Geneva: Road to peace

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GENEVA
ROAD TO PEACE

by Joseph Clark
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By JOSEPH CLARK

On many monuments and churches in Geneva you read the words: From the Darkness the Light.

Who can deny that the Geneva conference, which brought together President Eisenhower, Premiers Bulganin and Faure and Prime Minister Eden, cast a light which pierced the darkness of "the Cold War"?

Estimates vary about how much was actually achieved by the Big Four conference. Some might dispute a headline in the Daily Sketch, of London, after the conference: REJOICE! THE DAYS OF WAR ARE PAST!

But even the cautious statement of President Eisenhower on his return from Geneva, said: "There is evidence of a new friendliness in the world." He added something that is quite new for the Administration—that any negotiations must involve mutual concessions.

British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan said jovially when he was back in London: "There ain't gonna be any war."

French Premier Faure said the conference "will have a happy influence" on future events.

Soviet Premier Bulganin declared the conference contributed "to the relaxation of tensions between states." He also said Geneva "opens a new era in the relations among the four powers, and not only among them."

Best of all we like the comment of an Iowa farmer who was having his own "conference" with some visiting Soviet farm experts, while the Big Four met in Geneva.

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“People out here,” the Iowan said, “and probably in the rest of the country, too, are sick and tired of talk about war and international tension. We are willing to do just about everything to get rid of it. If getting to know something about the Russians is necessary, then we want to do that.”

At the bar in the huge Maison De La Presse (House of the Press) a reporter from a mid-west paper asked me what I thought about the conference. This was just after the first day. I said it looked fine and noted that President Eisenhower also said it was going fine.

“Just words,” my colleague said, “the Russians haven’t given up their aim of world conquest.” There it was—the argument behind nearly ten years of cold war. However, now for the first time in ten years American and Soviet heads of government were sitting down together. Can we have peace with the Russians? Here’s how President Eisenhower answered that on the third day of the conference:

“I have spoken to each member of the Russian delegation. I wish to make it clear it is my belief that they are as earnestly desirous of finding peace as we are.”

Now, that’s a lot different from what we’ve heard ever since the end of the war. One correspondent for a big metropolitan newspaper said in all seriousness that Eisenhower was spreading “communist propaganda.” Which gives you an idea of how unprepared the big business press was for the conciliatory atmosphere and spirit of good feeling at Geneva. In fact, up till the last day their favorite word was “deadlock.”

These correspondents had fallen for their own stories about imminent and inevitable war. A most notable result of the Geneva conference was that it exposed the terrible hoax to which our country had been subjected for so many years—the hoax of imminent and inevitable war, and of an external menace.

Naturally, the Geneva conference didn’t settle all the differences and conflicts that have arisen in the last ten years. Six days is a short time to undo the harm of ten times 365 days. Here we propose to discuss the unsettled questions and examine the possibilities of getting satisfactory results. But first let’s see how the Geneva conference came about in the first place and why it didn’t take place sooner.

Before the Geneva conference, this July, there had not been a meet-
ing of the American and Soviet heads of state since July, 1945. Certainly it wasn’t for lack of differences and conflicts! By the end of 1947 serious disputes had developed between our country and the U.S.S.R. about Germany, about Korea, and about atomic weapons.

On May 4, 1948, our ambassador in Moscow, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, informed Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that he deplored the bad relations. Ambassador Smith said: "As far as the United States is concerned, the door always remains open for exhaustive discussion and settlement of our differences."

Five days later, on May 9, Molotov replied. The Soviet Foreign Minister suggested "discussion and settlement of differences existing between us." But Washington rejected this proposal and the door, which Smith said was open, closed with a bang.

Less than two weeks later, on May 17, Soviet Premier Stalin replied to an open letter from Henry Wallace, at that time still a supporter of Roosevelt’s policy of American-Soviet friendship. The former vice-president urged that capitalism and socialism live together in peace and differences be settled through negotiations.

Stalin answered Wallace: "The coexistence of these systems and the peaceful settlement of differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are not only possible but absolutely necessary in the interests of universal peace."

