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A Comparative Analysis of the People's Republic of China and Its Treatment of Uyghur Muslims and Nazi Germany and Its Treatment of the Jewish People

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ITS TREATMENT OF UYGHUR MUSLIMS
AND
NAZI GERMANY AND ITS TREATMENT OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

by

JORDAN R. ELLIS
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2022

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science
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Thesis Chair: Kelsey Larsen, Ph.D.
Other Committee Members: Kenneth Hanson, Ph.D. and Justin Miller, M.A.

ABSTRACT

Like many before, this thesis uses the tragedy of the Holocaust as a historical comparison to an event occurring today, mainly in the Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China. Many historians have argued that comparisons to the Holocaust should be academically or intellectually prohibited. Many have stated that such an effort could minimize the perceived severity of or unintentionally raise other events to the level of the Jewish genocide. However, such comparisons should be permitted and are necessary to help prevent a similar atrocity from ever occurring again. There is much to be learned from Nazi policy and ideology that may be used to aid genocide prevention. Thus, this paper will discuss how policies or actions within two cases may be similar or different via comparative analysis. Such a discussion will be approached by examining basic principles of Nazi ideology and directly comparing them to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. The secondary portion of this research will evaluate a direct comparison of the policies of Nazi Germany and the People's Republic of China regarding the respective minorities in question. Furthermore, this piece's preliminary assumption is that the two cases will be vastly different. Like many complex cases throughout history, few show literal parallels- especially those birthing from different cultures and spanning separate eras. This thesis fundamentally tackles the uncertainty of dissimilarity between the two cases aforementioned.

Keywords: Xinjiang, Holocaust, Uyghur, Jew, Muslim, China

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INTRODUCTION - WHAT CRISIS?

First, they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out— because I was not a Jew. Then they came for me— and there was no one left to speak for me.¹ (Niemöller, 2020, p. 738)

What do we mean when we repeat the phrase *never again*? Do we genuinely mean it, or do we just want to believe a horror like the Holocaust could never happen again? Indeed, there were those during the reign of the Nazi Party in Germany before the implementation of the Final Solution that thought such an atrocity could never occur in a *modern* Germany. This sounds very similar to the words of many today who believe that another genocide on the scale of the Holocaust is not possible.

Today, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, China, has fallen under the international community's microscope, or satellite telescope. Uyghurs are the largest Turkic ethnic group in the Xinjiang region (Davis, 2008). Multiple nations and entire international organizations have expressed their concern regarding the secretive nature of the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in the western region of China. The accusations lobbed at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are severe. The situation has created a sense of urgency among many to investigate, uphold the meaning of *never again* and determine if such implications brought about by these words are appropriate.

¹ A post-war quote from Pastor Martin Niemöller (1892-1984)- a prominent Lutheran pastor and critic of Hitler in Germany. He was forcibly imprisoned in concentration camps during the last seven years of Nazi Party rule.

In 2018 reports began emerging from the Xinjiang region that groups of people, solely based on their ethnicity and religion, were being detained en-mass in *political re-education* camps (Raza, 2019). With the presentation of such reports, many in the international community began asking harsher questions. In 2019, new reports came about, increasing the suspicions of human rights activists and governments worldwide. In these new documents, an estimated 1.5 million or 17% of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was detained. In response to questioning, the Chinese government attempted to reassure skeptics that the camps were established for the safety of China by re-educating those with *extremist* views. Yet, more questions were left unanswered, such as why children aged 3-6 were being forced into programs that enforced *re-education* (Raza, 2019).

Certain *beneficial modernization* programs have destroyed mosques and caused damage to several in the span of two years from 2016 to 2018 (Raza, 2019). Another example is the Han-Chinese Migration Incentives. In this migration program, Han-Chinese are encouraged to visit the Xinjiang region, where they reportedly have relatives living. During these visits, Uyghurs are presented with eastern Chinese customs, culture, and language. It is reportedly the intention of these programs to transform the Uyghur population into a more *Chinese* population. According to Raza (2019), Uyghurs are highly encouraged, if not disallowed, to push back against these indirect forms of cultural reeducation if they do not wish to be subject to more rigorous methods of *re-education*.

