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Rule-Following, Enculturation, and Normative Identity

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RULE-FOLLOWING, ENCULTURATION, AND NORMATIVE IDENTITY

by

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ABSTRACT

Rule-following has been a controversial issue in professional philosophical literature since Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. Many authors have developed accounts of rule-following along different lines, including those that naturalistically reduce rule-following to non-normative phenomena and those that take rule-following to be an irreducible aspect of cognition and agency. Hannah Ginsborg, a prominent contributor to rule-following literature, has developed a *partially reductive* account of rule-following, combining features of both reductionist and nonreductionist accounts. But naturalizing or internalistic theories of rule-following, or even Ginsborg's partial reduction of rule-following, ignore important facets of what it is to follow a rule, particularly its *social* aspect. In this thesis I reject Ginsborg's partial reductionism, holding that her hybrid theory does not escape the particular problems of naturalistic reductionism or nonreductionism about rule-following. I argue instead that certain social concepts are necessary for a satisfactory theory of rule-following. The first concept is how an individual is "enculturated" into her various social and cultural networks. The second is one's "normative identity," the accumulated concepts and behaviors one has as part of a social and cultural network. I develop these notions with inspiration from Wittgenstein and other social contributors to rule-following literature.

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INTRODUCTION

Rule-following is one of a variety of intentional phenomena, in that following a rule requires an agent to accord to a standard of behavior and that her behavior is normatively constrained or delimited by that standard. An agent's rule-following behavior must then at least be *about* rules. Authors disagree on the details of the intentionality of rule-following beyond this basic point.¹

But while it is easy to see how rule-following might require intentionality, it is in fact the converse that has inspired the majority of contemporary rule-following literature. This literature emerges from a gradual change in the conception of logic and reason originating in Enlightenment philosophy. Leibniz (1973 [1712]) believed “it is sufficient for the expression of one thing in another that there should be a certain constant relational *law*, by which particular in the one can be referred to corresponding particulars in the other” (176-177; emphasis added). Using the example of a elliptical projection of a circle, Leibniz explains that “for to any point of the hyperbola a corresponding point of the circle which projects the hyperbola can be assigned by the same constant law” governing representations (177). Leibniz sees such inferential transitions between representations as “applications of general principles” that one has access to prior to engagement with empirical affairs (Brandom 1994: 10). Kant (1996), steeped in Leibniz, contends that “concepts [...] rest on functions” (B93/A68). A function for Kant means “the unity

¹ A famous example of this disagreement is the Dreyfus-McDowell exchange over the phenomenology of perception, action, and rule-following. Dreyfus (2005) took aim at McDowell's conceptualism about perception and action, arguing that intentional agents can act without concepts being a part of their action by “develop[ing] a way of coping in which reasons play no role” (8). McDowell (2007) responds to Dreyfus by reaffirming that “in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness” and correcting problems with Dreyfus' characterization of his conceptualism (339).

of the act of arranging various presentations under one common presentation” (B93/A68), that is, a *rule* for applying a concept to different occasions. Frege later takes up Kant’s position by “respecting and enforcing the distinction between the normative significance of applying concepts and the causal consequences of doing so” (Brandom 1994: 11). In maintaining this distinction Frege seeks to understand the application of concepts in terms of “rational or cognitive right” (12), as opposed to the non-normative regularities of nature.² But after Frege, whose “concerns were at base semantic and not pragmatic” (13), Wittgenstein, a central figure to various strains of analytic philosophy, comes to see that “*intentionally* contentful states and acts have an essentially *normative* pragmatic significance” (13).³ Intentional acts such as meaning or understanding something by a word are “states and acts that *commit* or *oblige* us to act and think in various ways” (13). The meaning of an expression, for example, must indicate how one correctly uses it. Correct and incorrect uses of an expression fix the expression’s meaning for a particular community of speakers. Mature speakers may still use an expression incorrectly, but establishing the proper conditions for using the expression determines just what the expression means. An expression’s meaning normatively constrains when and where the expression can be used. Intentionally contentful states, by extension, limit how one ought to act in light of them by putting constraints on what satisfies a state like belief, understanding, or intention. So the possession of intentionally contentful states requires an agent to follow rules for satisfying the contents of such states.

² For more on Frege’s thoughts on normativity and logic as well as his indebtedness to Kant, see Korhonen (2018).

³ For a recent treatment on Wittgenstein’s understanding of normativity, see Ginsborg (2021).

Analyses of rule-following have much at stake, for whichever analysis wins out will affect areas beyond just the theory of intentionality. Naturalists of many stripes, including both philosophers and cognitive scientists, have attempted to demonstrate that intentional phenomena like rule-following are reducible to physical states that have nothing essentially normative about them. Authors including Jerry Fodor (1987) have believed for some time now that physicists are very close to “complet[ing] the catalogue they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things” (97). Of all the properties that may appear in the physicist’s ontology, Fodor argues that “*aboutness* surely won’t: intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep” (97). According to a naturalist like Fodor, intentionality is not an underivative feature of the universe, but instead a phenomenon that occurs just when certain material arrangements obtain. For intentionality to factor into the physical states of a cognizer, it must be reducible to such arrangements. Fodor finds it “hard to see, in face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist” (97).

There are different routes one can take to reduce rule-following while preserving the sort of naturalism about intentionality just described. One approach to analyzing rule-following is to hold that an agent follows a rule when she has a disposition to accord with that rule.⁴ This approach can easily lead to a fully naturalized theory of rule-following and even of intentionality. One might reduce particular dispositions to discrete physical arrangements, resulting in a reduction of rule-following and intentionality to other non-normative phenomena, in line with Fodor’s position. But one can alternatively endorse an irreducible conception of rule-

⁴ Proponents of this view include Fodor (1987), Dretske (1981), and Martin and Heil (1998).

following and resist naturalization by developing a nonreductive account of rule-following.⁵ A nonreductive account might consist in an agent having a normative mental item, such as a distinctive conscious state that justifies rule-following behavior, that constitutes her rule-following behavior. This particular form of nonreductionism would also be internalistic, in that it appeals to a mental item to explain rule-following. These various approaches to rule-following are not mutually exclusive, and some authors have contributed hybrid accounts to avoid the shortcomings of more theoretically restricted ones.

In her recent body of contributions to rule-following literature, Hannah Ginsborg offers a “partially reductive” theory of rule-following. She takes instances of rule-following to be a combination of a disposition to act consistently with a rule in certain circumstances and a conscious feeling that one’s actions are appropriate in light of past behavior. For Ginsborg, this conscious feeling that what one does is fitting to one’s current circumstances raises a behavioral disposition to an instance of rule-following. This feeling of appropriateness does not contain any propositional content, such as a representation of an abstractly-formulated rule. Ginsborg’s theory is dispositional and internalistic, in that the presence of an occurrent mental state makes one’s behavioral dispositions genuine rule-following behavior. This hybrid approach may overcome the complications with strictly dispositional or strictly internalistic accounts, making her theory highly attractive to readers with different philosophical motivations.

But Ginsborg’s strategy of partial reduction still ignores important facets of rule-following, particularly its *social* aspect. There may be nothing linking different instances of rule-

⁵ Proponents here include McGinn (1984) and Stroud (2000a). Although McGinn uses the term “capacity,” which is often interchangeable with “disposition,” he describes capacities as being more primitive than dispositions. For McGinn “a person’s capacities are just *one* factor operative in determining his behaviour on a particular occasion,” while a disposition “aggregates distinct factors or forces to give a gross result” (1984: 173).

following behavior that unites them into a physically-realized disposition to accord with a rule. At the same time, identifying some consciously-accessible mental item as the determinant of one's rule-following behavior rejects many cases of actual rule-following that simply lack this sort of mental item. To analyze rule-following by reducing rule-followings to dispositions or identifying a special state that makes behavior "rule-following" misses the integral social components of rule-following that are preconditions for subjects making normative judgments about one another.⁶ Complications such as these have inspired various authors to render rule-following a social phenomenon.⁷ Social accounts of rule-following fall under the broader category of social accounts of intentionality, which hold that by their essence, "contentful tokens, like ritual objects, customary performances, and tools, occupy determinate niches within the social fabric" (Haugeland 1998: 147).⁸ One's rule-following is a product of her appreciation and participation in a community and its practices.

Although I deny that any of the aforementioned approaches to rule-following fully capture the phenomenon, I believe certain social elements partly constitute what it is to follow a rule. Rules have distinctive social contexts that determine what it is to follow them, such that, without the necessary context in which one's behavior takes place, one *cannot* follow a particular rule. Navigating these networks and becoming an active member of a particular community requires developing the right concepts of correctness regarding rules. I describe this process as

⁶ Here I am not attacking every form of dispositionalism about rule-following, but rather one that tries to reduce rule-following directly to dispositions analyzed as physical states. Other dispositionalists take a nonreductionist approach to analyzing rule-following or, like Schlossler, suggest that "[r]ules and norms are ... abstract entities, perhaps" which cognizers instantiate (355).

