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## Antihaitianismo Analyzed: The Development of a Community and Underlying Social Issues in the Dominican Republic

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*ANTIHAITIANISMO* ANALYZED: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMUNITY  
AND UNDERLYING SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Honors in the Major Program in International and Global Studies  
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Thesis Chair: Dr. Sandra Sousa

## **Abstract**

Discrimination manifests itself in an unending variety of forms and can be observed in nearly every society the world has seen up to the present. What is often overlooked, however, are the ways in which discriminatory behaviors form as a result of complex history and cultural relations. This is the case of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, two countries that share a small island in the Caribbean. This thesis places its focus in breaking down the complex history and attitudes that have, in turn, led to the creation and espousing of *antihaitianismo* in Dominican political policy. From here, historical accounts, cultural analyses, and statistical breakdowns will be utilized in unison to work towards providing a better understanding as to how a particularly authoritarian period in Dominican history worsened living conditions for Haitians in the country. Ruthless governance combined with antagonistic laws and incentives will be inspected and studied alongside existing data to better understand how conditions currently stand for those of Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic.

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## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The island of Hispaniola is unique—geographically, historically, and culturally. It has existed for centuries divided into two countries, two colonies, two areas of clashing influence. The two countries in question are the Dominican Republic and Haiti. With these abundant disparities existing between the two, one may assume that proximity would lead to cultural, social, and political strife between the two. One would be precisely correct with this assumption. Haiti and the Dominican Republic, due to an intricate history tied into colonial struggle, conquest, domination over each other, and disparities in development, have existed in almost constant tension with each other. No less is this evident than right now when Haiti is faced with challenges in every area of its existence. The 2010 earthquake that rocked the country, particularly the capital, continues to affect the lives of Haitians to this day. Additionally, the country recently experienced the assassination of its president Jovenel Moïse, who ruled over a country riddled with internal conflict. The earthquake and ensuing civil crises in turn have led many to leave and cross the border to the Dominican Republic in the last decade due to its general accessibility and economic prospects. As of 2017, it is estimated that 7.4 percent of the Dominican Republic’s population is Haitian, among which two-thirds were immigrants born in Haiti (US Dept. of State, 2019, p. 21).

To be clear, however, the aforementioned factors form only a single layer that contributes to cultural behaviors in Hispaniola. What has arisen from the many factors influencing antagonistic feelings between the two countries is a mentality that some Dominicans hold towards their neighbors: *antihaitianismo*. Translated as “anti-Haitianism” from Spanish, the

concept is precisely what the term would imply. A complex blend of anti-immigrant sentiment and political policies have led to a particular type of discrimination that targets Haitians, especially those living in the Dominican Republic (Paulino, 2011, p. 266). This concept is not new; it became especially fervent in light of the presidency of Rafael Trujillo, a leader who changed the rhetoric between Dominican and Haitian communities with his ethnically-targeted policies. Coercion, forced migration, and extortion became hallmark tactics utilized by Trujillo, his administration, and his government (Hintzen, 2016, p. 30).

It is my aim to answer the following question with my thesis: How have historical developments, particularly those related to the rule of Rafael Trujillo, led to a generally challenged state of living for Haitians in the Dominican Republic today? Through an analysis of historical accounts of mistreatment of Haitians and Dominican government policy in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, informational reports from human rights organizations, data relating to development and income disparities (specifically the Human Development Index [HDI] on local and national levels), my findings provide a comprehensive understanding of how Trujillo's policies and rhetoric led to an increase in *antihaitianismo* during his rule from the 1930s to the early 1960s. To accomplish this, I then use said findings to identify correlations between developments in that period, the remainder of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the current state of affairs within the Dominican Republic in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I analyze disparities between people of Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic and Dominicans, with regard for cultural strife, political imbalances relating to differences in living conditions and human rights, and equal access to services and economic opportunity.



## CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL BACKGROUND

### Historical Origins

History is essential in the formation of the concept of *antihaitianismo* and how it has shaped the ways in which the Dominican Republic has come to perceive Haitians, particularly those living in the country. The European settlement of Hispaniola began in the late 15<sup>th</sup> century with the arrival of Christopher Columbus, an Italian explorer working for the Spanish crown whose landing in the Caribbean led European powers to establish colonies across the region—one of which was the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (not to be confused with the city that is today the capital of the Dominican Republic). In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the French came to acquire greater influence over the western half of Hispaniola, presenting a countering sense of cultural strength against the Spanish (Martinez, 1999, p. 60). The French came to formally possess the western half of the island in 1697, and battles between the French and Spanish on Hispaniola marred much of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

The end of this period saw one of the most pivotal moments in French-Spanish relations on the island, during which the Haitian Revolution occurred between 1791 and 1804. The large population of slaves in the French portion of Hispaniola, then referred to as Saint-Domingue, revolted against their owners under the leadership of Toussaint Louverture. They eventually declared independence from the French, becoming the first independent country in the Caribbean. It was from here that a new wave of battles, conflicts, and squabbles occurred between the Haitians and eventually the Dominicans after they declared independence from Spain in 1821. There was a period of island-wide rule under the Haitians from 1822 to 1844, but

the Dominicans saw this as blatant invasion and war ensued (Augelli, 1980, p. 23). The day on which independence from the Haitians was declared, February 27, 1844, is celebrated today as the Dominican Republic's formal independence day. Battles continued with relative frequency for the next five years, but Haiti continued to be defeated, leaving the Dominican Republic in control of its own territory. Such a contentious history was guaranteed to lead to strained relations into the future.

As the two countries moved into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Dominican Republic became increasingly antagonistic and discriminatory towards those of Haitian descent. Under the authoritarian leadership of Rafael Trujillo, *antihaitianismo* became institutionally mandated and encouraged through legislation. The 1930s saw border disputes and discriminative attacks that targeted Haitians believed to be practicing voodoo, a practice seen as sacrilege by the strongly conservative Catholic majority in the Dominican Republic—even though Haiti itself also had a strong Catholic presence (Augelli, 1980, p. 24). Much of the discrimination against Haitians, the majority of whom in this case lived along the border, resulted in killings and the eventual massacre of Haitians in the Dominican Republic of 1937. Trujillo, after having surveyed border regions with his loyal army, ordered this mass murder of thousands of Haitians (Hintzen, 2016, p. 29).

To this day, there has been no conclusive historical explanation as to why Trujillo ordered the massacre (Hintzen, 2016, p. 41). It is today referred to as the Parsley Massacre in English, and it is perhaps the most consequential event that contributed to Trujillo's *antihaitianismo*-oriented rhetoric through the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. This was the first of many events, though, that led to the increased legitimization of discrimination in the Dominican

Republic; the government sent in religious leaders and teachers to border communities to “Dominicanize” the areas that had been exterminated of their Haitian population and cultural influence (Hintzen, 2016, p. 42).