There is cause for investigation into potential human rights abuses with so many unknowns. This study will take advantage of what can be compared to Nazi ideology and policy implementations of said ideology while determining the need for future research. In the current case of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, this paper will attempt to draw preliminary conclusions regarding

the state of events and their dissimilarity to the Holocaust. Albeit, on their faces, the two cases seemingly follow the trends of other historical comparative analyses that use the Holocaust as the dependent variable. Due to the cultural differences and the period that separates many cases, the Holocaust stands out as is rather unique. Hopefully, by making similar inquiries, we are fulfilling the meaning of *never again* and partially clarifying some of the uncertainty surrounding this case.

LITERATURE REVIEW - PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE

There are various perspectives regarding comparisons to Nazi policies and the Holocaust. The best phraseology for the question of comparability is instead to discuss the uniqueness of Nazi policy and the Holocaust. Yet, the first issue we run into is the definition of uniqueness itself. Two meanings, among others, determine that the said unique thing in question is incomparable or unprecedented (Margalit & Motzkin, 1996). With that being said, is the Holocaust incomparable or unprecedented- for its time or now?

According to Margalit and Motzkin (1996), when labeling a historical event incomparable, one might logically assume that, when applied to an event such as the Holocaust, this event cannot be compared to either past or future events. Yet, Steven T. Katz (2001) has stated in “The Uniqueness of the Holocaust: The Historical Dimension,” chapter four of *Is the Holocaust Unique?* that he firmly believes that the Holocaust is a unique phenomenon in history; never has a state set out to destroy an entire ethnic population. In conjunction, Margalit and Motzkin (1996) firmly demonstrated that they believe that certain aspects of the Holocaust are unique yet object to the notion that the genocide is incomparable or unprecedented. This thesis agrees with the statements above on perhaps a more logical level. Yes, the Holocaust itself is unique; currently, no event lives up to the method and other factors of the genocide and policies of the Nazis. This does not mean that the event itself should not be used as a benchmark for historical comparisons and comparisons to the events of today or tomorrow.

Furthermore, Margalit and Motzkin (1996) agree that, because the Holocaust is unprecedented, “new brutalities in the future may relegate the Holocaust to being merely the first

instance of a new form of social behavior” (p. 66). Such a statement would suggest that, although the genocide and subsequent Nazi policies are unique, they can still be used as a benchmark for future analysis of separate events. Yehuda Bauer, a prominent historian of the Holocaust, argues that the Holocaust is not unique. He often rivals the *mystification* of the genocide with the question: if that event is not at all unique, where then are its parallels or precedents? (Eckardt & Eckardt, 1980, p. 167). This thesis will attempt to fill a gap in the literature on how Nazi policies may be used comparatively or as benchmarks for the current Uyghur Muslim crisis in Xinjiang, China.

Comparative Case Examples

Experience and perspective can be drawn from past comparative case analyses involving other instances in which researchers use the Holocaust as the dependent variable to examine the independent variables of other cases in which governments or groups of individuals are accused of genocide or ill-treatment of another group. Such comparative studies can be used by examining the methodology, breadth of investigation, dissemination of information, and conclusions to determine the applicability and *appropriateness* of using the Holocaust as the dependent variable in this study.

René Lemarchand’s 2002 article, *Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust Reconsidered*, makes a concerted effort to analyze points of convergence and dissimilarity between the two cases of genocide in Nazi Germany and Rwanda in 1994. This piece evaluates old and makes new points while concluding the parallels, or lack thereof, between the two.

Lemarchand evaluates the applicability of the term genocide in each case while determining how the individual variables of the Rwanda case align directly, or not, with the variables of Nazi Germany. Specifically, the author grapples with the questions of defining *victim* and *antagonist* between both cases and the degree to which they are dissimilar in each case. Lemarchand also analyses the ideological context in which both cases unfold before discussing the differences between the implementation of violence. Fundamentally, while re-examining the work of others and current evidence, the paper draws many clear distinctions and similarities relatively straightforwardly, thus providing evidence of the possibility, appropriateness, and effectiveness of using the Holocaust as the dependent variable in comparative case analyses.