One of the most important correspondents covering the Geneva parley was James Reston, chief of the N. Y. Times Washington Bureau. Which brings to mind a part of the record in which Reston himself was a participant.

Toward the end of 1952, Reston sent a series of questions to Stalin. In one of them he asked if the Soviet Premier would agree to "diplomatic conversations with representatives of the new Eisenhower administration, looking toward the possibility of a meeting between yourself and General Eisenhower on easing world tensions?"

On December 21, Reston got a reply from Stalin in one word: Yes. But from the White House? Silence.

Then Malenkov took office, after Stalin died. On March 15, 1953, I was sitting in the press box with my American, British and French colleagues, at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Premier Malenkov was speaking and he said:
“At the present time there is no disputed or unsolved problem which cannot be solved by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual agreement of the interested countries. This refers to our relations with all states, including our relations with the United States of America.”

Just a few weeks later, Prime Minister Churchill made it much more specific. He suggested a meeting “at the summit.” And on May 11, shortly before I left the U.S.S.R., Pravda came out with a big story welcoming Churchill’s proposal. Two years and more passed without a meeting at the summit, although Churchill proposed it time and again. Winston Churchill explained in Commons that while the Soviet Union had accepted his proposal Eisenhower had vetoed it.

Clearly, the influence of McCarthy and Knowland was poisoning not only the domestic atmosphere but also foreign policy. There must be no deals with the Soviet Union, they thundered. They called for “liberation” of the European People’s Democracies and China. They argued for preventive war, and the Eisenhower Administration came perilously close to repeating their slogans when it urged “liberation” and “massive retaliation.”

Despite all this, a series of events took place which brought about an easing of world tensions, though this was interspersed with the Indochina crisis of 1954, and the Formosa crisis this year.

In the summer of 1953, the terrible fighting in Korea was ended by negotiations. A year later the last shooting war in the world ended in Indochina, also through negotiations. Those negotiations also took place at Geneva and China participated as a great power for the first time in that 1954 conference.

Earlier this year, the long deadlocked Austrian state treaty was signed. And in Bandung, Indonesia, 29 Asian and African countries got together and agreed on peaceful coexistence. It was at Bandung that China’s Premier Chou En-lai made his dramatic proposal for direct negotiations with our country to settle the Far East crisis.

There was a reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. And the Soviet Union took the occasion to emphasize the socialist principle of non-intervention by socialist states in the affairs of other countries. This principle had also been stressed in five-point
coexistence agreements between China and India, Burma and India, and other Asian lands.

Then India's Prime Minister Nehru toured the U.S.S.R. Out of this visit came a big demonstration for peaceful coexistence and non-intervention of countries in the internal affairs of others.

But all these events did not just fall from the skies. Something new entered the field of diplomacy and world affairs. The people, the plain ordinary John Does and Mary Does, of all lands, were making their influence felt as never before in history. What was achieved at the summit was made possible by what happened at the base. On a world scale, the forces of peace were strong than the war forces.

An organized peace movement arose in every country which had a tremendous impact on the governments of the world. Think back to the critical situation in 1950. The Korean fighting broke out and many said the war must and will spread. It was five years ago that the Christmas issue of Newsweek magazine asked this question: "Is this the last Christmas of peace on earth?" Its answer was: "Yes."

But millions of people were at that time signing the Stockholm petition to ban atomic bombs. Millions of people were also demanding peaceful negotiations to bring about a cease-fire in Korea. In our own country, thousands of letters flooded Washington and came to the editors of local newspapers with this demand.

And still more millions all over the world signed petitions and held meetings and agitated for a big-power meeting at the summit. Steadily the demand grew for top-level talks. During the British election campaign this was a central issue. The Tories vied with the Labor Party as champions of a meeting at the summit. This was a great tribute to the common sense of the plain people who had been demanding this long before their leaders agreed to it.

Pressure for such a meeting grew in our country, too. In order to forestall such a meeting, Secretary of State Dulles tried to pull a fast one. He ordered the release of the Yalta papers.