⁷ Social theorists include Wittgenstein (1968), Kripke (1982), Brandom (1994), Stroud (2000b), Bloor (2002), and Kusch (2006).

⁸ Haugeland lists "Martin Heidegger, Wilfrid Sellars, and Robert Brandom" as some the major figures for socially-oriented "neo-pragmatism" about intentionality (1998: 147).

how an individual is *enculturated* into her various social and cultural networks. And it is an individual's *normative identity*, or her accumulated experience and knowledge as part of a social and cultural network, that permits us to make certain rule-following ascriptions of her.⁹

My aim in this thesis is to articulate these essential social elements that a theory of rule-following must accommodate. Although I am not providing my own theory of rule-following, the constraints I identify here preclude pure internalism and certain forms of reductionism. Such accounts overlook not only the significance of social inculcation to rule-following but also overly emphasize rule-following as a consciously-directed act of according with a standard. This latter problem with such accounts excludes a genuine form of rule-following I call *implicit rule-following*. Additionally, given that she provides an interesting and compelling hybrid account of rule-following, I address Ginsborg's primitive normativity account. Ginsborg's account exemplifies a conciliatory attitude toward theories of rule-following that nevertheless ignores the social component of rule-following. While I believe hybrid accounts like Ginsborg's are the most promising analyses of rule-following, I attempt to demonstrate that her intentional-dispositional account does not suffice, as it restricts its analysis to an individual's behavior and mental states. The shortcomings of Ginsborg's account give cause to search for a stronger account of rule-following, thus inspiring the social constraints of enculturation and normative identity I introduce in this work.

In Section 1, "Reduction, Dispositionalism, and Rule-Following," I provide an overview for several important concepts I refer to throughout. These include the common forms of

⁹ This understanding of identity is not synonymous with *personal* identity in the strict metaphysical sense, but rather concerns the collective body of facts relating to one's momentary behaviors, proclivities, and history as a normative agent.

reductionism, dispositionalism, and internalism about rule-following, as well as the broader metaphysical positions these can be couched in.

Section 2, “The Primitive Normativity Account and its Influences,” recounts Hannah Ginsborg’s primitive normativity account of rule-following. In 2.1 I provide an overview of relevant work from Wittgenstein, Kripke, and Barry Stroud, as Ginsborg’s account is inspired by and in dialogue with each of these contributors. I then outline Ginsborg’s primitive normativity account of rule-following in 2.2.

In Section 3, “Primitive Appropriateness and its Methodological Problems,” I pose certain methodological problems regarding Ginsborg’s notion of a *sui generis* state of primitive appropriateness. I call these the *parsimony problem* and the *explanatory problem*.

Following from the issues identified in the previous section, Section 4, “Enculturation, Normative Identity, and Community,” elaborates certain concepts I take to be essential for any robust account of rule-following. These include the distinction between *explicit* and *implicit rule-following*, the communal process of *enculturation* of rule-followers, and *normative identity*, the collective body of past behaviors and contexts of an individual that permit us to ascribe rule-following behavior to one another. This requires some consideration of extended cognition, a concept first introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers which I explore in Section 4.2. I treat implicit rule-following in Section 4.3, which I take to be a genuine form of rule-following that has been overlooked by much rule-following literature. Implicit rule-following is explicable only with the social concepts I introduce, and so any successful theory of rule-following must feature a social aspect that at the very least includes enculturation and normative identity.

I conclude by considering how the concepts explored in this work should apply to future contributions to rule-following literature.

1 REDUCTIONISM, DISPOSITIONALISM, AND INTERNALISM

Reductionism about rule-following consists of analyzing rule-following behavior with phenomena that are not normative or intentional in themselves. Many contributors to rule-following literature take different approaches to reducing rule-following. In particular, I will cover conceptual reductionism and ontological reductionism along with dispositionalism and internalism about rule-following.

Conceptual reductionism is a reduction of the *concept* of rule-following to other concepts. This amounts to a linear analysis of rule-following to a different concept. One could argue that the concept “rule-following” is reducible to the concept “intentional behavior,” so whatever applies to the concept “rule-following” would then also apply to the concept “intentional behavior.” If this conceptual reduction checks out, then there can be no meaningful distinction between rule-following and intentional behavior. The same goes for reducing the concept of “heat” to “mean molecular motion.” We might preserve the term “heat” colloquially, but every correct use of “heat” must be an application of the concept of mean molecular motion following the reduction.

Although the conceptual status of rule-following is clearly relevant to rule-following accounts, far and away the most common form of reductionism about rule-following is ontological reductionism. This form of reductionism consists in reducing various entities or properties to other entities or properties. Proponents are generally committed to a form of monism, namely physicalism. Ontological reductionism often comes in one of two specific varieties, which differ in the strength of their commitments. *Type-type reductionism* is the view that an entire kind or “type” of existent or property in one ontological category reduces to a type

in another. A type-type reductionist about mental properties holds that “[a]ny mental kind which is nomologically possibly instantiated is identical to a physical kind” (van Riel 2014: 131), meaning that a certain kind of mental state is *uniquely* identical to a certain kind of physical state. This position, however, has strong theoretical commitments which make it costlier than the alternative. Reducing mental types to physical types seems impossible “[i]f a mental property is multiply realized by a variety of physical properties in diverse spaces and structures” (Kim 1995: 751). If this is the case, a mental property appears unable to “be identified with any single physical property” (751). *Token-token reductionists* avoid the stronger commitments of type-type reductionism by holding that, “[f]or any token of any mental kind, it is identical to a physical token” (van Riel 2014: 135).¹⁰ A “token” in this sense is an instance of one ontological kind, and the token-token reductionist believes that *only* tokens, not types, of one category can reduce to tokens of another. The token-token reductionist can simply say that mental states *do* reduce to physical ones, while also holding that particular mental states are the products of different physical states at different times.

Dispositionalism is the view that there are properties called *dispositions* that manifest some action or behavior under particular conditions.¹¹ Dispositionalists about rule-following are generally physicalists, adherents to the “doctrine that everything is physical” (Davis 1995: 679).¹² A dispositionalist might take behavioral dispositions to be properties instantiated by

¹⁰ Type-type and token-token reductionism are also called *type-identity* and *token-identity reductionism* respectively.

¹¹ Dispositions may be contrasted with categorical properties, which some argue do “not [...] carry inherent causal relevance” (Dummsday 2019: 1). The property of being square, for example, “tells us nothing about what that object can do or have done to it” (1).

¹² Physicalism itself entails naturalism, the view “that everything there is belongs to the world of nature, and so can be studied by the methods appropriate for studying that world” (Lacey 1995: 604). One can be a naturalist without being a physicalist as long as one does not admit “incursions from outside by souls or spirits, divine or human” or “strange entities like non-natural values or substantive abstract universals” (604).

certain physical arrangements, and this approach leads to a reductive dispositionalist theory of rule-following.¹³ Broadly speaking, contributors to rule-following literature are interested in whether rule-following can be reduced ontologically to physical states. If this is so, rule-following debates can be subsumed under the larger umbrella of debates about metaphysics of mind, with much favor going to the physicalist.

I now outline a number of reductive approaches I will refer back to in what follows. One is *naturalistic reductionism*, the view that instances of rule-following behavior can be completely reduced to non-normative natural phenomena. The naturalistic reductionist would accept that rule-following is ontologically reducible, but not necessarily conceptually reducible. A naturalistic reductionist seeks not to eliminate the concept of rule-following, but rather to specify its applicandum in natural, non-normative terms. To this end, naturalistic reductionists may take the stance that behavior is simply dispositional and dispositions reduce to physically-determined regularities to act in particular ways given the circumstances. To deal with mental phenomena relevant to rule-following, they can endorse at least token-token reductionism. This view is attractive to many philosophers and cognitive scientists who want to completely naturalize intentionality. It also avoids potential complications with incorporating non-physical entities or phenomena into accounts of rule-following and intentionality.