### **Political Problems**

Haitians in the Dominican Republic and Dominicans of Haitian descent continue to experience discrimination in some capacity in the Dominican Republic, once again highlighting the omnipresence of *antihaitianismo* in the country. What is immediately clear among Haitians living in the Dominican Republic is the lack of representative legislation and general disputes between the two countries. This can be highlighted with the political history of Haitians in the country through their role in the sugar industry before and during Trujillo’s presidency. One of the core policies during the beginning of his tenure as president was the belief that Dominican society “required the absence of Haitians from Dominicans’ everyday lives,” alongside the “widespread acceptance that the Haitian culture posed a threat” (Hintzen, 2016, pgs. 29-30). It was with this political motivation that Trujillo sought to remove Haitians from cities and towns and force them into new rural communities entirely oriented around the production of sugar with the goal being to intrinsically link the Haitian identity in the country to sugar production (Martinez, 1999, pgs. 72-73). In due time, Haitians were forced en masse to live in what were essentially sugar plantations.

By the 1930s, Haitians “accounted for a majority of the harvest labor force” (Martinez, 1999, p. 66). This reliance that Haitians living in the Dominican Republic had upon the sugar industry led to a unique political phenomenon in which there was a heavy sense of dependence

upon the sugar industry to provide protection and assistance with living. Trujillo's presidency also saw a beginning of the use of *cédulas*, a type of nationally issued documentation that included information on skin color and place of residence (Hintzen, 2016, p. 35). Those who possessed a *cédula* were required to visit local offices once a year to renew them. The factory managers were responsible for their workers and their *cédulas*. Whenever a Haitian worker was found without their *cédula*, governmental authorities often blamed the management of the factory where the Haitian worker in question was employed. This led to a sort of compromised status for Haitian sugar workers, wherein they had an emphasized sense of reliance upon the factories and their management compared to the government in cases like this. The inability of the government to deal with these situations properly led to some discontent among portions of the Dominican populous, specifically members of the higher class that were observant of government affairs (Hintzen, 2016, p. 36).

It was with these generalizations of Haitians that *antihaitianismo* started to become a core tenant of Trujillo's governing ideology, one that was shared between himself, fellow leaders, and prominent Dominican intellectuals (Paulino, 2011, p. 266). The issue of *cédulas* evidently complicated the societal role Haitians, especially those in rural sugar-growing regions, played in the country. Trujillo continued to antagonize and dehumanize Haitians, openly encouraging their leaving of the country. He also encouraged migration from Europe and Japan to dilute Haitian presence and influence in the Dominican Republic (Howard, 2007, p. 733). Trujillo rationalized this policy by characterizing it as an encouraging opportunity for the Dominican Republic to reinforce its *dominicanidad*, a concept translated in English as essentially "Dominican-ness" that entailed "his ideas of sovereign territory, security, and nationhood" (Howard, 2007, p. 733).

According to Trujillo and his closest political companions, this concept would retain the heritage that was integral to Dominican culture and the cohesiveness and unity of the country overall (Howard, 2007, p. 735).

With a continuation of this type of policy, remnants and new manifestations of this same racism and discrimination continue to exist today across the country. This can be observed through eruptive discussions regarding the presence of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. A 2006 meeting in Santo Domingo among members of a variety of non-government agencies and academics devolved into a negative discussion regarding the place Haitians held in Dominican society and what type of effect they had on the country's economy (Howard, 2007, p. 735). Modern deportation is yet another pervasive problem; though infrequent, it is serious. Amnesty International released a 2007 report detailing statistics on these deportations and estimated that 20,000 to 30,000 Haitians, including those who "looked like Haitians" and may have had proper documentation or Dominican citizenship, were deported from the country every year (Matibag & Downing-Matibag, 2011, p. 97). Dominicans often view these deportations as a sort of "vigilante action" and deported Haitians perceived as being criminally dangerous, often with little to no basis in fact (Howard, 2007, p. 735). Racialized violence occurs as well. For example, part of a settlement populated primarily by Haitians was burned to the ground in 2006 after the death of a Dominican soldier. Shortly after, it was revealed that the soldier had been killed by another Dominican (Howard, 2007, p. 735). The remnants of Trujillo-era policies, fervently and blatantly racist in nature, continue to influence Dominican politics to this day through incidents like these, as well as through political discourse that continues to be openly encouraged by political officials.

## Cultural Strife

Another point of debate and argument between the two countries of Hispaniola are marked cultural differences. What is unique to note is that both countries and their cultures were created as results of creolization, a term used to describe the way in which elements of different cultures are combined to create a new one. They each emerged distinctly and uniquely as a result, clashing in a number of ways. This was a point that the Dominican elite and some members of government sought to highlight; because the Dominican Republic was viewed as “mixed” compared to their “black” Haitian neighbors, Dominicans sought to set themselves apart from their neighbors by being more “civilized” and “developed” (Hintzen, 2016, p. 32). Differences in colonial influences have additionally caused strife. Haiti’s culture was strongly influenced by France during its colonial period, and Haitian Creole has origins in the French spoken in the country centuries past. Meanwhile, the Dominican Republic overwhelmingly uses Spanish and has been strongly influenced by Castilian and Canarian culture and migration.

Returning to Trujillo’s development of *antihaitianismo* during his tenure, his administration viewed the Haitians’ presence as being directly and entirely incompatible with Dominican culture in religious, political, and social contexts. Rampant accusations, both then and now, push the agenda that the two cultures “can never exist in the same spatial context without tension and the ultimate subversion of Dominican civil progression” (Howard, 2007, p. 733). An example of one of these accusations can be seen in the case of the anonymous, likely government-funded, faxes distributed on the eve of the 1994 presidential election in the Dominican Republic. The opposition candidate in the election, José Francisco Peña Gómez, the child of Haitian parents and adopted by a Dominican family, was caricatured in the faxes as

practicing voodoo, a common folk religion in Haiti that is frequently demonized by Dominicans. Peña Gómez was portrayed as a “serious threat to Dominican civility” as a result of these damaging stereotypes (Howard, 2007, p. 733).

Another contentious issue regarding cultural clashes between the two countries is the presence of Dominican citizens of full or partial Haitian descent. With Haiti’s proximity to the Dominican Republic, many Dominicans can trace their heritage back to parents, grandparents, and past generations that are descended from Haitian immigrants. The problem has reached the point where services at civil registry offices have been blocked from access for some individuals purely based on them “looking like a Haitian” (OSF, 2010, p. 5). This situation was particularly rampant in the 1990s and 2000s, when those who had dark skin, spoke with an accent, or wore particular types of clothing were often prone to probing, questioning, and improper handling (OSF, 2010, p. 5).

