Organizational Change At The Service Delivery Level: An Investigation Into The Perceived Reaction To Change Initiatives In Moral

2006

Larry Cochran
University of Central Florida

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd

University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu

Part of the Public Affairs Commons

STARS Citation

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/807

This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact lee.dotson@ucf.edu.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AT THE SERVICE DELIVERY LEVEL:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE PERCEIVED REACTION
TO CHANGE INITIATIVES IN MORALE, WELFARE AND
RECREATION ACTIVITIES OF THE US ARMY

by

Larry Cochran
B.A.S. Troy State University, 1978
M.B.A. Troy State University, 1979
M.S. Troy State University, 1982

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Public Affairs
in the College of Health and Public Affairs
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2006

Major Professor: R. Paul Maiden
ABSTRACT

As the speed of change increases, federal agencies are challenged more often to develop and implement improvements to existing programs, new programs to meet new needs, or adjustments to programs based on changed circumstances of delivery.

Built on the foundation of systems theory, expectancy theory, and field theory, this research seeks to explain why some managers do not propose changes in their organizations—even when the very survival of the organization is at risk. By measuring the fields of influence encountered by managers, we find that the chain of command is supportive of change initiatives. Other organizational elements—human resources and legal staff were measured in this research—are, in general, indifferent about the managers’ effort to change. Employees, on the other hand, are strongly opposed to any change with even minimal impact on their work habits and conditions.

Based on a survey of 201 managers of Army morale, welfare and recreation activities worldwide, this research views the climate for change from the perspective of the activity manager. There are general findings, along with
detailed analysis, that support the need for a change to
the environment itself.

Executives charged with reviewing and approving
activity-initiated changes may find this study useful in
developing implementation strategies. Managers may take
comfort in knowing that their environment is highly
consistent with the experiences of other managers. Support
staff—particularly legal and human resources offices—may
find the perceptions of managers to be incongruent with the
service objectives.

We hope that everyone can find enlightenment, or
perhaps confirmation of their own experiences, in the
responses of these managers, and can use this information
productively in the management of their areas of
responsibility.
For her constant encouragement, support, and understanding, I dedicate this work to my bride of many years, Kathleen.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is an old African proverb that holds, “It takes a village to raise a child.” This research is my “baby”, and it has taken a large village, indeed.

Paul Maiden stepped up to the plate and got me on track with this research. Without his guidance and encouragement, this project would never have been completed.

Wendell Lawther signed documents that brought me into the PhD program, and he is signing the one that lets me out. I also want to acknowledge the contributions of my other committee members, Denise Gammonley and Jane Allgood. Their input and comments have been invaluable.

My brother, Tim, also stepped forward in a time of need and helped with editing and formatting the final paper.

Special thanks go to Eileen Abel, Margaret Mlachak, Brian Japak, and Joah Devenny. Having people believe in you is an incredible experience, and these four have always managed to buoy my confidence when it I was drowning in self-doubt.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES.......................................................... xi
LIST OF TABLES........................................................... xii
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS................................... xiii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION............................................. 1
  Planned Organizational Change........................................ 2
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW..................................... 10
  Background..................................................................... 10
  Philosophical/Theoretical Basis...................................... 14
  Qualitative Research.................................................... 15
  Quantitative Research................................................... 16
  Weaknesses.................................................................... 20
  Adding Organizational Context....................................... 25
  Conclusion...................................................................... 27
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY.......................................... 29
  This Research: Systems Theory, Expectancy Theory and Field
  Theory........................................................................... 34
  Systems Theory............................................................. 35
    Expectancy Theory....................................................... 37
    Field Theory............................................................. 39
  Applying Expectancy Theory to an Open System................. 44
  Treating Groups as “Fields”.......................................... 47
Operationalizing Fields of Influence: Force Field Analysis ................................................................. 50
Identification of the Critical Actors ......................... 52
Private Services in a Public Organization: Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Managers .......... 54
Army MWR: A Billion Dollar Public Business .......... 55
Formal Structure of Army MWR .......................... 59
Implementing Policy and Strategic Direction: A Divided House ...................................................... 62
MWR at the Service-Delivery Level: Hard Choices, Unsure Future ......................................................... 67
Management Choices: Four Levels of Change ......... 72
Measuring Expectancy: Survey of Managers .......... 74
Expectancy Theory and Army MWR Managers ............ 77
Research Questions and Hypotheses ..................... 78
Hypothesis 1: Individual Field Influences ............... 80
Hypothesis 2: Combined Influences ........................ 81
Hypothesis 3: Interaction Effect of Influences ........... 82
Hypothesis 4: Response Distribution ..................... 83
Survey Population/Sample ................................ 84
Instrumentation ............................................. 87
Protocol .................................................... 95
Publication of Executive Summary ....................... 100
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS.................................. 101
Implementation and Respondents ......................... 102
Limitations of the Research Method ....................... 104
Location Bias .......................................... 104
Gender Bias ............................................. 107
Version Bias .......................................... 107
Occupation Bias ..................................... 112
Hypothesis Testing .................................... 115
Hypothesis 1a: Individual Field Influences............. 116
Hypothesis 1b: Super-ordinates field influences....... 119
Hypothesis 1c: Human resources field influences.... 121
Hypothesis 1d: Legal staff field influences......... 122
Interactions of the Expectancy Values for Institutional
Actors ................................................. 124
Hypothesis 2a: Combination of forces................. 125
Hypothesis 2b: Relative value of forces............. 125
Hypothesis 3: Vector correlation...................... 130
Distribution of Expected Responses within Professional
Fields of Institutional Actors ......................... 132
Hypothesis 4: Normal distribution of forces........ 133
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION............................... 144
The Need for Change ................................... 146
The Effect of Change Initiatives ....................... 148
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Sources and Used of Funds, MWR.................. 58
Figure 2: Installation Management Agency Regions......... 65
Figure 3: Army MWR Operating Funds Income/Expense Statement from Army (2003), page 21. ......................... 70
Figure 4: Employee Response to Change Options........... 118
Figure 5: Employee Response and Odds of Implementation by Change Option ................................. 119
Figure 6: Histogram of Chain of Command Responses, Status Quo Option .................................................... 135
Figure 7: Histogram of Human Resource Responses to Status Quo Proposal .................................................. 136
Figure 8: Histogram of Legal Staff Response to Status Quo Option ............................................................... 138
Figure 9: Histogram of Employee Response to Status Quo Option ............................................................... 139
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Force Field Analysis for Strategic Change....... 53
Table 2: Active Duty Army Demographics................... 56
Table 3: Independent Sample T-test Comparing Version 4.29
and Version 8.14 ........................................ 109
Table 4: Mean and Standard Deviation, Version 4.29 and
Version 8.14, By Response Group ....................... 111
Table 5: Independent Samples T-Test, Odds of Implementation
by Response Group ........................................ 115
Table 6: Pearson Product Moment Correlation and
Significance, Expected Outcome, by Response Group ... 127
Table 7: Regression Model, Response Groups as Predictors of
Odds of Implementation ................................... 129
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFES</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Army Ammunitions Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMP</td>
<td>Army Recreation Machine Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Army Ammunitions Service Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AASA</td>
<td>Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSIM</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Appropriated Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA (I&amp;E)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSC</td>
<td>Community and Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRA</td>
<td>Civilian Human Resources Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Cash Management Account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COO</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAC</td>
<td>Civilian Personnel Advisory Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSN</td>
<td>National Steel Company of Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASA(HR)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Human Resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMA</td>
<td>Installation Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOCM</td>
<td>Journal of Organizational Change Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare and Recreation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xiv
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MWR BOD</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare and Recreation Board of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR Bd Exec Comm</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare and Recreation Board of Directors Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>Nonappropriated Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIBD</td>
<td>Net Income Before Depreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>Outside the Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQM</td>
<td>Total Quality Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USGAO</td>
<td>United States General Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The last quarter century has witnessed unprecedented changes in organizations, particularly those in the federal government. Change management has become a key organizational competency of modern managers (Armenakis, et al., 1996), and one of the most important determinants of managerial effectiveness is in the ability to influence people into developing their commitment to task objectives (Yukl, G., 1990). Because governmental organizations are generally driven by congressional mandates and broad executive direction, most organizational change in the federal realm can be described as “planned” change.

Planned organizational change is described by Ford & Ford (1995) as occurring when an organization consciously sets out to establish conditions that are different from what they are now and accomplishes that through some set or series of actions. Research relating to planned organizational change has focused on a variety of organizational dynamics (Armenakis & Bedian, 1999; Bartunek, et al., 1992; Beer & Nohria, 2000; Coyle-Shapiro, 1999; Freeman, 1999; George & Jones, 2001). Much attention
has been paid to the management tactics used by managers to influence employees and motivate them to support the change (Bass, 1985; Daly & Geyer, 1994; Dossier, et al., 1988; Ford & Ford, 1995; Kotter, 1995).

The aim of this research is to test the theories of organizational change management, particularly those addressing the institutional response to change, by applying them to a specific organizational context. Given the extant research and theory on planned organizational change, it is expected that organizational forces beyond the immediate organizational unit have a direct effect on the efforts by managers to implement change.

**Planned Organizational Change**

Generally, planned organizational change occurs in three phases (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Lewin, 1947). In the readiness phase, the organization’s current behaviors must be examined and the needed changes identified; Lewin (1951) referred to this process as “unfreezing” behaviors. In the adoption phase, changes are implemented, new procedures and priorities set, and a more functional organizational model adopted. The final phase,
institutionalization, integrates the new model into long term behavioral standards (refreezing).

There is a substantial body of literature validating the need for employee commitment to the change effort, some of which is quite recent (e.g., Armenakis & Harris, 2002; Tyler and Blader, 2001; Brockner, 2002; Barry, 2001). But the social science history of research in change, influence, and motivation goes back to the first half of the twentieth century with groundbreaking work such as the experiential philosophy of John Dewey (1991), Lewin’s “Frontiers in Group Dynamics” (1947) and Field Theory in Social Science (1951), and Festinger’s “Informal Social Communication” (1950). The influences of these and other early twentieth century psychologists can be seen as foundational in most modern literature on change.

Modern theories hold that committed employees can be relied upon to demonstrate enthusiasm and willingly engage in behaviors to insure that change efforts are successful (Tyler, 1999). This commitment and enthusiasm make the success of the change initiative far more likely (Robertson et al., 1993).

Unfortunately, gaining that commitment is difficult, given most employees’ inherent aversion to change (Likert,
1967) and the variety of interests, motives, and needs (Locke, 1976) experienced in any employee group. Strategies to obtain employee support range from participative efforts such as asking employees to help design the change (Nutt, 1996) to persuasive efforts to explain the need for and benefits of change (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999) to coercive measures using rewards or sanctions (Poole et al., 1989).

Because of this emphasis on employee co-optation in change management, much of the change management research and theory is grounded (either implicitly or explicitly) in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy theory predicts that individuals will be more likely to support change when three conditions are met:

1) Expectancy beliefs: The belief that the individual or group can successfully perform the desired change behavior.

2) Instrumentality beliefs: The belief that a change in behavior will result in certain outcomes.

3) Valence beliefs: The belief that the outcomes achieved by changing behavior will be more desirable than present outcomes.
Expectancy theory has been used explicitly in a variety of organizational change studies (Burton et al., 1992; Allen et al., 1997; Fudge and Schlacter, 1999; Furst, 2004), and those studies generally support the idea that positive employee expectancy improves the probability that change efforts will be effective. While not explicitly cited in the studies, the concepts of expectancy theory can be found in research testing motivation of employees to make changes (Poole, et al., 1989) as well as research on shaping employee’s expectations to make change meaningful for them (Latham, 2001).

The difficulty in organizational change efforts seems to arise more from practice than from theory. Where research has been conducted on managerial behaviors that elicit employee participation, the results are, at best, equivocal (Jermier, 1998; Lau & Woodman, 1995). Employee participation in designing change can either be productive (Coyle-Shapiro, 1999) or disruptive (Bruhn, et al., 2001). Persuasive efforts also generate qualified results (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Klein et al., 2001). Coercive methods are common in large organizational change efforts (Kaufman, 1956; Dyson, 1976) and almost universally meet strong resistance, but at least one study (Poole et al.,
1989) found them to be the most effective means of effecting change.

One possible explanation for the lack of definitive results in existing studies is that they study the organizational unit using a wide variety of behavioral descriptors. O’Toole (1986) conducted a comprehensive review of implementation studies (reaffirmed in 2004 in a study by Furst) and found that there was no generally accepted theory of change implementation. In most studies, the unit of analysis is the employee and the manager’s effort to influence behavior is the experimental treatment with an expected outcome.

Without well-defined constructs and consistent definitions of management behavior, the findings of these studies cannot be compared and generalized. The application of this study’s findings will require further consideration of these behaviors, but the research itself relies on a more general concept of support for management initiatives rather than specific behaviors by managers, employees, or other stakeholders.

Another potential explanation for the lack of consensus within change management studies is that they examine individual organizations without the context of the
larger organizational environment. Case studies (e.g., Trader-Leigh, 2002; Hatcher & Ross, 1991) tend to be richer in contextual detail than the quantitative studies (e.g., Klein et al., 2001; Armenakis et al., 1996), but the unit of analysis remains the employee or employee group. By not considering the broader organizational context of change efforts, the studies may be missing some of the forces that contribute to the behavior of the manager and/or the affected employees.

Lindblom (1994) likens organizational change efforts to warfare, and notes that dominant stakeholders often possess powerful incentives and formidable capacities to resist change. Notably, he discusses change in the broader context of the organization and does not limit his analysis to the immediate work unit. Chris Argyris (1994) also sees “cognitive impairment” of organizational units as an obstacle to change, leading to “self-serving, anti-learning, and overprotective” behavior.

Two studies that addressed these contextual influences were Thompson and Ingraham (1996), who studied change efforts in federal reinvention laboratories, and Trader-Leigh’s (2002) case study of State Department implementation of the International Cooperative
Administrative Support Service (ICASS) system. Both studies identified formidable resistance forces both within the organizational unit and throughout its organizational context.

This research project applies expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) to a larger organizational context by measuring the expectancy beliefs (the belief that the individual or group can successfully perform the desired change behavior) of unit managers in their current organizational context. To do this, a 360-degree model is used, measuring not only the expected response of subordinates but also those of super-ordinates and peers.

By creating survey assumptions that specify positive instrumentality beliefs (the belief that a change in behavior will result in certain outcomes) and valence beliefs (the belief that the outcomes achieved by changing behavior will be more desirable than present outcomes), the survey isolates the manager’s expectancy beliefs in regard to the reaction of the organizational environment he/she experiences.

The results of the current research provide an indication of the forces that must be addressed by managers in their efforts to design, advocate, and implement change.
Additionally, analysis of the response patterns provides indications of manager-perceived resistance within career fields and management chains, that will help define appropriate actions to improve support or reduce resistance to change efforts. Finally, incorporating this information into the existing research base will support recommendations on further research or in the application of this research to change management in other organizations.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

On its website, the Journal of Organizational Change Management observes that, “The world today is changing faster than ever before. Technological developments, financial constraints, expanding markets, restructuring and mergers, new philosophies and government legislation are all putting pressure on organizations to change and stay dynamic. Yet the process of change is far from easy, and implementing it successfully makes considerable demands on the managers involved.” (JOCM, 2005).

Changing organizations has been a major area of management literature, in both public and private sectors, throughout the twentieth and into the twenty first century. Most change literature was originally founded on the work of theorists in the early twentieth century such as F.W. Taylor’s “Scientific Management” (mirrored and elaborated in Europe by H. Fayol), Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, and Henry Gantt. Taylor and his contemporaries were engineers, and their theories were focused on efficiency and are
frequently categorized as a “mechanical model” of organization (von Bertalanffy, 1968).

As the second half of the twentieth century opened, the social sciences began to take more control over management theory. The classic bureaucracy of Max Weber, against which the scientific management principles were applied, became viewed as too mechanistic. Social psychologists and behavioral theorists became influential in management thinking at a time when organizational change became a survival skill due to the acceleration of technological advancement and expansion toward globalization.

As a result of this emphasis on social sciences in the management literature, much of the change management research has been focused on the human side of organizations. For example, justice theory has been used to explain positive relationship between participatory tactics and openness to change (Wanbert and Banas, 2000), and cooperation and competition theory developed by Deutsch (1938) has been used to explain improvements from a gain-sharing pay plan (Hatcher & Ross, 1991).

As the management research and theory has become increasingly employee-centered, principles of motivational
psychology have taken a stronger hold of management thinking. Among the most cited theories found in the literature was influence theory.

Influence theory holds that, by manipulating the impressions and information conveyed via different influence tactics, employee behaviors are shaped by managing their beliefs about a combination of the requested behavior and the manager who is making the request (Dulebohn, 1997). Influence tactics range from focusing on the employee’s perceptions and participation at all stages (“Consultation” and “Inspirational appeal”, Yukl, et al, 2003) to outright coercion (“Pressure”, Yukl, et al., 2003; “Assertiveness”, “Sanctions”, “Persistence”, Kipnis, et al., 1980; Schreisheim & Hinkin, 1990); “Intimidation”, Jones & Pittman, 1982); “Threats”, Frazier & Summer, 1984).

There have been efforts to reconcile these diverse categories by developing broader categories of influence tactics (Tepper et al., 1998; Barry & Shapiro, 1992), including some meta-categories developed by more recent researchers (Farmer et al., 1997; Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002). However, neither the individual categories proposed by earlier researchers, nor the meta-categories, have been
able to demonstrate reliability in measuring behaviors related to change management.

While each theory offers a unique perspective on the challenges of changing employee behavior, there is a lack of general consensus about the "best" theoretical underpinnings of change management (Furst, 2004). The only consistency is that organizations rely on the willingness of members to behave in ways that support the organization (Barnard, 1938). To generate this willingness, organizations must employ tactics that persuade employees at all organizational levels, who have personal goals that may be different from the organization's, to direct their efforts toward a common organizational goal (Gouldner, 1954; Cyert & March, 1963).

During planned organizational change, managers play a crucial role in facilitating the change process (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Ferris & Judge, 1991), and their behaviors are particularly important to employee response during change efforts (Reger et al., 1994; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999).

What is lacking from the literature is a clear understanding of how managers reach their decisions on which organizational change to effect. The choice of
change initiatives is covered in great detail and the persuasive efforts to gain employee acceptance (reviewed below) is covered, but the organizational context in which the manager must develop and promote practical initiatives is not addressed. Because the decision to promote a particular change strategy is closely related to motivation, the literature on motivation and influence was reviewed at length.

**Philosophical/Theoretical Basis**

Managers must be able to “unfreeze” the view that the status quo is desirable, institute the desired changes, and then “refreeze” the new behaviors (Lewin, 1951). To do this, they must be able to motivate employees to make the desired change (Poole, et al., 1989) by making the change meaningful to them (Latham, 2001) and convincing them that the change is not only possible, but will lead to more desirable outcomes (Beer & Nohria, 2000; Robertson, et al., 1993).

The following research and theory has been identified as relevant to the challenges faced by managers in selecting and implementing change.
Qualitative Research

Education, communication, and participation were identified in a case study by Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) as effective strategies in obtaining employee support for change. Education and communication were used to communicate the need for and logic of the change. Participation involved managers seeking out and applying employee views on the proposed change.

From interviews of 91 managers, Nutt (1986) identified “intervention” which was similar, but not identical, to behaviors Kotter & Schlesinger (1979) had labeled as “education” and “communication”. Nutt’s “participation” behavior was essentially identical to the “participation” behaviors identified by Kotter & Schlesinger. To these behaviors, Nutt added “persuasion” (the use of outside experts to support the change) and “edict”, where change was prescribed by management and employee support was expected to follow.

