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## Más Que Cubano: Linked Fate, Transnationalism, and Generational Differences among Cuban Immigrants

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*MÁS QUE CUBANO*: LINKED FATE, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND  
GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES AMONG CUBAN IMMIGRANTS

by

BRYAN CRUZ

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science  
in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs  
and in the Burnett Honors College  
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Thesis Chair: Nikola Mirilovic, Ph.D.

## **ABSTRACT**

Latinos in the United States are a diverse group, and their growing presence and recent elections illustrate the importance of understanding and recognizing their distinct political identities. The political identity of Cuban immigrants has been understood as being an anomaly among Latino groups and is largely referred to as an outlier in research of Latin American immigration. The intent of this thesis is to explore the question of why some Latin American immigrants relate to a greater Latino identity. Linked fate is identified as a relevant concept that addresses the formation of group identity. From the literature, transnational connections and period of arrival are expected to be determinant factors in an individual's perception of linked fate. A logistical regression analysis is conducted with data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, and the results suggest that both transnational ties and immigration generation are positive predictors for linked fate. The thesis concludes by finding similarities with linked fate predictors in past studies and suggests that several similarities exist between Cubans and other ethnic groups regarding linked fate.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## **CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION**

In many ways, we can see why a general identity for Latin American immigrants and Hispanic individuals is likely to exist. Within the United States, many Latinos of different national origin speak the same language, listen to similar musical styles and artists, and watch the same news or television channels. Shared characteristics such as these can be traced to the fact that many Latin American countries share similar and connected histories. As a result, people from these countries have similar interests and concerns that continue into the current day. All of these factors appear to be the basis of a Latino voting bloc that has been perceived as trending towards the Democratic. Remarkably, this voting bloc has been predicted to grow in numbers and strength in upcoming elections due to an increasing percentage of Latinos throughout the United States (Igielnik & Budiman 2020).

Given the incredible diversity of Latin American nations and culture, it should also not be surprising that Latinos share large differences. Just as with other groups, Latinos are divided by several factors, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and age (Rakich & Thomson-DeVeaux 2020). The differences across nationalities may fracture the group as a voting bloc, making a Latino identity a less unified and reliable source of partisan votes. It is also very much possible that superficial similarities of culture language do not translate to shared political beliefs. Acknowledging such divisions has become increasingly important as recent elections demonstrate the volatility of Latinos as a political group. Within the most recent 2020 U.S. election, the Democratic



candidate Joe Biden underperformed relative to the last election cycle – losing a large amount of votes in some Texan Mexican American counties, as well as the county with most of Florida’s Cuban Americans (DeVeaux, Skelley & Bronner 2020).

Understandably, there are many possible questions about the consistency of a Latin American vote if such deviations are possible and threaten the overall trend of political partisanship. It appears that understanding the nature and factors of Latin American political identity continues to be of interest in the study of immigration politics and political behavior. The Democratic underperformance with a predominantly Cuban American district may seem surprising, however important considerations about this demographic are revealed upon closer inspection.

Cuban Americans occupy an interesting space in the conversation of Latin American immigration within the United States: despite their relatively small numbers, they have a concentrated demographic presence in the state of Florida as well as a distinct political identity. This tends to give Cuban Americans the label of being an “outlier” among Latin American immigrant groups, as they express distinctly different beliefs and behavior from what is associated with the traditional Latin American political identity. Generally, the causes of these differences are intuitively apparent and uncontroversial. This includes the role of contextual history of revolutionary Cuba, as well as U.S. policy during the cold war as being determinant of how Cuban American exile community might differ in significant ways from other immigrant groups. Their immigration seemingly being primarily political rather than economic likely entails a strong ideological component that will cross over into political life. In this sense, it is

expected that Cuban Americans might differ in what is considered Latino linked fate, or belief in a shared identity and experience despite specific nationality that has been observed as growing in the landscape of Latino immigration politics.

However, there is also reason to believe that this distinct Cuban identity can blend with a greater Latino identity. As relevant history and context becomes relatively further from the present day, new generations of immigrants face new problems within a new political landscape that deviate from past historical context. Likewise, global interconnectedness and communication has changed dramatically in recent years, enabling immigrants to maintain ties to their country of origin in new ways. Indeed, evidence has shown that Cuban Americans have shifted in perspective in a myriad of ways in recent years, which may indicate that the Cuban American community is beginning to share characteristics more like the general Latino immigrant identity.

The apparent distinctiveness of Cubans from other Latinos provides an interesting perspective from which we can evaluate how Latinos form a shared sense of identity. Certain concepts such as linked fate and transnationalism emerge in the literature of immigration politics that supports the possibility that Latinos can form a shared identity, and that there is a basis for shared experiences. The key question is as follows: why do some immigrants feel linked fate more than others? In the following literature review, several factors will be explored as potential indicators of this shared identity. Additional dimensions such as transnational ties and generational change, among other variables, will be explored in their role in influencing attitudes of linked fate. In addition, this thesis seeks to test for indicators of linked fate among Cuban

immigrants in order to identify key similarities and differences from past studies. If comparisons are consistent, it may indicate the potential for Cubans to engage with a greater Latino immigrant identity.


## CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

### Linked Fate and Group Identity

The concept of linked fate in politics emerges from Dawson's seminal work, *Behind the Mule*. Focusing on the group identity African Americans, the book seeks to address competing theories of class and racial identity as proxies for political beliefs and behavior, and consequently gives evidence to believe the latter is predominant in shaping African American political thought. According to Dawson (1994), the evidence indicates that a shared history of economic and social turmoil causes relative unity in political interests for African Americans. The concept of linked fate arises when considering how African Americans might connect their own experience with those who face similar problems of racial injustice. Though African Americans as a group are uniquely positioned for this analysis due to an extensive history of unique oppression, this framework for analysis that emphasizes group identification as a proxy for politics has been expanded to consider other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. Dawson's work, as will be explored in subsequent paragraphs, has been influential in the discussion of Latino group identity as it relates to political interests in the United States.

Determinants of group consciousness have also been explored in an article by Allen, Dawson, and Brown (1989), which suggests that there are numerous dimensions by which a racial belief system might arise. Both low education and low socioeconomic class are found to positively impact solidarity with the notion of black masses. Religiosity was theorized to be additionally impactful due to advocating unity and shared struggle in Black church's gospel, however the findings are inconsistent.

Religious heterogeneity is speculated to be the reason for this, which is validated by a later study McDaniel, Dwidar, and Calderon (2018). Although Black churches served a role in civil rights and social justice causes that oriented religiosity towards group consciousness, this is has not maintained over time. The divergence of religious beliefs in the decades after the civil rights era has accounted for divergence in political beliefs. These different approaches to faith, such as “social gospel, prosperity gospel, and Black religion theology”, suggest different views of group identity and linked fate respectively (McDaniel, Dwidar, & Calderon 2018, 274) Though this study disputes religion as being homogenous and analogous to a singular black identity, it does reinforce the notion that a type religious belief can correspond with attitudes of linked fate if enables certain visions of community within the racial and ethnic group. The religious beliefs of Latinos are mostly Christian with a majority being Roman Catholic, although there is increasingly diversity of Christian denominations: see figure 1. These investigations into causes for group consciousness and linked fate among African Americans have contributed to the basis for exploring the concept as it pertains to other racial and ethnic groups.