During the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Haitians have gradually become more integrated in subsections of Dominican society, particularly in urban and suburban areas as reliance upon rural sugar farming has diminished (Jayaram, 2010, p. 37). Regardless, they continue to face much cultural discrimination and commonly are forced into the poorest segments of Dominican society. Though Haitians have contributed significantly to rural industrial and agricultural production historically, shifts in industry are widespread as the country modernizes and progresses economically. As a result, Santo Domingo, other major cities, and resort towns have seen expanding waves of Haitian immigration into the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Jayaram, 2010, pgs. 37-38). Within Santo Domingo, one can observe Haitians living on the fringes of the city who survive off of contributions to the informal economy, while other Haitians work in professional settings

or attend universities (Jayaram, 2010, p. 38). Moreover, class distinctions are clear among Haitian-Dominicans. This has led to the emergence of a new sort of *antihaitianismo* that particularly targets Haitians of poorer urban classes. The subset of the community that often works within the informal economy and resides in the lower-income neighborhoods of the city is often ostracized, being considered part of the “Haitian problem,” and viewed as contributing little to nothing to society, while those in the upper strata of social class are often viewed no differently from another Dominican (Jayaram, 2010, p. 38).

### **Current State of Affairs**

As it stands, despite an overwhelming sense of *antihaitianismo* in the Dominican Republic, Haitians continue to move into the country at a high rate, especially with the lack of infrastructure and economic opportunities that currently exist in Haiti. The earthquake of 2010 saw catastrophic devastation of the Haiti’s cities, infrastructure, and a tremendous death toll whose estimates still remain unclear. The country saw a massive outpouring of financial support and aid from around the world, including a swift response from the Dominican Republic. Food and medicine were offered to victims, the country’s government made it less difficult for Haitians to acquire visas, and hospitals were opened for treatment of victims (Forman & White, 2011, pgs. 11-12). Additionally, there was an initial welcoming sentiment among many Dominicans to greet Haitians refugees as they continued to seek assistance and housing in light of the destruction. This highlighted an incredible shift in policy and rhetoric for the Dominican Republic that pointed to a greater emphasis on foreign relations, particularly with Haiti. The



destructive effects of the earthquake made it clear to the Dominican Republic that historic issues had to be overseen in this case (Forman & White, 2011, p. 15).

Despite this shift, concerns still exist over the presence of Haitians and their influence in the country. Border security is one example. Though initially proposed by Rafael Trujillo, acting president Luis Abinader has supported an effort to construct a border wall to counter immigration, the inflow of crime, and the drug trade between the two countries (BBC, 2021). Though only small portions of border wall have been constructed, reports indicate that an increase in border patrol has been observed across the country, particularly in areas where migration occurs at a high rate (BBC, 2021). An additional consequential and recent development within Haitian affairs is the assassination of president Jovenel Moïse, who had been presiding over a nation deeply embroiled in civil conflict and crisis. This event led President Abinader to close the border out of caution due to expected spikes in crime and unrest (Reuters, 2021). Haitian officials have declared an official “state of siege” in the country, leaving many domestically and internationally confounded and worried about what could happen next for the country. It is expected that the previously deteriorating civil state of the country is to break down further (Reuters, 2021), leaving officials in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic cautious of what will happen in the near future.

### **CHAPTER III: CONTEXTUALIZING *ANTIHAITIANISMO***

It must be made clear that *antihaitianismo* is incredibly layered and goes beyond the Trujillo era. As mentioned previously, the ideology ties into cultural, political, and colonial differences that go back to the beginnings of European colonization in Hispaniola. With this in mind, one can then analyze *antihaitianismo* beyond the period that will be focused upon with my research. One can additionally use examples from other cases of policy-driven racism globally, such as recent relations between the United States and Mexico, to compare similar traits to further contextualize issues between Haitian and Dominican communities. Beyond relating experiences among Haitians in the Dominican Republic to other related global issues, one can also draw on historical accounts and analytical pieces to gain a more comprehensive and first-hand account of the treatment that Haitians endured in the midst of the Trujillo era, as well as before and after.

With these methods of contextualization brought into light, I will begin with analyzing the origins of the ideology of *antihaitianismo* more deeply by delving into the historical context of the issue, particularly following the independence of the Dominican Republic from Haiti and the beginnings of the formation of the Dominican identity and the concept of *dominicanidad*. The forging of *dominicanidad* emerged sharply as anti-Haitian, with Haiti having taken over the Dominican Republic almost immediately after they established their colonial freedom from Spain. Shortly after Haiti attempted to and successfully established control over the Dominican Republic, the Haitian government and the military worked ruthlessly to unite the island politically, but the Spanish influence in the Dominican Republic was heavily overriding Haitian attempts to engage in unification.

### ***Dominicanidad's Relation to Antihaitianismo***

Though this thesis is an analysis of *antihaitianismo* and its legal and cultural stratification throughout the course of Dominican history, it is critical to note the role that Dominican nationalism and *dominicanidad* play in *antihaitianismo*. Anti-Haitian sentiment has been upheld through *dominicanidad*, particularly during the Trujillo era, with the emphasis on pure, untarnished Dominican culture throughout the country. It was with the development of the Dominican Republic that *dominicanidad* was birthed. A complex term in nature with an array of applications, it is described as emerging “out of the historical events that placed the Dominican Republic in a geographic and symbolic border between the United States and Haiti since its birth in 1844” (García-Peña, 2016, p. 3). As such, Dominican independence was critical in the forging of said identity and concepts.

It was in the early years following Dominican independence that the allyship of the United States and the Dominican Republic was paramount in the perceived superiority of Dominicans over Haitians during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. During this period, the United States “disavowed Haiti as racially inferior and thus unfit for self-government” (García-Peña, 2016, p. 7), despite the challenges the United States itself was continuing to face with widespread slavery and racial inequity. With this unequal view of the two countries of Hispaniola, the dichotomy between the two became clear. It was from here that an affirmed global understanding of the two countries became solidified. (García-Peña, 2016, p. 7). The desire to remain in touch with criollo Spanish colonial roots and an anti-American expansionism perspective espoused by prominent Dominican writers such as Félix Maria del Monte and Manuel de Jesús Galván contributed to the upholding of Dominican culture and values. This concept of race within *dominicanidad* was

decidedly anti-black and was considered inherently different from Haiti's cultural values that emphasized blackness and cultural origins in west Africa. Those who upheld *dominicanidad* fervently distanced themselves from this (García-Peña, 2016, p. 7). Those who were considered "Dominican hybrids," especially *rayanos* (residents of the Dominican regions along the border with Haiti), were continually targeted by these *dominicanidad* adherents and the military (García-Peña, 2016, p. 7).

