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Henry A. Wise was never elected to the presidency, he was never nominated as a candidate for that office, his name was never brought before a nominating convention of his party and yet his connection with the presidency is interesting. The immediate occasion for the secession of the Southern States was the election of Lincoln, and in all probability he would not have been elected had the two factions of the Democratic party been united-in the election of 1860. Among the many aspirants for the Democratic nomination the only one on whom the party could have united was Henry A. Wise of Virginia. Had his political views been rightly understood by the men of his own party, he might have united his party and by defeating Lincoln would have postponed secession for at least four years.

The question at issue in the presidential election of 1860 was the existence of slavery in the territories of the United States. The controversy over this question began before the adoption of the constitution with the ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory in 1787. Its settlement was attempted by the Missouri compromise in 1820 and by the compromise of 1850, but in 1854 it was still unsettled and from that time until 1860 it was the predominating question in the politics of the country.

When the United States acquired New Mexico and California by the treaty at the close of the Mexican war, territorial governments for them were proposed

Note-This paper is based in part upon a number of letters written by Wise to W. F. Samford, of Alabama, during the decade prior to the War. The originals are in the possession of Dr. George Petrie, Professor of History and Dean of the Graduate School, Alabama Polytechnic Institute; and it was on his suggestion that the paper was written, some years ago, soon after the letters were brought to light. - Ed.

in Congress. This afforded another occasion for the discussion of the slavery question which was continued until compromised in 1850 by the establishment of the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the new territories. The compromise of 1850 had applied the principle of non-intervention only to the territory newly acquired from Mexico. When the discussion was reopened by the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854 this principle was extended to the old Louisiana territory and a step further was taken in establishing popular sovereignty, that is the people of a territory were given the right to decide for or against slavery.

In 1854, then, the leading political question of the day was slavery in the territories and the events of the next few years increased its importance. The bitter struggle between the slavery and anti-slavery parties in Kansas for the control of that territory forced the question on the attention of the public. The Dred Scott decision encouraged the South by acknowledging its claims in a Supreme Court decision and strengthened the Free-soilers by making them unite to oppose it. By 1860 this question overshadowed all others and was the one important issue in the presidential election of that year.

In this election the principal parties were the Democrats and the Free-soilers or Republicans. The latter had grown rapidly in strength during the decade preceding the war by the acquisition of both Democrats and Whigs. Its fundamental principle was opposition to the extention of slavery. They declared in their-platform of 1860 that they had no intention of interfering with slavery in the states where it already existed, but confined themselves to opposing its extention into the territories. They declared : "that the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom", and

that Congress had the power to abolish slavery there, and should do so when necessary. The right which the South claimed of protection for slaves in the territories, they denounced as "dangerous political heresy' and denied the authority of Congress or of a territorial legislature or of any individuals to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States.

The Democratic party had united in 1856 on the Cincinnati platform which affirmed the principle of non-intervention, established by the Kansas-Nebraska bill. During the four years of Buchanan's administration different constructions had been placed on this platform by different parts of the Democratic party, and by 1860 two well defined factions had developed-the Northern or Douglas faction and the Southern-rights faction.

The Northern faction, led by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, believed that the question of slavery in a territory should not be decided at all by Congress, but that a territorial legislature could establish or abolish slavery. This was soon brought face to face with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case which stated clearly that neither Congress nor the territorial legislature had the right to abolish slavery in a territory. In order not to directly oppose a decision of the Supreme Court in the presidential campaign of 1860, they avoided committing themselves to either position by declaring in their platform that since there were differences of opinion regarding slavery in the territories "the Democratic party would abide by decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of constitutional law."

The Southern-rights wing still favored the popular sovereignty of the Cincinnati platform, but claimed that the people of a territory could exercise

this right only in forming a state constitution and not before.

At the Charleston Convention this wing of the Democrats objected to the Northern wing platform because it. took no definite position on the slavery question. They demanded a platform making a clear statement in favor of protection.

