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WHITE OPINIONS OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION:
TESTING RIVAL HYPOTHESES, 2004

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

Few issues in the contemporary American political and social environments are as salient and emotionally charged as the debate over immigration. The thesis tests several competing hypotheses concerning the determinants of public opinion – among white respondents – on immigration issues. These include: the contextual considerations of southern residence and proximity to large numbers of Hispanic immigrants, as well as the individual-level factors of economic insecurity, political knowledge, national identity, group pride, and racism. Using data from the 2004 American National Election Study, the thesis provides a critical test of the competing hypotheses using multivariate analysis. Furthermore, conditional relationships are posited, facilitating a more refined analysis of the structure of attitudes on immigration issues.

The results indicate that racism, group pride, symbolic patriotism, ideology, and isolationism are the most consistent and significant predictors of immigration policy preferences. The use of four distinct dependent variable questions also highlights the inconsistency in public opinion regarding immigration and the division between public perception of documented and undocumented entries. Future research should focus on the interrelationship between variables that are used by the individual to define group associations, as well as the change in national and personal identity brought about by the events of September 11th, 2001.

To Mom, Dad, Andrew, Ben, Gram,
Grandpa, Aunt Susan, Elijah, and Taylan:
You are my soul, inspiration, wit, memory, wisdom,
endurance, dedication, imagination, and joy.
Thank You.

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INTRODUCTION

“The growth and influence of the Latino community will significantly change the power structure within the United States as well as the way in which we live on a day-to-day basis. Nothing – absolutely nothing – will remain untouched by this Latino presence” (Ramos 2004, xvii). Few would argue with the reality of Ramos’s statement, although American voters and policymakers may have conflicting views as to the desirability of Hispanic¹ influence in the coming decades (Harwood 1986).

The American Latino community was the largest minority population in the United States by the turn of the century, officially displacing African Americans in the 2000 Census count (Bureau of the Census, 2000; Camarota 2005; Voss 2001). Population projections estimate that whites will lose the majority status they have held since the inception of the United States by the year 2050 (De la Isla 2003; Ramos 2004). In addition to sheer numerical representation, the Hispanic population in America is also unique in the political clout that it exerts (Ramos 2004). Hispanic political power is already being felt at the national level. In the 2000 presidential elections, the number of votes that the Hispanic community contributed to the election was over 10 times greater than the vote spread between Gore and Bush (Ramos 2004).²

¹ A creation of the Census Bureau for the 1970 census count (De la Isla 2003; Ramos 2004), the comprehensive term “Hispanic” will be used interchangeably with “Latino” to refer to United States residents who can trace their ancestry to Spanish-speaking areas of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Spain (De la Isla 2003; DeSipio 1996; Portes and Truelove 1987; Ramos 2004). See Portes and Truelove (1987) for the complications resulting from the use of this comprehensive ethnic term.

² De la Isla (2003) and Ramos (2004) also suggest that the contested media release of the 2000 election results were due to biased Hispanic exit poll numbers. The polls did not take the true percentage of Cubans (who voted overwhelmingly for Bush) in southeast Florida into account. As a result, other Hispanic subpopulations, which were more inclined to favor Gore, were over-represented.

The influence wielded by the Latin American community results, in part, from the fact that it has the ability to define races in states that hold large blocs of electoral votes. Already, “[Hispanics] represent the decisive swing vote in the hotly contested states of California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, New York, Arizona, and New Mexico” (Ramos 2004, xxii; see also DeSipio 1996). While current Hispanic political participation is lower than that of other minority groups (Cassel 2002; Shaw, De la Garza, and Lee 2000) – due largely to the percentage of residents under voting age and the lack of citizenship in the population (Sierra 2000) – political elite fear centers around the latent repercussions of organized Latino mobilization (DeSipio 1996; Ramos 2004).³

Due to their visibility and growing numbers, immigrants in general, and Hispanic immigrants in particular, are increasingly the recipients of native, specifically Caucasian-American, antipathy. In recent years, the term “immigrant” has become synonymous with the term “ethnic minority” in the United States, as the legal and illegal immigration streams continue to be composed primarily of Hispanic entrants. According to Burns and Gimpel (2000), “The more the term ‘immigrant’ becomes associated with negatively-stereotyped minority groups, the more likely immigration policy will be decided on the basis of peoples’ racial attitudes” (204).

Immigration to the United States has been a point of debate since the dawn of the “nation of immigrants.”⁴ Immigration policy,⁵ shaped to respond to fluctuating population needs and

³ The proximity of sending-countries and recent technological progress add to Hispanic distinctiveness. Latin American immigrants, primarily Mexicans, benefit from adjacency to the United States. In addition, communication and networking advances, which have taken place alongside their influx, have assisted the continual flow and settlement of new immigrants (Portes and Truelove 1987; Ramos 2004).

⁴ For a compelling argument that the United States is not a nation of immigrants, but is instead a nation of colonial settlers, see Samuel Huntington’s (2004) book, entitled *Who Are We: The Challenge to America’s National Identity*.

⁵ It is important to distinguish between the concepts of immigration policy and immigrant policy. Immigration policy refers to legislation addressing the number of immigrants allowed into the United States, including entrance

concerns, has gone through several eras⁶ since its institutionalization in the late nineteenth century (Daniels and Graham 2001; Yang 1995). Public opinion regarding the desirability of immigrants has also vacillated. Americans have never overwhelmingly supported raising the number of immigrants. There have been periods, however, where the majority of United States citizens were not incontrovertibly calling for a reduction in numbers, as they are now (Simon and Lynch 1999).

Prominent newspapers across the country address the issue of immigration in their headlines every day. The *Chicago Tribune* published an article on October 2nd, 2006, discussing legislation passed by many major cities in the United States “forbid[ding] county agencies from asking about immigration status when providing services” in an effort to provides illegal immigrants with “symbolic support as well as protection from real abuses.”⁷ Other headlines criticize the building of a border fence, either due to the insensitivity it shows to undocumented residents or the lack of confidence they place in its potential to achieve border security.⁸ An

and citizenship procedures. Immigrant policy, such as California’s controversial *Proposition 187*, addresses benefits given to legal and illegal foreign-born residents once they reside within United States borders. The national nature of available data in the survey utilized herein dictates that the present study will emphasize public opinion of national immigration policy.

⁶ Specifically, Daniels and Graham (2001) suggest that recent immigration has had five distinct periods, including “(1) high immigration and growing restriction (1882-1924), (2) low and decreasing immigration and severe restriction (1924-43), (3) low but increasing immigration and decreasing restriction (1943-65), (4) high and increasing immigration and relatively low restriction (1965-80), and (5) high and increasing immigration and increasing but essentially ineffective restriction (1980-present)” (5). Variations of this “period” timeline exist. For example, Yang (1995) suggests a different list of (pre-1965) immigration periods that extends further back, including: “the open-door era” (1776-1882), “the era of selective exclusions” (1882-1921), and “the era of numerical restriction” (1921-1965) (Yang 1995, 10).

⁷ The article, entitled “Immigration Resolution Passes Early Test” was written by Josh Noel. For further reading on “sanctuary laws,” see Heather MacDonald’s April 13th, 2005 testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, entitled “Immigration and the Alien Gang Epidemic: Problems and Solutions” which is available online through the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (see Appendix C).

⁸ See *Chicago Tribune* articles from October 8th by Steve Chapman entitled “A Border Solution That’s Chock-Full of Holes,” and October 4th by Deb Riechmann, entitled “Bush Signs Homeland Security Bill.” *U.S. News* also released a series of articles in late September by Carl Hulse, Eric Lipton, and/or Rachel Swarns addressing the “border fence” controversy.

October 6th *Los Angeles Times* article details the incident at Columbia University, which resulted Jim Gilchrist (the co-founder of the Minuteman Project) being forced offstage “by students who said his anti-illegal immigration message was not welcome in New York.”⁹

The issue of immigration is inescapable and the tension is mounting. Part of the confusion over the topic is the apparent disagreement among the people and the politicians as to how the issue should be solved. The resurgence of pre-World II era restrictionist sentiment, evident in the American public over the last three decades, has not been reflected in immigration policy or enforcement (Bulkley 2004). Whereas before WWII, elite policymaker opinion and public opinion were in congruence, the neorestrictionist wave is ridden by the public alone (Harwood 1986).¹⁰

Public opinion is a cornerstone of American politics. The perceived lack of political awareness or sophistication in the public has caused mainstream academics to doubt for decades the ability of the masses to act in an organized, cohesive fashion in order to prompt desired change. Nevertheless, prominent scholars such as Stimson (2004) maintain that an adequate number of people in the American electorate care enough of the time to ensure that it is their volition which will ultimately prevail. It is therefore necessary to determine the reasons behind the public’s growing apprehension of immigration.

Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson (2002) suggest that there are three primary reasons why studies addressing public opinion of immigration are vital. Public attitudes influence:

⁹ This article, entitled “Minuteman Founder Forced from N.Y. Stage” was written by Jennifer Delson.

¹⁰ Liberal immigration policy may have, at least initially, been a political elite response to declining populations in developed countries. See Hollander (2000) for a concise list of the implications of different immigration level “scenarios” for developed populations.

- Public policy, because governments take public opinion into account when formulating and implementing policy, such as immigration legislation.
- Individuals' behavior, because the success and satisfaction of immigrants once they reside in the United States depends largely on the attitudes of individual's they interact with daily.
- The collective national identity, because who is, and who is not, accepted as a member of the national ingroup is a result of native public acceptance.

The politics of United States public opinion not only reflects future American political and social realities, but they are also applicable to other countries. Simon and Lynch (1999) found that, regardless of the differences in the severity and enforcement of legislation, residents of different nations “share a great many attitudes and beliefs about immigrants” (464). Hence, results are valuable to policymakers and social scientists in all immigrant-receiving countries.

Despite the relevance of public opinion and the electorate's pull for restriction, immigration numbers continue to ascend. According to the Census Bureau,¹¹ the number of foreign-born individuals, as a percentage of the total United States population, is at its highest point since the end of the Great Wave. The difference being that when the Great Wave ended in the 1920s, the nation's total population was slightly over 100 million, whereas the current number of individuals residing in the United States is nearly 300 million (Table 1).¹²

While “few controversies in our political environment are as contentious as the current debate over immigration policy,” research on public opinion of immigration remains noticeably inadequate (Hood and Morris 1998, 1). This gap in the pertinent research is all the more striking

¹¹ All Census Bureau data utilized in the study are derived from either *The (2000) Statistical Abstract of the United States* and/or *The (2003) Foreign-Born Population in the United States*, supplied by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce (Economics and Statistics Administration).

¹² According to an October 5th, 2006 *Orlando Sentinel* article by Babita Persaud, entitled “Coming Soon: American Number 300 Million,” the U.S. population is less that 100,000 souls away from the 300 million person marker. The piece quotes demographer William Frey as stating that number 300 million will “likely be a boy born in Los Angeles of Hispanic descent.” See similar articles, published the same week, in the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *New York Times*.

because there exists an extensive collection of literature on attitudes toward minorities and immigrants that has yielded a number of testable hypotheses. “The fact that these hypotheses are dispersed across different disciplines and have not been gathered in one place or tested on the same body of data is partly responsible for the failure to inspect immigration attitudes more carefully. In addition, existing hypotheses have not been examined using adequate statistical methodologies” (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, 536). The present research represents a step towards filling the void.

The testable hypotheses provided by previous research rest on the assumption that both Hispanics and immigrants, as they become increasingly intertwined (Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000), will be the recipients of focused white attention once reserved for African Americans (Hernandez-Leon and Zuniga 2002; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Voss 2001). The first three hypotheses, which together comprise the population class of explanation, address an individual’s place of residence or the local population composition. For example, due to the singular political and racial history of the southern region of the United States, it is possible that a racial residue continues to dictate ethnic relations in the region (Black and Black 1987; Giles and Evans 1986), resulting in disproportionately restrictive immigration views among southern white residents.

Next, the local concentration of ethnic minorities has, historically, been credited with increasing white antipathy towards African Americans (Giles and Evans 1986; Key 1949; Orey 2001) and minorities in general (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Voss 2001). It is possible that living in a state where the Hispanic and immigrant concentrations are ever increasing and exceed the national average may cause the local white residents to display heightened hostility towards liberalizing immigration policy (Hood and Morris 1998; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000). To counter the pessimistic hypotheses, which assume that contact between ethnic groups encourages

angst, social scientists suggest that social contact can instead encourage tolerance and acceptance of social outgroups (Connolly 2000; Taylor 1998).

The second class of explanation utilizes economic considerations to account for restrictive immigration stances. As an update to the racial concentration theory, some scholars propose that social group competition over limited resources causes economic insecurity, which may have taken the place of blatant racism as a conflict catalyst (Giles and Evans 1986; Glaser 1994; Sears and Kinder 1985).

The third explanation addresses an individual's level of political knowledge. It is possible that those respondents possessing high levels of political information will express different opinion patterns than the less politically sophisticated (Gomez and Wilson 2001; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995). If so, then they may respond differently to the issues of immigration desirability (Moore 1986). Another dimension of the political sophistication explanation claims that the complexity of certain immigration questions may highlight the relevance of political knowledge (Carmines and Stimson 1980).

Four association variables, which make up the fourth class of explanation, are included to capture self- or group-classifications that may affect an individual's perception of immigration. The national identity variables assume that blind and symbolic patriotism, as indicators of the strength of national association, will be significant predictors of immigration stances (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Parker 2003). Authors suggest that the national identity consideration may be particularly pertinent after the events of September 11th, 2001 (Li and Brewer 2004; Parker 2003).

White Americans' perceptions of their own ethnic group, or positive ingroup stereotyping, may also significantly factor into how they perceive minority outgroups (Druckman

1994). Positive ingroup stereotyping is not to be confused with racism, which is negative outgroup stereotyping. Traditional racism, included as a distinct independent consideration, is expected to increase restrictive immigration sentiment (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Clark and Legge 1997). Hence, restrictive immigration stances are expected to increase alongside the levels of national identification, group pride, and racist sentiment that individuals express.

Finally, the conditional explanation suggests that each independent variable will be as, or more, successful when evaluated for group, rather than direct, influence. The conditional considerations serve to reinforce or question the relationships revealed in the initial comprehensive regressions. In addition, supplementary information may be provided by an examination of the explanatory variables from another perspective.

As the discord over the issue of immigration continues to escalate, the need to explain contemporary public opinion of immigrant numbers and immigration policy in the United States mounts. The primary purpose of the present research is to collect into one study a comprehensive list of the theories presented to explain attitudes regarding immigration (Table 2).¹³ The secondary objective is to then apply these theories to a rigorous and simultaneous quantitative test. The research utilizes responses to the 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) survey,¹⁴ in an effort to ascertain whether statistical evidence justifies the application of the included hypotheses to contemporary white opinions of immigration and unveils the most relevant indicator.

¹³ The bivariate correlations for the independent variables are provided in Table 3.

¹⁴ The ANES is a nationally representative survey, which is conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. The present study uses only responses from individuals who classify themselves as non-Hispanic “whites” (see Appendix A).

The article proceeds as follows. First, each of the major political psychology, political science, and social science theories pertaining to racial relations and immigration opinion in the United States is presented. Next, data from the ANES is utilized to quantitatively and concurrently test the theories, in conjunction with relevant control variables. Finally, the findings will be discussed, as will the implications for the future of native white – immigrant relations.¹⁵

¹⁵ Special thanks to Dr. Knuckey for his encouragement and patience, and without whom the present research would still be an outline with potential.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Social scientists have been considering the effect of minority concentrations, primarily African American, on white attitudes for nearly a century. There are several complimentary and conflicting theories that address white perceptions of local minority groups. To reiterate, the purpose of the present study is to present a comprehensive list of theories credited with affecting white perceptions of minorities and immigrants and to ascertain whether or not these theories of racial animosity are accurate in predicting white Americans' opinions of immigrant numbers and immigration policy. The independent variables expected to reveal the existence or absence of each theory and their bivariate correlations are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

Population Explanations

The first three hypotheses focus on the local population. First, the southern distinctiveness theory suggests that white residents of the South will desire greater immigration restriction than individuals living in the rest of the United States. Second, the immigrant backlash hypothesis posits that residents of states with high levels of Hispanic immigrant concentration will exhibit the most anti-immigration attitudes. Third, the social contact theory assumes the opposite of immigrant backlash: instead of increasing racial hostility, Hispanic and immigrant concentration will promote less restrictive views of these minority groups.

“Although a considerable amount of work suggests that social context plays an important role in opinion formation, we know relatively little about the contextual determinants¹⁶ of opinions on immigration issues” (Hood and Morris 1998, 2). The population explanations represent the contextual consideration. “Context is the size of a minority group within a specified geographic area (e.g., neighborhood, county, state)” (Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000, 286). Put succinctly, the southern distinctiveness, immigrant backlash, and social contact theories are proposing that the social context of the respondents’ state of residence alters their immigration attitudes.

Southern Distinctiveness

In his groundbreaking book *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, V.O. Key (1949) tested the relationship between black population density and increased white antipathy. He found that understanding the racial dynamics of a state was essential to understanding state politics and policy. However, Key focused exclusively on southern states and direct white hostility – or “traditional racism” – towards blacks. At the time, continuing white control of the political system, maintained in states with majority African American residents only by forced disenfranchisement, was the primary goal of white southerners. The “black-belt hypothesis,” as asserted by Key, centers on the connection between African American population concentration and increased white rancor.

¹⁶ “Contextual determinants” (Hood and Morris 1998) are also referred to as “environmental determinants” (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000), “migrant context” (Hood and Morris 1998), and “structural characteristics” (Schissel, Wanner, and Frideres 1989) in the immigration literature.

The South¹⁷ has historically encompassed high levels of general conservatism within its electorate (Black and Black 1987) and, until recently, a political system unquestionably rooted in racist sentiment. Scholars such as Middleton (1976) “argue that regional differences in racial prejudice¹⁸ arise because southern subculture socializes its members to more negative racial attitudes” (Giles and Evans 1986, 476; see also Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997). It is conceivable that residents of the South may still harbor resentment toward minorities, disproportionate to their demographic characteristics. Recent studies have tested the black-belt hypothesis, utilizing minority versus majority density and proximity as the dominant factors affecting white racial attitudes to ascertain if V.O. Key’s southern observations extend to other minority groups within the region. The results are mixed.

Giles and Evans (1986) confirm that black density still results in increased white antipathy as the local concentration of African Americans increased (see also Giles and Buckner 1993). Interestingly, in areas where black numbers exceeded 40%, racial animosity seemed to decrease below peak levels, suggesting that in areas where the minority and majority numbers equalize, racial resentment no longer predicts white attitudes. Orey (2001) agrees that racial resentment considerations and local African American population density are, in tandem, strong predictors of support for white candidates who openly reject policy aimed at benefiting the African America community.

¹⁷ The most commonly accepted definition of the region is that used by V.O. Key (1949), who defined the South as “the eleven states that seceded to form the Confederacy” (11), including: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia” (see also Knuckey 2005).

¹⁸ Brown (1995) defines prejudice as “the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior towards members of a group on account of their membership in that group” (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, 172).

Giles and Buckner (1993) use the terms “racial threat”¹⁹ and “racial backlash” in their study of the 1990 U.S. Senate race involving David Duke, as updates to Key’s black-belt hypothesis. They found that African American concentrations in Louisiana districts did increase white support for the obviously racist candidate, which indicates the continuation of the black-belt phenomenon into the “New South” (see also Howell 1994). The authors suggest that racism is still present, and perhaps even remains dominant in the South, but that there are no longer any suitable old-fashioned racist candidates available to support (see also Wright 1977). “Dividing respondents up between the South and the rest of the country reveals that the backlash pattern only applies in the southern states, a matter of historical residue and probably little else” (Voss 2001, 227).

Contemporary southern scholars note that partisan identifications have changed in the region over the past two decades, in accordance with earlier shifts in voting behavior (Knuckey 2005). However, the question of whether or not the South has completely converged with the rest of the nation regarding racial hostility is still debated. Black and Black (1992) hold that racially based issues are still addressed, albeit now covertly. Brewer and Stonecash (2001) suggest that class divisions, not race, are an escalating source of political cleavage in the South. In other words, the class divisions, such as income, that have existed in the region all along may no longer be trumped by race, and are instead openly manifesting themselves. Abramowitz (1994) finds evidence of issues overcoming race in “new” southern politics. Using traditional racism indicators, the author decides that it is the Democratic stance on issues such as social

¹⁹ Giles and Hertz (1994) also use the term “black threat” to refer to the tendency of whites in counties with high levels of African American representation to support candidates emphasizing race.

welfare and national security, not race, which prompted the white flight from of the southern Democrats to the Republican Party in the 1980s.

Others scholars counter that the evolving “social and economic trends in the region are [also] working to undermine the effectiveness of racist campaigns” and are, therefore, discouraging politicians from emphasizing race in their campaigns (Giles and Buckner 1993, 711). Knuckey (2001) agrees that the covert racial appeal is to an established undertone in the conservative political agenda that no longer has to be openly addressed by candidates. “In future southern elections, at all levels, racial issues may no longer be immediately visible, but this is not because race has disappeared as a factor in southern party and electoral politics. Rather, it is because it has been woven into the partisan fabric that now characterizes the ‘newest’ southern politics” (271).

As is evident, the theory that the South is distinct in its treatment of racial issues is well established in the literature. However, southern studies almost unanimously address the black-white racial conflict, rarely delving beyond this single facet of race relations. It is reasonable to assume that the unique history of the South, which has caused its white residents to view their African American neighbors with hostility, may be transferable to other minority groups. Voss (2001) points out that, if anything, “linguistic minorities should seem much more threatening because of their cultural differences” (219).

Culturally, white Americans and African Americans share numerous traits, many of which blacks have influenced to some degree. The bond with Hispanic Americans is more tenuous. The perceived failure of recent immigrants to assimilate into the American cultural mainstream maintains the societal rift. In addition, the accelerating influx of specific minorities – such as Hispanics – is capable of focusing white attention and hostility in the areas where the

division is most pronounced. The South has been the most recent region of choice for Hispanic, especially Mexican, settlement. The settlers are “altering the bipolar racial structure of many communities, transforming the ethnic make up of social classes, affecting public and private institutional dynamics as they incorporate newcomers, [and] changing local politics,” which is “creating new inter-ethnic and linguistic tensions” (Hernandez-Leon and Zuniga 2002, 3).

Of the seven states that experienced an increase of 200% or more in the representation of persons of Latin origin between 1990 and 2000, six of them were southern, including: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee (U.S. Census Bureau).²⁰ In addition, specific counties within all of the remaining southern states experienced similarly impressive Hispanic growth. While the growth in these states did not bring the total Hispanic population to the level of traditional border and high-immigration states, except in a limited number of counties, it is still possible that the extreme increase was very visible, especially if southerners are still race-sensitive.

Hero and Tolbert (1996), in their “diversity approach” to racial politics, suggest that states with high total minority concentrations, “have an ‘anti-minority’ outlook, even when the particular minority group that may be targeted by the policy is not present in large numbers” (864). As an illustration of this point, the majority of the states that attempted to enact measures making English the official dominant language in the 1980s had African American populations surpassing the national average, including: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi,

²⁰ For district information, see the U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, Redistricting Data (PL 94-171) Summary File. According to the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee are continuing the trend in recent years, with over 100% immigrant population growth between 2000 and 2005 (Camarota 2005).

North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia (Hero and Tolbert 1996).

The South has long been considered a bastion of racial conservatism. The southern distinctiveness theory suggests that, if it is the unique history of the South that continues to weigh into its residents' opinions and behaviors, southern white residents will be disproportionately conservative in their responses to questions regarding immigration. Is the new and fastest-growing racial minority in the South now the focus of latent racial tensions? Does the singular history of the southern United States, in which the social attribute of race trumped all other potential conflict points, continue to make the residents of the region unusually sensitive to race-based issues? Or, as suggested by Glaser and Gilens (1997) and Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens (1997), has the South now converged with the rest of the nation in its most historically divisive issue?