Dulles' strategy was as simple as it was nasty. The McCarthyites had long been using "Yalta" as a sort of dirty word with which to smear Roosevelt and the Democrats. So Dulles released the papers, hoping to discredit the idea of a summit meeting. Since most post-Roosevelt Democratic leaders no longer supported FDR's policy of
American-Soviet friendship, the field seemed wide open for the Dulles strategy.

But the release of the Yalta papers boomeranged. Dulles had reckoned without one thing—popular sentiment in our country favored a top-level meeting. The Gallup poll had shown 77 percent in favor of a meeting of the Big Four heads of government. The people were way ahead of their so-called leaders.

Meanwhile, some of the shrewder Democrats, including chairman Walter George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, finally awoke to the Dulles scheme and to what the American people actually wanted. So Senator George followed up the release of the Yalta papers with a proposal for a Big Four parley of the heads of government.

The rest is very recent history. It includes a last-minute decision by Eisenhower to help out his Tory friends in the British election. So, finally he went along with Bulganin’s agreement for a Big Four top-level meeting.

What the Geneva Big Four meeting accomplished is symbolized by the picture on the cover of this pamphlet. The heads of the American, Soviet, British and French governments came together as friends, not enemies. A new spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence was indicated.

From a practical point of view the Geneva conference decided to convene a meeting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers on October 27 to take up the directives agreed upon by the heads of state.

A dramatic development that came right after the Geneva conference was the announcement by the Chinese and American governments that they were going to start negotiations in Geneva. This was followed, even before the negotiations opened, by the release by the Peking government of eleven U.S. airmen. Clearly, the Geneva spirit was spilling over to the Far East. The crisis there was a result of a policy which gave the Knowland and McCarthy representatives of Formosa a dangerous influence over Far Eastern affairs.

At Cairo, during the war, at Potsdam and later our government had recognized that Formosa was Chinese. And how long can the fiction be maintained that Chiang Kai-shek speaks for China? Negotiations between China and the U.S. were clearly in order. And they
were indeed initiated during the Big Four meeting in Geneva.

Each of the four heads of government—Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Faure—has stressed the new atmosphere created at Geneva. But still there remain sharp differences which the heads of state agreed to turn over to their foreign ministers for further study, negotiation and solution. Let’s take up the three points on which the Geneva conference issued directives to the foreign ministers. Let’s see what the differences are and whether solutions are possible which will satisfy the interests of all.

1. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND GERMANY

Nobody has to be reminded that Europe was ravaged by fire and sword for centuries. Whatever the other causes of those world wars, no one will dispute the special part which German militarism played as an aggressor. And our country was involved in each world war.

The dispute between the Western heads of state and the Soviet premier can be summed up very simply on this issue. The Western position, in which our government took the lead, was that German “reunification” must have priority over any considerations of European security. The Soviet position was that security and protection of all against any attack is a basic condition for reunification of Germany.

At the heart of the so-called Western position was the rearmament of West Germany and incorporation of the new Wehrmacht in NATO. A unified Germany would, in this position, also be remilitarized and become part of the NATO military alliance.

Turning to the record we find that on June 29, 1949, shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union protested that it had been excluded. And later, the Soviet government, on March 31, 1954, sent us a note proposing “to join with the interested governments in examining the question of the Soviet Union’s participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.”

This brings to mind a series of compromise proposals made both by the British and Soviet governments at Geneva. Bulganin several times went out of his way to stress that he was not proposing to break up NATO. Instead, he suggested agreements on consultation and non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw pact. [The latter was
formed as a counterweight to NATO by the Soviet government and the East European People’s Democracies six years after NATO was created.]

Bulganin proposed this as part of a first stage for solving the problem of German unification and all-European security. In the final stage, there would be a collective security pact of all Europe, including a united Germany and the U.S.A. This would then be able to replace the military alliances—NATO and Warsaw—now facing one another in Europe.