### **A Border and the Environment**

When contextualizing *antihaitianismo*, it is also essential to consider the role that the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic has played in relations between the two countries. The border, as described previously, divides two worlds that are vastly different despite immediate proximity. The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 established the border as part of a series of legislation acts passed in French interests in the Caribbean (The Louverture Project, 2009); Spain recognized French control of the western third of Hispaniola while it dominated the other two-thirds (The Louverture Project, 2009). Since then, the border has seen slight deviations but has remained largely the same in terms of the territory delegated to the two colonies and later countries. As the two countries have diverged in their development, particularly from the 1960s and onward, differences are immediately clear, particularly from a satellite view. One can observe drastic environmental differences between the two countries. Haiti exhibits harsh soil degradation and overuse of land, leading to barren and brown dirt and grass. By comparison, the Dominican Republic's side is verdant with lush vegetation and plants, laden with generally well-tended farmland (Image 1).



Image 1

This satellite image highlights the stark difference in environments between the two countries without the need for boundary markings. The left side is Haiti and the right is the Dominican Republic (NASA, 2002).

It is as though the image above indicates with immediate clarity the ways in which life differs in the two countries. Haiti, suffering from widespread impoverishment and mismanagement of resources, struggles with the regulation of logging and farming leading to environmental decay and excessive deforestation. This image also spotlights one of the most abundantly clear distinctions between the two countries—enforcement of policy. Haiti’s government is often unable to adequately enforce environmental laws to regulate deforestation—

Haiti today has only 4% of its land with forest cover, compared to 75% coverage in 1925 and 41% coverage in the Dominican Republic today (Robineau, 2018). It, in turn, exists across the country and is a national issue. In particular, the harshest effects of such policy failures can be exhibited in Haiti's eastern regions along the border with the Dominican Republic. The effects of soil degradation have reached such a point that severe rainstorms have caused immense landslides that led to the deaths of thousands in the eastern regions, where the terrain is more prone to soil decay and looseness.

The deforestation and resulting soil eradication are accelerated due to Haiti's reliance on charcoal as a primary fuel source. Ninety-eight percent of Haiti's surface area has been deforested, and charcoal represents 60% of domestic energy production (Kheel, 2014). Even more alarming, the Dominican Republic is struggling to prevent Haitians crossing into their lands illegally to deforest further and continue charcoal production. On top of the illegality of the border crossing, charcoal production is also outlawed in the Dominican Republic (Kheel, 2014). The fact that Haitians have to risk their life to continue producing one of their country's primary energy sources highlights the dire state in which Haiti finds itself. In addition, this connects to the cross-border issues that tie into *antihaitianismo* and why it continues to exist—negative stereotypes that Dominicans hold of Haitians regarding the difference in economic development between the two countries.

### **The United States and Hispaniola**

Issues relating to historical stereotypes driven by cultural differences as well as harshly enforced border policies in Hispaniola mirror the relationship between other countries, perhaps

most evident being that between the United States and Mexico. Over the last five years in light of the Trump presidency, a renewed emphasis on border security along the US-Mexico border was abundantly observable. This was paired with an increasingly visible rhetoric that continually antagonized Mexican-Americans and Mexican immigrants in the United States. Though distinct from *antihaitianismo*'s intrinsic ties to the Dominican Republic's political culture and policy decisions, the context with which the basis of *antihaitianismo* originates can be seen through cases in other regions. Though nationalistically-driven border enforcement and anti-immigration policies are not unique, it is the pervasive nature of *antihaitianismo*, as mentioned above, that makes it particularly harmful to Haitians living in the Dominican Republic.

With respect to the United States, foreign intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic has also been formative to *antihaitianismo* in the latter. Though the United States has hosted interventions in both countries of Hispaniola to engage in "state-building" (Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924), it has been argued that the US's occupation of Haiti endured for longer and its execution was much harsher due to the significant difference in perception of race by the American administrations in each country (Pampinella, 2020). Haiti, existing with a cultural emphasis on one's blackness and rich cultural tradition rooted in West African influence, was frequently subjected to racist and violent treatment under its long US occupation (Hudson, 2013). The Dominican Republic, on the other hand, upheld its connections to Spanish colonial traditions, and was subjected to a shorter occupation that ended with a new US-supported government (Pampinella, 2020). It is abundantly clear that undertones of perceived racial superiority of Dominicans over Haitians was clear at the time; this brought in

more indirect influence over the region that would, in turn, contribute to the Trujillo-era concept of superiority over Haitians, a core ideology of *antihaitianismo*.

## **CHAPTER IV: THE PARSLEY MASSACRE AND ITS LEGACY**



The issues mentioned above provide a deeper sense of context regarding the contributing factors that have led to the formation and rise of *antihaitianismo* throughout the Dominican Republic's history. That aside, a single event in the Dominican Republic's history has been most formative to the concept of *antihaitianismo* and is generally considered the moment in Dominican history wherein the country's political and cultural rhetoric and conversation took a harsh turn towards anti-Haitian discrimination and racism—the Parsley Massacre. A new precedent had been set by this mass killing of Haitians in the border regions of the Dominican Republic. Centuries of pent-up cultural and political strife dating back to the colonial era of the two countries manifested in a horrifically calculated destruction of communities, organized by a ruthlessly nationalist dictator.

### **The Background of the Massacre**

As previous information has revealed, much of Haiti's population, particularly its lower classes, live without essential protections and social services. Many within these socioeconomic classes are among those that end up migrating to the Dominican Republic, leaving them with even less of a safety net of protections. This leaves them an overwhelmingly disenfranchised population when it comes to situations regarding economic exploitation and ethnically-targeted policies in the Dominican Republic. During the beginning of Trujillo's rule in the Dominican Republic, the rhetoric against Haitians was fervent and rampant, particularly in the border region between the two countries where Trujillo sought to extract resources. This, coupled with the fact that much of the Haitian residents of the border regions were landless and part of the peasant

class (Fiehrer, 1990, p. 2), led to a pervasive sense of fear among Haitian communities that built up prior to the massacre.