Immigrant Backlash

A brief history of immigration policy in the United States highlights the pathway to the recent prominence of Latino representation in population growth and immigrant numbers. From 1924 to 1965, immigration policy was governed by a system that encouraged immigration from western and northern Europe while suppressing the admission of individuals from other world regions. The *1965 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments* formally replaced the discriminatory national origins quota system with policy that set the amount of legal permanent

immigration from each country on an equal footing.²¹ “As a result, total immigration to the United States has increased substantially” (Yang 1995, 1).

While the intent of the legislation had been to “redress past wrongs done to peoples ‘from southern and eastern Europe,’” the new law instead facilitated the entrance of Asian, Central American, and Mexican immigrants (Daniels and Graham 2001, 43; see also Yang 1995). “The change in U.S. immigration laws coincided with the population explosion in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s and the resulting rise in poverty” (Ramos 2004, 54). The subsequent mass legalization program initiated by the 1986 *Immigration Reform and Control Act* – an attempt to address rising concerns over climbing illegal immigration numbers – was also deemed unsuccessful at even pausing the illegal flow (Portes 1994).

By the mid-1980s, the fact that Hispanic immigrants were concentrating themselves in specific states and the subsequent possibility for intensified social ramifications was peaking the interest of scholars. “Over 75% of the 14.5 million people identified by the 1980 Census as Hispanics are concentrated in just four states – California, New York, Texas, and Florida; California alone has absorbed almost one third” (U.S. Bureau of Census 1983)” (Portes and Truelove 1987, 360).²²

Efforts to address immigration concerns spread from the federal to the state level in the 1990s, resulting in Official English initiatives and attempted restrictions on immigrant benefits.

²¹ This 1965 legislation is also referred to as the *Hart-Cellar Act*. It placed a numerical “cap” on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, “but because roughly half of the total number of slots were reserved for them, this was a liberalization rather than the restriction that it would have been in 1924” (Daniels and Graham 2001, 41). For further reading on United States immigration legislation, see Bulkley 2004; Daniels and Graham 2001; Keely 1979; and Yang 1995.

²² According to a September, 2005 report, entitled “The Impact of Immigration on the California Economy” by the *Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy*, “In 2004 California had an estimated 36.6 million residents. Of these, 9.5 million were foreign-born. Out of the 9.5 million foreign-born, 2.4 million were unauthorized immigrants” (5).

This move to restrict benefits at the state level is not surprising since the fiscal cost of immigration is usually felt most acutely at the local and state levels (Huber and Espenshade 1997). *Proposition 187*, California's controversial 1994 initiative, was aimed at denying public services to illegal aliens and requiring law enforcement officials to report suspected undocumented residents (De la Isla 2003).²³ "While the majority of non-Hispanic whites saw this as an honest attempt to deal with the illegal immigrant problem, most Latinos saw the initiative as 'anti-Latino'" (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001, 730). The ensuing conflict encouraged both Latino and white Americans to take notice of the issues involved.²⁴

In 1995, Americans' focus on national security was brought to the forefront and intensified with the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil to that point – the Oklahoma City bombing. Just six years later, in September of 2001, the public attention refocused on national security as the Twin Towers fell. The September 11th terrorist attacks, exponentially deadlier than Oklahoma City, solidified both nationalist and isolationist sentiments within the American public. "In particular, because the terrorists involved in the attacks seem to have entered the United States as immigrants or using visitor visas, responses to the threats posed by the terrorists may extend to immigrants in general" (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002, 70).²⁵

²³ "Large sections of *Proposition 187* were subsequently held unconstitutional in federal court for violations of individual rights," and because immigration regulation is not to be enacted at the state level (Huber and Espenshade 1997). See also the November 21, 1995 *New York Times* article by B.D. Ayres, Jr., entitled "California Immigration Law is Ruled to be Partly Illegal."

²⁴ As a consequence, "A series of statewide ballot initiatives raised the salience of immigration and ethnicity in state politics" (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001, 735). For example, *Proposition 209*, which appeared on the November 1996 ballot, attempted to "outlaw affirmative action in public employment, education, and contracting" (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001, 736).

²⁵ The terrorist attacks can cause both short and long-term ramifications, depending on the perceived social and economic ramifications. "At the same time, national identity and attachment are likely to be strengthened among members of the host population, with tighter and more clearly defined ingroup boundaries evident" (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002, 73).

Immigrant backlash theory was developed for this study to determine whether or not recent immigrant groups – the largest, most visible and politically relevant of which are the legal and illegal Hispanic residents – are now the recipients of hostility based strictly on their numerical concentration. Where southern distinctiveness predicts that residence in the South will result in animosity towards immigrants, immigrant backlash predicts that the state’s concentrations of Hispanic and immigrant residents will illicit angst. In short, since Latinos surpassed African Americans as the number one minority group at the end of the 1990s, and the topic of immigration has become increasingly salient over the last two decades, the theory anticipates that racial animosity will be increasingly directed at immigrants and immigration policy.

The scarce studies of racial density that do address minorities in the United States, other than African Americans, seldom find evidence of general applicability (Voss 2001), but they rarely address several theories simultaneously (Orey 2001). As justification for his own comparison among racial threat, social contact, and racial resentment theories, Orey (2001) draws from Kinder and Sears (1981) in proposing that, “although theories of racial prejudice have been extensively catalogued, empirical confrontations between competing theories are surprisingly rare in the social sciences” (234). Hence, to test the southern distinctiveness and immigrant backlash concepts, the research will look at southern region residence and immigrant and Hispanic concentration as competing contextual hypotheses.²⁶ It is expected that white

²⁶ Hood and Morris (1998) find that the relationship between foreign-born residents and white animosity is dependent upon whether the foreign-born residents are documented or undocumented. The present research addresses the Census count of immigrant and Hispanic residents, but does not distinguish between legal and illegal residents.

animosity towards Latino immigrants²⁷ will be manifested in the 2004 ANES responses to questions regarding general immigration numbers and border security.

Few would argue that white opinions of Hispanics are not always flattering. Nor would scholars hesitate to confirm the saliency of the topic of immigration and the connection between immigration and the Hispanic American population in most people's minds. It has been argued that, "growing numbers of racial/ethnic populations have affected, and are significantly affecting, politics and policy in the states as well as nationally" (Hero and Tolbert 1996, 854). Therefore, it seems premature to give up on determining how that link reveals itself and what causes it to intensify.

While it is understood that not all Hispanics are first generation immigrants, statistics do confirm that Latin American countries are overwhelmingly the most dominant numerical contributors to both national population growth and immigrant arrivals in recent decades. More importantly, they are the most visible group, due in part to political and media attention.²⁸ Authors who elaborate upon anti-immigration movements point to their "anti-Hispanic" foundation and the Latino American community's unified response (De la Isla 2003; DeSipio 1996; Ramos 2004). Evidence suggests that Hispanics are the recipients of more criticism for their numbers than Asians or African Americans. Voss (2001) suggests that this is due to their

²⁷ While a limited number of scholars do address the fact that conflict and competition may exist between separate minority groups as well as in white-minority situations (Hero and Tolbert 1996), research usually addresses Hispanic-white conflict. Introducing other minority groups (such as Asians), and therefore more dependent variables, could confuse the direct comparison between immigrant and Hispanic concentrations and white conservatism.

²⁸ Stimson (2004) notes "that media play an influential role in setting the public agenda by choosing to cover some issues and not others. The common statement is that media do not tell people what to think, but they do tell them what to think about" (17). Media attention to specific events, and to immigration in general, undoubtedly affects public opinion. Citrin et al. (1997) comment on the importance of media attention to immigration attitudes, but note that limited media impact data provided by the ANES make it very difficult to determine the effect of media coverage on immigration opinions, not to mention the political salience of the issue as a whole.

rapid influx and the linguistic divide. In addition, recent world events and the assertive a visible tactics used by the Latino community within the United States may prompt an increase in white Americans' awareness of their local population composition.

The issue of immigration makes a clear distinction between Hispanics and the historically dominant minority groups. Due to forced entry and centuries of struggle, African Americans, while a prominent minority, are not considered part of the immigration influx. Asian residents are present in much smaller numbers and are fairly stable in numerical representation. Interestingly, residents with Asian roots are often the recipients of positive stereotyping rather than negative. According to Brodie (1995), "More than a third of whites responding to the 1995 Kaiser Race Poll told interviewers that increases in the minority population would be a bad thing. They were more likely to single out Hispanic increases for criticism than they were to condemn black or Asian increases" (Voss 2001, 218). This link between white opinions of Hispanics and immigrants is clearly stated in the study by Stein, Post, and Rinden (2000), who use the desired numbers of immigrants and the Hispanic feeling thermometer as their dependent variables. The authors illustrate that the contextual percentage of Hispanics and/or personal interaction with Hispanic individuals can affect respondents' perceptions of the Latino immigrant population.

Voss (2001) suggests that the negative opinions may, in part, be in response to incorrect perceptions of local population and a fear of losing their numerical superiority. As one of the few scholars who attempts to apply the black-belt hypothesis, and its group threat contemporary, to other ethnic groups, Voss states that "if quantity and proximity together evoke any realistic threat to majority interests, then a backlash should appear for all minority groups" (Voss 2001, 218). At this time, then, analyzing ANES responses to questions regarding immigrants is a

promising start to discovering whether or not black-white conflict theories predict white attitudes of immigrant desirability.

The present study is confident that questions highlighting immigrant numbers and immigration policy will almost exclusively tap white perceptions of recent Hispanic immigrant issues. According to the immigrant backlash theory, a higher Hispanic and immigrant density should result in increased white antipathy. Therefore, the six states with the largest percentage of immigrant and Hispanic representation (Table 4) will be evaluated as a region in order to determine whether or not white respondents from these states collectively illustrate a higher level of restrictive sentiment.

Social Contact

Despite the plethora of social and political science theories forwarded to explain negative white opinions of racial minorities in the United States, some authors continue to advocate the positive effects of social contact. Those scholars who feel that proximity actually breeds empathy and understanding are proponents of the social contact hypothesis. The social contact theory, as presented in the present study, is the polar opposite of the black-belt hypothesis. It predicts that the local population density of, and white interaction with, minorities actually encourages acceptance and reduces inter-group conflict (Hood and Morris 1998). In short, higher levels of immigrant and Hispanic concentrations in the population will discourage restrictive immigration stances.

In the words of Connolly (2000), the theory “proposes that contact between members of different racial and/or ethnic groups will result in a reduction of prejudice between these groups and an increase in positive and tolerant attitudes” (169; see also Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998;

Taylor 1988). Connolly believes that the appeal of the theory comes, in part, from its attempt to define ethnic cleavage and racism as false impressions bred from ignorance. “The more that individuals can meet and thus learn about members of other ethnic groups, the more their existing prejudices and stereotypes will be undermined” (170).

Rothbart and John (1993) provide a comprehensive explanation of the social contact hypothesis:

[T]he basic idea is that antagonistic groups generate unrealistically negative expectations of one another and simultaneously avoid contact. To the extent that contact occurs, the unrealistically negative perceptions of the group members are modified by experience. In other words, hostility is reduced as a result of increasingly favorable attitudes toward individual group members, which then generalize to the group as a whole (42; Hood and Morris 1998, 3).

According to Allport (1979), whether or not contact reduces prejudice depends upon the level of the contact, from casual and superficial to more consistent and personal (Fetzer 2000). Since information regarding the perceived local immigrant and minority concentration is beyond the scope of the national survey statistics included in this study, the social contact theory will instead be tested through Census statistics.

Voss’s (1996) research points to the benefits of contact, finding no increase in support for candidates perceived as hostile to minority interests with local minority concentration. A later study by Voss (2001) further suggests that, in relation to Hispanic-white relations, interaction reduces contempt. “If anything, Anglo whites sympathize with Hispanic claims for special attention when they live near a larger concentration of that ethnic group” (226). Taylor (1998) agrees that among white Americans, “traditional prejudice against Latinos shows no tendency to increase as the local percent Latino increases. In fact the relationship, though not significant, runs in the opposite direction” (529).

The results of Giles and Evans (1986) also touch on the possibility that equal levels of minorities and whites in an area can encourage tolerance. While white resentment increases with local minority population, it is possible that at a certain point the relationship changes. Specifically, African American density over 40% (at the county level) can positively affect white views of racial policy. Taylor (1998) agrees that Key's original black-belt hypothesis is still only applicable to limited cases of black-white relations.

It is important to note that many proponents of interaction's liberalizing abilities are quick to point to conditions, which must be met in order for contact to improve relations (Taylor 1998).²⁹ This shopping list of criteria that has been developed to outline ideal personal, social, and institutional contact is too long to be reasonably tested with variables available in social or political surveys.³⁰ There is also support, however, for the positive influence of general, rather than specific, contact in the immigration literature. Optimal conditions may not be required to produce positive results. It is possible that "any type of frequent non-negative contact between majority/minority groups will reduce prejudicial attitudes and policy positions irrespective of the setting or nature of the contact" (Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000, 289).

In the present study, the social contact hypothesis is used as the antithesis to the immigrant backlash theory. If the coefficient is positive, and restrictive feelings increase with state Hispanic concentration, then immigrant backlash is supported. Conversely, if the coefficient is negative, and restrictive immigration stances decrease with Hispanic-white contact,

²⁹ Scholars in the United Kingdom have used the contact theory to argue for the reduction in immigrant numbers in order to improve the quality of native-minority contact (Reicher 1986).

³⁰ Specifically, Connolly (2000) necessitates contact that is personal, sustained, and between groups that hold equal status, where there is limited inter-group competition and positive institutional support (see also Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). Also, most authors use smaller geographical segments, usually county, to test the benefits of contact. However, due to structure and number of response, the ANES does not allow for such detailed analysis.

then the behind the social contact theory bolstered. Put succinctly, the southern distinctiveness, immigrant backlash, and social contact theories are proposing that the social context of the respondents' state of residence alters their immigration attitudes.

Economic Explanation

As the “new” South emerged in the early 1970s, an updated version of V.O. Key’s black-belt hypothesis was needed. The results of these later studies, aimed at discovering white Americans’ contemporary perceptions of African Americans, support the continuation of Key’s noted phenomenon (Giles and Hertz 1994; Taylor 1998). Some scholars feel that traditional racism had continued despite the South’s evolution after federal intervention was forced, while others point to growing competition between whites and minority groups over increasingly limited resources, termed group conflict.

According to Hero and Tolbert (1996), alternative approaches that have been offered to explain politics and policy in the United States “generally fall into two broad categories, (socio)-economic, and political” (852). The dual concepts of group conflict,³¹ which focuses primarily on socio-economic variables, and power theory,³² which emphasizes political control, became the parallel evolutions of Key’s hypothesis. Unfortunately, these concepts often have overlapping theoretical definitions. Once seen as competitive, the political and economic

³¹ “Group conflict” theory (Glaser 1994; Wilson 2001) is also referred to in the literature as “group threat” (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian 1995), “realistic conflict” (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian 1995), and/or “collective threat” (Wilson 2001). See also Quillian’s (1995) discussion of “self-interest theory.”

³² “Power theory” (Giles and Hertz 1994) is also referred to in the literature as the “power approach” (Giles and Evans 1986), and/or “competitive ethnicity” (Giles and Hertz 1994). See also Giles and Buckner’s (1993) discussion of “racial threat.”

explanations are now often represented as complimentary theories in the literature (Hero and Tolbert 1996).

The power approach emphasizes the need of the dominant group to maintain the status quo through political, social, and economic means. “Although not denying the operation of generalized racism rooted in personality traits, the power approach emphasizes the role of competition in creating intergroup hostility” (Giles and Evans 1986, 471). As racial and ethnic groups compete for power, prestige, and privilege, hostilities arise that increase with the intensity of the competition. For example, whites benefiting from higher economic status shifted to the Republican Party due to conservative issue appeals, while lower status whites made the political shift in direct response to the fear of black influence within the Democratic Party (Giles and Hertz 1994). Hence, the social status of whites, measured through median household income, has been a successful indicator of the perceived threat to power, as well as a predictor of white Americans’ motives for realigning with the Republican Party (Giles and Hertz 1994).

The second theoretical update to V.O. Key is the group conflict theory, which stresses the clash between strong group identities and inter-group competition. “Group identities have a significant impact on relationships between individuals; individuals that share an important group characteristic (i.e., in-group members) tend to develop an aversion to individuals who do not share the relevant group characteristics or identity (out-group members)” (Hood and Morris 1998, 2; see also Giles and Evans 1986). Sears and Kinder (1985) suggest that, as is true with the power approach, realistic group threat should be dominant among individuals who are most susceptible to competition over resources. Individuals who perceive their self-chosen group as receiving unjust treatment are more apt to envision members of other groups as a threat to their power.

Glaser and Gilens (1997) point out that scholars who support group conflict theory, like Giles and Evans (1986) and Glaser (1994), accept that adults are open to changing policy preferences and that racial conceptions respond to environmental stimuli. In other words, more than traditional prejudice may now be involved in a group or individual's perception of threat (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Even if the overt acts of aggression and racist candidate support once dominant in the South are now either extinguished or shrouded within political party jargon, the conflict over jobs and resources is still relevant within the region and the country as a whole. The group threat theory, therefore, is an interaction between economic and social factors that affect a group's political clout. Giles and Evans (1986) state:

Without group identification only threat to one's individual position can be expected to evoke a response. In contrast, given a sense of group identity individuals perceive threat to other members of their group as threat to their own position, even if they themselves are not directly threatened (471).

It is important to clarify the distinction between these theories of economic and social marginalization – or the perception of being outside the economic or cultural majority – and economic insecurity. Whereas a sense of camaraderie and empathy can develop between economic, cultural, or ethnic minorities from shared marginalization, economic self-interest predicts rivalry or hostility between competitive groups (Fetzer 2000). Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) clearly differentiate between ingroup preference, economic status, and prejudice in their study addressing opposition to racial integration, and emphasize the distinction between competition and ungrounded hostility.

A quandary does develop, however, when attempts are made to draw distinctions between the group conflict theory and economic predictors in the power approach. The common thread is personal vulnerability – which is most easily tested in the economic sphere. Since

economic predictors are the most distinct aspect of both of these concepts, extracting the economic indicators allows for simultaneous examination with the other political and social science theories.

Furthermore, economic self-interest or insecurity also seems to have the most obvious causal link to public opinions of immigration (Fetzer 2000). Due to their linguistic differences and rapid influx, Hispanics and Asians might be the focus of more dramatic negative attention in recent years than African Americans (Voss 2001). Previously, theories surrounding group conflict have centered in the South and on black-white dynamics, and attempts to expand the research beyond this single dimension of racial politics have had mixed results (Voss 2001). Fetzer (2000) contends, “Economic self interest would predict that being disproportionately harmed by immigration or believing oneself to be so affected will increase [both] opposition to immigration and support for nativist political movements” (8). Specifically, unemployment, holding blue-collar positions, a declining personal economic situation, and low levels of education should all contribute to feelings of economic vulnerability.

Indeed, some studies have succeeded in expanding the group conflict application to other minority groups. Quillian (1995) and Wilson (2001), for example, applied the concept of group conflict specifically to white perceptions of immigrant groups. The authors confirmed the effect of group dynamics, as well as immigrant concentration, on the majority’s perception of threat in Europe and the United States. Citrin et al.’s (1997) study also supports the connection between economic fluctuations and public opinion of immigration. “Historical research indicates that surges in anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States have followed sharp economic downturns, partly in response to the tendency of politicians and labor union leaders to blame foreign workers for unemployment and downward pressure on wages” (859). In their evaluation

of attitudes toward immigration in Germany, Clark and Legge (1997) use the term “‘victims’ hypothesis” to refer to the “xenophobic” reaction of the “economically disadvantaged” (909).

In summation, the common denominator between group conflict theory and power theory is economic vulnerability. Competition over limited resources causes different groups to perceive each other as threats. Increasing numbers of Hispanic residents in America have long been the focus of discussion regarding competition over limited, especially low income, jobs. Burns and Gimpel (2000) and Kessler’s (2001) term “economic insecurity” will be used to refer to an individual’s susceptibility to economic competition and subsequent pessimism. Hence, economic insecurity should increase white Americans’ desire to restrict immigration. Ingroup identification and outgroup hostility, or racism, will herein be addressed as discrete explanations.³³

Political Knowledge Explanation

While the theories outlined thus far explain the possible causes for whites’ views of immigration in the United States, they all make one, possibly over-simplistic assumption: that all white residents of a specific geographical area or economic situation are able to comprehend the immigration controversy on the same conceptual level. It is possible that, within regions and economic insecurity levels, individuals differ in their perception of immigrants due to their ability to absorb the implications of the issues involved. Within the race relations and immigration literature, there is compelling evidence that the ability to absorb information has a dramatic

³³ It is important to note that any in-depth examination of the power theory and group threat approaches would have to more closely address the interaction between economic insecurity, ingroup identity, and outgroup hostility (Burns and Gimpel 2000), as well as the links with cognitive understanding. No attempt will be made to address interaction relationships in the present research.

influence on the way individuals respond to issues. Furthermore, many questions asked by the ANES incorporate several different issues into one question. Not only is the issue under investigation complicated, but the language of the questions available for interpreting public opinion introduces additional ambiguity.

Authors such as Campbell, Converse, and their colleagues (1960) have long been investigating the correlation between levels of political knowledge³⁴ and public opinion. Political sophistication – commonly measured by political interest (Carmines and Stimson 1980; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995), education (Carmines and Stimson 1980; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995), and/or answers to politically relevant questions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993) – is known to facilitate an individual’s ability to hold and express stronger and more consistent opinions on issues. Hence, individuals with high levels of political knowledge exhibit different opinions and voting patterns on many issues than individuals with low levels (Gomez and Wilson 2001). If so, respondents cannot be treated as a cohesive group (MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995).

In the tradition of Converse, contemporary analysis of voting behavior has focused on differences among individuals in cognitive processing. According to MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug (1995), evidence suggests that sophisticated voters use a greater quantity of data, and utilize information differently, than do individuals who possess less political sophistication.

The emotional factors involved in issues revolving around race and immigration may also encourage people to take a stance based on sentimentality and impulse. “[I]ndividuals, particularly the less educated, quickly determine their likes and dislikes and immediately jump to

³⁴ The terms political knowledge, political sophistication, and political savvy will be used interchangeably.

the end of the policy reasoning chain. They then may ‘reason backwards’ to justify why they advocate a certain position toward a minority group” (Clark and Legge 1997, 914). In other words, political knowledge may be the partition between individuals who study the issue and then make an informed decision, and those who make a decision before understanding why they have taken that particular stand.

Carmines and Stimson (1980) add another dimension of consideration to the political knowledge hypothesis. They reasonably surmise that it may be the complexity of the issue (or question), in addition to the sophistication of the individual, which dictates the response. The authors distinguish between “easy” and “hard” issues, dependent on the level of political insight required for understanding. They list three criteria that an easy issue must meet. First, the issue must be symbolic in that it can be easily presented to the public in terms it can understand. The issue must not be too technical for easy mass absorption. Second, the issue should deal with the end goal of the policy, rather than the means by which to achieve that goal (see also Stimson 2004). Third, the issue must be long in the public eye and on the political agenda. Carmines and Stimson (1980) suggest easy issue voting “occurs when a particular issue becomes so ingrained over a long period that it structures voters’ ‘gut responses’ to candidates and political parties” (78).

Easy issue voting requires almost no supporting context of factual knowledge, no impressive reasoning ability, and no attention to the nuances of political life. Thus, easy issues produce a mass response without respect to political knowledge, awareness, attentiveness, or interest (Carmines and Stimson 1980). It is an implied requirement that political elites must hold well-known and publicly understood stances on an issue for the public to choose a side. For, if

there are no sides being forwarded, then the issue does not present choices that can be understood (see also Carmines and Stimson 1986).³⁵

Hard issues, more common in American politics, require an in-depth knowledge of political realities, such as past successes and failures of policy. The voter must understand the subtle nuances of the political sphere and possess a personal understanding of the political goals that he or she envisions for the country. Furthermore, the policy means needed to achieve the desired ends is discovered through active interest in politics, at the expense of great time and energy.