In a 1989 study of change at a bank, Poole et al. identified “instruction” and “proclamation”, again similar to the behaviors identified by Kotter & Schlesinger (1970)
and Nutt (1986). To these, he added “manipulation”, in which information was either disseminated or withheld by management in order to influence employee behavior.

Kotter & Schlesinger (1979) reported success in obtaining employee support for change when managers “manipulated” them by selectively using information, assigning employees desirable roles in the change process, and restructuring events to present them in their most favorable light. Poole et al. (1989) reported unfavorably on management’s “manipulation” of employees through concealing the actual intent of the change and withholding information from the employees. Nutt (1986) found intervention (“Managers provide rationales for why change is needed or justifications to explain how peer organizations are engaging in similar efforts”) as the most effective management behavior in instituting change, while Poole et al. (1989) found manipulation and enforcement to be the most successful tactic.

**Quantitative Research**

There have been a number of quantitative studies that addressed management tactics in change management. For
example, resource allocation was found to be effective as a tool of change by Klein et al. (2001). Hatcher & Ross (1991) studied changes in employee productivity after introduction of new pay plans, finding little support for use of this strategy. "Inspirational speeches" were found by Armenakis, et al. (1996), to impact favorably on employee cooperation with business turnarounds. The strong impact of employee self-image on change efforts was also documented by Judge et al. (1999).

Teas (1981) studied 171 industrial sales personnel and found their expectancy beliefs were affected by the way they were treated by their supervisor. Mossholder et al (1998) conducted a study of employees from a service-oriented company and a hospital, finding lower justice perceptions where coercive power was used. Alge (2001) studied temporary workers to measure the effects of monitoring on employee perceptions of procedural justice, finding that increasing surveillance levels lowered employee perceptions of justice.

Mowday (1978) investigated the relationship between five influence tactics by elementary school principals and their overall effectiveness in exercising influence. Only one tactic, information distortion, showed significant
discrimination between the more effective principals and their less effective peers.

Kipnis & Schmidt (1988) developed a scale using four categories of influencers, comparing them to performance evaluations to determine the relative performance of each type of manager. Kipnis & Schmidt found that there were gender differences in “effectiveness” within the categories and that more aggressive (“Shotgun”) styles of upward influence resulted in lower performance evaluations and higher stress.

The success of prior change efforts was shown to have an impact on current receptivity to change (Wanous, et al, 2000). It has also been indicated that managers may improve expectations and motivation by providing rational arguments and facts regarding change. (Smith, et al., 2000).

In a somewhat unusual study, Lantham (2001) demonstrated that eliminating positive outcomes associated with theft reduced employee motivation for and their propensity to steal from the employer. Lantham used social cognitive theory to determine the positive and negative outcome expectancies of the employees who stole and developed a program to eliminate the positive outcomes.
This study demonstrated the unusual strength of outcome expectancies in changing employee behavior.

Being treated with consideration by their supervisor was positively associated with salesperson’s beliefs in the likelihood of receiving desired extrinsic rewards (Teas, 1981). Employee perceptions that their managers will not protect their interests can result from a lack of a formal voice in developing change initiatives. (Whitener et al, 1998) This perception, in turn, causes the outcomes of their behavior to be less favorable (Florey & Harrison, 2000).

A study of 95 full-time MBA students suggest that they expected inspirational appeals, consultation, and personal appeals to result in commitment to the requested change, but that compliance with the change was most frequently associated with exchange and legitimization.

Pressure and coalition were most frequently associated with resistance (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). However, research does not show a consistent relationship between the tactics and target outcomes (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). Yukl & Tracey (1992) associated exchange tactics with greater employee commitment, while a concurrent study (Falbe &
Yukl, 1992) found exchange tactics were most often associated with both compliance and resistance.

Weaknesses

Almost all studies identified in the literature involved a limited number of observed behaviors in a single-work-setting environment. This small sample is a common weakness of studies that rely on researcher observations or interviews. Application of the findings from these studies limits their value in large scale organizational change.

Another weakness of the studies was the use of post hoc methods to define observed behaviors, making categorization of behaviors somewhat idiosyncratic. This lack of consistent behavioral definition prevents comparison of results. Researchers also must selectively identify which behaviors to study in exclusion of others (Erez & Rim, 1982). This, in turn, limits the comparability of the results to other studies limited to the same behavior or behaviors.

While quantitative methods were used, these studies identified a wide variety of behaviors that are defined, in
most part, by the observer. For example, various researchers found behaviors they characterized as participation (Coyle-Shapiro, 1999), consultation (Falbe & Yukl, 1992), co-optation (Lam & Schaubroeck, 2000; Kumar & Ghadially, 1989), rationalization (Daly & Geyer, 1994), rational persuasion (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004), rewards (Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987), guilt (Baumeister et al., 1994; Kumar & Ghadially, 1995), ingratiations (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004); personal appeals (Falbe & Yukl, 1992), moral and social obligations (Baumeister et al., 1994; Brass & Burkhardt, 1995; Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979), inspirational appeals (Falbe & Yukl, 1992), pressure (Falbe & Yukl, 1992), and upward appeals (Yukl & Tracey, 1992).

While each of these studies defines and distinguishes the behavior identified, no generally accepted set of definitions could be identified in the review.

There have been efforts to aggregate this wide body of literature. A recent meta-analysis of 23 influence studies showed that ingratiations and rational persuasion demonstrated strongest relationships with positive work outcomes (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). There have been several studies examining how often specific influence tactics are used across different targets and for different objectives.
(Ansari & Kapoor, 1987; Erez & Rim, 1982; Erez, Rim, & Keider, 1986; Kipnis et al., 1980; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1982; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). None of these efforts, though, provide a clear definition of the best tactic, or combination of tactics, to use in developing and implementing organizational change.

Another weakness of these studies is that they lack organizational context. There is no way to generalize the climate in the studied organizations toward change, making the interpretation of the results very limited. Trader-Leigh’s 2002 study of the implementation of change in the State Department is the exception, and her analysis indicates that factors such as the individual’s self-interest, psychological impact on the object of the change, the tyranny of custom, perceived changes in control or funding authorities, inertia, cultural incompatibility, and political effects have a large impact on the response of individuals to attempted change. Without knowledge of these factors, research on motivation must be applied to different contexts with care.

An example of this limitation is shown in the studies of employee receptivity to change. Receptivity has been shown affect commitment to the change (Bartunek et al.,
and how employees respond to managerial influence attempts (Sussman & Vecchio, 1991). The affects of receptivity extend to the credibility assigned to the manager (Barnard, 1938; Barry, 2001) and the reasons employees attribute to the change (Rousseau & Tijoriwala (1999). This credibility determination, in turn, influences the interpretation assigned to a manager’s behavior and messages (Deutsch, 1968).

Given the apparent importance of receptivity, how does one develop high receptivity in employees? Researchers have found that receptivity is affected by whether the employees believe the task is desirable and feasible (Yukl & Siefert, 2002), but it is also affected by perceptions of the manager as fair, competent, and likeable (Ferris & Judge, 1991; Tepper et al., 1998). Employees who are treated with respect and consideration by their manager may have greater confidence that their efforts will result in a desirable outcome. Perceptions of procedural justice improve employee expectations of favorable outcomes from their change efforts (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Employees treated with respect should develop stronger affective bonds and greater interpersonal trust (Engle & Lord, 1997; McAllister, 1995). Employees are more likely
to support change when they understand the reasons behind it and actively participate in shaping its outcomes (Cropanzano & Schminke, 2001; Vroom & Yetton, 1973).

Given these results, it appears that a history of openness and fairness by the supervisor/manager should have a positive impact on employee receptivity to change. This is borne out by research indicating a positive effect from the employee’s ability to shape supervisory decisions about performance ratings, salary increases, and promotions (Engle & Lord, 1997). “Normative” supervisory practices use a relationship bond to create an affective state to motivate employees to do what the manager wants (Baumeister, et al., 1994: 247). Polite and respectful treatment from a manager signals greater concern for employees than undignified, disrespectful, or impolite treatment (Tyler et al., 1997). Employees are more likely to believe that the manager will protect their interests if they have strong trust based on continuing transactional justice (Whitener et al., 1998).

All of these results indicate that sensitive, participative management behavior will provide a solid foundation for change. However, when a manager uses normative tactics to implement change, employees may
perceive a lack of formal power and personal resources (Brass & Burkhardt, 1995: 448). There is also a potential for employees to feel manipulated (Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979) and interpret the manager’s normative management efforts as an attempt to avoid personal responsibility (Ashforth and Lee, 1990). In fact, Kuma and Ghadially (1989) found, in a survey of 278 managers, that the use of normative tactics (termed by them as “co-optation”) was negatively related to perceptions of interpersonal trust and positively correlated to alienation.

It appears from these studies that manager efforts to create a positive, interactive environment may result in either strong employee support or a may cause a backlash from employees who feel manipulated. Why the same tactics would result in these opposite reactions from employees is not apparent from the literature.

**Adding Organizational Context**

This literature review indicates that the emphasis of change research has been on manager efforts to influence employees, not on the actual development and championing of change by managers. Development and championing of a
change effort requires gaining support of not only employees, but super-ordinates (who approve the plan for change) and peers (who either support or resist change efforts).

Coercive tactics such as pressure in which managers demand, monitor, or persistently remind employees to adhere to the change (Yukl & Seifert, 2002), obligation tactics where managers explicitly remind employees is consistent with role expectations (Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979), or sanctions in which managers use punishment for non-compliance with change efforts (Shriesheim & Hinkin, 1990) are inappropriate for use with super-ordinates or peers.

One might conclude that no particular tactic is suitable for championing change efforts, and that a combination or “mix” of tactics would be more successful. Unfortunately, the research base does not support this assumption, either.

Kipnis & Schmidt (1988) found that managers with high scores on a combination of assertiveness, appeal to higher authority, and coalition (“shotgun managers”) received the lowest performance ratings; those using ingratiation received moderate ratings; and those using rational persuasion (“tacticians”) received the highest ratings. By
contrast, Schilit & Locke (1982) studied upward influence attempts using 18 categories of tactics and found few significant differences in the effectiveness of the tactics selected.

The use of large numbers of tactics toward varying audiences (21 in a study of tactics directed by superordinates by Case et al., 1988; 17 in a study of influence of subordinates by Dosier et al., 1988; and 11 in peer influence study by Keys et al., 1987) resulted in only two differences which met a 5% significance test.

**Conclusion**

There is no comprehensive overview or consensus on which tactics are most effective or on how to identify the supporters or resistors to change efforts. A review of the literature reveals a large body of both qualitative and quantitative research on change management. Each element of the literature provides value in assessing strategies for change.

Additionally, the influences that affected managers’ decisions on what changes to advocate, and how to support those changes, was not addressed in the literature. This research seeks to fill that void by studying a specific
context in which change is required and measuring the expected response to various change initiatives. From that insight, the research base can be applied to developing potentially successful tactics to reduce resistance or improve support for management-initiated changes.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Much of the change management research has been focused on the human side of organizations. For example, social justice theory has been used to explain positive relationship between participatory tactics and openness to change (Wanberg & Banas, 2000; Coyle-Shapiro, 1999; Copanzano & Schminke, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998;), and cooperation and competition theory developed by Deutsch (1938) has been used to explain improvements from a gain-sharing pay plan. Exchange theory is a common basis for research (e.g., Blau, 1964; Yukl & Siefert, 2002), as is social cognitive theory (e.g. Latham, 2001; Bartunek et al., 1977; Harrison & McLaughlin, 1996; Hope & Pate, 1988); social power (French & Raven, 1959) and social learning theory (Bandura, 1977).

Some research has reached out into areas more accurately described as “concepts” or “philosophies” rather than theory. Bass (1985) explored the value of inspiration, as well as leadership (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994). Bies & Shapiro (1988) looked into of voice and justification on the perception of fairness.
Another concept was that of coercion as a method of obtaining compliance. When coercive tactics are used with subordinates, they may work because employees recognize and accept the power conferred to the manager by his/her position (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) and from the desire to evade punishment for non-compliance (Trevino, 1992). These tactics are not effective with super-ordinates or peers. Even with subordinates, coercion may cause employees to lose motivation because they lack control over and support for their efforts (Elangovan & Xie, 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2000) and because employees lack information regarding the desired methods and outcomes (Yukl, 1989), making their performance more mechanical and less innovative. The connection between non-compliance and negative outcomes to the employee, characteristic of coercive tactics (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), may violate the employee’s sense of social exchange (Schopler & Layton, 1972) and destroy the trust and sense of reciprocity essential to an exchange-based relationship (McAllister, 1995; Whitener et al., 1997). Tepper (2000) describes this sense of inequity in an exchange relationship as “relative deprivation”, or getting less than a fair return on one’s efforts. With few
exceptions, the researchers found negative outcomes from coercive tactics.

Even base emotions have been explored for their motivational value. Baumeister et al. (1994) explored guilt, while others looked at power (e.g., Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Michener & Suchner, 1972). Trevino (1992) evaluated the impact of using punishment in organizations, applying social justice theory to the use of fear as a motivator.

As the management research and theory has become increasingly employee-centered, principles of motivational psychology have taken a stronger hold of management thinking. Among the most cited theories found in the literature of the last 20 years was influence theory.

Influence theory holds that, by manipulation the impressions and information conveyed via different influence tactics, employee behaviors are shaped by managing their beliefs about a combination of the requested behavior and the manager who is making the request (Dulebohn, 1997). Influence tactics range from focusing on the employee’s perceptions and participation at all stages (“Consultation” and “Inspirational appeal” (Yukl, et al, 2003)) to outright coercion (“Pressure” (Yukl, et al.,
“Assertiveness”, “Sanctions”, and “Persistence” (Kipnis et al., 1980; Schreisheim & Hinkin, 1990); “Intimidation” (Jones & Pittman, 1982); “Threats” (Frazier & Summer, 1994)).

There have been efforts to reconcile findings by developing broader categories influence tactics (Tepper et al., 1998; Barry & Shapiro, 1992). However, there is little support for the validity of either the individual tactics as described in early studies or the meta-categories developed by more recent researchers (Farmer et al., 1997; Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002). While each theory offers a unique perspective on the challenges of changing employee behavior, there is a lack of general consensus about the “best” theoretical underpinnings of change management (Furst, 2004).

The various theories, offered by sociology and social psychology, explain the employee’s (or, in the case of this research, the manager’s) behavior by using a simple causal model. In each case, the actor (normally the supervisor) does something that causes the object (normally the employee) to change his/her behavior in a desired way. This “A causes B” model is elegant in its simplicity, but
it does not effectively explain the complex interactions of an open system.

For this research, expectancy theory provided the best foundation upon which to study management behavior. Because expectancy beliefs can be measured against the behavior of multiple fields of influence, both individually and collectively, expectancy theory provides a foundation for determining the impact of those fields on the object of their influence.

Vroom (1964) forwarded the theory that an individual’s motivation to engage in behavior is a function of their expectancy, instrumentality and valence beliefs. Expectancy theory predicts employees will be more motivated to support a change when they believe:

1) They can successfully perform the change behavior (expectancy beliefs)
2) They will obtain certain outcomes as a result of changing their behavior (instrumentality beliefs), and
3) That those outcomes are desirable (valence beliefs).

Expectancy theory prescribes that managers should select tactics that enhance employee expectancy,
instrumentality, and outcome favorability beliefs about the change (Sanchez et al., 2000).

**This Research: Systems Theory, Expectancy Theory and Field Theory**

To understand the design of this research, it is necessary to recognize the influence of systems theory on the overall research model. Systems theory recognizes that decisions regarding organizational change are not isolated actions, but rather occur in the context of the larger organizational unit. Given this “organizational context”, a 360-degree research model is required to evaluate the potential for success of any given change strategy.

Expectancy theory is used to develop the decision model in this research. By holding constant the instrumentality and valence elements of expectancy theory, the expectancy values (Can I successfully perform this change?) of the principle actor (the activity manager) can be evaluated.

Field theory presents a conceptual framework to evaluate the sources of resistance to change within the studied organization. By aggregating the responses based on various groups, or “fields”, of influence, the expected
resistors to change can be viewed in their social context. The value of this research depends, to some degree, on the patterns of resistance that are localized (assorted stakeholders at the same location tend to have the same levels or patterns of resistance), and from professional stakeholders who tend to resist in a manner consistent with other stakeholders in similar professional positions, such as human resources or legal counsel.

Systems theory, expectancy theory, and field theory are discussed in detail below.

**Systems Theory**

Systems theory is not a “true” theory in that it lacks explanatory power and testable hypotheses. Rather, it provides an analogy or perspective from which to analyze groups (von Bertalanffy, 1968). A system may be defined literally as an organized or complex whole, an assemblage or combination of thing or parts forming a complex or unitary whole. (Ginter, et al., 1999, p. 17, citing Cleland & King, 1983). Organizations are systems, normally consisting of many levels of sub-systems and supra-systems. The relationship of each system to other systems is the foundation of systems theory.
Closed systems have no exchange with their environment, whereas open systems are involved in environmental exchanges. Littlejohn (1983, p. 32) defined an open system as “a set of objects with attributes that interrelate in an environment.”

Much of the research on organizational change has used the individual employee as the unit of analysis, measuring how the employee responds to outside stimulus. This is the result of emphasis on motivation and how the employee is motivated to support, accept, or resist change efforts. These are discussed at length in the literature review, but examples include Kotter (1979), who looked at obligation as a motivation for employee compliance while Schriesheim & Hinkin (1990) focused on sanctions and Bhanthumnavin (2003) studied emotional and informational support in producing employee satisfaction and productivity. When the employee is the unit of analysis, the system is usually defined as the immediate work group and the field of influence is frequently limited to the immediate supervisor.

In this research, the unit of analysis is the activity manager. That manager is influenced by a variety of other systems including the employee workgroup, the chain of command, and peer organizations, and the human resources
and legal systems. The manager’s expectancy values are influenced by their interaction with these external systems, and force field analysis provides a methodology to measure the direction (vector) and strength (valence) of these influences.

Expectancy Theory

As previously discussed, expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) predicts employees will be more motivated to support a change when they believe:

1) They can successfully perform the change behavior (expectancy beliefs)
2) They will obtain certain outcomes as a result of changing their behavior (instrumentality beliefs), and
3) That those outcomes are desirable (valence beliefs).

Expectancy beliefs create the core of this research and will be discussed last.

Instrumentality beliefs involve the likelihood, as assessed by the individual, that certain outcomes will occur if, and only if, they change their behavior. In contrast, valence beliefs evaluate whether the individual
views the predicted outcomes as desirable. While these two beliefs are clearly related, instrumentality beliefs are independent of valence beliefs because they focus on the likelihood of the outcomes, without regard to their desirability.

All identified research on instrumentality beliefs was based on individual employee reactions to change initiatives. For example, researchers found that instrumentality beliefs may be improved by using management tactics that signal a high quality management/employee relationship (Blau, 1964). Instrumentality beliefs are enhanced when fairness is improved by management offers of inducements for work contributions (Sparrowe & Liden, 1997), increasing employee confidence in the outcomes expected from their work efforts (McAllister, 1995; Whitener et al., 1998). Managers can influence employee beliefs regarding the likelihood of obtaining desirable outcomes over time (Mitchell, 1982). This review identified no research addressing management instrumentality beliefs in the development and implementation decisions regarding change.