Besides the new Free-soil element and the two factions of the Democratic party, there was still to be reckoned with the remnants of the American or Know-nothing party. In 1856 this party had showed considerable strength under the principles of opposition to foreigners and Roman Catholics and neutrality on the slavery question, but now only a remnant of its old members formed the Constitutional Union party with the policy of neutrality on the slavery question. It had no chance of winning the election and was feared chiefly by the Southern Democrats who thought that it might break the solid Democratic South by winning some of the Southern states. It was generally conceded up to a few months before the Republican convention that William H. Seward would be the choice of the Free-soil party. Therefore the Democrats would have to select a nominee who would be especially strong against him. But the question as to who this Democratic nominee should be was answered in various ways. As the party was divided in principle and could unite on no platform, so they could agree on no candidate. Douglas was in the field representing the Northern wing ; Buchanan, who desperately sought to please both sections, was a candidate for re-election ; and Henry A. Wise of Virginia was the most prominently mentioned Southern man.

Stephen A. Douglas had no rival in his faction. He had introduced into Congress in the Kansas-Nebraska bill the doctrine of popular sovereignty which

was the foundation of his policy and had continued its persistent champion. He claimed that this principle had been established in the compromise measures of 1850 and should be applied thereafter in the formation of all territorial governments. He understood popular sovereignty in the sense of squatter sovereignty, that. is, that during the territorial period the people of a territory through its legislature might establish or prohibit slavery. When the Dred Scott decision contradicted the doctrine of squatter sovereignty by stating that neither Congress nor the territorial legislature could interfere with slavery, Douglas was compelled to state his position anew and he attempted to please both sections. To the South he said that the decision of the court was supreme and must be obeyed. To the North he said that though the decision of the court was supreme and forbade the territorial legislature to abolish slavery, yet by refusing to protect it by necessary police regulations the legislature might make the existence of slavery impossible. This answer lost him the support of the South because it did not uphold protection.

Buchanan had been elected in 1856 on the Cincinnati platform which endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska bill. It affirmed the principle of non-intervention, but on the question of popular sovereignty it was ambiguous and probably intentionally so in order that both wings might interpret it to suit themselves. During his administration Buchanan had done all in his power to keep in favor with both factions and hence had attempted to avoid committing himself to the views of either.

Between these two presidential aspirants, Douglas and Buchanan, there was a personal antagonism which had sprung from a difference of opinion on popular sovereignty and chiefly on the Lecomption

question. Buchanan had been in favor of the admission of Kansas under the Lecomption constitution and had tried in every way to have Congress accept it, but he had been opposed by Douglas to whose efforts the defeat of this plan was mainly due.

While Douglas and Buchanan each had claims on one section of the Democratic party, there was reason to believe that both wings might unite on Henry A. Wise. On the question of most importance, that of slavery in the territories he was extremely Southern, taking very advanced ground. He was one of the earliest and most ardent supporters of the doctrine of protection. As early as 1854 when it had hardly been discussed at all he opposed the Kansas-Nebraska bill because one of its clauses provided against reviving a law protecting slavery. On this point his friend Col. W. F. Samford of Alabama writes on Dec. 28, 1858,

> Gov. Wise has taken higher ground on the territorial question than any other presidential aspirant North or South. While Douglas, Davis, Orr and Stephens have been ducking, diving, dodging and hiding and openly declaring in favor of the power of a territorial legislature to exclude slavery by refusing to it the "peculiar" protection and "police regulations" necessary to its maintainance in a territory, or anywhere else, Henry A. Wise stands up boldly and declares for the South without reservation or equivocation. He says the territorial legislature, no more than Congress. has the right to exclude or to cripple the institution in anyway; or to any extent but, on the contrary, are bound by the Constitution and the law, as declared by the Supreme Court, to protect slavery just as they are bound to protect any other property, and to give that sort and degree of protection which its peculiar nature demands. The Kansas act bad a double-side which many of us did not see in 1856, but which we may be made to feel in 1860, and ever thereafter. Out of this has come a doctrine absurd in theory and ruinous to the South in practice. It is this: That Congress and the President shall not interfere to protect any more than to destroy slavery in the territories or states. This is the very genius and spirit of the Kansas Act, and an evil spirit it is for the South. I did not see this consequence of the Act in 1856, my eye rested on the repeal of the Missouri Restriction, and I little dreamed that in 1858, that Act would be claimed as establishing the doctrine, that the South has no right to Protection of her property from this Federal Government in the territories or States.

I know Gov. Wise was originally opposed to the Act with the Badger Proviso, and suspicious of its operations and he stands today among the presidential aspirants, the only man who from the beginning, has asserted the right of the South to have her property protected in the territories.