Therefore, “the relationship between hard issues and vote [choice] should be conditional on level of political information possessed by voters...No such distinction should hold if the issue is easy. That the ill-informed can respond appropriately is a defining characteristic of the easy issue” (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 82). The effect of political knowledge should be more pronounced for difficult issues, because the cognitive processes that evolve consistent policy preferences from generalized, vague opinions are more established in politically sophisticated individuals.

The opposing viewpoint argues that certain issues illicit a gut response, which is not reliant on political sophistication. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) argue that mental shortcuts, or “heuristics,” allow individuals to take a stance on an issue, such as the immigration debate, with little or no information on the specifics involved. Hood and Morris (1998) elaborate:

³⁵ It is this aspect of the easy issue that the political elites in the United States have yet to fulfill. While it is commonly assumed that members of the Republican Party will be more restrictive regarding immigration policy than their Democratic counterparts (Bulkley 2004), recent political races have complicated the issue. The upcoming 2006 midterm and 2008 presidential elections may force the parties and the candidates to voice more assertive and distinct opinions on the issue of immigration.

Using such logic, a citizen would require relatively little information on current immigration policy to make a decision as to his or her stance on this issue. If an individual lives in an area largely affected by immigration and this same individual feels threatened by future immigration, then one or more heuristics may provide the connection between a negative attitude toward migrants and a conservative opinion on immigration policy (4).

The political knowledge explanation rests upon the assumption that political sophistication is necessary for an individual to successfully absorb relevant information and turn it into a reasonable policy stance. Furthermore, following said theory, it is logical to make the case that the first two dependent variable questions – which address immigrant numbers and the threat immigration poses to American jobs – fall under the category of “easy.” Conversely, the third and fourth immigration questions asked by the 2004 ANES, that address illegal immigration, are conceptually “hard.” Political knowledge should be more statistically significant in predicting responses to the two more difficult immigration questions than the more direct, simple inquires.

The best example of a difficult immigration question provided by the 2004 ANES asks respondents whether or not federal budget spending should be increased in order to tighten border security to prevent illegal immigration. Several distinct issues are being simultaneously addressed by the question, including the respondents’ views on federal budget spending and border security. In addition, the individual’s view of illegal, not legal or unspecified, immigration is tapped.³⁶

³⁶ There is reason to suspect that recent American immigration sentiments are shaped largely by a growing awareness of illegal immigration, and a lack of proper distinction in many survey questions between legal and illegal entrants. Harwood (1986), writing in the midst of the diminishing support for granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants, feels that “alarm expressed over illegal immigration may really measure Americans’ dislike for law-breaking of any kind as well as Americans’ concern over the integrity of the country’s borders” (205). However,

Political knowledge is a means by which to absorb and comprehend the vast amount of political information available to the American public. Proponents of the effects of political savvy suggest that, in response to survey questions asking multi-faceted or complex issues, individuals may be aided by their basic knowledge of political institutions and figures. The primary assumption of the political knowledge hypothesis is that individuals possessing higher levels of political sophistication will hold more or less restrictive immigration stances.

There is a foundation within the immigration literature upon which to build such an assumption. Harwood (1986) and Moore (1986) found that social scientists differed significantly from the general public in their views on immigration. “As a group, [the] social scientists were found to be more supportive of legal and illegal immigration than the general public,” and the more “expertise” the individual “has on the subject of immigration, the more likely he or she is to feel that immigrants make positive contributions to American society” (Moore 1986, 213).³⁷ The political knowledge explanation’s secondary prediction is that respondents will rely more heavily on political sophistication to answer difficult, multifaceted questions, such as dependent variables three and four.

Association Explanations

The final four hypotheses focus on the concept of personal association with identity ingroups or against outgroups. First, the two national identity variables capture distinct

survey questions do not delve into the connection between these concepts, and available data makes it very difficult to control for the law-breaking aspect of negative immigration sentiment.

³⁷ However, this positive impression of the contributions of immigration does not always translate to more liberal views on immigrant or Hispanic-sensitive policies. According to Houvouras (2001), while “college-educated individuals are more likely to say that we should allow more immigrants to enter the country and to understand that immigrants are structurally disadvantaged,” results also “indicate that college-educated individuals are 36% more likely to oppose bilingual education than individuals who have not attended college” (150).

dimensions of patriotism. The theories suggest that white ANES respondents who exhibit higher levels of blind and symbolic patriotism will desire greater immigration restriction than individuals who are less patriotic. Second, the group pride hypothesis assumes that individuals who positively stereotype their own ethnic group – whites – will desire more restrictions on immigration numbers and policy than those who respond with neutral or negative stereotypes. Third, the traditional racism hypothesis posits that respondents who negatively stereotype Hispanics will exhibit the most restrictive immigration attitudes. The perceived link of the individual to the group is what ties these four theories together.

National Identity

American national identity results from a group or self-definition, supported and perpetuated by values that are mutually agreed upon and institutionalized by the nation (Parker 2003). In the United States, the American Creed principles, which value the ideals of “egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, a belief in limited government, and individualism,” are often named as the cornerstone of the American identity (Parker 2003, 4; see also Huntington 2004). Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001) suggest that a sense of pride in one’s country and feelings of national superiority result from socialization, and have the ability to “mitigate ethnic conflict by integrating diverse groups in an overarching identity” (78). Simultaneously, national identity can fulfill certain psychological desires within an individual, resulting in a greater “sense of security, a feeling of belonging, and prestige” (Druckman 1994, 44).

Furthermore, individuals’ perceptions of their personal and/or national identity may affect their view of outside threats, such as those posed by immigrants. Recent challenges to the American way of life – primarily the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the resulting War on

Terror – may have reemphasized national identity concepts within the American public (Parker 2003; 2004). The violent strike on United States soil resulted in an instant and obvious increase in expressions of national identification and unity throughout the country (Li and Brewer 2004; Parker 2003).³⁸ “[F]eelings of national identity are likely to be evoked by international terrorist activities because they raise the salience of one’s status as an American” (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001, 78), prompting the national identity to take precedence over other identity considerations, such as ethnic group or social class.³⁹

However, just because flag waving and national affection increased in the aftermath of the attack does not mean that Americans have also increased in their negative feelings toward other nations, or insecurity in the country’s international position. There is increasing agreement over the last several decades that the feelings encapsulated in the term national identity actually include more than one dimension. De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) suggest that national pride consists of two inverse components that have opposite effects on personal prejudice. There is a negative dimension of national identity, which is often referred to as nationalism, and a positive dimension, which is the more commonly cited term – patriotism. Blank and Schmidt (2003) agree, elaborating that nationalism and patriotism can be seen as parallel consequences of national identity.

“An ethnocentric conception of American national identity, therefore, may intensify internal political conflict by hardening resistance to the demands of cultural minorities for recognition and support” (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001, 93). The studies by Citrin, Wong, and

³⁸ For example, Wal-Mart’s sale of American flags was about 10,000 on September 12th, 2000, but an extraordinary 250,000 on September 12th, 2001 (Huntington 2004, 3).

³⁹ It is also possible that events, such as the War on Terror, along with high national unemployment rates and Republican control of the House, Senate, and/or Presidency, may encourage the passage of restrictive immigration policy (Bulkley 2004).

Duff (2001) and Parker (2003) find a statistically significant relationship between the negative traits of national identity and a more restrictive view of immigration numbers and policy. Therefore, national identity is a necessary inclusion in race and immigration studies.

Another translation of the dichotomous nature of patriotism was noted by Tocqueville in 1945: “The first version [of patriotism], ‘instinctive patriotism,’⁴⁰ privileges customs, tradition, and general reverence of the past,” while the second, termed “‘reflective patriotism,’⁴¹ is a state of mind in which ‘citizens...grapple with the various aspects of America which are not so rose-colored’” (Parker 2003, 8). Tocqueville’s comments focus on the distinction between individuals who are and who are not willing to acknowledge the less appealing parts of their nation’s history.

Parker (2003) adds a third dimension to the concept. “Symbolic patriotism” captures an ideologically neutral aspect of patriotism “evoked by the traditions, rituals, and symbols associated with American national identity” (9). While constructive patriots may respond just as loyally to national symbols, such as the flag and the National Anthem, they are also more likely to point out past or potential weaknesses in their nation’s political and social reality. The blind patriot loves their country and denies any need for change. The constructive or informed patriot is more aware of faults and has considered how the country can be improved, hence illustrating a clearer understanding of why they love their country.

The present study rests heavily on Parker’s (2003) interpretation of patriotism for three reasons. First, his study represents a post-September 11th view of changing national identity.

⁴⁰ Other terms that are used interchangeably with “instinctive patriotism” (Tocqueville 1945) are “blind” (Parker 2003) and “pseudo” (Adorno et al. 1950) patriotism.

⁴¹ Other terms that are used interchangeably with “reflective patriotism” (Tocqueville 1945) are “constructive” (Parker 2003) and “genuine” (Adorno et al. 1950) patriotism.

Second, Parker utilizes questions in his study that most closely parallel the available variables in the 2004 ANES.⁴² Third, the author directly addresses the link between national identity, race, and stances on immigration policy.

On the continuing assumption that previous studies have failed to fully and interactively utilize the plethora of available theories regarding public opinion of immigrant numbers and immigration policy, this study will integrate a range of patriotism indicators. While the national identity questions available in the 2004 ANES survey do not clearly capture the competitive nature of the nationalism concept, the available questions do parallel the dual dimensions of blind and symbolic patriotism, as used by Parker.⁴³ Therefore, a factor analysis is conducted on the five most direct patriotism variables. The results (Table 7) clearly reveal two distinct dimensions of patriotism.

The factor analysis reveals that blind patriotism is captured through the inability of an individual to acknowledge the less than desirable aspects of America. The inverse measure, or second dimension, is captured by the same variables is constructive patriotism, or the presence of a critical (Blank and Schmidt 2003) awareness of American faults. Whereas Parker used

⁴² Parker's (2003) study, utilizing the 2002 California Patriotism Pilot Study, includes as "blind" patriots those individuals who respond "strongly agree / somewhat agree" to the questions: "I would support my country right or wrong," "I believe U.S. policies are almost always morally correct," "I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of the country," and "There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world, and we should not criticize the U.S." To capture "constructive" patriotism, Parker includes the answers "strongly agree / somewhat agree" to the questions: "People who love the U.S. should notice its problems and work to correct them," "If I criticize the U.S., I do so out of love for my country," "I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it," "I express my love for the U.S. by supporting efforts for positive change," and "My love for the U.S. demands that I speak out against popular but potentially destructive policies." "Symbolic" patriotism includes the response "very good / extremely good" to the question "When I see the American flag flying it makes me feel..." and the response "very strong" to the question "How strong is your love for the U.S.? Would you say it is..." (26)?

⁴³ Stein, Post, and Rinden (2000) used also used a factor analysis in their study of white Texans' attitudes towards Hispanics and immigrant numbers. However, due to the difference in available questions, their factor analysis resulted in a single "American identity" dimension, which was found to have a slightly negative affect on support for increasing immigration numbers.

separate questions to tap these inverse concepts, the inaccessibility of diverse data recommends the use of the two poles of a single dimension. The second dimension revealed in the factor analysis is symbolic patriotism, herein defined as an affinity for democratic and American symbols.

De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) discourage the use of ideology in a study trying to capture the effects of patriotism and nationalism. “Ideology is a significant predictor only when nationalism and patriotism are excluded from the model, suggesting that national identity somehow taps the aspect of ideology which is associated with xenophobia” (186). However, the present study, in its attempt to address all possible explanations concurrently, cannot ignore the relevance of the ideology variable, despite its possible diluting effect on the national identity variables.

Group Pride

The data presented in the present study utilize only white respondents. Research has found that individuals who share similar characteristics other than race still differ in their levels of racial resentment and opinions on immigration policy. Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle (1997) and Polinard, Wrinkle, and De la Garza (1984) find that Mexican Americans and Anglos differ in their opinions of amnesty, social benefits extended to undocumented immigrants, and the employment of a national identity card. Likewise, De la Garza and Weaver (1985) determine that Mexican American attitudes on policy affecting minorities are significantly related to their ethnicity (De la Garza et al. 1991). It is logical, then, to assume that Hispanic respondents will be more inclined to support less restrictive immigration policy than whites.

Other ethnic groups within the United States also differ in their restrictive sentiments. Unchecked immigration may be perceived as threatening by any minority group that competes with Hispanic immigrants for limited resources (Diamond 1998; Kposowa 1995; Waldinger 1997). However, it is also possible that “political alliances” in recent decades among minority groups may instead spawn a feeling of camaraderie (Diamond 1998, 467). Either way, the inclusion of non-white respondents would unnecessarily complicate the research.⁴⁴

As discussed in the economic insecurity section of the Literature Review, certain studies have merged group loyalty with economic insecurity to form the power approach hypothesis. Giles and Hertz (1994) believe that a systematic exclusion of outside groups by advantaged groups is pivotal to this approach. “In contexts where the threat posed by a minority group is high, the dominant group’s response is predicted to be more hostile than in contexts where that threat is low” (317). The power approach studies claim that as competition from minority groups increases, so does the subsequent racial intolerance and opposition to government policies that benefit minorities (Giles and Evans 1986). The goal of the majority group is to maintain dominance.

In addition, a strong sense of ethnic group identification may change individual competition into a sense of group rivalry. Outgroups wield more power on ingroup actions when a situation becomes competitive (Druckman 1994), and dominant groups respond to threats by forming and dividing along previously benign faults, in an effort to avoid change or competition from outgroup members (Giles and Evans 1986; Hood and Morris 1998). Increased immigration in recent years represents a threat with the potential to strengthen white group identity.

⁴⁴ The low “n” values for African, Asian, and Latino Americans would have also challenged the integrity of the study’s quantitative results.

Druckman (1994) provides psychological insight into the cause of, and need for, group loyalties. Ingroup preference may inadvertently affect an individual's perception of inter-group conflict and may actually alter the way he or she perceives their world and their own status position. Thus, outgroup challenges strengthen ingroup ties. "As the demands for loyalty and commitment increase, the tendency is to defend the group's position and to gain something for the group in any negotiation" (55). The alliance to the association also comes from the human desire to belong and be secure. "Studies suggest that people see groups as providing them with security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for their loyalty and commitment" (63).

In the case of immigration, ethnic cleavages may become more pronounced among those individuals with racial identities that trump other social alliances, whether or not they exhibit racist tendencies. While racism is often the result of a strong ethnic group identity, the group pride hypothesis should be evaluated separately from outgroup derogation. "Feshbach and his colleagues are consistent with the argument that we should be able to distinguish among kinds of ingroup orientations and identifications. Certain types of ingroup orientations are associated with a tendency to denigrate outgroups, while others are not" (Druckman 1994, 47). However, the relevant link is between ingroup identification and positive ingroup evaluation (group pride) (Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001).

The group pride variable is meant to capture the respondent's identification with whites as an ethnic group. The group pride class of explanation suggests that it is the respondent's strength of white ingroup identity that will determine their immigration opinions. The significance of this effect should be distinct from those of racism and economic insecurity. It is

expected that white respondents who more closely identify with their ethnic ingroup, though positive stereotyping, will be more inclined to take a restrictive immigration stance.

Traditional Racism

The addition of a racism variable is undeniably necessary. A measure of racial attitudes is a natural inclusion in any study involving topics that have a strong ethnic component. Racism has been affecting politics in the United States since its inception, and there is little conclusive evidence that this effect has been extinguished. A brief outline of the recent literature on American racial attitudes has already been provided in the southern distinctiveness section of the Literature Review. Even so, the potential for a relationship between traditional racism and restrictive immigration stances is intuitive, especially since the mid-1960s when the ever-increasing number of Asian and Hispanic immigrants began to dominate entries.

While the effects of racism have persisted, the definition has fluctuated through the years and among academic disciplines. A modernized thesis, symbolic racism,⁴⁵ proposes that race still disproportionately determines political and social outcomes, but assumes that a new political environment allows the traditionally racial sentiments of Americans to be expressed in an acceptable, conservative political arena (Howell 1994). Sniderman et al. (1991) define symbolic racism as a combination of traditional racism⁴⁶ and traditional norms. According to Raden

⁴⁵ Other terms used to express concepts similar to “symbolic” racism (Howell 1994; Knuckey 2005; Sniderman et al. 1991) include: “covert” (Sniderman et al. 1991), “modern” (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; McConahay, Hardee, and Batts 1981), “new” (Sniderman et al. 1991), and “subtle” (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997) racism or prejudice, as well as “racial resentment” (Knuckey 2005). According to Meertens and Pettigrew (1997), the distinction between the similar terms is in “subtlety and severity” (68).

⁴⁶ Other phrases are used interchangeably with “traditional” racism (Clark and Legge 1997), including: “biological” (Knuckey 2005; Orey 2001), “blatant” (Sniderman et al 1991; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997), “old-fashioned” (Howell 19994; Sears et al. 1997), “overt” (Orey 2001), and “red-neck” (Clark and Legge 1997) racism or prejudice.

(1994), traditional norms often express themselves in the Protestant work ethic values of self-reliance and individualism.

The symbolic racism hypothesis further asserts that any perceived decline in old-fashioned racism, not to mention the merge between northern and southern racial attitudes, is a mirage – a misperception caused by respondents’ intentional dishonesty when answering survey questions. It is possible that some respondents give socially acceptable answers in lieu of honest responses and that researchers, absent alternative data, are unintentionally using tainted results.

Despite many claims that symbolic racism can be “reliably measured and distinguished” from traditional racism (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997, 66), scholars such as Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) “charge that the distinction between the two types of racism is conceptually and empirically unclear” (Virtanen and Huddy 1998, 312). Raden’s (1994) study also finds little evidence that symbolic racism performs as a distinct racial disposition.

Moreover, the measures used by symbolic racism researchers are often unreliable and inconsistent. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) point to the:

[A]mbiguities in how symbolic racism has been defined as well as disagreements among major proponents of the approach as to how it should be conceptualized...There is a lack of consistency in item content across studies, confusion in measures between the defining attributes of symbolic racism and its possible effects, and confounding in the same instruments of symbolic racism with traditional racial prejudice (Raden 1994, 379).

The primary concern among opponents of symbolic racism is that it is entangled with economic and social conservatism and, consequently, “indicts conservatives as racists” (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997, 54).

Traditional racism is, as the name implies, the more common historical version of bigotry. As defined by Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996), traditional prejudice is “an irrational

antipathy against minority groups and their members. Prejudice is understood as heavily imbued with negative affect and negative stereotypes that make the views of the prejudiced individual unreceptive to reason and new information” (887). It is important to note, as cautioned by Burns and Gimpel (2000), that it is not the use of stereotypes that cause prejudice, but rather negative stereotypes are a symptom of racism. Specifically, it is the consistent use of negative or demeaning stereotypes, common among those individuals who are more likely to allow their political views to be dominated by trite racial classifications, that is the concern.

Therefore, the present study chooses not to fuse together the concepts of conservative economic and/or social values with traditional racism into a symbolic racism measure. Instead, economic insecurity, political ideology, and racism are included as separate independent variables. Traditional racism is included to tap individuals’ perceptions of innate difference between races or ethnic groups, independent of circumstance or experience. In recent years, the link between the terms immigrant and Hispanic is hard to deny. For that reason, the study utilizes an index of negative racial stereotypes to address traditional racism against Hispanics as a cause of more restrictive immigration stances among white Americans.

Conditional Explanations

As is evident in the initial regressions (Table 8), certain hypotheses are more successful than others in explaining white opinions of immigration issues. The highlighted independent variables were not triumphant in many cases. To this point, all of the explanatory factors have been utilized identically as independent and control variables. However, in light of the impressive literature suggesting significant relationships between the presented hypotheses and restrictive racial and immigration opinions, the lack of expected results gives reason to be more

thorough. In order to confirm the outcomes in Table 8, the regressions will be run again, using each independent variable separately as a conditional limitation on the model.⁴⁷

The term conditional was chosen to clearly express that these variables are being divided along arbitrary “lines in the sand” for the purpose of the present study only. The dividing values between high and low that are assigned to the groups of responses in order to draw out individuals who most clearly exhibit a given trait are wholly dependent on the response distribution in the survey at hand. Instead of using aggregate data, such as state characteristics and regional placement, to define a cleavage within the respondent pool, the conditional regressions create groups out of the individual-level responses.

The second reason for using the term conditional is to distinguish the concept from the more commonly used “contextual” consideration, which is described and utilized in the earlier population explanations section of the Literature Review. Remember that the South was comprised of states with a southern geographical placement. In order to form the Hispanic immigrant region, state demographic characteristics from the 2000 Census were utilized to determine the state’s Hispanic and migrant contexts. The region was then formed from states with high levels of immigrant and Hispanic residents. The resulting immigrant and southern regions were then included in the study, and initial regressions, as direct contextual independent variables.

The rationale behind examining the independent variables from this second viewpoint is to confirm or call into question the relationships revealed in the initial regressions, and to add supplemental data to the study. The hope is that patterns will emerge, which either confirm the

⁴⁷ Special thanks to Dr. Pollock for recommending this secondary “conditional” approach.

results from the initial regressions or allow for a more comprehensive examination of the independent variable effects. For instance, Hispanic immigrant region residence does exhibit explanatory power for the first immigration question, regarding immigrant numbers, but not for the other three dependent variables. It is possible that examining only the blanket reaction of all whites as a group may conceal significant relationships among the variables. In order to eliminate the possibility that local Hispanic density affects public opinion of immigration on the other questions, the regressions from Table 8 will be run separately for residents of the Hispanic immigrant region and the rest of the nation.

The same steps will be taken to confirm the expected and/or unexpected performance of each independent variable. The conditional examination of the independent variables may help determine whether the association variables, unquestionably the strongest initial performers, maintain their significance in qualified regressions. Or, the limited regressions may instead highlight the significance of other independent variables under specific circumstances.

METHODS

Immigrants entering the United States over the last forty years have become increasingly, even undeniably, linked to the Hispanic-American community. Media and political elite rhetoric confirm the perception. Each of the possible explanations, as outlined in the Literature Review, is tested individually and conditionally for significant influence on white perceptions of immigrant numbers and immigration policy. In order to determine the effect of each explanation on the restrictive immigration stances of white Americans, data are taken from the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) survey. The ANES is a representative sample of United States residents of voting age. ANES items addressing immigration have been limited in most years. However, in 2004, several items specifically tapping public perception of immigration were provided. Supplemental information is provided by the 2000 Census.

Dependent Variables

The four dependent variables utilized exhaust the immigration-specific questions available in 2004.⁴⁸ The first question addresses legal immigration numbers. The second question taps the effect of immigration on American jobs. The third question attempts to ascertain the importance the respondent places on limiting further illegal immigration as a foreign policy goal. The final question asks whether federal spending should be adjusted to tighten border security and prevent illegal immigration.⁴⁹ Within the limitations of the available

⁴⁸ The illegal immigrant feeling thermometer, while available in 2004, is excluded from the study due to the high correlation of feeling thermometer ratings across ethnic groups and topics (Table 5).

⁴⁹ Other surveys provide more comprehensive coverage of specific immigration issues. For instance, Roper's (2002) report entitled "Americans Talk about Illegal Immigration" provides American opinions about the number of immigrants that is desirable and immigration policy enforcement. Also, Zogby International's (2002) survey

data, ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions simultaneously test the possible causes for restrictive immigration stances among white Americans.

Independent Variables

Four classes of explanation, which include nine distinct hypotheses, are expected to affect the level of white restrictionist sentiment regarding United States immigration. The first set of explanations, and corresponding three hypotheses, utilize population explanations.⁵⁰ The southern region independent variable, used to test the southern distinctiveness hypothesis, includes: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia.⁵¹ The rest of the (non-southern and low Hispanic immigration) states are combined into a control region. A dummy variable is created, where zero equals non-southern region and one equals southern region.⁵²

The other two hypotheses within the population class of explanation use the Hispanic immigrant region independent variable to test both the immigrant backlash and social contact theories. This region is comprised of states possessing levels of both immigrant and Hispanic concentration above the national averages in 2004 of 10.4% and 12.5%, respectively (Table 4). With this criterion, the immigrant region includes: California, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey,

entitled “American Views of Mexico and Mexican Views of the U.S.” provides a binational glimpse at immigration issues. However, the ANES was chosen for this study because it is unique in the detail it provides on respondents’ demographic characteristics and other political opinions.