Trujillo recognized that the border regions were prime for the cultivation of plantation crops, including bananas, tobacco, and rice, for exportation. Alongside this, other land was dedicated for sugar production, a previously successful crop in the country that had already been widely cultivated. This led to the establishment of what could be referred to as “agro-colonies” (Fiehrer, 1990, p. 9-10), and policies were put into effect through central state planning to move primarily poor Dominicans from urban areas into the border regions to work in plantations. Distinct from the aforementioned sugar plantations, 39 colonies were established, many of which were poorly run. Planning was scant, the needs of the workers were often insufficiently met, and morale among the workers was generally low (Fiehrer, 1990, p. 10). On top of these issues, Haitian immigration was rampant during this period. Montecristi, a major border crossing, had eight settlements nearby in the Dajabón region just south of it. It was here that Trujillo engaged with the workers through several speaking tours in which he continually suggested that it was the Haitians and their perceived over-exertion of already diminished resources that led the border regions to environmental and economic challenges (Fiehrer, 1990, p. 10). This characterization of the Haitians, on top of the conditions the Dominicans in the region were experiencing, only worsened tensions in the border regions.

### **Operation *Perejil***

On October 2, 1937, “Operation *Perejil*” (*perejil* being the Spanish word for parsley, a difficult word for many Haitians to pronounce due to the verbal differences between the sound of “R” between Spanish and Haitian Creole—the word’s pronunciation was used often by Dominican citizens and authorities to crassly distinguish who was Haitian) ensued. Armed forces began to round up Haitians in the border regions as individuals and families were subsequently killed on sight with little to no warning. These practices were widespread during the massacre and led to the immediate devastation of local communities and their economies. Estimates regarding the number of those killed vary widely, as statistics were not accurately reported. Low-end estimates place the number around 12,000, while higher estimates stand at roughly 35,000 (Wucker, 1999, p. 51).

To further comprehend the effects of the massacre and how it shaped *antihaitianismo*, we must investigate the way in which the United States reacted just after news broke internationally. The United States during this period espoused what was referred to as the Good Neighbor Policy. This was a foreign policy initiative that the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt espoused that sought to engage in pervasive non-interventionism across Latin America based on the principle that “no nation has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of another for any reason” (Gilderhus, 2006). Additional incentives within the policy included an emphasis on cooperation across Latin America to foster and retain peace alongside the maintenance of regional security (Gilderhus, 2006). In turn, the Good Neighbor Policy exhibited a partiality for “stable military leaders, though not preferred” (Roorda, 1996, p. 302) to push the desires the policy upheld to enhance the means for American interests and economic activities in the region.

Trujillo's dictatorship and the Parsley Massacre proved to be a challenge to this partiality (Roorda, 1996, p. 302).

### **Aftermath and Global Ramifications**

The Parsley Massacre, alongside a slew of other mass killings worldwide (including the Rape of Nanking and the Holocaust), marked a period in world history marred by nationalist violence led by ruthless dictators and autocrats (Roorda, 1996, p. 302). The massacre and the ensuing diplomatic standoff between the two nations of Hispaniola and its mediators, including the United States, put the non-interventionism of the Good Neighbor Policy into limbo. The Roosevelt administration did not attempt to make public judgements on Trujillo's character following the massacre, instead pushing for a solution reached through international mediation.

However, Trujillo preferred not to engage with outside actors, instead opting to pay Haiti a large sum of money without formally admitting to any massacre having taken place. It was with this "sense of resolve" that the United States portrayed the issue as being essentially settled, considering it a victory for the United States' aims towards Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy (Roorda, 1996, p. 303). Trujillo was additionally acutely aware of the damage he had done to his well-formed image that he had spent years cultivating. Would the world view him as a Hitler-inspired mass murderer? He did not think so, as he introduced a policy—among the other immigration incentives mentioned earlier—to accept 100,000 Jews from Germany and Austria (Roorda, 1996, p. 303). With policies such as this, the Trujillo dictatorship aimed to prevent any racist implications from being made with other policies that aimed to cover up massive injustices.

With all of this being made clear, one can observe the pivotal role that the Parsley Massacre holds regarding the shift in Trujillo's policies throughout the rest of his rule in the Dominican Republic. Always striving to maintain a presentable image as a man simply aiming to retain his country's national character, Trujillo worked tirelessly to conceal his *antihaitianismo* from the world and foreign delegations. Meanwhile, Haitians in the country struggled with income inequality, economic injustices, and the fact that their community had been targeted with impunity in a massacre that the government failed to acknowledge. The legacy of the Parsley Massacre continues to be contested to this day, as the Dominican Republic acknowledges the massacre happened without specifying who carried it out in particular. Additionally, the Dominican Republic continues to blame Haitians for issues the country continues to face, as they are at fault for stealing Dominican goods and land (Strongman, 2006, p. 29).

## CHAPTER V: THE TRUJILLO ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES

### Consolidation of Power

Rafael Trujillo was arguably the most consequential leader of the Dominican Republic in the last century, not only regarding domestic policy, but also Haitian-Dominican relations. His policies leading up to the Parsley Massacre and directly after were incredibly formative to the rhetoric that came to dominate Dominican politics throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, one that consistently antagonized and disavowed Haitians and their influence in the country. What came to mark much of his tenure in general, however, was his superiority complex. Trujillo described himself as a “person capable of miracles and superhuman feats” (Derby, 1999, p. 96), presenting himself as the savior of his people. As his presidency extended over three decades, he attributed his presidential longevity as being part of his “special power to combat enemies and foes against all odds” (Derby, 1999, p. 96).

Trujillo and his followers additionally established a de facto one-party state. The Dominican Party (*Partido Dominicano* in Spanish), as it was called, possessed a tight grip on Dominican society and political culture under Trujillo’s oversight. All adult citizens of the Dominican Republic were required to register as members of the party; this also mandated the ownership of what were called “*los tres golpes*” (the three strikes) (El Nacional, 2016). One always needed to have their personal identification card, compulsory military service card, and their *palmita*—a membership card that indicated formal membership with the party. No real ideologies existed within the party; allegiance to Trujillo and his policies were the only stated stances of the party (El Nacional, 2016).

## Policies Pre-Massacre

Haitian-Dominican relations between 1930 to 1937 are generally considered to have been less inflamed. This was a period that Trujillo focused more prominently on expanding his power domestically. What led to Trujillo's solidification as a dictatorial leader were the events that took place in 1934, when he both promoted himself as the *generalissimo* of the country's army and faced no contestation in the election that year. He additionally manipulated crowds by hosting large gatherings where he would encourage citizens to express their fervent support for him. Trujillo then asserted that he was popular nationwide in order to push for a continued grasp on power (El Nacional, 2016). His reelection in 1934 allowed him to instigate policy changes with an iron fist against any supposed opposition. He began to form a personality cult and shaped Dominican identity policies that contributed to *antihaitianismo* on a national level (El Nacional, 2016).