Meta-analysis indicates that interaction of valence and instrumentality beliefs can predict “effort” by the
employee (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Valence beliefs, which reflect the individual’s values, needs and preferences (Locke, 1976), reflect the employee’s view that certain modes of belief or end states are desirable (Rokeach, 1973). Valence beliefs may be the hardest beliefs to influence, since they tend to be stable over time (Rokeach, 1973).

Expectancy beliefs, which are being tested in this research, involve the individual’s expectation that he or she can successfully perform the change behavior. As elaborated later, the manager of an organization may believe that a certain course of action will result in a specific outcome (instrumentality beliefs), and may find that outcome desirable (valence beliefs), but may have an expectation that their performance of the behavior will be prevented by the actions (or inactions) of others. Given a low expectancy belief, the individual manager may be expected to not be motivated to attempt the desired changes.

Field Theory

Kurt Lewin (1947) is widely credited with the development and application of field theory to the study of
social psychology. While field theory was in use prior to Lewin (see Stone & Finison (1980) for a discussion of prior efforts in field theory), Lewin applied it to organizational and group settings and developed the Force Field Analysis technique.

Martin (2003) provides a solid analysis of the history, evolution and current status of field theory in the social sciences. Martin describes field theory as a more or less coherent approach in the social sciences whose essence is in the explanation of regularities in individual action by recourse to position vis-à-vis others. In his analysis, he prescribes (Martin, 2003, p. 3) five characteristics that exist in a field:

1) It purports to explain changes in the states of some elements (e.g., a static field induces motion in a charged particle) but need not appeal to changes in states of other elements (i.e., “causes”).

2) These changes in state involve an interaction between the field and the existing states of the elements (e.g., a particle of positive charge moves in one way and one of negative charge another);
3) The elements have particular attributes that make them susceptible to the field effect (particles differ in the degree and direction of charge).

4) The field without the elements is only a potential for the creation of force, without any existent force.

5) The field itself is organized and differential. In other words, at any position the field is a vector of potential force and these vectors are neither identical nor randomly distributed.

These characteristics can be applied to a magnet, which provides a physical force ("magnetic") field. A magnet will change the state of (or "move") metal shavings, yet leave the paper under the shavings unchanged (characteristic #1). Movement of the metal shavings is an interaction between the magnetic field and the shavings (#2), and the shavings would not be affected if they were not metal (#3). A magnet without the associated metal objects has a magnetic field, but that field has no force until it is associated with a metal object (#4). Finally, one can describe and measure the force field of a magnet, and it has direction (Lewin called this the "vector" of the field) and force (Lewin’s "valence") (#5).
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) defined the organizational field as "those organizations that in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products." (Cited by Martin, 2003).

Applying field theory to an organization requires identifying fields that, collectively, constitute the organizational environment. Using DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) definition, the analysis is conducted from the perspective of the object of influence. This object is normally an organizational element or, in this research, the manager of an organizational element. From the perspective of this object of influence, force field analysis looks outward through the organizational field to identify those organizations that exert force (or influence) on the manager.

Lewin (1947) theorizes that stability within a social system is a dynamic, rather than static, condition. Using the magnet analogy, the object is a magnet surrounded by a number of other magnets in varying relative position ("vector") and strength ("valence"). As a dynamic system, these magnets are constantly in motion, changing both
vector and valence on a continuing basis. As explained by Brager & Holloway (1978, p. 108), the seeming stability in social systems is the result of opposing and countervailing forces that continuously operate to produce what we experience as stability.

These dynamics make the analysis of force fields a useful tool in understanding complex relationships where the action and influence of any given actor is not sufficiently direct to create a causal relationship. Causality is said to exist when a change in state in one variable produced by external manipulation would impel a change in state of another variable (Martin, 2003). In field theory, there is no requirement for a change in state of an independent variable; rather, the total relationship of all variables is a dynamic state and what one measures as a stable state is, in fact, the overall interaction of these constantly changing influences. Consequently, a researcher cannot manipulate an independent variable and measure its effect on the dependent variable; rather, the researcher must identify the most salient forces and measure their individual and cumulative influence on the research object. The tool develop by Lewin to measure these forces is force field analysis.
To conduct a “force field analysis” (Lewin, 1947), the forces that are expected to influence any given change are identified and categorized as either “driving forces” or “restraining forces”, depending on the vector of their expected influence. These categories are somewhat intuitive and are merely foundational to further research; they can be categorized as “inferences, informed speculations, and initial judgments” (Brager & Holloway, 1978).

The force field analysis identifies the forces, and the impact of those forces on the object of influence can be measured from the perspective of the object. Measurement of that influence contributes to the understanding of organizational dynamics, and can provide the foundation for efforts to change either the vector or valence of influence through a variety of organizational actions.

Applying Expectancy Theory to an Open System

The current research focuses on the activity manager, and how that manager’s expectancy beliefs are affected by his/her organizational environment.
I found no research that examined how managerial influence tactics shape employee valence, instrumentality and expectancy beliefs during organizational change (Furst, 2004). Theoretically, expectancy beliefs should be stronger when employees clearly understand the behavior that is expected from them (low role or task ambiguity) (Kahn et al., 1964). Expectancy beliefs should also be stronger when employees believe they have the knowledge, skills, and resources to perform the expected behavior (Bandura, 1986).

To limit the scope of expectancy values in this research, low task ambiguity and high competency were included in the design of the survey instrument. Specifically, the manager is described as the actor in evaluating the organization issues requiring change and, with the support of a local university, in developing the proposed solution. Given that these conditions specify low task ambiguity and competence to execute the change, the remaining instrumentality value to be measured is the required support by super-ordinates, peers, and subordinates.

Klein & Sorra (1996) found that expectancy beliefs are enhanced when employees have the support of their manager
and coworkers, and when the overall organizational climate is supportive of change. Unlike Klein & Sorra, my research focuses on the decision process preceding organizational change, not the change implementation. However, the Klein & Sorra research makes an interesting observation that organizational climate is a strong influence in change efforts, but that even organizational climate is limited by positive or negative congruence with worker’s values. Given the bureaucratic nature of federal organizations, and the paternalistic nature of the military culture, the concept of congruence with values provides a partial explanation of organizational resistance to change as measured in this research.

In this research, instrumentality beliefs are specified in the conditions of each scenario, which states, “You have both statistical and anecdotal evidence that our plan is well thought out, well supported, and achievable.” Further, the scenario where the manager is analyzing the situation and developing alternative corrective strategies incorporates valence beliefs.
Treating Groups as “Fields”

Field theory looks at the world as an arena for the action of forces, where the objects are simply specific places for the interaction of these forces (White, 1992, p. 53). In this research, the “object” is the manager, and all groups that exert influence over his/her actions generate a “field” of influence, much as the magnet generates a magnetic force field.

The “object” in the preponderance of research on organizational change is the employee. The emphasis of those research findings is on actions by the manager to cause change by the affected employees. These findings reflect a classic causal model: the manager’s actions are the cause; the employee’s response is the effect.

Some examples of research findings may clarify this point. For example, researchers have found that, when coercive tactics are used with subordinates, they may work because employees recognize and accept the power conferred to the manager by his/her position (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) and from the desire to evade punishment for non-compliance (Trevino, 1992). These tactics are not effective with super-ordinates or peers. Even with
subordinates, coercion may cause employees to lose motivation because they lack control over and support for their efforts (Elangovan & Xie, 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2000) and because employees lack information regarding the desired methods and outcomes (Yukl, 1989), making their performance more mechanical and less innovative. The connection between non-compliance and negative outcomes to the employee, characteristic of coercive tactics (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), may violate the employee’s sense of social exchange (Schopler & Layton, 1972) and destroy the trust and sense of reciprocity essential to an exchange-based relationship (McAllister, 1995; Whitener et al., 1997). Tepper (2000) describes this sense of inequity in an exchange relationship as “relative deprivation”, or getting less than a fair return on one’s efforts.

In every case, the actor is the manager whose actions (or, in experimental terms, “treatments”) either do or do not cause the desired change. The manager is presumed to be totally independent and the sole source of influence, while the employees respond mechanistically to their perception of the manager’s efforts.

In this research, the manager’s perspective as the “object” of influence from various sources provides the
reference points for all fields of influence. There is no necessity for the groups to act or abstain; their mere presence influences the manager’s actions.

A simple analogy to this phenomenon is the practice by law enforcement officials of parking an unoccupied police car on a busy highway; its presence tends to slow traffic, even though there is no real potential for an adverse action. The field of influence exerted by the parked police car extends even beyond the drivers that can see it; drivers who do not see the car slow in response to the behavior of other drivers.

From the perspective of the manager, super-ordinates make crucial decisions regarding his/her well being. Not only do they evaluate the manager’s performance, but their daily decisions affect the ease or difficulty encountered by the manager in performing his/her duties. The field of influence, in this case, extends beyond formal action to a more generalized concern regarding support, rewards, or perceptions from the manager’s chain of command.

The proliferation of studies about employee response to change reflects the reality that employees have a direct influence on the success or failure of a manager’s efforts. A manager anticipating strong resistance can be expected to
either prepare to overcome that resistance or, by avoiding or mitigating the “best” change, yielding to the employees’ influence.

Finally, organizations that are theoretically peer-groups to the manager have a direct influence. In the federal bureaucracy, legal review is required for any action where either legal, regulatory, or labor/employee relations issues are involve. The same is true for human resources staff offices that review planned actions for impact on the employees and for other potential issues. From the manager’s perspective, the support, or lack of support, from these staff agencies can significantly influence how difficult change efforts are.

Each of these groups, along with others with lesser influence, project fields of influence that extend well beyond the actions contemplated in mission and function tables.

**Operationalizing Fields of Influence: Force Field Analysis**

Lewin (1947) developed an analytic technique he named “force field analysis”. To conduct a force field analysis requires an informed, but intuitive, evaluation of the
potential positive (driving) and negative (restraining) forces to be encountered by the object in seeking change.

Force field analysis is not a separate theory of organizational change; rather, it is the operationalization of field theory for practitioners to use in developing change strategies (Brager & Holloway, 1978). Based on Lewin’s (1951) field theory, force field analysis provides the tools to identify and evaluate the various forces that are exerted on the organization, both driving forces which tend to increase preference for change and restraining forces which tend to increase preference for the status quo. To analyze these forces on the implementation of change requires identification of:

1) the need for change,
2) the change goal
3) the critical actors who will affect the change process,
4) the driving and restraining forces, and
5) the impact of those forces on the critical actors.
Identification of the Critical Actors

"The critical actor is located by asking the question: "Who (or what group) has the power to deliver my change if he perceives it to be in his own or the organization's best interest to do so?" (Brager & Holloway, 1978, p. 116). Given a change goal and one or more strategies for achieving that goal, it is essential to identify the critical actors who can approve and achieve the change proposal.

In most organizations, many "critical actors" are easily identified; they are the person or group with approval or funding authority. However, there are two types of facilitators who may be even more crucial in the process than the critical actors. I call the first "intermediate facilitators", from whom you must obtain approval to reach the critical actor(s). Like critical actors, these intermediate facilitators are normally easy to identify.

The second type of facilitators, who I designate "influence facilitators", are those whose approval, disapproval, or neutrality will affect the decisions of the intermediate facilitators or critical actors, and thereby
affect the potential for obtaining approval for the change proposal. These influence facilitators are often not obvious, but it is critical that they be identified before continuing with the analysis.

The structured Force Field Analysis identified the critical actors and evaluates their amenability to change, potency in effecting change, and consistency in their support or opposition to the proposed change.

Table 1: Force Field Analysis for Strategic Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITICAL ACTORS</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asst Sec of the Army (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept Asst Sec of the Army (HR)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR Bd of Dir</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRIVING FORCES</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>RESTRAINING FORCES</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASA (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Garrison Cmdr</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASA (HR)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>IMA (HQ &amp; Region)</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR Bd of Dir</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>CPAC (Installation)</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR Bd of Dir Exec</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>SJA (Installation)</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdr, CFSC</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Workgroup Employees</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COO, CFSC</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Amenability to Change  U = Uncertain
P = Potency to Affect Change L = Low
C = Consistency            H = High
The critical actors, as identified above, will be discussed at length and the rationale for selecting them as “critical”, as well as the ratings on amenability, potency, and consistency explained, in the following section.

Private Services in a Public Organization: Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Managers

The following information relies heavily on the US Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report (US Army, 2003). Substantially all financial and descriptive information is either directly quoted or minimally paraphrased for clarity. The report covers operations during fiscal year (FY) 2003, extending from October 2002 through September 2003. This is the most recent MWR Annual Report released to the public at the time of this writing.

The services provided by Army MWR activities are predominantly “private services” comparable to those provided by commercial enterprises in non-military communities. While there are a few public services (e.g., parks and recreation, libraries), these consume a small minority of the budget dollars, employees, and operational attention of MWR. Lodging, food and beverage, golf,
bowling, child care, and other services typically provided by the private sector make up the lion’s share of MWR.

**Army MWR: A Billion Dollar Public Business**

Military service takes individuals away from their hometowns and transplants them in unfamiliar places both inside and outside the continental United States. In addition to this disassociation from their family support structure, soldiers and their families experience unusual stresses due to the nature of military duties and frequent, often extended, separations of the soldier from his/her immediate family. To respond to these unusual stresses, the military services operate “Morale, Welfare, and Recreation” (MWR) programs.

The following table depicts active Army demographics (Army, 2003, p.9). In addition, Army MWR also serves the reserve components (National Guard and Reserves), DoD civilian employees, and contractor civilians.
Table 2: Active Duty Army Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Duty</strong></td>
<td>78,368</td>
<td>79,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>406,183</td>
<td>413,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>484,551</td>
<td>493,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>583,539</td>
<td>600,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Units</strong></td>
<td>284,774</td>
<td>282,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Distribution</strong></td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Married</strong></td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dual Military</strong></td>
<td>5,039</td>
<td>4,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,538</td>
<td>21,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single Parents</strong></td>
<td>2,936</td>
<td>3,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33,595</td>
<td>34,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Members</strong></td>
<td>252,193</td>
<td>254,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>460,853</td>
<td>469,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,599</td>
<td>3,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>716,645</td>
<td>727,462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 282,301 active duty Army soldiers in 2003 represented 282,307 “family units”. 86% of these family units were inside the continental US (“CONUS”), while 14% of them were residing outside the contiguous 48 states.
(“OCONUS”). Because the deployment issues and mission-related challenges of “dual military” families, as well as those for single parents, the Army tracks these groups separately. There are approximately 1.5 family members for every active duty member (727,462 / 493,563) while each family unit (282,307) contains 3.6 members (military sponsor plus 2.6 dependents).

MWR is challenged to provide a “home town” for each of these military members plus their family members. To accomplish this, there are business (e.g., golf, bowling, clubs), family (e.g., child development, youth activities), recreation (e.g., sports, fitness centers), and support (e.g., financial management, human resources) activities at each installation.

Collectively, MWR program in the Army had revenues of $1.4 billion in FY 2003. The following table indicates sources and uses of these funds.
Army MWR is funded by a combination of appropriations (appropriated funds or “APF”) and revenues generated from sales in “business” activities and fees at certain recreation and family activities (nonappropriated funds or “NAF”). Over half of the funds from all sources are used to pay for labor and benefits, with just over a third going to “Other Expenses” (e.g., cost of goods sold, utilities, and maintenance) and approximately ten percent being reinvested in capital equipment or buildings.
Formal Structure of Army MWR

The Secretary of the Army has delegated responsibility for MWR to three principle staff members, including the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)), who holds policy responsibility for all programs affecting the military and civilian employee well-being; the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (AASA), who oversee the Installation Management Agency; and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and the Environment (ASA(I&E)), who has policy responsibility for all real property, including that used by MWR.

Of these designees, though, only the ASA(M&RA) can be considered a critical actor. The AASA has, historically, limited his influence to those issues affecting the Army headquarters, DoD, and the congress; as discussed later, he has delegated the operating responsibility for MWR to the Installation Management Agency. The ASA(I&E) is predominately interested in physical plant and does not interact on MWR issues on a regular basis.

The ASA(M&RA) has a seat on the eight-member MWR Board of Directors (BOD). As a member of the BOD, he remains knowledgeable about global MWR issues, and can make
significant policy changes on his own authority. The current ASA(M&RA) is newly appointed and represents an unknown level of amenity to change and unmeasured consistence. However, there is no question that he would have high potency in affecting or resisting change in MWR activities.

The principle assistant to the ASA(M&RA) for MWR issues is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Human Resources (DASA(HR)). The DASA(HR) is more intimately involved in overseeing the operations of MWR, and exerts significant influence on a regular basis. He is unquestionably a critical actor, with demonstrated high amenability to change, high potency on issues he chooses to support or oppose, and high consistency in his efforts to change and improve MWR.

The final critical actor is actually a group--the MWR Board of Directors (BOD). The MWR BOD consists of the ASA (M&RA), the four-star commanders of five of the Army’s major commands, the three-star commander of the US Army Pacific, and the Army’s top enlisted person, the Sergeant Major of the Army. The BOD meets twice annually to review operations and make decisions regarding priorities, fund allocation, and other executive issues. The BOD is
critically interested in the long-term viability of MWR as a program and has demonstrated high amenability to change, high potency in directing change, and high consistency in their support for change actions.

The ASA(M&RA), DASA(HR), and MWR BOD are all listed as driving forces for change as well as critical actors. This duality reflects the very active role taken, historically, by each of these offices and the BOD in shaping the strategic direction of MWR. As a result, they are both critical actors and driving forces for change and must be viewed in both roles in formulation of change initiatives.

The BOD executive committee, consisting of the MWR chiefs in each region of the Installation Management Agency (discussed later), is also a driving force for change. The executive committee is a facilitating actor in the sense that it makes no decisions, but can either facilitate or block information and issues on their path to the BOD. The executive committee is considered a driving force with high amenability, potency, and consistency for change because they have operating responsibility for activities that are, on the whole, in the negative curve of organizational life cycle.
The entire formal structure of the MWR BOD is designed to give voice to a wide variety of constituencies while providing a mechanism to identify and support the most important issues. The Executive Committee, other committees, and the working group play a key role in vetting and promoting major change initiatives. While not listed separately, they are forces that impact the management of change because they help shape the overall vision of the board.

Implementing Policy and Strategic Direction: A Divided House

The symmetry of the executive leadership, keying off the ASA(M&RA) as both the policy chief and a member of the BOD, should provide a stable and potent platform for strategic vision and accountability. However, the execution of that vision is divided between two autonomous organizations that report to a chain of command that does not include either the M&RA or BOD.

The Army civilian leadership, including the Secretary of the Army and his civilian staff, provides policy and oversight of the Army staff that, led by the military chain of command, executes the programs. There is normally a high
structural comparability between the Secretariat staff responsible for policy and oversight and the corresponding Army staff element; for example, the DASA(HR) structure for military and civilian personnel is mirrored by a staff in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1) that ultimately reports through the Army staff channels to the DASA(HR).

Unfortunately, this is not true of MWR. Policy and oversight is assigned to the ASA(M&RA), but the execution of that policy lies with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), who reports through staff channels to the ASA(I&E). The ACSIM also operates the US Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC) as a Field Operating Activity responsible for financial management, human resource, and other staff support functions. The Commander, CFSC, “holds the purse strings” for distribution of appropriations to MWR as well as for the banking and investment funds, benefits programs, and risk management (RIMP) programs; both the Commander and Chief Operating Officer of CFSC are clearly high potency forces for change. The current CFSC Commander has only recently assumed command, so his amenability to and consistency in support of change is unknown; the COO, a long tenure civilian
employee, has demonstrated high amenability to and support for change efforts.

