Examining the Role of Protests in South Korean Democratization

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EXAMINING THE ROLE OF PROTESTS IN SOUTH KOREAN DEMOCRATIZATION

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science in the College of Sciences and in the Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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ABSTRACT

This research examines how relative deprivation theory can be applied to study the success of protest movements and their subsequent impact on the process of democratization of the South Korean state. This study hopes to provide a more comprehensive approach to how the role of protests in the development of a democratic state is explained within the field of political science. Utilizing both a quantitative and qualitative research design, this work applied a case study analysis as well as a supplemental data analysis regarding the success of Korean protest movements and their impact on democratization as well as global views of democratization as previously mentioned. For the case study analysis, I focused on four protest movements in South Korea and applied relative deprivation theory in each case. Then, I defined five metrics for protest success based on my previous analysis and used these metrics to conduct a comparative analysis regarding the short and long term success of each protest movement. For the data analysis, I utilized Systemic Peace’s Polity Project Series V dataset in order to quantify changes in the qualities of the regime over time, on a scale ranging from highly authoritarian to highly democratic regime qualities. Based on this mixed-mode analysis, I find that protest movements that were linked to progressive deprivation (a form of relative deprivation) led to most successful shifts towards democratic regime qualities in the long-term. This project is significant to the field as it will address criticisms in previously discounted protest theory as well as explore the changing narrative of democratization in the modern world and dispel historical misconceptions of political culture in East Asia, focusing on Korea.
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1 INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATIONS & GOALS OF RESEARCH

Here, I will present my initial reasoning for pursuing this thesis topic. While reading scholarly works on democratization in East Asia and reflecting on discussions in my Political Science courses, I noted a bias some Western academics hold regarding the democratization of non-Western states. This bias asserts that East Asian states are inherently unsuited to Western style democracy as a result of the Confucian value present within East Asian culture that prioritizes the community over the individual. Knowing what I did about the remarkably successful democratic transition of South Korea, I decided to study the unique, historic democratization of South Korea not only to analyze the role of protest movements in South Korean democratization but also to develop an empirical criticism against such biases ever present in political science in Western academia. These biases against the success of democratization in East Asian states fail to take into account the unique style of democracy which developed in East Asian nations such as South Korea. In the past, democratization in general was defined by Westerners within in the field of political science, but South Korea has developed their own style of valid, successful democracy.

This work seeks to highlight the history and development of Korean democracy through the lens of four key protest movements which contributed to the democratic transition of Korea and their success as defined by this thesis. I will be analyzing these four protest movements using relative deprivation theory as posed by Gurr (1970), applying a mixed methodology involving a qualitative case study analysis as well as a quantitative data analysis. I sincerely hope
this analytical critique will do its part in the political science community to promote unbiased, diverse arguments in future academic works on the subject of democratization in East Asia.
2 RESEARCH QUESTION & HYPOTHESIS

2.1 Research Question:
How can relative deprivation theory be used to explain the success of protest movements in the context of their contribution to democratization in South Korea?

2.2 Hypotheses:
The first two hypotheses focus on relative deprivation theory and its relation to both the number of protest movements and their likelihood to succeed to achieve their goals. Each of these hypotheses will be explored using a case study analysis four key protest movements within South Korea.

1) Protest movements occur as a consequence of relative deprivation.
2) When progressive deprivation occurs, protest movements are more likely to be successful (by the definition within this thesis).
3) Successful protest movements led to the overall greater success of democratization in Korea.
3 USING RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY TO EXPLAIN THE ROLE OF KOREAN PROTEST MOVEMENTS

3.1 An Overview of Relative Deprivation Theory and its Origins

Within this discussion of protest movements in South Korea, it must be understood how such movements correspond with the overall scholarly discourse of social movements. This thesis will utilize relative deprivation theory of social movements focusing on the interpretation by researcher Gurr (1970), in addition to the ideas of Davies (1962) and Morrison (1971). After presenting an overview of the theory and its key assumptions, a case study analysis will be presented, connecting the theory to Korean protest movements. I argue that relative deprivation theory is related to the case of Korean protest movements due to its adherence to the structural conditions described by Morrison (1971) and the importance of intergroup connections in Korean society as discussed by Gurr (1970).

The relative deprivation theory of social movements argues that protests are most likely to take place when a lengthened period of prosperity and development is followed by a sudden shift in the opposite direction. Because people fear that the progress that they achieved will be obsolete, their attitudes become more radical. This shift in attitude is the catalyst for revolution in the form of social movements. According to Gurr (1970), the goal of any regime is to meet the expectations of the populace in satisfying their needs, which refers to basic resources as well as sociological needs for democratization and freedoms (Majeed 1979). When a regime fails to meet this goal, a gap is created between the expectations of the populace and what they are actually given by the regime, which progressively declines. This effect is what Davies (1962) refers to as the J-curve, which is named for the graphical shape of the gap between increasing
expectations and stagnant reality. According to Davies (1962), it is at this point (when the populace’s expectations surpass what they receive in reality) that revolution will occur.

Of course, Davies’ and Gurr’s ideas are not referred to as the sole theory of relative deprivation; but they can be considered a branch of this theory. Earlier versions took on a more basic interpretation, arguing relative deprivation is the judgement that one or one’s group is less favored by the regime, creating a sentiment of resentment that leads to revolution. Later scholars including Davies (1962), Gurr (1970) and Morrison (1971) built upon this basic idea in their theories.

While Morrison’s interpretation did not include any significant alterations to the theory (as described by Davies and Gurr) itself, Morrison did point out the weaknesses of previous studies of the theory. According to Morrison, studies that apply the theory lack direct evidence because data on the feelings of individuals are often lacking. Additionally, structural conditions that lead to relative deprivation are rarely considered. Thus, Morrison outlined five structural conditions relevant to high levels of relative deprivation. The first is a large sector of the population experiencing the effects of relative deprivation, which creates the base of followers required to begin a social movement. The second is a community with a high degree of interaction, which leads to the reinforcement of ideas creating a united ideology. The third is a high degree of class consciousness, creating awareness about the realistic standing of individuals. The fourth is a stratification system within society, increasing the likelihood that individuals will recognize their place within society and seek to change or challenge it. Finally, the fifth is the presence of voluntary association within society, commonly termed as civil society (Yun 1997). This creates a basis of organization and leadership within society that are imperative to form successful social movements (Morrison 1971).
Gurr’s theory is significantly similar to Davies’ theory, but the primary difference is as follows: Both theorists assume the idea that the resentful sentiment that leads to revolution is created by a gap between expectations and reality. However, Gurr argues that the J-curve theory is only one possible pattern of relative deprivation which Gurr termed as progressive deprivation; instead Gurr posits two patterns in addition to progressive deprivation. The first is detrimental deprivation, in which an individual’s expectations remain stable, but they continue to receive less. The second is aspirational deprivation, in which expectations rise while achievements remain stagnant. The third is thus progressive deprivation as explained by Davies (1962). Additionally, while Davies’ interpretation focused on expectation setting within individuals, Gurr’s interpretation also accounted for the role of expectation comparison between groups, which is an additional factor leading to the resentment described within the theory (Majeed 1979).

Thus, as Gurr builds upon the idea of Davies’ J-curve hypothesis, this paper argues that Gurr’s theory can be considered a more complete view of relative deprivation, as it accounts for a wider range of patterns within the theory as well as intergroup dynamics that are especially important in studying an ethnically homogenous but divided society by social class and income inequality such as South Korea (Chang 2008). Morrison’s structural conditions will additionally be accounted for within this study, but this paper argues that an additional structural condition should be considered. That is, some degree of efficacy, or the belief that a situation can be changed through protest or political action is necessary. If individuals do not believe that their goals can be achieved through protest, while they may feel the resentment described in the theory, they will not possess these feelings to the degree required to act upon them. Thus, efficacy is an additional necessary factor within cases of relative deprivation.
3.2 Modern Criticisms of Relative Deprivation

While this study accounted for basic knowledge of the theory and its key assumptions, equal attention must also be paid to modern interpretations of the theory and its adaptation over time. This thesis will provide an overview of recent (meaning roughly 21st century) studies that apply relative deprivation theory to explain the causes of the protest movement. It focuses on its application to empirical evidence and potential shortcomings of the theory, which this study may need to consider when developing a research design. This overview will be presented using a wide range of studies on the theory, not limited to studies on Korea and democratization movements only.

Recent studies of political struggle, especially studies of political psychology and sociology, still widely apply relative deprivation theory. However, one criticism commonly raised in regards to relative deprivation theory is that such studies often lack direct empirical evidence between the phenomenon that they observe and the theory that they apply (Brush 1996). One such study includes that of whether relative deprivation explains inefficacy within the US’ Civil Rights Movement, which failed to find a causal mechanism between relative deprivation and perceptions of inefficacy (Brown, Kettry and Duncan-Shippy 2017). However, according to Smith and Pettigrew (2015), if relative deprivation is accurately defined using the right level of analysis, the theory can offer valid insight regarding the formation and nature of protest movements.

Certainly, evidence found in some studies will not support the theory, as theories propose explanations for phenomena rather than predicting exact causal mechanisms for such phenomena. However, this lack of evidence could be due to a wide variety of factors rather than an abject failure of the theory itself. Within the Civil Rights study mentioned (2017), Brown,
Kettry and Duncan-Shippy admit that the likely reason the study failed to find a causal mechanism is due to the lack of knowledge on mechanisms that produce variation in perceptions of race-related social change, not an issue with the theory itself. Conversely, one study on relative deprivation as an explanation for the 2011 Arab Spring did find the gap in expectations (the aforementioned J-curve) to have been an accurate predictor of the level of destabilization in Arab nations after the Arab Spring (Korotayev and Shishkina 2020). Additionally, Smith and Pettigrew (2015) cite seven other examples of studies which did find either causal or correlative mechanisms explained by relative deprivation theory.

The intent of this section on relative deprivation is not to simply name “successful” or “valid” (meaning studies that found mechanisms explained by relative deprivation, although the term “success” is somewhat meaningless pertaining to research results) studies based on the theory. Rather, the point this study hopes to make is this: It should be acknowledged that looking at the theory’s history, relative deprivation studies can admittedly fail to find direct evidence pointing to causal relationships. However, criticisms of the theory can in fact be addressed if two precautions are taken, which are as follows.

The first is making sure to use the proper level of analysis, which in Gurr’s (1970) case refers to accounting for both individual and intergroup explanations. According to Smith and Pettigrew (2015), studies using both levels of analysis provide a more comprehensive understanding of explanations for protest movements in terms of factoring for variation. For instance, the role of culture can serve as a source of variation in studying the mechanisms of protest movements when measured using collective identity, which will be discussed later in this study. Within this study’s focus on South Korea, accounting for both individual and group-based relative deprivation is especially imperative. Collective identity is an important facet of Korean
political culture, and individual attitudes are vital when analyzing democratization and protest movements, especially as this study utilizes Gurr’s (1970) interpretation of relative deprivation.