Laurence Thomas' 1991 article, *American Slavery and the Holocaust: Their Ideologies Compared*, literally tackles an ideology-biased comparative case analysis. It states boldly that the Holocaust and American slavery are fundamentally different from one another (Thomas, 1991). Breaking down the analysis into categories: The Coercive Factor; The Issue of Natal Alienation; and The Conception of the Victims, this paper makes confident statements as to why the Holocaust was genocide while American Slavery was natal alienation by using historical evidence and previous analysis. Slightly different from the last paragraph's article, Thomas' article solely discusses the ideological differences and does so efficiently, effectively, and definitively.

In *Paradigms of Genocide: The Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, and Contemporary Mass Destructions*, a 1996 article by Robert Melson, a comparative analysis of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide is used to determine that, although people often turn to the Holocaust as a reference point of genocide, perhaps the proper dependent variable in such studies should be the Armenian Genocide. The author begins by briefly stating the similarities between the two cases

and detailing the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust individually, elaborating on the differences in a substantially longer section afterward. As with other studies, the differences between the two are rather extensive, while the similarities are consistently shorter or more general- referring to patterns or the implementation of genocide. This piece also references cases of atrocities in Nigeria and Yugoslavia, using Armenia as the dependent variable. Thus, based on the findings of the latter analysis, it was determined that the Armenian Genocide might serve as a better dependent variable than the Holocaust. Regardless of this secondary conclusion, this study cements the possibility of effectively using the Holocaust to gain a better understanding of other cases of atrocity to discover patterns, parallels, and dissimilarities while going even further to show that the Holocaust can be used in comparison case analyses to determine which is the *better* standard to compare other cases to.

It is clearly possible to effectively, efficiently, and definitively produce evidence of parallels, patterns, and dissimilarities between comparative case analyses that use the Holocaust to draw its dependent variables. As such, this paper confidently moves forward in its pursuit of determining such relationships between the Holocaust and the Uyghur Muslim Crisis.

METHODOLOGY

The research method utilized in this study may be defined as a comparative case study. The analysis portion tests the dissimilarity of the Holocaust and the Uyghur Muslim Crisis in the People's Republic of China. A traditional comparative case study utilizes the facts of two cases and cross compares them in various ways deemed necessary and proper by the researchers. Such a method of analysis is useful in identifying parallels, dissimilarities, and patterns between multiple cases. Using Nazi ideology and policy implementations regarding the Jews of Germany as the dependent variables, the ideology and policy implementations of said policy on the part of the Chinese Communist Party regarding Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang will be directly compared as the independent variables. The extent to which some of the major components that define each case's variables are dissimilar will be analyzed by making conclusions regarding how the independent variables must develop to logically parallel the dependent variables.

This study will be modeled closely after Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan Beasley's publication, *A Practical Guide to Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology* (1999). According to Kaarbo and Beasley (1999), the complications that are conjunctive with comparative case studies usually include the problem of "too many variables" (p. 378). Becoming increasingly focused on a specific phenomenon and addressing a finite issue is the best solution (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999). For the reasons above, the thesis will be focused solely on two individual cases with clear parameters. First, regarding the Jews preceding the end of the Holocaust, this thesis will focus only on those who resided in Germany at any point during the formation of the Nazi Party and through the end of World War Two. To keep this comparative study organized and precise, Jews and other

minorities outside of Germany will not be included, as the paper will be directly comparing the ideology and policies of one government (Nazi Germany) to another government the (CCP) in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Together, these two parties will be analyzed regarding their relation to the specific minority populations within their borders within their respective periods and cross-compared. Given the parameters of limitation surrounding this Honors Undergraduate Thesis, it would be unwise to delve any further into other academic study while promising to address the issue in question appropriately.