An alternative position is *nonreductionist dispositionalism*, which takes rule-following to be the possession of a disposition to follow a rule that is not completely reducible to the physical. There may be a supervenience relation between intentional behavior and physical states, but that

¹³ Alternatively, a property dualist could reduce rule-following to dispositions or capacities that are themselves irreducible properties.

would not entail that intentional behavior is reducible to physical states.¹⁴ On the other hand, *internalistic nonreductionists* hold that some irreducible, nondispositional mental item distinguishes rule-following behavior from non-normative behavior. Having a nondispositional mental state, such as a feeling or an occurrent state (e.g. Ginsborg’s notion of “primitive appropriateness”), makes behavior rule-following. Still another kind of nonreductionist about rule-following would deny internalism. Barry Stroud, an important contributor to rule-following literature and an inspiration for Ginsborg’s own contributions, defends such a nonreductionism about language. As will be discussed later, Stroud maintains that the use of expressions “can be described in explicitly semantic or intentional terms and the abilities constitutive of linguistic understanding can be characterized in terms of what we can *say* or *mean*” (Miller 2019: 737). He believes the normativity of language can only be described in nonreductive terms by speakers who have already developed a command of language.

¹⁴ Supervenience is a relation between two sets of properties: *A* properties supervene on *B* properties iff no difference in *A* can occur without a difference in *B*. Supervenience is necessary for reduction, but certain properties might supervene on others while still being irreducible to the latter. Mental properties may supervene on physical properties, but that does not entail mental and physical properties are ontologically identical.

2 THE PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY ACCOUNT AND ITS INFLUENCES

Rule-following accounts are traditionally developed to answer a certain “skepticism” about rule-following articulated by Saul Kripke in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Kripke himself was trying to clarify a particular aspect of Wittgenstein’s later work which he thought had been previously misunderstood. Given that Ginsborg develops what I call her *primitive normativity account of rule-following* (hereafter PNA) as a contribution to this literature, I provide brief synopses of the relevant material from Wittgenstein and Kripke. Additionally, I cover Stroud’s nonreductionism about language, as Ginsborg first develops her PNA as a response to problems she identifies in his work.

2.1 BACKGROUND

In the *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter *PI*), Wittgenstein contributes consequential analyses of language, meaning, rule-following, and psychological notions, many of which are still important in professional philosophical literature. One contribution that unites each of these different strands commonly goes by the *private language argument*, drawn primarily from §§243–271. The passages contend that a language invented by someone to describe her private sensations is an impossibility. Based on Wittgenstein’s considerations on the nature of language, including the roles that community and training play in developing one’s linguistic capacities, an inventor alone cannot assign and fix meanings to such a language’s signs, and so a language invented for one’s private sensation would be meaningless.

Because of the *PI*’s aphoristic and opaque style, there are nearly as many interpretations of the private language argument as there are interpreters. Each tries to synthesize the disparate threads of Wittgenstein’s text into a coherent argument and to explain its implications. Kripke

called for a revision in then-current thinking about the private language argument in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982).¹⁵ He contends that “the basic ‘private language argument’ precedes section 243” as opposed to *beginning* there (5). According to Kripke, Wittgenstein poses a “skeptical paradox” of meaning and rule-following where “no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule” (*PI* §201). Starting from this point, Kripke then develops what the Wittgenstinian skeptical problem is and what it entails, drawing from sections of the *PI* prior to §243. He first discusses what it means to “grasp” the rule for addition when confronted with the symbol “+” and the word “plus.” An essential part of one’s grasp of a rule like addition is that “the rule determines [the] answer for indefinitely many new sums that [one] ha[s] never previously considered” (Kripke 1982: 7). There are distinctive normative constraints when one grasps the addition rule such that “[one’s] past intentions regarding addition determine a unique answer for indefinitely many new cases in the future” (8). A rule, under this view, is an infinitely applicable procedure that always results in a determinate answer according with one’s past intentions. For any never before encountered addition problem, such as “68 + 57,” the rule mandates the answer “125.” This is the correct answer not only in the mathematical sense that 68 and 57 *do* make 125, but also in the “metalinguistic sense that ‘plus’, as [Kripke] intended to use that word in the past, denoted a function which, when applied to the numbers [he] called ‘68’ and ‘57’, yields the value 125” (8).

¹⁵ The contents of *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* are taken from multiple lectures Kripke gave starting from 1976 (Diamond 1983: 96). Kripke’s views were well-known to Wittgenstein commentators prior to the publication of this text in 1982.

But Kripke then introduces his “bizarre sceptic” of meaning and rule-following (1982: 8),¹⁶ who believes that rules like the one for addition *cannot* be infinitely applied in the metalinguistic sense. Kripke’s skeptic “suggests, as [Kripke] used the term ‘plus’ in the past, the answer [he] intended for ‘68 + 57’ should have been 5” (8). The skeptic believes that Kripke has been “quadding” instead of adding for every equation involving “+” and “plus” he has previously encountered. According to the skeptic, “quaddition” is a mathematical operation nearly identical to addition, save for the significant added condition that if any of the initial terms are greater than 57, the result will be 5. So, if Kripke intended to conform to quaddition, he ought to have answered the problem with “5” instead of “125.” Kripke himself notes that the skeptic’s position is outlandish, but concedes that it has bite—not because it is intuitively or demonstrably true, but because it cannot be easily disproven. Some identifiable fact about one’s past applications of a rule must determine what rule one presently conforms to. But there seems to be nothing of the sort.

After presenting the skeptical paradox and rejecting certain responses to it, Kripke details his own solution. He distinguishes between “straight” solutions to skeptical paradoxes, a type of solution that “shows [...] on closer examination the skepticism proves to be unwarranted” (1982: 66), from “skeptical” solutions.¹⁷ Kripke describes the latter as follows:

A sceptical solution of a sceptical problem begins [...] by conceding that a sceptic’s negative assertions are unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is

¹⁶ Kripke prefers the spelling “sceptic” and “sceptical” in his work. “Skeptic” and “skeptical” are the standard North American spellings.

¹⁷ Kripke borrows the notion of a skeptical solution from David Hume (1982: 66).

justified because—contrary appearances notwithstanding—it need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable. (66)

Kripke's skeptical solution lies in a community's practice of "admitting" speakers into the community. Speakers are judged by individual members of a community for their grasp of the "*assertability conditions*" of various expressions (1982: 74), or the proper conditions under which an expression is used. These are community-sanctioned approvals of when and where expressions should be used given their role in the community's practices. Through training and practice with a community's customs, one comes to be "judged" by the community as to whether she has learned how to use an expression or follow a rule. If a community judges an individual to have passed a sufficient amount of these tests, she "is admitted as a normal speaker and member of the community" (92). The skeptical solution gives up on realism about the meanings of expressions outside of a community, since meanings are only fixed by the communally approved role that every contentful expression is granted. Realism about meaning would require that there is a distinct *fact* about what some expression means on a particular occasion, which is just what the skeptical paradox demonstrates is impossible. But Kripke's meaning anti-realism does not entail that a solitary Robinson Crusoe, lacking any community to judge his behavior, cannot follow rules. Kripke argues instead that "*if we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him*" (110). Only if Crusoe were considered part of no community could one say that he follows no rules. In sum, one means what they do in broadly conforming to a community's constellation of concepts and their assertability conditions (Green: 5-9).

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language inaugurated a new secondary Wittgenstein literature in response to what Kripke got “personally ... out of reading Wittgenstein” (Kripke 1982: 5). Many philosophers, including Stroud, reject Kripke’s skeptical solution and argue that the paradox can be refuted with a straight solution. Taking inspiration from Wittgensteinian texts including the *PI* and its precursor the *Blue Book* (1935), Stroud develops an alternative social understanding of rule-following which admits of meaning facts whose account does not lead to problems of regress. Stroud, following his reading of Wittgenstein, begins his article by rejecting that “[s]igns [...] get their meanings from processes accompanying or producing the utterance of them or the response to them” (2000b: 81).¹⁸ Instead, Wittgenstein holds that “a person who means or understands a sentence he utters or hears is not operating a calculus at all” (Stroud 2000b: 82), since there is no distinctive mental item or operation that produces meaning for one’s words. Rather, mastery over a language “is nothing more than the person’s capacity to produce the correct signs of the language in the right way on the appropriate occasions and to respond appropriately to the utterances of others” (82). The use of a sign is what gives it meaning or “life,” as opposed to the way that computers or machines can manipulate “dead” signs but not intentionally use or understand them (81).