The second is applying the theory under the lens of wider theoretical models, by considering factors beyond the theory itself, such as collective identity and efficacy (social impact theory). For example, the aforementioned study on destabilization after the Arab Spring focused on relative deprivation under the broader scope of scholarly knowledge on destabilization as a whole (Korotayev and Shishkina 2020). Within this study, the aforementioned structural conditions termed by Morrison (1971) will account for this precautionary measure. This thesis’ application of the structural conditions by Morrison (1971) can be found in Table 2.

3.3 Relative Deprivation and Its Application to Korean Protest Movements

In the next sections of this thesis, relative deprivation theory will be applied to specific cases of Korean protest movements. Particular attention will be paid to comparing the nature and outcomes of protest movements before and after Korean democratization that occurred in 1998 with the election of Kim Dae-Jung. See Table 1 for an organized, brief description of each movement, and Table 2 for the application of each movement to Morrison’s (1971) structural conditions.

3.3.1 April Revolution, 1960 (Pre-democratization)

The April Revolution was the largest mass protest in South Korea since the end of Japanese occupation in 1945. This protest movement eventually led to the resignation and exile of Korea’s first President Rhee Syng-Man (Shin 2020). The event triggering the protest is officially labeled as the discovery of the body of high school student activist Kim Ju-Yul. Kim
Ju-Yul died due to a close-range grenade thrown by military forces during riots protesting rigged election results favoring the re-election of Rhee Syng-Man. As news of the body’s discovery broke, Rhee Syng-Man and his followers attempted to censor the news and blamed the riots on a larger Communist conspiracy, angering activists (Yang 1973). However, the specific conditions which led to the April Revolution and Rhee Syng-Man’s eventual downfall are evidently more complex than just this event, which will be discussed in this section.

First, attention should be directed towards Rhee Syng-Man’s background. Rhee Syng-Man became the first Korean President not by the Korean populace or even by any Korean decision-making body, but by the United States government (an election did take place, but it is widely regarded as rigged). Rhee Syng-Man attended American schools throughout his overall education and served in several positions as a representative of Korean affairs to the US and Western powers. US leaders selected Rhee Syng-Man to support as the first president due to his ability to fluently converse in English with the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), who presided over Korea from 1945 to 1948 after Japanese occupation ended (Hwang 2001). Thus, Rhee Syng-Man’s background could be considered more of the choice of American than that of Korean (Lee 2015). Rhee Syng-Man’s American background heavily reflected on his actions as a decisionmaker adopting an extremely pro-US and anti-Communist stance in nearly all aspects of his policies (Hwang 2001).

Additional points of note regarding Rhee Syng-Man are that along with his strong American influence, his leadership style quickly took on a more authoritarian shape (Shin 2020). Rhee Syng-Man suppressed dissent from political opponents, most notably ordering the assassination of opposition figure Kim Gu. Kim Gu was shot by one of Rhee Syng-Man’s lieutenants in his home in 1949, with the assassination being justified by regime-fabricated
Communist links to Kim Gu. Rhee Syng-Man also suppressed anti-regime protests to a large degree, such as his violent subduing of the Jeju Uprising (1948-1949), which reported a death toll of over 14,000. Jeju Island possesses a history of colonial resistance to Japanese authoritarianism, and thus became a force against the new authoritarian power of Rhee Syng-Man. Rhee Syng-Man again justified this suppression by arguing the protestors were Communists.

Rhee Syng-Man’s US education and US influence meant that he often acted as a puppet for US interests and not as a leader or provider for the common people in Korea. During Rhee Syng-Man’s regime (1948-1960), higher education institutes increased dramatically, going from only 19 in 1945 to 189 in 1960, a near 995% increase (Yang 1973). As more students entered higher education, they entered the ideal breeding ground to develop revolutionary mindsets as well as learn valuable skills of organization and group cooperation (Shin 2020). Both of these factors contributed to the development of an influential, solidified civil society within the student population, a key factor in the general success of revolutions (Yun 1997). Due to Rhee Syng-Man’s influence from the US, American socio-political ideals of democracy, fundamental rights and empowerment of the common people became mainstays within Korean higher education curriculum, later contributing to the April Revolution. (Yang 1973).

Additionally, the upbringing of these students must be considered. If one assumes their ages entering higher education to be 18 (international age), university and high school students during this time (1948-1960) would have been born roughly between 1928 and 1942. Thus, some of these students would have remembered the Korean revolutionary efforts against the Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945, perhaps even taking part in some of these efforts themselves, or hearing about these efforts from parents or other close figures. Remembering this revolutionary legacy
and its importance allowed students to connect their democratic education along with direct examples of successful protest movements (Yang 1973). I make the argument within this thesis that this generational aspect of Korean political culture, particularly relating to protest culture, is that which makes Korea’s democratization so unique from other democratized societies. The Korean revolutionary legacy of protest, primarily by students, as an aid to achieve not only democratization but also freedoms as a whole is a central aspect of what has allowed Korea to be so successful today. During the April Revolution as well as the other case studies analyzed in this thesis, this revolutionary legacy exacerbated feelings of relative deprivation which led to students to eventually unite in protest (Yang 1973).

This democratic education along with the reminiscence of Korea’s revolutionary tradition led to the continual building of the students’ expectations for such democratic ideals within their own government (Choi 1991). Additionally, the experience of liberation from autocratic Japanese rule set high expectations for the new, democratic era of Korean leadership by this new President, Rhee Syng-Man. However, what the students received from their leaders in reality was a far cry from what these students expected throughout their education. Events such as the Jeju Uprising and Kim Gu’s assassination along with Rhee Syng-Man’s generally autocratic behavior (such as removing the two-term constitutional limit on Presidency in 1956) revealed a leader much removed from the democratic, heroic leader they imagined (Yang 1973). Economic growth was also slow during Rhee Syng-Man’s rule, and thus the populace experienced little development on most front (economically, socially and politically).

An additional factor contributing to relative deprivation involved in the April Revolution was the Korean War (1950-1953). The Korean War began with the invasion of South Korea by the Communist North Korean regime, with the US military also getting involved to stop South
Korea from falling to the Communist threat. The war had a devastating effect on the peninsula, with three million dead, missing or wounded and over 10 million families (a third of the population) separated by the war (Koh 1993). The war ended with the signing of an armistice agreement by the North and South Korean governments along with the US government. Rhee Syng-Man opposed the signing of this agreement, hoping to unite the two Koreas by force and continue the war. This public opposition of the agreement was highly unfavorable to the Korean populace. The populace sacrificed their and their family’s lives for the war, and Rhee Syng-Man’s wishes to continue the war rather than work toward peace was seen as unpopular and a decision which could be made only from a privileged position. In a way, Rhee Syng-Man favored the interests of the US and Communist-opposers over those of his own people. The war additionally crippled the South Korean economy, with the amount of property damage equaling South Korea’s GNP in 1949 (Koh 1993). Rhee Syng-Man expressed a clear disregard for the sacrifices of the populace during and after the war along with the overall instability the war created. This disregard contributed to the frustration students and revolutionary groups felt during Rhee Syng-Man’s regime.

All of these factors led to high yet unrecognized expectations creating a deep emotional sense of frustration within the student community in response to this constant failure of the regime to deliver on expectations. These constantly high expectations of the populace paired with rapidly lowering capabilities of the regime to grant the populace are consistent with Gurr’s (1970) concept of decremental deprivation, in which expectations are constant but capabilities to provide decrease. While the populace, students especially, had high expectations for a heroic, democratic leader after years of mistreatment and repression under Japanese rule, Rhee Syng-Man’s regime failed to meet these expectations. Thus, when students found fellow protestor Kim
Ju-Yul’s body, they found a catalyst for a larger scale protest movement like the April Revolution to take place.

3.3.2 Gwangju Uprising, 1980 (Pre-Democratization)

This section marks the second installment of this research’s overall analysis of Korean protest movements and how relative deprivation theory can be applied to such protest movements. This section will center attention on the 1980 Gwangju Massacre along with the set of circumstances that led to the uprising and how it applies to the theory.

To accurately “set the scene” of the Gwangju Massacre, attention should be focused on the previous decade before discussing the actual protest movement. After the ousting of President Rhee Syng-Man in 1960, a power vacuum existed for a short time in the Korean government. While the short-lived Second Republic attempted to fill this vacuum by experimenting with a parliamentary system, the lack of stable leadership created disorder and uncertainty. Thus, in 1961 a military coup led to the overthrow of the Second Republic and the establishment of the Third Republic, headed by general Park Chung-Hee (Han 2004). Park Chung-Hee maintained the office of President for the next 17 years until his assassination in 1979, ruling the country in an authoritarian and uncompromising manner. Park Chung-Hee limited the press, freedom of assembly and the ability to oppose the regime in nearly any way, effectively crushing any possible dissent (Yun 1997).

While one may assume that Park’s leadership style might be viewed as unpopular, autocratic by the Korean populace, the reality was quite the opposite. Although Park Chung-Hee was certainly an authoritarian leader by Western standards, Park Chung-Hee’s charisma to appeal to the Korean populace made his leadership style permissible and even welcomed by the people. Unlike Rhee Syng-Man who was somewhat elitist with American background, Park
Chung-Hee emerged from humble beginnings, working his way up the ladder of Korean politics with his military skill. Park Chung-Hee’s origins reflected in his ideology as a leader, as Park Chung-Hee strongly supported populist ideals such as anti-elitism and egalitarianism (Han 2004).

The support of such ideals made Park Chung-Hee incredibly popular no matter the limiting of social and political freedoms due to the socio-economic situation of South Korea at the time. The combination of the steep increase in higher education institutes along with the financial ruin of the nation after the Korean War and Rhee Syng-Man’s economic decision making led to an increasing urban-rural economic imbalance (Yang 1973). This imbalance created frustration for those living in rural areas who did not have the chance to capitalize on the education opportunities of the urban population.

Thus, the bolstering of ideals such as anti-elitism and egalitarianism was extremely popular with the frustrated rural population. The democratic implication of these ideals also led to their popularity within the educated urban population (which had just led a democratic revolution). Additionally, Park Chung-Hee utilized heavy nationalism and anti-Americanism in his ideological appeal to Korean population, contrasting to Rhee Syng-Man. Not only was Park Chung-Hee able to gain the favor of the populace through his ideology and charisma, but Park Chung-Hee’s actual policies were successful as well, with the most famous and successful being the New Community Movement that helped to bring South Korea to the elevated economic position it still enjoys today (Han 2004). Park Chung-Hee is often accredited with restoring Korean economic growth after the disastrous impact of the Korean War, modernizing South Korea at a remarkably fast pace, with GDP per capita’s growth rate rising from -40% in 1961 to nearly 23% in 1969.
After Park Chung-Hee’s death in 1979, his successor, Chun Doo-Hwan, was far less popular. Like Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan came from humble beginnings, worked his way up as a military leader, and was able to become President through the use of a military coup. However, Chun Doo-Hwan was already viewed as a less effective leader even before he came to power. As the successor to someone as beloved and well-regarded as Park Chung-Hee, meeting the expectations set by Park Chung-Hee would have been nearly impossible—and Chun Doo-Hwan was not up to the task. Although the two leaders shared similar origins, Chun Doo-Hwan lacked the support and charisma of Park Chung-Hee (Han 2004).