⁵⁰ Regions are used in lieu of individual states to increase the “n” value.

⁵¹ The modified South excludes Florida and Texas, due to their periphery status (Key 1949; Black and Black 1992) and their high percentage of Hispanic residents. Due to limitations in the 2004 ANES “state” data, only six states are included in the region for analysis. It is interesting to note that, as of the 2000 census, all six of these states still possessed African American populations that exceeded the national average of 12.3% (Table 4).

⁵² There is some concern that the number of southern respondents is too low to produce reliable statistics (see Appendix A). However, including border or peripheral southern states in the region could be even more harmful to the integrity of the results.

New York, and Texas. A dummy variable is created, where zero equals non-immigrant region and one equals Hispanic immigrant region.

The second class of explanation, and fourth hypothesis, employs a trio of economic indicators supplied by the 2004 ANES, including household income level and the respondents' perceptions of their personal and the national economic situation. The sociotropic measure is included to capture respondents that perceive collective, in lieu of individual, threat. Each response is given a value of one if it suggests a negative perception of economic conditions, or a zero for neutral or positive perceptions. It is not the purpose of the research to determine which economic variable is the best performer. Rather, the intention is to ascertain whether economic considerations as a whole – herein represented by economic insecurity – outperform the contextual, political knowledge, or association explanations. Therefore, the items are combined into an economic insecurity index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the scale is recoded into a metric ranging from zero (least economic insecurity or most economic optimism) to one (most economic insecurity or pessimism).

The third class of explanation, and fifth hypothesis, defines individuals according to their level of political knowledge. The political knowledge variable integrates six questions, four of which ask the respondent to recognize the names of prominent politicians and provide the job or political office that they now hold, including: the Prime Minister of England (Blair), the Vice President of the United States (Cheney), the Speaker of the House (Hastert), and the Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court (Rehnquist).⁵³ In addition, two items, as suggested by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993), ask the respondent to correctly answer which party held majority status in the House of Representatives prior to the election (Republican Party) and which party is more conservative at the national level (Republican Party). The six items are combined into a political knowledge index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the scale is recoded into a metric ranging from zero (least political knowledge with zero correct answers) to one (most political knowledge with six correct answers).

The association class of explanation consists of hypotheses six through nine, including: national identity, group pride, and racism. Five questions are chosen to capture American national identity. They include: feelings towards the flag, agreement with the statement that things about America make the respondent ashamed and/or angry, love of country, and the importance of being an American. Two distinct independent variables, as determined through factor analysis (Table 7), are used as complementary dimensions of patriotism. Blind patriotism is an uncritical affection for American institutions, and includes the questions tapping the presence or absence of anger and/or shame directed at aspects of American reality. Symbolic patriotism is a self-proclaimed love of country and the flag, as well as the importance the respondent places on being an American.

The next hypothesis within the association class of explanation addresses the group pride, or ingroup identity, theory. There are several questions provided by the 2004 ANES that directly

⁵³ The inclusion of the recognition of Tony Blair is intended to capture respondents with international, as well as domestic, political knowledge. In addition to basic name recognition, the question concerning the placement of the parties on the ideological spectrum is intended to capture individuals who have an awareness of abstract political concepts.

address racial stereotyping. The trio of questions utilized to reflect white ingroup pride taps the respondents' perceptions of white individuals' intelligence, work ethic, and trustworthiness. These three items are combined into a white group pride index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the scale is recoded into a metric ranging from zero (least positive stereotyping) to one (most positive stereotyping).

The same trio of questions used for the group pride explanation, this time addressing negative Hispanic stereotyping instead of positive white stereotyping, is used for the ninth hypothesis, addressing racism.⁵⁴ As before, the three items are combined into a Hispanic racism index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the scale is recoded into a metric ranging from zero (least negative stereotypes) to one (most negative stereotypes). Whereas group pride is coded to capture whites that hold positive stereotypical attitudes concerning their own ethnic group, the racism index codes negative stereotypical responses as higher.

An index of stereotypical responses is used in lieu feeling thermometers to maximize variation and improve reliability. There is reason to believe that the “bipolar trait-rating format,” where the respondent is asked to place a race or ethnic group on a bipolar scale, is both reliable and valid when measuring prejudice, and is found to “produce evidence of much higher levels of negative stereotyping than do older forced-choice formats” (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996, 906).

⁵⁴ The index measure is also more desirable, and allows for greater variation, than the Hispanic feeling thermometer. The study makes no attempt to test theories, which are conglomerations of simpler theoretical concepts. For instance, a symbolic racism measure is not employed because ideological conservatism, individualism, traditional racism, and other items included in covert racist measures are utilized individually in the research. In addition, the purpose is to unearth a correlation between white perceptions of Hispanic desirability and immigrant desirability. Therefore, traditional racism, as evidenced in stereotypical perceptions of Hispanics, is the most direct and appropriate measure for this study.

Whereas feeling thermometer ratings that whites give their own ethnic group versus that they give Hispanics and African Americans are highly correlated (Table 5), the created index has lower white-minority correlations (Table 6).

In order to determine which social science hypothesis lends the most explanatory power to restrictive immigration attitudes, and in order to test the theories simultaneously with controls, a multivariate analysis is employed. The explanations that are the most consistent and statistically significant predictors of conservative white ANES responses to opinions of immigration, with relevant control variables taken into account, will reveal the hypotheses that are most applicable to white opinions of immigration in 2004.

Two separate routes test the effect of the variables. Initially, the independent variables will be used in a standard OLS regression to determine their direct influence on respondents' perceptions. Subsequently, to assess whether the independent variables operate conditionally as well as directly, split regressions will be run. Relevant variables will be dichotomized, with a separate regression run for individuals scoring high and low or neutral for each independent variable.

Controls

Within the literature concerning white-minority relations and immigrant opinions, several recommended controls are supplied, in addition to the common demographic inclusions. Individuals who have native-born parents are thought to be less sympathetic than recent newcomers (Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000). Religiosity is often included in studies addressing racial relations, and affiliation with specific denominations has been found to affect perceptions of immigrants (Fetzer 2000). Those respondents claiming religious attachment will be evaluated

separately as Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, in order to determine whether denomination affiliation increases or decreases sympathy for immigration. In addition, a control is added for individuals, according to how important religion is in their daily lives.

There are also several controls that should, intuitively, be added to any study of immigration opinions. Self-employment, especially in high-minority regions of the United States may affect the desirability of easy and cheap labor accessibility. Conversely, union membership is included to control for American workers who feel that immigrants threaten wages (Citrin et al. 1997; Kessler 2001). As a parallel consideration, respondents with a strong sense of individualism may perceive Hispanics as violating traditional American self-reliance. Therefore, both self-employment and individualism will be added to the model as dummy variables. It is also plausible that urban residence can increase tolerance or competition on issues pertaining to race or ethnicity (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Giles and Buckner 1993).

In addition, individuals with a strong desire for the United States to remain isolated from outside social and economic pressures will be more likely to support a restrictive immigration stance (Huber and Espenshade 1997). Isolationism may also taint the perceived desirability of growing representation of minority groups within the United States (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Ideology is included to ascertain whether or not self-proclaimed conservatives are more inclined to favor restrictive immigration policy than their liberal counterparts (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Hood and Morris 1998; Kessler 2001).

The basic demographic variables included are gender and age. Women are often found to differ from men in their support for liberties extended to perceived outgroups, racial attitudes (Howell and Day 2000), and immigration (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Burns and

Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000). Gender will be included as a dummy variable, where females are assigned the value of zero and males are one. It has also been suggested that aversion to new immigrants increases with age (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Clark and Legge 1997; Hood and Morris 1998). Age is included in its original scale.

Hypotheses

Population Explanations

Hypothesis 1

If the southern distinctiveness theory is correct, then there will be a significant positive relationship between residence in the South and restrictive immigration stances.

Hypothesis 2

If the immigrant backlash theory is correct, then there will be a significant positive relationship between residence in states with high immigrant and Hispanic population densities and restrictive immigration stances.

Hypothesis 3

If the social contact theory is correct, then there will be a significant negative relationship between immigrant and Hispanic population density and restrictive immigration stances.

Economic Explanation

Hypothesis 4

If the economic insecurity theory is correct, then there will be a significant positive relationship between economic vulnerability and restrictive immigration stances.

Political Knowledge Explanation

Hypothesis 5

If the political knowledge consideration is viable, then there will be a significant negative relationship between political knowledge and restrictive immigration stances. In addition, political knowledge will be more significant for the complicated, multifaceted immigration questions than the easier questions.

Association Explanations

Hypothesis 6

If the blind patriotism consideration is viable, then there will be a significant positive relationship between patriotism and restrictive immigration stances.

Hypothesis 7

If the symbolic patriotism consideration is viable, then there will be a significant positive relationship between symbolic patriotism and restrictive immigration stances.

Hypothesis 8

If the group pride consideration is viable, then there will be a significant positive relationship between positive white stereotyping and restrictive immigration stances.

Hypothesis 9

If the traditional racism consideration is viable, then there will be a significant positive relationship between negative Hispanic stereotyping and restrictive immigration stances.

FINDINGS

It is the primary purpose of the present research to collect into a single study a comprehensive list of the hypotheses with the potential to affect white Americans' perceptions of racial issues and immigration. The secondary purpose is to simultaneously test the provided theories along with relevant control variables. The findings highlight the complexity of the issue and the discord in many cases among the responses to the four dependent variable questions, despite their obvious immigration link. Therefore, the findings for each dependent variable will be presented in order, followed by a comprehensive evaluation.

Results: Dependent Variable 1

Immigration is emerging as the issue of the generation. It is becoming all but impossible for political candidates to sidestep this salient and controversial topic. Immigration should be especially pertinent in states where immigrant numbers keep the issue on the minds of its native, especially white, population. While residence in states with high levels of Hispanic immigrants is significant for this, the most straightforward and frequently asked ANES immigration question addressing immigrant numbers, the coefficient suggests a minimal relationship. The immigrant backlash hypothesis falls far short of the explanatory power of the individual-level indicators. Perhaps the use of state-level contextual data is to blame. Many studies that do find a more impressive relationship between Hispanic or immigrant representation and restrictive white opinions often use smaller contextual units, such as counties or districts.

Southern region residence also fails to reach statistical significance for the first dependent variable. It is possible that the unimpressive results for the population explanations are due to

accessible and popular national media coverage. More and more people are watching national cable news providers, in lieu of local stations. Cable news networks such as CNN and FOX capture, on average, between two-and-a half and three million regular viewers. Specific events, such as elections and the events of September 11th, 2001, can more than double the normal viewing audience.⁵⁵ “After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks [though], Fox News Channel covered the fighting in Afghanistan with heavy patriotism, referring to ‘our troops’ who are fighting ‘terror goons.’” Subsequently, Fox News jumped to first place in the cable news ratings by January 2002. In response to Fox’s success, MSNBC “added several features to capture more conservatives, who, along with moderates, make up a larger share of the cable news audience than do liberals.”⁵⁶

If millions of individuals are now being exposed to a national news perspective, through cable news stations, AM radio, and Internet exposure, it is possible that the impression of an immigrant threat has spread. Perhaps the perceived menace, once limited to residents of immigration states is now nationalizing, or being felt by residents of other states. The filtering of Hispanic immigrants from their traditional settlement states to less traditional locations may also be nationalizing the perceived threat.

As an alternative to region of residence, it has often been posited that the real or perceived threat to an individual’s economic stability can cause a fear of possible rivals in the

⁵⁵The cable news viewing information comes from Nielsen Media Research, found at <http://www.nielsenmedia.com/nc/portal/site/Public/>, and from The Project for Excellence in Journalism’s (PEJ) article, entitled “The State of the News Media: An Annual Report on American Journalism, 2005,” found at <http://www.journalism.org/>. The PEJ is “a research organization that specializes in using empirical methods to evaluate and study the performance of the press.”

⁵⁶ The quotes come from the April 16, 2003 *New York Times* article by Jim Rutenberg, entitled “Cable’s War Coverage Suggests a New ‘Fox Effect’ on Television.” (“Like Fox News and MSNBC, CNN featured an American flag on its screen after Sept. 11.” CNN has since removed the flag from its screen.)

economic sphere. In its present coding, the economic explanation is the only independent variable that fails to reach statistical significance for even a single dependent variable question. This lack of relationship may point to a decline in the economic insecurity of the American population. However, the number of individuals who exhibit above average insecurity about the state of their own and the national economic situation outnumber those with below average insecurity (see Appendix A). This suggests that the answers lay elsewhere.

As a group, the association explanations lend the most explanatory power to the first regression model. Group pride, racism, and symbolic patriotism all have strong significant relationships with restrictive immigration. Individuals with high levels of group pride and/or those who express negative stereotypical racism against Hispanics are more likely to desire fewer immigrants. While this information is not unexpected, it does strengthen previous arguments that race issues are still present in American politics, independent of economic insecurity.

The second pattern concerns national identity. Patriots who load on the symbolic, rather than the blind, dimension of patriotism are less likely to desire decreased immigrant numbers. This inverse relationship is specific to dependent variable number one and suggests that expressing a love of the country and its symbols does not result in a desire to restrict future immigrant numbers.

Gender and isolationism also have a significant effect on the first question. Males and people who answer that the United States would be better off if it avoided problems in the rest of the world are more likely to desire decreased immigrant numbers. Ideology does not lend explanatory power to this model, suggesting that liberals are no less likely than conservatives to desire fewer immigrant entries.

The conditional regressions do little to challenge the merits of the original model (Tables 9-24 and 25-28). Both the initial and conditional regressions are the most successful for the first dependent variable, with R-squares that range from slightly over 20% for individuals with low levels of blind patriotism to almost 40% for respondents with high levels of group pride and non-southern residents. For individual-level data, these models exhibit robust overall predictive power.

Other patterns emerge in the conditional models (Table 25). For instance, traditional racism remains strong and significant for individuals with both high and low levels of group pride, but the same is not true for the conditional racism regressions. Those respondents with high levels of racism are only slightly more inclined to be high in the group pride measure, and the relationship is non-existent for individuals with low racism. It appears that racism against Hispanics is more frequent among individuals with high levels of group pride, than group pride is among racists. These relationships also confirm the distinction between the concepts of group pride and racism.

The significance of the restrictive influence of residence in a state with an unusually high level of Hispanic immigrants is also confirmed. Immigrant backlash does cause individuals who exhibit high levels of economic insecurity, symbolic patriotism, and traditional racism to desire a lower numerical cap on the immigrant entries. Furthermore, the inverse is true for individuals with low levels of traditional racism, who are willing to accept increased immigrant numbers. While the coefficient for the immigrant backlash theory is not nearly as robust as those for the association explanations, they do encourage the continued inclusion of contextual racial conditions in research addressing public opinion of immigration.

Two additional patterns arise in the conditional regressions for dependent variable one, which were not apparent in the initial models. For individuals who rate “low” on the independent variables or “non” on the independent contextual variables, economic insecurity seems to become significant. In addition, these same models have significant ideology coefficients. Furthermore, economic insecurity and ideology fail to reach significance for southern and immigrant region respondents and those individuals who rate high on the independent variables. It appears that economic insecurity and ideological conservatism work in tandem in these models to increase the respondents’ desire to decrease immigrant numbers.

More interestingly, political knowledge is absent as a significant indicator in the “low” models, but is present in the “high” conditional regressions. It appears that individuals either rely on political knowledge or ideology and economic insecurity to help them form opinions about immigrant numbers. It is possible that a conservative ideology makes an individual who is already economically insecure translate that insecurity into wanting fewer immigrants. This economic-ideology-political knowledge pattern is not present in the models for the other three dependent variables.

Results: Dependent Variable 2

Neither the southern distinctiveness nor the immigrant backlash variable achieves significance for the question regarding the threat immigration poses to Americans’ jobs. This suggests that residence in southern or high immigration states does not increase or decrease the perception that recent immigrants are stealing desirable or necessary jobs from natives. The primary finding for the second dependent variable is the continued significance of the association explanations. Symbolic patriotism, group pride, and racism continue to have a strong significant

relationship with the immigration opinions of white respondents. However, the coefficient for symbolic patriotism has reversed. Whereas increased affection for the country and its symbols resulted in a less restrictive response to the first dependent variable, the same symbolic patriotism results in a more restrictive reaction from individuals regarding the threat immigrants pose to American jobs. This apparent inconsistency may be attributable to American insecurity about jobs and the economy. It is curious that economic insecurity failed to reach significance in this, of all, variables.

Blind patriotism also lends explanatory power to the second dependent variable, but in an unpredicted way. The blind patriotism variable has a negative coefficient, suggesting that it is constructive or critical patriots, not blind patriots, who are more likely to be restrictive regarding protecting American jobs. In other words, patriots who are more willing to admit anger or shame at aspects of American policy and history are also more likely to see immigrants as a danger to jobs.

Political knowledge remains significant in the second model. As political knowledge increases, so does the tendency of respondents to disagree with the statement that recent immigrants pose a threat to jobs in the United States. Politically savvy Americans seem more likely to focus on the benefits, rather than the costs, of immigration. Gender and isolationism also retain their significance from the previous model. However, in this case, ideology comes into play in the expected direction.

In addition, having native parents influences the response to this question, which overtly addresses the economic sphere. Respondents who have only native-born parents are more likely to agree that immigrants threaten American jobs. This finding is intuitive. What is surprising is the native parent control variable is not significant for the other three dependent variables. One

interesting addition to this model is the inclusion of religiosity. Apparently, individuals who acknowledge that religion contributes to their daily lives are also more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat to American jobs.

The conditional models for the second dependent variable (Table 26) again confirm the relationships present in the initial regression. Political knowledge, not racism or group pride, is the most consistent performer across all conditional subgroups for this question. In every case, an increase in political sophistication decreases the restrictive posture. Racism continues to perform as expected, with the exception of non-southern residents and individuals with low levels of group pride. However, group pride loses explanatory power in many of the models.

The results for ideology present in the initial regression seem wholly attributable to individuals with high levels of economic insecurity, blind patriotism, and traditional racism. Perhaps, in these cases, ideology is the effect, rather than the cause of immigration stances. If the respondent is unwilling to criticize any facet of America, feels economically vulnerable, or is willing to negatively stereotype Hispanics based on race, they may feel that the conservative label better exemplifies their policy goals of less immigration.

Results: Dependent Variable 3

For dependent variable three, which shifts the focus to illegal immigration, the association explanations again outperform the other independent variables. In fact, the coefficient for symbolic patriotism increases, suggesting that individuals who voice a fervent love of country and the flag are more inclined to take an openly restrictive stance when it comes to undocumented immigrants. Symbolic patriots see controlling illegal immigration as an

important facet of American foreign policy. In this case, the feelings of blind patriots coincide with their symbolic counterparts, although to a lesser degree.

The immigrant backlash hypothesis continues to fail as an explanatory variable. A significant relationship does now exist between southern residence and restrictive immigration stances, but not the relationship that was predicted by the southern distinctiveness hypothesis. Meaning, southern residents are actually less likely to take a restrictive posture on the question of whether illegal immigration should be an important policy goal than their non-southern counterparts. The controls for gender and isolationism do not reach statistical significance in the third model, but ideology gains explanatory strength.

The conditional regressions for the dependent variable addressing illegal immigration as a foreign policy goal again do little to contradict their initial counterpart (Table 27). However, supplemental information is provided for the southern distinctiveness explanation. Southern distinctiveness shows up as significant in six of the conditional models, but always with a negative coefficient, which confirms the counterintuitive relationship in the initial regression. The inverse relationship between southern residence and a restrictive stance on this question is especially apparent for individuals with low levels of blind patriotism and high levels of symbolic patriotism. Meaning, the southern distinctiveness variable has an intermediate negative influence on individuals who are less willing to exhibit a love of the United States and its symbols and are more likely to be angry at, or ashamed of, their country.

Group pride again loses some explanatory power in the conditional regressions, but racism and ideology remain consistently robust indicators. Isolationism also regains some significance. The particularly puzzling results are in the regressions highlighting high levels of group pride and low levels of traditional racism. Among individuals with a strong sense of white

identification, not a single independent variable is significant. The same pattern exists for respondents who positively or neutrally stereotype Hispanics, although ideology and isolationism do remain significant in this case.

Results: Dependent Variable 4

The final dependent variable question asks about federal budget spending to tighten border security. The inverse relationship for the southern distinctiveness variable remains significant, and is confirmed in the conditional models (Table 28). It seems that in specific cases, southern residence makes an individual less, not more, likely to want restrictive immigration policy. Perhaps the explanation for these unexpected results lies in the connection between questions. The common denominator is the illegal implication. It is possible that the protection afforded the South due to geographical distance from the illegal entry points keeps southern residents from feeling as immediately threatened by the illegal influx as their counterparts in the rest of the nation. If so, then this contradicts the earlier argument that the issue of immigration is being nationalized by the media.

Symbolic patriotism and ideology are the most robust performers in the initial regression for dependent variable four, and maintain their significance across the conditional models. Racism, group pride, and isolationism fluctuate in their significance across the conditional regressions, without an apparent pattern. In addition to ideology and isolationism, there are two new significant control variables: age and Jewish. Older respondents and those claiming Jewish denomination are more restrictive in both the initial and conditional regressions, meaning they are willing to pay more to see border security increased. While the age coefficients may seem

miniscule, it is important to remember that they represent a scale variable, where age is represented in years.

Results: Overall

First and foremost, the use of four distinct dependent variable questions highlights the inconsistency in public opinion regarding immigration. The results confirm the complexity of the immigration issue and the challenge that the United States government will face in making broad appeals to its citizens regarding immigration policy. The findings demonstrate why it is essential to use multiple immigration questions, which tap both the legal and illegal dimensions of the issue. While the conditional regressions do provide supplemental information regarding public opinion nuances, they do little to challenge the results of the primary regressions.

The results indicate that racism, group pride, symbolic patriotism, ideology, and isolationism are the most consistent and significant predictors of white immigration policy preferences. What is especially noteworthy is that the effects of symbolic patriotism and white group pride remain significant even after controlling for racism, which was also statistically significant in all four models. Symbolic patriotism and group pride both exert a positive effect on restrictive immigration stances above and beyond the influence of traditional racial stereotyping. The exception is symbolic patriotism's influence on the dependent variable addressing limiting immigration numbers, where the effect is negative.

There is little quantitative evidence that the contextual population explanations influence immigration stances. Residence in states with high levels of Hispanic immigration does minimally increase the chance that a respondent will desire fewer numbers of immigrants. The lack of a positive relationship between immigrant region residence and restrictive immigration

responses to three of the four questions does bolster support for the social contact hypothesis. Even though proximity fails to result in a liberalizing relationship, contact may temper the negative effects of cultural divisions.

Residents of the South are slightly less likely to desire policy changes that would further restrict illegal immigration, which suggests that the black-belt hypothesis is not transferable to the new South's perception of Hispanic immigrants. The unimpressive findings for the population explanations also suggest that immigration perspectives are national, not regional.

Political knowledge and southern residence are the only two independent variables that appear to divide along the illegal versus legal line. According to the data, political knowledge seems to affect the desirability whites assign to immigrants, but not the importance they assign to defending against illegal entries. As political knowledge increases, so does the likelihood that respondents' will give a less restrictive response to the questions addressing the number of immigrants the country should absorb and whether or not immigrants threaten American employment. The second political knowledge consideration, which assumes that the easier issues will require less political sophistication, is not supported since political knowledge is not significant for the more complex, multifaceted immigration questions. It also appears that an increase in the significance and coefficients of symbolic patriotism coincide with the loss of political knowledge significance across the models.