It is hypothesized that the treatment of Uyghur Muslims on the part of the People's Republic of China is dissimilar to the treatment of the Jews preceding the end of the Holocaust on the part of Nazi Germany regarding policy and, more so, ideology. To make this study easier to replicate, the hypothesis being tested can be described, according to the classification requirements laid out by Elezovic (2021), as a theoretical, qualitative hypothesis (pp. 166-167). In the case of this thesis, this classification means that the hypothesis being used is formed in a manner that aids the explanation of the research itself by using a theoretical qualitative extreme to be tested.

Two extremes may act as the hypothesis and aid the research and explanation of findings: one, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China is entirely dissimilar to the treatment of the Jews in Germany; two, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China is altogether similar to the treatment of the Jews in Germany. According to the scientific method of study, it is logically plausible that either extreme may be concluded as accurate; both must remain an open possibility to produce a logical study. Although, based on superficial research, it is clear that the final answer will fall somewhere between the two extremes. As René Lemarchand (2002) stated, history, "as someone said, never repeats itself, but it sometimes rhymes" (p. 499). As such, due to the cultural and period

differences between the two cases, it can be theorized that the cases will have striking dissimilarities, but patterns may emerge. The former hypothetical explanation will be used for the creation of the hypothesis because it seems, in this case, it will be simpler to provide data to disprove the existence of nothing rather than disproving the existence of everything: the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China is entirely similar to the treatment of the Jews in Germany.

In comparative case studies, it is imperative to “establish the relationship between two or more variables; it is necessary to minimize variability in other variables that may affect the investigated relationship” (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 379). The variables that will be tested are as follows: the extent to which the case of the Uyghurs in China resembles the case of the Jews in Nazi Germany in terms of ideology and policy. The thesis will qualitatively test the hypothesis of whether these variables concerning Uyghurs in China compare to those of the Jews in Germany during the reign of the Nazis. These variables will be tested in a manner consistent with the methodology (Step 3 and 4) laid out by Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) in that the historical variable (Jews in Nazi Germany) will be used to derive the bases of comparison in a broad manner (p. 380). This is because the history of the Holocaust and Nazi policy is well established, while the situation Uyghur Muslims are experiencing is unfolding. Therefore, a question that will be used to test the similarities or differences between the two cases will be: If we know fact *A* about the Uyghur situation, how must it progress to be the same as fact *A* regarding the Jews in Nazi Germany, if there is even a similar fact in both cases. Furthermore, how easily can fact *A* regarding the Uyghur situation progress to exemplify fact *A* regarding the Jews in Nazi Germany? If there is no equivalent or similar fact *A* in both cases or is an exact comparison, such a conclusion will be stated simply. This method of questioning will provide as consistent a mode of testing across all

variables as possible and provide an increasingly clear picture of the findings and the need for future research.

An issue that may arise from studying this matter is the politicization surrounding the Uyghur Muslim situation. The information retrieved must be sourced to limit the effects of such a problem. Regarding the collection of information, the sources used will be restricted to academic journals, books, and government publications. This is to ensure the consistency and intellectual integrity of the thesis.

Furthermore, the concern of reliable information must be dealt with. As this situation is being used worldwide for propaganda for multiple purposes, the data used must be as empirical as possible and evaluated for misinformation from private and governmental sources. This issue will be dealt with by, again, using specific academically endorsed sources, governmental reports, and primary sources of information.

ANALYSIS

Ideology

The Nazi Party and German Jews

Undoubtedly, it would be academically, historically, and logically inconsistent to try to separate Hitlerism from Nazism and, subsequently, the Holocaust itself. Using the definition and categorization process afforded by Herman & Herman (1989) regarding an *ultimate decision unit*, it can be determined, as Fuhrer, Hitler would be considered a predominant leader, insensitive to external influences, and generally self-contained (p. 363).² Although the aforementioned article applies its definition and categorization of decision units to foreign policy, it is the opinion of this paper that the same process can appropriately be applied to domestic policy as well. In conjunction with many scholars, it is the opinion of this paper that the Hitlerian ideology can be shown to be inseparable from Nazism and the Holocaust as Hitler drove Nazi ideology and, subsequently, the Holocaust itself. Therefore, if individuals wish to understand the ideology that drove the Holocaust, one must understand that of Hitler.