Rather than gaining power through the willingness of the people, Chun Doo-Hwan’s source of power came from his military association, namely his leadership of an exclusive military alliance known as the Hanahoe. Through the Hanahoe, Chun Doo-Hwan succeeded in his complete government takeover by purging the old generals and creating a party that would specifically serve the Hanahoe’s political interests, the Democratic Justice Party (Moon and Rhyu 2013). Chun Doo-Hwan’s tight grasp on the military meant that the military became the primary enforcer of government policy rather than actual public reverence for Chun Doo-Hwan. Thus, Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime lacked legitimacy as he overly relied on hard power to enforce his ideas rather than soft power. Although Park Chung-Hee also utilized military power to crush dissent, his strong sense of legitimacy and support meant that suppressing opposition was justified to the public. Park Chung-Hee also possessed a strong anti-Communist association and a sense of public sympathy after an assassination attempt on the President led to the death of his wife, all things that served to bolster his popularity. Under Chun Doo-Hwan, such suppression was not tolerated due to his lack of personal charisma and sense of personal touch with the
public (Kim 2011). The discrepancy between support of the two leaders only served to exacerbate the frustration of the populace.

Additionally, the way Park Chung-Hee’s regime ended also contributed to Chun Doo-Hwan’s lack of legitimacy and respect from the public. Park Chung-Hee was assassinated by the leader of the KCIA in an event which shocked the nation. While Park Chung-Hee did become slightly less popular in later years due to his authoritarian behavior (such as the Yushin Constitution that outlawed opposition activity), he was still remembered as the leader who brought Korea out of the devastation of Rhee Syng-Man’s rule and the Korean War (Han 2004). This served to deepen the unfavorable comparison between Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan. The abrupt end of the regime with Park Chung-Hee’s assassination created political and social instability, which allowed Chun Doo-Hwan’s coup to succeed but also gave way to the growth of opposition movements (Choi 1991).

The aforementioned revolutionary legacy of the Korean state after numerous social movements such as that against the Japanese colonial rule and the April Revolution only 20 years earlier in 1960 also contributed to feelings of relative deprivation which led to the Gwangju Uprising. According to Abramson and Inglehart (1986), generational replacement, or the argument that the experiences accumulated by generations and the subsequent replacement of those generations by younger generations is a key factor in value shifts within societies. While their study focused on Europe and the West, I believe that a somewhat similar sentiment can be applied to the case of Korean democratization. This revolutionary legacy originating with the parents and grandparents of 1980s teenagers and young adults fighting against Japanese rule and Rhee Syng-Man’s regime reinforced the feelings of relative deprivation felt by Gwangju students as they could look back on the successes of their forefathers as a source of inspiration to fight
against the repression they felt under Chun Doo-Hwan’s lacking rule. As argued by Abramson and Inglehart (1986), generational value shifts are often related to the differences in life experiences between past and present generations. In the case of South Korea, the clear similarities in the life experiences, those of revolution and protest against political oppression, of the generations in 1940s, 1960s and now 1980s Korea led to the reinforcement of these revolutionary values in each subsequent generation. Each subsequent generation became more and more revolutionary based on their experiences and those of their forefathers, and as this generational “reinforcement” rather than a generational replacement as termed by Abramson and Inglehart (1986) continued to occur, the greater success of protest movements is seen with the cases of the June Struggle (1987) and Candlelight Revolution (2017) (see Section 4.1.1).

This lack of political legitimacy combined with the instability that Park Chung-Hee’s assassination left behind led to the ideal conditions for an uprising during Chun’s regime. Yet, the direct catalyst to the Gwangju Massacre was the jailing of opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung, who was native to Gwangju province (Chung 2003). Chun Doo-Hwan imposed martial law in the name of “security” against anti-government uprisings, furthering his unpopularity and frustrating the populace due to constant military presence in their homes (Moon and Rhyu 2013). As the name implies, the revolution in Gwangju was brutally suppressed by Chun Doo-Hwan’s forces, with the military going so far as to use bayonets and sexually assaulting protestors (Kim 2011). Although the struggle lasted for ten days, the protestors eventually had to give in to the power of the military.

Applying the situation of the Gwangju Massacre to relative deprivation theory, the Gwangju Massacre can be explained by decremental deprivation as outlined by Gurr (1970), in which expectations for the regime’s success remain constant while the capability of the regime to
deliver on these expectations decreases. While the developmental success of Park Chung-Hee’s regime may have led to heightened expectations for continued economic prosperity, considering the highly authoritarian nature of Park Chung-Hee’s rule and the similarly autocratic way Chun Doo-Hwan came into power, expectations for a more democratic regime clearly did not increase. Due to the authoritarian nature of Chun Doo-Hwan combined with his lack of charisma and ability as a political leader, the capabilities of the regime to deliver on those expectations continued to stagnate with the imposition of martial law and the jailing of Kim Dae-Jung. Thus, expectations stagnated while the capabilities of the regime decreased.

For the purposes of this study, it will be helpful to include a short discussion on the varying degrees of success of the April Revolution and the Gwangju Massacre. While both were ignited by a reaction to authoritarian behavior of incumbent leaders, the April Revolution was able to spread to nearly the entire Korean peninsula, while the Gwangju uprising was confined to Gwangju province. Due to the brutality of the massacre, even if civilians in other provinces supported the uprising, it was far too dangerous to express any favor towards the protestors, and as Chun Doo-Hwan’s forces successfully closed off the city, the possibility of any protest aid was crushed. Furthermore, when one looks at the timeline of the two protest movements, the April Revolution was nearly twelve years in the making (Rhee Syng-Man’s regime lasted from 1948-1960), allowing organization to take place and frustrations to grow gradually. Conversely, the Gwangju uprising was far more abrupt in nature, with Chun Doo-Hwan ruling for less than a year when the event occurred. Thus, the Gwangju protestors were far less organized than the April protestors, impeding the potential success of the revolution (Na 2003). Infighting between protest alliances was also common during the Gwangju Uprising, making it difficult to mount a united protest movement with a clear goal such as the April Revolution (Choi 1991).
3.3.3 June Struggle, 1987 (During democratization)

It is important to understand the background of the June Struggle how frustrations against the regime came to the point of political protest. As the Korean populace came to know the realities of the Gwangju Massacre and the government’s role, Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime lost a great deal of trust and support from the populace. The brutal suppression of opposers led to an overall feeling of melancholy and discontent, as the people began to lose hope for democratic governance. (Lee 2000). This forced Chun Doo-Hwan to rule using coercion rather than the actual support of the people. However, Chun Doo-Hwan also utilized appeasement to a certain degree, such as allowing students who were expelled due to participating in protest activities to return to school. Thus, Chun Doo-Hwan’s inconsistent policies created a sense of weakness in his leadership style among the populace despite the brutality he showed in the Gwangju Massacre. Chun Doo-Hwan’s lacking ability to choose between coercive or appeasing methods in dealing with opposers had a democratizing effect, giving leeway for the growth of democratic organization and institution-building within civil society (Jung and Kim, 2020).

While there was a degree of democratic group consolidation during the Gwangju Uprising, such as the Mulim and Haklim, these groups consisted of only students prior to the 1980s. Additionally, because these groups often disagreed with one another over protest tactics and possessed little organization, they often failed to succeed in their endeavors (Choi 1991). The tragedy of the Gwangju Massacre along with Chun Doo-Hwan’s discrepant policy choices served to unite these previously opposed groups. Particularly, democratic groups united under the minjung, or people’s ideology, focusing on grassroots strategies and group consolidation rather than actual protest movements (Chung 2003). A tactical shift occurred in which protest groups concentrated on reaching out to groups outside of purely students (Choi 1991).
The students specifically focused on the working class, as it had the largest number of people. Protestors looked for jobs within factories and working-class areas in order to get closer to the laborers by working alongside them. Protest groups reached out to the working class by educating laborers through “night school” and providing them resources to connect with democratic groups (Yun 1997). Prior to the connection of the students and working class, the working class stayed out of political issues as their primary goal was feeding their families and making a living. This education and connection led to laborers feeling strongly enough about democratization to form movements of their own. One such movement was the 1985 Kuro Alliance Strike in which labor unions joined with student activists in a strike, which led to thousands of workers losing their jobs (Yun 1997). Thus, by connecting multiple sectors of society, those who opposed the regime could more efficiently unite the populace, rather than relying on students (Choi 1991).

During the post Gwangju Massacre from 1980 to 1987, various organizations came together to end Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime. One such group known as the Mintongryun (United Minjung People’s) Movement for Democracy and Reunification, or the UMMDU, united students and the working class (Yun 1997). Prior to the Gwangju Massacre, these groups rarely possessed concrete planning and resources. The UMMDU rectified this mistake in two ways. First, while previous protests were organized and occurred primarily in cities, the UMMDU set up regional branches to spread their message to a broader audience, which brought in the rural populace. Second, the UMMDU created a common, concrete agenda of goals and mission statements to spread across each province in order to consolidate and organize their goals (Yun 1997).
Arguably the most important tactical change was the shift in the mission of the opposition groups. Previously, opposition groups did not hold a concrete goal. Rather, their goals were often split between working against the authoritarian domestic regime and working against US imperialism. The people questioned whether the real enemy was the regime itself or the imperialist powers which upheld it. While it was certainly accurate that US imperialism contributed to the regime, activists examined how their message could more easily reach the general public, namely the middle class. These activists realized that while the middle class shared their concerns about democracy, they did not possess the same negative feelings towards the US and foreign powers. Thus, the activists shifted their agendas to focus on the common goal of democracy rather than the less organized, less easily achieved goal of also ending US imperialism (Shorrock 1988). The changing tactics and organization of groups led to greater success in their goal of democratic elections.

Chun Doo-Hwan’s seven-year term as President came to an end in 1987. He announced his chosen successor as fellow Hanahoe member Roh Tae-Woo, stating the election would occur in a similar manner to Chun Doo-Hwan’s “election” in 1980. Essentially, this selection by Chun Doo-Hwan secured Roh Tae-Woo’s succession as President due to Chun Doo-Hwan’s complete control over the Electoral College (Chung 2003). Chun Doo-Hwan made a spectacle of his selection, presiding over a televised “election” of Roh Tae-Woo and shaking his hand, smiling. At this point (1987) an amendment which would have the President directly elected achieved popular support from the populace, so this display of arrogance and flashiness enraged the public (Shorrock 1988). Opposition party members in the National Assembly thereby demanded an amendment for a popular vote. One additional aspect to note is that opposition parties began to gain footing during this period due to the charisma and leadership of two future Presidents, Kim
Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam. The presence of representative opposition leaders allowed protestors to unify even more, as they now had figureheads to attach their ideology to (Yun 1997).