Economic insecurity fails to perform significantly in all four initial regressions, but ideology and isolationism exert influence above and beyond the association variables in three of the four models. Conservatives and individuals exhibiting higher levels of isolationism are more likely to take a restrictive immigration stance. Isolationism is especially influential regarding the question about immigrant numbers, which is the only model in which ideology is not significant.

Gender seems to affect the perception of legal immigrant numbers and immigrants as a threat to American jobs. Males are slightly more likely to be restrictive than females regarding these issues, but not in response to the questions addressing undocumented entries.

It is vital at this point to reiterate the political and social context of the 2004 ANES. The lack of population and economic explanation performance may be the results of heightened group and national identity. In other words, contextual considerations and economic insecurity could be losing ground to their association counterparts due to the national focus on the War on Terror since the events of September 11th (Parker 2003; 2004). This explanation fits the data, as the coefficients and consistent significance of the symbolic patriotism, group pride, and racism association variables clearly highlight their significance as the models most influential factors.

CONCLUSION

The effect of unrestrained immigration on the American culture is undeniable, as is the essential part that public opinion will play in the success or failure of immigration policy. The present study clearly illustrates that the public's perception of immigration is as complex as the issue itself. No easy answers await future policymakers, but studies addressing the factors relevant in shaping American views can assist them in the challenging task ahead.

The ramifications from any policy reform are sure to span the economic, social, and political spheres of both the United States and immigrant-sending nations. The economic ramifications alone are enough to confound the most dedicated strategist. With the economic ties between the United States and Mexico, created by proximity and encouraged by alliances such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), there is little doubt that a true economic and social break would have ramifications for all involved.

Assuming that there was a way to realistically seal the porous U.S.-Mexico border, the immediate victims would be the thousands of businesses along the two-thousand mile division. The consideration of this "subnational culture" or "two-nation biculture" along the border "substantially changes U.S.-Mexico relations" (Brown 1997, 108, 111, 115). The complexity of the situation is not assuaged by perpetuating the current situation either. If the border continues to integrate north and south, the two countries will still be forced to decide jurisdiction. Any binational projects, such as border airports, have to assign both power of decision and liability to one side or the other (Brown 1997).

In addition, the availability of inexpensive labor to fill jobs north of the border would be limited. However, the aspect of the situation that is less frequently addressed is that mass

legalization or amnesty plans, often trumpeted by members of both parties, would also challenge the supply of cheap labor. If the individual becomes an American citizen, then they are eligible for the same benefits as natives, including minimum wage and unemployment benefits, and the need for a new flow of undocumented workers begins. The failed amnesty attempt of the *Immigration Reform and Control Act* of 1986 is a case in point.

The focus of the present research is on public opinion, which is most clearly exhibited in the social realm. The War on Terror keeps the fear of non-native born individuals a very real and pressing threat on United States residents. The study's findings suggest that the factors most likely to influence immigration opinions revolve around an individual's perception of their identity. Whether it is their patriotic attachment to the country and desire to remain isolated from outside influence, alignment with a conservative ideology, intensity of ingroup white ethnic attachment, or feelings of racism and superiority toward outside ethnic groups, identity alliances seem to be the defining characteristic of public opinion.

It is fully recognized by the current study that the results herein may represent an anomaly. The attacks of September 11th may have solidified the association considerations in the minds of Americans. However, there is little reason to believe that the current pattern will reverse in the near future. The tension between natives and non-natives may have even increased since the 2004 ANES survey. Social disquiet results from native attempts to restrict immigration as well as publicized immigrant attempts to rally support. The traditional vision of immigrants as peaceful victims of circumstance searching for economic opportunity may have been squelched by recent organized Latino marches and lawsuits against United States citizens. Whether or not the image of immigrants has been altered by these actions and their subsequent media coverage, the events undoubtedly keep the issue of immigration in the forefront of

political rhetoric and public opinion, and solidify the “us” versus “them” rift between natives and immigrants.⁵⁷ Immigration also has the opportunity to bridge the African American-white social dichotomy, which has so long defined American society. The growing tension between Hispanics and African Americans, caused by competition over political and social resources, may result in unique and unprecedented coalitions.⁵⁸

American politics most clearly reflects the complexity of the issue. The consistent significance of ideology in the study suggests that being a self-declared conservative does, as is so often alluded to in the media and the literature, affect an individual’s perception of the desirability of unrestricted immigration policy. However, the conservative elite response to immigration options in recent decades does not seem as conservative as the will of the constituents. There is some mystery as to why the political elites in the country continue to ignore public opinion and either liberalize immigration policy or refuse to enforce restrictive laws that are already on the books. The present findings suggest that it may be due, at least in part, to the inconsistent messages political elites are receiving from the American public.

One thing is increasingly undeniable – the effect of the immigration issue on the upcoming midterm 2006 and presidential 2008 elections. Presidential hopefuls are already quoted as taking sides on the issue, and not always in line with the assumed political platform of their party. There are several components present in the immigration issue that whisper of its

⁵⁷ See the April 7, 2005 *New York Times* article by Nina Bernstein, entitled “Fight Over Immigrants’ Driving Licenses Is Back in Court;” the May 2, 2006 *New York Times* article by Randal C. Archibold, entitled “Immigrants Take to U.S. Streets in Show of Strength;” the August 19, 2005 *New York Times* article by Andrew Pollock, entitled “2 Illegal Immigrants Win Arizona Ranch in Court;” and the September 6, 2006 *Chicago Tribune* article by Sara Olkon, entitled “4-Day Illinois March for Immigrant Rights Begins.”

⁵⁸ See the October 3, 2006 *New York Times* article by Rachel L. Swarns, entitled “A Racial Rift That Isn’t Black and White.” See also Kposowa’s (1995) findings on the “deleterious effects of immigration on racial minority unemployment and earnings” (605).

realigning potential. Specifically, the division within party ranks on the issue, the highly emotional response it elicits among the socially and racially divided masses, and its persistent and increasing salience, all speak to immigration issue's potential as a critical election catalyst.

Future research of public opinion regarding immigration should focus on the interrelationships among, and effects of, factors that are used by individuals to define their personal identity and group associations. As a natural expansion of the present research, comparisons of the immigration opinions of Asian Americans, African Americans, Hispanics, and whites – with special attention paid to group and national alignments – may unveil new or supporting patterns. The relevance being that each ethnic group's perception will be reflected in their acceptance or rejection of future immigration policy.

It is also necessary to determine whether the increased importance of national and ethnic identity brought about by the events of September 11th and the subsequent War on Terror is a temporary or more permanent addition to American identity. If the influence of patriotism, group pride, racism, ideology, and isolationism are confirmed as the factors most influential in determining immigration opinions, what are the long-term implications for American culture?

Finally, the influence of the media is often overlooked in public opinion studies due to unavailable or incomplete data. With the changes in the dominance and accessibility of news media outlets, as well as the limitless choices in viewing and listening options, it would be helpful if future surveys provided more comprehensive media inquiries. Specifically, the primary news sources and viewing frequency of respondents might uncover intervening relationships between group identity and immigration stances.

In today's globalizing economic and political environment, it is even possible that some of the association patterns apparent in the United States, specifically the dominance of group

pride and racism in determining immigration attitudes, may also exist in other Democratic nations, who share the perceived threat of rising immigrant numbers as well as vulnerability to terrorist activity.

APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

All dependent and independent variables are coded so that the most “restrictive” responses, or the responses predicted to coincide with restrictive immigration stances, have the highest value. Only “white” responses were utilized in the study (n = 876).

Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable 1

Number of Immigrants: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be: increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now? A little or a lot” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A five category variable, where zero = increased a lot (n = 14); 0.25 = increased a little (n = 48); 0.50 = left the same (n = 323); 0.75 = decreased a little (n = 227); one = decreased a lot (n = 158). Missing responses: n = 106.

Dependent Variable 2

Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs: “(Now I’d like to ask you about immigration in recent years.) How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here: extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A four category variable, where zero = not at all likely (n = 119); 0.33 = somewhat likely (n = 329); 0.66 = very likely (n = 188); and one = extremely likely (n = 142). Missing responses: n = 98.

Dependent Variable 3

Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal: “Should Controlling and reducing illegal immigration be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A three category variable, where zero = not important at all (n = 28); 0.50 = somewhat important (n = 273); and one = very important (n = 479). Missing responses: n = 96.

Dependent Variable 4

Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security: “Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept about the same” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A three category variable, where zero = cut out entirely / decreased (n = 39); 0.50 = kept about the same (n = 230); and one = increased (n = 600). Missing responses: n = 7.

Independent Variables

Population Explanations

Independent Variable 1

Southern Region: Due to limitations in the 2004 ANES “state” data, as well as high Hispanic and immigrant concentrations in Florida and Texas, the South is limited to: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia. A dummy variable is created, where zero = non-southern region (n = 717); and one = southern region (n = 159). No missing responses.

Independent Variable 2

Hispanic Immigrant Region: The Hispanic immigrant region is comprised of states where the percentage of the Hispanic population is over the national averages of 12.5%. Again, due to limitations in the 2004 ANES data, the region is limited to: California, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. In addition, all of these states, with the single exception of Colorado, also have immigrant populations over the national average of 10.4%. A dummy variable is created, where zero = non-Hispanic immigrant region (n = 604); and one = Hispanic immigrant region (n = 272). No missing responses.

U.S. Control Region: All remaining states in the 2004 ANES data, which are not included in either the Hispanic immigrant or southern regions.

Economic Explanation

Independent Variable 3

Economic Insecurity: The three economic items (included below) are combined into an “economic insecurity” index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the resulting scale is condensed into five categories (0-0.60; 0.61-1.20; 1.21-1.80; 1.81-2.40; and 2.41-3.00) and recoded into a metric ranging from zero to one, where zero = least economic insecurity or most economic optimism (n = 42); 0.25 = below average economic insecurity (n = 177); 0.50 = average economic insecurity (n = 310); 0.75 = above average economic insecurity (n = 160); and one = most economic insecurity or most economic pessimism (n = 78). Missing responses: n = 109.

Household Income: Income of respondent’s family the previous year (Source: 2004 ANES). A five category variable, where zero = \$120,000 or more (least economic insecurity); 0.25 = \$70,000 – \$119,999; 0.50 = \$45,000 – \$69,999; 0.75 = \$22,000 – \$44,999; and one = \$0 - \$21,999 (most economic insecurity).

Personal Retrospective Financial Situation: “(We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days.) Would you say that you (and your family living here/there) are better off, worse off, or just about the same financially as you were a year ago? Much better/worse or somewhat better/worse” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A five category variable, where zero = much better (least economic insecurity); 0.25 = somewhat better; 0.50 = stayed the same; 0.75 = somewhat worse; and one = much worse (most economic insecurity).

National Retrospective Financial Situation: “Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse? Much better/worse or somewhat better/worse” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A five category variable, where zero = much better (least economic insecurity); 0.25 = somewhat better; 0.50 = stayed the same; 0.75 = somewhat worse; and one = much worse (most economic insecurity).

Political Knowledge Explanation

Independent Variable 4

Political Knowledge: The political knowledge variable uses four political figure identification questions provided by the ANES, as well as two of Delli Carpini and Keeter’s recommended questions regarding control of the House prior to the election and party ideological placement. The six political awareness items (included below) are combined into a “political knowledge” index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the resulting scale is condensed into seven categories and recoded into a metric ranging from zero to one, where zero = no political knowledge (no correct answers, n = 16); 0.17 = minimal political knowledge (one correct answer, n = 44); 0.34 = below average political knowledge (two correct answers, n = 86); 0.50 = low average political knowledge (three correct answers, n = 140); 0.66 = high average political knowledge (four correct answers, n = 182); 0.83 = above average political knowledge (five correct answers, n = 139); and one = maximum political knowledge (all six questions answered correctly, n = 75). Missing responses: n = 194.

Tony Blair: “What job or political office does he now hold?” If respondent answers that they don’t know, they are probed with, “Well, what’s your best guess” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A two category variable, where zero = identification that is incomplete or wrong, makes no attempt to guess, and refused to answer; and one = correctly identifies as Prime Minister of England (or Great Britain).

Dick Cheney: “What job or political office does he now hold?” If respondent answers that they don’t know, they are probed with, “Well, what’s your best guess” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A two category variable, where zero = identification that is incomplete or wrong, makes no attempt to

guess, and refused to answer; and one = correctly identifies as Vice President of the United States.

Dennis Hastert: “What job or political office does he now hold?” If respondent answers that they don’t know, they are probed with, “Well, what’s your best guess” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A two category variable, where zero = identification that is incomplete or wrong, makes no attempt to guess, and refused to answer; and one = correctly identifies as Speaker of the House.

William Rehnquist: “What job or political office does he now hold?” If respondent answers that they don’t know, they are probed with, “Well, what’s your best guess” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A two category variable, where zero = identification that is incomplete or wrong, makes no attempt to guess, and refused to answer; and one = correctly identifies as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

House Majority: “Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington BEFORE the election (this/last) month?” If respondent answers that they don’t know, they are probed with, “Well, what’s your best guess” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A two category variable, where zero = identification that is incomplete or wrong, makes no attempt to guess, and refused to answer; and one = correctly identifies the Republican Party.

Party Ideology: “Is one party more conservative at the national level?” (Follow-up question:) “Which party is more conservative?” If respondent answers that they don’t know, they are probed with, “Well, what’s your best guess” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A two category variable, where zero = identification that is incomplete or wrong, makes no attempt to guess, and refused to answer; and one = correctly identifies the Republican Party.

Association Explanations

Independent Variable 5

Blind Patriotism: The two of the five patriot items (included below) that loaded on the second factor in the factor analysis (Table 7).

Independent Variable 6

Symbolic Patriotism: The three of the five patriot items (included below) that loaded on the first factor in the factor analysis (Table 7).

The following items are designated “Patriot Items” by the ANES.

Feelings Towards Flag: “When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A four category variable, where zero = not very good; 0.33 = somewhat good; 0.66 = very good; and one = extremely good.

America Makes Ashamed: “Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the next few statements. ‘There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree’” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A three category variable, where zero = agree; 0.50 = neither agree nor disagree; and one = disagree.

America Makes Angry: “(What about) There are some things about America today that make me feel angry about America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree; or disagree” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A three category variable, where zero = agree; 0.50 = neither agree nor disagree; and one = disagree.

Love of Country: “How strong is your love for your country – extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A three category variable, where zero = not very / somewhat strong; 0.50 = very strong; and one = extremely strong.

Importance of Being American: “Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A four category variable, where zero = not too important / not important at all; 0.33 = somewhat important; 0.66 = very important; and one = extremely important.

Independent Variable 7

Positive Stereotyping of Whites: White group pride is defined as positive ingroup stereotyping. The three stereotype items (included below) are combined into a “white ingroup pride” index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item within the index is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the resulting 18-pt scale is condensed into five categories (16-21; 13-15; 12; 9-11; and 3-8) and recoded into a metric ranging from zero to one, where zero = negative stereotyping (n = 7); 0.25 = neutral-positive stereotyping (n = 37); 0.50 = neutral stereotyping (n = 203); 0.75 = neutral-positive stereotyping (n = 239); and one = positive stereotyping (n = 279). Missing responses: n = 111.

White Work Ethic: “Where would you rate white Americans on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 indicates hard working, 7 means lazy, and 4 indicates most white Americans are not closer to one end or the other)” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A seven category variable, where one = positive stereotyping; and seven = negative stereotyping.

White Intelligence: “Where would you rate white Americans on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 indicates intelligent, 7 means unintelligent, and 4 indicates most white Americans are not closer to one end or the other)” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A seven category variable, where one = positive stereotyping; and seven = negative stereotyping.

White Trustworthiness: “Where would you rate white Americans on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 indicates trustworthy, 7 means untrustworthy, and 4 indicates most white Americans are not closer to one end or the other)” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A seven category variable, where one = positive stereotyping; and seven = negative stereotyping.

Independent Variable 8

Negative Stereotyping of Hispanics: Racism is defined as negative outgroup stereotyping. The three stereotype items (included below) are combined into a “Hispanic racism” index, which is computed through an additive scale, where each item within the index is assigned equal weight. To facilitate the analysis, the resulting 18-pt scale is condensed into five categories (3-8; 9-11; 12; 13-15; and 16-21) and recoded into a metric ranging from zero to one, where zero = positive stereotyping or least racism toward Hispanics (n = 115); 0.25 = neutral-positive stereotyping (n = 263); 0.50 = neutral stereotyping (n = 213); 0.75 = neutral-negative stereotyping (n = 127); and one = negative stereotyping or most racism towards Hispanics (n = 24). Missing responses: n = 134.

Hispanic Work Ethic: “Where would you rate Hispanic Americans on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 indicates hard working, 7 means lazy, and 4 indicates most Hispanic-Americans are not closer to one end or the other)” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A seven category variable, where one = positive stereotyping; and seven = negative stereotyping.

Hispanic Intelligence: “Where would you rate Hispanic Americans on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 indicates intelligent, 7 means unintelligent, and 4 indicates most Hispanic-Americans are not closer to one end or the other)” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A seven category variable, where one = positive stereotyping; and seven = negative stereotyping.

Hispanic Trustworthiness: “Where would you rate Hispanic Americans on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 indicates trustworthy, 7 means untrustworthy, and 4 indicates most Hispanic-Americans are not closer to one end or the other)” (Source: 2004 ANES)? A seven category variable, where one = positive stereotyping; and seven = negative stereotyping.

Controls

Age: A scale variable, where values are equal to exact age in years. No missing responses.

Gender: A dummy variable, where zero = female (n = 480); and one = male (n = 396). No missing responses.

Ideology: “I’m going to show you a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” A seven category variable, where zero = extremely liberal (n = 16); 0.17 = liberal (n = 80); 0.34 = slightly liberal (n = 98); 0.50 = moderate or middle of the road (n = 198); 0.66 = slightly conservative (n = 117); 0.83 = conservative (n = 142); and one = extremely conservative (n = 23). Missing responses: n = 202.

Individualism: “Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” A seven category variable, where zero = the government should see to jobs and standard of living or least individualistic response (n = 62); 0.17 = low level of individualism (n = 62); 0.34 = below average level of individualism; 0.50 = average level of individualism (n = 161); 0.66 = above average level of individualism (n = 151); 0.83 = high level of individualism; and one = each person is on hi/hers own or most individualistic response (n = 113). Missing responses: n = 75.

Isolationism: “Do you agree or disagree with this statement: This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.” A dummy variable, where zero = disagree or non-isolationist (n = 715); and one = agree that country would be better off if we just stayed home (n = 152). Missing responses: n = 9.

Native-Born Parents: “Were both of your parents born in this country?” A dummy variable, where zero = non-native parents (n = 106); and one = native-born parents (n = 770). (The goal of the variable coding is to assign the higher value to the response more likely to cause a restrictive immigration stance.) No missing responses.

Race: An implied control since only white respondents were included in the analysis (n = 876).

Religiosity: “Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not? (If respondent says that religion is important, then) would you say your religion provides some guidance in your day-to-day living, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance in your day-to-day life?” A four category variable, where zero = religion not important (n = 209); 0.33 = some guidance (n = 178); 0.66 = quite a bit of guidance (n = 201); and one = a great deal of guidance (n = 280). Missing responses: n = 8.

Religious (Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant) Denomination: Three separate dummy variables. First, where zero = non-Catholic (n = 501); and one = Catholic (n = 226). Second, where zero = non-Jewish (n = 695); and one = Jewish (n = 32). Third, where zero = non-Protestant (269); and one = Protestant (n = 458). Denomination missing responses: n = 149.

Self-Employed: A dummy variable, where zero = work for someone else (n = 637); and one = past/current self-employment (n = 129). Missing responses: n = 110.

Union: A dummy variable, where zero = no labor union members (n = 713); and one = labor union member(s) in household (n = 160). Missing response: n = 3.

Urban: A dummy variable, where zero = non-urban or rural residence (197); and one = urban residence (679). No missing responses.

Conditional Variables

See the (above) independent variables. The original explanations are re-examined for conditional, versus direct, influence, with all other variables maintained in their original form.

Southern Region: Tables 9 and 10 use residence in the southern United States as a conditional variable instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who live in the South (n = 159) and those who do not (n = 717), with both independent regional variables removed.

Hispanic Immigrant Region: Tables 11 and 12 use residence in high Hispanic and immigrant concentration states as a conditional variable instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who live in the Hispanic immigrant region (n = 272) and those who do not (n = 604), with both independent regional variables removed.

Economic Insecurity: Tables 13 and 14 use levels of economic insecurity as a conditional variable instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals with below average or average levels of economic insecurity (zero, 0.25, and 0.50; n = 529), and those with above average levels of economic insecurity (0.75 and one; n = 238), with the independent economic insecurity variable removed.

Political Knowledge: Tables 15 and 16 use levels of political knowledge as a conditional variable instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who have a low or average levels of political knowledge (zero, 0.17, 0.34, 0.50, and 0.66; n = 468) and those with high levels of political knowledge (0.83 and one; n = 214), with the independent political knowledge variable removed.

Blind Patriotism: Tables 17 and 18 use levels of blind patriotism as a conditional instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who have low or average levels of blind patriotism and those with high levels of blind patriotism, with both independent patriotism variables removed.

Symbolic Patriotism: Tables 19 and 20 use levels of symbolic patriotism as a conditional instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who have a low or average levels of symbolic patriotism and those with high levels of symbolic patriotism, with both independent patriotism variables removed.

Group Pride: Tables 21 and 22 use positive white ingroup identity as a conditional variable instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who negatively or neutrally stereotype whites (zero, 0.25, and 0.50; n = 247) and those who positively stereotype their own ethnic group (0.75 and one; n = 518), with the independent group pride variable removed.

Racism: Tables 23 and 24 use negative Hispanic stereotyping as a conditional variable instead of an independent variable. The regressions from Table 8 are run separately for individuals who positively or neutrally stereotype Hispanics (zero, 0.25, and 0.50; n = 591) and those who negatively stereotype Hispanics (0.75 and one; n = 151), with the independent racism variable removed.

APPENDIX B: IMMIGRATION TERMS

Below are definitions of relevant immigration terms, as provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.

Census (Decennial) – The U.S. Constitution provides for a census of the population every 10 years, primarily to establish a basis for apportionment of members of the House of Representatives among the states. Since the 1940 census, in addition to the complete count information, [supplemental] data have been obtained from representative samples of the population.

Emigration – The movement of population out of its original country of residence. For example, a person who emigrates from the United States leaves the United States to live in another country.

Hispanic or Latino Origin – People who identify with the terms Hispanic or Latino are those who classify themselves as in, on, of the specific Hispanic or Latino categories listed on the decennial census [or ANES] questionnaire – Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban – as well as those who indicate that they are “other Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino.” Origin can be viewed as the heritage, nationality group, lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person’s parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States. People who identify their origin as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino may be of any race.

Immigration – The movement of population into a new country of residence. For example, a person who immigrates to the United States enters from another country to live in the United States. [Legal] immigrants are aliens admitted for legal permanent residence in the United States. The principle source of immigration data is the Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a unit of the Department of Justice. Immigration statistics are prepared from entry visas and change of immigration status forms.

Internal Migration – A relatively permanent change in residence between specifically designated political or statistical areas within the boundaries of a given country. For the purpose of this report, internal migration refers to migration within the United States.

International Migration – A relatively permanent change in residence across national boundaries.

Migration – A relatively permanent change in residence between specifically designated political or statistical areas or between type-of-residence areas.

Nativity – The native population consists of all persons born in the United States, Puerto Rico, or an outlying area of the United States. It also includes persons born in a foreign country who have at least one parent who is a U.S. citizen. All other persons are classified as “foreign born.”

Race – Over the course of the century, the concept of race as used by the Census Bureau has reflected enumerator identification and/or self-identification of people. Prior to 1980, race was determined solely by the observation of the enumerator or by a combination of enumerator observation and self-identification. These categories reflect social usage and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature. Furthermore, the race categories include both racial and national-origin groups. The basic racial categories are American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, and White. (The directive identifies Hispanic origin as an ethnicity.)