Sir Anthony Eden then proposed a five-power security pact to include the Big Four and a united Germany. Eden showed he was ready for compromise in his statement that this pact might be enlarged to include other European states. And Bulganin showed he was ready for compromise in saying he was willing to consider fewer than all the states of Europe in the pact.

Many in Geneva were startled by President Eisenhower’s explanation that NATO was formed to prevent the rise of Hitlerism in Germany. No one was more surprised than the West Germans. It was especially startling in view of a dispatch sent from Bonn, Germany, by the Associated Press at the very time when Eisenhower was making that statement. The dispatch, as it appeared in the Christian Science Monitor (July 20), stated:

“The West German government has informed parliament of its plan to take over the American-financed international spy network headed by former Lt. Gen. Reinhard Gehlen.

“It will become the West German federal intelligence service, operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

“Financed for the last eight years with up to six million dollars of United States funds, the Gehlen organization has 4,000 agents, some operating as far east as Siberia.”

What a strange way of preventing the rise of Hitlerism! Lt. Gen. Gehlen of the Nazi High Command operated intelligence forces against American troops who fought under General Eisenhower a little more than ten years ago. And Lt. Gen. Gehlen was Hitler’s most trusted operative against the Soviet Union. His Hitlerite network, which was “American-financed,” is now part of Adenauer’s forces, and is being proposed for inclusion in NATO.
Is it any wonder that right after the Geneva conference, the Social Democrats and the trade union federation of West Germany undertook a new effort to bar the incorporation of the proposed new Wehrmacht in NATO? These German trade unions have for ten years been backed by the AFL and CIO, financially and otherwise. Shouldn't American trade unionists pay some heed to what their German brothers are saying now? These German unionists are warning that revived militarism would be disastrous for free trade unions.

How can Germany be united, the West German workers ask, if we insist that not only West Germany, but a united Germany must become part of NATO? The question before us, the Social Democrats said, is to discuss a basis for reunification under which West Germany would not be committed to NATO and East Germany would not be committed to Warsaw.

The manner in which the Geneva conference tied together the questions of European security and German unification shows there are broad areas for compromise on both sides and solution of this difficult problem is possible.

2. DISARMAMENT

For ten years, the costs of armaments have pressed more and more heavily on people everywhere. The money we have spent on financing the cold war could have provided decent housing for every American family. It could have built enough schools to eliminate all sub-standard educational facilities. It could have provided the recreational facilities and supervised youth activities to help combat the terrible scourge of juvenile delinquency which has mounted steadily during the years of the cold war. It could have provided an effective flood control program.

Across every issue arising in the post-war world has been the shadow of the A-bombs and H-bombs. True, the forces of peace have proved stronger than the forces of war even in the most critical post-war years. But as long as there was a Cold War, it could nurture atomic destruction at some future date.

That is why the peace movement, church assemblies, Pope Pius XII—all have appealed for banishing the horror bomb menace.
At Geneva, the four powers agreed to spur the efforts of their representatives on the UN disarmament sub-commission. Their representatives in that body, as well as the foreign ministers, are instructed to take into account the proposals made by the heads of government.

Great attention was given in the world press to President Eisenhower's proposal that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. exchange defense installation blue prints. Also, that they sponsor aerial flights over each other's countries "from end to end."

After the dust had settled somewhat, the question was how much had this contributed to disarmament? James Reston, of the N. Y. Times (July 22, 1955), noted:

First, "it was generally regarded as unrealistic."

Second, "it is illegal under United States laws."

Third, it is a proposal "which the other side knew in advance had no chance of being accepted."

And fourth, the plan, "apparently was not explored in any detail, if at all, with Congressional leaders, who make the laws."

What was extraordinary about Eisenhower's speech was that while it was on the subject of disarmament, it contained no proposal for arms reduction or limitation at all. In fact, the President stated that the measures which he was proposing would be ineffective in the checking or inspection of nuclear weapons.