The demand for such an amendment acted as the catalyst for the June Struggle to occur, along with the reveal of the torture and death of a student protestors, Kim Jong-Cheol by the regime. The UMMDU along with several other democratic groups organized a coalition, known as the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution, or NCDC. Learning from the tragedy at Gwangju, the NCDC employed peaceful tactics to avoid regime retaliation, the most famous being the People’s March where over one million people participated in a peaceful march through 34 cities on June 26th 1987 (Yun 1997). Additionally, when examining how to get the public (namely the middle class) involved, activists recognized that the middle class was put off by violent movements. Therefore, tactics shifted to more peaceful, organized measures (Shorrock 1988). The regime now had a choice as to respond with force or concede to the protestors. Seeing a physical manifestation of his unpopularity and lack of support, as well as taking into account that his previous attempts at forcible suppression of opposition clearly failed, Chun Doo-Hwan made the latter decision. On June 29th, the regime finally conceded to the protestor’s demands and issued the June 29th Declaration that laid out an eight-point plan to move towards democratization. While Roh Tae-Woo still won in the eventual presidential election due to the opposition vote between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam being split, the Declaration was the first official step towards democratization.

The events of the June struggle can be explained by Gurr’s (1970) and Davies’ (1962) concept of progressive deprivation. Expectations began to stagnate as Chun Doo-Hwan’s unpopularity grew, but then expectations steadily increased as opposition movements and leaders
rose in prominence, creating an expectation for democratization in the near future. During this time, regime capabilities continued to decrease. When the regime continually failed to deliver on the democratic expectations of the people, the people’s frustrations ignited into an organized, effective movement.

3.3.4 Candlelight Revolution and the Removal of President Park Geun-Hye (Post-democratization, 2016-2017)

A quick spotlight on the background of the protest movement will be given here. In 2016, media sources revealed President Park Geun-Hye knowingly allowed her aide and close friend, Choi Soon-Sil to use her political position to obtain donations from Korean conglomerates (chaebols). Allowing her aide to leverage her position in exchange for support from the chaebols led to a massive corruption scandal. Additionally, in 2014 the tragic Sewol Ferry sinking occurred, leaving hundreds of high school students dead. After the sinking, media reports revealed that Park Geun-Hye’s government attempted to cover up the actual extent and cause of the event in a hope to save face, hurting the reputation of the Park regime (Yap 2015).

President Park Geun-Hye is the daughter of President Park Chung-Hee, whose popular legacy initially helped elevate Park Geun-Hye’s political status. However, like Park Chung-Hee’s successors it was soon revealed that Park Geun-Hye also lacked the charisma of her father, and was out of touch with the populace, as seen with her response to the Sewol crisis (Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell 2018). As the corruption scandal loomed, Park Geun-Hye apologized only through her lawyers and refused to attend impeachment hearings. It was also revealed by the press that the Park administration created a blacklist to target critics of the regime, reminding the public of the tactics of her father. Authoritarianism was permissible to the populace in the 1970s due to the need for rapid economic growth as well as Park Chung-Hee’s personal charisma. In
the post-democratic age, such attempts at authoritarianism combined with clear abuses of power were unforgivable to the more critical, hardened Korean public.

It will be helpful to include a short discussion on the differences between pre-democratization protests and post-democratization protests in Korea, to demonstrate the effect of democratization on protest tactics and building. The Candlelight Protests were one of the largest protest efforts in Korean history, with the cumulative number of participants reported as 10 million (Seo 2020). The Candlelight Protests were also extremely peaceful consisting primarily of marches with protestors holding lit candles, a Korean symbol of justice in comparison to previous movements that occurred in pre-democratic Korean era (Kim 2017). Similar to previous movements, the Candlelight Protests did originate with student activism, as students at Ewha Women’s University questioned the admission of Choi Soon-Sil’s daughter without proper qualifications. However, as the protests continued, the largest portion of protestors came to be the middle class (Delury 2017). The middle class of the 2010s were the same students who had protested authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s. This gave these students a legacy of protest traditions which led them to do the same during the Candlelight Protests. Thus, in the post-democratic era a larger sector of the populace felt emboldened to participate, signifying the transition to a more democratic state. Additionally, as these protests occurred in the post-democratization era, the populace no longer feared violent retribution once faced in the late 1900s. Even families participated, pushing strollers in one hand and carrying candles or signs in another (Delury 2017). According to Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell (2018), the consistent role of protests in Korea’s democratization process made protests a typical, almost routine democratic tradition in Korea.
A key factor that aided in the success of the Candlelight Protests, which was not present during pre-democratization protests, was the freedom of news media. Progressive media outlet Hankyoreh and the Samsung-affiliated JTBC Newsroom first broke the scandal’s story. Notably, since Samsung was one of the chaebols accused of accepting political favors from Choi Soon-Sil, JTBC’s choice to break the story seems odd and bold. In the years following JTBC’s creation by Samsung-affiliated conservative newspaper Joong-Ang in 2011, JTBC’s growth was initially slow. However, after the network acquired shrewd MBC journalist Sohn Suk-Hee as CEO in 2013, Sohn demanded editorial independence for the network to meet his demands of high quality journalism. The network began to focus on bringing in public ratings in order to boost business growth, which tended to mean more progressive and shocking journalism. Although the initial reason for the shift was to bring in ratings, this shrewd change contributed to democratic development by focusing on investigative, hard-hitting journalism. JTBC’s critical coverage of the Sewol Ferry sinking was a key contributor to its reputation as an investigative network (Seo 2020). By making a larger sector of the populace aware of the deprivation, the free press aided in the democratic movement, according to Morrison (1971).

An additional, new factor in these protests was social media, which allowed protest campaigns and organizational information to quickly flow through protest networks (Yun and Min 2020). The primary organization involved in the protest, the Emergency Citizen Action for the Park Geun-Hye Administration’s Resignation (ECAPAR), was able to gather 1,500 civic groups using social media strategies to put more pressure on the National Assembly. While Park’s Saenuri Party members at first supported the President, as Park’s approval rating fell to 4% it was clear that supporting her would danger their chances of reelection (Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell 2018). Park was impeached by a 78% of votes in the National Assembly in December
of 2016, with the decision upheld by an 8-0 court decision in March of 2017. Park, along with Choi Soon-Sil and 20 other regime members, were later arrested and jailed for corruption and abuse of power charges (Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell 2018).

Scholars such as Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell (2018) and Yap (2014) argue that the events of the Park administration such as the Sewol Ferry crisis and the impeachment reveal a country which has not fully democratized. However, this thesis makes the alternative argument. The leadership of Park Geun-Hye can certainly be considered a failure, regarding her response to Sewol Ferry and her corruption issues. However, it was not a failure of the democratic process. Park Geun-Hye was still democratically elected to the office of President, and she was peacefully removed from that office due to the work of protestors and the free media. The removal of Park can be considered a testament to the fact that Korea did undergo a successful democratic transition, as the impeachment followed democratic processes and ultimately the will of the populace. Thus, the protests did achieve a constructive commitment to the quality of democracy by pressuring governmental institutions to uphold the due process (Kim 2017). A commitment to a democratic system does not mean that corrupt leaders like Park will never come into power or commit such wrongdoings as she had. Rather, an accountable democratic system will safeguard against abuses of such power and ensure that those who do abuse power are brought to justice, as Park faced.

With the cases of the Candlelight Revolution as well as the June Struggle (1987), the long-term effects of the “generational reinforcement” discussed in Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 can be clearly seen. Both movements, especially the Candlelight Revolution when compared to the earlier April Revolution (1960) and Gwangju Massacre (1980) experienced clear successes for democratization and a wider scale of involvement of numerous social sectors, alliances and
organization. The reinforcement of the revolutionary legacy set forth by the forefathers of past social movements in Korea led to the development of similarly minded democratic values and thus a democratic political culture built on protest and the accountability of the government. I argue that this generational reinforcement of democratic values rooted in protest is the primary aspect which makes Korean democracy and society uniquely predisposed to a culture of protest, allowing the democratic transition of South Korea to continue succeeding and thriving as time moves on and generational reinforcement continues to occur.

The circumstances of the Candlelight Revolution can be applied to Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation theory through the concept of progressive deprivation, or Davies’ (1962) J-curve. As the democratic transition took place, the populace came to consistently increase their expectations for democratic, accountable political leadership. At the same time, the capabilities of the Park regime to deliver on those expectations declined with the Sewol and corruption scandals, and Park’s overall failure to appeal to the will of the people. Thus, a J-curve is formed with a gap between expectations and capabilities.
4 WHAT MAKES A SUCCESSFUL PROTEST MOVEMENT?

4.1 Five Metrics for Defining Protest Success

This thesis defines a set of five metrics for what components a successful protest tends to include:

1) Goals are explicitly defined and agreed upon in a unified manner by the movement’s participants.
2) Primary goal of the protest is directly met and produces meaningful effect(s) in the timespan following the protest.
3) Possesses a clear, inclusive organization of the protest by groups involved (collaboration of inequality).
4) A meaningful portion of the population participates in the protest (strength in numbers).
5) The protest displays the precursive qualities which this thesis defines as progressive relative deprivation (Hypothesis 2).

Since protest goals are the most important aspect of protest success, as shown in the simple definition from earlier, the first two metrics discuss goals. First, explicit definition of protest goals must be established for organizational purposes, as participants cannot have their goals met if what their goals are is unclear to the government (Biggs and Andrews 2015). Agreeing upon protest goals among different segments of the participants is equally important. According to Wouters and Walgrave (2017), it is the most persuasive factor in terms of convincing political elites or representatives to deliver on the protest participants’ demands. The reason for why unity is so convincing is twofold. First, unified goals produce a clearer message that can then be interpreted more easily by the government. Second, a unified message gives the
impression of a solidity among protesters, making the government sees protest demands as legitimate and thus important to address in order to garner support for the government (Wouters and Walgrave 2017).

Instead of deciding upon protest success based on whether a certain number of goals were met, this thesis argues that it is more parsimonious to determine success based on whether the primary goal was met. The primary goal in each case study can simply be considered some shift towards democratization, or any move towards a Polity score of 8, as democratization is the dependent variable in this thesis. However, note that each case possesses a certain degree of nuance within that label. For example, the April Revolution (1960), Gwangju Uprising (1980) and the June Struggle (1987) all possessed the primary goal of forming a democratic government ultimately. In the case of the Candlelight Revolution (2017), while a democratic system was already in place, the movement to remove Park Geun-Hye is characteristic of democratization as it focused on the peaceful removal of an elected leader (Kim 2020). Thus, using the primary goal of democratic trends shifts will simplify measurement while still adequately addressing the overall focus of this thesis, the democratic process.