Direct operational control of MWR activities is assigned to another ACSIM sub-element, the Installation Management Agency (IMA). IMA has a headquarters and six regions. The regional offices, in turn, supervise the installation MWR activities and are responsible for their operating success or failure. The Headquarters and Regional Offices of IMA are currently considered to be Low in their amenability for change, based on their extensive use of “standard” organizations and rigid operating metrics. This low perceived amenability (or “resistance”) to change is to be measured as part of this research.

The regional organization of the IMA is represented by the following map, obtained from the IMA website (http://www.ima.army.mil/Regions.asp).
The seven IMA regions, and the installations they oversee, are as follows:

**Northwest Region (19 installations):** Deseret Chemical Depot, Dugway Proving Grounds, Fort Carson, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Lewis, Fort McCoy, Fort Riley, Iowa AAP, Kansas AAP, Lake City AAS, Lima Army TPL, Newport Chemical Depot, Pueblo Chemical Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Tooele Army Depot, Umatilla Chemical Depot, US Army Garrison Michigan, and Yakima Training Center.
Southwest Region (15 installations): Corpus Christi Army Depot, Fort Bliss, Fort Hood, Fort Huachuca, Fort Irwin and the National Training Center, Fort Polk, Fort Sam Houston, Fort Sill, McAlester AAP, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Presidio of Monterey, Red River Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot, White Sands Missile Range, and Yuma Proving Grounds.

Northeast Region (27 installations): Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Adelphi Laboratory Center, Carlisle Barracks, Charles E. Kelly Support Facility, Fort A.P. Hill, Fort Belvoir, Fort Detrick, Fort Devens, Fort Dix, Fort Drum, Fort Eustis, Fort Hamilton, Fort Lee, Fort Meade, Fort Monmouth, Fort Monroe, Fort Myer & Fort McNair, Fort Story, Letterkenny Army Depot, Soldier Systems Center, Picatinny Arsenal, Radford AAP, Scranton AAP, Tobyhanna Army Depot, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Watervliet Arsenal, and the West Point Military Reservation.

Southeast Region (20 installations): Anniston Army Depot, Blue Grass Army Depot, Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, Fort Buchanan, Fort Campbell, Fort Gillem, Fort Gordon, Fort Jackson, Fort Knox, Fort McPherson, Fort Rucker, Fort Stewart, Holston AAP, Hunter Army Airfield, US Army Garrison Miami, Mian AAP, Mississippi AAP, Redstone Arsenal, and Sunny Point MOT.
Pacific Region (10 installations): Akizuki/Kure, Fort Greely, Fort Richardson, Fort Shafter, Fort Wainwright, Kwajalein Atoll, Schofield Barracks, Tokyo/Yokohama, Camp Zama, and Sagamihara.

European Region (34 installations): Activities in/around Vicenza and Livorno, Italy; Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Chievres, Wuerzburg, Grafenwoehr, Hanau, Ansbach, Babenhausen, Darmstadt, Bad Aibling, Bamberg, Baumholder, Butzbach, Giessen, Bremerhaven, Dexheim, Friedberg, Garmisch, Germersheim, Giebelstadt, Hohenfels, Illesheim, Kaiserslautern, Kitzingen, Mannheim, Schinnen, Schweinfurt, Schwetzingern, Vilseck, and Weisbaden, Germany; and Brussels, Belgium.

Korea Region (30 installations): Thirty camps throughout the Korean peninsula.

MWR at the Service-Delivery Level: Hard Choices, Unsure Future

At each installation throughout the Army, MWR activities are provided through a local command starting at the Garrison Commander and progressing (downward) through the Director of Community Activities to the chiefs of five functional divisions.
Chief, Business Programs: Clubs, bowling, golf, horse stables, and other activities comparable to those provided by the private sector in civilian communities.

Chief, Family Services Division: Child development, youth activities, and other programs designed to help the military family cope with the unique circumstances and stress of military life.

Chief, Financial Management Division: Budgeting, cash handling, and various financial services.

Chief, Recreation Division: Sports, parks, and recreation programs typically provided by civilian communities, supported by either a taxes or fees-for-service or a combination of both.

Chief, Support Division: Support services such as warehousing, supply, contracting/purchasing, and administrative services.

There is currently a substantial amount of pressure being placed on all MWR programs operated at the installation level. Generally, operating revenue is down and operating expenses are up, resulting in deteriorating financial returns. As the financial situation becomes more and more stressed, operating managers are required to
either meet their assigned “metrics”, or goal, or face externally imposed reductions up to and including closure.

Financial reporting for MWR is confusing to many because it involves a mixture of direct appropriations, indirect appropriated support in the form of wages and benefits for civil service employees and military personnel, and a variety of “reimbursements” from appropriations for work performed by nonappropriated fund employees. Additionally, many activities generate revenues by charging fees or selling food, beverage, or retail items. Added to this mix are profits generated by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), which has “department stores” at each installation and shares some of its “profits” with the Army; the Army Recreation Machine Program (ARMP), which operates amusement machines worldwide and slot machines in foreign areas; the Army Banking and Investment Fund, which centrally manages NAF bank accounts and generates investment earnings from those balances; and the Armed Forces Recreation Centers, which contribute 2% of the revenues generated by the Army’s four luxury destination resort hotels into a central fund. A summarized income and expense statement is presented below:
Appropriations are more often cut than increased. The FY 2003 appropriated revenues were down by over $20 million from FY 2002, while the expenses were up by $50 million. At the same time, NAF revenues dropped $25.5 million, while expenses were reduce only $11 million. Net income before depreciation, the Army’s “cash flow watermark”, dropped over $37 million (over 22%) in one operating year. This deterioration in financial position is part of a trend over
the past decade, and the impact is being strongly felt at the installation level, creating real pressure for reductions in cost or improvements in revenue.

Activity managers are challenged to develop plans that better generate revenues or reduce expenses. While there are a large number of potential combinations of action, the options can be described by four major categories:

1) Status Quo: This is the do-nothing option; the activity continues to operate in the same manner and hopes for the best.

2) Reorganize: Reorganization is a revenue-based option, moving assets around or reutilizing them without any real change in expenses. Sometimes changes in venue or schedule can reconnect the activity to its customers, stimulating increased utilization and revenues.

3) Downsize: This is a cost-based option, reacting to a reduction in revenues or appropriations by reducing the single largest expense item, labor cost.

4) Outsource: Particularly in food and beverage or retail operations, the private sector competition is usually “right outside the gate”
and includes major food and retail chains with notoriously low overhead and labor costs. Bringing those activities onto the installation is currently being tested at a variety of installations. AAFES has had excellent experience, over more than a decade, with “concessionaires”, private sector companies that provide goods or services under contract with the exchange system.

Management Choices: Four Levels of Change

If considered in the order presented, these four options represent a progressively larger impact on the members of the organization. Status quo, of course, has no change impact. Under the status quo option, organizations simply await their fate and hope for the best. Individuals within the organization either rely on fate or, in some cases, may be trying to delay any adverse action until a future point in time, when they plan to either move on to another organization or they become eligible for some sort of benefit (retirement, severance, etc.)
Reorganization, as it is described in the survey scenario, can cause employee schedule disruption, transportation challenges, and other transient impacts. However, at this level of change everyone gets to keep a job. Because it represents a change, higher levels of resistance are expected from employees, but little or no resistance is expected from the chain of command, human resources, or legal office due to the lack of “adverse actions”.

Downsizing, or the more palatable euphemism “right-sizing”, means that some employees will no longer be employed and others may have to take a reduction in pay or benefits to remain with the organization. Downsizing involves official adverse action, thereby creating workload and stress for human resources and legal staffs. When reductions are anticipated, the local commander must obtain approval from the next higher level of the organization, bringing the regional staffs into the planning process. At this point, increasing levels of resistance are expected from employees, legal and human resources staffs, and the chain of command.

With outsourcing everyone in the organization will be impacted through the loss of their job; while some may find
other federal employment, none will remain unscathed in their current job. This is the option with the most extreme adverse impact, generating highest workloads for legal and human resources and subjecting the chain of command to the strongest and most persistent criticism from employees, labor organizations, and the community. It was expected, at the time of research design, the survey would show that the managers expect maximum levels of resistance from all quadrants as a result of this option.

Measuring Expectancy: Survey of Managers

The unit of analysis of this research is the individual; specifically, the individual manager who is responsible for the development, advocacy, and implementation of change. The need for change is objectively demonstrated by the widespread failure to meet the standards set by the Army for MWR activities (Army, 2003). Yet the downward trend of performance indicates that effective change is not being implemented in response to these shortfalls. This research examines the organizational context, as experienced by the activity
manager, as a possible explanation for the apparent failure to make positive organizational changes.

Measuring organizational contexts in 155 Army installations worldwide presents a formidable challenge. These activities are not only part of the overall Army MWR program; they are also part of a regional organization and located on installations where local command priorities, human resources and legal staffs, and community demographics and economic factors create their organizational context. This research seeks to analyze the perceptions of manager regarding the receptivity to change in their environment and, given the extant receptivity levels (positive or negative), their expectation of success or failure ("expectancy values") in advocating effective change strategies.

At the local level, the Garrison Commander has final management oversight and responsibility. These military officers come from a large variety of backgrounds and have diverse views on management priorities. While it is possible that these officers may have a business academic background, they are predominately assigned based on their military specialty (i.e., infantry, artillery, armor, aviation, etc.) and not due to any particular background in
business or activity management. As a result, there is a wide variety of command contexts affecting the activity managers; to add complexity, these Commanders change every two to three years, creating a new set of priorities and preferences. While studying these command influences individually might be enlightening, this research focuses on the perceived influence these commanders exert across a wide variety of activities.

The legal and human resources staffs at each installation are part of government-wide career fields. As individuals in these career fields progress through their career, they are progressively trained through a centralized training program. As a result, the attitudes of these staff members may be shaped by the training and experiences peculiar to their career field, and may or may not share the values required by MWR activities that are seeking to provide a private good in a public environment. Further, the human resources staff experiences high workload from decisions to reduce or eliminate the workforce. The human resources staff also shares the workload of grievances and appeals from displaced employees, as well as the reaction by unions and local communities to these actions.
Finally, employees within the activity take the direct impact of management change initiatives, and can be expected to respond negatively to those changes that are seen as adversely affecting one or more employees within the group.

Each of these four groups can be expected to react with varying levels of support or resistance to any change initiative. By measuring the expectations of managers regarding both the degree of support or resistance and the likelihood of implementing change, this research seeks at least a partial explanation for the continuing failure of these activities to change and survive.

Expectancy Theory and Army MWR Managers

Instrumentality and valence beliefs (Vroom, 1964) are presented as assumptions to the survey population. Instrumentality beliefs involve the likelihood, as assessed by the individual, that certain outcomes will occur if, and only if, they change their behavior. Instrumentality beliefs are established by stipulating, in the hypothetical situation, that the manager with the support of the local university developed the proposal, and that there are no
technical, legal, or regulatory barriers to the proposed change action.

In contrast, valence beliefs evaluate whether the individual views the predicted outcomes as desirable (Vroom, 1964). Valence beliefs affect the selection of the particular course of action by the manager (the manager would presumably select only courses of actions where the outcome is expected to be favorable). To reinforce this assumption, the expected outcomes are briefly stated as part of the description of the selected action.

Given that instrumentality and valence beliefs are stipulated in the survey scenario, the manager’s expectancy beliefs remain to be measured. If the expected response from the employees, chain of command, and support offices correspond to the manager’s expectancy beliefs (probability of success), then the expectancy beliefs may be an indication of why managers with low perceptions of support fail to develop, advocate, and implement necessary changes.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Expectancy theory holds that the likelihood of action is based on the interaction of three beliefs. As previously
discussed, expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) predicts employees will be more motivated to support a change when they believe that:

1) they can successfully perform the change behavior (expectancy beliefs)
2) they will obtain certain outcomes as a result of changing their behavior (instrumentality beliefs), and
3) those outcomes are desirable (valence beliefs).

In this research, we seek to test the expectancy beliefs of activity managers who are considering a change initiative. To test those beliefs, we measure their confidence that a given change initiative will be implemented. To limit the test to expectancy beliefs, the response must be limited to expectancy beliefs only, and the instrumentality and valence beliefs must be held constant. This is accomplished by stipulating, in the survey instrument, the level of instrumentality and valence beliefs for all respondents.

The conditions that affect expectancy beliefs are defined as fields of influence. Respondents are presented with four fields of influence (subordinates, superordinates, their human resources staff, and the legal
staff). By measuring the valence and vector of influence from each field and the expectancy value reported by the respondent, this research seeks to determine the relative influence of each field on the respondent’s expectancy value.

The research question can be stated as follows:

Do associated fields of influence affect the expectancy value of activity managers affected by the vector and valence of influence?

Hypothesis 1: Individual Field Influences

To test the impact of individual fields of influence on the expectancy value of the activity managers, the correlation of expectancy value and the vector (direct, positive or negative) and valence (strength, or value) must be measured for each field of influence.

Hypothesis 1a: The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from employees in response to change proposals.

Hypothesis 1b: The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from super-ordinates in response to change proposals.
Hypothesis 1c: The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from the human resources staff in response to change proposals.

Hypothesis 1d: The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from the legal staff in response to change proposals.

Hypothesis 2: Combined Influences

Field theory looks at the world as an arena for the action of forces, where the objects are simply specific places for the interaction of these forces (White, 1992, p. 53). In this research, the “object” is the manager, and four groups that exert influence over his/her actions affect the manager. Each of these groups generates a field of influence, much as the magnet generates a magnetic force field that influences other fields within its sphere of influence.

Hypothesis 1 looked at the influence of the individual forces; hypothesis 2 examines the combined, or interactive, forces and their impact on the expectancy values of the manager.
Hypothesis 2a: The expectancy value of the activity manager is positively related to the combined forces anticipated from subordinates, super-ordinates, human resources staff, and the legal office.

Hypothesis 2b: Certain combinations of anticipated forces influence the expectancy value of the activity managers more than others.

Hypothesis 3: Interaction Effect of Influences

The forces exerted by a field do not act exclusively on the object (manager), but also on each other. Conceptually, a group of five magnets would generate five fields, each field influencing each of the other associated fields. Hypothesis 3 examines whether the fields tend to align to a single vector and combined valence, or whether they act independently.

Hypothesis 3: The perceived vector and valence of each field will correlate with the vector and valence of one or more other fields within the arena of the manager.
Hypothesis 4: Response Distribution

This research does not seek to explain the “why” of forces, but only to measure their vector and valence in relation to the object of their influence. Yet the information gathered in this survey may yield insight into the source of some of that force.

The principle of social proof indicates that, “We view a behavior as correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it.” (Cialdini, 2001). This corresponds with hypothesis 3, where we measure the correlation of fields within the object’s arena. A different extension of this principle would indicate that professional groups, particularly the legal, human resources, and command groups, might be influenced by behavior within their professional fields that extends beyond the immediate arena.

Hypothesis 4 reflects the expectation that the social proof influences within these professional fields will influence the vector and valence of individual fields at varying locations.

**Hypothesis 4:** The perceived vector and valence of force anticipated by the actors from the fields will
be normally distributed across the population of each professional field.

**Survey Population/Sample**

This is a population survey of managers currently or previously involved in the morale, welfare and recreation activities sponsored by the US Army. The survey population, and the activities those managers are responsible for, are described below.

The Army operates 233 club, food, beverage and entertainment operations worldwide, which recorded $162 million net revenue in 2003 (Army, 2003). The $10.9 million net income before depreciation (6.7% of net revenues) failed to meet the 8.0% level required by the Army leadership. In addition, net revenues for these activities were down $2.9 million (1.8%) from FY 2002, and net income before depreciation decreased $2.3 million (17.2%). The managers of each of these outlets, plus their supervisors, are in a position where organizational change is becoming a survival issue.

The 56 Army golf courses produced $64.2 million in revenues during fiscal year 2003, down $3.5 million (2%)
from 2002. Unfortunately, net income before depreciation dropped from $7.1 million to $5.9 million (17%) and failed to meet the Army-required 18% of revenues (NIBD $5.9 = 9.1% of $64.2 revenues). As with clubs, these activities are failing to meet their financial goals and require major innovation to survive.

The Army’s 104 bowling centers produced $4.4 million net income before depreciation on $43.9 millions net revenue, or 10% NIBD/Revenues. The Army standard is 18%, with some relief for those bowling centers that are operated in remote or isolated areas. Again, these managers face organizational extinction if new strategies cannot be identified and implemented to bring their operations within standard.

Army lodging operates 21,240 guest rooms Army-wide. The Army is currently seeking to outsource all lodging within the continental United States. This initiative, known as Privatization of Army Lodging, has not yet outsourced any lodging facilities and there is serious doubt that it will be successful in doing so during fiscal year 2006. While these activities are moving toward outsourcing, many managers and installations are striving to implement practices to demonstrate the “in-house”
ability to operate lodging, hoping to fend off or modify the Army’s initiative. Again, these managers are intimately involved in the change process.

Finally, the Armed Forces Recreation Centers operated by the Army at four locations (Orlando, Florida; Garmisch, Germany; Honolulu, Hawaii; and Seoul, Korea) generated total revenues of $106.3 million and NIBD of $19.2 million (18%). The operations in Orlando are now highly outsourced on a labor-contracting strategy. The hotel in Germany continues to struggle for even break-even operations, while the hotel in Honolulu produces a NIBD of only 11% of revenues. The hotel in Seoul is highly profitable ($15.24 million NIBD (42%) on revenues of $36 million), but much of this is due to a highly profitable casino area. Troop repositioning worldwide under military transformation plans threatens both the lucrative Seoul hotel (with major redeployment of troops outside the Seoul area) and the new $68.4 million facility in Germany.

Collectively, the researcher estimates that these business operations, plus the miscellaneous operations such as equestrian clubs, the recreation machine program, and others, employ in excess of 600 activity managers with responsibility for organizational change. The IMA point of
contact indicated that their working estimates were between 600 and 650 within the business operations area, providing partial confirmation of the researcher’s estimates.

Instrumentation

This research seeks to measure the perceptions about the environment for change as managers of delivery-level activities experience it. The data collection instrument, a self-administered internet survey, was selected to maximize both the coverage of the survey and the probability of response.

Survey responses can be seen as a form of social exchange (Dillman, 2000, 14). As such, it is critical to view the social costs, rewards, and trust involved in the survey administration.

As discussed in Chapter 3, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978) suggests that the most important factors in obtaining high response rates to surveys include reducing costs and increasing the perceived importance of the survey.

A variety of features were incorporated into the survey design. The use of an internet survey provides a
unique advantage to the survey participants. They are free to select a time and place where they can consider each question and make a response at their own pace (Mangione, 1995).

While there are no questions about socially undesirable or illegal behavior, privacy and confidentiality serve to dispel any concerns the participant may have regarding completing the survey (Tourangeau & Smith, 1996).

Self-reporting in the privacy of one’s home or office is a familiar method of communicating. “By far the most common form of social measurement is the verbal or self-report. Self-reports are generally accurate measures of background measures such as age, gender, marital status, and education. They also are used extensively to measure subjective experiences, such as knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and opinions (Singleton & Straits, 1999: 105)”.