*Figure 1: Religious Affiliation of Hispanics in 2013*

Source: Pew Research Center, 2014

The concept of linked fate and group consciousness, which brings immigrants of different national origin to share similar political concerns, has been explored before as being a large component of Latino political identity. Barreto and Pedraza (2009) affirm the prevalence of Latino group identity using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, in correcting flaws of past data. Their findings demonstrate much stronger political unity in partisanship as opposed to the non-Hispanic population. This signifies that linked fate is particularly relevant and significant in assessing Latino politics. Additionally, a study by Garcia-Rios and Barreto (2016) suggests that a large motivator for Latino political participation is based on a politicized immigrant identity constructed through news media. Linked fate is relevant to the construction of this politicized immigrant identity, and Spanish media consumption has been noted to be a significant

indicator for linked fate among Cubans, according to Masuoka (2006). Similar to other studies (Grenier 2006 and Mirilovic & Pollock 2018), this article also accounts for the Cuban American exile origins as an exception that experienced higher political participation relative to other Latino groups. While this source does not focus on Cuban immigrants, it does assess the extent to which immigration's prevalence in the national dialogue brought attention towards a Latino political identity. This research prompts several questions in regard to my investigation, such as the extent to which Cuban immigrants identify with linked fate and whether their exception from a larger politicized immigrant identity stems from sustained attachment or interest in country of origin politics.

Masuoka (2006) engages with the growing literature of linked fate to establish the presence of pan-ethnic consciousness among immigrant groups in a comparative sense. Both socioeconomic status, native born, and discrimination seem to be positive indicators for pan-ethnic consciousness in Hispanics. This emphasis on discrimination can support the notion that newer immigrants may have higher linked fate perception, although the positive indicator for Cubans natively born in the United States could signify that later immigration generation may be less of a predictor for linked fate than otherwise expected. Masuoka also highlights Cubans in the study, noting that they exhibited particularly high attitudes of linked fate relative to other Latinos, and concludes it is based on contextual factors such as their strong cultural ties as well as Spanish media consumption given their unique demographic concentration.

Sanchez and Vargas (2016) build on the concept of linked fate on political consciousness by highlighting the key similarities in linked fate as it exists in African American and Latino communities in the U.S. based on shared perceptions of discrimination. However, contrary to some conclusions drawn by Barreto and Pedraza, this study finds less indicators of very strong Latino linked fate and concludes that it is not analogous to the form of shared consciousness within African American communities, due to cultural boundaries. Exploring different groups with differences in nationality, political experience, and transnational ties might provide a comparative basis for how linked fate differs between groups. Furthermore, the concept of linked fate as a concept within African Americans has been questioned as well. Gay, Hochschild, and White (2016) contend that group identification based on race or ethnicity is becoming less indicative of political beliefs than before, and class is increasingly becoming a signifier for group identity. This negation in findings suggests that linked fate as a concept relating to ethnic identity may be more complex or less relevant of a predictor than previously understood and warrants further examination.

### **Identifying a Transnational Approach**

In the study of immigration, transnationalism found prominence as scholars began considering new approaches of how migrants might integrate and maintain ties between nations, departing from traditional perspectives such as assimilation theory. Assimilation theory had held a long-standing influence on the literature, but through the later part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, declined in relevance. In seeking alternatives that might offer a more complex framework of migration, Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton



(1992) argued in favor of a transnational approach for international politics, identifying the approach as enabling more detailed analysis of migration flows and its impact on both sending and receiving countries. The advantage of this model over assimilation theory is that it considers the agency of migrants in constructing and maintaining ties of culture, rather than primarily working towards integration of a dominant one.

However, while transnationalism was accepted as a valuable alternative and grew considerably in the literature, perspectives on the concept of assimilation developed as well. In their 2003 book *Remaking the American Mainstream*, Alba and Nee acknowledged limitations of the assimilation model, and put forward the notion of assimilation of a process that could take multiple forms; “boundary crossing, boundary blurring, and boundary shifting” (2003, 60). This distinction enables the concept of assimilation to remain while admitting the multi-dimensional nature of shifting cultural and demographic dynamics that gave weight to the transnational approach. Thus, rather than appearing as opposing ideologies on the nature of immigration, the concepts of transnationalism and assimilation appear to be compatible.

Additionally, some immigration scholarship has put forth an understudied alternative in the notion of dissimilation in the context of immigration. It is, in a sense, an extension of assimilation intended to estimate the differences that arise between a migrant group and their country of origin. Fitzgerald (2013) addressed the question of dissimilation among Mexican immigrants in *How Migrants Impact Their Homelands* and concludes that there is evidence to suggest that migrant behavior changes when they return to their country of origin as a result of their outside experiences. Notably,

Fitzgerald acknowledges that hometown associations and remittances act as a counterbalance that can prevent dissimilation by strengthening transnational ties (2013, 132-133). The basis of this approach helps address how this research might expect Cuban Americans to associate with their country of origin. From the body of literature encompassing theories of immigration, such as assimilation and transnationalism, we can further understand how migrants develop, maintain, or lose connections to their country across borders.

### **Indicators of Transnationalism**

Remittances serve as a primary example of how transnational ties might be expressed among immigrant communities. As discussed, remittances through hometown associations have been identified as a positive indicator for transnational connections in the case of Mexican immigration (Fitzgerald 2013). Logically, navigating through channels and barriers of transferring money and maintaining communication indicate that remittances carry an implication of transnational ties and commitment. The extent to which remittances might influence behavior and impact immigrant communities is therefore relevant to the study of Cuban American transnationalism. However, current literature on Cuban remittances vary on analysis and conclusions. Certain economic studies, such as Orozco and Hansin (2011) suggest that remittances have a significant role in encouraging economic development and sustaining households, supporting the notion that transnational ties can have sociopolitical ramifications, such as economic initiatives and entrepreneurship in Cuba. This highlights the importance of understanding the political implications of immigrants who

maintain transnational ties, as their relations and connections may encourage certain political beliefs and behavior.

However, specific studies regarding effects and contributors to Cuban American remittance sending are limited by scope of economic data and contradicting claims. This case that is not necessarily exclusive to Cuba as remittance data has generally been considered difficult to measure for other countries, however conditions particular to Cuba might provide additional limitations. In 2005, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López analyzed the existing studies on Cuban remittances and found the current estimates to be inaccurate due to inconsistent data and methodologies. Additionally, the difficulty of measuring Cuban remittance data is complicated by Cuba's lack of transparency and inadequate research efforts to conduct large-scale surveys. The difficulty of assessing accurate numbers indicates that making claims on comprehensive numbers of remittances with existing data is prone to error. However, this does not negate the possibility that valid conclusions can be drawn by studying determinants of remittance sending in proportional disparity between senders rather than making claims of precise amounts.