Additionally, the goal must be directly met, meaning that the protestors’ goal should be clearly addressed in a manner favorable to the protestors’ demands. Finally, the goal being met must produce some meaningful effects in the years following the protest. For example, while the April Revolution (1960) did succeed in removing Rhee Syng-Man and installing a rudimentary parliamentary system, the system was installed for only a year before Park Chung-Hee’s takeover. Thus, it could barely be considered anything more than an experiment with democracy (Han 2004). Thus, while the goal was directly met, it did not produce a meaningful, lasting effect.
in creating a democratic system, with the continued success of a different authoritarian leader only a year after.

A clear, inclusive protest organization by groups is imperative to protest success, as it contributes to a unified message as mentioned in metric one (Wouters and Walgrave 2017). A concise organization yields a key precursor to protest development, such as education, or more simply the ability to easily deliver information regarding protest motivations and tactics to spread them to a wider portion of the population (Hussain and Howard 2013). This metric is especially important to consider when analyzing a case study such as that of South Korea, where civil society and alliance formation played a massive role in nearly all major democratic movements (Chang 2008).

Another force for protest success in the case of South Korea was an inclusive and diverse base of support for protest movements. Particularly looking at the case of the June Struggle (1987), the inclusion of workers and farmers beyond just students (which was the primary protest group in previous case studies) created a shift in protest strategy that later led to the movement’s success in creating democratic elections (Yun 1997). This component reflects the idea of the collaboration of inequality, allowing diverse groups to come together in an understanding of each’s unequal treatment by the regime, and lead them to act upon their concerns in an organized manner. Thus, successful movements are not only limited to one social group, but rather a unique, diverse set of multiple social groups coming together to create a unified agenda (Wouters and Walgrave 2017).

Explaining the fourth metric, successful protests tend to possess a sizable participation rate from diverse sections of the population. Along with unity of protest goals as previously mentioned, the sheer size of a protest movement plays a significant role in persuading political
elites or leaders to listen to and act on the demands of protesters (Wouters and Walgrave 2017). The reason for this influential role is simple: large numbers give political elites a sense of how much broad support the movement possesses in the scope of the general public. Thus, political authorities are more likely to respond to protesters’ demands (Biggs and Andrews 2015).

Additionally, the metric mentions the importance of diverse sections of the population, similarly to metric 3. However, metric 3 refers more so to social groups such as varying social classes participating in movements. Metric 4’s focus on diversity centers on the geographic inclusion of varying regional groups partaking in the protests. In the case of South Korea, regionalism and loyalty to one’s region are prevalent due to Korea’s homogenous ethnic structure (Chang 2008). For example, one weakness of the Gwangju Uprising was the limited participation of one region in the movement, leading to a weak sense of importance of the protest to the rest of the country (Kim 2011). A diverse participation by multiple regions, thus, makes protest demands more likely to be met, indicating a higher rate of protest success (Yun 1997).

Finally, the fifth metric returns to the main concept in this thesis, which is the idea that feelings of relative deprivation contribute the greatest to the probability of creating a protest movement in general (Hypothesis 1) as well as to the success of movements (Hypothesis 2), both of which have been elaborated on in chapter 2 of this thesis. Additionally, the precursive qualities mentioned in the metrics are those outlined by Morrison (1971) in Section 3.1. One hypothesis’ reasoning which relates to the fifth metric has not been evaluated at length yet, which is Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 mentions that while all forms (decremental, aspirational and progressive) of relative deprivation as outlined by Gurr (1970) do produce a meaningful impact on protest success, progressive deprivation leads to the most probability of protest success of the three.
Recall that progressive deprivation refers to constantly rising expectations or needs of the people coupled with a steep decline in the capabilities of the government in power to deliver on those expectations. This combination creates what Davies (1962) termed as the J-curve. The J-curve depicts a larger gap between the needs of the constituents and the capabilities than aspirational or decremental deprivation due to the sharp drop in government capabilities. In progressive deprivation, the aforementioned gap is the widest among the three forms of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970). Ultimately, relative deprivation is a theory based on the emotions of deprival by protestors. For example, each of the four Korean protest cases mentioned in this thesis began with an emotional catalyst which, when combined with pre-existing feelings of deprivation caused the protestors to act. The April Revolution and the June Struggle ignited with the discovery of the torture and death of a student by the government (Lee 2007). The Gwangju Uprising began with the imprisonment of Gwangju-born politician Kim Dae-Jung (Kim 2011), and the Candlelight Revolution originated with the government’s poor response to the sinking of the Sewol Ferry in 2014 (Yap 2014). Noting the importance of feelings in protest movements, I argue that as progressive deprivation produces the widest gap between expectations and capabilities, these feelings of relative deprivation enable protest organizers to draw more people into a successful protest movement.

Because the wide gap indicates the most powerful feelings of deprivation, this thesis argues that protests are more likely to succeed when the relative deprivation materializes in the form of progressive deprivation. Protests with a stronger emotional basis as well as a specific goal are more successful, because protestors are more persistent in achieving their goals and less likely to give up in the face of adversity (Yun 1997). Additionally, protests with a strong
emotional basis have a greater influence on others to join in, which also contributes to the greater probability of protest success (Wouter and Walgrave 2017).

4.1.1 Analyzing the Success of the Four Case Studies

This section of the thesis will address Hypothesis 2 (see Section 2.2). Prior to discussing the overall success of each case study, this section will briefly outline the goals of each of the four cases.

In the April Revolution (1960), the primary goal was to force the removal of Rhee Syng-Man from office based on Rhee Syng-Man’s poor handling of the Korean War and generally authoritarian tactics without the charisma needed to back them up (Hwang 2001). In the Gwangju Uprising (1980), the main goal was to incite Chun Doo-Hwan’s government to release Gwangju native and democratization figure Kim Dae-Jung from prison, where Kim Dae-Jung was being kept for threatening the regime (Na 2003). In the June Struggle (1987), the primary goal was to lead the government to creating an amendment that would decide the President by a popular vote, as the failures of Chun Doo-Hwan generated support for a democracy (Shorrock 1988). In the Candlelight Revolution (2017), the main goal was to force the removal of Park Geun-Hye from office after her corruption scandal involving the chaebols as well as her negatively viewed reaction to the Sewol Ferry Sinking in 2014 (Kim 2020).

By applying each of the four cases to metrics for a successful protest movement defined by this thesis, the metrics can be utilized to measure the relative level of success for each case study. Analyzing the April Revolution (1960) through the first metric, because the protest’s goals were agreed upon but were not defined, the metric is only partly satisfied. The goal was unified as the protestors focused on their mutual dislike for Rhee Syng-Man’s rule. However, as the protestors had no clear idea of what they wanted after Rhee’s removal occurred, the protestors’
goals were not clearly defined. Looking at the second metric, only one aspect of this metric is satisfied, as the protest’s goal was directly met without meaningful long-term effect. While the protestors did succeed in removing Rhee Syng-Man, only a year later a different authoritarian leader (Park Chung-Hee) came into power.

The third metric is unsatisfied as there was no clear, inclusive organization of the protest by the groups involved. Since the April Revolution included little organization, primarily by students, it was also not inclusive of multiple social groups/classes. The fourth metric is satisfied as a meaningful portion of the population participated in the protest. The number of participants in this protest is thought to be around 100,000, the third largest protest of among the four cases. Additionally, the protest did eventually reach Seoul with the participation of Korea University students. Finally, the fifth metric is not satisfied as the protest does not display conditions which are defined as progressive deprivation and is considered to be an example of decremental deprivation (see Section 3.3.1). Examining all five metrics, a few of the metrics are somewhat met (Metrics 1 and 2), but only metric 4 is completely satisfied. Thus, this protest cannot be considered successful by this thesis’ definition.

Analyzing the Gwangju Uprising (1980) using the first metric, because the protest’s goals were defined but not agreed upon, the metric is only partly satisfied. In this case, goals were clearly defined, which was to secure the release of Kim Dae-Jung. However, over time the protest groups (Mulim and Haklim) disagreed over what tactics should be used to achieve these goals. Looking at the second metric, neither aspect is satisfied as the protest’s goal was not directly met and did not produce a meaningful effect. Kim Dae-Jung was not released until 1983, while protestors faced massive violence by the government. No meaningful effect against the regime was produced until 1987 when the June Struggle takes place. The third metric is also not
met, as protest organization was not clear or inclusive. While groups did physically organize, the
two groups that formed (Mulim and Haklim) constantly disagreed on the substance of protest
such as protest tactics. Additionally, because only students primarily took part, organization was
not inclusive.

Looking at the fourth metric, a meaningful, diverse portion of the population did not take
part in the protest. Because the numbers of protestors are reported to be around 10,000, this
protest is the smallest of the four cases. Also, only one region (Gwangju) took part in the protest,
and it never reached Seoul. Examining the fifth metric, the Gwangju Uprising does meet the
conditions for general relative deprivation as well as progressive deprivation (see Section 3.3.2).
Combining each of the five metrics, because the Gwangju Uprising met only metric 5, it cannot
be considered successful by this thesis’ definition and is the least successful movement of the
four.

Examining the June Struggle (1987) using the first metric, because the protest’s goals
were clearly defined and agreed upon, the metric is satisfied. Protestors united under the
common goal of seeking free and fair elections, and multiple groups united under an umbrella
organization such as the UMMDU to achieve their goal. Looking at the second metric, the
primary goal of the protest was directly met, but arguably no meaningful effect was produced.
The protest did achieve the goal to secure free elections, as an election for President did take
place that same year. However, a meaningful effect was not produced in terms of
democratization, as Chun Doo-Hwan’s successor was still elected. Democratization did not
occur until 1998 with the election of Kim Dae-Jung (see Section 4). The third metric was also
satisfied, as the protest’s organization was clear and inclusive. Organization was clear as groups
united under the UMMDU. Organization was also inclusive as this protest included not only students but members of the working class.

Because a meaningful and diverse portion of the population participated in the protest, the fourth metric is also satisfied. Roughly 240,000 people are reported to have attended, the second largest movement among the four cases. The movement spread across 22 cities, including Seoul. The fifth metric is satisfied as the June Struggle meets both the conditions for general relative deprivation and progressive deprivation. Since four out of five metrics are satisfied, this protest can almost be considered a complete success. However, although this protest did result in democratic elections, a member of the authoritarian Hanahoe still won the presidency. Thus, by the argument of this thesis, democratization was not achieved until 1998.

For the Candlelight Revolution (2017), the first metric is satisfied as goals were clearly defined and agreed upon. Similar to the June Struggle, groups united under an umbrella organization, the ECAPAR, who focused only on forcing Park’s resignation. The ECAPAR created a united social media campaign involving over 1,500 other protest groups. The second metric is additionally satisfied. The primary goal was met, as Park Geun-Hye (although she did not resign) was impeached. This goal also produced a meaningful effect, as Park was not only removed but also placed on trial and convicted as a result of bribery and corruption charges. This demonstrates a commitment by the state to prevent future actions of corruption within the Korean government, which had continued to be an issue until the Candlelight Revolution.