Stroud emphasizes that communal accord about an expression’s use is only a recognition of a standard of use, a fact that is separate from the actual meaning of the expression. Stroud notes that “[t]o identify the meaning of an expression [one] ha[s] to say precisely *what* use it has” (86). Communal agreement about the general uses of an expression is necessary to

¹⁸ Stroud (2018) elaborates on this point elsewhere when he asserts that “knowing what an expression means can be nothing other than knowing how it is or has been used” (242). A sign obtains its meaning through its various applications by users and not through other concomitant mental processes.

determine the correctness of particular uses, but it does nothing to specify what the actual use or meaning of an expression is:

What matters in each case is *how* [speakers] use the expressions in question—not simply whether they all use them in the same way, but what particular role the expressions actually play in what the people are doing when they use them. Those uses can be described. They are observable matters of fact. (91)

According to Stroud, all that is needed to defeat Kripke’s skeptical paradox is to emphasize “that the fact of [speakers’] meaning what they do is not *simply* the fact that they all use certain signs in the same way” (91; emphasis added). Were the two facts about meaning and use “simply” the same, this would amount to a reduction of use to other facts, which Stroud rejects as a nonreductionist. Kripke’s view that the nature of nonreductive states of meaning are “completely mysterious” may seem at first to undermine Stroud’s nonreductionism (1982: 51). But Kripke’s point only holds for states that *guide* use, so says Stroud. Kripke’s skeptic is wary of semantic facts that relate past actions to present ones, which are subject to the same paradox as meaning “plus” was. Stroud “avoids the accusation of mystery-mongering by rejecting the idea that meaning facts have to be capable of guiding competent use” (Miller 2019: 738). His meaning facts are simply about the use of expressions, which can be intelligible, though not reduced, just through irreducible specifications of use.

Stroud ends by noting a certain dissatisfaction with his nonreductive straight solution. Since one begins to analyze language having already been raised in a linguistic community, “[n]othing we say within the language about the meaning or understanding of expressions could serve to get us into language in the first place” (Stroud 2000b: 94). For Stroud, we must have

already developed a skillful capacity for language, and have already been a member of a linguistic community, to analyze language itself.

2.2 THE PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY ACCOUNT

Ginsborg lays the foundation for the PNA in an article on Stroud's nonreductionism. Here Ginsborg rejects that meaning is irreducible. Instead, she seeks to *partially* reduce meaning. We can study language from the "outside" of a community "by characterizing the capacities involved in speaking and understanding a language in a way which makes it unmysterious how we can come to acquire them" (2011a: 166). What separates meaningful uses of words or purposeful behavior in response to some utterance by another is a conscious awareness that one's response is appropriate to the occasion.

Ginsborg uses Wittgenstein's builder-assistant scenario originally discussed in *PI* §2 to illustrate this conscious awareness of appropriateness. In this section, Wittgenstein depicts an imaginary scenario with two individuals, a builder "A" and his assistant "B," who speak the same language. The "language" that they speak "consist[s] of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'" (*PI* §2). Their language functions such that when "A calls [a word] out [...] B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call" (§2). Ginsborg describes the normative implications of their use of language:

[The assistant] conceives the relation between the builder's shout and his own response not just as causal but also as normative: he takes the shout not only to elicit, but also to make appropriate, the response which he is giving. (2011a: 169)

The assistant has a conscious awareness that his response is appropriate to the occasion, a fact that makes his response an instance of rule-following, whereas it would fail to be one were there no such consciousness.

For Ginsborg, “this consciousness [...] does not guide, instruct, or justify the assistant in his response to the sign,” but instead “is responsible for the meaningfulness of expression” (2011a: 170). This consciousness of normativity imbues signs with meaning, or “life” following Stroud, “simply by making the difference between a merely reflexive response to (or production of) a sign, and the kind of response which we think of as ‘intelligent’ in the sense of involving understanding” (170). This central notion, which she later comes to call “primitive normativity,” “offers a middle way between” two responses Kripke finds insufficient for refuting his skeptic of meaning (2011b: 230). These responses are: (1) a reduction of rule-following behavior to dispositions to behave in ways relevant to one’s context and (2) a nonreductionist proposal for rule-following as a primitive state. According to Ginsborg, one need only have a certain “normative attitude” regarding the appropriateness of one’s response given one’s past responses to elevate dispositional responses to instances of rule-following (240). This feeling of “primitive appropriateness,” that one is acting as one ought to in light of past behavior, is all that is necessary for meaning “plus” instead of “quus” when coupled with a disposition to respond with the sum in plus queries. Primitive appropriateness answers the normativity constraint of Kripke’s skeptic:

When the skeptic asks what it was about you in virtue of which you previously meant addition rather than quaddition, you can say that it was your being disposed to give the

sum rather than the quum and, in so doing, to take yourself to be doing as you ought in the primitive sense. (245)

Ginsborg describes her account as “partially reductionist,” as she neither conducts a naturalistic reduction nor holds rule-following to be irreducible. She “aims to reduce facts about meaning to facts that are in a sense more primitive” although she “does not attempt a reduction of meaning to facts conceived purely naturalistically” (2011b: 230). One’s feeling of appropriateness is not that one correctly followed a particular rule, but instead that the response was simply appropriate to the occasion. Were primitive appropriateness to be grasping a rule, such that consciously entertaining a rule justifies an indefinite number of a rule-follower’s responses, Ginsborg’s account would succumb to Kripke’s skeptic. This understanding of a speaker’s grasp of an expression as a mental representation of a rule is what Kripke’s skeptic is calling into question. Ginsborg also holds that states of primitive appropriateness are themselves triggered by dispositions:

[...] your disposition is not just to say ‘125’ in answer to ‘68 plus 57,’ ‘126’ in answer to ‘68 plus 58,’ and so on; it is also, in each case, to take what you are saying to be the appropriate response to the query. You are disposed not only to respond with a number which is in fact the sum, but to consider that particular response appropriate. (2011b: 244-245)¹⁹

¹⁹ Following Ginsborg’s characterization of the PNA, primitive states of appropriateness might not amount to actually considering one’s actions appropriate. “Consideration” is generally thought to follow from deliberation, which primitive states of appropriateness seem not to be. As Ginsborg does not distinguish primitive appropriateness from consideration so conceived, I read her as claiming one merely needs the disposition to have primitive states of appropriateness to be a rule-follower.

This means that the PNA is dispositional both regarding the regularity of behavior and the source of mental states. The PNA is still internalistic in that the presence—or, at least, the disposition to be present—of primitive appropriateness is what distinguishes a rule-following from non-normative behavior.²⁰

Ginsborg builds on the PNA by reevaluating how we first come to follow rules. Her notion of “going on,” “consist[ing] [...] in behaviour involving conscious conformity to previous behaviour, as in the case of continuing a simple arithmetical series” (2020: 1), serves as the foundation for rule-following itself. The very ability to “go on” in a sequential procedure like counting natural numbers, holding each step to be appropriate with reference to past steps taken, is a necessary condition for becoming a rule-follower. Going on “seems to be a prior condition of coming to grasp rules and concepts” (Ginsborg 2020: 7-8). This runs contra Kripke, who “assume[s] that the kind of normative requirement that is central to our ordinary understanding of rule-following [...] can be understood only as a matter of accordance with a grasped rule or an item of intentional content” (10). And this assumption that rule-following always requires an item of intentional content leads to Kripke’s skeptical paradox and the continued debate about the issue.

To sum up the foregoing: the PNA is an account of rule-following that takes instances of rule-following to be comprised of two different phenomena. These are a disposition to behave as one has in the past, which provides the behavioral aspect of rule-following, and a disposition to consciously take one’s behavior to be appropriate to the occasion, which provides the normative

²⁰ The PNA would not be internalistic if the content of a primitive state of appropriateness were externally determined, following semantic externalism. But Ginsborg never states that primitive appropriateness is externally determined.

aspect. Ginsborg's account avoids two common pitfalls: (1) reducing rule-following to dispositions and (2) appealing to some mental item with propositional guidance. Ginsborg's account is partially reductive in that she situates it "between a fully reductive naturalistic dispositionalism and the antireductionist view that meaning or content states are *sui generis*" (2011b: 252). An abstract formulation of rule-following according to the PNA would be:

Primitive Normativity Account: *S* follows rule *R* on occasion *O* by φ -ing iff *S* has disposition *D* to φ plus disposition *P* to have a feeling of primitive appropriateness *F*.

3 PRIMITIVE APPROPRIATENESS AND ITS METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

While the PNA has compelling theoretical and explanatory merits, it rests on our ability to be consciously aware that our responses are appropriate to their particular occasions. A robust account of rule-following, however, may not need such an internal state as primitive appropriateness. One might compare rules to social norms,²¹ which are distinguished from rules as abstract constraints on behavior with strictly formulable correctness conditions. Consciously thinking about a norm seems less necessary for determining behavior in agents than consciously thinking about rules. Peter Railton discusses how “the norms we hold [...] are reflected in the ways we *frame* our practical situations” even when we do not consciously think of or accept them (2006: 15). As he illustrates in his everyday examples of norms relating to bus passes and departmental confidentiality, norms frame an agent’s actions in that “[t]hey limit the otherwise unbounded and undelimited character of experience and restrict one’s scope of attention—not because one *sees* the frame, but because what one sees is seen *through* it” (15). Although norms have a regulative aspect in relation to behavior, such that one must consciously recognize a norm to evaluate an agent’s conformity, many of the norms we conform to are never consciously recognized despite the fact that we *do* conform to them.²² Railton observes that “[w]e often

²¹ Rules and norms are both types of regulatory constraints on behavior, but they are not synonymous. Norms may be broadly defined as “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior” (“norm, n.1”). A rule, on the other hand, is a principle able to be abstractly formulated into a procedure that can be executed by an agent.