A complication arises when trying to determine what were Hitler's true beliefs. After all, he was, by definition, a politician; therefore, the issue now becomes separating Hitler's true ideology from his rhetoric. This approach can be most effective by reviewing his ideological stances and personal beliefs before his political career. One such opportunity is presented while

² According to Herman & Herman (1989), a *predominant leader* is defined as, "A single individual [who] has the power to make [a] choice and stifle opposition (p. 363).

reviewing Hitler's comments written in a letter to Adolf Gemlich on September 16, 1919. In this, he expresses his belief that Jews are a member of a race, not a religion (Simms, 2014). Hitler goes on to describe Jews as a "racial tuberculosis" (*Rassentuberkulose der Völker*) (Simms, 2014, p. 330). Although Wilhelm Marr adopted the term racial antisemitism in the late 19th century, this is a break from historical Jewish discrimination that addressed Jews as belonging to a religious group (Klier, 1989, p. 529). Furthermore, because of Hitler's words in this letter, we can be certain that *Mein Kampf* is an early staple of Nazi racial ideology.

Throughout history, antisemitism was primarily based on Christian anti-Judaism (Bauer, 2001). Generally, Jews are blamed for not recognizing Jesus as the Messiah and, subsequently, his murder. According to historian George L. Moses, even German antisemitism during the 19th century did not break the bounds of racial hatred; the Jew was not German but an outsider (Bauer, 2001). Even with Hitler's assertion that the Jews were a diseased race, the mass murder of this religious group was not yet in the German playbook.

This transformation from religious antisemitism to racial antisemitism effectively required a transformation of the traditional solution to the so-called *Jewish Question* as well. The method of resolving religious differences can be quite *simple*: offer the choice of conversion or punishment.³ Transforming a religious group into a racial group makes this resolution untenable; one cannot be converted to another race but can be punished for their existence.

Furthermore, with the rise of the Nazis- ironically, in part via democratic means- Hitler's ideology began to take root, although obtaining scant results at first. In the beginning, his virulent

³ This *traditional solution* is a drastic simplification of historical approaches to the history of Jewish discrimination. Throughout history, Jews have been subject to slavery, economic and political discrimination, forced conversion, and even death (Bauer, 2001).

antisemitism was dampened so as not to make potential supporters uneasy. Starting just two decades before the outbreak of World War Two (WWII), Hitler wrote a twenty-point party program for the newly named National Socialist German Worker's Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP*) (Bosmajian, 1969). He laid out some of the earliest ideas of what this new Nazi party desired in this plan. According to Hitler's twenty-five-point party program, most of the problems Germans faced could be traced back to Jews; Jews could not be citizens of Germany as they were not truly German (Bosmajian, 1969). Although this program did state that Jews should be considered alien members of German society, that is if they didn't have a significant history in the nation. Unfortunately for recent migrants, they would be deported. Furthermore, with Hitler's time in prison and the authoring of *My Struggle (Mein Kampf)* in 1925, the Nazi ideology once again became increasingly apparent as he labeled the Jew as the enemy.

During the 1932 elections, the Nazis won 37.4% of the seats in the Reichstag (German Parliament) (Kerwin, 1932). Soon, Hitler would gain ultimate power. It is quite clear that Germany had not embraced Nazi ideology until just before the election. In 1933, the nation had a new chancellor, Adolf Hitler. Thus, ushering in an era of Nazi antisemitism that would soon sweep the country.

As stated previously, Nazi antisemitism began in the shadow of economic and anti-communist propaganda, among other things. Yet, soon enough, a new pathogenic hatred that combined Christian and pseudoscientific 19th-century antisemitism prevailed, equating the Jews to Satan himself (Bauer, 2001). The ideology that would drive the Holocaust would continue to fester. Yet, it also had reached a point of no return, as had Germany.