Regarding the demographic elements of remittance sending, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López (1997) contend that the nature of remittance behavior is dependent the status of the migrant community as refugees rather than voluntary immigrants. Furthermore, contextual policy and economic conditions are potential major disincentives to individuals who plan to remit to their country of origin. The article includes a comparative analysis of Cuban and Nicaraguan remittance data, suggesting

that the countries' similar history, comparing the 1960s Cuban revolution with the late 1970s and 1980s Sandinista government. Both communist-inspired movements appear to produce similar remittance behavior within the migrant groups. Although more than two decades have passed since, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López establish important considerations in the study of remittance behavior, including the role of policy incentives and disincentives on migrant behavior and comparisons between migrant groups.

Furthermore, Blue (2004) studied remittances to Cuba and determined that several factors positively influenced remittance sending. Among these factors, prominent ones included economic crisis, immediate relatives, and recent visits by the sender to the home country. Notably, the data of this study was taken from a 2000 Havana survey of Cuban households, supplemented with interviews, collecting data from the remittance receivers rather than senders. While Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López (1997) argued that political disincentives and refugee identity would decrease remittance sending as immigrants integrated into a new country, Blue's data demonstrated the opposite. In addition, according to her findings, older immigrants remitted more often, and in greater amounts. Given contradictory findings in the study of this subject, further research is warranted to estimate the disparity of transnational ties among immigrants.

### **Political Identity and Transnationalism**

Transnational ties can be demonstrated through more than just remittances. Political behavior and identity can also indicate whether an immigrant is significantly

interested and involved with their country of origin, and political attitudes can move through transnational channels of communication. Similar to Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, Grenier (2006) focuses on the unique identity Cuban immigrants adopt as refugees and exiles, and its consequences. Using multiple public opinion surveys conducted in different years, Grenier analyzes Cuban American political and social attitudes and behavior to determine whether the Cuban exile ideology had a determinant effect on policy preference and political affiliation. At the time, 69 percent of Cubans in Miami identified as Republicans, contrasting with 17 percent that identify as Democrats. The significant Republican affiliation among Cuban Americans is the strongest indication that an “exile ideology” persists over a general immigrant identity which finds itself aligning with Democratic policy goals. Grenier concludes that, although a semblance of an “exile ideology” is prominent across responses, the specific policy and political considerations tend to be varied and often appears contradictory with previous responses. Grenier also finds that later waves and further geographical groups of Cuban Americans are often more willing to compromise and negotiate with the Castro regime than those residing in Miami.

Generational divisions on politics within immigrant groups serves as a focus for this research as there are potential of generational differences in linked fate as well as transnational ties. Using 2004 election survey data, DeSipio and Uhnlaner (2007) studied generational differences of Mexican American voting preferences and found that generation did appear to be a contributing factor in voting preference, although this effect varied between demographics. Controlling for partisanship, generation was found

to be as significant as an indicator as party for perception of the candidates, and the gap between the candidates increased as generation increased. The generational divide for partisanship was not linear, however this was predicted based on a theory of second-generation exceptionalism which posits that second generations express more loyalty to U.S. values than other generations. Furthermore, Eckstein (2004) identifies that there are major differences between Cuban immigrant cohorts, and suggests that those who arrived before 1964 are part of a “privileged” group that had the means to escape the revolution, while immigrants after 1980 are of a more diverse set of workers and laborers who became disillusioned and disaffected with the government. Eckstein suggests this “proletarianized” cohort as being antithetical in character to the early immigrants. This shift is marked by the Mariel Boatlift mass-exodus in 1980. Eckstein (2004) and DeSipio and Uhnlaner (2007) indicate it possible and even likely that generational divisions exist within Cuban Americans. These generational divides, I believe, could be derived from differences in transnational ties and finked fate identity.

Existing literature has explored interest in country of origin politics and political identity. Mirilovic and Pollock (2018) argue that the sharp partisan divide in policy and rhetoric in the U.S. determines country of origin interest among immigrant groups. Using data from the 2012 American National Election Study, the study explores relevant survey responses among U.S. citizens of various national origins, both native and foreign born. Statistical analysis suggests that identification with Republican party coincided with lower interest in country of origin politics, and furthermore that generational divides did not demonstrably lower transnational ties. The article

highlights a notable exception in Cuban Americans, indicating that their Republican identity is consistent with transnational ties due to contextual factors, such as country-specific policy and history. This appears to coincide with the findings and analysis of Grenier (2006), where Cuba's unique Republican affiliation relates to country of origin interest, as it appeals to the greater "exile ideology" and desire for targeted anti-Castro Cuba policy. Furthermore, this confirms findings by Masuoka (2006) which indicate that the unique Cuban Republican identity contributes to linked fate where it would otherwise negatively affect other groups, as with transnationalism.

### Party Identification, % of Hispanics in Each Group




Figure 2: Party Identification by Percent of Hispanics

Source: Pew Research Center, 2014



Considerations of political identity and partisanship are therefore relevant for the discussion of transnationalism as factor in understanding other beliefs, such as linked fate, in a population of Cuban immigrants. Of course, no voting bloc based on national identity is uniform. Even though increased Republican identity has sharply differentiated Cubans from other Latinos, there remains much political variation within all groups. A Pew Research Study (2014) analyzes survey data to find that more Cubans identify or lean towards the Democratic party, though they maintain the largest percent of Republicans relative to other Latinos: see figure 2. The authors of the study are careful to note, however, that among those registered to vote, Cubans are registered with the Republican party more than the Democratic party, 47% to 44% respectively (Pew Research Center, 2014, 129). This study suggests that Cuban political identity and partisanship is more complicated than upon initial inspection. Cubans do maintain a unique degree of Republican affiliation, however the degree of this may be overstated and uncertain among other Latinos. Analyzing such dimensions of the demographics may indicate more similarities between Cubans and non-Cuban Latinos in other unexplored forms of identity, such as linked fate.

Transnational ties have also been found to have consequences on political identity on non-migrant citizens in the country of origin. Duquette-Rury, Waldinger and Lim (2018) assessed the consequences of international migration ties in Mexico utilizing survey data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study. They found that having migrant connections, through social ties and remittances, had a positive relationship to political interest, as well as being more critical of the election process. This indicates the

importance of transnational connections and remittances in political interest and behavior. Though this research focuses on Mexico, the principle of social remittances might extend to other migrants who maintain social ties across borders. Additionally, this research appears to support the findings put forward by Orozco and Hansin (2011), that remittances could have a transformative effect on politics and beliefs the receiving country.

### **Shifting Policy and Relations**

A significant component to both the study of remittances to Cuba and political attitudes of Cuban Americans is the reality that both are substantially impacted by the context which immigrants arrive in (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López 1998, Blue 2004, Grenier 2006). The creation of these circumstances is very much reflected by ongoing diplomatic relations and policy changes between the United States and Cuba. This is especially important, provided that this historical origin has been acknowledged to form a unique basis for Cuban American identity that separates it from other Latin American identity (Mirilovic and Pollock 2018, Garcia-Rios and Barreto 2016). Following in that tradition of the literature, it is worth considering how we can imagine these impacts on transnational ties relating to specific policy shifts and periods in history.