²² Ginsborg could certainly accept that in certain cases we follow rules we are not distinctly aware of. As long as one has the right disposition and a primitive sense of appropriateness regarding one’s actions, Ginsborg may say that some rule is being followed. I believe her account would still be inadequate *simpliciter* if the objections discussed below are correct.

discover what norms we hold only indirectly, from seeing how we react to another culture, changed life circumstances, personal emergencies, and even long-sought successes” (16).

Seeing that we can ascribe normative accord to agents without also claiming there are mental items by which agents grasp norms, this could also go for rules. And we should generally favor an account that tries as much as possible to avoid quantifying over unnecessary mental states or items. But Ginsborg argues that “there are grounds for treating [primitive appropriateness] as a special case” of mental state (2011b: 252). She sees primitive appropriateness as “not being susceptible to the same kind of skeptical challenge which can be developed for *addition* or *grue*” (252).²³ Ginsborg’s primary rationale for primitive appropriateness is that she wishes to put the facts relevant to rule-following “below the level of facts about meaning” but still “above the level of mere behavioral responses and their psychological concomitants” (2011b: 230). She “maintain[s] that there is a sense in which you ought to say ‘125,’ given the finite list of your previous uses, independent of what meaning, if any, those uses expressed” (232-233). Primitive appropriateness is the very phenomenon that, in combination with a behavioral disposition to accord with a rule, makes one’s behavior genuinely rule-following. If there must be some explanatory postulate between facts about meaning and facts about behavior and psychology, then Ginsborg is willing to accept the unique status of primitive appropriateness in order to preserve her theory.

But primitive appropriateness’ unique status leads to a vexing concern: how is primitive appropriateness instantiated as the same type of mental state across occasions? If this question cannot be answered, it seems we could not know whether a subject has the state and is therefore

²³ For “grue,” see Goodman (1983).

following a rule. Although all states of primitive appropriateness are caused by the same disposition, it is not clear *how* we can recognize them as states of primitive appropriateness on different occasions. Here Ginsborg is presented with two different lemmas: to either accept or reject that primitive appropriateness is a unique mental state that can be distinguished from other mental states. If states of primitive appropriateness all share a special metaphysical status by instantiating some normativity-conferring property to one's behavior, then we might admit more postulates than we need to explain rule-following. And until further criteria are provided for distinguishing primitive appropriateness from other states, primitive appropriateness appears to be an epistemically unsure foundation for rule-following. If they do not share such a status and are just mere feelings or affective states,²⁴ no new metaphysical notion or special state needs to be introduced by the PNA. The cost of this move, however, is severe. It contradicts Ginsborg's view that primitive appropriateness is a unique and irreducible mental state. It is just because primitive appropriateness is a *sui generis* state that it is not subject to problems of regress.

It seems that Ginsborg is forced to accept the first lemma and thus must further justify why we should consider primitive appropriateness a necessary postulate. This move leads to two further *methodological* problems with primitive appropriateness. These problems rest on the fact that primitive appropriateness is shared *ex hypothesi* across all rule-followers and manifests as a distinctive mental state. The first methodological problem I identify is the *parsimony problem*. The second is the *explanatory problem*.

²⁴ States of primitive appropriateness fall short of being belief states. Ginsborg at times calls primitive appropriateness a "consciousness of appropriateness" (2011b: 237), but she also describes whether one follows a rule as "doing or not doing as what you are disposed to *regard* as appropriate to the context" (245; emphasis added). On another occasion she considers primitive appropriateness to consist in "the thought *this is appropriate*" (251). At the very least states of primitive appropriateness are *about* one's action and amount to "entertain[ing] a concept of normative fit" (252).

The parsimony problem follows from endorsing primitive appropriateness while dismissing metaphysically simpler accounts of rule-following. As expressed above, a theoretically limited rule-following account should be preferred to an account that introduces several explanatory concepts or postulates. A robust theory of rule-following should commit us to as few postulates as needed to explain rule-following. Primitive appropriateness cannot be subsumed under another category of mental state, given that it is *sui generis* and comes between facts about meaning and our behavior and psychology. Primitive appropriateness is also not conceptually reducible to belief states, for if it were it would lose its normativity-conferring status. Given this issue of parsimony, more metaphysically parsimonious theories should be preferred if we can devise alternatives.

The explanatory problem concerns the need for an explanation of primitive appropriateness other than first-person experience. Different reports of primitive appropriateness may be of qualitatively different kinds of experiences that resist singular categorization. Perhaps there are many different ways for one to consider that her action was appropriate to the context. One could have various levels of doubt about how correct her actions are on different occasions. A threshold for doubt could possibly determine whether one has followed a rule or not, since one can act in an apparently rule-abiding way but still not apply concepts of “ought” or “appropriate” to her behavior. Viewing that some action *might be* appropriate appears distinct from taking one’s action to actually be appropriate, and this could make all the difference between rule-following and not. A math student may take her integration of a natural logarithm to be the best response she can muster while still being unsure about its appropriateness. If the student ends up integrating correctly, in spite of her tentative or conjectural rule-following, Ginsborg could still

hold that this was not a genuine rule-following given that the student's doubts did not amount to a state of primitive appropriateness. Many apparently valid instances of rule-following would then amount to failed attempts to accord with a rule or unjustified behavior that just so happens to accord with a rule. How primitive appropriateness manifests as the same state across rule-followings is unclear and gives reason to doubt that they constitute a *sui generis* mental state. It is incumbent on Ginsborg to provide further criteria for distinguishing primitive appropriateness from other mental states, even if she considers them primitive states.

One might reply that there is no such problem for other mental states. Although belief states manifest differently on various occasions, no one doubts that such mental states exist and play an integral role in explaining rule-following. If there are doubts regarding how primitive appropriateness is to be explained, the same should go for belief states more broadly, as they are in some sense a postulate to explain our mental lives and psychological data.

But I respond by maintaining that the role of primitive appropriateness changes how we should treat it. The case of primitive appropriateness is not fully analogous to that of belief states in that the former plays a very specific explanatory role. The difference in treatment between primitive appropriateness and belief states lies in the fact that *even if* belief states were just theoretical postulates, they are still fundamentally necessary for an account of the mind and mental processes of human beings. Belief states are "often (especially in the philosophy of mind) taken to be the primary cognitive state" (Dretske 1995: 83), and their existence is further vindicated by our conscious experience and psychological data. Belief states are not just any sort of postulate, for they appear to be *uniquely appropriate* to explaining mental activity. Primitive appropriateness lacks the broad support and explanatory power of belief states. Various feelings

or senses we are directly aware of may *seem* to be instances of primitive appropriateness, but neither these phenomenal appearances, nor the disposition to have such appearances, serve as the normativity-conferring component of rule-following. I do not deny that from time to time we take ourselves to be acting as we ought without a further grasp of something that guides our behavior. Rather, I deny that this amounts to a *sui generis* state with normative content. I seek instead to defend an understanding of rule-following where whether one follows a rule is not determined by having a conscious sense of appropriateness in addition to a particular behavioral disposition. My alternative is *social* in nature, for I believe that communally-held judgments play many important roles in rule-following and that rule-following cannot be fully explicated without at least some social component.

4 ENCULTURATION, NORMATIVE IDENTITY, AND COMMUNITY

4.1 ENCULTURATION, NORMATIVE IDENTITY, AND RULE-FOLLOWING

Seeing that a hybrid account, i.e., one that has elements of nonreductive internalism and naturalistic reductionism, still runs into problems, the alternative may be to emphasize the necessity of the social for rule-following. In this section I define two key social notions, “enculturation” and “normative identity,” that future accounts of rule-following must adopt. Much of the following in this section has been inspired by Kripke’s skeptical solution. Kripke’s solution, as discussed earlier in this work, is a social account of rule-following where becoming a rule-follower means being admitted into a community of other rule-followers. What I intend here is to develop the concepts of enculturation and normative identity to explain my understanding of implicit rule-following. My contributions further specify how admission into a community of speakers or rule-followers applies to implicit rule-following. I leave enculturation and normative identity as social notions that need to be incorporated into a robust account of rule-following. I am ultimately agnostic as to what such an account would look like in detail, but it must include at least these social notions relating to rule-following ascriptions.