Finally, to summarize Nazi antisemitism, Walter Zwi Bacharach (1998) describes the fundamental qualities of the newly appointed chancellor of Germany in the book chapter “Antisemitism and Racism in Nazi Ideology” from *The Holocaust and History*. Bacharach (1998) argues it is fundamentally anti-Christian and pagan in its essence. This transformed hatred was defined by parasitology- the Jew as a parasite, deeming Jews the core of Germanic problems and racial hatred (Bacharach, 1998). This drove the party’s policy, running rampant in its political convictions as well. The politicization of antisemitism was the greatest transformation of Jewish hatred. Essentially, the Nazi Revolution was an anti-Jewish revolution.

The brief explanation and chronological summarization of Nazi ideology laid out in this section have been written to include all generally necessary components. Therefore, removing any portion of this paper’s explanation of Nazi ideology would deem it logically unrecognizable. Thus, using these fundamental points, our question becomes: are there similarities between the ideology of the Nazi Party regarding Jews and the ideology of the CCP regarding Uyghurs.

Table 1

Components of Nazi Ideology in Relation to German Jews

- i. Uses a contradictory form of the majority and a minority religion to weaken the members of the minority, making them more vulnerable while bolstering the majority religion, ideology, and socio-political structure of the nation itself.
- ii. Uses a group to base the nation’s problems. Broadly links this group to many issues.

Comparative Analysis - Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party's People's Republic of China Relating to the Uyghur Population of Xinjiang

With the death of Mao Zedong, Maoism has since faded as the ideological driving force in China. According to Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova (2018), the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party appear to base their beliefs on what can be best described as “Marxism Leninism and state socialism” while embracing markets and entrepreneurialism (p. 325). Furthermore, the evolution of the Xi era from the Hu era is not representative of a grand shift in ideology, but a set of different politics used to tackle issues that have plagued China for decades. In slight contrast to the constant revolution that defines Nazi ideology, “the onus [of CCP ideology] is on continuity, evolution, and development in the realms of action and thought, not revolution and the dramatic abandonment of the past” (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018, p. 328).

According to Klimeš and Marinelli (2018), the importance of ideology as a driving factor in the actions of the Chinese Communist Party has not decreased from the post-Mao era in the late 70s- carefully concealed but aimed at achieving sustainable one-party rule, the assertion of discipline, and the control of the core tactical spaces. It appears that, in general, it is the common belief that CCP ideology is driven in part by the will to make a CCP-led China a great nation. *Xi Jinping Thought* has become fundamental to the evolution of China since 2012. The belief that a Xi Jinping-led CCP would restore China to greatness could initially be seen with the updated term limits of the State Chairman and the State Vice-Chairman while allowing President Xi to remain in power.

In accordance with the assertion made by Klimeš and Marinelli (2018) and many other scholars, *Xi Jinping Thought* is inseparable from the current ideology of the CCP and by extension, the People's Republic of China. Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova (2018) analyzed twelve

“keywords” or a “core series” of words to provide an outline the ideology of the Xi Jinping era. *Minzhu* – “democratic”; “*wenming*” – “cultured/civilized”; “*ziyou*” – “freedom”; “*pingdeng*” – “equality”; “*fazhi*” – “rule of law”; “*aiguo*” – “patriotism”; “*jingye*” – “dedication”; “*chengxin*” – “trust”; “*youshan*” – “friendly” (pp. 332-334). By themselves, the words have little to no recognizable connection until one analyzes how they are used. These *keywords* act as bonds to Chinese nationalism and the idea of using national unity and the party that will lead China to greatness- sacrificing human rights and other ethical concerns for the sake of the nation (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Achieving a unified China is undoubtedly a lead focal point for President Xi in his efforts to restore a great nation. Furthermore, how one defines unity and evaluates the price appropriate to pay to acquire such a commodity must be analyzed.