White – A person having origins in any of the original peoples in Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as White or report entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, Near Easterner, Arab, or Polish.

Urban – An urbanized area comprises one or more places and the adjacent densely settled surrounding territory that together have a minimum population of 50,000 persons. In all definitions, the population not classified as urban constitutes the rural population.

APPENDIX C: IMMIGRATION SOURCES

Apart from magazines, journals, government statistical sources, and books, there are several very accessible, independent online sources on immigration and related topics. Below is a sampling of such sources, including each organization's name, address, web link, and statement of purpose.

Americans for Immigration Control (AIC)

P.O. Box 738, Monterey, VA 24465

<http://www.americanimmigrationcontrol.com/>

“AIC is an American non-partisan grassroots activist organization with more than a quarter of a million members - citizens of all races, creeds, and colors. AIC, founded in 1983, is about stopping the millions of illegal aliens who sneak across our border from Mexico every year...AIC is not affiliated with any political party or candidate for public office. Its operations are funded entirely by voluntary donations from the public.”

American Immigration Law Foundation (AILF)

918 F Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20004

<http://www.ailf.org/>

“The American Immigration Law Foundation (AILF) was established in 1987 as a tax-exempt, not-for-profit educational, charitable organization. The Foundation is dedicated to increasing public understanding of immigration law and policy and the value of immigration to American society, and to advancing fundamental fairness and due process under the law for immigrants...AILF's newest initiative, the Immigration Policy Center [IPC] is a "think tank" dedicated to research and analysis about the contributions made to America by immigrants. The IPC publishes short biweekly policy briefs on topics such as immigrants in the military, as well as longer more in depth policy reports bimonthly on topics such as the importance of Mexican workers to America's economy and the United States' ability to compete in the global battle for workers who will allow America to remain economically competitive in the years ahead.”

Center for Immigration Research (CIR)

University of Houston, 492 Philip G Hoffman Hall, 4800 Calhoun Road, Houston, TX 77204

<http://www.uh.edu/cir/>

“The Center for Immigration Research seeks to study the consequences of current immigration trends in order to inform decision making concerning international and national immigration policies, as well as to disseminate information to local institutions, organizations and policy-makers involved with the settlement and incorporation of America's 'new immigrants' into their communities.”

Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS)

University of California-San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093

<http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/>

“The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies is an Organized Research Unit of the University of California-San Diego. The Center is an interdisciplinary, multinational research and training program devoted to comparative work on international migration and refugee movements. Its primary missions are to conduct comparative (especially cross-national) and policy-oriented research, train academic researchers, students, and practitioners, and disseminate

research conducted under its auspices to academics, policymakers, and NGOs through research seminars, conferences, publications, the internet, and the mass media. The Center is also committed to actively collaborating with other academic institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the local community.”

Center for Immigration Studies (CIS)

1522 K Street N.W., Suite 820, Washington, DC 20005

<http://www.cis.org/>

“The Center for Immigration Studies is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit research organization founded in 1985. It is the nation's only think tank devoted exclusively to research and policy analysis of the economic, social, demographic, fiscal, and other impacts of immigration on the United States. It is the Center's mission to expand the base of public knowledge and understanding of the need for an immigration policy that gives first concern to the broad national interest. The Center is animated by a pro-immigrant, low-immigration vision which seeks fewer immigrants but a warmer welcome for those admitted.”

Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)

1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20009

<http://www.fairus.org/>

“The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) is a national, nonprofit, public-interest, membership organization of concerned citizens who share a common belief that our nation's immigration policies must be reformed to serve the national interest. FAIR seeks to improve border security, to stop illegal immigration, and to promote immigration levels consistent with the national interest—more traditional rates of about 300,000 a year. With more than 250,000 members and supporters nationwide, FAIR is a non-partisan group whose membership runs the gamut from liberal to conservative. Our grassroots networks help concerned citizens use their voices to speak up for effective, sensible immigration policies that work for America’s best interests...”

Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees (GCIR)

P.O. Box 1100, Sebastopol, CA 95473

<http://www.gcir.org/>

“GCIR seeks to move the philanthropic field to advance the contributions and address the needs of the world's growing and increasingly diverse immigrant and refugee populations. With a core focus on the United States, GCIR provides grantmakers with opportunities for learning, networking, and collaboration, as well as information resources that: enhance philanthropy’s awareness of issues affecting immigrants and refugees and their new communities, deepen the field’s understanding of how these issues are integral to community building in today's dynamic social, economic, and political environment., and increase philanthropic support for both broad and immigrant/refugee-focused strategies that benefit newcomer populations and strengthen the larger society.”

Immigration History Research Center (IHRC)

University of Minnesota, 311 Andersen Library, 222-21st Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455

<http://www.ihrc.umn.edu/>

“The IHRC enriches society by preserving and promoting understanding of the history of the American immigrant experience. In doing so, it acts in partnership with various ethnic communities, historical agencies, research specialists, educators, and many others. It develops and maintains a library and archival collection, provides research assistance, produces publications, and sponsors academic and public programs. Its work supports the tripartite mission-teaching, research, and service-of its parent institution, the University of Minnesota.”

Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM)

Georgetown University, Harris Building, 3300 Whitehaven Street, Third Floor Washington, DC 20007

<http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isim/>

“The Institute for the Study of International Migration [ISIM], founded in 1998, is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and affiliated with the Law Center at Georgetown University. ISIM focuses on all aspects of international migration, including the causes of and potential responses to population movements, immigration and refugee law and policy, comparative migration studies, the integration of immigrants into their host societies, and the effects of international migration on social, economic, demographic, foreign policy and national security concerns. ISIM also studies internal displacement, with particular attention to the forced movements of people for reasons that would make them refugees if they crossed an international border...”

Inter-University Committee on International Migration

292 Main Street, Building E38, 6th Floor, Cambridge, MA 02139

<http://web.mit.edu/CIS/www/migration/>

“Since its establishment in 1974, the Inter-University Committee on International Migration has been a focal point for migration and refugee studies at member institutions, which include Boston University, Brandeis University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Harvard University, MIT, Tufts University, and Wellesley College. The committee is chaired by MIT as a program of the Center for International Studies (CIS).”

Midwest Coalition to Reduce Immigration (MCRI)

E2302 Cool Brook Ct., LaValle, WI 53941

<http://www.immigrationreform.org/>

“MCRI was founded in 1995 as a non-profit, charitable organization whose goal is to educate the public about the need to reduce immigration to its traditional and sustainable levels... We are a non-partisan, all-volunteer, not-for-profit organization dedicated to educating Americans regarding the long-term consequences of present immigration laws. The evidence is overwhelming that it is in the best interests of present and future Americans to reduce annual immigration from the present unprecedented level of 2 million immigrants (half of them illegal) a year to our historic average of 300,000 a year.”

Migration Policy Institute (MPI)

1400 16th St NW, Ste 300 | Washington, DC 20036

<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/>

“The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think-tank in Washington, D.C. dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. MPI provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and thoughtful responses to the challenges and opportunities that large-scale migration, whether voluntary or forced, presents to communities and institutions in an increasingly integrated world.”

National Immigration Forum

50 F Street NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20001

<http://www.immigrationforum.org/>

“Established in 1982, the National Immigration Forum is the nation’s premier immigrant rights organization. The Forum is dedicated to embracing and upholding America’s tradition as a nation of immigrants. The Forum advocates and builds public support for public policies that welcome immigrants and refugees and are fair to and supportive of newcomers to our country. We are unique in that we do not have a specific constituency—we speak for immigration in the national interest. The Forum serves as the lead convener of hundreds of associate organizations and other national groups on a range of immigration policy issues, and has been the driving force behind many immigration policy victories. The Forum also works closely with local advocates and service providers across the country.”

National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR)

310 8th Street, Suite 307, Oakland, CA 94607.

<http://www.nnirr.org/>

“The National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR) is a national organization composed of local coalitions and immigrant, refugee, community, religious, civil rights and labor organizations and activists. It serves as a forum to share information and analysis, to educate communities and the general public, and to develop and coordinate plans of action on important immigrant and refugee issues. We work to promote a just immigration and refugee policy in the United States and to defend and expand the rights of all immigrants and refugees, regardless of immigration status...”

Numbers USA

1601 N. Kent Street, Suite 1100, Arlington, VA 22209

<http://www.numbersusa.com/>

“Numbers USA Action is a non-profit, non-partisan, public policy organization that favors an environmentally sustainable and economically just America. It opposes efforts to use federal immigration policies to force mass U.S. population growth and to depress wages of vulnerable workers. Numbers USA Action is pro-environment, pro-worker, pro-liberty and pro-immigrant. Activists in the Numbers USA Action network are Americans of all races and include many immigrants and the spouses, children and parents of immigrants. Those who need to refer to Numbers USA Action with a short, descriptive modifier should call it an ‘immigration-reduction organization.’”

Pew Hispanic Center

1615 L Street, N.W. Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036

<http://pewhispanic.org/>

“Founded in 2001, the Pew Hispanic Center is a nonpartisan research organization supported by The Pew Charitable Trusts. Its mission is to improve understanding of the U.S. Hispanic population and to chronicle Latinos' growing impact on the entire nation. The Center does not advocate for or take positions on policy issues. It is a project of the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan ‘fact tank’ in Washington, DC that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world.”

Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC)

500 Washington Street, Suite 800, San Francisco, California 94111

<http://www.ppic.org/>

“The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to improving public policy in California through independent, objective, nonpartisan research. The institute was established in 1994 with an endowment from William R. Hewlett. Research focuses on three program areas: population, economy, and governance and public finance. Studies within these programs examine the underlying forces shaping California's future, cutting across a wide range of public policy concerns: California in the global economy; demography; education; employment and income; environment, growth, and infrastructure; government and public finance; health and social policy; immigrants and immigration; key sectors in the California economy; and political participation.”

Population Resource Center (PRC)

Washington, DC Office: 1725 K Street, NW Suite 1102, Washington, DC 20006

Princeton Office: 1 Highland Road, Princeton, NJ 08540

<http://www.prcdc.org/>

“The Population Resource Center, a non-profit organization based in Washington, DC and Princeton, NJ, aims to further the development of public policy by bringing the latest demographic data to policymakers through policy briefings and small-group discussions. The programs help inform the debate and serve as a bridge between the social science community and the world of public policy. The goal of PRC is to enable policymakers to incorporate the latest research findings in population change into the development of public policy.”

Population Reference Bureau (PRB)

1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 520, Washington, DC 20009.

<http://www.prb.org/>

“The Population Reference Bureau informs people around the world about population, health, and the environment, and empowers them to use that information to advance the well-being of current and future generations...PRB's work is funded by private foundations, government agencies, and individual donors, and we frequently collaborate with other nonprofit organizations and universities. To these partnerships, PRB brings broad expertise and innovative, cost-effective approaches to analysis, information sharing, and capacity building.”

Urban Institute

2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20037

<http://www.urban.org/>

In the mid-1960s, President Johnson saw the need for independent nonpartisan analysis of the problems facing America's cities and their residents. The President created a blue-ribbon commission of civic leaders who recommended chartering a center to do that work. In 1968, the Urban Institute became that center.

Today, we analyze policies, evaluate programs, and inform community development to improve social, civic, and economic well-being. We work in all 50 states and abroad in over 28 countries, and we share our research findings with policymakers, program administrators, business, academics, and the public online and through reports and scholarly books.

APPENDIX D: TABLES

Table 1. Foreign-Born Population of United States (in Millions), 1880-2000

Year	Number of Foreign-Born Residents	Total U.S. Population	Percentage of Foreign-Born Residents
1880	6.7	50.2	13.3
1890	9.3	63.0	14.7
1900	10.3	76.2	13.6
1910	13.5	92.2	14.7
1920	13.9	106.0	13.2
1930	14.3	123.2	11.6
1940	11.7	132.2	8.8
1950	10.4	151.3	6.9
1960	9.7	179.4	5.5
1970	9.6	203.3	4.7
1980	14.1	226.5	6.2
1990	19.8	248.7	7.9
2000	28.4	274.1	10.4

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *2000 Statistical Abstract of the United States*.
See Camarota (2005) for a more updated glimpse of immigration numbers.

Table 2. Explanations by Independent Variables

Explanations by Variables	Southern Region Residence	Local Hispanic Concentration	Economic Insecurity	Political Knowledge	Blind and Symbolic Patriotism	Positive Ingroup Stereotyping	Negative OutGroup Stereotyping
Population: Southern Distinctiveness	Positive	None	None	None	None	None	None
Population: Immigrant Backlash	None	Positive	None	None	None	None	None
Population: Social Contact	None	Negative	None	None	None	None	None
Economic	None	None	Positive	None	None	None	None
Political Knowledge	None	None	None	Negative	None	None	None
Association: National Identity	None	None	None	None	Positive	None	None
Association: Group Pride	None	None	None	None	None	Positive	None
Association: Racism	None	None	None	None	None	None	Positive

Notes: The “conditional explanations” assume the same relationships as those listed above, with the independent variables examined for conditional, rather than direct, influence.

Table 3. Independent Variable Bivariate Correlations

		Southern Region	Immigrant Region	Economic Insecurity	Political Knowledge	Blind Patriotism	Symbolic Patriotism	Group Pride	Traditional Racism
Southern Region	Pearson Correlation	1	-.316(**)	.029	.001	.007	.054	-.034	-.024
Immigrant Region	Pearson Correlation	-.316(**)	1	-.071(*)	.091(*)	.011	.008	-.021	-.051
Economic Insecurity	Pearson Correlation	.029	-.071(*)	1	-.236(**)	-.184(**)	-.143(**)	-.059	.112(**)
Political Knowledge	Pearson Correlation	.001	.091(*)	-.236(**)	1	-.045	.016	-.049	-.134(**)
Blind Patriotism	Pearson Correlation	.007	.011	-.184(**)	-.045	1	-.003	.136(**)	-.042
Symbolic Patriotism	Pearson Correlation	.054	.008	-.143(**)	.016	-.003	1	.206(**)	-.029
Group Pride	Pearson Correlation	-.034	-.021	-.059	-.049	.136(**)	.206(**)	1	-.285(**)
Traditional Racism	Pearson Correlation	-.024	-.051	.112(**)	-.134(**)	-.042	-.029	-.285(**)	1

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 4. (Percent of) State Population by Race and Immigration, 2000

	State	Total Population	Black Population	Hispanic Population	Immigrant Population
1	Alabama (South)	4,447,100	26.0		
2	Alaska				
3	Arizona	5,130,632		25.3	12.9
4	Arkansas (South)	2,673,400	15.7		
5	California (Immigrant)	33,871,648		32.4	25.9
6	Colorado (Immigrant)	4,301,261		17.1	
7	Connecticut				
8	Delaware	783,600	19.2		
	District of Columbia	572,059	60.0		10.6
9	Florida (Immigrant)	15,982,378	14.6	16.8	18.4
10	Georgia (South)	8,186,453	28.7		
11	Hawaii				16.1
12	Illinois	12,419,293	15.1		
13	Idaho				
14	Indiana				
15	Iowa				
16	Kansas				
17	Kentucky				
18	Louisiana (South)	4,468,976	32.5		
19	Maine				
20	Maryland	5,296,486	27.9		
21	Massachusetts				12.4
22	Michigan				
23	Minnesota				
24	Mississippi	2,844,658	36.3		
25	Missouri				
26	Montana				
27	Nebraska				
28	Nevada	1,998,257		19.7	15.2
29	New Hampshire				
30	New Jersey (Immigrant)	8,414,350	13.6	13.3	14.9
31	New Mexico	1,819,046		42.1	
32	New York (Immigrant)	18,976,457	15.9	15.1	19.6
33	North Carolina	8,049,313	21.6		
34	North Dakota				
35	Ohio				
36	Oklahoma				
37	Oregon				
38	Pennsylvania				
39	Rhode Island				
40	South Carolina	4,012,012	29.5		
41	South Dakota				
42	Tennessee (South)	5,689,283	16.4		
43	Texas (Immigrant)	20,851,820		32.0	12.2
44	Utah				
45	Vermont				
46	Virginia (South)	7,078,515	19.6		
47	Washington				
48	West Virginia				
49	Wisconsin				
50	Wyoming				
	United States Totals	281,421,906	12.3	12.5	10.4

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *2000 Statistical Abstract of the United States*.

Notes: Data are only provided are for those states that have black, Hispanic, or immigrant populations exceeding the national average.

Table 5. Feeling Thermometer Correlations of White Respondents, 2004

		Feeling Thermometer: Whites	Feeling Thermometer: Hispanics	Feeling Thermometer: Blacks
Feeling Thermometer: Whites	Pearson Correlation	1	.474(**)	.569(**)
Feeling Thermometer: Hispanics	Pearson Correlation	.474(**)	1	.659(**)
Feeling Thermometer: Blacks	Pearson Correlation	.569(**)	.659(**)	1

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 6. Stereotyping Correlations of White Respondents, 2004

		Stereotype Index: Whites	Stereotype Index: Hispanics	Stereotype Index: Blacks
Stereotype Index: Whites	Pearson Correlation	1	-.285(**)	-.284(**)
Stereotype Index: Hispanics	Pearson Correlation	-.285(**)	1	.579(**)
Stereotype Index: Blacks	Pearson Correlation	-.284(**)	.579(**)	1

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 Note: The negative correlations are the result of the index coding (see Appendix A).

Table 7. Patriotism Factor Analysis Component Matrix

	Component	
	Symbolic Patriotism	Blind Patriotism
America Makes Angry	.524	.701
America Makes Ashamed	.521	.705
How U.S. Flag Makes Respondent Feel	.801	-.180
Importance of Being American	.765	-.376
Love of Country	.792	-.382

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 2 Components Extracted.