I distinguish between two general ways of conceiving rule-following, one of which I find to be largely overlooked in rule-following literature. John Haugeland held that, to make sense of the normative bounds of one’s rule-following, a “rule to be followed must be *explicitly formulated* in some code or language” (1998: 149; emphasis added). Taking inspiration from Haugeland, I call the first conception of rule-following “explicit” and the second “implicit.” Explicit rule-following consists of having a conscious mental state that authorizes or justifies one’s actions as they are performed. This is how rules are generally taught to young children in a

classroom setting or at home, such as when a child is first taught how to count. When first learning to count, the child must pay close attention to every step in the sequence, holding each successive step to be part of a single replicable process. A counter has learned the rule for counting explicitly when she develops *ceteris paribus* a conscious state that justifies her every step as she counts. Such a state could have propositional content (e.g. a proposition with the content “add 2 to the preceding number in the series”), or it could be a state similar to primitive appropriateness. Implicit rule-following, on the other hand, consists of following a rule without anything conscious that authorizes behavior.²⁵ A rule-follower need not have any particular feeling or conscious item that must occur when she follows a rule. Contra Ginsborg and the PNA, rules are *assimilated* over time, such that one having assimilated a rule can follow that rule even if there is no conscious recognition of a rule needing to be followed.²⁶

I believe both explicit and implicit rule-following occur in normative agents and must both be covered by any account of rule-following. A robust rule-following account must include implicit rule-following as the genuine article it is. However, it seems many participants in the rule-following debate take explicit rule-following to be the paradigm and leave implicit rule-following either unanalyzed, overlooked, or treated as irrelevant to genuine cases of rule-

²⁵ Ginsborg also touches on implicit rule-following, defining it as “the operation of a ‘subpersonal’ mechanism, where the rule is viewed as a representation to which the subject’s cognitive system, but not the subject herself, has access” (2011b: 239). While she accepts that subpersonal mechanisms could be relevant to one’s following a rule, she rejects that a subject “taking [her response] to be appropriate could be based on her recognition that it accords with that representation” (239). One must possess a disposition to have primitive states of appropriateness even in cases of implicit rule-following according to the PNA.

²⁶ By “assimilate” I do not mean to say that an implicit rule-following is a matter of “internalizing” a rule. Dreyfus rejects that “the rules of [some] game must be *internalized*, that is, stored in the mind” for one to play the game competently and without conscious consideration of the rules (2005: 9). An expert chess player “can be led to remember or at least acknowledge the rules when he is told them, and he knows he must conform to them or be penalized” (9), but is not always consciously aware of them nor are the rules unconsciously “present” in the player’s mind.

following. Since implicit rule-following deserves just as much attention, I make a point of determining what concepts are necessary to further analyze and defend a social conception of implicit rule-following. Social factors are partial determinants of implicit rule-following, for ascriptions of rule-following behavior that occur implicitly result from what we believe and find right to say about each other.

A master in some skill distinguishes herself from a novice *inter alia* by whether her skills are so ingrained that she no longer needs to explicitly follow a rule. Thinking back to counting, a child has mastered counting just when she can continue the sequence without having to consider whether her action is conforming to the counting rule. This process of adopting and assimilating certain normative behaviors through social indoctrination and practice such that they lose their explicit character I call *enculturation*. Someone who has been enculturated to act on or respond to certain stimuli in a particular manner can, even when lacking a distinct conscious item that colors her actions, follow a rule. The individual has a history of training or practice such that new actions reference past behavior without needing to entertain some conscious item.

In a similar vein, Wittgenstein explores how agents can be guided in normative practices without conscious awareness of or conformity to a rule in some remarks outside the *PI*. He describes how a craftsman engages in his aesthetic pursuits without propositional knowledge that directs or justifies how he alters the height of a door (2007: 14-15). Attending to his phenomenology reveals that, although craftsman has an aesthetic sense that directs and justifies his behavior, he approaches his tools and his work without the intermediation of concepts.²⁷ He

²⁷ In Heideggerian terms, the craftsperson is encountering their tools as they are *zuhanden*, “ready-to-hand.” Heidegger terms this mode of experience *Zuhandenheit* or “handiness,” the initial way we encounter objects in the world as useful or practical items (1996: 71). Macquarrie and Robinson render *Zuhandenheit* as “readiness-to-hand”

has developed aesthetic “instincts” that determine how he goes about his business. Such instincts are not only “socially acquired and controlled” but also “flexible in the sense that these reactions are sensitive to the situational context” (Rietveld 2008: 978).

Enculturation is not reducible to the acquisition of dispositions. Much normative behavior cannot be reduced to dispositions because what is counted as an instance of some normative behavior is highly judgment-dependent. By “judgment-dependent,” I mean that just what satisfies a particular ascription is determined by an individual or a community *judging* that something merits such an ascription. Our judgments as to what phenomena fall under what categories are learned through exposure to how a community organizes its categories. What counts as “speaking English,” for example, is laden with judgments as to what is and is not properly English. Dialects of English can differ greatly from each other such that they may hamper mutual intelligibility. But, though speakers of different regional dialects of English all use different pronunciation, vocabulary, and grammar, they are united into a common group of speakers not necessarily by means of some set disposition that each speaker possesses, but instead by a common treatment of certain languages as dialects of English.²⁸ That many people agree about what counts as “English,” share similar reasons for their beliefs, and use the term in similar ways means that they make the same broad judgments about English.

I take the judgment-dependence of normative ascriptions to be one of the important morals of Wittgenstein’s conceptual distinctions in the *PI*. Words such as “understanding,”

in their translation of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 2001: 98). Brandom likewise translates cognates of *Zuhandenheit* like *Zuhandensein* as “readiness-to-hand” (1983: 387).

²⁸ This may be contrasted with the treatment of Scots, a language descended from Middle English but often treated as a distinct modern language by linguists and speakers, as well as creole languages descended from English like Tok Pisin.

“knowing,” and “reading” actually describe a myriad of different behaviors and contexts that are united by ascriptions; they are not descriptions of context-invariant mental facts (*PI* §§143-171). Correct ascriptions of these behaviors identify distinct behaviors at different times. But a history of associated (yet distinct) behaviors can be grouped together based on communal judgments, resulting in terms that collect many discrete actions into a single category of behavior. Believing that a term like “reading” identifies a single behavior motivates the search for what necessary processes result in different instances of reading. This in turn leads naturally to analyzing these behavioral processes as a disposition to read. Enculturation resists Ginsborg’s particular analysis on the basis that there is no singular mental process or set of processes selected by an ascription of some normative behavior.

Communal agreement about certain ascription conditions of rule-following behavior is one element that makes enculturation *cultural*. Different communities have not only different conditions under which they make particular behavior ascriptions, but also different behaviors that they have ascriptions for. Enculturation consists in developing a particular set of judgments and background assumptions that narrow the scope of one’s ascriptions of rule-following behavior. It is learning, in accordance with a community, whether some behavior should count as an instance of following a particular rule, *whether or not* there is a particular mental item present in the mind of a rule-follower.

Enculturation comes in two mutually-supporting forms: enculturation on the ascriber side and enculturation on the ascribee side. One is enculturated into a particular community as an ascriber when she is able to more or less apply the same behavioral ascriptions as her community. If she sees a person looking at words in a book with apparent intent and says that

this person is “reading,” and this accords with the communal use of the word “reading,” then she may be enculturated into that community and would be using the word meaningfully. But individual instances of making proper ascriptions can be flukes. One cannot be enculturated on the basis of a mere handful of correct ascriptions. Enculturation requires one to develop certain regularities of ascription over time, such that one makes similar ascriptions across many occasions. These regularities emerge from amassing a large amount of personal experience with ascriptions of certain kinds of behavior across different conditions. One learns to group many different practices in different contexts as “reading” through exposure to different community-accepted uses of the term. Reading aloud, reading to oneself, reading print or cursive, reading in a foreign language, reading prose, and reading poetry all count as the same activity for English speakers despite the various mental and phenomenological differences between each form of reading.²⁹

When one develops a variety of habits, behaviors, and assumptions in common with the community one belongs to, one may then be *ascribed* certain kinds of rule-following behavior. Wittgenstein’s example of the adult and the beginner reader in the *PI* helps to illuminate how different ascriptions can be made of individuals regardless of what is occurring in their heads. Before going into the example, Wittgenstein notes that “for us [the ascribers] it is the