The distribution protocol, which keys off the regional director of MWR, establishes both the legitimacy and value of the survey. This perceived importance, along with the low social cost of responding to the survey, is intended to maximize response rates.
Dillman (2000:9) lists four sources of survey error;
1) sampling error (the extent to which the precision of sample survey estimates is limited by the number of persons (or other units) surveyed),
2) coverage error (when the list from which the sample is drawn does not include all elements of the population),
3) measurement error (when a respondent’s answer to a survey question is inaccurate, imprecise, or cannot be compared in any useful way to other respondent’s answers), and
4) non-response error (where a significant number of people in the survey sample do not respond to the questionnaire and have different characteristics from those who do respond, when these characteristics are important to the study.

Potential sampling and non-response errors pose a particular concern in this research design. Under the protocol, each of the regional directors of MWR committed to the distribution of the survey through official channels. While this personal commitment from the regional director can be expected to yield initial distribution of the survey (Cialdini, 2001), further distribution depends
on the principle of authority for motivation. As a result, it was not possible for the researcher to control distribution directly, and follow-up communications were implemented as unresponsive regions or installations were identified.

In addition to sampling and non-response errors inherent to the survey protocol, the traditional sources of systematic error have been reviewed and, where appropriate, addressed in the design process. “Systematic measurement error results from factors that systematically influence either the process of measurement or the concept being measured.” (Singleton & Straits, 1999: 112)

“When the respondent’s sensitivity or responsiveness to a measure is affected by the process of observation or measurement, we refer to this as a reactive measurement effect (Webb et al., 1966: 13 cited by Singleton & Straits, 1999: 115).” Use of an internet survey design minimizes the intrusiveness of the researcher, as well as the cost of responding; both factors should minimize reactive measurement effect.

Also addressed in the survey design were concepts such as social desirability effects (tendency to give “politically correct” responses), acquiescence effect.
(tendency to agree with statements regardless of content), and stereotyped responses (tendency to respond consistently, such as favoring right hand, left hand, or central responses). Questions were carefully worded to minimize researcher influence from social desirability or acquiescence; responses will be tested for stereotyped responses.

The survey instrument has been designed to take less than ten minutes to complete. This is to encourage the target audience to visit the site and complete the survey in one sitting.

Scales with nine response categories were used because they are generally more reliable and valid than shorter scales (Alwin, 1992, 1997). As the result of recommendations by peer reviewers, narrative descriptors were used to indicate responses instead of numerical values. While there are nine possible responses (four negative, four positive, and one neutral), descriptors were provided for the extremes (strong resistance, strong support), the absolute zero value (indifference), and one mid-point on the negative (resistance) and positive (support) sides of the scale. This left four unlabeled intervening responses, located between each narrative
descriptor. After redesign, this was again peer-reviewed with positive feedback.

Unambiguous terms improve reliability and validity of responses. Also of concern is the appropriateness of the vocabulary to the target group, keeping the questions focused on a single idea per question (avoiding “double-barrel” questions), emotionally-laden terms, leading questions, and by being consistent in maintaining the respondent’s frame of reference. (Singleton & Strait, 1999: 297-298). The design of each question was reviewed for mutual exclusivity and collective exhaustiveness, along with neutrality of language.

While all the respondents are/have been managers of an installation MWR activity, the quality and success of those activities vary widely. To obtain a consistency of responses and improve reliability, a hypothetical situation was considered by the researcher to be superior to a factual question. This eliminated the variance among the activities managed by the participants, as well as neutralizing the emotional investment by the participant in describing change efforts within his/her activity.

An offer of the executive summary of results is provided as an incentive to complete the survey. There is
currently widespread interest in change management and the impact of organizational climate on change efforts; initial interviews with members of the MWR career field indicate that a short executive summary of the results would be valued. The protocol, which called for reports to the regional MWR directors regarding response rates, was intended to create a sense of competition and accountability; care was taken to limit the reports to regional overviews and not to report individual installation or activity responses.

Singleton & Straits (1999:119-120) recommend several ways to improve reliability of measurements. Exploratory studies, preliminary interviews, or pretests of a measure with a small sample of persons similar in characteristics to the target group to determine if the measure is clearly understood and interpreted similarly by respondents.

Reducing ambiguity and increasing the consistency of administration will also improve the reliability of responses.

Exploratory studies and preliminary interviews with members of the target audience were helpful in conducting the force field analysis and in developing the initial survey instrument. Peer review (recommended by Dillman,
yielded a number of administrative changes to the original survey instrument, clarifying the questions and responses.

Pre-testing of the instrument yielded an unexpected result: there was a consistency of responses across the four change options. Since Guttman (1950) scaling was an integral part of the design, this pattern merited further consideration. If the response pattern was anomalous to the small sample group, it would disappear in the full survey. If the response pattern indicated that all changes tend to be supported or resisted regardless of the proposed change (i.e., a consistent response to any change initiative), then the response pattern would indicate that the type of change proposed would not be a causal factor in the response.

However, ordering effect (or, in influence terms, “consistency”) is a potential source of this lack of variance among the various change options. Cialdini (2001: 52) notes that consistency and commitment are “hobgoblins of the mind”. Once the response of the various stakeholders is considered and recorded (in this case, considering the “status quo” option), there may be a tendency for the participant to repeat the responses in
subsequent questions in order to be (and appear to be) consistent. If this is the case, the order in which the questions are presented will influence the responses of all the questions.

To allow for post-administration testing of this bias, a split sample methodology was developed. Of the seven IMA regions, three received one version of the survey and four received another. One version listed the change options from the least impact (status quo) to the highest (outsourcing), while the other listed them from highest (outsourcing) to lowest (status quo). Randomization was considered, but randomization of the responses added substantial confusion to the choices being offered; therefore, reversing the order with a split sample seemed the most practical approach to measuring this potential bias.

Protocol

The Regional MWR Directors distributed the survey through normal operating channels. Six of the seven Regional MWR Directors had been contacted in advance of the survey distribution, and each agreed to distribute the
survey. Efforts to contact the seventh Regional Director (Northeast region) were unsuccessful.

Using official channels for distribution insured the widest possible dissemination to all levels of operating managers and provides proof of the legitimacy of the survey (Cialdini, 1984). Obtaining the personal commitment of the regional MWR directors was intended to obtain their active support when the survey is distributed (Cialdini, 2001: 61-66; Freedman & Fraser, 1966: 201).

This study is a non-random population survey of a selected group of managers. This population was selected for the study because:

1) They are relatively homogenous in work environment, in that they all work (or have worked) within MWR activities of the US Army;
2) Data is available to evaluate their current work environments in terms of success or failure, producing an indirect measure of the urgency of the need for change.
3) The members of the group are available to the researcher through officially approved channels of communication.
The study population is non-random because the current security posture of the US Army precludes development of an accurate list of MWR managers for use in this study. Instead, a population study design resulted in substantial responses. The effect of the four types of survey error identified by Dillman (2000:9-10) are addressed in final data analysis and reported in the study limitations.

An internet survey was selected as the best method to gather the data required to analyze the manager expectancy values. The survey strategy was selected because:

1) The target audience is widely dispersed, and there is no practical way to obtain mailing addresses for the individuals.

2) The target audience is highly computer literate, using both resident computer programs, such as word processing and spreadsheets, and the internet in their daily activities. The principle communication method between the managers and their chain of command, as well as the related staff offices, is by e-mail.

3) Use of an internet-based survey method allows direct entry by the participant of responses that are electronically recorded in a
spreadsheet format suitable for analysis. This allows for a large volume of responses to be received and analyzed efficiently.

4) Electronic mail addresses are not centrally available for many of the target audience; the regional MWR directors agreed to forward the survey invitation to the managers at installations under their purview. Added to these directly forwarded surveys, the researcher has invited participants to share the request for survey responses with others in their career field or installation. The Civilian Human Resources Agency (CHRA), in obtaining evaluations of civilian personnel administration, has used this strategy with considerable success.

Because this survey is web-based, it is accessible to all persons with access to the internet. While it is impossible, using this method, to screen out those who might intentionally enter false information, the probability of this happening on sufficient scale to significantly affect the final results is considered to be
low. Anyone seeking to affect the results would have needed to make repeated visits to the URL that is unique to the survey. Further, the timeline for responses was limited, making it less likely that someone outside MWR would find the site and make response entries.

Initial distribution was to the regional MWR directors with an e-mail reminding them of their commitment to distribute the survey and expressing gratitude for their efforts to do so. Three regions received links to the survey listing options from least impact (status quo) to most (outsourcing), while four regions received links to an otherwise-identical survey listing the change options from maximum impact (outsourcing) to minimum (status quo).

The initial cutoff for responses was a set date 30 days after distribution to the regional directors. High levels of initial responses were received within the first business week, with rapidly declining response rates after the first week. This rapid response/rapid decline pattern is consistent with recent internet survey results (Dillman, 2000).

At the end of the first month, a preliminary analysis was conducted to determine the response pattern. A follow-up e-mail was then forwarded to each regional director,
reporting response rates and thanking them again for their support. If necessary, further follow-up was conducted and the initial cutoff for responses extended until December 15, 2005.

When the cutoff date was reached, the survey was closed and no further responses were accepted.

Publication of Executive Summary

The executive summary of results served as an incentive for the target audience to complete and return the survey. By providing an e-mail address, the respondents were promised a short summary of the survey results that will be prepared after approval of the full report.

The offer of the executive summary was not only an incentive. By voluntarily obtaining electronic mail addresses of respondents, the researcher is attempting to identify respondents who can be later contacted if case studies or further research is warranted by the outcome of this research.
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

This is explanatory research, seeking to explain the failure of managers to act when faced with the need for change. The theories underlying this research include systems theory (which sees organizational elements as interacting with their environment), field theory (which sees organizational elements as exerting a force either for or against change), and expectancy theory (which sees the interactive forces as influential in the behavior of the “object” of influence). A full explanation of this theoretical foundation is included in Chapter III.

This research is based on the theoretical relationship between the forces exerted by actors within the organization and the behavior of activity managers, and seeks to measure that influence and confirm its impact on the decision process of the research subjects (activity managers). If the theoretically constructed effects of other actors (super-ordinates, peers, and subordinates) show a significant impact on the decision of the actors, then the support (or resistance) by those actors provides a partial explanation of the managers’ behavior when confronted with the need for change.
To measure the vector (direction) and valence (strength) of these influences, as well as their effect on management decision processes, a survey was constructed and distributed to a sample of 201 out of approximately 600 managers within the Army’s morale, welfare, and recreation community. This analysis covers two preliminary issues in addition to the central hypothesis testing:

1) Given the population survey method, is there evidence that the distribution method minimized bias in the response set?

2) Are the conclusions sufficiently powerful for the purpose intended; i.e., can the Army leaders rely on this data as an indicator of the environment for change at the activity level?

Implementation and Respondents

The research was conducted during the period 1 October 2005 through 15 December 2005. Responses were received from 201 respondents from 51 organizational locations.

The respondents were relatively mature, with 73.8% (n=141) between the age of 40 and 60. Only 13.1% of the respondents were under age 40. They were also relatively
experienced in MWR (median experience 16-20 years) and as managers (median 11-15 years).

The respondents were well distributed among the various work divisions of MWR. The largest segment of the response population (21.9%; n=44) was managers who were (or had been) responsible for multiple activities. Family Support Division (19.9%; n = 40) and the various support activities such as contracting, human resources, supply, marketing, etc., also posted double-digit response rates (15.4%; n = 31). Responses were also received from managers of lodging operations (7.0%; n = 14), the Armed Forces Recreation Centers (2.5%; N = 5) and Army Community Services managers (1.5%; n = 3).

The preponderance of respondents were white (75.6%; n = 152), with 10% black (n = 20), 7% Hispanic (n = 14), 1.5% Asian American/Pacific Islander (n = 3) and 1.5% “Other” (n = 3).

The respondents were closely split between the genders, with 88 female (43.8%) and 97 male (48.3%) respondents; 16 respondents (8%) declined to identify their gender.
Limitations of the Research Method

Efforts to control the sampling error and measurement error were incorporated into the survey instrument design and implementation (described fully in Section III, Methodology). A post-hoc analysis of the survey responses has been conducted to test for indications of coverage and non-response errors.

Location Bias

The first measure used to test for bias was location, or geographical dispersion. Since the respondents are reporting institutional (super-ordinate and peers) change climates, respondents from the same geographic location could be expected to report similar change climates. A disproportionate number of responses from the same location/organization could, then, create a bias toward one location’s change climate over other, less represented locations.

Of 155 potential assignments, responses were received from 51. The highest concentrations of responses were from Ft. Riley (n=21; 10.5%), Ft. Campbell (n=15; 7.5%), and Bamburg, Germany (n=12; 6.0%). The remaining installations
all reported less than 10 responses, or \( \leq 5.0\% \) of the total. Given the number and distribution of the responses, there is no reason to believe that the results are biased by any given organizational element.

Another potential bias lies in the difference between employment conditions in areas outside the US. A Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by the State Department with the host nation covers each foreign area. Employment of local nationals (LNs) by the US government is always an important element of these agreements, with the host nation seeking maximum economic value by stabilizing the employment of its citizens. As a result, the organizations outside the US have much stronger employee protections for the LNs, and this could affect their expectations for support of or resistance to changes that affect employees or working conditions. Over-representation by overseas respondents could be expect to overstate resistance by institutional actors (chain of command, legal, and HR) while under-representation might be expected to over-state support.

The respondents were assigned to the headquarters (CFSC or IMA, \( n = 25, 12.8\% \)), at the 91 installations within the U.S. (\( n = 113, 57.6\% \)), and in the 64 overseas
locations (n = 58, 29.6%). This is a preliminary indication that the respondents were well distributed.

Testing further, the data was recoded for respondent organizations located in the US and those located in foreign areas. To determine if there was a difference between respondents in the US and those in foreign areas, an independent sample t-test on the two groups was conducted for each probability of success for the four change proposals (status quo, reorganization, downsizing, and outsourcing). The data showed no significant difference in the variances using Levene’s test (status quo p=.917; reorganization p=.054; downsizing p=.069; outsourcing p=.980). Where Levene’s fails to reject the H₀ (equal variances), a t-test for equality of means is required; in this case, the t-tests also failed to reject the H₀ of equal means (status quo, p=.868; reorganization, p=.755; downsize, p=.322; outsource, p=.124).

Given the frequency distribution by location, paired with the tests for equality of variance and means, it can be concluded that there is no basis to believe the data was biased by location of the respondent.
Gender Bias

The responses were received from a similar number of male (n=97) and female (n=88) respondents, providing strong indications of the perceptions of each group. Using independent sample t-tests, comparing the odds of implementation of each alternative by gender, it appears that the odds of implementation for three of the four alternatives (status quo (p=.851), reorganization (p=.163), and outsourcing (p=.055) are not significant at the .01 level. Downsizing (p=.025) is significant at the .01 level.

The t-test for equality of means does not show significance for any of the four alternative variables. Since the $H_0$ for equal variances cannot be rejected at the .01 level, and the $H_0$ for equal means also cannot be rejected, we must conclude that there is no evidence of gender-based response differences.

Version Bias

In the design of the survey instrument, there was a concern that the response pattern might create a bias by presenting options in a specific order. For clarity, it was not considered desirable to randomize the order, since
the logic of the responses built from a change strategy with no-impact (status quo) to one with high-impact (outsourcing). To test for any response-order bias, the design included two versions of the survey instrument; version 429, which listed options from least-to-highest impact and version 814, which listed options from highest-to-least impact.

Version 429 received 53.2% of the responses (n = 107) and version 814 received 46.8% of the responses (n = 94). Implementation of each version was identical. In theory, if there was a significant response difference between the two versions, the response pattern could be considered as a factor in creating measurement error in the survey.

Splitting the sample by version and conducting an independent samples t-test accomplished testing for differences in the two versions. The results are presented in the following table:
Table 3: Independent Sample T-test Comparing Version 4.29 and Version 8.14

The independent sample t-test produces two types of equality tests: Levene’s Test of the Equality of Variances and the t-test of the Equality of Means. In this comparison, each response group (Chain of Command, Human Resources, Legal Staff, and Employees) was tested, as was the overall expectation of success for each change option by each group. If the test results were biased by the order of the questions, the independent sample t-test should result in a rejection of the assumption that the means are equal.

Levene’s test did not show a statistically significant difference in variance for the chain of command (p = .703),
human resources \((p = 0.060)\), or legal staff \((p = 0.732)\) responses. When Levene’s test for equality of variances is not significant, the t-test for equality of means is used. For this sample, the t-test indicated that the differences in means for the groups “chain of command” \((p = 0.732)\) and “human resources” \((p = 0.701)\) were not significant; however, it did find a significant difference \((p < 0.01)\) in the means of the group “legal staff”.

Levene’s test did show a statistically significant difference in variances for the employee responses \((p < 0.01)\), as well as for the overall expectation of success \((p < 0.01)\).

Spatz (2001, 198) cautions researchers that, “If a difference is statistically significant, you have to go beyond hypothesis testing to decide if the difference is important.” Given that the respondents presented answers that were statistically significantly different to version 429 and 814, it is necessary to determine if that difference is important to the analysis of the results.

Comparisons of the means and standard deviations between the two versions indicate that there is little practical difference between them. The mean and standard
deviation (mean; SD) are presented for each group and each option below:

Table 4: Mean and Standard Deviation, Version 4.29 and Version 8.14, By Response Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chain of Command</th>
<th>Human Resources</th>
<th>Legal Staff</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Odds of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V 429</td>
<td>.8; 2.5</td>
<td>.2; 2.15</td>
<td>.2; 1.78</td>
<td>-.8; 2.43</td>
<td>57.7; 30.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V 814</td>
<td>.7; 2.47</td>
<td>.3; 1.92</td>
<td>.8; 1.52</td>
<td>-.3; 2.69</td>
<td>65.0; 26.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there are differences, and three of the five groups have statistically significant differences, the practical difference is nominal. Given the choice between Strongly Oppose (-4), Oppose (-2), Indifferent (0), Support (2), and Strongly Support (4), the difference in the mean for each group leaves it within the same descriptor. For example, the legal staff’s mean response is slightly above indifference and, if we perceive the scale to be interval, not even halfway to “support”. This is true of both surveys, leading us to the conclusion that the difference, while statistically significant, is not of practical significance.
The “odds of implementation” do not have a narrative scale; they are values from 0 to 100. As a result, we do not have an a priori descriptor; we will conclude that the respondent is probably not likely to advocate changes where the success of implementation is in the 50-70% range. With that in mind, and considering the very close means of the other values, we conclude that the difference in question order did not have a significant practical effect on the outcomes of the survey.

Occupation Bias

In pre-design interviews, there were discussions with MWR professionals regarding the potential for higher levels of support for change in business activities than in those more heavily supported by appropriations. This perception was based on the view that, where revenues are the source of funds to pay payroll and other expenses, there is a dollar-based analysis that supports changes to keep expenses in line with revenues.

By contrast, appropriations are based on the fiscal year, and once a position is funded there is little incentive to eliminate or modify it.
The question of whether the source of funds affects the perceptions of support for change can be answered by dividing the work division upon which responses were based into “revenue supported” (consisting of Business Operations, AFRC and Lodging) and those which are given “appropriated fund support” (Family Support, Support Activities, Community Recreation, Army Community Services).

Response category “Other” allowed the respondent to specify their work assignment. After analysis of the responses, a category was added for “Army Community Services” and the responses of those reporting an ACS work assignment were recoded. The remainder of the “Other” responses was either multiple-division assignments or the Director of Community Activities, who has responsibility for all activities, including those supported by appropriations and those supported through revenues. These responses will be included in the “revenue supported” category. Revenue supported activities are most frequently placed on the “watch list” for closure or major reorganization from regional headquarters; in this analysis, it is more likely that the change initiatives for multi-division managers would be driven by revenue failures than appropriation changes.
Using the independent samples t-test, we see that there is no statistically significant difference in the variances between revenue-producing activities and those supported by appropriations. This test compared the response by the chain of command (p=.850), human resources (p=.789), legal staff (p=.539), and employees (p=.854) for the revenue producing and non-revenue producing activities. No significant difference was found between the responses from revenue-supported activities and those supported through appropriations.