Gov. Wise approved of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise but he opposed the Kansas-Nebraska bill because of the Badger amendment which provided against the revival of any law protecting or establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery. Without this proviso, he claimed, the old Spanish law of the Louisiana territory protecting slavery would have been revived. On Aug. 6th, 1857, he writes to Samford:

I happened unfortunately to agree with my friend Mr. Wilson in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The Dred Scott decision proves too late our sagacity. The law of slavers was the law of the Louisiana territory, N and S. of 36° 30', prior to 1820. It was unrepealed, up to the Kansas Act, by any law other than that of the law and line of the Missouri compromise. That compromise was constitutional or unconstitutional. If constitutional, it affected only the territory N. of 36° 30'- that S. of it was left unaffected. In other words slavery was the status south of 36° 30' in Kansas. But for the Kansas bill, the Dred Scott decision would have established that the compromise law of 1820 was void and that the old Spanish law of slavery was untouched, unrepealed north of 36° 30' in all the Louisiana territory not organized into a state government. What did the K-N bill? By a proviso twice repeated in the 14th Section and in the 32nd Section it enacted: "that nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law prior to 1820 either protecting or establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery." There was no law prior to 1820 prohibiting or abolishing, but there was a law establishing and protecting slavery in Kansas and that law this proviso repealed. How can they who repealed slavery in Kansas abuse Walker for saying, it is, or it will be a free state. I was at Washington when the amendment passed and protested against it. It came from that Danaos Badger. Stewart of Michigan protested against the revival of slavery north of 36° 30' and Badger, superservicably, instead of confining the proviso to north of 36° 30' which, true, would have been only to reenact the Missouri compromise law and line made it sweeping South and North, not only to revive, but also not to "put in force" the Louisiana territorial law establishing and protecting slavery. In a clause of non-intervention it intervened to discriminate "between all other property and slavery and repealed the law, the only law establishing-and protecting slavery.

As Wise favored protection he necessarily opposed squatter sovereignty because to sanction squat-

ter sovereignty would be to admit that a territorial legislature could prohibit slavery, and according to his doctrine of protection it not only could not prohibit but must protect it. In a speech delivered at Norfolk during the campaign of 1860 he said,

> The only difference between Lincoln and Douglas is that Lincoln claims the power and duty of Congress to abolish slavery in the territories, and Douglas practices intervention and preaches non-intervention by Congress, but claims that a territorial legislature, a mere creature of Congress, a most subordinate Federal authority, can intervene to abolish property in slaves. It is safer for us to contest the power in Congress, we can't risk our slaves to contest it in the territories. In Congress we are represented and in Kansas Legislature we can't be.

During July of 1859 Gov. Wise received a letter from a body of New York Democrats asking his views on the leading questions of the day, as his "name had been prominently brought before the American people of the Democratic party, both in this section and in other quarters of the Union as their choice for the nomination of the Charleston convention as a candidate for the Presidency". In *a* lengthy reply Gov. Wise explained his views on naturalization, on protection abroad for naturalized citizens, on the powers of a state relating to naturalization, on the reopening of the slave trade and no protection in the territories. On the last point he said,

> You ask my views also regarding the legitimate bounds of congressional legislation, which, while maintaining non-intervention on the question of forcing or excluding slavery from them, yet should claim the constitutional power if necessary to protect the rights of persons and property within their borders, leaving the people free at the proper time to form a state constitution and seek admission in the Union, whether Free or Slave states as they may elect.
>
> This question in itself, in the shortest space states my views in substance with precision. All persons and all property, equal and alike, require only not to be assailed and destroyed in, or excluded from the common territories. Every species of right require laws, it is true, suited to their character and their case. Personal property for example must have a law that it shall not be "taken and carried away"; and land which cannot be "taken and carried away" must have a law that it shall not be trespassed

upon in some other way, and so with slaves and everything else, they must have provisions according to their kind. But the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress heretofore organizing territories are sufficient, and if amendments of the laws are required, it is the duty of Congress to see that they are provided, of the Executive of the United States to see that they are executed and the Judiciary to decide upon the rights under the laws. The Slave states should never pretend to any peculiar privileges and do not so far as I know. They ask only that their rights shall not be assailed and invaded and, if they be assailed, that they may be protected as other personal and proprietary rights are protected; that they may have equal confederate, federal privileges and immunities, and they ask for no special or peculiar code. The sole question is: What protection does the Constitution guarantee in the territories? We contend that it guarantees. all protection required, to all persons and all rights recognized within its jurisdicton.