²⁹ That “reading” encompasses all these activities may seem obvious, but they need not necessarily be denoted with the same term in the same language. Languages often make quite subtle distinctions about the use-conditions of particular terms which are not reflected in other languages. To say that a person “frisst” in German would generally be offensive, as the verb means “to eat” when an animal is eating. “Essen” is the proper verb for “to eat” when a person is eating. Communities can also gradually adopt views or judgments that are inconsistent with their former practices and introduce entirely new social concepts. Consider the concept of “deadnaming,” which is using one’s former name, either accidentally or disrespectfully, after one has transitioned to another gender identity and adopted a new name. Deadnaming is conceptually fixed by a set of fundamental beliefs about gender identity, namely that gender identity is mutable and is determined by the individual. Deadnaming is conceptually discontinuous with the practices of certain communities in that it does not exist until a community holds such judgments about gender identity.

circumstances under which [an ascriber] had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on” with his rule-following (§155). The “circumstances” here, as I read Wittgenstein, are the relevant details and facts about a person that allow us to make certain ascriptions of her. Wittgenstein then introduces an adult who “has learned to read his native language” and a pupil first learning to read (§156). The pupil’s teacher “says that he is not really *reading* the words” when he tries to read (§156), given his struggles with spelling out and recognizing words. But, although Wittgenstein thinks it natural to consider “*reading* [...] a special conscious activity of mind” (§156), he suggests instead that:

[...] the same thing may take place in the consciousness of the pupil who is ‘pretending’ to read, as in that of the practised reader who is ‘reading’ it. The word ‘to read’ is applied *differently* when we are speaking of the beginner and of the practised reader. (§156)

But if there is not any conscious difference between the adult and the beginner reader, the alternative seems to be that “there must be one in the unconscious workings of their minds, or, again, in the brain” (§156). Once again, Wittgenstein resists this internalistic understanding of rule-following. He responds by noting “these [unconscious] mechanisms are only hypotheses, models designed to explain, to sum up, what you observe” (§156). There may not be any relevant differences in the conscious or unconscious mental operations of the adult and beginner reader, yet they are not both thought to be “reading.” And this distinction occurs because of the different circumstances of the ascribers. The relevant circumstantial facts about ascribers which determine what rule-following behavior they would be ascribed with are facets of their *normative identity*, which I elaborate later on.

Enculturation is rarely an active or conscious process for the individual. Following Railton's example of the department chair who was once a student radical, the chair acts according to a hierarchical norm he would consciously object to were he asked about his views on the norm. But, although he "would not endorse a hierarchical norm governing contact and interruption" (2006: 25), he has still internalized the norm and his actions are thus framed by it. Subjects passively acquire certain behaviors and attitudes that determine what ascriptions one would make of them. Infants born into and raised in an English-speaking community do not choose to learn English, but through continual exposure and internalization they develop fluency. As they mature, young English speakers can be evaluated for their accordance with the standard rules of English grammar and pronunciation. This is a case of unintentional enculturation but still allows for the subject to be evaluated for accordance with communal standards. This even goes for ascriptions for contra-intentional rule-followings, where one follows a rule one does not intend to. The department chair did not intend to act in accordance with the hierarchical norm, but he still did despite his general egalitarian intentions. Proper ascriptions of rule-following behavior do not always square with the conscious feelings or states of a rule-follower.

I have been discussing ascriptions of rule-following behavior and how enculturation functions for the ascriber and the ascribee. This is because I place the necessary component of regularity in a rule-following account in the regularity of ascriptions made by ascribers to ascribees over time. All accounts of rule-following require a notion of regularity that guarantees different actions under conditions of sufficient similarity can be identified as instances of the same behavior. Wittgenstein thought "there must be agreement not only in definitions but also [...] in judgments" for speakers of the same language to communicate with one another (*PI*

§242), as a similarity of basic judgments lays the foundation for a community's practice of applying concepts in similar cases over time. The same agreement in basic judgments across a community is likewise fundamental for the regularity of ascriptions in social accounts of rule-following. Regularity on the side of the ascriber regards the repeated communally-sanctioned application of rule-following ascriptions to others. On the side of the ascriber, regularity lies in the ascriptions made of someone according to her normative identity. While the PNA places its regularity in dispositions and primitive appropriateness, this leads to theoretical complications like the methodological problems discussed earlier. For this reason, neither special mental states nor physically reductive properties like dispositions should be solely relied on to situate an account of rule-following and normative behavior. Turning to ascriptions themselves for the regularity of behavior prerequisite to rule-following, whether they appear explicitly in language or implicitly in how one reacts or responds to another's behavior, avoids such problems. Ascriptions may be negotiations within a community with fuzzy application boundaries, but so too are the boundaries of actual behaviors we regularly ascribe to each other.

Rejecting discretely reducible conditions for ascriptions of rule-following behavior may appear to undercut the possibility for knowing whether one is following a particular rule. But, as noted above, one can know well enough from personal experience whether one is explicitly following a particular rule, such as the rule for counting. The same is not true for one's knowledge of rule-following done by other subjects, nor for all of one's own instances of rule-following behavior. This is an epistemic problem for ascriptions of rule-following behavior. Much normative behavior is implicit, without an item accessible to consciousness which makes the behavior normative.

A change in our thinking about how we attribute rule-following behavior might help alleviate this epistemic problem. A driver can drive in accordance with the proper rules of the road without consciously thinking of them.³⁰ Even though she may not be thinking about the rules she observes, she is still certainly *observing* them just as much as someone who thinks “I need to lower my speed to obey the speed limit.” She has assimilated the rules such that she generally takes actions consist with them. Neither driver needs to share any conscious item to follow the rules of the road. Rather, we can change our treatment of rule-following and hold that we make ascriptions of rule-following behavior without ever needing to know what conditions obtain in detail inside the minds of other rule-followers. So we can at most say that they are both following the rules of the road, as it is reasonable for us to do, but we cannot claim that they have an identical mental item or phenomenal experience that affirms their rule-following. What makes it reasonable for us to think that both drivers are following the rules of the road, and what makes such ascriptions true, is that they share a similar normative identity despite significant differences in their conscious experiences.

I describe what normative identities are and their relationship to rule-following in the next section. Here I distinguish the identities and actions of individuals from the communities they belong to, a task with its own conceptual difficulties. Communities are both things that determine the identity of individuals and at the same time composites of individuals. Distinguishing the individual from her communities needs special attention alongside the concepts of enculturation and normative identity.

³⁰ This claim is contested. Jason Stanley makes the contrary claim that “[k]nowing how to do something is a kind of knowledge-wh” as well as “a first-person mental state” (2011: 111).

4.2 EXTENDED COGNITION, EMBEDDEDNESS, AND INDIVIDUALITY

Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists in recent decades have introduced new ideas that give reason to doubt one's cognitive processes are a wholly internal affair restricted to one's brain and body. One such contribution is the *hypothesis of extended cognition* (hereafter HEC) first introduced in "The Extended Mind" (Menary 2010) by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Clark and Chalmers "advocate [...] an *active externalism*, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes" (27). This active externalism is a "third position" they distinguish from internalism and passive externalism about meaning and intentionality (27).³¹ Certain physical entities and processes may be "coupled" with the human mind, such that the roles of mental processes are "delegated to manipulations of external media" (28). Clark and Chalmers provide empirical examples of how cognitive processing can be located in external physical phenomena, including how the manipulation of Tetris pieces on a screen aids the player in deciding where the pieces should go (28). They cite research that shows Tetris players rotate shapes in the game "to help *determine* whether the shape and slot are compatible" (28), since manipulation of shapes in the game and recognizing a fit is faster than rotating the shapes mentally and recognizing a fit. Clark and Chalmers believe that "this sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head" (29).

Later advocates of HEC argue that one's mind is embedded in the *social* and *normative* realms. A natural back-and-forth takes place between subject and world to the effect that "[w]e

³¹ Clark and Chalmers describe "passive externalism" as the "standard variety advocated by Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979)" (Menary 2010: 29). External features of the world help to fix the meanings of words, but such features do not need to be presently accessible to consciousness in order to do so.

are individually products, and collectively are producers, of [socially-distributed] cognitive institutions, tools, and practices” (Cash 2013: 64). Mason Cash identifies examples of practices and institutions, including languages, the scientific community, and the legal system as necessarily belonging to a distributed cognitive network consisting of agents and their actions both individual and collective (64). On this view, abstracting one’s cognition and mental processes from their social and normative situation misses how interaction and inculcation in communities and practices shape and influence one’s cognition. There are no definite boundaries between internal and external cognitive processes, as they are really long-form negotiations between individuals and the norms they hold and practices they follow.