The President said he would consent to arms reduction or bans only if inspection or testing could be effective. Then he said:

"We have not been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons." In other words, he is saying that his own proposal brings no closer a method of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Evidence of the new and better relations between our country and the USSR was seen in the Soviet attitude toward the Eisenhower proposal. The Soviet leaders did not reject or rebuff it even though it does not include any reference to banning atomic bombs or reducing conventional arms. They suggested that it be considered, along with all other proposals, as a serious contribution.

In other words, even areas where there are great differences can become areas of agreement in the new climate of Soviet-American
relations. That is why friendship between the two most powerful countries in the world is so important to all of us.

It is interesting, by way of contrast, that Premier Bulganin accepted a proposal of the Bandung conference to ban all nuclear weapon test explosions. This is something that definitely can be checked. It was originally proposed by William Randolph Hearst to Marshal Zhukov. Now, it pops up in a Soviet proposal to which we had no positive response.

Another interesting sidelight was the Soviet acceptance of the Eisenhower proposal to contribute atomic materials to a world atomic pool for peace.

Premier Bulganin also repeated the Soviet plan for disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons which his government originally proposed on May 10. Prime Minister Eden, in commenting on this at Geneva, noted that it brought the East and West much closer together on this issue.

The Soviet Union accepted the Western proposals on levels of armaments. It accepted the Western proposals of a stage-by-stage approach to banning nuclear weapons. And the Soviet plan contains a detailed system of international inspection to enforce a nuclear weapon ban as well as the reduction of conventional armaments.

It is not generally realized that this Soviet plan on inspection and control does not provide for any veto in the day-to-day operations of the international inspection agency. The international agency is authorized to conduct inspections at any time by a simple majority vote and it must be allowed access to all "objects of control."

The issue, from the viewpoint of our best interests, is not disarmament versus inspection. The solution of this problem will require disarmament AND inspection. To pit one against the other is to bar the way to what the world and our country needs—a ban on nuclear weapons, lifting of the armaments burden, along with security for all.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Of far-reaching benefit in developing mutual good feeling was the agreement of the Big Four to bring about:
1. Elimination of barriers to free communication and trade between East and West.
2. Freer contacts and exchanges.

It may still come as a shock to many Americans that our government has erected barriers between peoples. Many may be surprised to learn that at present the Soviet Union sells us ten times as much goods as we sell them. And we are sure most people would be amazed to learn that as late as 1951, when we had cut off practically all exports to the Soviet Union, they were still selling us such strategic materials as manganese and chrome. Those purchases from the U.S.S.R. went into tanks, artillery and other ordnance. But at that very time we were banning the sale of penicillin, passenger cars, tractors and fishing boats, along with a thousand other such items, to the U.S.S.R. and any of the other socialist lands.

Similarly with regard to travel and cultural exchange between East and West. Many Americans will be surprised to learn that ordinary tourist travel is already under way between Europe and the U.S.S.R. And the newspapermen, congressmen, sportsmen, farmers and students who have visited the Soviet Union have not been asked for their fingerprints or told to sign a statement that they travel at their own risk, as is the case under the McCarran-Walter Act.

It is important for every American to know how much our country's name has suffered abroad because of the passport ban we've placed on Paul Robeson. Tories from London and Catholics in France told me they want to see Robeson in Othello and hear him sing.

The wonderful welcome which the Midwest and Far West farmers gave to the Soviet farm delegation here and the fine reception our farmers got in the U.S.S.R. show how ordinary people want to break down barriers to East-West friendship. AFL President George Meany is out of step with his own membership when he opposes the exchange of labor delegations. And Democratic Senator Ellender scored a bullseye when he went to Moscow and there sent a message to George Meany urging labor delegations to exchange visits. "They might see things in a different light," Ellender said to the AFL leaders.

Which brings up the whole question of the witchhunt and anti-Communist hysteria. One of the most terrible consequences of the cold-war foreign policy of the Truman and Eisenhower Administra-
tions was the witchhunt. Only now does it become clear what a heavy price our country paid for a disastrous foreign policy. Entire chunks of our most cherished traditions and constitutional guarantees were cut away under the pretext of an "external menace" and the hoax of a "world communist conspiracy."