Further, there was no difference in the odds of implementing any recommendation (p=.181) for change. A table the analysis of reflecting these differences is provided below:
Table 5: Independent Samples T-Test, Odds of Implementation by Response Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.850</td>
<td>-.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.977</td>
<td>560.832</td>
<td>.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.789</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>561.691</td>
<td>.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>561.348</td>
<td>.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODDS</td>
<td>1.790</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>1.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>564.998</td>
<td>.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYEE</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.854</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>545.116</td>
<td>.834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, there is no evidence that the work assignments of the respondents had any impact on the responses received.

Hypothesis Testing

This research was designed to test hypotheses that, in turn, were developed from observing the behavior of activity managers confronted with the need for change. The central hypotheses follow, with the results of the research.
Do associated fields of influence affect the expectancy value of activity managers affected by the vector and valence of influence?

To test the impact of individual fields of influence on the expectancy value of the activity managers, the correlation of expectancy value and the vector (direct, positive or negative) and valence (strength, or value) must be measured for each field of influence. This is done by separating each field of influence into a separate hypothesis for testing purposes.

Hypothesis 1a: Individual Field Influences

Hypothesis 1a: The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from employees in response to change proposals.

This hypothesis was not supported. The expectancy value of the activity manager, as reflected in the “odds of implementation”, was not related to the expected response of employees (n=588, r=.068, p=.101).

Reviewing the responses for each change option, the progression of the employee response is consistent with the premise that employees oppose change, and that the opposition is stronger where the change has higher impact.
on the employee group. The “status quo” option had a positive mean (1.04), indicating at least nominal support for the idea of not changing the organization. It is noteworthy that the responses had a high negative skew (Skewness = -.553; Standard Error of Skewness = .200), indicating a large number of responses to the right of the mean; the median response was 2.00, indicating that the 5% of employees who strongly opposed this option (n = 10) biased the distribution of responses of the majority who supported it.

As the change options increased in impact on the employees, the median response dramatically dropped, demonstrating strong opposition to the proposals (Reorganization = -1.00; Downsizing = -4.00; Outsourcing= -4.00). Examining the distributions further, the skew of responses became increasingly positive (Reorganization = .331; Downsizing = 1.687; Outsourcing= 2.980), confirming that the strength of employee opposition is related to the impact the proposed change will have on the employee group.
By contrast, the odds of implementation is weakest in the status quo option (mean = 48.01), gaining higher probability of success in the Reorganization and Downsizing options (mean = 68.71 for both options), and slightly weaker odds of success in Outsourcing (mean = 58.30).

To provide a visual comparison between the response of employees and the odds of implementation, the odds values were rescaled to match the range of the response by employees (-4 to 4), and the means were charted below.
Given these response patterns, it can be said that the employee responses to change may have some impact on the odds of successfully implementing the change, but that their influence is not a major factor in the odds of success for any given change option.

Hypothesis 1b: Super-ordinates field influences

The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from super-ordinates in response to change proposals.

This hypothesis was supported by the responses received (n=587; r=.610; p<.01). The expectancy value
(“odds of implementation”) was strongly and positively related to the force anticipated from super-ordinates (chain of command).

Examining the mean response patterns indicates that the chain of command was opposed to the status quo option (-1.84) and supported the three change options almost equally (Reorganize = 1.77; Downsize = 1.61; Outsource = 1.61). The median values were even more consistent, with the opposition to the status quo (median = 2.00) exactly equal to the support for each change option (median = 2.00 for Reorganize, Downsize, and Outsource).

This response pattern by the chain of command is consistent with the expected success rates for each proposal. The Status Quo option had less than 50% odds of success (mean = 48.01), while the Reorganization (mean = 68.71), Downsize (mean = 68.71), and Outsource (mean = 58.3) options were rated well above 50%. Strengthening this relationship, the median showed the same pattern (Status Quo = 50%; Reorganize = 75%; Downsize = 75%; Outsource = 65%).

Based on both statistical testing of the responses and examination of the underlying response patterns, it appears that the expected response from the chain of command has a
strong, positive relationship to the expectancy value of the managers.

Hypothesis 1c: Human resources field influences

The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from the human resources staff in response to change proposals.

This hypothesis was supported (n=588; r = .523; p<.01). The expectancy value was positively related to the force anticipated from the HRO.

Further examination of the underlying data raises questions about the practical value of this statistically strong relationship. The survey provided a scale of + 4, with 0 being indifference, + 2 indicating support/resistance, and + 4 indicating “strong” support/resistance. In valuing the support or resistance of the human resources staff, the manager’s expectations were very close to indifference for all options. The mean and median values for Status Quo (-.19;0.00), Reorganize (.74;1.00), Downsize (.31;0.00), and Outsource (0.00;0.00) were all within 1 response value of indifference. While the response distributions all showed a full range of support/resistance (minimum for each was -4; maximum +4),
half of the responses of each centered around zero; the median of Status Quo, Downsizing, and Outsourcing was “0”, or indifferent. Reorganization showed the strongest support with a median value of 1. The most frequent response was 0, or indifference, for Status Quo, and 2, or support, for the options requiring change to the workforce.

While the support/resistance of the Human Resources staff has a strong, statistically significant relationship to the expectancy value of the manager, it appears that the relationship is weak in practical significance because it is reflective of low, widely dispersed levels of support for change.

Hypothesis 1d: Legal staff field influences

The expectancy value of activity manager is positively related to the force anticipated from the legal staff in response to change proposals.

This hypothesis was supported by the data (n=588; r=.601; p <.01). The expectancy value was positively related to the force anticipated from the legal staff.

As with the human resources responses, further examination of the underlying data raises questions about the practical value of this statistically strong
relationship. The survey provided a scale of $\pm 4$, with 0 being indifference, $\pm 2$ indicating support/resistance, and $\pm 4$ indicating “strong” support/resistance. In valuing the support or resistance of the legal staff, the manager’s expectations were very close to indifference for all options. The mean and median values for Status Quo (-0.18; 0.00), Reorganize (.76; 1.00), Downsize (.76; 1.00), and Outsource (0.55; 1.00) were all within 1 response value of indifference. While the response distributions all showed a full range of support/resistance (minimum for each was -4; maximum +4), half of the responses of each centered around 1; the median of Reorganization, Downsizing, and Outsourcing was “1”, the midpoint between indifferent and support. The most frequent response was 0, or indifference, for Status Quo (n=85; 57.8%), Reorganization (n=50; 33.8%), and Downsizing (n=50; 33.8%). Outsourcing responses received full support as the most frequent response (n=40; 27.4%), but almost that many responses reflected “0”, or indifference (n=39; 26.7%) to the change proposal.

Like Human Resources, the support/resistance of the legal staff has a strong, statistically significant relationship to the expectancy value of the manager, but it
appears that the relationship is weak in practical significance because it is reflective of low, widely dispersed levels of support for change.

Interactions of the Expectancy Values for Institutional Actors

Field theory looks at the world as an arena for the action of forces, where the objects are simply specific places for the interaction of these forces (White, 1992, p. 53). In this research, the “object” is the manager, and four groups that exert influence over his/her actions affect the manager. Each of these groups generates a field of influence, much as the magnet generates a magnetic force field that influences other fields within its sphere of influence.

Hypothesis 1 looked at the influence of the individual forces; hypothesis 2 examines the combined, or interactive, forces and their impact on the expectancy values of the manager.

Hypothesis 2a and 2b can be consolidated in the analysis by applying the linear regression model to the data. These hypotheses were:
Hypothesis 2a: Combination of forces

The expectancy value of the activity manager is positively related to the combined forces anticipated from subordinates, super-ordinates, human resources staff, and the legal office.

Hypothesis 2b: Relative value of forces

Certain combinations of anticipated forces influence the expectancy value of the activity managers more than others.

These hypotheses were partially supported by the responses.

To determine whether the expectancy value of the activity managers was positively related to the combined forces, the regression model was used to determine the strength ("r") of each institutional actor.

The results were positive for each group, indicating a positive relationship between the expectance value of the manager (measured as variable “odds”) and the chain of command (“COC”), legal staff (“JAG”) and human resources (“HR”) staff. The results are shown in the table below. Using Cohen’s (1969) effect size index for r, these
institutional actors can be said to exert medium (.30 - .50) to strong (.50+) influence on the expectancy value of the manager as measured by the expected outcome of the change initiative.
Table 6: Pearson Product Moment Correlation and Significance, Expected Outcome, by Response Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Odds</th>
<th>Chain of Command</th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odds</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.477</td>
<td>.469</td>
<td>.601</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td>.477</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>-.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odds</td>
<td>.469</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.556</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>.601</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>.556</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.329</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sig. (1-tailed)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odds</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To determine combined forces, the linear regression model was applied using stepwise analysis of the three institutional respondent groups. This model measures the influence of the independent variable (respondent group) on the expectation of success, and shows the predictive value of progressively better combinations of variables. The outcome, shown in the table below, indicates that the legal staff (JAG) has the highest level of predictive value, but that its influence is increased by the addition of the chain of command (COC) and human resources (HR) responses. Employee responses were not included in the model because the influence was not statistically significant in the regression model ($r=.011; p=.392$).
Table 7: Regression Model, Response Groups as Predictors of Odds of Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model #</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
<th>Std Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>23.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.436</td>
<td>.434</td>
<td>21.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>21.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictor, Model 1: (Constant), Legal
Predictor, Model 2: (Constant), Legal, Chain of Command
Predictor, Model 3: (Constant), Legal, Chain of Command, HR
Dependent Variable: Odds of Implementation

Using the linear regression model, the predictive value of the responses from each group can be used as a measure of the “strength” (or valence) of each field, while the actual value (+ or -) can be used as a measure of “direction” (or vector). Each of the institutional actors exerts an influence, including chain of command (r = .473; p = .000), human resources (r = .470; p = .000), and the legal staff (r = .603; p = .000).

The forces exerted by a field do not act exclusively on the object (manager), but also on each other. Conceptually, a group of five magnets would generate five
fields, each field influencing each of the other associated fields. Hypothesis 3 examines whether the fields tend to align to a single vector and combined valence, or whether they act independently.

Hypothesis 3: Vector correlation

The perceived vector and valence of each field will correlate with the vector and valence of one or more other fields within the arena of the manager.

This hypothesis was fully supported. Correlation between the variable was tested using independent t-test procedures. Employee response does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of successful implementation of change initiatives ($r = 0.068; p = 0.101$). However, the chain of command ($r = 0.610; p < 0.01$), legal office ($r = 0.601; p < 0.01$) and human resources staff ($r = 0.523; p < 0.01$) strongly affect the probability of success ($r > 0.5$ indicates a large effect; Cohen, 1969). The vectors (positive or negative effect) and valence (the strength of the effect) of these three institutional actors correlate strongly. The vector of the employees is negative (mean = ($-1.6$)), compared to positive vectors for the institutional actors (means for chain of command = 0.77; human resources = 0.21;
legal staff = .44), indicating a strong overall negative employee response expectation; however, this employee-response effect is not statistically significant (p=.101) and must be considered as descriptive only.

The correlation of the institutional actors (chain of command, human resources, and legal staff) is consistent with the theoretical model that predicted that the expectancy value of the manager would be affected by the vector and valence of the four groups. However, the effect of the employee group is not as strong (statistically significant) as expected. Generally, the model is confirmed with the caveat that employees may not be as influential as predicted by the model.

We have discussed correlation and effect, but the theoretical model supports the conclusion that these influences not only correlate to the expectancy value of the manager, they are causally related. Given the high correlation between the responses of the institutional actors, we can confirm the theoretical model that attributes those responses as a cause of the low expectancy values of the managers.
Distribution of Expected Responses within Professional Fields of Institutional Actors

This research does not seek to explain the “why” of forces, but only to measure their vector and valence in relation to the object of their influence. Yet the information gathered in this survey may yield insight into the source of some of that force. The principle of social proof indicates that, “We view a behavior as correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it.” (Cialdini, 2001). This corresponds with hypothesis 3, where we measure the correlation of fields within the object’s arena.

A different extension of this principle would indicate that professional groups, particularly the legal, human resources, and command groups, might be influenced by behavior within their professional fields, rather than the needs of their customers. Hypothesis 4 reflects the expectation that the social proof influences within these professional fields will influence the vector and valence of individual fields at varying locations.
Hypothesis 4: Normal distribution of forces

The perceived vector and valence of force anticipated by the actors from the fields will be normally distributed across the population of each professional field.

This hypothesis was not supported; the responses from each respondent group were significantly skewed, showing a marked consistency in the expected response from each group.

For all prior analysis, the response sets from each group have been considered across all options, including Status Quo, Reorganization, Downsizing, and Outsourcing. For this analysis, it is more appropriate to consider the Status Quo option separately, since no change is proposed. By segregating the Status Quo option from those where change is proposed, the tolerance for no change can be evaluated and compared to the group of options proposing change at various levels.

Conceptually, we will analyze the Status Quo option as if it were the control group (no treatment), and the change options as progressively more aggressive treatments (small, medium, and large changes). This conceptual shift will allow a more refined analysis of the distributions resulting from each change.
For the status quo option, the Chain of Command has a mean of nearly -2, or “Oppose”. However, the most common response is “Strongly Oppose” (n=54; 36.5%), followed by a slightly diminished “Oppose” (n=36; 24.3%) group. If the responses were collapsed into “Oppose” (x<1), “Indifferent” (x=0), and “Support” (x>1), “Oppose” would represent 71.6% (n=106) of the responses, while “Indifferent” would represent 10.8% (n=16) and “Support” would represent 19.7% (n=26). Clearly, the Chain of Command is strongly opposed to the “Status Quo”, resulting in a highly positive skew (.894).

The strong positive skew of the Chain of Command responses is clearly illustrated by a histogram with normal curve.
Figure 6: Histogram of Chain of Command Responses, Status Quo Option

By comparison, the human resources staff response is only slightly skewed (skew = -.003), but the selection of “Indifference” (n=78; 53.1%) by over half the respondents shows high consistency among the members of this career group. The majority of the manager expect the human resources staff to be generally indifferent to this option, with slightly more than ¼ of the managers expecting opposition (n=40;27.2%) and approximately 1 in 5 expecting
support (n = 29; 20.7%). While this distribution is more normally distributed than that of the chain of command, it fails the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for normality (p<.01). The effect on of high levels of indifference by the human resources staff to a lack of change is clear when the responses are graphed in a histogram with a superimposed normal curve.

**Figure 7: Histogram of Human Resource Responses to Status Quo Proposal**
The legal staff response is very similar to that of the human resources staff. The responses are only slightly skewed (skew = -.287), but the selection of “Indifference” (n=85; 57.8%) by over half the respondents shows high consistency among the members of this career group. Essentially, the majority of the managers expect the legal staff to be generally indifferent to this option, with approximately one fourth of the managers expecting opposition (n=36; 24.5%) and approximately 1 in 6 expecting support (n = 26; 17.7%). While this distribution is also more normally distributed than that of the chain of command, it fails the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for normality (p<.01). The effect on of high levels of indifference by the legal staff to a lack of change is clear when the responses are graphed in a histogram with a superimposed normal curve.
Legal Staff

Figure 8: Histogram of Legal Staff Response to Status Quo Option

Where the Chain of Command has a mean of nearly -2, or “Oppose”, the employees are supportive of the Status Quo option (mean = 1.0). The most common response is “Support” (n=38; 25.9%), followed by a slightly diminished “Indifferent” (n=29; 19.7%) and “Strongly Support” (n=28; 19.0%). If the responses were collapsed into “Oppose” (x<1), “Indifferent” (x=0), and “Support” (x>1), “Oppose”
would represent only 21.1% (n=31) of the responses, while “Indifferent” would represent 19.7% (n=29) and “Support” would represent 59.2% (n=87). Clearly, the employees are not opposed to the “Status Quo”, resulting in a highly negative skew (-.553).

The strong negative skew of the employee responses is clearly illustrated by a histogram with normal curve.

![Histogram of Employee Response to Status Quo Option](image)

Figure 9: Histogram of Employee Response to Status Quo Option
When the change options are considered, each of the response subjects failed to meet the test for normality as well. The chain of command showed support for change (mean = 1.66; median = 2), with less support from the legal staff (mean = .69; median = 0) and even less from the human resources staff (mean = .35; median = 0). Employees strongly opposed change (mean = -2.48; median = -4). These consistent patterns resulted in strong negative skews for the chain of command (-.893), human resources (.369), and legal staff (-.607), and the even-stronger employee opposition resulted in a positive skew of 1.306. The distributions for all groups rejected the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for normality with p<.01.

The strong skew of each group is visible in histograms of the responses to the three change initiatives.
Figure 10: Histograms of Response Group Reactions to Change Options, Combined

These strong, non-normal distributions are indicative of a bias regarding change that runs throughout these subject groups. Commanders are, as a group, consistently opposed to the status quo and somewhat supportive of change initiatives. Their opinions on status quo and change options are stronger than that received from other
institutional actors (human resources and legal staff), which may result from their personal responsibility for the success or failure of the activities in this study.

The human resources and legal staff are predominately indifferent to the status quo option, which may be related to a lack of “call to action” that occurs when operations remain the same. While they are, overall, supportive of change initiatives, their responses tend to be less supportive and the number of negative responses is higher. This is consistent with the view that change creates workload for these staffs, or it may be an interaction between their loyalty to the commander and the resistance they experience from the affected employees.

Employees, as expected, are resistant to change initiatives. The strength of their resistance actually exceeds the strength of support from the institutional actors. This is an important subject for further research, both in the question of why the resistance is so strong, and in the question of how to reduce the resistance to facilitate change.

As a final observation, the non-normal distributions of these groups may be a factor that precludes application of this research model to smaller samples, such as
installation or studies within professional groups. While the regression model is sufficiently robust to withstand some variations from normality for large sample sizes (such as this study), application of this model to smaller samples may require in a more limited analysis using descriptive statistics and nonparametric tests.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The aim of this research is to test the theories of organizational change management, particularly those addressing the institutional response to change, by applying them to a specific organizational context. Through a survey of managers within the Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) activities worldwide, we have measured their perceptions of support for change from super-ordinates, peers, and subordinates, and have related those perceptions to the managers’ expectancy values regarding the achievability of those changes.

Analysis of the data is a critical step in the process, but the findings must be useful, and used, if they are to be of value. While the steps to change the identified change climate are beyond the scope of this research, the conceptual uses, or “the variety of ways in which evaluations indirectly have an impact on policies, programs, and procedures (Rossi et al, 1991:432),” are important. While stopping short of prescribing action, we will discuss alternative methods that may be of value to the users of this research. Instead of prescriptions for action, we hope the findings will be informative and useful
in a conceptual sense. Conceptual use of findings is, “the variety of ways in which evaluations (can) indirectly have an impact on policies, programs, and procedures.” (Rossi et al, 1991:432)

The results of this research are not dramatic. Managers expect resistance from their employees, increasing as the impact on the workgroup increases. Managers expect support from their super-ordinates, as well as their peers. All of these results were predicted theoretically and are consistent with the literature.