Looking at the third metric, organization was clear due to unity created by ECAPAR and its umbrella groups. Organization was also inclusive as not only students and the working class but also the middle class took part in the protest, demonstrating the ingrained nature of protest in Korean society as a result of democratization.
The fourth metric is also satisfied as a diverse, meaningful portion of the population took part in the protest. At least 16 million people are thought to have attended, according to the organizer’s claims, thus making this the largest protest by far. Nearly every region in Korea took part in the protests in some way, with the largest protests happening in Seoul. The fifth metric is satisfied as well, as the Candlelight Revolution meets both the conditions for general relative deprivation and progressive deprivation. By this thesis’ definition, the Candlelight Revolution is considered a complete success as five out of five metrics are satisfied. See Table 3 for a visual depicting the relative successes of each case.

As the comparative successes of the four case studies are now explored within this thesis, Hypotheses 1 and 2 have both been addressed. The next section of this thesis will thereby address Hypothesis 3, which focuses on how the success of protest movements led to the advancement of democratization within South Korea. A case study analysis will be performed by applying the shifts in quantitative indicators of democratization to the previous argument developed in this thesis regarding the success of each case study.
4.2 Polity Project: An Overview

In order to quantify democratization, the dependent variable, this study will utilize the Polity Project (from here on referred to as Polity) Series V (1800-2018) developed by Systemic Peace. Polity Project scores countries based on the characteristics of the central regime in a certain year, focusing on how that regime utilizes as well as places controls on its authority, hence the term “authority trends.”

The score determined by Polity Project is based on a 21-point scale, which ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to a +10 (consolidated democracy). These categories are also divided into three categories reflecting autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10). An anocracy is essentially a “semi-democracy,” which includes both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. The overall scores are composed of six indicator variables, which are defined as follows:

1) XRREG refers to the regulation of chief executive recruitment, centering on the extent of a country’s institutionalized, well-defined procedures for choosing the leader of said country. XRREG is based on three categories: unregulated/forced seizures of power, designational/transitional in which executives are designated by an elite body without formal due process, and regulated transitions of executive power.

2) XRCOMP refers to the competitiveness of executive recruitment, focusing on the presence or absence of competition and a way to advance oneself politically. XRCOMP is also based on three categories: designated selection of an executive (usually referring to hereditary succession), dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary
succession and one is chosen by competitive elections, and finally pure competitive elections.

3) XROPEN refers to the openness of executive recruitment, meaning that every person in the politically active population has the ability to become a chief executive by a regulatory process. Four categories are used to determine this score: closed recruitment (usually referring to hereditary succession), dual executive designation (both executives are designed by an elite body), dual executive election (one executive is chosen by election), and finally open recruitment (elections).

4) XCONST refers to the presence or absence of executive constraints. This variable focuses on the extent of institutional constraints on the ability of the executive to make decisions, and takes into account the role of “accountability groups” which can place such limitations. This variable uses seven categories: unlimited authority, intermediate category (this term denotes a “middling” categories between the preceding and succeeding categories), slight to moderate limit on authority, intermediate category, substantial limitations on executive authority, intermediate category, and executive parity or subordination (meaning accountability groups are more powerful than the actual executive).

5) PARREG refers to the regulation of political participation, and focuses on institutionalized rules for how preferences are expressed. This variable includes five categories: unregulated participation (fluid with no political organizations), multiple identity where groups are somewhat stable, sectarian in which interests between political groups are incompatible (often leads to factionalism), restricted participation and regulated participation.
6) PARCOMP refers to the competitiveness of participation, focusing on civil interaction and civil society. This variable is coded on a five-category scale: repressed competition, suppressed, factional, transitional (intermediate between factional and competitive), and competitive.

4.3 Polity Project’s Authority Trend Report: Four Case Studies

This section will apply the scores provided by Polity Series V to the case studies of South Korea and provide an analysis.

First, it can be observed from Figure 1 that from 1948 to 1959 the general Polity remained stable, ranging from about -3 to -4. This period prior to 1960s’ Polity reflects the anocratic nature of Rhee Syng-Man’s government. Rhee Syng-Man’s government is considered anocratic rather than purely authoritarian because Rhee Syng-Man was not a hereditary monarch and was technically chosen by an executive body of American military leaders, who selected him for his upbringing in the American education system, strong anti-Communist stance and perceived ability to be easily controlled by American officials (Koh 1993). Additionally, executive constraints by the American government were present, because Rhee Syng-Man acted as more of a figurehead than an actual executive. Figure 2 shows that the primary contributor to this anocratic score is the component XROPEN, displaying Rhee Syng-Man’s appointment as President not by the Korean people or even an elite Korean body, but an American body claiming to make decisions on behalf of the Korean people (Hwang 2001). Another important factor in this score is PARCOMP, which emulates the lack of equal participation in Korean civil society at the time. In the period after the Korean War, most Koreans dealt with issues of pure survival rather than focusing on politics or civil society due to the disastrous effect of the war on
the Korean economy. Thus, the average Korean person was understandably not concerned with political participation or building civil society (Koh 1993).

As a result, Korean elites who were not as affected by the war were able to manipulate Korean politics to their benefit, allowing them to control the government over the general Korean people. The saturation of elites into the public and the government paved the way for the success of the chaebols during Park Chung-Hee’s presidency, an issue that still produces detrimental effects to Korean democracy today (Han 2004). This effect can also be seen in the rise of Chun Doo-Hwan’s Hanahoe group that dominated Korean politics in the 1980s (Moon Rhyu 2011). Therefore, the destructive effects of the Korean War on the economy also affected the political state of affairs in Korea, limiting chances for democratic participation and supporting an anocratic regime.

In 1960 the Polity made a sharp rise to a score of 8, when the April Revolution took place, and Rhee Syng-Man’s government lost its power. Looking at the Polity components, the key factor in the Polity change is XCONST, which shifts from 2 to 7 in 1961. An XCONST of 7 refers to executive parity or subordination, in which groups outside of the executive become more powerful than the actual executive. During the April Revolution, executive parity clearly existed as primarily student groups were able to force out the President of South Korea and his cabinet members out of the government (Koh 1993).

I argue that this executive parity was able to exist due to the lack of both traditional and charismatic legitimacy. Traditional legitimacy was lacking due to the novelty of the office of the Presidency, which prior to Rhee Syng-Man’s appointment had not existed. Charismatic legitimacy was absent because of Rhee Syng-Man’s failure to appeal to the ordinary Korean people—not only was he not appointed by Korean people or even an executive body of Korean
elites, but he had spent most of his life in the US with American elites. Thus, he had little ability to sympathize with most Korean citizens (Hwang 2001). As a result, student groups were able to remove him and his government from office, reflecting a pillar of democracy in the ability to remove a corrupt leader. Shortly after Rhee Syng-Man was removed, another authoritative leader, Park Chung-Hee, came into power and remained President through the 1960s and 1970s until his assassination in 1979. Thus, an autocratic backsliding event (a bold, black X) is marked on Figure 1 after the April Revolution, referring to the “backwards” motion of declining democratic trends in Korea at that time. Although a democratic trend did take place, it was quickly reversed, hence the backsliding event.

Relating this autocratic backsliding event to the issue of protest success, Table 3 depicts the April Revolution as mostly unsuccessful, satisfying only one of the five metrics (Metric 4) for protest success and partly satisfying two metrics, Metrics 1 and 2 (see, Section 4.1.1). It is also one of two case studies which is not considered an example of progressive deprivation. Hypothesis 2 states that when progressive deprivation occurs, protest movements are more likely to be successful. According to the argument of this thesis, the April Revolution’s pointed lack of meaningful success can be considered evidence to support Hypothesis 2’s claims. Based on the autocratic backsliding event shown by the shift in the Polity score and considering that the Polity score is being used by this thesis to represent the dependent variable democratization, the April Revolution could be considered a failure of democracy as a trend towards authoritarianism flourished shortly after the event. However, while the April Revolution may have been a failure of democracy in that Korea did not democratize until nearly thirty years later, this thesis argues it along with the other two “unsuccessful” case studies (Gwangju Uprising and June Struggle) were
marginal successes for democratization. This argument will be expanded upon in this thesis’ concluding remarks.

As this thesis has already discussed in Chapter 1, after Park Chung-Hee’s death in 1979 Chun Doo-Hwan and his Hanahoe group of military-backed supporters took power in 1980, installing Chun Doo-Hwan as President. From Figure 1, it can be seen that throughout the late 1970s the Polity score remained strongly autocratic (specifically ranging between -8 and -9), thus it was natural for Chun Doo-Hwan to continue the autocratic legacy Park Chung-Hee had left behind (Han 2004). In 1980, the Gwangju Uprising took place after the imprisonment of Chun Doo-Hwan’s political opponent Kim Dae-Jung. The Gwangju Uprising achieved relatively little success in the long run (Table 3). However, it did achieve some successes for democratization in the short run, as depicted by shifts in the overall Polity in Figure 2 (Shorrock 1988). After the Gwangju Uprising took place, the Polity score shifted upward from -8 in 1980 to -5 in 1981 (depicting a slight shift towards democratic trends), and then remained at a score of -5 until 1987, when the June Struggle occurred.

Thus, the Gwangju Uprising’s short-term success was able to shift the authority trends of the regime from an extremely solidified autocracy to an anocracy. Looking at Figure 2, the most influential components of the Polity responsible for this score is XRCONST, and to a lesser degree PARREG. In terms of XRCONST, in a similar manner to the scenario described during the April Revolution in 1960, civil society groups such as the student activists were highly influential during the Gwangju Uprising. In terms of PARREG, although its component score shifted a lesser degree compared to XRCONST, PARREG’s score actually moved in the opposite direction of XRCONST in that the score decreased. PARREG refers to how political participation is regulated, and its score moved from 4 in 1980 to 3 from 1981-1986 (prior to June
Struggle). A higher score refers to a greater level of regulation, and thus, a drop in this score is not necessarily indicative of a lower level of democratic trends. In this case, a 4 refers to restricted participation, while a score of 3 refers to sectarian participation where interests between accountability groups are incompatible, relating to the concept of factionalism. Factionalism was certainly present to a high degree during the Gwangju Uprising and was arguably the primary factor in the movement’s lack of success as mentioned in Chapter 1. Two primary groups, the Mulim and the Haklim, disagreed on what tactics were best to use in the protest. Specifically, the Mulim focused more so on the need for the long-term development of the movement and preached peaceful methods of protesting, while the Haklim preferred a more direct, even violent strategy of protesting in order to achieve rapid development (Chung 2003). This factionalism continued until after the success of the June Struggle.