When the issue of popular sovereignty was made to leave the people perfectly free to form their state constitution, without force, fraud, or dictation or intervention from Congress or any other power, I declared openly for the sovereignty of the people, But I am utterly opposed to "squatter sovereignty" and hostile to the cry of "no code" for the sake of protection-and utterly opposed to the equally vicious doctrine lately put forth: "That the Congress may renounce its powers and duties of protection".

On reopening the Slave Trade, Wise said in this same letter,

I can easily defend the slavery of the United States as it now exists and has existed from first to last, and show that it is now, at least, well founded on principles wholly opposed to the re-opening of African Slave trade; that the one is wholly irreconcilable with and opposed to the other; and that the reopening of the slave trade would be as offensive to the moral sense of the large majority of slave-holders and of the people of the South as to any other people in our own or in any other country.

This advanced Southern-rights ground taken by Wise, demanding protection for slaves in the territories, gave him great strength with the Southern wing of the Democrats but his bold stand against the Lecomption constitution on account of its injustice was entirely misunderstood and lost for him the support to which he was entitled and which his position on protection alone would have given him. He claimed that the power to ratify the Lecomption constitution had not been delegated by the people of Kansas. to the convention which framed it, but had been re-

served to the people themselves, and that therefore, since only one section of it had been ratified by them, the constitution as a whole was not the act and deed of the people. He believed "that the inhabitants or people of a territory are sovereign to form for themselves a constitution and State Government", and as this constitution was not the act and deed of the inhabitants he thought it was neither right nor just to force it upon them.

Besides opposing it on the ground of its injustice he said also that there was no advantage in its being adopted. In 1858 he wrote,

> And why impose this constitution of a minority on a majority? Cui bono? Does any Southern man imagine that this is a practicable or sufferable way of making a Slave State? Who believes that Kansas will be made a Slave State or kept one for any time by the admission of this constitution? Who will carry a slave there now to become a bone of contention in a border war? The sport of violence and fraud and force like that which has so long endangered person and property and political franchise in that unhappy battle ground of sectional feuds? To what end is this to be done if speedily it is to be undone with State authority, created to drive slave property from the territory?
>
> We have proudly, heretofore, contended only for equality and justice; but if this be wantonly done without winning a stake-the power of a slave state, thereby-it will be worse than vain. It will be snatching power *per fas aut nefas*, to be lost "speedily" with the loss of something of far more worth than political votes, our moral prestige.

On the ground of justice then and of expediency, Wise opposed the Lecomption constitution and thought that Congress should reject it and send it back to the people of Kansas. He denied the right of Congress to alter it in any way, claiming that this power belonged only to the people of the territory. If anything within it made it inadmissible then it was not the duty of Congress to change it but simply send it back to the people who might change it or not as they chose. On his Lecomption policy he wrote in 1859 to Samford,

> My dear Sir: My position was-That Congress must either *accept or reject* the proposition of the people to be admitted as a

state. This would depend upon two questions-1st: Is the proposition in form, the act and deed of the people, legally and in due form expressed. 2nd: If so, is its form Republican, and are its terms and conditions admissible.

To ascertain these inquiries we were not to go behind the returns. The return was the Schedule or Ordinance. Did it show on its face that it was not Republican, or that its conditions were inadmissible?

I contended that it showed both. What then? That Congress was to send it back to the people to be voted on by them as it might prescribe? No. On the contrary, that Congress was not to intervene for any such purpose, but was simply to admit or reject the state. If for either reason above it rejected, the matter was to be left to the people or their Legislature in the territory to order a new convention and form another constitution or not as to them might seem proper, without dictation or prescription from Congress. That Congress could not, in justice or reason, adopt the Lecomption Schedule, and if it did not that it was obliged to reject the proposition after being obliged from its own nature to change it. That if Congress changed the terms of the proposition, it went back rejected of its own nature, and not referred back rightfully to be voted on.

Because Wise opposed the admission of Kansas under the Lecomption constitution, and thus failed to take advantage of an opportunity to bring a slave state into the Union he was accused by many Southern Democrats of deserting his principles and his party.

In opposing the adoption of the Lecomption constitution, Wise and Douglas occupied the same position. They both opposed it on the ground that it violated the right of the people to form their own state government in that it had not been voted on by them. The questions on which these two men differed, protection and squatter sovereignty, were not involved. Wise's agreement with Douglas on this question brought him into favor with the Northern Democrats.