While not dramatic, the results may still be important. While super-ordinates support change initiatives, the support lacks sufficient strength to overcome the other forces (indifference, resistance) within the manager’s work experience. Peers are even weaker in their support than super-ordinates. If a change proposal is developed, its average chance of implementation is above 50/50, but often not by much. And there is a high level of agreement within career groups (i.e., commanders, human resources professionals, and legal staff) regarding how to respond to specific change proposal and to change in general.
While the purpose of this research was to test the behavior of managers for low expectancy values, it is important to discuss some options for those responsible for organizational management and change. This is not an easy process; in fact, Patton (1997:328) noted, “Recommendations have long struck me as the weakest part of evaluation…. But what recommendations always include, usually implicitly, are assumptions about the future.” And planned organizational change is about creating a future that is better than the present.

Careful review of the specific research findings may provide information that is useful to commanders and career group managers in developing a more fertile environment for activity-level change initiatives, thereby helping the future to be more productive than the present.

The Need for Change

In examining the data, it is clear that commanders see the need for change. Whereas 71.6% (n=106) of the respondents expected opposition from their chain of command to the proposal for status quo, or “do nothing”, the extreme majority expected support for change initiatives
(reorganize = 124, 83.8%; downsize = 113, 76.9%; outsource = 113, 76.9%). This is also reflected in the odds of implementation for the proposals, where status quo averaged a 48% chance of success while reorganization (68.7%), downsizing (68.7%), and outsourcing (58.3%) were far more likely to be fully implemented.

This recognition of the need for change is consistent with the literature on public administration. Much of the professional literature concerns itself with the “New Public Management” movement of the last decade (Kettl, 2002; Linden, 2002; NAPA, 2003; Popovich, 1998). By contrast, the trade literature, most actively published by the US General Accounting Office (USGAO, 2004; USGAO, 2003 a-g; USGAO, 2002; Walker, 2003) and assorted interest groups (Agranoff, 2003; Atkinson, 2003; Eggers, 2004; Fosler, 2002; Kamarck, 2002) is almost exclusively focused on rapid transformation of federal agencies.

Regardless of the forum, interest in change is present at all levels of government in the area of strategic plan development and implementation. This interest is not new, since it has been evident in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations (Barzely, 1996; Gore 1993; Osborne &

The Effect of Change Initiatives

In instituting change, there are a variety of forces at work. Some change impacts are positive, others negative. The actual impact of any given action is dependent on how it is designed and implemented.

Avoidance of change, even if avoidance were possible, is not a reliable way to avoid the impact of change initiatives. Weimer and Vining (1999; 49) point out that there are several ways that people react when they are dissatisfied with organizations in which they participate. Weimer and Vining adopt Hirschman’s (1970) concept of choice and exit, and add disloyalty. While the disgruntled employee’s voice is annoying to others, and his/her exit may be unfortunate to both the employee and the organization, the disgruntled employee who engages in sabotage is perhaps the greatest risk in organizations with low turnover.
Actions by the Chain of Command

Executives, the “chain of command” in this study, must select their change strategies carefully. Balancing between top-down process orientation (TQM, Six Sigma, etc.) and the bottom-up practices that evolve (or mutate) based on operational realities is a tough challenge for any executive. As reported by Seely Brown and Duguid (2000:48), “…lean too much toward practice and you may get new ideas bubbling up all over the place, but you’ll lack the structure to harness them. Lean too much toward process, and you’ve got lots of structure but too little freedom of movement to strike that initial spark. Finding the right balance is a central task for managers everywhere.”

Executives with trouble implementing change, no matter how well designed and necessary, might consider the methods of Donald Regan, who ran Merrill Lynch in the 1970’s. Regan hired a consulting firm to help assess the implications of entering the cash management account (CMA) market, which tied checking accounts, credit cards, money market funds, and traditional brokerage services together. When the highly positive report was presented to his senior
executives, Regan went around the room and gathered comments.

“They all saw problems,” reported one of the executives present. “The operations vice president noted that it now cost the firm many dollars to process a transaction; when the transactions were deposits in money market accounts or checks written on such accounts, the company would have to be able to process them for only cents per transaction... Then the legal vice president noted that the CMA ideas would turn the firm into a bank, making it subject to much more stringent regulation... And the marketing vice president noted that banks were currently some of Merrill Lynch’s best customers. They would certainly be offended if the firm became a competitor and might take much of their business to other securities firms.”

Regan did not dismiss the problems. But he said he had decided to proceed because of the importance of the product to the company. “The question is,” he asked, “how do we solve the problems you described so articulately?” (From Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999:37)

Applying Regan’s approach to the organizations covered by this study could have the effect of increasing the
support from support departments such as human resources and legal. Without disregarding the issues that are inherent to change proposals, this approach creates common interest among the change team, which consists of the chain of command, manager and employees, but also of the support departments that will have a role in solving the implementation problems created by the change.

A variety of methods currently in use to stimulate large scale change initiative were described by Rouda (1995). Many executives may wish to consider those activities, as well as others reported by a variety of authors and consultants, and find the approach that most closely matches their management style.

Actions by Activity Managers

Activity managers, who were the respondents in this research, reported low expectancy values toward successful change initiatives; as discussed in the analysis section, these low expectancy values were directly related to their perception of low levels of support from other institutional actors who were needed to implement the changes. Seeing the immediate organization as “us” and the support staffs as “them” is not unique to this population.
Braun (2003:3) observes, “Managers are encouraged to be “action oriented” and “proactive”, constantly engaged in the process of pushing on people and situations to make them change or move. Typically, they focus their attention on the sphere of activity in the organization that coincides with their title and job description. The Limits to Growth archetype (or Limits to Success as it applies) reminds managers to take time to examine what might be pushing back against their efforts. The counter-force may come, and most likely will come, from either (a) parts of the organization not under control of the manager or (b) from the external environment.”

This internal conflict extends to federal organizations as well as the private sector firms studied by Braun. Trader-Leigh (2001: 139-140) observed the same infighting at Department of State. “Today’s federal management reform efforts reflect a shift in the traditional administrative management paradigm to a more entrepreneurial federal administration... Existing stakeholders often perceive that these changes result in disenfranchisement and a redistribution of benefits as a result of the actions taken. Consequently, organization designs for major change often result in failure or a
struggle between forces supporting change and those resisting change followed by long and bitter implementation battles. It is critical to understand how stakeholders are affected and understand the often hidden dynamics and cost of change.”

These internal battles are unfortunate, and they detract from a significant force that is needed in any organization’s struggle to change in a modern environment. Thompson (1999:21) highlighted the importance of managers to change efforts in his review of the National Performance Review instituted by the Clinton/Gore administration.

“One apparent tactical error—which future reformers may want to consider—was the failure to mobilize middle managers and enlist their support and assistance in implementing those changes of which they were to be the primary beneficiaries.” (Thompson, 1999:21)

Mobilizing these executives may be a challenge that is exacerbated by the need to replace the experienced cadre that is currently managing our activities. “With the increasing numbers of employees retiring and the numbers of employees who will be eligible to retire in the near future...federal agencies are in a struggle to recruit and retain highly skilled employees.” USGAO, 2002:11
Congress in 2003 approved the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) that is currently being implemented throughout the Department of Defense. In his review of transformation efforts government-wide, Don Kettl observed: “Personnel systems designed to insulate government from political interference have proven less adaptive to these new challenges, especially in creating a cohort of executives skilled in managing indirect government.” (Kettle, 2000:488) In the five years since Kettl’s observations, approval and implementation of NSPS has created hope that the slow, cumbersome recruitment processes may soon be a thing of the past.

But faster recruitment is not the “final answer” to integrating a new group of managers into the MWR profession. Leaders are not born; they are trained. And Ray Blount (2000) suggests that one of the methods needed to grow new leaders is “well-crafted and systematic development programs that are grounded in practical reality, where leadership is learned through action and through deeply involved senior leaders as teachers.”
Actions by Professional Support Staff

The approach discussed above may improve the support from the activity manager, but the consistency of the responses in the survey indicate that there is still a strong corporate change climate among human resources and legal professionals that mediate their response to change proposals. It may be desirable to foster communities of practice among these groups that have, as their focus, competencies in change planning and implementation.

“What are communities of practice? In brief, they’re groups of people informally bound together by shared expertise and a passion for a joint enterprise—engineers engaged in deep-water drilling, for example, consultants who specialize in strategic marketing, or frontline managers in charge of check processing at a large commercial bank…A community of practice may or may not have an explicit agenda on a given week, and even if it does, it may not follow the agenda closely. Inevitably, however, people in communities of practice share their experience and knowledge in free-flowing, creative ways that foster new approaches to problems.” (Wenger and Snyder, 2000:3)

Unlike workgroups or teams, communities of practice cannot be organized and managed by senior executives. By
their nature, they must spring from a common interest, be bound by common (or converging) values, and be directed from within.

Wenger and Snyder (2000:4) recognized these requirements. “But we have observed a number of companies that have overcome the managerial paradox inherent in communities of practice and successfully nurtured them. In general, we have found that managers cannot mandate communities of practice. Instead, successful managers bring the right people together, provide an infrastructure in which communities can thrive, and measure the communities’ value in nontraditional ways. Theses task of cultivation aren’t easy, but the harvest they yield makes them well worth the effort.” (Wenger and Snyder, 2000:4)

In the context of this study, it may be that the senior leadership of these groups could be the catalyst for creating communities of practice. In the digital age, location is less of an impediment than it has been; virtual workshops are now common. Creating and nurturing these communities of practice could be a way to develop new cultural norms of positive support for change, rather than the current norm of near-indifference.
Actions by Employees

Employee resistance is another element requiring attention from the senior leaders. It is easy to dismiss the negative responses of employees by assuming they are inherently resistant to change. By its nature, federal employment is viewed by many employees as a lifetime of job security in an ever-more-insecure world. Through its elaborate processes and rules developed to protect employees from political pressures, the federal service attracts employees who are willing to forego higher earnings in the private sector in exchange for job security. A decade of change initiatives have diminished, but not eradicated, this sense of security. When radical change is imposed, especially in the form of downsizing or outsourcing of jobs, federal employees are particularly resistant to the change effort (USGAO, 2003c).

And it’s easy to look to the private sector as a “better model” for change. Unfortunately, the private sector does not have it any easier than the public sector when it comes to change resistance.

There is a substantial body of literature validating the need for employee commitment to the change effort, some
of which is quite recent (e.g., Armenakis & Harris, 2002; Tyler and Blader, 2001; Brockner, 2002; Barry, 2001).

“If change is the natural order of things in modern organizations, so, apparently is resistance....

Unfortunately, this problem cannot be overcome simply through a reasoned discussion on which a manager logically presents the merits of a change initiative. One CEO ruefully explained that he had learned through bitter experience that logical arguments were not enough to convince skeptical employees they ought to change their way of doing things. ‘Logic is important,’ the CEO said, ‘but the most important thing is getting it into their hearts.’”

(Brill and Worth, 1997:50)

How can the managers and executives “get into the hearts” of employees when change is being planned?

The classic answer is brute force. Luddites were a group of 17th century English craftsmen who violently opposed change, in this case the introduction of new technology. After the Luddites burned mills and looms, killed guards hired to protect the mills, and kidnapped at least one mill owner, the British army put down the revolution and the leaders were either hanged or sent to a
penal colony. (Kirkpatrick Sale (1996) provides a much more sympathetic description of the movement.)

Brute force is one answer. A more moderate view considers the employees’ initial resistance as a natural phenomenon. The comments of an American Workers National Union officer during the efforts to create a management/union partnership may be informative.

“These are people we’re talking about, people whose very existence depends on the past. Everything they know today is what they learned in the past. You take the old (system), and there’s always a reason for the old. Hell, we were successful with the old. Were we successful enough to compete with the new? No, hell, no! But every system that’s ever been developed will reinforce itself to continue, so you’re fighting that constantly. What really gets me is that some of us fighting to save something that we ourselves would admit stinks!” (Quoted by Scarselletta, 1999:1)

But employees can change their minds about the need for, and value of, change. An extreme example comes from Brazil, where privatization became a survival issue for mill workers.
“In November 1988, militant steelworkers went on strike at the government controlled National Steel Company (CSN) mill in Volta Redondo (Brazil), demanding six hour workdays and higher wages... Roughly four years after that bloody strike, after the Berlin wall had fallen, those very same CSN steelworkers were demanding—demanding—that the mill be privatized, because they understood that was the only way it could remain competitive and keep most of them employed.” (Friedman, 2000:44)

Is organizational survival an issue within the Army MWR community? The former employees of those activities that have been closed, consolidated, and downsized would agree that organizational extinction is no longer an abstract concept—it is a reality.

Why don’t the employees see this threat to their security and income? One researcher believes that managers (and the executives they work for) may be their own worst enemies when it comes to communicating the need for change.

“In the name of positive thinking...managers often censor what everyone needs to say and hear. For the sake of “morale” and “considerateness”, they deprive the employees and themselves of the opportunity to take responsibility for their own behavior by learning to
understand it... (Being considerate and positive) will never help people figure out why they lived with problems for years on end, why they covered up those problems, why they covered up the cover-up, why they were so good at pointing to the responsibility of other and so slow to focus on their own.” (Argyris, 1994:93)

The truth may not be enough, but it is a start. Brill and Worth (1997:50) observe, “Like all human beings, employees are a complex set of paradoxes and contradictory characteristics. To make the change effort work, we must learn how to capitalize on positive human qualities, such as trust, idealism, and dedication, and mitigate the impact of those other natural human traits (suspicion, stubbornness, anxiety) that often undermine the change process. (Brill and Worth, 1997:50)

If the change climate is heavily entrenched, the social sciences may be able to help evaluate the change climate and recommend workable solutions to negative behavior by employees. Scientific methods may be surprisingly simple. Latham (2001) used a simple 2 X 2 matrix to determine positive and negative outcomes of desirable and undesirable behavior. Based on the outcomes of that matrix, the company reduced theft from a million
dollars a year to a negligible amount by implementing a simple, no-cost program.

**Bringing it Together: Creating A Change Climate**

A commander with strong expectations of support for initiatives, communities of interest for change leaders in supporting career fields, open and honest communications with employees, interventions to eliminate counter-productive behaviors—these are methods which lead toward changing the organization’s climate.

Klein and Sorra (1996:1061) posit, “The stronger an organization’s climate for the implementation of a given innovation, the greater will be the employees’ use of that innovation, provided employees are committed to innovation use.”

If this is the case, the strong resistance of employees in this study is an undeniable indication of a weak climate for change in many MWR activities.

Change will not be easy, nor will it be quick. And there is little chance that well-intentioned federal executives will be able to follow a straight path from where they are to where they want to be. “[Government
decision making] is not rational in the sense that a good scientific study would allow you to sit down and plan everybody’s life...But you do have to be careful what you expect from a rational study when you insert it into the system. It can have tremendous impact, but it’s a political, not a rational process...Life is not a very simple thing.” (Patton, 1997:348, quoting an interview with a government decision maker)

Those serious about improving the organizational climate may wish to review the excellent discussions of issues relating to organizational change climate from Ashkanasy, et al. (2000) and Cooper et al., (2001). These handbooks provide a wealth of articles to stimulate thoughtful discussions of various change management options.

Changing the organizational climate—a precursor to changing the organization itself—is not an easy task. It is, though, a crucial part of the job of leading an enterprise such as MWR, where the quality of life of soldiers and their families is at stake.

Robert Shapiro, chairman of Monsanto, observed, “In the end, what matters and what lasts is what makes you better as a competitor in a wide-open race. The way you
manage and exchange information and the way you learn as a company—these are your only sustainable advantages.”
(Quoted by Freidman, 2000: 226)

Getting from where we are to where we need to be is the path to gaining a sustainable advantage. The most difficult step along that path may be the first: moving from knowing to doing. In the words of T.S. Eliot (1925):

Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow.

Opportunities for Further Research

This research measured the perceptions of managers faced with developing and implementing change proposals. Their view of their peer groups, including human resources and legal staffs, was that these groups were generally indifferent to the change needs of the activity. In future research, it would be interesting to determine the view of those groups toward managers who develop and propose change.
One question left open by this research is the “why” behind the responses expected from the super-ordinates, peers, and subordinates in the change effort. Further research on the source of these responses might provide insight on how to improve this dynamic.

Another area of interest would be to contrast those locations where change was more strongly supported with those with weak support or resistance from commanders and peers, and where employee resistance was strongest. This contrast might indicate how the strong commanders affect the overall climate for change initiatives at the activity level.

The anticipated employee reaction to change proposals was particularly strong and stable; managers expect resistance to any proposal for change. Since this research measured manager perceptions, it would be important to test these perceptions against actual employee responses to determine if the perceptions are accurate. If the employees are, in fact, highly resistant to all change efforts, it would be interesting to determine if this is a reaction based on a generalized distrust of management, economic or social self-interest, adverse past experience, or some combination of these and other reasons.
If the senior leaders of career groups such as legal, human resources, and others, decide to take action to improve the response of these groups to change initiatives, it would be good to do so in a manner that allows both pre-and post-implementation evaluation. This data would be particularly useful if alternative strategies (communities of interest, installation change teams, changes to curriculum to include/expand change management coursework) were tested and a full analysis done to determine the effectiveness of each.

Finally, a full review of the externally imposed changes implemented at the activity level would provide insight on how much change is expected at that level. It is possible that the changed imposed by regional and national headquarters has fully consumed the activity manager’s resources for change, and further change within the activity is not feasible in the current operational environment.

A further potential area of interest which would be highlighted in a study of externally imposed change would be the potential for “change fatigue”. Where the respondents have experienced a large number of changes, their experience with those changes may affect their
perceptions of support or resistance from the various stakeholders. “Change fatigue” would correspond to compassion fatigue (defined by Joinson, 1992; see Figley, 1995 for full discussion), whereby caregivers experience burnout as a result of dealing with the traumas of others. In an organizational context, “change fatigue” would be burnout from frequent or repeated changes in the organization. Further study of this group might yield insight into the long term effects of repeated changes imposed by the Army leadership in its efforts toward transformation.
Final Thoughts

Former ambassador to China Winston Lord was once driving the Chinese countryside with his wife. They stopped at an ancient Buddhist temple, where the senior monk greeted them enthusiastically. “Would you do this temple a great honor and favor for our future visitors, to guide and instruct them? Would you write something for us in English?”

Ambassador Lord felt quite flattered because he knew that, traditionally, only emperors and great poets were invited to write for the temple. The monk returned shortly carrying two wooden plaques and said: “To guide and instruct future English visitors, would you write on this plaque the word ‘Ladies’ and on this plaque the word ‘Gentlemen’?” (Patton, 1997:212)

I hope that my writings can prove to be as useful as those requested of Ambassador Lord.
APPENDIX A: SURVEY VERSION 4.29
Dear MWR Professional:

I am a graduate student at the University of Central Florida. As part of my dissertation research, I am conducting a survey of MWR professionals. The purpose of the survey is to learn how MWR managers perceive their work environment and how individuals and groups respond to change initiatives.

I am asking you to participate in this survey because you have field experience in MWR operations. You will be asked to participate in an internet-based survey lasting no longer than 10 minutes. If you choose to participate in the survey, the questionnaire will be available to you after you indicate that you have read this information and have given your consent to participate in the survey.

You will not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer. Your survey will be conducted by internet data collection, and participants are not identified with their responses by the data collection program. You are not required to identify yourself, and potentially identifying data such as activity and installation data will not be associated with your response in the final manuscript.

There are no anticipated risks, compensation or other direct benefits to you as a participant in this survey. You are free to withdraw your consent to participate and may discontinue your participation in this survey at any time without consequence.