Looking at the data compiled from our analysis in Table 3, the Gwangju Uprising was clearly the least successful of the four cases, satisfying none of the five metrics for protest success. Considering the brutality faced by protestors as a result of the authoritarian regime during the movement (being termed a “massacre” today) and the way spreading any information about the factual events of the protest was largely suppressed by the regime, it is clear that the protest’s success was incredibly unlikely to occur even if protest organization or tactics had been different. However, although this protest did not meet the definition of success as termed by the five metrics, evidently it achieved some success regarding democratization as the Polity score shifted upward from -8 to -5, reflecting a regime change from a strong autocracy to an anocracy. While the regime did not shift to a fully democratic state, the Polity score reveals that the sacrifices made at Gwangju led to slight (but present) movements towards a regime with more democratic qualities.
As mentioned in the previous section, prior to 1987 the Polity score throughout Chun Doo-Hwan’s presidency remained at -5, reflecting a strong anocracy (scores between -5 and +5, with lower numbers reflecting great authoritarian characteristics). In 1987 the year of the June Struggle, the score drastically shifted to a score of +6 according to the trend report. Thus, according to Polity, South Korea officially became a democracy in 1987. It should be noted that scores for a democracy range from +6 to +10. Thus, a score of +6 expresses a somewhat weak democracy.

Looking at the component report for the year 1987, every component increases to a score of 6 (referring to a high degree of democratic traits); but this increase is only temporary. From 1988 until about 1998, nearly all of the component scores made a regression to a lower degree of democratic characteristics. Analyzing scores in later years, the overall Polity also did not shift to a strong democracy until 1998, with a score of +8. This is the same (and first) year that an opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, was democratically elected President. Examining the component shifts from 1987 to 1988, the most influential factors were XRREG and XRCOMP. Both components relate to chief executive recruitment, with the former designating the regulation of how an executive is chosen and the latter designating how competitive the selection process is. Chief executive recruitment was arguably the greatest observable change when comparing before and after the June Struggle, as this movement reformed the electoral process to decide on the President (Shorrock 1988).

However, while these elections were a step in the direction of democracy, the election results did not reflect such a drastic change. Between 1987 and 1998, while democratic elections did take place, the eventual Presidents were consistently from the same party (Yun 1997). Some could argue that a score correlating with a strong democracy (+8-+10) should have originated in
1993. Previous opposition candidate Kim Young-Sam became President in 1993, defeating incumbent Roh Tae-Woo. However, in 1990 a merger occurred which combined Kim Young-Sam and Roh Tae-Woo/Chun Doo-Hwan’s parties (Kim 1997). Considering the factor XRCOMP, such a merger evidently made elections less competitive (prior to 1998).

The merger made Kim Young-Sam’s party gain the majority in the National Assembly, but clearly damaged Kim Young-Sam’s supposed hopes for a democratic Korea considering the actions of Roh and Chun during the Gwangju Uprising (Kim 1997). Additionally, although Kim Young-Sam made challenging corruption a key issue on his political agenda, at the end of his presidency a scandal occurred that was similar to Park Geun-Hye’s scandal in 2017 (Kim 2020). The media discovered that Hanbo Steel company received great preference from the government, mainly in the form of forcing banks to issue loans to the company under pressure from politicians. Kim Young-Sam’s son was found to have been directly involved and sentenced to three years in prison, and Kim Young-Sam’s involvement was thought to have been likely (Park 1998).

Thus, I would argue that the development of a strong democracy did not occur until 1998 with the election of Kim Dae-Jung, which is reflected in the Polity score. Kim Dae-Jung was imprisoned by Chun and Roh’s governments in the 1980s. Yet, his influence grew to win Kim Dae-Jung the Presidency over their Chun and Roh’s authoritarian party in 1998, and he never chose to work together with the authoritarian party in order to garner political advantage as Kim Young-Sam chose to do. Kim Dae-Jung’s election was more significant to the overall trend of democratization in Korea, because he experienced a great deal of opposition from the primary authoritarian party and was still able to become President. This accomplishment in the face of
previous opposition means that Korea’s democratic process had developed to the point that people like Kim Dae-Jung were able to succeed, thus reflecting stronger democracy (Kim 1997).

Beyond the issue of executive recruitment, examining the component PARCOMP it is clear that political participation became less restricted, more competitive and generally viewed as more important to citizens. PARCOMP (which ranges from 1 to 5, 5 being mostly democratic) shifted from a consistent score of 2 in the early 1980s to a score of 4 after 1987, denoting advance in civil society. Such a trend implies the immediate success of the beginning of the democratic transition with the June Struggle (1987). Additionally, the later shifts towards a stronger democracy in 1998 as mentioned earlier display the consolidation of democracy in Korea during the post June Struggle era (Yun 1997).

Connecting the analysis of Polity Project to Hypothesis 3 in regards to the June Struggle, while the June Struggle was not considered a full success, it did satisfy four out of five metrics for protest success (see Table 3). The only metric it did not fully satisfy was Metric 2 in that the goal of the protest movement was directly met but did not produce a meaningful effect. Above, this thesis explains this argument in greater detail, and concludes that democratization in South Korea did not occur until 1998 with the election of Kim Dae-Jung. Although the June Struggle was not a complete success according to the metrics of this thesis, and it did not produce a meaningful effect directly after its occurrence, it is clear that the June Struggle did contribute to the eventual democratization of South Korea. The June Struggle achieved its goal of free elections, leading citizens to expect greater rights and freedoms from the government and to become more interested in political involvement (see Section 3.3.3). Thus, although the June Struggle was not a fully successful protest movement, it was a highly important contribution to Korean democratization and can still be considered in support of Hypothesis 3.
The argument that full democratization in Korea officially occurred in 1998 is supported by the shift in the Polity score in that year. From 1987 to 1997, the Polity remained at +6, but in 1998 shifted to +8, where it has remained since. The most significant aspects of this shift were in the upward movement of XRREG and XRCOMP, which both involve the regulation and competitiveness of chief executive recruitment. As opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung was elected in 1998 fairly and without compromising with previous authoritarian leaders or groups, his election was most conducive to democratization and led to the Polity shifting to reflect a strong democracy with a score of +8. As this score remained since 1998, +8 was also the Polity during the 2017 Candlelight Revolution. The strong, lasting democracy which such a score is representative of is clearly shown in how the Candlelight Revolution were able to both achieve its immediate goals and produce a meaningful democratic effect after its occurrence.

Considering that the Candlelight Revolution satisfy five out of five in the metrics for protest success as defined by this thesis and are thus considered a fully successful protest movement, along with the +8 score, this thesis’ case study analysis of this movement is clearly supportive of Hypothesis 3. Additionally, the success of the Candlelight Revolution does not purely indicate the increased effectiveness of protest movements in the post-democratic era where movement are less limited by suppression from the government. The success of the Candlelight Revolution also highlights the influence of prior movements of the 1960s and 1980s. While pre-democratization protests were clearly less successful in achieving a meaningful democratic effect during their time, their influence still permeates the modern protest culture which has developed in Korea. The seemingly more minor successes of previous protest movements eventually culminated into the full democratization of Korea in 1998, allowing for protests like those in 2017 to achieve their goals in a non-violent, effective manner.
4.3.1 Survey Data Analysis of Attitudes of Koreans regarding Democratization (1980-2020)

Looking at additional survey data from World Value Survey, evidence can also be found to support the argument that the increased success of protest movements played a key role in the democratization process of South Korea. When one is asked to define the term “democratization,” a common response is that democratization allows people to have a greater say in the decisions of the government that represents them. Another concept typically affiliated with democratization is that people under a democracy have greater freedoms available to them, such as freedom of speech. If one considers these two concepts as democratic values, these values can be used in order to measure the level of democratization affecting the values system of Koreans to support my argument. One question from World Value Survey asked Korean respondents “If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?” The response options given were: “Maintaining order in the nation,” “Giving people more say in important government decisions,” “Fighting rising prices,” and “Protecting freedom of speech.”

In 1982, 13.2% of respondents chose “Giving people more say in important government decisions” as their first choice, while 9.7% of respondents chose “Protecting freedom of speech” as their first choice. In 1990, 14.5% of respondents chose “Giving people more say in important government decisions” as their first choice, while 11% of respondents chose “Protecting freedom of speech” as their first choice. Thus, there was a slight increase in the period directly after the Gwangju Uprising and the timeframe after the June Struggle. In 2018, 23.3% of respondents chose “Giving people more say in important government decisions” as their first choice, while 1.8% of respondents chose “Protecting freedom of speech” as their first choice. The percentage of respondents who chose the former option nearly doubled since 1981-1984, but the percentage
of respondents who chose the latter option clearly decreased. However, the latter option decreasing in priority for the respondents does not necessarily indicate a loss of value in freedom of speech. Rather, considering the amount of time that had passed since the democratic landmark of Korean democratization, the June Struggle occurred, this thesis argues that Koreans at this point in time (2017-2020) would already have felt that their freedom of speech was protected and thus did not prioritize this value as much. Given that their rights were already protected, Koreans would instead prioritize issues such as “Fighting rising prices,” the option which was chosen by 40.7% of respondents as their first choice. Thus, the shifts in responses for this survey question indicate a tangible increase in democratization and democratic values from 1981-2020 in South Korea, as is argued by this thesis.
5 CONCLUSION AND APPLICATION TO FURTHER STUDY

Here, our original hypotheses will be restated:

1) Protest movements occur as a consequence of relative deprivation.

2) When progressive deprivation occurs, protest movements are more likely to be successful (by the definition within this thesis).

3) Successful protest movements led to the overall greater success of democratization in Korea.

The findings from the case study analysis clearly support the first hypothesis. Each protest movement applied to some form of relative deprivation (see section 3.3), with the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising being considered examples of decremental deprivation and the June Struggle and Candlelight Revolution being considered examples of progressive deprivation. Feelings of relative deprivation, referring to the negative discrepancy between what people (tangibly or intangibly) expect from the regime and what they actually receive clearly existed in each case study, and served as the primary motivation for the development of the discussed protest movements.

The findings from the case study analysis supported the claims made in the second hypothesis. While the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising were instances of decremental deprivation and not progressive deprivation as mentioned in the second hypothesis, both were also unsuccessful by the standards of this thesis, with the April Revolution satisfying one out of five metrics and the Gwangju Uprising satisfying none of the metrics. Contrastingly, the June Struggle and Candlelight Revolution were both examples of progressive deprivation and were mostly successful by the standards of this thesis, with the June Struggle satisfying four out of
five metrics and the Candlelight Revolution satisfying all five metrics. As the two mostly successful protests were considered to be instances of progressive deprivation, and the two mostly unsuccessful protests were considered instances of decremental deprivation (still relative deprivation, but a different form of relative deprivation), the findings from the qualitative case study analysis supported the second hypothesis.

The findings from the case study analysis and quantitative Polity Project data analysis support the third hypothesis. As seen in Figure 1, from 1948 to 1959 the Polity was stable, ranging from about -3 to -4, reflecting the anocratic nature of Rhee Syng-Man’s government. The Polity rose to 8 in 1960 when the April Revolution took place and Rhee Syng-Man’s government lost its power. Yet when Park Chung-Hee took power soon after an autocratic backsliding event occurred in 1961, the score quickly decreased to -7. After the Gwangju Uprising took place in 1980, the Polity score shifted upward from -8 in 1980 to -5 in 1981 (depicting a slight shift towards democratic trends), and then remained at a score of -5 until 1987 when the June Struggle took place. While both the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising were considered unsuccessful (satisfying one and none out of five metrics respectively) as individual protest movements, the subsequent shifts in their Polity scores towards democratic trends indicate that the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising were successes for democratization, but marginal successes in comparison to the success indicated by the Polity scores of the two more recent protest case studies.