Identifying the need for such research, Eckstein and Barberia (2002) conducted a survey of Cuban American community leaders to identify generational disparities in transnational ties as they relate to the historical context of that immigration. They found that the earliest immigration waves opposed transnational visits as their migration was related on political opposition informed by cold war sentiment, while the second wave of

Cuban migrants were more grounded on economic reasons as opposed to ideological. U.S. arrivals from Cuba after-1980 are concluded as being more likely to have family that still remained on the island, indicating that there is more basis to maintain transnational ties. Furthermore, Eckstein and Barberia conclude that despite travel policy becoming restrictive from in 1994 with the U.S.-Cuba migration agreement, visits continued to increase and have an “eroding” effect on Cuban state control, economic or otherwise. This article provides a basis to believe in disparities between Cuban Americans relating to transnational ties and concurs with Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López’s (1998) findings that such disparity can occur from circumstance of immigration and contradicts Blue’s findings that older immigrants harbor deeper attachment and commitment to country of origin. Furthermore, the conclusion that international impacts can be driven by migration ties have significant implication in demonstrating the relevance of transnationalism as an area of political research.

Similarly considering waves and generations of immigration, Grenier (2017) used aggregated results from several years of polling data to conclude that preferences towards engagement policies increased among later waves of Cuban migration as opposed hardline isolationist measures. Once more, this would suggest that generations of Cuban Americans are divided politically in attitudes regarding U.S.-Cuban relations, as a potential consequence of different historical experiences of shifting policy. Furthermore, one can expect party identification to contribute to some of disparities on policy preferences regarding country of origin, as indicated by Mirilovic and Pollock (2018). Notably absent from this analysis, however, is the consideration of how

transnational ties, such as remittances and visitation, affect or account for such differences. Transnational ties are necessarily maintained through engagement, which could suggest some tension between those who are immigrants and transnationals and the belief that contact and engagement with Cuba should be limited and restricted in a political sense. Given this unresolved question, the literature on transnationalism's impacts on the Cuban population remains somewhat inconclusive and warrants further examination.

### **CHAPTER III: EXPECTATIONS AND METHOD**

Overall, the body of literature that provides the basis for this thesis is composed from a body of knowledge that is diverse in topic, purpose, and conclusions. Relative to other demographics, studies into Cuban Americans, immigrants, and populations are limited in quantity and scope. As such, insight and expectations are drawn from the conclusions of studies that differ in focus of racial and ethnic identity. Previous research into African American linked fate can highlight certain variables that contribute to linked fate (Allen, Dawson, & Brown 1989; Dawson 2004; Sanchez & Vargas 2016; McDaniel, Dwidar, & Calderon 2018). Likewise, existing immigration literature has explored transnationalism in Latino populations from other countries, such as Mexico, and in general (DeSipio & Uhnlaner 2007; Fitzgerald 2013; Duquette-Rury, Waldinger, & Lim 2018). Thus, the concept of linked fate is largely unexplored in the context of Cuban immigration. However, past studies of linked fates that focus on other nationalities and populations can inform the predictor variables of this model. In doing this, differences or continuities in the Cuban immigration experience can be understood.

This thesis seeks to answer the question as to why some immigrants express linked fate more than others. Between Cuban immigrants and other Latino groups, there is reason to expect to find greater convergence of shared Latino identity among later immigration waves than earlier ones. If later generations of Cubans share a profile that is more in line with a shared immigrant experience, it can be expected to be a positive indicator that later generations of Cuban Americans are more likely to align with linked

fate or a greater Latino identity. Given these considerations, I put forward the following hypotheses:

H<sub>1</sub>: Cuban immigrants with transnational ties to their homeland will express attitudes of linked fate or pan-Latino identity.

H<sub>2</sub>: Later generations of Cuban immigrants will express attitudes of linked fate or pan-Latino identity.

H<sub>3</sub>: Later generations of Cuban immigrants and Cuban immigrants with transnational ties will express higher attitudes of linked fate or pan-Latino identity.

Using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (n=8,634) by Fraga et al., a sample of 341 self-identified Cuban immigrants are relevant for the analysis of this study. No native-born Cuban Americans are analyzed in this model to test for effects of date of arrival. The model will be constructed using an ordered logistic regression to conduct a multivariate analysis. All variables in this study were transformed for analytical purposes from the dataset. The dependent variable, linked fate, can be operationalized using responses regarding perceptions of intra-Latino relations and perception of pan-ethnicity. While the 2006 Latino National Survey provides several different types questions regarding pan-Latino identity and linked fate, the model was constructed using a variable from the most relevant question. For a more detailed explanation on the creation and transformation of the variables in the model and the wording of the questions and responses within the survey, see Appendix 1. For tables

and figures that illustrate the distribution of responses within each variable used in the model, see Appendix 2.

The variable for transnationalism can be operationalized using an aggregate of relevant responses designated under the “transnationalism” section of the survey design, including questions regarding sending money, visitation, and contact to their country of origin. The resulting composite variable was then collapsed into a dummy variable, indicating between no transnational connections or some transnational connections. Effects for transnationalism affecting group identity follow from the findings of Duquette-Rury, Waldinger and Lim (2018) that suggest transnationalism can influence political identity. As identified in the alternative hypotheses, this is expected to have a positive effect on attitudes of linked fate due to the effect of strengthening the immigration identity that prevents dissimilation, as suggested by Fitzgerald (2013). The variable for immigration generation can be operationalized using responses to year of arrival to create a dummy variable, indicating whether they arrived before or after the Mariel boatlift in 1980. The relevance of this variable will test the significance of the historical event in transforming the group identity of Cuban immigrant population as theorized by Eckstein (2004), and furthermore the effects of generational differences as identified by Grenier (2017). Based on the literature, there is an expected positive effect for this variable.

An ordinal household income variable was utilized as an additional control variable, as the literature has indicated that questions of wealth and class are relevant to immigration cohorts and linked fate attitudes. There is an expectation of higher income

positively relating to more perceptions of linked fate, based on findings by Dawson (1994) and Masuoka (2006). Age group is included in the model as it is expected to positively correlate with transnationalism, as Blue (2004) indicates that older immigrants remitted more, thus exhibiting a greater tendency to maintain certain transnational ties.

Furthermore, inferring from Dawson (1994), Masuoka (2006), and Garcia-Rios and Barreto (2016), a greater Latino identity possibly will be concurrent with nationally politicized beliefs, which can form from shared experiences of discrimination, politically imposed barriers between countries, and media consumption. A control variable for Spanish media preference is used in the model, which is predicted to positively relate to linked fate. An additional predictor variable in perceived discrimination was also utilized in the ordered logistic model. A composite variable was created using the variables indicating discrimination, varying from 0 to a maximum of 4 areas of perceived discrimination. A variable for naturalized citizens is utilized to test for effects of national assimilation on transnationalism. Education is included in the model as a standard control variable. The literature indicates that younger generations of Cubans favor “engagement” policies (Grenier 2017), suggesting that policy preferences towards immigration are becoming more open than restrictive. To test for this, an ordinal variable measuring support for open immigration policy is included in the model.

