4.33	3.74	9.68	21.41	4.32

Table 12: Terrorist Attacks (CV3)

Year	Hungary	Germany	France	Greece	UK
2000	0	8	28	28	60
2001	1	8	21	14	91
2002	0	3	17	11	21
2003	0	2	34	12	23
2004	0	4	11	4	5
2005	0	3	33	5	29
2006	0	4	34	23	6
2007	0	3	16	15	20
2008	2	3	13	53	39
2009	1	3	9	115	23
2010	0	1	3	48	57
2011	0	8	8	11	46
2012	0	5	66	22	55
2013	0	0	18	54	137
2014	1	13	14	26	103
2015	1	65	37	31	114
2016	1	44	26	31	15
2017	0	27	41	43	122



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