Tying further into his personality cult, he renamed Santo Domingo as *Ciudad Trujillo* in 1936. In 1938, when he was eligible for reelection once again, he announced he would no longer run for office. His vice president Jacinto Peynado was nominated and elected accordingly, operating as a puppet of Trujillo's, ruling with essentially no power. With this, Trujillo sought to "dominicanize" the entire country, particularly the far reaches outside of the influence of urban centers like Ciudad Trujillo and Santiago de los Caballeros. There was a particularly strong pull to bring the influence of cosmopolitan Dominican influence to the border regions; infrastructure projects were undertaken in an attempt to unify these regions more concretely with urban areas.

### **Trujillo's Accomplices and Policies Post-Massacre**

As has been explained, it was the Parsley Massacre that marked the turning point in relations between not only Haiti and the Dominican Republic, but Haitians living in the Dominican Republic and Dominicans. Trujillo's borderland policies only became more nationalist in nature as he sought to shield his country from foreign—specifically Haitian— influence. Among the politicians Trujillo aligned himself with that served as prominent accomplices in the creation of policy were Manuel A. Peña Batlle and Joaquín Balaguer (Sagás; Wucker, 1999). Both were paramount in the formation of *antihaitianismo* policy and rhetoric post-Parsley Massacre, and they fundamentally shifted the thinking of millions of Dominicans as Haitian culture and influence came to be viewed as inferior and, in essence, harmful.

Peña Batlle, alongside Trujillo, engaged in the reformation of history within the Dominican Republic and relations with Haiti, distinguishing Haitians as vicious and against the values that Dominican culture upheld. Among the many public speeches Peña Batlle gave to reinforce *antihaitianismo* and *dominicanidad*, his speech titled “*El Sentido de una Política*” given in the border town of Elias Piña outlined the state's stances on Haitian influence, detailing the “undesirable” nature of Haitian immigrants and how they cannot “represent for us any ethnic initiative” (Sagás, 1993). Trujillo continued enforcing border strengthening policies that eradicated any semblance of Haitian cultural influence within the border regions through efforts like these. Peña Batlle defended Trujillo's policies for decades, continuing to distort historical events, particularly conflicts between the two countries. He redefined the standing strife between the two countries as “the modern version of the old conflict between the invading French buccaneers and the Spanish authorities” (Sagás, 1993). Peña Batlle also connected the Haitian



migrants of the time with the French colonists and invaders of the past. For instance, he referred to Haitian migrants and their movement into the country as reminiscent of the French's antagonistic mentality of wanting to conquer all of Hispaniola and ultimately eradicating all Spanish culture and presence on the island (compared to Dominican culture of the time) (Sagás, 1993). With this inherently incorrect comparison between two fundamentally different groups, Peña Batlle defended Trujillo's authoritarianism as necessary in the face of "Haitian expansionism" and proceeded to question how places like Cuba could exist without realizing how Haitians were doing the same to them at the time (Sagás, 1993).

Alongside Peña Batlle, Joaquín Balaguer was another staunch Trujillo apologist that was consequential to Trujillo's retention of power (Wucker, 1999, p. 53). Balaguer penned *La Realidad Dominicana* (1947), which is regarded as the finest work of pro-Trujillo propaganda (Sagás, 1993). It defined the Dominican Republic's right to defend its border and cultural omnipresence. Overall, he defended Trujillo's policy regarding Haiti to no end, serving as a strong ideological ally that upheld the dictator's values above all else (Sagás, 1993). As Balaguer explains, "There is no reason of justice nor of humanity that can prevail over the right of the Dominican people to subsist as a Spanish nation and a Christian community" (Balaguer, 1947). It is clear with this statement that the Dominican Republic during this period was not purely concerned with upholding its culture or its religious emphasis on Catholicism, as Haiti was also a predominantly Catholic nation.

As Balaguer continued, "The problem of race is, by consequence, the principal problem of the Dominican Republic. If the racial problem is of great importance for all countries, for Santo Domingo, by the reasons already mentioned, this issue is of an immense significance,

since on it depends, in a certain way, the very existence of the nationality that for more than a century has been struggling against a more prolific race” (Balaguer, 1947). Trujillo and his affiliates’ racist intents are immediately made clear through this summary of his intent to retain Dominican racial superiority over Haiti. This was achieved through characterizing Haitians an ethnic group that has been continually vetted against the Dominican Republic’s historical hegemony in Balaguer’s eyes. This demonstrates why Balaguer stood out among Trujillo’s high-ranking supporters. He was renowned for defining Trujillo’s policy in manners such as this, expending support for Trujillo’s policy through his dictatorship and membership with the *Partido Dominicano* (Sagás, 1993).

## **CHAPTER VI: A MODERN-DAY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

Based on the above historical analysis, statistics can now be analyzed to observe the ways in which policies from the Trujillo era have affected the living conditions for Haitians in the Dominican Republic in recent years. Immediately, one can observe on a macro level a strong disparity in development between rural communities and urban communities in the Dominican Republic. Additionally, there are distinct differences in the quality of life for Haitians living in rural areas, particularly along the border regions, and those living in cities. Finally, largely because of the legacy of *antihaitianismo*, the most prominent gap is in living standards between Haitian Dominicans and Dominicans. Alongside this, I will analyze trends in discrimination against Haitian Dominicans through data related to citizenship and documentation. With these trends being made clear, I will then inspect statistics on the information at hand to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why the communities, as they exist today, reached this point and why the disparities that exist exhibit themselves in the way that they do.

### **Human Development Index: Regionally Analyzed**

Analyzing the Human Development Index (HDI) and the corresponding scores for the Dominican Republic's nine geographic regions makes it immediately clear that the Dominican Republic's border regions stand out as among the least developed regions of the country (Image 2).




Image 2

A map of the Dominican Republic's nine geographical regions and their levels of development visualized; darker green indicating a higher HDI score and lighter green to yellow indicating a lower HDI score (Global Data Lab, 2019)

The Human Development Index takes a cumulative look at an assortment of indicative measures of statistics generally related to education, per capita income, and life expectancy to create a score that aims to provide an overview of the general quality of life in a place. Applied most commonly to countries on a national level, it can also be used to gauge quality of life in subnational entities, cities, and even neighborhoods. Higher life expectancies, per capita income, and a greater number of average years in formal education will contribute to a higher HDI score; lower scores for each statistic will result in a lower HDI score. With this, one can observe a

direct relationship between the statistics and evaluating a general understanding of development in a place.

The Dominican Republic's geographic regions and their boundaries stem largely from historical organization. They are each broken down from historic regions—Cibao, Sur, and Este/Sureste. The nine regions within these historical regions are most often used for statistical analyses on a subnational level in the Dominican Republic, but most particularly for development, as can be observed here. This allows for a more localized level of analysis that is not as broad as the historic regions with regard for the rural/urban divide that exists in the country. As mentioned previously, the country exhibits a stark disparity in income and development between rural and urban communities. This is most evident within the rural communities along the border, as seen in Image 2.