A National Security Law passed in 2015 defined “national security” as:

“A status in which the regime, sovereignty, *unity*, territorial integrity, welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively not faced with any danger and not threatened internally or externally and the capability to maintain a sustained security status”⁴ (Finnegan, 2020, p. 7).

This would leave open the possibility of the CCP to use this language to target ethnic minorities, especially Muslim minorities, as they would be considered a front to the *unity* of China. This can also be seen by a Counter-Terrorism Law, “which targeted what the CCP deemed to be a terrorist activity, with a specific focus on the Uyghur population in Xinjiang” (Finnegan, 2020, p. 7).

In general, Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party have not used Uyghurs to base the nation’s problems entirely. Rather, they often argue that the extremist threat from the region of western China is what drives much of their policy regarding the *re-education* and internment of

⁴ Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China 2015, art 2.

Uyghurs to help bring about a *unified* China. In his 2018 article, *Ideology, Propaganda, and Political Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era*, Klimeš argues that national and provincial authorities within China during President Xi's first term introduced *ethnic unity* and *de-extremization* policies to achieve social stability and the “modernization of the Xinjiang governance system and capacity” (p. 418). This continuation of ideational objectives was incorporated into policy after an escalation of violence in 2007. The ethnopolitical tensions within the Xinjiang region have troubled the domestic security of China for decades. To this day, ideology is used to transform the worldview and political values of Uyghurs.

In the effort to transform these values, the PRC does use propaganda to present a warped version of Islam. However, it has not generally claimed that Islam has anything to do with blood as the Nazis stated about German Jewry. It seems to attempt such transformations by making security arguments and standardizing a hegemonic-Han-based way of life for what China argues is for the benefit of Uyghurs and the country as a whole. This can be seen, in part, in the way the government describes any unrest in the Xinjiang region as *extremism*. Furthermore, there are campaigns to label Muslim religious traditions such as wearing headscarves or face coverings and growing beards as a young man as backward, outdated, or implications of extremism.

In the early years of the Xi presidency, efforts to increase control in the Xinjiang region have intensified efforts to alter the religion, culture, and other attributes that make up Uyghur ethnic identity (Klimeš, 2018; Klimeš & Marinelli, 2018). After 2009, the Chinese Communist Party continued its monetary investment policy in the Xinjiang region and combined a new approach based on assimilation with “eugenic overtones” (Millward, 2021, p. 536). According to Finnegan (2020), by analyzing the history of the State policies of China and the recent legislative

initiatives over the past 20 years, the CCP has a clear aim to assimilate the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang into the Han-majority way of life.

As a result, it does not appear that the ideology of the CCP is based on anti-Muslim principles in the same way Nazi ideology was fundamentally borne out of antisemitism. Rather, the CCP's ideological function, by design, produces an environment that is secular and Han-based. Anything that challenges this hegemony is treated as a threat to *unity*. As such, Uyghur Muslims' way of life and actions in Xinjiang do not meet the requirements of this ideal image of China, regardless of extremist actions in the region.

Table 2

Core Components of Chinese Communist Party Ideology in Relation to Uyghur Muslims

- i. Strong belief in cultural hegemony and national *unity*.
- ii. Culturally and politically secular, leaving little room for expression outside the *norm*.

Policy Implementation

Nazi Jewish policy 1933-1938

With the destruction of the Reichstag in February of 1933, the Nazis ushered in an era of arrests, fear, and the suppression of constitutional guarantees (Leichsenring, n.d.). After a failed attempt to secure a parliamentary majority with new elections that excluded the Communist party, Hitler turned to other methods to ensure Nazi control (Bauer, 2001). The “Act for the Removal of the Distress of People and Reich,” also known as the Enabling Act, was passed, removing legislative power from the Reichstag and handing it to the Nazi-controlled government (Leichsenring, n.d.). Furthermore, a series of legal and political actions led to the legal declaration of Nazi hegemony- making Hitler’s party the only legal, political party in the nation (Leichsenring, n.d.). According to Bauer (2001), after the death of Hindenburg in 1934, with the combination of the presidency and the office of the Chancellor (*Reichskanzler*), a new government was created with Hitler as supreme leader- Führer. This cemented the ability of Hitler to swear in Nazi anti-Jewish policy.