But there must be a general way to identify when some cognitive process belongs to an individual under socially-distributed HEC. We may do this by determining when someone is particularly *responsible* as an agent for some cognitive process or action. Cash supplies a useful criterion for determining personal responsibility under socially-distributed HEC: “A *socially and physically distributed cognitive process counts as mine if it is appropriate to hold me responsible—to blame me or praise me, punish me or credit me—for the ideas or actions produced by this process*” (2013: 67). Cash does not provide a supplementary reductive analysis for such responsibility. Rather, his criterion recognizes that normative ascriptions and ascriptions of cognitive processes are a part of a judgment-dependent and social practice, a dialogue between individuals belonging to a community and the community itself.³² Additionally, this

³² There may still be facts about rule-following at the communal level. I am agnostic as to their reduction.

criterion leaves room for normative agents to be the authors of their actions as opposed to the mere subjects of the pressure of social mores and institutions.³³

I situate my notion of normative identity in Cash's socially-distributed form of HEC. Normative identity is the result of enculturation on the individual, and is the facet of one's identity that licenses certain ascriptions of normative behavior to be made of her. As cognizers, we are all enculturated from birth, leading us to develop certain attitudes and basic presuppositions through language and communal interaction that lay the groundwork for our own actions. We are *embedded* in collective practices in such a way that we would not be rule-followers outside of a community. If our rule-following were only the product of internalistic mechanisms or material states of affairs, we could not account for the multifarious ways of successfully following a rule. What counts as a successful rule-following is determined by communal accord. Becoming part of a community by developing certain assumptions, judgments, skills, and behaviors over time, that is, developing a normative identity, is what determines how one is ascribed with rule-following behavior. And rooting ascriptions of rule-following in identity allows us to localize ascriptions to *individuals*. Were we to accept extended cognition without having a way of distinguishing when actions are attributable to individuals, we would not be able to provide any account of rule-following at all.

Normative identity is a persistent feature of one's *social* being. We come to know others through continual interaction with them and learning more about how they act in different settings and scenarios. Returning to Wittgenstein's case of the pupil and the practiced reader,

³³ Cash (2013) discusses the relevance of "relational autonomy" to a socially-distributed conception of HEC. Relational autonomy is a feminist reimagining of individual autonomy which places autonomy in "the acumen, skill, expertise, and 'tools for thinking' with which [agents] have surrounded themselves through a lifetime" (66), all of which are vital for our ability to reflect on norms and determine whether to follow or resist them.

different ascriptions are made about their behavior despite the fact that they share similar phenomenal experiences. And it is in light of their normative identity that others feel that they can treat them differently. The practiced reader, having sufficiently demonstrated that he can read through his past behavior, is uncontroversially considered a “reader” to those watching him read.³⁴ Observers do not need to ask him about his phenomenal experience as he is reading to confirm what he is doing. For the same reason the pupil, lacking the history of practice that the adult reader is presumed to have, is not reasonably considered a reader by others. At some point, however, once the pupil has sufficiently demonstrated that he is reading through enough approved practice, we will include him in the group of competent readers.

4.3 IMPLICIT RULE-FOLLOWING AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTS

Here I provide a rule-following scenario that I take to be implicit and compare its treatment by internalistic and social theories of rule-following. Examples of how an internalistic theory of rule-following and a social theory with enculturation and normative identity handle implicit rule-following should show the insufficiency of the former.

I take “bike-riding” to be a strong candidate for implicit rule-following, as correct bike-riding is a largely unconscious practice as opposed to a conscious application of a rule. There are multiple sub-routines one must perform to ride a bike, including pedaling, braking, and monitoring one’s environment visually and aurally. Additionally, how one correctly rides a bike depends on the type of bike it is. Knowing how to shift gears on a mountain bike may be part of

³⁴ This is not to say that an observer must have a personal relationship with the practiced reader to figure him a reader. Reading is considered an important milestone in one’s maturation into adulthood in many cultures, and so it is reasonable for an onlooker to assume that the practiced reader is reading. Background assumptions about the identities of others are another facet of the social nature of rule-following.

the skill of bike-riding broadly construed, but one can be a competent bike-rider without ever having shifted gears on a bike.

An internalistic theory like the PNA would require a bike-rider to have a distinct internal state in addition to successfully staying upright and moving forward with the pedals for the rider to count as following the bike-riding rule. This, however, contradicts the general phenomenal experience of bike-riding. A rider can observe her surroundings so intently as to lose her awareness of being on a bike, yet she can still maintain her balance and speed while doing so. She does not stop following the rule as soon as her conscious experience is focused on the scenery. Internalism about bike-riding also introduces conceptual problems about what instances of bike-riding such a state would govern. If a bike-rider has correctly ridden only fixed-gear bikes in the past and tries riding a mountain bike, she might not know how to shift gears though she can maintain her balance and speed. Assuming that this bike-rider does have a conscious awareness of the appropriateness of her actions, it is unclear whether this feeling coupled with her behavior amounts to her following the rule for riding a mountain bike. She does not shift gears in this moment, nor has she demonstrated a capacity to shift them, so she is not fully utilizing the mountain bike's mechanisms and she does not have something like an unrealized disposition to do so. Whether this state raises her behavior to an act of rule-following is then uncertain.

Enculturation and normative identity avoid these problems of internalism about bike-riding. An onlooker can observe the bike-rider and correctly say that she is riding a bike without needing to infer that she has an internal state that authorizes her bike-riding. This is because, whether or not she is aware that her every push of the pedals is appropriate, she implicitly

follows the bike-riding rule. In an instant one can glance at a bike-rider and conceive of them as such given basic assumptions about the rider's normative identity. Enculturation and normative identity can also accommodate the context-sensitivity of bike-riding ascriptions. These concepts are part of a judgment-dependent conception of rule-following, and so it would depend on the community evaluating her behavior to conclude whether she is following the rule. There need not be a distinct rule for riding a fixed-gear or a mountain bike in a judgment-dependence account. What matters is if the community of ascribers agree that, when one rides a mountain bike, she must express some capacity for shifting the gears in order to be considered a competent mountain bike-rider. The rider first using a mountain bike has no history of enculturation with the gearshift, and by extension no normative identity that would license others to say that she knows how to ride a mountain bike. An onlooker might assume that she knows how to shift gears, but this is an instance of a mistaken assumption about one's normative identity.³⁵ And the community's evaluation of this rider still does not affect its judgments about her riding fixed-gear bikes. These subtle distinctions in rule-following ascriptions about different biking scenarios cannot be made by appealing to internal states, but are easily made with enculturation and normative identity.

It perhaps seems strange to say that one is following a rule when they ride a bike successfully. Bike-riding looks like it may be the only activity one can do with a bike, and the design of the bike seems to constrain exactly how one makes use of it. But there are certainly

³⁵ Such false attributions of rule-following behavior are not uncommon. Consider someone who knows how to order at a restaurant in a second language but is otherwise not fluent in that language. Waiters taking this person's order might believe that she knows the second language well if her accent and grammar are convincing enough. They would be wrong to think so, but they would not be unwarranted nor could they know the contrary from this interaction alone.

ways of using or interacting with a bike that do not amount to bike-riding. A bike shop employee can move a bike's pedals to check where the chain might be catching on the gear. This is not bike-riding, and no one would take it to be. There *is* a rule for bike-riding, and appealing to an internal state does not account for how we follow that rule.

CONCLUSION

I reiterate that I am not contributing my own theory of rule-following. My task here has been to introduce and defend enculturation and normative identity, as well as to show that implicit rule-following must be accounted for by a theory with at least some social aspect. Accommodating these social notions as well as implicit rule-following constrains what should be considered robust theories of rule-following. In particular, purely naturalistic reductionist and internalistic nonreductionist theories, which take the regularity of rule-following to be recurrent physical or mental states, cannot account for the social nature of implicit rule-following. What is regular across valid rule-followings is a similarity of judgments in a community, on the basis of one's history of enculturation and resulting normative identity.

It remains, then, for a new theory of rule-following to be developed or adapted that includes enculturation and normative identity. A possible avenue would be to take an existing social account of rule-following and to incorporate these concepts. But I think that accounts with a diverse range of metaphysical commitments are capable of accommodating enculturation and normative identity without being *solely* social accounts. All an account must do is accept these concepts and use them to explain implicit rule-following in addition to the rest of the account's commitments. However the complete account of rule-following looks, our ascription practice relies on attributing rule-following behavior to others even if they have no distinct conscious awareness of their actions. But much rule-following literature, including Ginsborg's own work, has questioned the genuineness of implicit rule-following and relegated it to a secondary or lesser status in comparison to explicit rule-following. Recognizing implicit rule-following

according to my definition, and that it needs to be explained by the social concepts I develop throughout this work, opens up a new gap to be filled by future contributions.

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