This was the meat on which McCarthyism fed. How happy people all over the world were to repeat a phrase they had heard—that McCarthyism had become McCarthywasm. That symbolized an ending of the Cold War to them.

But can it be said that McCarthyism is already a thing of the past? How can it, when right after Geneva we read reports in all European papers about the Un-American investigation of actors and theatrical figures for their "subversive" connections.

McCarthyism is still with us, though McCarthy himself is discredited, as long as men and women are jailed for their political beliefs under the Smith and the McCarran laws. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, 50 years a leader of American labor, is now in prison under the Smith Act along with many others. The terrible irony about this is that Miss Flynn and her co-workers championed the idea of a "meeting at the summit" when both the Truman and then the Eisenhower Administration bitterly opposed it.

But observe how history has vindicated those who said negotiations between East and West are both possible and necessary; how those who demanded a big power conference were correct, while those who sponsored the Cold War were harming our country's interests.

The cold war was profitable for a tiny minority. Wall Street firms, which had made 10 billion dollars profit annually after taxes during World War II, raised that to 20 billion a year during the Cold War.

But at Geneva the voice of the people proved irresistible. The demand for peace crept in through every door, every window and every crevice of the Palace of the Nations. It was a voice which said mankind will tolerate war no more. Geneva was a triumph for the idea of peaceful coexistence.

How big a part the American people played in bringing about the present improvement of the world situation could be seen in the popular protest at every phony crisis cooked up by the war party.
Testimony to this is given by Walter Lippmann in a New York Herald-Tribune column (Aug. 2) when he wrote: "It may have been the threat of war over such an absurdity as Quemoy and Matsu which was the trigger that set off the American revulsion against a third World War."

In that same column, Lippmann confirms that "even as late as last January" President Eisenhower "felt compelled to appease them (the war party) considerably."

Geneva was a triumph for the idea of peaceful coexistence. It was not a "six-day wonder." It brought about wonderful changes in six days, but what happened in the ten years before made Geneva possible. The real origin of Geneva was in the great victory over Hitlerism in World War II which profoundly altered relations among the powers. It was a victory of American-Soviet cooperation. And after that victory every effort to instigate another World War came up against these new relations. Above all, they came up against the people everywhere who wanted no such war.

How wise the people were when they supported a Big Four meeting even though the Administration in Washington opposed it. How wise the people were when they expressed great hopes that the Geneva meeting would succeed although the Administration warned against such hopes and poured cold water on such expectations.

And now once more the Administration is trying to curb the enthusiasm of the people about the spirit of Geneva. On August 25 the newspapers published a speech by President Eisenhower at Philadelphia in which he cautioned against the popular hopes aroused by Geneva. James Reston said in the N. Y. Times:

"The Eisenhower Administration has reached a policy decision to put a brake on the optimism created by the Big Four conference last month in Geneva."

But the need today is not for a brake but for a spur to the Geneva spirit. If the popular expectations and demands in this matter are impressed on Washington, then the spirit of Geneva will flourish.

Geneva was the first big step in ending the Cold War. And as Americans remain alert and speak out for patient negotiations, on a two-way street, their will for peace will prove decisive.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOSEPH CLARK'S pamphlet, *Geneva: Road to Peace*, is based on first-hand observation as special correspondent for the *Daily Worker* and *Peoples World* at Geneva, where he covered the Big Four conference in July. His coverage of this historic gathering attracted worldwide attention because of the U.S. State Department's initial refusal to issue a passport to Mr. Clark, an action which it was forced to rescind because of wide protest.

Mr. Clark is the Foreign Editor of the *Daily Worker* and for three years was its Moscow correspondent, his vivid on-the-spot reportage of life and activities in the U.S.S.R. having appeared in numerous magazines, including *Masses & Mainstream*, *New World Review*, *Jewish Life*, and others. He is the author of *Hell Bomb or Peace? Behind the Berlin Crisis*, *Must There Be War?*, and *The Real Russia*, all published by New Century Publishers.

A veteran of the last war, he served in the infantry and was awarded the Silver Star for heroism in action.

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