Research such as Eckstein and Barberia (2002) argue that the generational divide is making Cuban immigrants for more economic than ideological reasons that were prominent during the cold war. From this, a dummy variable testing for economic



reasons for migration is also included in the model, with the expectation that will increase linked fate due to aligning the Cuban immigrant experience closer with the average immigrant experience. Self-reported skin tone is operationalized in the model as a corollary to race and class, as race data within the survey was insufficient at providing any delineation. See Appendix 1 for further explanation. As Eckstein (2004) suggests, the cohort that emerged from the Mariel boatlift immigration wave corresponded with a more racially diverse distribution of migrants. From this, we can expect this to both impact effects of discrimination and year of arrival. A dummy variable for Republican affiliation was constructed using party identification to test for effects of partisan policy preferences, as explored by Grenier (2006, 2017) and Mirilovic and Pollock (2018). Given the demonstrated capacity for Republican identity to focus on limiting engagement with Cuba and focusing on Cuba's unique exile identity among Latino groups, a negative effect on linked fate is expected among Cubans who choose to identify with the Republican party over the Democratic party.

Religiosity will be included in the analysis to determine whether a community oriented dedicated to church attendance results in an increased of linked fate, as is found among certain African American gospels (McDaniel, Dwidar, & Calderon 2018). The distribution of religion within this sample is significantly more catholic than the 2013 Pew Research study would suggest, meaning that it is expected to have a more uniform effect than if religious affiliation were more fragmented. Refer to Appendix 2 for more information on the profile of the sample population as they compare to the recent Pew Research findings among Hispanics.

## CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

As discussed previously, the primary objective of this study is to determine predictors of linked fate for Cuban American immigrants. An ordered logistic model was used to calculate the effects that numerous independent variables had on degree of linked fate, as shown in Table 1. The model includes a total of  $n=180$  observations after omitting all respondents who had at least 1 missing response among the variables. The results indicate that the presence of transnational ties was positively related with increased attitudes of linked fate at a significance level of 0.05. This corresponds with the model expectations. Likewise, individuals who arrived in the U.S. after 1980 expressed higher attitudes of linked fate than individuals who arrived prior to 1980 at a stricter significance level of 0.01. This also corresponds with the expectations that later arrivals are more likely share an identity with other Latinos based on a recent experience with immigration. Removing the transnational variable does not seem to negatively affect the relationship of post-1980 migration on linked fate and removing post-1980 migration likewise does not seem to diminish the effect of transnationalism on linked fate. However, the other predictor variables were found to be less significant as a result. This may suggest that both transnationalism and post-1980 arrival are significant predictors independent of one another, however together they give more predicting strength to the model overall.

Perceived discrimination was found to positively relate to linked fate, although to a lesser degree than transnational ties and time of arrival. This confirms prior research that finds discrimination as a predictor for group identity and linked fate (Dawson 1994,

Masuoka 2006, and Garcia-Rios & Barreto 2016). Furthermore, the inclusion of discrimination of the model increased the effects of transnational ties, year of arrival, Spanish media consumption, and age group. This suggests that discrimination is a key control variable for the model. Household income demonstrated only a slight positive relationship with linked fate at a 0.1 significance level. Though this is not the most robust finding, this would seem to disprove notions that low economic class would differentiate recent immigrants, and that class is a barrier to group identity such as linked fate (Eckstein 2004). Thus, the results did not match the expectations established in the methods. The inclusion of household income did, however, increase the relationship of transnationalism to attitudes of linked fate, further indicating that level of income may not be a hindrance to attitudes of linked fate.

Age group has a substantial positive relationship with linked fate at the strictest significant level of 0.01, just as with year of arrival. This provides further evidence towards the effect of later generational differences on reflecting an immigrant identity that deviates further from the Cuban exception and more in line with what is understood as the more general Latino immigrant experience, as explored by Grenier (2017). It is interesting to note that age group's inclusion in the model significantly increased the effects of post-1980 arrival from .2855855 to 1.078412, and similarly improved the impact on transnationalism by a decent amount, increasing the relationship coefficient from .7415182 to .8983263. The latter effect appears to confirm findings by Blue (2004) that concluded older immigrants remitted more, meaning the increase of transnationalism among older groups could lead to greater attitudes in

linked fate. It also notable that both age and recent arrivals are positively related with linked fate, despite the large fact that recent arrivals tend to be younger. The data indicates that both later arrivals and older immigrants have a positive effect, meaning both contribute to linked fate despite the difference in overlap. Spanish media consumption comprised of another strong positive indicator towards linked fate, with the second highest effect among all variables at a significance level of 0.05. This affirms the expectations based on the findings of Masuoka (2006) and Gracias-Rios and Barreto (2018) which suggest that Spanish media plays a large role in the construction of linked fate and a politicized immigrant identity. Indeed, it would appear to be the case that Spanish media which is relied upon by a diverse set of Latino demographics would contribute to the individual's ability to identify with a shared set of experiences and concerns, given they cover a wide range of issues that relate to Spanish speakers. The effects of this variable's inclusions are interesting, as it lowered the effect of both transnationalism and post-Mariel boatlift arrival in predicting linked fate but increased the significance and magnitude of effects from discrimination and income. This finding is significantly related with linked fate and confirms expectations, despite seemingly diluting the effects of transnationalism and immigration generation.

Naturalized citizenship was not found to a significant relationship with linked fate, meaning that its effects cannot be determined within the model of this study. The inclusion of this variable did somewhat lower the effect of transnationalism, from .9254714 to .9104257. This seems to indicate that assimilation through naturalization has a dampening effect on transnationalism, which aligns with the expectation.

Education was divided into two dummy variables, testing for high school graduates and individuals with some post-secondary education. The results do not seem to significantly relate with linked fate. Furthermore, removing this variable from the model also does not impact any statistically significant relationships apart from household income, which is to be expected based on the typical relationship between education and income level. Interestingly, immigration policy preference does not seem to indicate linked fate necessarily, however its inclusion does affect the transnational relationship with linked fate, changing the coefficient from .6876675 without immigration policy as a variable to .9104257. Therefore, the immigration policy variable was a useful addition for its effects among those with transnational ties, although it did not conform to expectations.

Republican identity, as evident on Table 1, was a statistically insignificant predictor of linked fate. Furthermore, it appears inclusion appears to have had a negligible effect on the other variable's coefficients or statistical significance. This fails to confirm or deny the expectation that Republican identity has a negative effect on linked fate. Economic motivations for immigration similarly had no significant effects on linked fate, although the potential coefficient appears mostly positive within the standard error. For the purposes of this study, however, the results are inconclusive. Including this variable seems to have somewhat lessened the effect transnational ties on linked fate from .955947 to .9104257. This goes against the expectations of the model based on the literature.