To break down individual scores to compare development across the country, one can see that the most developed region is Region 0, consisting of the National District and Santo Domingo's outskirts and the surrounding areas, standing at a score of 0.776 (see Image 2). Region II, in which Santiago de los Caballeros is located, has the country's second highest regional HDI score at .767. Region I, directly west of Region 0, stands just below it at a score of 0.756. The three border regions, as can be observed from the graphic above, are the least developed in the country, standing at scores of 0.717 (Region IV), 0.706 (Region VI), and 0.703 (Region VII) (Global Data Lab, 2019). It is clear from previous analyses that this disparity in development is directly related to policies that have oppressed the Haitian minorities residing in border regions. As indicated with the historical breakdown above, it was the Parsley Massacre that initiated the changes in policy that led to the continued oppression of Haitians in the region,

wiping out communities that drastically shifted the way of life for thousands in the border regions and disrupting development and economic activity in the region profoundly.

Alongside rural poverty being a general trend across much of the Dominican Republic, this leaves these border regions at a disadvantage developmentally today when compared to urban areas like Santo Domingo because they are disconnected from essential economic and logistical resources. As mentioned before, there was little change in these regions despite Trujillo's efforts to nationalize the region under a Dominican identity and developing roads in the border regions to unify the area to the rest of the country. Trujillo continually attempted to quash Haitian cultural influence and populations in the area, but the region is constantly experiencing immigration from the country directly adjacent.

What additionally compromises development in the border regions are natural disasters that have plagued the Caribbean for much of the region's history. According to data from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the Dominican Republic has experienced disaster losses at an estimated \$420 million per year (0.69% of the 2015 national GDP) during the span of time between 1961 to 2014 (GFDRR, 2019). Alongside rapid urbanization and poor management of natural resources, particularly in regions with limited legal reach, these problems are drastically exacerbated and affect these regions of the country most significantly. The border regions are especially prone to this with their mountainous terrain; earthquakes, floods, and landslides after hurricanes devastate rural communities nationwide and have been widely documented.

## An Analysis of Recent Migration Data

With this, one can also take the historical context alongside recent findings regarding the citizenship status of Haitian Dominicans to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of systematic oppression and discriminations by the Dominican government. Here, one can observe the findings from a 2015 study (Ribando Seelke, Margesson, and Taft-Morales, 2015) that breaks down the issue of citizenship and the debate related to it, tying into the historical problems that have been analyzed above (Image 3).




Image 3

These findings summarize data from two groups—those born in the Dominican Republic to migrant parents and those born outside of the country who migrated to the country. Within the group of those born to migrant parents in the country, there are two subgroups: those that had Dominican documentation and who have never had Dominican identification documents (Ribando Seelke, Margesson, & Taft Morales, 2015).

It is clear from these findings that those born in the country without documentation (Group B) are significantly less likely to have applied for documentation (roughly 4.4%) than those have immigrated to the country (57.7%) (Ribando Seelke, Margesson, and Taft-Morales,

2015). With these statistics in mind, one then needs to contextualize why these results were found. With that, I will now frame the study within the events that occurred beforehand and how the statistics were gathered.

As has already been made clear, immigration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic goes far back between the two countries' history, and recent surges have led to heightened tensions between the two, particularly considering how large the groups of Haitian migrants have been with recent problems in Haiti. It was after the surge in migration after the 2010 earthquake that a Dominican Constitutional Tribunal ruling in 2013 called into question the legal status of Dominicans of Haitian descent, particularly those born to parents without documentation. With this ruling, the Dominican government would then take action against children of undocumented immigrants with regard for their status, whether they would be rendered stateless by the government, and, in turn, whether or not they would be deported to Haiti. This was problematic, as Haiti—a country with struggling infrastructure and overcrowded cities—would face challenges with accommodating a surge in residents.

This ties back into the frequently discussed issue of the presence of Haitians in the Dominican Republic and brings into question how previous discriminatory legislation passed by the Dominican government contributed to the 2013 ruling. The policies churned out by the government over the last century have resulted in a pockmarked system that leaves different groups of Haitians—either of descent or having recently migrated—in the Dominican Republic with wildly differing legal statuses, as is evident from the findings of Ribando Seelke and colleagues' study. Nationality laws frequently clash and contradict each other, leading to abundant legal misfires and general uncertainty as more migrants enter the country. These issues,



tied into a tradition of discriminatory policies and views towards Haitians in the Dominican Republic, have led to a system that has essentially failed hundreds of thousands of people, once again showcasing the abundance of problems internal to the Dominican government.

To return to the statistic referencing Group B—children of immigrants without documentation—the Dominican government experienced pressure from the United States and other governments to provide legal resolve for those that fell within Group B. The governments of foreign actors like the US and others exuded pressure over this entire situation with its potential for vast human rights abuses, particularly regarding the potential for mass deportations to Haiti. Those who met the criteria to be included in the group were given a legal priority status to register for an expedited path to citizenship by February 1, 2015, having 18 months to register. That 4.4% previously mentioned was the percentage of people within Group B that registered prior to the deadline, but as of the time that the findings from the study were published, it remains unclear what will happen to the remaining 95.6% of individuals that still are a part of Group B that did not meet the deadline.

As can be observed, the statistic for those who have requested new documentation among Group A is relatively low, and the statistic for those in Group B that applied for the expedited path to citizenship is even lower. Why is this? Returning to the information provided in Chapter II regarding *cédulas*, those in the farming labor force were incredibly dependent on this documentation. Operating under a deeply flawed system that made assumptions based on one's appearance and background, often based on crude and incorrect judgements, it is understood that the legacy *cédulas* left for many Haitian Dominicans is tarnished at best. Subjecting a sizeable minority in a country to a registration system that served them poorly and categorized them

incorrectly guaranteed a sense of distrust among the group of the method that was used to legally legitimate their participation in the economy. Without a doubt, this was among the most demeaning tactics the government utilized.

Additionally, the inability of the government to aid the Haitian *cédula*-owning sugar workers also contributed to the low statistics among Groups A and B. As was explained in Chapter II, problems were common, and the government essentially provided no assistance for issues related to *cédulas* despite their relative importance at the time. Additionally, as stated in Chapter II, there even existed a heavier reliance among sugar workers on their employers—the leaders of the sugar plantations—than the government as a result of the government’s inability to address problems many Haitians had with their *cédulas* and other documentation. A lack in trust in the government is a definite way to erode faith in its abilities. With the Trujillo’s antagonistic stances towards the Haitian minority in the country, particularly during the period in which *cédulas* and documentation were so important, it is no surprise that the percentage of individuals in Group B is so low proportionately.