Table 8. Immigration Opinions of White Respondents, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.039 (.032)	.066	.009 (.043)	.011	-.085** (.041)	-.116	-.087** (.037)	-.129
Immigrant Region	.047* (.024)	.098	.027 (.034)	.041	-.016 (.032)	-.026	-.020 (.029)	-.037
Economic Insecurity	.020 (.052)	.022	.111 (.071)	.092	.054 (.068)	.048	-.036 (.061)	-.035
Political Knowledge	-.195*** (.050)	-.201	-.312*** (.069)	-.238	-.059 (.065)	-.049	.025 (.059)	.022
Blind Patriotism	.009 (.035)	.012	-.120** (.049)	-.127	.126** (.046)	.143	-.015 (.042)	-.018
Symbolic Patriotism	-.210*** (.057)	-.189	.155** (.079)	.103	.317*** (.074)	.227	.308*** (.067)	.242
Group Pride	.179*** (.051)	.180	.228*** (.071)	.169	.158** (.067)	.126	.113* (.061)	.099
Traditional Racism	.227*** (.046)	.248	.216*** (.063)	.177	.191*** (.060)	.169	.106** (.054)	.102
Religiosity	.008 (.032)	.012	.073* (.044)	.086	-.010 (.041)	-.013	-.009 (.037)	-.012
Catholic	-.020 (.105)	-.043	-.009 (.145)	-.014	.070 (.137)	.119	.091 (.124)	.169
Jewish	-.159 (.115)	-.145	-.006 (.159)	-.004	.104 (.151)	.075	.234* (.136)	.186
Protestant	.002 (.105)	.005	-.020 (.145)	-.032	.122 (.138)	.212	.161 (.124)	.307
Age	.001 (.001)	.040	-.001 (.001)	-.041	.001 (.001)	.034	.003*** (.001)	.190
Gender	.043* (.023)	.094	.078** (.032)	.128	.022 (.030)	.039	.007 (.027)	.013
Ideology	.072 (.058)	.073	.169** (.080)	.126	.251*** (.076)	.202	.203*** (.068)	.179
Individualism	.038 (.045)	.047	-.067 (.062)	-.061	.013 (.059)	.013	.028 (.053)	.030
Isolationnisme	.143*** (.033)	.213	.092** (.045)	.102	.065 (.043)	.076	.079** (.039)	.103
Native Parents	.036 (.036)	.051	.106** (.049)	.110	-.017 (.047)	-.019	.053 (.042)	.065
Self-Employed	.000 (.031)	-.001	.015 (.043)	.018	-.014 (.040)	-.019	-.039 (.036)	-.056
Union	.034 (.027)	.062	-.015 (.038)	-.020	.020 (.036)	.028	.025 (.032)	.040
Urban	.018 (.028)	.033	-.049 (.038)	-.067	-.003 (.036)	-.005	.011 (.033)	.019
Constant	.155 (.137)		.103 (.190)		.043 (.180)		.007 (.162)	
R Square	.277		.233		.200		.216	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 9. White Respondent Opinions: Southern Region Residents, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Economic Insecurity	-.007 (.064)	-.008	.061 (.081)	.051	.081 (.078)	.071	.040 (.071)	.038
Political Knowledge	-.213*** (.058)	-.213	-.303*** (.075)	-.237	-.022 (.072)	-.018	.031 (.065)	.027
Blind Patriotism	.024 (.040)	.034	-.120** (.052)	-.131	.135** (.050)	.154	.015 (.045)	.019
Symbolic Patriotism	.224*** (.066)	.197	.087 (.086)	.060	.281*** (.083)	.203	.324*** (.075)	.251
Group Pride	.184*** (.060)	.177	.322*** (.078)	.243	.223*** (.075)	.177	.157** (.068)	.134
Traditional Racism	.232*** (.054)	.244	.290*** (.070)	.241	.199*** (.067)	.174	.146** (.060)	.137
Religiosity	-.005 (.035)	-.008	.104** (.046)	.126	.019 (.044)	.025	.019 (.040)	.027
Catholic	.018 (.109)	-.038	-.032 (.142)	-.054	.069 (.136)	.121	.088 (.124)	.166
Jewish	-.188 (.122)	-.161	-.014 (.160)	-.009	.108 (.153)	.076	.221 (.139)	.167
Protestant	.013 (.109)	.027	-.013 (.143)	-.022	.112 (.136)	.199	.155 (.124)	.296
Age	.001 (.001)	.068	.000 (.001)	-.002	.000 (.001)	-.005	.003** (.001)	.158
Gender	.039 (.026)	.084	.049 (.034)	.083	.004 (.033)	.007	.006 (.030)	.011
Ideology	.057 (.065)	.056	.118 (.085)	.091	.240*** (.081)	.195	.221*** (.074)	.193
Individualism	.039 (.052)	.047	-.028 (.068)	-.026	.094 (.066)	.091	.064 (.060)	.067
Isolationism	.139*** (.036)	.208	.091* (.047)	.106	.061 (.045)	.074	.087** (.041)	.115
Native Parents	.032 (.038)	.046	.087* (.050)	.099	-.037 (.048)	-.044	.027 (.044)	.034
Self-Employed	.014 (.035)	.024	.052 (.045)	.066	-.013 (.043)	-.017	-.033 (.039)	-.047
Union	.054* (.030)	.100	.007 (.039)	.011	.033 (.037)	.050	.035 (.034)	.056
Urban	.045 (.032)	.078	-.032 (.042)	-.045	-.019 (.040)	-.027	-.019 (.036)	-.030
Constant	.141 (.147)		.048 (.193)		-.014 (.185)		-.095 (.168)	
R Square	.266		.226		.215		.251	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 10. White Respondent Opinions: Non-Southern Region Residents, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Economic Insecurity	.286*** (.068)	.316	.210** (.098)	.175	.094 (.096)	.083	.017 (.108)	.014
Political Knowledge	-.001 (.068)	-.001	-.214** (.098)	-.175	-.207** (.096)	-.180	-.123 (.108)	-.097
Blind Patriotism	-.052 (.056)	-.068	-.115 (.080)	-.114	-.017 (.078)	-.018	-.047 (.088)	-.046
Symbolic Patriotism	.118 (.077)	.112	.063 (.110)	.045	.275** (.107)	.211	.283** (.121)	.197
Group Pride	.077 (.073)	.079	-.011 (.104)	-.008	.049 (.101)	.040	.066 (.114)	.049
Traditional Racism	.255*** (.065)	.291	.043 (.092)	.037	.142 (.090)	.131	.003 (.101)	.003
Religiosity	.033 (.054)	.049	.036 (.078)	.039	-.132* (.076)	-.155	-.106 (.086)	-.114
Catholic	-.011 (.109)	-.019	.242 (.158)	.307	-.045 (.153)	-.061	.077 (.172)	.095
Jewish	.066 (.133)	.056	.220 (.192)	.139	-.015 (.187)	-.010	.250 (.210)	.154
Protestant	.034 (.106)	.063	.243 (.153)	.339	.058 (.149)	.087	.235 (.167)	.319
Age	.001 (.001)	.053	.000 (.002)	-.002	.001 (.002)	.066	.003* (.002)	.155
Gender	.093** (.035)	.194	.146** (.050)	.228	.026 (.049)	.044	.018 (.055)	.027
Ideology	.228** (.086)	.221	.025 (.123)	.018	.376*** (.120)	.291	.232* (.135)	.164
Individualism	.037 (.057)	.049	-.073 (.082)	-.072	-.106 (.079)	-.111	.094 (.090)	.090
Isolationism	.069 (.050)	.096	.151** (.072)	.157	.121* (.070)	.135	.033 (.079)	.034
Native Parents	.100** (.043)	.173	.125** (.062)	.161	.056 (.060)	.077	.032 (.068)	.041
Self-Employed	-.115** (.051)	-.163	-.081 (.071)	-.090	.060 (.069)	.071	.042 (.079)	.044
Union	-.069 (.051)	-.095	-.164** (.073)	-.168	-.017 (.071)	-.018	-.036 (.080)	-.036
Urban	-.058 (.049)	-.091	-.109 (.069)	-.130	.072 (.068)	.091	.044 (.077)	.050
Constant	-.073 (.187)		.163 (.267)		.218 (.260)		.022 (.293)	
R Square	.389		.277		.217		.181	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 11. White Respondent Opinions: Immigrant Region Residents, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Economic Insecurity	.028 (.059)	.033	.208** (.085)	.173	.038 (.079)	.035	-.059 (.077)	-.057
Political Knowledge	-.174*** (.057)	-.190	-.327*** (.085)	-.248	-.110 (.079)	-.094	.033 (.077)	.029
Blind Patriotism	-.046 (.042)	-.068	-.147** (.061)	-.154	.120** (.057)	.141	-.030 (.056)	-.036
Symbolic Patriotism	.239*** (.064)	.230	.144 (.095)	.096	.330*** (.088)	.248	.259*** (.086)	.199
Group Pride	.158** (.060)	.168	.105 (.089)	.077	-.016 (.083)	-.014	.068 (.080)	.058
Traditional Racism	.221*** (.052)	.258	.203** (.076)	.167	.219*** (.070)	.202	.119* (.068)	.113
Religiosity	.066* (.039)	.107	.052 (.058)	.058	.030 (.053)	.038	.022 (.052)	.029
Catholic	.000 (.099)	.000	.015 (.147)	.024	.048 (.136)	.084	.048 (.133)	.087
Jewish	-.099 (.115)	-.085	.065 (.171)	.039	.068 (.159)	.045	.224 (.155)	.152
Protestant	.025 (.098)	.057	-.005 (.147)	-.008	.067 (.136)	.120	.102 (.133)	.189
Age	.001 (.001)	.053	-.001 (.001)	-.034	.001 (.001)	.079	.004*** (.001)	.239
Gender	.061** (.026)	.143	.098** (.038)	.161	.071** (.035)	.132	.026 (.035)	.049
Ideology	.056 (.064)	.060	.135 (.096)	.100	.193** (.089)	.161	.136 (.087)	.116
Individualism	.010 (.050)	.013	-.061 (.074)	-.056	-.049 (.069)	-.050	.040 (.067)	.042
Isolationism	.113*** (.037)	.180	.056 (.056)	.062	.014 (.052)	.017	.030 (.051)	.038
Native Parents	.030 (.043)	.044	.098 (.064)	.101	-.043 (.059)	-.050	.097* (.058)	.114
Self-Employed	-.019 (.037)	-.031	-.022 (.055)	-.026	-.023 (.050)	-.031	-.071 (.049)	-.095
Union	.009 (.031)	.017	.000 (.046)	.000	.031 (.043)	.046	.006 (.042)	.009
Urban	.016 (.031)	.034	-.081* (.045)	-.118	.006 (.042)	.009	.026 (.041)	.044
Constant	.136 (.140)		.215 (.210)		.223 (.195)		.039 (.190)	
R Square	.316		.259		.197		.191	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 12. White Respondent Opinions: Non-Immigrant Region Residents, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Economic Insecurity	.243*** (.074)	.241	.019 (.091)	.016	.054 (.089)	.045	.089 (.091)	.072
Political Knowledge	-.095 (.069)	-.094	-.200** (.084)	-.169	-.108 (.082)	-.091	-.080 (.084)	-.065
Blind Patriotism	.069 (.054)	.086	-.087 (.066)	-.092	.062 (.064)	.066	.015 (.066)	.015
Symbolic Patriotism	.116 (.080)	.100	.051 (.098)	.037	.293*** (.096)	.212	.358*** (.098)	.250
Group Pride	.144* (.076)	.132	.305*** (.093)	.237	.300*** (.091)	.231	.164* (.093)	.122
Traditional Racism	.265*** (.068)	.269	.203** (.083)	.175	.168** (.082)	.144	.113 (.084)	.093
Religiosity	-.104** (.047)	-.150	.094* (.057)	.116	-.108** (.056)	-.132	-.067 (.057)	-.079
Catholic	.025 (.122)	.045	.192 (.149)	.299	-.041 (.146)	-.063	.126 (.149)	.189
Jewish	-.032 (.138)	-.027	.149 (.170)	.107	-.004 (.166)	-.003	.258 (.170)	.178
Protestant	.051 (.121)	.097	.209 (.148)	.338	.054 (.145)	.087	.213 (.148)	.330
Age	.002 (.001)	.098	.000 (.001)	.009	.001 (.001)	.038	.003** (.001)	.161
Gender	.024 (.035)	.047	.044 (.043)	.071	-.078* (.042)	-.126	-.009 (.043)	-.014
Ideology	.276*** (.083)	.250	.051 (.102)	.039	.412*** (.100)	.313	.339*** (.102)	.250
Individualism	.110* (.060)	.133	-.045 (.073)	-.045	.015 (.072)	.015	.126* (.074)	.123
Isolationism	.102** (.048)	.138	.157** (.058)	.179	.161** (.057)	.182	.135** (.058)	.148
Native Parents	.113** (.040)	.181	.137** (.050)	.185	.066 (.048)	.089	.008 (.049)	.011
Self-Employed	-.058 (.045)	-.084	.038 (.055)	.047	.022 (.054)	.027	.030 (.056)	.036
Union	.021 (.042)	.031	-.074 (.052)	-.094	.026 (.051)	.033	.079 (.052)	.097
Urban	.001 (.052)	.002	-.016 (.063)	-.017	.074 (.061)	.077	-.014 (.063)	-.014
Constant	-.150 (.182)		-.131 (.224)		-.058 (.219)		-.246 (.224)	
R Square	.270		.206		.252		.272	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 13. White Respondent Opinions: High Economic Insecurity, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.036 (.037)	.062	-.007 (.049)	-.009	-.089* (.048)	-.117	-.058 (.044)	-.083
Immigrant Region	.055** (.028)	.121	.055 (.038)	.090	-.013 (.037)	-.022	-.009 (.034)	-.017
Political Knowledge	-.190*** (.059)	-.195	-.267*** (.079)	-.205	-.101 (.077)	-.080	.040 (.071)	.035
Blind Patriotism	.013 (.039)	.020	-.111** (.052)	-.126	.131** (.051)	.153	.032 (.047)	.041
Symbolic Patriotism	.139** (.069)	.127	.104 (.091)	.071	.411*** (.090)	.289	.286*** (.082)	.220
Group Pride	.226*** (.065)	.221	.339*** (.086)	.247	.081 (.085)	.060	.103 (.078)	.085
Traditional Racism	.274*** (.058)	.294	.239*** (.075)	.195	.168** (.074)	.141	.060 (.068)	.056
Religiosity	.009 (.036)	.015	.044 (.049)	.054	.014 (.047)	.018	-.024 (.043)	-.033
Catholic	-.100 (.146)	-.222	.057 (.194)	.095	-.020 (.191)	-.035	-.016 (.175)	-.030
Jewish	-.206 (.156)	-.199	.043 (.207)	.031	.016 (.204)	.011	.177 (.187)	.143
Protestant	-.075 (.146)	-.170	.048 (.195)	.082	.017 (.191)	.029	.052 (.175)	.099
Age	.001 (.001)	.071	.000 (.001)	-.010	.001 (.001)	.068	.004*** (.001)	.201
Gender	.015 (.027)	.035	.042 (.036)	.073	-.006 (.035)	-.010	.020 (.032)	.039
Ideology	.050 (.067)	.052	.233** (.089)	.183	.180** (.087)	.145	.219** (.080)	.193
Individualism	.051 (.055)	.061	-.169** (.073)	-.152	.031 (.072)	.029	.055 (.066)	.056
Isolationism	.085* (.046)	.110	.077 (.061)	.075	.111* (.060)	.111	.129** (.055)	.141
Native Parents	.033 (.040)	.050	.160*** (.053)	.182	-.035 (.052)	-.041	.084* (.048)	.107
Self-Employed	.032 (.035)	.057	.013 (.046)	.017	.025 (.045)	.034	-.043 (.042)	-.066
Union	.061** (.031)	.119	.016 (.041)	.024	.029 (.040)	.043	.002 (.037)	.003
Urban	.013 (.032)	.026	-.041 (.042)	-.061	.025 (.041)	.038	-.006 (.038)	-.009
Constant	.237 (.170)		-.039 (.226)		.155 (.222)		.045 (.204)	
R Square		.244		.246		.229		.224

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.
(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 14. White Respondent Opinions: Low Economic Insecurity, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.020 (.050)	.031	-.012 (.064)	-.015	-.058 (.061)	-.077	-.102 (.066)	-.125
Immigrant Region	-.042 (.040)	-.080	-.098* (.052)	-.150	.011 (.050)	.019	-.087* (.053)	-.130
Political Knowledge	-.076 (.072)	-.077	-.279*** (.093)	-.226	-.086 (.089)	-.075	-.098 (.095)	-.078
Blind Patriotism	-.081 (.060)	-.095	-.173** (.077)	-.165	.015 (.075)	.015	-.101 (.079)	-.094
Symbolic Patriotism	.162** (.079)	.142	.031 (.102)	.022	.143 (.098)	.109	.322** (.105)	.223
Group Pride	.130* (.072)	.128	.050 (.094)	.040	.213** (.090)	.183	.137 (.096)	.108
Traditional Racism	.256*** (.065)	.280	.155* (.084)	.138	.189** (.080)	.180	.150* (.087)	.130
Religiosity	-.003 (.054)	-.004	.134* (.070)	.148	-.092 (.066)	-.109	-.002 (.071)	-.002
Catholic	-.011 (.100)	-.020	.110 (.130)	.159	.034 (.125)	.053	.137 (.134)	.194
Jewish	-.076 (.132)	-.055	.129 (.172)	.075	.004 (.164)	.002	.213 (.177)	.122
Protestant	.006 (.100)	.011	.103 (.130)	.156	.127 (.124)	.207	.212 (.133)	.315
Age	.001 (.001)	.088	.001 (.001)	.037	.001 (.001)	.042	.004** (.002)	.197
Gender	.061** (.035)	.119	.098** (.045)	.153	.028 (.043)	.048	.000 (.046)	.000
Ideology	.227** (.089)	.190	-.114 (.116)	-.077	.393*** (.111)	.285	.235** (.119)	.155
Individualism	.028 (.059)	.033	.013 (.076)	.013	-.031 (.073)	-.032	.088 (.078)	.083
Isolationism	.111** (.043)	.173	.109** (.056)	.137	.058 (.054)	.077	.070 (.057)	.086
Native Parents	.105** (.046)	.166	.034 (.059)	.043	.102* (.057)	.140	-.011 (.061)	-.013
Self-Employed	-.093* (.055)	-.118	.024 (.070)	.026	-.045 (.067)	-.051	.048 (.074)	.049
Union	-.055 (.049)	-.076	-.156** (.063)	-.173	-.004 (.061)	-.004	.053 (.065)	.058
Urban	.002 (.056)	.003	-.048 (.072)	-.051	-.019 (.068)	-.022	.029 (.075)	.030
Constant	.066 (.165)		.428 (.214)		.131 (.204)		-.075 (.220)	
R Square	.304		.224		.187		.222	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 15. White Respondent Opinions: High Political Knowledge, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.041 (.042)	.067	.009 (.057)	.011	-.061 (.054)	-.081	-.092* (.051)	-.127
Immigrant Region	.031 (.031)	.066	-.004 (.042)	-.007	-.011 (.039)	-.018	.001 (.037)	.002
Economic Insecurity	.024 (.067)	.027	.255** (.089)	.212	.089 (.084)	.078	-.012 (.079)	-.011
Blind Patriotism	.015 (.044)	.022	-.076 (.060)	-.083	.217*** (.056)	.253	-.002 (.053)	-.002
Symbolic Patriotism	.220*** (.074)	.193	.204** (.101)	.134	.455*** (.095)	.317	.370** (.090)	.270
Group Pride	.079 (.063)	.082	.160* (.085)	.125	.177** (.080)	.146	.161** (.076)	.140
Traditional Racism	.227*** (.054)	.271	.206** (.072)	.187	.134** (.068)	.128	.085 (.064)	.085
Religiosity	.058 (.039)	.097	.120** (.053)	.150	.049 (.050)	.066	.012 (.047)	.017
Catholic	.007 (.106)	.016	.045 (.145)	.074	.046 (.137)	.081	.051 (.129)	.093
Jewish	-.233* (.124)	-.196	.101 (.169)	.064	.064 (.159)	.043	.289* (.151)	.202
Protestant	.033 (.106)	.075	.082 (.145)	.139	.131 (.137)	.236	.145 (.129)	.273
Age	.000 (.001)	.000	-.002* (.001)	-.131	.000 (.001)	-.019	.003*** (.001)	.204
Gender	.059** (.028)	.133	.073* (.038)	.125	.049 (.036)	.089	.042 (.034)	.079
Ideology	.037 (.073)	.035	.133 (.099)	.096	.133 (.093)	.101	.219** (.088)	.175
Individualism	.030 (.052)	.040	-.097 (.071)	-.095	.039 (.066)	.041	.003 (.063)	.003
Isolationism	.126*** (.038)	.210	.093* (.052)	.116	.009 (.049)	.012	.052 (.046)	.072
Native Parents	.036 (.045)	.053	.049 (.062)	.054	-.014 (.058)	-.016	.069 (.055)	.084
Self-Employed	.025 (.042)	.038	.116** (.057)	.136	-.088 (.054)	-.109	-.041 (.051)	-.053
Union	.036 (.035)	.066	.043 (.048)	.060	.067 (.045)	.098	.067 (.042)	.102
Urban	.029 (.035)	.058	-.017 (.047)	-.025	.075* (.045)	.119	.052 (.042)	.086
Constant	.109 (.150)		-.117 (.206)		-.162 (.194)		-.138 (.183)	
R Square		.264		.215		.219		.237

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 16. White Respondent Opinions: Low Political Knowledge, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.031 (.042)	.052	-.043 (.057)	-.055	-.101* (.053)	-.134	-.057 (.056)	-.072
Immigrant Region	.001 (.034)	.003	.020 (.047)	.032	-.022 (.043)	-.036	-.059 (.046)	-.093
Economic Insecurity	.251*** (.065)	.277	.132 (.089)	.112	.085 (.082)	.074	.026 (.087)	.022
Blind Patriotism	-.014 (.051)	-.018	-.153** (.070)	-.158	-.039 (.065)	-.042	-.013 (.069)	-.013
Symbolic Patriotism	.139** (.071)	.133	.048 (.098)	.036	.210** (.090)	.160	.255** (.096)	.185
Group Pride	.266*** (.072)	.259	.250** (.099)	.186	.126 (.092)	.097	.081 (.097)	.060
Traditional Racism	.311*** (.066)	.322	.227** (.090)	.182	.245*** (.083)	.204	.111 (.089)	.088
Religiosity	-.066 (.046)	-.098	.052 (.064)	.058	-.065 (.058)	-.076	-.035 (.062)	-.039
Catholic	-.010 (.114)	-.019	.230 (.156)	.345	-.005 (.145)	-.008	.145 (.154)	.216
Jewish	.033 (.130)	.029	.167 (.179)	.114	-.011 (.165)	-.008	.224 (.176)	.152
Protestant	.025 (.114)	.051	.231 (.157)	.361	.034 (.145)	.055	.210 (.154)	.325
Age	.001 (.001)	.086	.000 (.001)	-.003	.002* (.001)	.120	.004*** (.001)	.199
Gender	.049 (.034)	.097	.065 (.047)	.099	-.043 (.043)	-.069	-.021 (.046)	-.032
Ideology	.236*** (.076)	.244	.064 (.104)	.051	.496*** (.097)	.408	.233** (.103)	.183
Individualism	.060 (.059)	.075	-.047 (.080)	-.045	-.064 (.074)	-.063	.135* (.079)	.130
Isolationism	.100** (.046)	.132	.127** (.064)	.129	.170** (.060)	.176	.063 (.063)	.063
Native Parents	.074* (.038)	.124	.117** (.053)	.152	.035 (.049)	.047	.028 (.052)	.036
Self-Employed	-.092** (.041)	-.149	-.109** (.056)	-.136	.027 (.051)	.035	.022 (.055)	.027
Union	-.027 (.040)	-.044	-.139** (.055)	-.174	.027 (.051)	.035	.014 (.054)	.017
Urban	.012 (.046)	.017	-.051 (.061)	-.058	-.047 (.056)	-.055	-.034 (.061)	-.036
Constant	-.253 (.169)		-.212 (.230)		.100 (.213)		-.052 (.228)	
R Square		.274		.182		.250		.225