Each of Wise's positions on the slavery question brought him into favor with some faction of his party. His advanced position on protection and his support of the Dred Scott decision gained him favor in the South. His opposition to the Lecomption constitution brought him into favor with Northern Dem-

ocrats but was entirely misunderstood at the South and brought him into disfavor there. If the Southern-rights men could have seen that he was simply acting on principles of justice in not wishing to force the Lecomption constitution on Kansas, if they could have seen that they would lose nothing by his policy since Kansas must necessarily become a free state, they would have supported him and it is probable that the whole party would have united on him as a candidate in 1860.

Whatever differences there might be on these questions there was none as to his success in overthrowing the Know-nothing party. Fro-m time to time there had been feeling in favor of a Nativist or American party but the first one of any importance was formed in 1852. The fundamental principle of this party, opposition to foreigners and Roman Catholics, was strongly objected to by Wise, and besides he protested against the secrecy with which all its actions were covered. The solemn oaths, the passwords, the initiation ceremonies, he said, did not properly belong to a political party all of whose actions should be open and above board. In 1854 he wrote concerning this party to a committee of Virginia citizens,

> Here is proposed a great primary, national organization, in its inception--What? Nobody knows. How organized? Nobody knows. Governed by whom? Nobody knows. How bound? By what rites? By what test oaths? With what limitations and restrictions? Nobody, nobody knows ! ! ! All we know is that persons of foreign birth and Catholic faith are proscribed, and so are all others who don't proscribe them at the polls. This is certainly against the spirit of magno chasta. I am an American in every fibre, and in every feeling an American; yet in every character, in every relation, in every sense, with all my head and all my heart, and all my might, I protest against this secret organization of Native Americans and of protestants to proscribe Roman Catholics and naturalized citizens !

The American party had gained rapidly in strength partly on account of disruption of the Whig

party, and by 1855 had succeeded in carrying many states in the North. Though not so far advanced in the South it was increasing in strength in that section and bid fair to continue to do so, especially as one of its principles was opposition to the agitation of the slavery question. The first real test of this party in the South was the election for Governor in Virginia, in 1855. Wise was the Democratic candidate and his only opponent was the Know-nothing nominee. At the beginning of the campaign the outlook was unfavorable for Wise, for his opponents were strong and well organized and he was not the unanimous choice of his party. However, he took the stump in an aggressive campaign and by his eloquence, his logic and his enthusiasm he raised his party from despair and succeeded in defeating his opponents. The eyes of the whole country were turned on this election and its result was watched with keenest interest. This defeat of the Know-nothings marked the beginning of the decline of their power and the credit for it was universally given to Wise.

When the name of Henry A. Wise was before the country for the nomination for the presidency in 1860, he claimed the support of the party on account of his past record. As we have seen, he claimed the support of the whole party because of his campaign against the Know-nothings; that of the Southern-rights faction because of his position on protection; and that of the Northern wing because of his position on Lecomption. Besides his past record his striking personality would also have been a factor greatly in his favor. He was known to be a man of bold, fearless and determined character. He cared little for public opinion. His doctrines were clear and it was generally believed that he would unhesitatingly put them into practice. In speech he was eloquent and

persuasive, and in a campaign tireless and aggressive and in a presidential contest he would certainly make himself popular.

Of his own nomination Wise was at times very hopeful. In a letter to Samford under the date Nov. 3rd, 1858, he says, "Douglas would not consent to be Vice. He would regard the offer as an insult. Let him run his line out and he will then be obliged to come to me. I will leave him no excuse. I have every evidence of more strength in the North than he has." On July 7th, 1859, he writes, "The Letcher nomination and election have made me in Virginia invincible. We will go to Charleston a unit determined on a platform of protection." Though he had hoped for Pennsylvania's support, on July 24th, 1859, he writes, "The Herald says my chance is gone since the Enquirer's savage attack on the administration and a Pittsburgh paper openly announces Mr. Buchanan for re-election and that Pennsylvania is rabid against me". On Jan. 27th, 1859, he writes, "You have hoisted my flag. Well I owe you more than I can ever pay for the motive. I fear Distraction rules the hour and a Black Republican will be the next president."