However, it should be noted that these findings are not intended to minimize or discount the clear impact of the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising on South Korea’s democratization movement or Korean history as a whole. The sacrifices of those who
participated in these movements can be felt today with the clear success of Korean
democratization (look no further than the example of the Candlelight Revolution) and the
memorialization of the movements in South Korean history, pop culture, literature and public
events. Taking into account the marginal successes of these earlier movements, it may be
conducive to consider protest movements not as individual events, but instead as a larger
movement for democratization. For instance, a time series analysis on wider array of protest
movements in South Korea as well as other countries which have undergone democratization
could be performed to study shifts in democratization movement altogether in relation to protest
success. Additionally, I would be interested in looking into the role of these so-called
“unsuccessful” protest movements in a broader study examining how individually unsuccessful
protest movements can still make a valid contribution to the mission of democratization.

The findings from the case study analysis and the quantitative data analysis regarding the
two most recent protest movements, the June Struggle (1987) and the Candlelight Revolution
(2017) do support our third hypothesis. Before 1987 the Polity score throughout Chun Doo-
Hwan’s presidency remained at -5, reflecting a strong anocracy. In 1987, the score made a
dramatic shift to a score of +6, marking South Korea’s official transition to democracy. From
1987 to 1997, the Polity stayed at +6, but with Kim Dae-Jung’s election in 1998 the score shifted
to +8, which remains today. Thus, +8 was also the Polity score during the 2017 Candlelight
Revolution, reflecting the lasting success of democratization in South Korea since 1987. These
findings clearly support our third hypothesis, as the more recent protest movements were also the
most successful movements by the definition of this thesis, with the June Struggle satisfying four
metrics and the Candlelight Revolution satisfying five out of five metrics.
Examining the application of this thesis to future works, I believe that a major contribution of this thesis to the field of political science is the argument that the presence of a revolutionary legacy within a society is a central contributor to the success of democratization within said society. This longstanding revolutionary legacy in South Korea served as a major source of motivation for protest development along the course of its democratization. Seeing this, I would be interested in analyzing the concept of revolutionary legacies and political legacies in general, and highlighting the application of this argument to other democratized or non-democratized societies or states. I would be particularly interested in examining the revolutionary legacies of other Asian and Southeast Asian states in relation to their processes of political development.

To close this thesis, I will reiterate my initial reasoning for beginning this research. In an effort to address and provide an empirical critique against prevalent Western scholarly analyses of political and democratic development within East Asian states, I chose to study the successful democratic transition of South Korea and the role of protest movements in this transition through the lens of relative deprivation theory as posited by Gurr (1970). I sincerely hope that this analysis promotes objective arguments which account for diverse cultural perspectives on political development in future academic works on the subject of political development in East Asia and will serve as a positive contribution to the study of political science as a whole.
# LIST OF TABLES

## 6.1 Table 1: Comparing Protest Movements in South Korea

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<tr>
<td>Mass protests against President Syngman-Rhee, leads to resignation.</td>
<td>Mass protests against President Chun Doo-Hwan after arrest of Kim Dae-Jung culminate in Gwangju massacre.</td>
<td>National Assembly demands amendment to choose the President by popular vote.</td>
<td>Large-scale, peaceful street protests carried out against the Park Geun-Hye regime after her corruption scandal involving her aide using her political position to obtain illegal donations from chaebols.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discontent for Rhee rises: corruption concerns, violent suppression and uneven development.</td>
<td>Many protestors are killed, raped or beaten by military forces deployed by Chun.</td>
<td>After the events of Gwangju massacre and increased hopes for democratization, the populace joined protest against the regime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Primarily student-led, some labor groups.</td>
<td>Primarily student-led, some working class.</td>
<td>Primarily student-led, middle class and labor groups.</td>
<td>Diverse base of protestors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliances/Relationships between protest groups</td>
<td>Low level of organization between protestors. No significant alliances formed.</td>
<td>The debate between the Mulim and Haklim created strife between protestors. Alliances are only formed within groups and not between them.</td>
<td>Representatives from broad social sectors unite a giant alliance known as the NCDC</td>
<td>Nearly all sectors of populace join.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Reaction</td>
<td>Rhee steps down days after protest.</td>
<td>Chun Doo-Hwan’s military forces suppress protestors, Chun Doo-Hwan’s successor Roh Tae-Woo yielded to</td>
<td>Park Geun-Hye is impeached in 2017 and is arrested for</td>
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</table>
| Outcomes | Rhee flees for exile in the US.  
Second Republic of South Korea adopts a parliamentary system. Two years later, Park Chung-Hee gains power in a military coup. | Legitimacy of the regime is questioned by not only students but general civilians due to the brutality shown. | Large-scale democratic reforms introduced, including direct election of the president. Opposition leaders Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam fail to produce a sole presidential candidate, both are defeated by Roh Tae-Woo. | The peaceful protests along with the peaceful removal of a leader show the success of the democratic transition in Korea. |
### Table 2: Morrison’s Structural Conditions in Relation to the Four Case Studies

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<tr>
<td>Large sector of the population affected by deprivation</td>
<td>Dramatic increase of higher education institutes created a larger sector of the educated population. Allows more people to recognize their deprivation.</td>
<td>Increase in education &amp; economic success allowed the populace to focus outside survival (after the Korean War). Gave the population more time to focus on other affairs like politics.</td>
<td>Unpopularity and stagnated growth during Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime led to increased frustrations.</td>
<td>Majority of the population developed a negative perception towards Park after scandal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community with a high degree of interaction</td>
<td>The Confucian emphasis on sense of community in Korea was amplified when education and civil society grew during this period.</td>
<td>Combined with institutional Confucian ideology, the success of and growth during the Park regime (1963-1979) allows for an even greater degree of interaction.</td>
<td>As civil organizations grew, societal interaction increased to an even higher level.</td>
<td>In the post-democratic era, civil society thrived as there were no limitations on free speech and meeting. Social media gave rise to a free platform for people in various areas to develop movements in pursuit of social justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High degree of class consciousness</td>
<td>More education led to a greater degree of class consciousness as people are more aware of their societal standing.</td>
<td>More education combined with greater economic standing led to greater class consciousness and people could dedicate more time and effort to change.</td>
<td>Student efforts to educate the working class on their socio-political standing were highly successful, bringing larger sectors of the population into democratization activities.</td>
<td>Media freedom is no longer limited and the rise of investigative media and social media movements brought more interest to social justice pursuits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratification system in society</td>
<td>Confucian ideas emphasize a stratified society and generally lower socio-economic mobility.</td>
<td>Widespread economic growth meant that previously rich and powerful conglomerates became even</td>
<td>The dominance of the military and the regime over the populace created a more obvious stratification system.</td>
<td>Rapid economic growth created stratified economic classes, creating a strong divide between the lower,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary association within society (civil society)</td>
<td>The students had the insight due to their education to recognize it (see condition #3).</td>
<td>more influential and the system more stratified.</td>
<td>middle and upper classes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary association within society (civil society)</td>
<td>Higher education institutes as well as the preexisting Confucian tradition of a strong civil society creates a strong basis of societal interaction.</td>
<td>The increase in economic fortune gives people more time to participate in voluntary associations.</td>
<td>Civil society grew immensely during this period (1980-1987) with the creation of the UMMDU and NCDC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some degree of efficacy</td>
<td>The Korean revolutionary legacy against Japanese colonial rule gave students the knowledge of the success of protest movements, giving a sentiment of efficacy.</td>
<td>The Korean revolutionary legacy of the April Revolution and Korean independence from Japan provided the students with a sense of efficacy for success.</td>
<td>Increased power and organization of civil society and prominent opposition leaders gave protestors a greater sense of efficacy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some degree of efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The legacy of protest movements and the role of protests in achieving democratization gave the populace efficacy in participation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.3 Table 3: Success of the Four Case Studies based on the Five Metrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Metric (Satisfied/Partly Satisfied/Unsatisfied)</th>
<th>Goals are defined and agreed upon</th>
<th>Primary goal is directly met and produces meaningful effect</th>
<th>Clear, inclusive organization of the protest by groups involved</th>
<th>Meaningful geographic portion of the population participates in the protest (does it reach Seoul?)</th>
<th>Protest displays conditions defined as progressive deprivation</th>
<th>How many metrics were met + is the protest deemed successful?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April Revolution (1960)</td>
<td>Partly Satisfied</td>
<td>Partly Satisfied</td>
<td>Unsatisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Un satisfied</td>
<td>Not Successful (1/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju Uprising (1980)</td>
<td>Partly Satisfied</td>
<td>Unsatisfied</td>
<td>Unsatisfied</td>
<td>Unsatisfied</td>
<td>Un satisfied</td>
<td>Not Successful (0/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candlelight Revolution (2017)</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Successful (5/5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 LIST OF FIGURES

7.1 Figure 1: Authority Trends in South Korea from 1948-2018

7.2 Key for Figure 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity Project’s Regime Conditions</th>
<th>Explanation of the Condition’s Meaning</th>
<th>Denotation of Condition</th>
<th>Corresponding Polity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic backsliding event</td>
<td>Eventual decline in the quality of democracy, essentially the opposite direction of democratization.</td>
<td>Bold black diamond</td>
<td>POL changes by five points or greater toward more autocratic characteristics that forcibly overthrows the established regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive auto-coup or autogolpe event</td>
<td>Also known as a self-coup, refers to an event where a nation’s leader</td>
<td>Bold red triangle</td>
<td>POL changes by five points or greater, with the change initiated by a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dissolves the legislature and grants themselves great power, usually unlawfully.</td>
<td>ruling executive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity Score</strong></td>
<td>Based on the authority trends of the regime in a particular year.</td>
<td>Solid blue line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21-point scale, ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to a +10 (consolidated democracy). 21-point scale is divided into three categories:  • autocracies (-10 to -6)  • anocracies (-5 to +5)  • democracies (+6 to +10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3 Figure 2: Polity Project Score Component Trends from 1948-2018
### 7.4 Key for Figure 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Polity Score</th>
<th>Component Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXREG</td>
<td>Regulation of chief executive recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XRCOMP</td>
<td>Competitiveness of executive recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XROPEN</td>
<td>Openness of executive recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCONST</td>
<td>Presence or absence of executive constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARREG</td>
<td>Regulation of political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARCOMP</td>
<td>Competitiveness of political participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing trends of xxreg, xrcmp, xropen](image)

#### 7.5 Figure 3: Polity Project Score Component Trends: xxreg, xrcmp, xropen
7.6 Figure 4: Polity Project Score Component Trends: xconst, parreg, parcomp
REFERENCES


http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp].