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact me at (334) 774-9765. My faculty supervisor is Dr. R. Paul Maiden. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCF Institutional Review Board (UCFIRB) office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207, Orlando, Florida 32826. The phone number is (407) 823-2901.

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1044036&Rnd=0.8871707

8/16/2005
Please indicate below if you wish to take the survey. By selecting the "I voluntarily agree to participate in this survey" option below, you give me permission to report your responses anonymously in the final manuscript to my faculty supervisor as part of my course work.

Sincerely,

Larry Cochran

2. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Demographic information about you will be used in the analysis of the responses. This includes no identifying data about you except the voluntary option of requesting a copy of the study findings.

2. What is your current age group?
   - Less than 18
   - 18-29
   - 30-39
   - 40-49
   - 50-59
   - 60-69
   - 70 or older

3. What is your gender?
   - Male
   - Female

4. How many years have you been working in MWR as a primary assignment or career?
5. How many years have you been the manager or executive responsible for operation of one or more MWR facilities or activities (total of all such assignments)?
   - Less than 1
   - 1-5
   - 6-10
   - 11-15
   - 16-20
   - 21-30
   - More than 30

6. Which of the following best describes your race and ethnic origin?
   - White
   - Black
   - Asian American/Pacific Islander
   - Hispanic/Latin Origin
   - Other (please specify)

7. Which of the following best describes the organization upon which your answers will be based?
   - Recreation Activity
   - AFRC/ARMP
   - Support Activity
   - Youth and Family Services Activity
   - Business Operations Activity
   - Lodging Activity
   - Other (please specify)
8. Which of the following best describes your current work assignment?

- CFSC Headquarters
- CFSC Operating Element (ARMP, AFRCs, CRO, etc.)
- IMA Headquarters
- IMA NE Regional Office
- IMA SE Regional Office
- IMA SW Regional Office
- IMA NW Regional Office
- IMA Pacific Regional Office
- IMA Korea Regional Office
- IMA Korea Camp
- IMA Europe Regional Office
- Aberdeen Proving Grounds
- Adelphi Laboratory Center
- Akazuki/Kure
- Anniston Army Depot
- Ansbach
- Babenhausen
- Bad Aibling
- Bamberg
- Baumholder
- Brussels
- Butzbach
- Blue Grass Army Depot
- Camp Zama
- Carlisle Barracks
- Charles E. Kelley Support Facility
- Chievres
- Corpus Christi Army Depot
- Darmstadt
- Deseret Chemical Depot
- Duxheim
- Dugway Proving Grounds
- Friedberg
- Ft. A.P. Hill
- Ft. Belvoir
- Ft. Benning
- Ft. Bliss
- Ft. Bragg
Hanau
Heidelberg
Hohenfels
Holston AAF
Hunter AAF
Illsheim
Iowa AAF
Kaisersauern
Kansas AAF
Kitzigen
Kwajalein Atoll
Lake City AAS
Letterkenny Army Depot
Lima Army TPL
Mannheim
McAlester AAF
Miami AAF
Mississippi AAF
Newport Chemical Depot
Picatinny Arsenal
Pine Bluff Arsenal
Presidio of Monterey
Pueblo Chemical Depot
Radford AAF
Red River Army Depot
Redstone Arsenal
Rock Island Arsenal
Sagamihara
Schinnen
Schofield Barracks
Schweinfurt
Schwetzingen
Soldier Systems Center
Stuttgart
Sunny Point MOT
Tobyhanna Army Depot
Tokyo/Yokohama
Tooele Army Depot
Umatilla Chemical Depot
US Army Garrison Miami
US Army Garrison Michigan

http:// surveymonkey.com/ SurveySummary.asp?SID=1044036&Rnd=0.8871707
8/16/2005
ABOUT THE SCENARIO

This survey is designed to get your views on the environment for change at the activity level. You are provided a scenario in a hypothetical activity which needs to change. The circumstances, as given, include a deteriorating operating situation and financial/budgeting failure in a service organization.

It is important that you understand the scenario before answering the eight questions which follow.

There are four possible change options, each having a different impact on your operations and employees:
Status Quo (Do Nothing)
Reorganization
Downsizing
Outsourcing

For each change option, we ask about the expected reaction from four important groups:
Your Chain of Command
The HR Staff
The Lawyers
Your Employees
Ultimately, you are asked to rate the probability of success for each of the change options.

Thank you for taking the time to help us understand the environment for change as you have experienced it.

9. Would you like to receive a summary of responses from this survey? If so, please enter your e-mail address in the space provided.

4. Description of Survey Scenario

Please base your responses on this hypothetical circumstance.

For the purpose of this question, assume that you are a manager in an activity at your current or most recent installation with a workgroup of 21 subordinates. You provide services directly to customers in a high-touch, low-tech delivery system.

PERFORMANCE:
Satisfaction is Dropping: Over the past year, your customer satisfaction ratings have dropped from 85 to 75 percent (other comparable organizations have ratings from the low 50's to high 90's).

Response Time is Increasing: Response time to requests and complaints has increased from 3 days to over 30 days; there is no corporate measure or goal for response time.

Failing Financially: You are no longer within budget goals, and your financial performance continues to deteriorate due to a decreasing number of customers using your services.

LOGISTICS: You have exactly the same staff, location, facilities, and equipment as you have had for the last two years.

ANALYSIS: You have completed a detailed analysis of the situation with the support of the local university graduate program. An interdisciplinary team has helped you develop and support a plan that responds to your situation. You have prepared a complete, well-developed presentation that clearly describes your decision to implement change and the basis for it. You have both statistical and anecdotal evidence that your plan is well thought out, well supported by facts, and achievable. You have a full report of findings and recommendations with extensive backup to demonstrate the quality and accuracy of your plan.

http:// surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1044036&Rnd=0.8871707

8/16/2005
LIMITATIONS: There is no objective business reason not to follow your recommendation, nor does it violate any law rule or regulation.

PROPOSED CHANGE: Four alternative proposals and plans are presented below which represent, in general terms, different levels of change you might propose. For each alternative change strategy, please indicate the response you expect from each group of stakeholders if you were to propose that strategy for your organization.

STAKEHOLDERS: The stakeholders who will be presented your plan include your chain of command, the local human resources staff, the local legal officer (SJA), and your employees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the STATUS QUO option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

| Support Probability | 0  | 5  | 10 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 75 | 80 | 85 | 90 | 95 | 100 |
|---------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|

12. REORGANIZATION: You have decided that the deterioration in service is from a failure to transition to more modern service methods and means. You propose to realign and retrain your staff, eliminating old, outdated methods and tools and replacing them with newer ones. The pay to each employee will not be changed, but almost everyone will have new tasks and duties that require them to change their methods and means of work. Also, working conditions will change because you are extending the hours of operation to provide service during peak periods and you are changing work locations to

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1044036&Rnd=0.88871707

8/16/2005
better meet customer demographics. Responses range between strong opposition and strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the REORGANIZATION option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100

14. DOWNSIZING: You have decided that many of the services you offer are no longer valued or required by your customers. You have competitors who have made significant inroads into your market, but you cannot realistically compete with them due to price/location advantages they enjoy, and you have no real potential for recapitalization of your existing facilities or the construction of a new facility. As a result, you can REDUCE YOUR STAFF FROM 21 TO 7 without any decrement to service, reducing costs by an estimated $700,000 annually with no reduction in revenues. Responses range between strong opposition to strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the DOWNSIZING option above, please estimate the probability of successful

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1044036&Rnd=0.8871707

8/16/2005
**16. OUTSOURCING:** You have decided that the services you provide, along with other services that are outside your capabilities, are readily available from commercial sources at a significantly higher profit margin and/or lower cost than current operations. After a market study, you discover that you can **REDUCE THE STAFF TO ONE PERSON AND OUTSOURCE ALL SERVICES,** with a combined reduction in cost and improvement in revenues of over $1,000,000 annually, with concurrent improvements in service and availability. Responses range between strong opposition to strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chain of Command</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**17. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the OUTSOURCING option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

| 0  | 5  | 10 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 75 | 80 | 85 | 90 | 95 | 100 |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

---

**5. Thank You!**

Thank You!
Merci Beaucoup!
Muchas Gracias!

Your time and consideration are greatly appreciated!
APPENDIX B: SURVEY VERSION 8.14
Dear MWR Professional:

I am a graduate student at the University of Central Florida. As part of my dissertation research, I am conducting a survey of MWR professionals. The purpose of the survey is to learn how MWR managers perceive their work environment and how individuals and groups respond to change initiatives.

I am asking you to participate in this survey because you have field experience in MWR operations. You will be asked to participate in an internet-based survey lasting no longer than 10 minutes. If you choose to participate in the survey, the questionnaire will be available to you after you indicate that you have read this information and have given your consent to participate in the survey.

You will not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer. Your survey will be conducted by internet data collection, and participants are not identified with their responses by the data collection program. You are not required to identify yourself, and potentially identifying data such as activity and installation data will not be associated with your response in the final manuscript.

There are no anticipated risks, compensation or other direct benefits to you as a participant in this survey. You are free to withdraw your consent to participate and may discontinue your participation in this survey at any time without consequence.

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact me at (334) 774-9765. My faculty supervisor is Dr. R. Paul Maiden. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCF Institutional Review Board (UCIRB) office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207, Orlando, Florida 32826. The phone number is (407) 823-2901.

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165

8/16/2005
Please indicate below if you wish to take the survey. By selecting the “I voluntarily agree to participate in this survey” option below, you give me permission to report your responses anonymously in the final manuscript to my faculty supervisor as part of my course work.

Sincerely,

Larry Cochran

2. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Demographic information about you will be used in the analysis of the responses. This includes no identifying data about you except the voluntary option of requesting a copy of the study findings.

2. What is your current age group?
   - Less than 18
   - 18-29
   - 30-39
   - 40-49
   - 50-59
   - 60-69
   - 70 or older

3. What is your gender?
   - Male
   - Female

4. How many years have you been working in MWR as a primary assignment or career?

http:// surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165 8/16/2005
5. How many years have you been the manager or executive responsible for operation of one or more MWR facilities or activities (total of all such assignments)?
- Less than 1
- 1-5
- 6-10
- 11-15
- 16-20
- 21-30
- More than 30

6. Which of the following best describes your race and ethnic origin?
- Hispanic/Latin Origin
- Asian American/Pacific Islander
- White
- Black
- Other (please specify)

7. Which of the following best describes the organization upon which your answers will be based?
- AFRC/ARMP
- Youth and Family Services Activity
- Business Operations Activity
- Recreation Activity
- Lodging Activity
- Support Activity
- Other (please specify)

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165 8/16/2005
8. Which of the following best describes your current work assignment?

- CFSC Headquarters
- CFSC Operating Element (ARMP, AFRCs, CRO, etc)
- IMA Headquarters
- IMA NE Regional Office
- IMA SE Regional Office
- IMA SW Regional Office
- IMA NW Regional Office
- IMA Pacific Regional Office
- IMA Korea Regional Office
- IMA Korea Camp
- IMA Europe Regional Office
- Aberdeen Proving Grounds
- Adelphi Laboratory Center
- Akazuki/Kure
- Anniston Army Depot
- Ansbach
- Babenhousen
- Bad Aibling
- Bamberg
- Baumholder
- Brussels
- Butzbach
- Blue Grass Army Depot
- Camp Zama
- Carlisle Barracks
- Charles E. Kelley Support Facility
- Chievres
- Corpus Christi Army Depot
- Darmstadt
- Deseret Chemical Depot
- Duxheim
- Dugway Proving Grounds
- Friedberg
- Ft. A.P. Hill
- Ft. Belvoir
- Ft. Benning
- Ft. Bliss
- Ft. Bragg
Hanau
Heidelberg
Hohenfels
Holston AAP
Hunter AAF
Illesheim
Iowa AAP
Kaiserslautern
Kansas AAP
Kitzigen
Kwajalein Atoll
Lake City AAS
Letterkenny Army Depot
Lima Army TPL
Mannheim
McAlester AAP
Mian AAP
Mississippi AAP
Newport Chemical Depot
Percinny Arsenal
Pine Bluff Arsenal
Presidio of Monterey
Pueblo Chemical Depot
Radford AAP
Red River Army Depot
Redstone Arsenal
Rock Island Arsenal
Sagamihara
Schinnen
Schoefield Barracks
Schweinfurt
Schweizern
Soldier Systems Center
Stuttgart
Sunny Point MOT
Tobyhanna Army Depot
Tokyo/Yokohama
Tooele Army Depot
Umatilla Chemical Depot
US Army Garrison Miami
US Army Garrison Michigan

http://surveymonkely.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165  8/16/2005
3. Scenario

ABOUT THE SCENARIO

This survey is designed to get your views on the environment for change at the activity level. You are provided a scenario in a hypothetical activity which needs to change. The circumstances, as given, include a deteriorating operating situation and financial/budgeting failure in a service organization.

It is important that you understand the scenario before answering the eight questions which follow.

There are four possible change options, each having a different impact on your operations and employees:

- Outsourcing
- Downsizing
- Reorganization
- Status Quo (Do Nothing)

For each change option, we ask about the expected reaction from four important groups:
- Your Chain of Command
- The HR Staff
- The Lawyers
- Your Employees

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165 8/16/2005
Ultimately, you are asked to rate the probability of success for each of the change options.

Thank you for taking the time to help us understand the environment for change as you have experienced it.

4. Description of Survey Scenario

Please base your responses on this hypothetical circumstance.

For the purpose of this question, assume that you are a manager in an activity at your current or most recent installation with a workgroup of 21 subordinates. You provide services directly to customers in a high-touch, low-tech delivery system.

PERFORMANCE:
Satisfaction is dropping: Over the past year, your customer satisfaction ratings have dropped from 85 to 75 percent (other comparable organizations have ratings from the low 50's to high 90's).

Response time is increasing: Response time to requests and complaints has increased from 3 days to over 30 days; there is no corporate measure or goal for response time.

Failing financially: You are no longer within budget goals, and your financial performance continues to deteriorate due to a decreasing number of customers using your services.

LOGISTICS: You have exactly the same staff, location, facilities, and equipment as you have had for the last two years.

ANALYSIS: You have completed a detailed analysis of the situation with the support of the local university graduate program. An interdisciplinary team has helped you develop and support a plan that responds to your situation. You have prepared a complete, well-developed presentation that clearly describes your decision to implement change and the basis for it. You have both statistical and anecdotal evidence that your plan is well thought out, well supported by facts, and achievable. You have a full report of findings and recommendations with extensive backup to demonstrate the quality and accuracy of your plan.

surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165 8/16/7
LIMITATIONS: There is no objective business reason not to follow your recommendation, nor does it violate any law rule or regulation.

PROPOSED CHANGE: Four alternative proposals and plans are presented below which represent, in general terms, different levels of change you might propose. For each alternative change strategy, please indicate the response you expect from each group of stakeholders if you were to propose that strategy for your organization.

STAKEHOLDERS: The stakeholders who will be presented your plan include your chain of command, the local human resources staff, the local legal officer (SJA), and your employees.

10. OUTSOURCING: You have decided that the services you provide, along with other services that are outside your capabilities, are readily available from commercial sources at a significantly higher profit margin and/or lower cost than current operations. After a market study, you discover that you can REDUCE THE STAFF TO ONE PERSON AND OUTSOURCE ALL SERVICES, with a combined reduction in cost and improvement in revenues of over $1,000,000 annually with concurrent improvements in service and availability. Responses range between strong opposition to strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the OUTSOURCING option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100

12. DOWNSIZING: You have decided that many of the services you offer are no longer valued or required by your customers. You have competitors who have made significant inroads into your market, but you cannot realistically compete with them due to price/location advantages they enjoy, and you have no real potential for recapitalization of your existing facilities or the construction of a
new facility. As a result, you can REDUCE YOUR STAFF FROM 21 TO 7 without any decrement to service, reducing costs by an estimated $700,000 annually with no reduction in revenues. Responses range between strong opposition to strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the DOWNSIZING option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

|     | 0 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 75 | 80 | 85 | 90 | 95 | 100 |
|-----|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|     |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

Add Question  Add Page

14. REORGANIZATION: You have decided that the deterioration in service is from a failure to transition to more modern service methods and means. You propose to realign and retrain your staff, eliminating old, outdated methods and tools and replacing them with newer ones. The pay to each employee will not be changed, but almost everyone will have new tasks and duties that require them to change their methods and means of work. Also, working conditions will change because you are extending the hours of operation to provide service during peak periods and you are changing work locations to better meet customer demographics. Responses range between strong opposition and strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add Question  Add Page
15. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the REORGANIZATION option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

|       | 0 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 75 | 80 | 85 | 90 | 95 | 100 |
|-------|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|       |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

Add Question  Add Page

16. STATUS QUO: Based on the careful analysis, you have decided that the service measures are not meaningful and that there is little or nothing you can do to improve your organization. You propose to make NO CHANGE in organization, workflow, or staff. Responses range between strong opposition to strong support. Please indicate below how you expect each group to respond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Opposition</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Strong Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add Question  Add Page

17. Given the expected levels of support or resistance as described in the STATUS QUO option above, please estimate the probability of successful implementation of that proposal on a scale of 0-100%.

|       | 0 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 75 | 80 | 85 | 90 | 95 | 100 |
|-------|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|       |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

Add Question  Add Page

5. Thank You!

Thank You!
Merci Beaucoup!
Muchas Gracias!

Your time and consideration are greatly appreciated!

http://surveymonkey.com/SurveySummary.asp?SID=1274059&Rnd=0.3903165  8/16/2005
APPENDIX C: UCF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
September 19, 2005

Larry Cochran
911 Willow Oaks Drive
Ozark, AL 36060

Dear Mr. Cochran:

With reference to your protocol #05-2869 entitled, "Organizational Change at the Service Delivery Level: An Investigation into the Reaction to Change Initiatives in Morale, Welfare and Recreation Activities of the U.S. Army," I am enclosing for your records the approved, expedited document of the UCFIRB Form you had submitted to our office. This study was approved by the Chairman on 9/15/05. The expiration date for this study will be 9/12/06. Should there be a need to extend this study, a Continuing Review form must be submitted to the IRB Office for review by the Chairman or full IRB at least one month prior to the expiration date. This is the responsibility of the investigator. Please notify the IRB when you have completed this study.

Please be advised that this approval is given for one year. Should there be any addenda or administrative changes to the already approved protocol, they must also be submitted to the Board through use of the Addendum/Modification Request form. Changes should not be initiated until written IRB approval is received. Adverse events should be reported to the IRB as they occur.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 407-822-2901.

Please accept our best wishes for the success of your endeavors.

Cordially,

Barbara Ward, CIM
UCF IRB Coordinator
(FWA0000351, IRB00091158)

Copy: IRB file
R. Paul Maiden, Ph.D.

BWjm
LIST OF REFERENCES


Elliot, T.S. (1925)


Academy of Management Review, 20, 541-570.

Fosler, R.S. (2002). Working better together: How government, business, and nonprofit organizations can achieve public purposes through cross-sector collaboration, alliances, and partnerships.
Washington, DC: Three Sector Initiative


Hatcher, L. & Ross, T.L. (1991). From individual incentives to an organization-wide gain-sharing plan:


Held, B, K.P. Horn, M. Hynes, C. Hanks, P. Steinberg, C. Pernin, J.J. Medby, and J. Brown. Seeking nontraditional approaches to collaborating and partnering with industry. Santa Monica, CA: RAND


Journal of Organizational Change Management [on-line].


interpersonal relations. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.