Testing for complexion as a corollary for race, we find that it is insignificant in predicting linked fate. This variable was anticipated to impact both relationships of discrimination and time of arrival on the model. Accounting for this variable did increase the discrimination from .3978056 to .5668939, however surprisingly it did not affect year of arrival's relationship to linked fate, rather, it did increase the relationship of transnational ties from .7451465 to .9104257. Furthermore, its presence appeared to strengthen the relationship of Spanish media consumption, while also lowering the significance of college education. These findings only partially match the expectation. Finally, increased church attendance did not seem to correspond with increased attitudes of linked fate. Furthermore, it only marginally appears to have increased both effects of transnationalism and time of arrival. The effects of church attendance are therefore do not match the expectations for the model.

Table 1: Predictors of Linked Fate

	<b>COEFFICIENT</b>	<b>STD. ERROR</b>	<b>P-VALUE</b>
<b>Transnational ties**</b>	.9104257	.3770858	0.016
<b>Post-Mariel boatlift arrival***</b>	1.089219	.4007291	0.007
<b>Discrimination**</b>	.5668939	.2756248	0.040
<b>Household income*</b>	.1814245	.1026243	0.077
<b>Age Group***</b>	.5334189	.1362338	0.000
<b>Spanish media consumption**</b>	1.052587	.4242936	0.013
<b>Naturalized citizen</b>	.3182422	.445933	0.475
<b>Highschool graduate or GED</b>	-.1080311	.4440219	0.808
<b>Some college or more*</b>	-.5968487	.3558176	0.093
<b>Open immigration preference</b>	-.169749	.1725121	0.325
<b>Republican identity</b>	.2106826	.3426954	0.539
<b>Economic immigration</b>	.4514585	.4976875	0.364
<b>Light complexion</b>	.188045	.3409983	0.581
<b>Church attendance</b>	.1216414	.1078108	0.259
<b>Cut 1</b>	4.352823	1.450472	
<b>Cut 2</b>	4.966232	1.457805	
<b>Cut 3</b>	6.382059	1.495884	
<b>Observations</b>	180		
<b>Log Likelihood</b>	-195.64062		
<b>Prob &gt; chi<sup>2</sup></b>	0.0000		
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.1279		

Key: \* =  $p < .1$ , \*\* =  $p < .05$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .01$

## CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This study examines how transnationalism and immigration generation, previously understood as affecting other political beliefs, can correspond to a shared Latino identity with linked fate. Analysis of the model suggests that the presence of transnational ties and being part of a later wave of Cuban immigration both positively and significantly relates with increased attitudes of linked fate. The demonstrated effects of transnationalism on linked fate within the model concurs with past studies that suggest transnational ties influence the establishment of political and immigrant identity (Fitzgerald 2013; Duquette-Rury, Waldinger, & Lim 2018). The effects of later generations of Cuban immigrants supports the past studies indicating generational differences as a predictor of different political attitudes (DeSipio & Uhnlaner 2007), and seemed to follow from Eckstein's (2004) indication that differences in Cuban immigrants would be marked by the 1980's Mariel boatlift.

The role of discrimination and Spanish media reliance within the model furthermore affirm the notion that individual experiences of discrimination and exposure to a Spanish media environment are influential to the formation of a linked fate identity, as with household income as a predictor for socioeconomic status (Dawson 1994, Masuoka 2006, and Garcia-Rios & Barreto 2016). Age group was surprisingly significant in results of the model, corresponding to expectations that older immigrants have higher transnational ties (Blue 2004). Notably, this further provides evidence against Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López (1997) who argue that political disincentives discourage older immigrants from remitting and consequently expressing transnational



ties and interests. The primary findings of transnationalism and generations are particularly important because they go against some intuitive understandings we may have regarding Cubans, from the literature or otherwise. One does not necessarily maintain a Cuban exile identity by maintaining connections to a country which they have immigrated from due to unique grievances. Rather, it is more likely that engaging with difficulties of border crossing and facing barriers in contacting their family back home provides a basis for Cubans to identify with other Latinos.

Notable departures from the expected results include the role of economic immigration, which did not indicate a relationship towards linked fate as was theorized based on findings established by Eckstein and Barberia (2002). Similarly, immigration policy preferences did not relate with linked fate directly, although it did increase the effect of transnationalism on linked fate. Furthermore, several variables were indeterminate in their ability to predict linked fate or in significantly altering the findings of the model, as with Republican identity, naturalization, education, and church attendance. Complexion as a corollary for race only partially matched expectation, as it increased the relationship of discrimination to linked fate but failed to indicate the same increase in later immigration waves.

There are several limitations that can be anticipated from the data. First, the 2006 Latino National Survey data may not perfectly reflect the sample populations and potential conclusions drawn from more recent studies on linked fates such as McDaniel, Dwidar, and Calderon (2018) and Cuban Americans, such as and Grenier (2017). It is also possible that the limited sample size, missing data and lack of response variation

within variables such as discrimination and economic immigration impose a limit on the model's predicting power. Although a decent sample size of 341 relevant cases were available, the number of observations dropped significantly to 180 due to missing data across numerous variables. It is possible that a statistical model that uses a method to estimate missing variables could provide a more accurate relationship of the analyzed variables.

Furthermore, inclusion of many dummy variables such as the presence of transnationalism does not test for the variable in degrees. Future studies could investigate into this variable further to assess the role of each transnational tie specifically and with more detail. A more recent data set can be used to test for these effects on linked fate in a modern context, where policy and engagement with Cuba has changed even further. Additionally, an analysis of linked fate attitudes and the effects of transnationalism in a longitudinal study could be examine how these variables change within an individual over time.

Finally, it is important to consider that there are limited claims one can make with the concept of linked fate. If certain criticisms from past studies are to be accepted as valid, then the degree to which linked fate reflects the ability for Latino nationalities to form a shared political consciousness is uncertain (Sanchez & Vargas 2016 and Gay, Hochschild, & White 2016). Furthermore, as revealed by the 2014 Pew Research study, it is likewise a mistake to assume that the presence of some linked fate equates to the ability for a group to act unanimously. Equally noteworthy is that national and ethnic groups and can differ within a group, and this discrepancy can change over time, as

evident with party identification and religion in Latinos. There is merit to repeating a perhaps overfamiliar reminder that ethnic groups are not monoliths: variation and disparities within groups exists, regardless of any apparent trends or relationships. Further research could explore how this sense of transnationalism's relationship to linked fate varies across other immigrant groups, as well as the influence of immigration generations on linked fate. The study of Cubans relative to other Latinos is significant in the study of politics, as they represent a political anomaly in the study of Latino immigration.

As indicated in the introduction, understanding how a greater Latino identity is constructed is of great importance considering the limitations of conceiving a Latino voting bloc. Furthermore, the ways in which Cuban's compare to other groups in linked fate attitudes can provide insight on how to better understand Cuban American political beliefs, interests, and behavior. The beliefs and behavior of this demographic are of growing importance, considering their large concentration in Florida, which can be politically consequential in local and national elections. Current research regarding Cuban immigrants is lacking when compared to other Latino groups, meaning that there are often disputed claims within the literature without clear resolution or consensus.