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 17. White Respondent Opinions: High Blind Patriotism, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.048 (.039)	.080	.021 (.058)	.025	-.006 (.055)	-.007	-.021 (.052)	-.029
Immigrant Region	.006 (.031)	.012	.001 (.046)	.002	-.003 (.044)	-.004	-.008 (.041)	-.014
Economic Insecurity	.018 (.066)	.020	.111 (.097)	.086	.026 (.092)	.022	-.056 (.086)	-.051
Political Knowledge	-.199*** (.064)	-.205	-.261** (.095)	-.191	.037 (.090)	.029	-.015 (.085)	-.013
Group Pride	.174** (.061)	.179	.212** (.091)	.155	.249** (.087)	.196	.138* (.081)	.119
Traditional Racism	.225*** (.057)	.246	.209** (.083)	.165	.311*** (.079)	.264	.133* (.074)	.123
Religiosity	.030 (.039)	.049	.111** (.057)	.130	-.026 (.054)	-.033	.032 (.051)	.044
Catholic	-.034 (.107)	-.069	.005 (.159)	.008	.055 (.151)	.087	.029 (.142)	.050
Jewish	-.127 (.120)	-.124	-.017 (.179)	-.012	.013 (.170)	.009	.144 (.159)	.116
Protestant	-.022 (.107)	-.048	-.041 (.159)	-.063	.093 (.152)	.153	.097 (.142)	.174
Age	.001 (.001)	.036	-.001 (.001)	-.048	.001 (.001)	.077	.004*** (.001)	.208
Gender	.016 (.029)	.035	.048 (.043)	.076	-.021 (.041)	-.035	-.001 (.039)	-.002
Ideology	.226*** (.073)	.231	.234** (.108)	.171	.327*** (.103)	.256	.227** (.096)	.192
Individualism	.049 (.056)	.060	-.022 (.083)	-.019	.068 (.080)	.064	.067 (.074)	.068
Isolationism	.145*** (.038)	.229	.101* (.057)	.113	.046 (.054)	.056	.071 (.051)	.093
Native Parents	.053 (.049)	.068	.111 (.073)	.102	-.072 (.070)	-.071	.080 (.065)	.085
Self-Employed	.000 (.041)	.000	.026 (.060)	.029	-.005 (.057)	-.006	.004 (.054)	.005
Union	.028 (.034)	.052	-.043 (.050)	-.056	.026 (.047)	.036	.038 (.044)	.058
Urban	.024 (.035)	.045	-.076 (.050)	-.103	-.034 (.048)	-.050	.005 (.045)	.008
Constant	.265 (.148)		.160 (.220)		.161 (.210)		.196 (.196)	
R Square	.308		.223		.184		.158	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 18. White Respondent Opinions: Low Blind Patriotism, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.001 (.045)	.002	-.013 (.053)	-.018	-.154*** (.053)	-.211	-.122** (.057)	-.153
Immigrant Region	.039 (.035)	.079	.029 (.042)	.049	.001 (.042)	.002	-.047 (.045)	-.074
Economic Insecurity	.211*** (.069)	.224	.185** (.081)	.167	.065 (.082)	.059	.047 (.086)	.039
Political Knowledge	-.080 (.067)	-.083	-.229*** (.079)	-.200	-.203** (.079)	-.181	-.085 (.085)	-.069
Group Pride	.149** (.075)	.140	.124 (.088)	.098	.145* (.088)	.118	.145 (.094)	.107
Traditional Racism	.255*** (.064)	.274	.146* (.076)	.132	.086 (.076)	.080	.037 (.081)	.031
Religiosity	-.050 (.049)	-.070	.020 (.059)	.023	-.050 (.058)	-.061	-.064 (.062)	-.071
Catholic	.062 (.120)	.122	.263* (.142)	.438	.021 (.142)	.036	.083 (.153)	.129
Jewish	-.048 (.146)	-.035	.308* (.173)	.186	.062 (.173)	.038	.172 (.186)	.097
Protestant	.090 (.119)	.182	.299** (.141)	.510	.063 (.141)	.111	.155 (.151)	.247
Age	.002* (.001)	.133	.000 (.001)	.025	.002* (.001)	.123	.005*** (.001)	.231
Gender	.072** (.033)	.148	.097** (.039)	.169	.022 (.039)	.038	.017 (.042)	.028
Ideology	.120 (.079)	.111	-.076 (.093)	-.059	.376*** (.093)	.300	.368*** (.100)	.267
Individualism	.092 (.057)	.118	-.076 (.067)	-.082	.031 (.067)	.034	.161** (.072)	.163
Isolationism	.058 (.048)	.078	.100* (.057)	.113	.130** (.058)	.148	.087 (.061)	.091
Native Parents	.114*** (.039)	.199	.132** (.046)	.194	.113** (.046)	.169	.036 (.050)	.049
Self-Employed	-.047 (.044)	-.072	-.017 (.053)	-.023	-.011 (.052)	-.015	-.037 (.056)	-.045
Union	.024 (.041)	.037	-.026 (.049)	-.034	.013 (.050)	.017	.020 (.053)	.024
Urban	-.056 (.046)	-.080	-.001 (.054)	-.001	-.014 (.054)	-.018	-.043 (.058)	-.049
Constant	-.018 (.171)		-.062 (.202)		.309 (.202)		.104 (.217)	
R Square	.217		.211		.174		.213	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 19. White Respondent Opinions: High Symbolic Patriotism, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.052 (.047)	.084	-.092 (.063)	-.114	-.175** (.067)	-.207	-.158** (.066)	-.194
Immigrant Region	.097** (.034)	.208	.010 (.047)	.017	-.016 (.050)	-.025	-.007 (.049)	-.012
Economic Insecurity	-.098 (.076)	-.107	.086 (.103)	.071	.009 (.109)	.007	-.108 (.107)	-.088
Political Knowledge	-.184** (.077)	-.192	-.282** (.104)	-.223	-.133 (.110)	-.101	-.046 (.109)	-.036
Group Pride	.284*** (.074)	.288	.232** (.102)	.179	.139 (.109)	.103	.093 (.106)	.071
Traditional Racism	.317*** (.067)	.342	.367*** (.092)	.304	.380*** (.097)	.300	.186** (.095)	.151
Religiosity	.034 (.047)	.055	.093 (.065)	.115	-.063 (.069)	-.075	-.071 (.068)	-.086
Catholic	.000 (.147)	.000	.142 (.202)	.243	.035 (.213)	.057	.336 (.210)	.564
Jewish	-.115 (.160)	-.117	.232 (.219)	.179	.064 (.232)	.047	.465** (.228)	.353
Protestant	.042 (.146)	.096	.132 (.201)	.230	.141 (.212)	.234	.441** (.209)	.753
Age	.002* (.001)	.147	-.001 (.002)	-.070	.003** (.002)	.178	.006*** (.002)	.309
Gender	-.024 (.033)	-.055	-.008 (.046)	-.014	-.030 (.048)	-.050	-.056 (.048)	-.095
Ideology	.022 (.085)	.022	.030 (.115)	.023	.269** (.122)	.197	.148 (.120)	.111
Individualism	.039 (.062)	.048	-.001 (.085)	-.001	.096 (.090)	.085	.079 (.088)	.073
Isolationism	.101** (.046)	.157	.037 (.063)	.044	.034 (.067)	.038	.052 (.065)	.061
Native Parents	.034 (.049)	.049	.011 (.068)	.012	-.019 (.071)	-.021	.070 (.070)	.077
Self-Employed	.041 (.044)	.067	-.041 (.059)	-.054	.013 (.062)	.017	-.043 (.062)	-.055
Union	.045 (.038)	.084	-.030 (.053)	-.043	.017 (.056)	.023	.008 (.055)	.012
Urban	.004 (.043)	.006	-.060 (.058)	-.079	-.018 (.061)	-.022	-.037 (.061)	-.047
Constant	.170 (.185)		.142 (.255)		.192 (.270)		-.027 (.266)	
R Square	.319		.243		.234		.211	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 20. White Respondent Opinions: Low Symbolic Patriotism, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.004 (.041)	.006	.009 (.053)	.011	-.047 (.049)	-.067	-.057 (.050)	-.076
Immigrant Region	-.041 (.032)	-.080	-.013 (.041)	-.020	-.018 (.038)	-.032	-.067* (.039)	-.110
Economic Insecurity	.192*** (.063)	.201	.196** (.081)	.166	-.001 (.074)	-.001	.040 (.075)	.036
Political Knowledge	-.092 (.060)	-.094	-.199** (.077)	-.162	-.109 (.071)	-.100	-.014 (.072)	-.012
Group Pride	.129** (.063)	.123	.162** (.081)	.123	.162** (.075)	.139	.160** (.076)	.128
Traditional Racism	.196*** (.057)	.210	.104 (.073)	.090	.088 (.067)	.086	.052 (.068)	.047
Religiosity	-.048 (.042)	-.068	.041 (.054)	.046	-.067 (.050)	-.086	-.032 (.050)	-.038
Catholic	-.050 (.096)	-.094	.084 (.124)	.127	.024 (.115)	.040	-.014 (.116)	-.023
Jewish	-.118 (.120)	-.087	.034 (.157)	.020	-.007 (.145)	-.004	.062 (.147)	.038
Protestant	-.053 (.095)	-.103	.069 (.124)	.107	.022 (.114)	.038	.013 (.116)	.021
Age	.001 (.001)	.087	.001 (.001)	.038	.002** (.001)	.124	.005*** (.001)	.250
Gender	.079** (.029)	.159	.107** (.038)	.171	-.012 (.035)	-.022	.016 (.035)	.027
Ideology	.206*** (.070)	.194	.112 (.091)	.084	.344*** (.084)	.290	.333*** (.085)	.262
Individualism	.131** (.052)	.164	-.019 (.067)	-.019	.059 (.062)	.066	.178** (.063)	.187
Isolationism	.130*** (.040)	.184	.158*** (.052)	.177	.091* (.048)	.115	.089* (.049)	.105
Native Parents	.127*** (.038)	.204	.181*** (.049)	.230	.071 (.045)	.101	.060 (.046)	.081
Self-Employed	-.062 (.040)	-.093	.019 (.052)	.023	-.001 (.047)	-.002	.007 (.048)	.009
Union	.003 (.036)	.005	-.057 (.047)	-.072	.021 (.043)	.029	.044 (.044)	.060
Urban	-.035 (.037)	-.056	-.061 (.048)	-.080	.009 (.044)	.013	-.003 (.045)	-.004
Constant	.139 (.143)		-.006 (.187)		.345 (.172)		.123 (.175)	
R Square	.270		.216		.146		.235	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 21. White Respondent Opinions: High Group Pride, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.096 (.064)	.157	.092 (.081)	.120	-.048 (.091)	-.061	-.025 (.079)	-.036
Immigrant Region	.075 (.049)	.153	-.038 (.064)	-.061	-.110 (.071)	-.175	-.042 (.062)	-.075
Economic Insecurity	.039 (.115)	.040	.132 (.147)	.108	-.103 (.167)	-.083	.015 (.140)	.014
Political Knowledge	-.234** (.111)	-.222	-.382** (.145)	-.286	.008 (.161)	.006	.177 (.138)	.147
Blind Patriotism	-.107 (.075)	-.141	-.193** (.094)	-.206	.120 (.107)	.124	-.039 (.091)	-.046
Symbolic Patriotism	.167 (.116)	.163	-.080 (.149)	-.062	.265 (.165)	.202	.141 (.144)	.121
Traditional Racism	.336** (.142)	.227	.449** (.184)	.242	.226 (.205)	.118	.108 (.178)	.064
Religiosity	.061 (.066)	.092	.108 (.087)	.130	-.089 (.095)	-.105	-.111 (.083)	-.148
Catholic	-.016 (.052)	-.031	-.074 (.067)	-.113	-.189** (.075)	-.281	.024 (.065)	.040
Jewish	-.103 (.110)	-.091	.077 (.142)	.054	-.106 (.158)	-.073	-.027 (.137)	-.021
Protestant	++		++		++		++	
Age	.001 (.002)	.081	.000 (.002)	.021	.003 (.002)	.151	.004** (.002)	.237
Gender	-.024 (.046)	-.049	.034 (.060)	.056	-.016 (.067)	-.026	-.027 (.058)	-.048
Ideology	.189 (.142)	.188	.161 (.183)	.126	.162 (.204)	.125	.473** (.177)	.412
Individualism	.095 (.097)	.107	.169 (.125)	.152	-.053 (.141)	-.046	.047 (.121)	.047
Isolationism	.123 (.078)	.167	.149 (.100)	.162	.103 (.113)	.106	.065 (.097)	.078
Native Parents	.017 (.094)	.017	-.058 (.121)	-.048	-.223* (.135)	-.180	.239** (.117)	.217
Self-Employed	-.078 (.064)	-.124	-.112 (.083)	-.142	-.070 (.092)	-.087	-.088 (.080)	-.124
Union	.079 (.060)	.140	-.022 (.078)	-.030	.001 (.087)	.001	.025 (.075)	.038
Urban	.001 (.059)	.002	-.121 (.075)	-.167	.029 (.084)	.039	.016 (.073)	.024
Constant	.150 (.220)		.368 (.284)		.576 (.322)		-.117 (.275)	
R Square		.388		.351		.230		.254

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

++ Excluded Variable (Collinearity)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 22. White Respondent Opinions: Low Group Pride, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.011 (.034)	.018	-.030 (.044)	-.038	-.096** (.040)	-.129	-.098** (.043)	-.125
Immigrant Region	-.016 (.026)	-.033	.022 (.035)	.034	.021 (.032)	.036	-.038 (.033)	-.061
Economic Insecurity	.144** (.052)	.158	.125* (.069)	.105	.118* (.063)	.107	.054 (.066)	.046
Political Knowledge	-.072 (.050)	-.076	-.197** (.067)	-.160	-.137** (.061)	-.120	-.048 (.064)	-.040
Blind Patriotism	.036 (.038)	.050	-.091* (.050)	-.096	.080* (.046)	.091	-.002 (.049)	-.002
Symbolic Patriotism	.165** (.058)	.145	.128* (.077)	.087	.334*** (.070)	.243	.386*** (.074)	.266
Traditional Racism	.226*** (.044)	.258	.178*** (.057)	.159	.177*** (.052)	.169	.075 (.055)	.068
Religiosity	-.040 (.034)	-.061	.067 (.045)	.078	-.007 (.041)	-.009	.002 (.043)	.002
Catholic	.027 (.078)	.055	.160 (.104)	.252	.060 (.095)	.102	.120 (.100)	.193
Jewish	-.042 (.095)	-.036	.157 (.126)	.101	.122 (.116)	.084	.330** (.121)	.216
Protestant	.048 (.078)	.101	.147 (.104)	.240	.089 (.095)	.156	.205 (.100)	.339
Age	.001 (.001)	.080	.000 (.001)	.010	.001 (.001)	.041	.004*** (.001)	.195
Gender	.055** (.024)	.118	.082** (.033)	.136	.019 (.030)	.033	.011 (.031)	.019
Ideology	.134** (.059)	.130	.075 (.078)	.056	.340*** (.071)	.273	.233*** (.075)	.177
Individualism	.050 (.043)	.065	-.100* (.057)	-.100	.016 (.052)	.017	.091 (.055)	.092
Isolationism	.093** (.033)	.139	.112** (.044)	.128	.093** (.041)	.114	.084** (.043)	.098
Native Parents	.097*** (.031)	.163	.143*** (.041)	.185	.072* (.037)	.099	.040 (.039)	.052
Self-Employed	-.008 (.033)	-.012	.027 (.044)	.032	.011 (.040)	.014	.004 (.042)	.004
Union	.001 (.030)	.002	-.051 (.040)	-.065	.022 (.036)	.030	.016 (.038)	.021
Urban	-.014 (.032)	-.023	-.066 (.041)	-.085	-.019 (.038)	-.027	-.014 (.040)	-.019
Constant	.102 (.117)		.103 (.155)		.086 (.142)		-.066 (.149)	
R Square	.239		.198		.227		.236	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 23. White Respondent Opinions: High Traditional Racism, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.024 (.036)	.041	.018 (.048)	.023	-.098** (.047)	-.127	-.060 (.042)	-.086
Immigrant Region	.047* (.027)	.099	.044 (.037)	.069	-.029 (.036)	-.048	-.014 (.032)	-.025
Economic Insecurity	.047 (.060)	.052	.066 (.079)	.054	.073 (.078)	.061	-.054 (.069)	-.050
Political Knowledge	-.169*** (.058)	-.172	-.341*** (.077)	-.258	-.048 (.076)	-.037	.004 (.068)	.003
Blind Patriotism	.032 (.040)	.047	-.088* (.053)	-.095	.178*** (.052)	.196	-.010 (.046)	-.012
Symbolic Patriotism	.248*** (.065)	.228	.183*** (.085)	.125	.346*** (.084)	.243	.309*** (.075)	.239
Group Pride	.094* (.056)	.092	.192** (.075)	.140	.105 (.073)	.079	.101 (.065)	.084
Religiosity	-.024 (.037)	-.038	.083* (.050)	.098	-.012 (.049)	-.015	.019 (.044)	.026
Catholic	-.012 (.108)	-.026	-.026 (.144)	-.040	.040 (.142)	.064	.052 (.126)	.092
Jewish	-.157 (.119)	-.155	-.018 (.158)	-.013	.106 (.155)	.080	.224 (.139)	.186
Protestant	.019 (.109)	.042	-.037 (.145)	-.061	.118 (.142)	.198	.120 (.127)	.223
Age	.001 (.001)	.059	.000 (.001)	-.024	.001 (.001)	.045	.004*** (.001)	.207
Gender	.033 (.026)	.074	.063* (.035)	.105	.001 (.034)	.002	-.007 (.031)	-.014
Ideology	.083 (.066)	.086	.207** (.087)	.159	.270*** (.086)	.213	.204* (.077)	.177
Individualism	.013 (.052)	.016	-.102 (.069)	-.094	.053 (.068)	.049	.087 (.061)	.091
Isolationism	.150 (.037)	.227	.118** (.050)	.134	.082* (.049)	.094	.090** (.044)	.115
Native Parents	.044 (.041)	.064	.126** (.054)	.136	-.029 (.053)	-.032	.042 (.048)	.051
Self-Employed	.000 (.035)	.000	-.027 (.047)	-.034	.003 (.046)	.004	-.027 (.041)	-.038
Union	.030 (.031)	.056	-.031 (.041)	-.043	.026 (.040)	.036	.046 (.036)	.072
Urban	.006 (.031)	.011	-.073* (.042)	-.104	.005 (.041)	.007	-.004 (.037)	-.007
Constant	.225 (.147)		.196 (.195)		.052 (.192)		.032 (.171)	
R Square	.226		.242		.232		.250	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 24. White Respondent Opinions: Low Traditional Racism, 2004

	Number of Immigrants		Immigrants as Threat to American Jobs		Controlling Illegal Immigration as a Foreign Policy Goal		Federal Budget Spending to Tighten Border Security	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Southern Region	.019 (.059)	.029	-.049 (.071)	-.062	-.065 (.068)	-.089	-.108 (.079)	-.125
Immigrant Region	-.090** (.046)	-.173	-.086 (.055)	-.138	-.009 (.054)	-.016	-.088 (.062)	-.130
Economic Insecurity	.272*** (.085)	.274	.235** (.102)	.200	.057 (.098)	.053	.135 (.113)	.106
Political Knowledge	-.111 (.081)	-.111	-.187* (.099)	-.158	-.145 (.096)	-.133	-.108 (.110)	-.084
Constructive Patriotism	-.007 (.067)	-.009	-.128 (.081)	-.132	-.031 (.079)	-.034	.026 (.090)	.024
Symbolic Patriotism	.070 (.094)	.061	-.075 (.114)	-.055	.172 (.111)	.136	.272** (.127)	.183
Group Pride	-.027 (.082)	-.026	-.037 (.100)	-.030	.046 (.097)	.041	.048 (.112)	.036
Religiosity	-.003 (.057)	-.004	.067 (.070)	.080	-.077 (.067)	-.099	-.089 (.077)	-.098
Catholic	.035 (.127)	.064	.295* (.156)	.456	.097 (.151)	.162	.135 (.173)	.192
Jewish	.185 (.174)	.112	.378* (.215)	.190	.127 (.208)	.069	.209 (.239)	.097
Protestant	.000 (.126)	.001	.252 (.155)	.402	.088 (.150)	.152	.206 (.172)	.302
Age	.003** (.001)	.164	.002 (.002)	.123	.002 (.002)	.110	.004** (.002)	.190
Gender	.086** (.041)	.168	.127** (.050)	.207	.012 (.049)	.021	.052 (.056)	.078
Ideology	.223** (.100)	.194	-.075 (.121)	-.055	.333** (.118)	.262	.289** (.135)	.193
Individualism	.137** (.069)	.171	.066 (.084)	.069	-.051 (.081)	-.058	.106 (.094)	.102
Isolationism	.088 (.056)	.119	.144** (.069)	.163	.126* (.067)	.154	.079 (.077)	.082
Native Parents	.097** (.050)	.162	.083 (.061)	.116	.115** (.059)	.173	.062 (.068)	.079
Self-Employed	-.134** (.058)	-.186	-.044 (.069)	-.052	-.028 (.067)	-.036	.008 (.078)	.009
Union	-.018 (.054)	-.025	-.070 (.066)	-.083	.033 (.064)	.042	-.021 (.073)	-.024
Urban	.023 (.068)	.027	.007 (.078)	.007	.015 (.076)	.017	.001 (.090)	.001
Constant	.085 (.209)		.111 (.254)		.291 (.246)		-.031 (.284)	
R Square	.283		.228		.150		.198	

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

(Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors)

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 25. Conditional Regressions for Dependent Variable 1

	Original Regression Results	Southern Region Residents	Non- Southern Region Residents	Immigrant Region Residents	Non- Immigrant Region Residents	High Levels of Economic Insecurity	Low Levels of Economic Insecurity	High Levels of Political Knowledge	Low Levels of Political Knowledge
Southern Region		---	---	---	---				
Immigrant Region	.047*	---	---	---	---	.055**			
Economic Insecurity			.286***		.243***	---	---		.251***
Political Knowledge	-.195***	-.213***		-.174***		-.190***		---	---
Blind Patriotism									
Symbolic Patriotism	-.210***	.224***		.239***		.139**	.162**	.220***	.139**
Group Pride	.179***	.184***		.158**	.144*	.226***	.130*		.266***
Traditional Racism	.227***	.232***	.255***	.221***	.265***	.274***	.256***	.227***	.311***
Ideology			.228**		.276***		.227**		.236***
Isolationism	.143***	.139***		.113***	.102**	.085*	.111**	.126***	.100**
R Square	.277	.266	.389	.316	.270	.244	.304	.264	.274

	Original Regression Results	High Levels of Blind Patriotism	Low Levels of Blind Patriotism	High Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	Low Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	High Levels of Group Pride	Low Levels of Group Pride	High Levels of Traditional Racism	Low Levels of Traditional Racism
Southern Region									
Immigrant Region	.047*			.097**				.047*	-.090**
Economic Insecurity			.211***		.192***		.144**		.272***
Political Knowledge	-.195***	-.199***		-.184**		-.234**		-.169***	
Blind Patriotism		---	---	---	---				
Symbolic Patriotism	-.210***	---	---	---	---		.165**	.248***	
Group Pride	.179***	.174**	.149**	.284***	.129**	---	---	.094*	
Traditional Racism	.227***	.225***	.255***	.317***	.196***	.336**	.226***	---	---
Ideology		.226***			.206***		.134**		.223**
Isolationism	.143***	.145***		.101**	.130***		.093**		
R Square	.277	.308	.217	.319	.270	.388	.239	.226	.283

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

Only statistically significant relationships listed

++ Excluded Variable (Collinearity)

Table 26. Conditional Regressions for Dependent Variable 2

	Original Regression Results	Southern Region Residents	Non- Southern Region Residents	Immigrant Region Residents	Non- Immigrant Region Residents	High Levels of Economic Insecurity	Low Levels of Economic Insecurity	High Levels of Political Knowledge	Low Levels of Political Knowledge
Southern Region		---	---	---	---				
Immigrant Region		---		---	---		-.098*		
Economic Insecurity			.210**	.208**		---	---	.255**	
Political Knowledge	-.312***	-.303***	-.214**	-.327***	-.200**	-.267***	-.279***	---	---
Blind Patriotism	-.120**	-.120**		-.147**		-.111**	-.173**		-.153**
Symbolic Patriotism	.155**							.204**	
Group Pride	.228***	.322***			.305***	.339***		.160*	.250**
Traditional Racism	.216***	.290***		.203**	.203**	.239***	.155*	.206**	.227**
Ideology	.169**					.233**			
Isolationism	.092**	.091*	.151**		.157**		.109**	.093*	.127**
R Square	.233	.226	.389	.259	.206	.246	.224	.215	.182

	Original Regression Results	High Levels of Blind Patriotism	Low Levels of Blind Patriotism	High Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	Low Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	High Levels of Group Pride	Low Levels of Group Pride	High Levels of Traditional Racism	Low Levels of Traditional Racism
Southern Region									
Immigrant Region									
Economic Insecurity			.185**		.196**		.125*		.235**
Political Knowledge	-.312***	-.261**	-.229***	-.282**	-.199**	-.382**	-.197**	-.341***	-.187*
Blind Patriotism	-.120**	---	---	---	---	-.193**	-.091*	-.088*	
Symbolic Patriotism	.155**	---	---	---	---		.128*	.183**	
Group Pride	.228***	.212**		.232***	.162**	---		.192**	
Traditional Racism	.216***	.209**	.146*	.367***		.449**	.178***	---	---
Ideology	.169**	.234**						.207**	
Isolationism	.092**	.101*	.100*		.158***		.112**	.118**	.144**
R Square	.233	.223	.211	.243	.216	.351	.198	.242	.228

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

Only statistically significant relationships listed

++ Excluded Variable (Collinearity)

Table 27. Conditional Regressions for Dependent Variable 3

	Original Regression Results	Southern Region Residents	Non-Southern Region Residents	Immigrant Region Residents	Non-Immigrant Region Residents	High Levels of Economic Insecurity	Low Levels of Economic Insecurity	High Levels of Political Knowledge	Low Levels of Political Knowledge
Southern Region	-.085**	---	---	---	---	-.089*	---	---	-.101*
Immigrant Region		---	---	---	---				
Economic Insecurity							---		
Political Knowledge			-.207**					---	---
Blind Patriotism	.126**	.135**		.120**		.131**		.217***	
Symbolic Patriotism	.317***	.281***	.275**	.330***	.293***	.411***		.455***	.210**
Group Pride	.158**	.223***			.300***		.213**	.177**	
Traditional Racism	.191***	.199***		.219***	.168**	.168**	.189**	.134**	.245***
Ideology	.251***	.240***	.376***	.193**	.412***	.180**	.393***		.496***
Isolationism			.121*		.161**	.111*			.170**
R Square	.200	.215	.217	.197	.252	.229	.187	.219	.250

	Original Regression Results	High Levels of Blind Patriotism	Low Levels of Blind Patriotism	High Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	Low Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	High Levels of Group Pride	Low Levels of Group Pride	High Levels of Traditional Racism	Low Levels of Traditional Racism
Southern Region	-.085**		-.154***	-.175**			-.096**	-.098**	
Immigrant Region									
Economic Insecurity							.118*		
Political Knowledge			-.203**				-.137**		
Blind Patriotism	.126**	---	---	---	---		.080*	.178***	
Symbolic Patriotism	.317***	---	---	---	---		.334***	.346***	
Group Pride	.158**	.249**	.145*		.162**	---	---		
Traditional Racism	.191***	.311***		.380***			.177***	---	---
Ideology	.251***	.327***	.376***	.269**	.344***		.340***	.270***	.333**
Isolationism			.130**		.091*		.093**	.082*	.126*
R Square	.200	.184	.174	.234	.146	.230	.227	.232	.150

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

Only statistically significant relationships listed

++ Excluded Variable (Collinearity)

Table 28. Conditional Regressions for Dependent Variable 4

	Original Regression Results	Southern Region Residents	Non- Southern Region Residents	Immigrant Region Residents	Non- Immigrant Region Residents	High Levels of Economic Insecurity	Low Levels of Economic Insecurity	High Levels of Political Knowledge	Low Levels of Political Knowledge
Southern Region	-.087**	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.092*	---
Immigrant Region		---	---	---	---	---	-.087*	---	---
Economic Insecurity						---	---	---	---
Political Knowledge								---	---
Blind Patriotism									
Symbolic Patriotism	.308***	.324***	.283**	.259***	.358***	.286***	.322**	.370**	.255**
Group Pride	.113*	.157**			.164*			.161**	
Traditional Racism	.106**	.146**		.119*			.150*		
Ideology	.203***	.221***	.232***		.339***	.219**	.235**	.219**	.233**
Isolationism	.079**	.087**			.135**	.129**			
R Square	.216	.251	.181	.191	.272	.224	.222	.237	.225

	Original Regression Results	High Levels of Blind Patriotism	Low Levels of Blind Patriotism	High Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	Low Levels of Symbolic Patriotism	High Levels of Group Pride	Low Levels of Group Pride	High Levels of Traditional Racism	Low Levels of Traditional Racism
Southern Region	-.087**		-.122**	-.158**					
Immigrant Region					-.067*				
Economic Insecurity									
Political Knowledge									
Blind Patriotism		---	---	---	---				
Symbolic Patriotism	.308***	---	---	---	---		.386***	.309***	.272**
Group Pride	.113*	.138*			.160**	---	---		
Traditional Racism	.106**	.133*		.186**				---	---
Ideology	.203***	.227**	.368***		.333***	.473**	.233***	.204*	.289**
Isolationism	.079**				.089*		.084**	.090**	
R Square	.216	.158	.213	.211	.235	.254	.236	.250	.198

Source: American National Election Studies, 2004.

Only statistically significant relationships listed

++ Excluded Variable (Collinearity)

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