At the National Democratic convention in 1852 Wise led the Virginia delegation. After voting for Buchanan for some time, he persuaded his delegation to support Pierce and won the nomination for him. In 1856 Wise was prominently mentioned for the presidency, being supported by Buchanan. Finally he lent his influence to Buchanan and procured him the nomination, it is claimed, by giving him Virginia's vote.

In his own state Wise had never failed to secure an election and as has been shown he had a great influence over the delegations of his party to the National conventions. In 1860, he expected the vote

of Pennsylvania for his own nomination. As Virginia had voted for Buchanan, Pennsylvania's candidate, so he thought Pennsylvania should vote now for Virginia's choice.

In writing to a Mr. Donnely of New York concerning his chances for securing the New York delegation at Charleston Wise said, "Our only chance is to organize by districts and either whip the enemy or send two delegations." This letter, though private, got into print and was copied in the newspapers throughout the country, and Wise was severely criticised for this paragraph. He was accused of deserting the regular party machine and of resorting to intrigues to win the New York delegation.

He believed that the time had come for the South to stand for her rights and to accept no more compromises or ambiguous platforms. Concerning the action of the South in the coming convention, he wrote, July lst, 1859,

> You must decide! 1st: To go into no nomination without a platform satisfactory first. 2nd: To take no platform which don't aver the principle of protection, or exclude the contrary conclusion. 3rd : If we can't get the principle, not to be responsible for the nomination. 4th: If the nominee is not trustworthy on our principles, to come out and appeal to an independent Democratic conservative nomination.

In order that the South might. control the convention and carry out his plan, he wished that votes in the convention be taken according to Democratic strength. On this point he wrote,

> We can hold them to our man by forcing them : 1st; Either to Scale states according to Democratic or Non-Democratic strength. Or 2nd: To adopt the rule that a majority of the convention carrying two-thirds Democratic states; or 3rd : two-third of convention, carrying a majority of Democratic states-shall make a nomination. This, with the Dred Scott decision will do. I would abide by a nomination thus made. But, if we get no fair mode of nomination, no reliable man, no just programme of principles, what are we to do? Secede as armed neutrals? I have no compromise with anyone that you may rely on.

Wise's name was never brought before the Charleston convention. The Virginia Democratic convention in sending delegates to Charleston had expressed no preference for any candidate, and in April, 1860, Wise wrote for the press,

> Whomever else the preference has been expressed for, it has not been expressed for me. Without the voice of Virginia clearly and indisputably declared for me, I decline to allow my name to be presented primarily before the convention for a nomination. In no event am I willing that it shall cause any division of the vote of our delegation. I beg my friends therefore not to offer my name, but to unite cordially with the majority of the delegation and to present the vote of the state a unit before the convention.

He gave his support to Breckenridge and Lane but thought they never had any real chance. After the Democratic party had failed to unite at Charleston, Wise saw that Lincoln's election was certain. He thought that under the Republican administration the rights of the South under the constitution would be utterly disregarded, and therefore in his usual fearless way he called for immediate action, he did not wish to wait for the election, he did not advocate secession but demanded that the South prepare for war within the union to protect her rights.

> Nobody South is going to be led into Revolution, and you and I won't shame men enough into resistance to be led into halters; I have thought so for years. I snuff "tyranny itself in the tainted breezes" of Pennsylvania and Indiana elections. They show that Lincoln's election is certain in event and certain in effect too ! It will be an avowal at the polls that the past agressions upon us are justified by the North :-that they will be persisted in and aggravated : that whilst territories west may govern themselves as they please, Southern states will be inhibited from regulating their own domestic institutions for themselves: that we shall be civilly disfranchised, and socially and morally revolutionized. Now would-ought any sovereign and independent people upon earth to be thus threatened without instantly flying to arms? It is actual though not declared war. The worse because it comes in all the panoply of legal forms. The form is election, the election is constitutional. That is the pore out of which the courage of resistance will ooze. But in substance, in reality is it not aggression-war upon our very vitals? The elections may be constitutionally formal, but is the avowed object of the election not to disturb our very social safety? Why then wait a moment in pre-

venting the election giving all power of nationality into the hands of the aggressors? If this view don't prevail, none will with the cowards and traitors who will submit servilely to be degraded. "Overt Act" after "Overt Act" has come and may come a thousand fold, iterated and intensified and they will submit. What can we do? Appoint "committees of safety" and "minute men" as in Revolutionary times. If masses and conventions won't, let the few who will, meet and arm-and, if they can do no more alarm.