Based on the findings of this study, the reject the null hypothesis can be rejected and the H<sub>3</sub> hypothesis is accepted, which argues that individuals with transnational ties and later generations of Cuban immigrants as indicating a higher expression of linked fate. The findings of many of the additional variables impacts on linked fate are largely inconclusive and warrant further examination. This research was intended to investigate

the factors that make certain immigrants express linked fate more than others, and consequently identified several predictors that appeared to indicate identification with linked fate. Determining predictors of linked fate among Cuban immigrants has enabled a comparison to different ethnic and immigrant groups. This study concludes that there are many continuities in the measurement of Cuban linked fate as with other group identities. Factors such as discrimination, Spanish media consumption, and socioeconomic status reflect similarities in past inquiries into linked fate.

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**APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND  
TRANSFORMATION**

*Table 2: Construction of the Linked Fate Dependent Variable*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Linked fate</b>	RGFATE	How much does your “doing well” depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing well? A lot, some, a little, or not at all?	Lot Some Little Nothing DK/NA	Variable was reordered, placing “Nothing” at a value of “0”, scaling up to “Lot” with a value of “3”. Responses of “Don’t Know” were omitted by recoding them as missing data.

*Note: “Don’t Know/Non-Applicable” responses were recoded to be missing data for all questions*

Although there were many variables included in the survey that used similar wording, this variable was selected as the best measurement of linked fate. Other variables in the dataset, such as “RGPCOMM” and “RGCOMM” had wording that fixated on political or economic similarities between groups, while “RGFATE” was is the most general in scope, simply indicating a sense of shared prospects across individual experiences, which is closer to what the literature explores as linked fate. The response distribution between the variables indicates that the difference in wording affected individual responses. Furthermore, this question indicates a personal feeling of linked fate, rather than other variables that measured whether they felt like Cubans in general had a similar linked fate to other Latinos/Hispanics, such as “LATFATE”. This is limiting, as respondents may consider their nationality as differing from the greater Latino identity based on empirical differences rather than personal identification. Refer to Table 3 for the list of unused variables.

*Table 3: Unused Variables for Linked Fate*

SURVEY VARIABLES	SURVEY QUESTION	RESPONSE RANGE
RGCOMM	Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do you have in common with other Latinos/Hispanics? Would you say you have a lot in common, some in common, little in common, or nothing at all in common?	
RGPCOMM	Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power, and representation, how much do you have in common with other Latinos/Hispanics? Would you say you have a lot in common, some in common, little in common, or nothing at all in common?	Lot
LATCOMM	Thinking about issues like job opportunities, education or income, how much do Cubans have in common with other Latinos or Hispanics? Would you say Cubans share a lot in common, some things in common, little in common, or nothing in common with other Latinos?	Some Little Nothing DK/NA
LATPCOMM	Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do Cubans have in common with other Hispanics or Latinos? Would you say Cubans share a lot in common, some things in common, little in common, or nothing in common with other Latinos?	
LATFATE	How much does Cubans “doing well” depend on how other Hispanics or Latinos also doing well? A lot, some, a little, or not at all?	

*Note: The wording of “Cubans” in the survey questions are dependent on the ethnic subgroup listed by respondent earlier in the survey. For the observed sample of this study, all responses to ethnic subgroup listed “Cuban”.*

Table 4.1: Variable Construction for Transnationalism

MODEL VARIABLE	SURVEY VARIABLES	SURVEY QUESTION	RESPONSE RANGE	DATA TRANSFORMATION
<b>Transnational ties</b>	TRCONTACT	How often do you have contact with friends and family in Cuba?	<p>More than once a month</p> <p>Once a month</p> <p>Once every few months</p> <p>Once a year</p> <p>Less Than Once A Year</p> <p>Never</p>	<p>Each variable was selected based on their ability to measure the respondent's attachment to their country of origin. All three variables were collapsed into a singular composite variable, then it was turned into a dummy variable that measured whether the respondent had at least 1 recent transnational connection, or none.</p>
	TRVISIT	How often do you visit Cuba?	<p>More than once a year</p> <p>Once a year</p> <p>Once in the past three years</p> <p>Once in the past five years</p> <p>Never</p>	
	TRMONEY	How often do you send money to Cuba?	<p>More than once a month</p> <p>Once a month</p> <p>Once every few months</p> <p>Once a year</p> <p>Less than once a year</p> <p>Never</p>	

*Table 4.2: Variable Construction for Post-Mariel Boatlift Arrival*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Post-Mariel boatlift arrival</b>	ARRIVEUS	When did you first arrive to live in the US [mainland]?	Numerical response for year	A dummy variable was created, denoting individuals who arrived prior to 1980 has having a value of “0” and individuals who arrived in 1980 or after as “1”.

*Table 4.3: Variable Construction for Discrimination*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Discrimination</b>	DFIRED	Have you ever been unfairly fired or denied a job or promotion?	No Yes	A composite variable was created, indicating the total types of discrimination faced, from “0” to a maximum of “4”, meaning faced each type at least once. Then, due to the skewed distribution across responses, individuals who faced more than 1 type of discrimination were collapsed into a single value. The final indicators are “no discrimination faced”, “one form of discrimination faced”, and “more than one form of discrimination faced”. See Appendix 2 for more information.
	DBADPOL	Have you ever been unfairly treated by the police?		
	DHOUSING	Have you ever been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent you a house or apartment?		
	DRESTAUR	Have you ever been treated unfairly or badly at restaurants or stores?		

*Table 4.4: Variable Construction for Household Income*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Household income</b>	HHINC	Which of the following best describes the total income earned by all members of your household during 2004?	Below \$15,000 \$15,000-24,999 \$25,000-34,999 \$35,000-44,999 \$45,000-54,999 \$55,000-64,999 Above 65,000	Missing values were removed, and variable was otherwise unchanged

*Table 4.5: Variable Construction for Age Group*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Age group</b>	AGE	No question provided in the codebook	Numerical response for age	Values range from 1 to 6 based on grouped categories. These values go from youngest to oldest: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 84-97. The grouping was decided with reference to age grouping based in past studies, namely Garcia-Rios and Barreto (2018).

*Table 4.6: Variable Construction for Spanish Media Consumption*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Spanish media consumption</b>	RELYMED	For information about public affairs and politics, would you say you rely more heavily on Spanish-language television, radio, and newspapers, or on English-language TV, radio, and newspapers?	English more Spanish more Both equally	Variable was transformed into a dummy variable by making “English more” responses a value of 0 and collapsing both “Equal” and “Spanish” responses into a value of 1. This was done to test for the effect of Spanish fluency and media environment on transnationalism.

*Table 4.7: Variable Construction for Naturalized Citizen*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Naturalized citizen</b>	NATUSCIT	Are you a naturalized American citizen?	No Yes	Response order was recoded to make “No” responses valued at 0, and “Yes” responses as 1. Otherwise, variable is unchanged.