It is also clear from the statistics and the contextual information provided by Ribando Seelke, Margesson, and Taft Morales’s 2015 study that the stances of the Dominican Republic after this data was gathered continues to affirm the negative way in which the government views Haiti in a broad context. Even long before the Trujillo dictatorship, as made clear from the previous historical analyses, the Dominican government has viewed Haiti as the source of many of the Dominican Republic’s problems.

The proposed solution to deal with the unregistered immigrants and children of immigrants in the country, said the Dominican government before backlash from the

international community, was to potentially deport all those who were unregistered back to Haiti. Haiti is a country largely unfit to accommodate such a large influx of people on such short notice over an accelerated period, and many Haitians that would be subjected to a policy like this have been established in the Dominican Republic for an extended period. Deportation to Haiti would result in the propulsion for many into a culture and environment with which they may be partially or fully unfamiliar. A government cannot make simple generalizations in the way the Dominican government has for centuries about a group and expect those subjected to their policies to cooperate or engage with their proposed requirements.

Although efforts have been made to attempt to provide a solution for those living in the Dominican Republic with a compromised status regarding their background or citizenship, not enough has been done. Negative perspectives abound within the legal realm because of a challenged legacy relating to immigration and cultural relations, particularly those of Haitian descent. Life continues to be challenging for Haitian Dominicans and recent Haitian immigrants, with different individuals from differing backgrounds encountering discrimination due to the lack of understanding of communities that are poorly defined and inadequately recognized by the Dominican government.

## CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

With clarity, connections can be made between the historical context provided, the literature that has been analyzed, and the statistics that have been broken down. *Antihaitianismo* runs deeply through Dominican politics, and a culture that is generally intolerant of Haitians and their presence in the country continues to exist. This is incontestable; the government continues to have issues with providing adequate services and legal recognition for those of Haitian descent living in the country. Though rampant antagonism is not as prevalent as it was through the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, the remnants of these cultural and political behaviors continue to have ripple effects to this day through the passage of legislature and general cultural attitudes among Dominicans.

What must be questioned once again, however, is how historical developments, particularly those related to the rule of Rafael Trujillo, have led to a generally challenged state of living for Haitians in the Dominican Republic today and how the effects of his rule continue to resound to this day. The findings presented in this thesis affirm with resounding clarity that Trujillo's fervent disdain for Haitians, discriminatory policies, cultural clashes, and a brutal massacre along the border with Haiti drastically worsened living conditions for Haitians in the Dominican Republic, which is still the case to this day.

Historical analyses are perhaps the best means to understand the development and cultivation of *antihaitianismo* in the Dominican Republic, particularly leading up to and during the Trujillo presidency. Stemming from cultural and political tension predating independence in both countries on Hispaniola, the continued exchange of power between Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo essentially doomed the two countries to have soured relations into the future.

Eventually, the Dominican Republic came to possess more economic strength than Haiti, and this tied into what stands today as a history of benefits reaped from the exploitation of Haitian labor by certain sectors of the Dominican economy, particularly the agricultural sector. Trujillo's institutionalization of labor and the widespread enforcement of documentation that unfairly profiled Haitians and Dominicans of all backgrounds set a precedent for the future treatment of Haitians in the country.

Alongside all of this, the Parsley Massacre is arguably the most consequential event in the history of the two nations. The mass murder of tens of thousands of people has left many in the Dominican Republic's border region to continue living life in fear that they too would be targeted on the basis of their race. It was from here that a ruthless and autocratic rule of a dictator who despised his neighboring country ensued. Policies, passed with the assistance of many close confidants, continued to challenge the lifestyle of the hundreds of thousands of Haitians that lived in the Dominican Republic, worsening relations between the two communities.

Additionally, cultural differences played a prominent role in the policy-driven divide between the two communities. The Trujillo administration actively targeted the religion and language of Haitians by legitimizing negative stereotypes and perspectives of Haitians into Dominican society. What must also be understood is the role foreign powers and onlookers, particularly the United States. Exhibiting its Good Neighbor policy, the United States continued to support Trujillo despite the Parsley Massacre. Even alongside comparisons to Hitler, Trujillo continued to pass policy initiatives to portray himself as a leader concerned with national defense and interests, concealing his racist and discriminatory intentions.

Statistics are supplemental for analyzing *antihaitianismo* and its effects as well. As can be observed from the regional HDI scores and how they compare on a national level, the border regions of the country are less developed when compared to the rest of the country, particularly urban areas. This can be observed in conjunction with the fact that the Parsley Massacre and anti-Haitian speech campaigns took place here in the 1930s, as has been explained. This can, in turn, be connected to the lower HDI scores in how they inhibited communities in the area from developing alongside the rest of the country. The events that took place here, targeting significant Haitian minority communities that are still present today, came to set a precedent for living conditions that unfortunately prevail to this day.

Additionally, the tarnished legacy of a documentation policy that originated in the 1930s continues to exude influence. A lack of trust in government policy and action because of the damaging *cédulas* that were strictly enforced have resulted in a population of individuals that are children of immigrants to the Dominican Republic, largely Haitian, who are not properly documented. Although born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents, their background and history of family immigration continues to lead the Dominican government to fail to categorize them for who they truly are—Dominicans that were born in the country and raised in the culture that the government claims to uphold.

*Antihaitianismo* remains present in all facets of life to this day for Haitians and Haitian Dominicans. This is clear through works of writing and art created by those that not only suffered directly because of its enforcement and presence in the Dominican Republic, but by those who are descendants of those that have suffered along with members of the Haitian diaspora. As *antihaitianismo* has been rampant and destructive across generations, particularly

post-Parsley Massacre, it remains a prominent theme in works across all mediums. Arguably among the best-known works that provides a fictional historical overview of the Parsley Massacre and its effects is Edwidge Danicat's *Farming of Bones*, inspired after Danicat visited the Dominican Republic's Dajabón region and was alarmed to hear from Haitians in the area that they were unaware that the Parsley Massacre had ever occurred.

Inspired to memorialize the suffering of those that died and lost homes and communities in the massacre, Danibon paints an image with vivid detail of the suffering that discrimination Haitians encountered before, during, and after the Parsley Massacre. Continually referred to as “*kout kouto*”, the term in Haitian Creole used to refer to the Parsley Massacre, the story artfully presents the reader with a window into a period that Danibon did not want to be forgotten and indicates the immense significance that is held in the awareness of events such as the Parsley massacre and its role in the shaping of the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals in a community that has faced and continues to face systemic racism and discrimination to an unending degree.

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