*Table 4.8: Variable Construction for High School Graduate or GED*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>High school graduate or GED</b>	REDUC	What is your highest level of formal education completed?	None Eighth grade or below Some high school GED High school graduate Some college 4-year college degree Graduate or professional degree	A dummy variable was created, including all responses coded “GED” and above as “1”, while “None”, “Eighth grade or below” and “Some high school” was coded as “0”.

*Table 4.9: Variable Construction for Some College or More*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Some college or more</b>	REDUC	What is your highest level of formal education completed?	None Eighth grade or below Some high school GED High school graduate Some college 4-year college degree Graduate or professional degree	A dummy variable was created, including all responses coded “Some college” and above as “1”, while all else were coded as “0”.

*Table 4.10: Variable Construction for Open Immigration Preference*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Open Immigration Preference</b>	IMMPOLICY	What is your preferred policy on undocumented or illegal immigration? Should there be... (read responses)	<p>Immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants</p> <p>A guest worker program leading to legalization eventually</p> <p>A guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country, but only temporarily</p> <p>An effort to seal or close off the border to stop illegal immigration</p> <p>None of these</p>	Responses that indicated “None of these” was coded as missing due to the inability to determine position in this scale. The remaining variables were reordered to an upwards scaling ordinal variable, giving “An effort to close off the border” a value of “0”, to a maximum of “3” with “Immediate legalization”, which indicated the most open policy preference listed.

*Table 4.11: Variable Construction for Republican Identity*

<b>MODEL VARIABLE</b>	<b>SURVEY VARIABLES</b>	<b>SURVEY QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE RANGE</b>	<b>DATA TRANSFORMATION</b>
<b>Republican identity</b>	PARTYID	Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, some other party, or what?	<p>Democrat</p> <p>Republican</p> <p>Independent</p> <p>Don't Care</p> <p>Don't Know/Other</p>	A dummy variable was created, with all responses indicating Republican identity “1”, and all else being “0”.

Table 4.12: Variable Construction for Economic Immigration

MODEL VARIABLE	SURVEY VARIABLES	SURVEY QUESTION	RESPONSE RANGE	DATA TRANSFORMATION
<b>Economic immigration</b>	WHYUS	What would you say is the main reason you came to live in the United States?	Education Family reunification Escape political turmoil My parents brought me as a child Improve economic situation Other (SPECIFY)	A dummy variable was created, with all responses indicating “improve economic situation” as “1”, and all else being “0”. The “Other” category was explored to check for additional economic responses, however there were none.

Table 4.13: Variable Construction for Light Complexion

MODEL VARIABLE	SURVEY VARIABLES	SURVEY QUESTION	RESPONSE RANGE	DATA TRANSFORMATION
<b>Light complexion</b>	SKNCOLOR	Hispanics/Latinos can be described based on skin tone or complexion shades. Using a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents very dark and 5 represents being very light, where would you place yourself on that scale?	1 Very Dark 2 3 4 5 Very Light	A dummy variable was created, with all responses indicating a medium (3) skin tone to very dark (1) as “0”, while the two highest responses were counted as “1”. The justification for using this variable rather than race is that when asked about their race, most Cuban respondents chose “other” and simply reiterated “Latino” or “Cuban”. This made the race variable unusable, and as such, this variable was used to separate individual with light complexions from individuals with medium to dark complexions.

*Table 4.13: Variable Construction for Church Attendance*

MODEL VARIABLE	SURVEY VARIABLES	SURVEY QUESTION	RESPONSE RANGE	DATA TRANSFORMATION
<p><b>Church attendance</b></p>	<p>ATTENDCH</p>	<p>How often do you attend religious services? Do you attend (read list)</p>	<p>More than once a week            Once a week            Once a month            Only major religious holidays            Never</p>	<p>Missing responses were removed, order was changed to go from less frequent to more frequent.</p>

## **APPENDIX 2: RESPONSE DISTRIBUTION ACROSS VARIABLES**

*Table 5.1: Response Distribution for Linked Fate*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Linked fate</b>	0 - None	56	16.42
	1 - Little	32	9.38
	2 - Some	70	20.53
	3 - Lot	132	38.71
	Missing	51	14.96

*Table 5.2: Response Distribution for Transnational Ties*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Transnational ties</b>	0 – No transnational ties	85	24.93
	1 – At least one transnational tie	235	68.91
	Missing	21	6.16

*Table 5.3: Response Distribution for Post-Mariel Boatlift Arrival*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Post-Mariel boatlift arrival</b>	0 – Arrived before 1980	179	52.49
	1 – Arrived during or after 1980	149	43.70
	Missing	13	3.81

*Table 5.4: Response Distribution for Discrimination*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Discrimination</b>	0 – No perceived discrimination	253	74.19
	1 – Experienced one form of discrimination	54	15.84
	2 – Experienced multiple forms of discrimination	18	5.28
	Missing	16	4.69

*Table 5.5: Response Distribution for Household Income*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Household income</b>	1 - Below \$15,000	59	17.30
	2 - \$15,000-24,999	38	15.84
	3 - \$25,000-34,999	46	11.14
	4 - \$35,000-44,999	37	10.85
	5 - \$45,000-54,999	18	5.28
	6 - \$55,000-64,999	12	3.52
	7 - Above \$65,000	51	14.96
	Missing	80	23.46



*Table 5.6: Response Distribution for Age Group*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Age group</b>	1 – Ages 18-34	29	8.50
	2 – Ages 35-44	55	16.13
	3 - Ages 45-54	112	15.54
	4 - Ages 55-64	79	17.30
	5 – Ages 65-74	49	23.17
	6 - Ages 75-84	43	12.61
	7 - Ages 84-97.	9	2.64
	Missing	14	4.11

*Table 5.7: Response Distribution for Spanish Media Consumption*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Spanish Media Consumption</b>	0 – Mostly English Media Environment	79	23.17
	1 – Equal or More Spanish Media Environment	257	75.37
	Missing	5	1.47

*Table 5.8: Response Distribution for High School Graduate or GED*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>High school graduate or GED</b>	0 – No	101	29.62
	1 – Yes	240	70.38
	Missing	0	0

*Table 5.9: Response Distribution for Some College or More*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Some college or more</b>	0 – No	242	70.97
	1 – Yes	99	29.03
	Missing	0	0

*Table 5.10: Response Distribution for Republican Identity*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Republican identity</b>	0 – Other	215	63.05
	1 – Republican	126	36.95
	Missing	0	0

*Table 5.11: Response Distribution for Economic immigration*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Economic immigration</b>	0 – Other reasons	302	63.05
	1 – Economic	39	36.95
	Missing	0	0

*Table 5.12: Response Distribution for Light Complexion*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Light complexion</b>	0 – Medium to dark skin tone	83	24.34
	1 – Light to very light skin tone	225	65.98
	Missing	33	9.68

*Table 5.13: Response Distribution for Church Attendance*

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>VALUE</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Church attendance</b>	0 – Never	92	26.98
	1 – Only major religious holidays	47	13.78
	2 – Once a month	46	13.49
	3 – Once a week	97	28.45
	4 – More than once a week	48	14.08
	Missing	11	3.23