According to Bessel (2004), the idea that Hitler rose to complete power because of his anti-Semitic beliefs would be fundamentally untrue. Together with Bauer, these two historians make the point that the millions of voters who supported the Nazi party did so for many reasons other than anti-semitism. This is not to say that these additional reasons were exclusive. Certainly, the anti-Jewish bent of Hitler and his party drew support. Yet, it should be noted that by 1933 few Germans attempted to “stick their necks out” to resist Jewish racism (Bessel, 2004, p. 179). Jewish

hatred was not at all new in Germany yet, the politicization of it after 1933 certainly was. Fundamentally, it was Nazi hegemony that enabled this rapid politicization on a national scale.

A goal of the new Nazi government was the exclusion of Jews from German society. As noted by Bauer (2001), much of the post-1933 anti-Jewish policy was seemingly in line with the general proposals of the 1913 book, *Wen Ich der Kaiser Wäre* (If I were Kaiser, Berlin 1913), by Heinrich Class (p. 108). Again, these policy proposals weren't necessarily new; they now had the possibility of implementation.

Between 1933 and 1935, Jews were barred from judicial service and occupations, civil service, armed service, the press, and cultural institutions such as art, film, and theatre. Ritual slaughter was outlawed, and Jews could no longer own German land (Bauer, 2001). There was even an attempt to bar them from the economy writ large via a boycott of Jewish business; led by Goebbels, Streicher, and Gauleiter, the campaign of forcing Jews out of the German economy was established. New Jewish citizens of Germany were to be stripped of their official German status, marriage was barred between Jews and *true Germans*, and it became illegal for Jews to fly the German flag according to the so-called Nuremberg Laws (National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.; Bauer, 2001). Even Jewish names, translated into German, were deemed illegitimate (Bauer, 2001). Jews were stripped of political and social, and most of their economic power.

As the war drew nearer, the outlook on the lives of German Jews became abysmal. In conjunction with Hitler's goal for *Lebensraum* (living space) across Europe for a revived Aryan race, the Jews had to be *taken care of*. In 1936, Herman Göring established the Nazi Four-Year Plan that would prepare Germany for war (Weinberg, 1988, p. 133). As such, the removal of the

Jews had to take place during these four years. Otherwise, Hitler believed that the “Jewish Satan” would destroy the German people- destroy or be destroyed (Bauer, 2001, p. 113). It is clear from history that the Nazis did not achieve their goal. As such, the policies toward the Jewish people in Germany became more extreme.

In 1938, the political, social, and economic assault on the Jews advanced. In April, hiding the Jewish identity of businesses became illegal; these businesses had to join a registry if they were valued at over 5,000 marks (Bauer, 2001). The restrictions on Jewish occupational options were further limited when the law decided they were stripped of their right to provide medical treatment to Aryans entirely (Wischnitzer, 1940). The names of all Jewish men and women were changed to Israel and Sarah, respectively; Jewish passports were to be identified with the marking of the letter “J” (Bauer, 2001). In addition, there later were attempts to deport Jews out of the country forcibly. Many of these migration plans either were never implemented, did not meet their goals, or failed entirely.

There was an escalation of anti-Jewish policy between 1933 and 1938. After *Kristallnacht* (The Night of Broken Glass), the fate of the Jews deteriorated even further.

The Final Solution for Jewish Germans

The use of concentration camps in Nazi Germany started shortly after the Nazi hegemony began in 1933. According to Goeschel and Wachsmann (2010), knowledge of the camps had spread throughout the world prior to the discovery of their true destructive nature. While the camps were in use, only testimonials such as that of Gerhart Seger, a former Social Democratic Reichstag deputy who escaped the Oranienburg camp near Berlin in 1933, and other leaks offered a look into

Nazi brutality in these establishments (Goeschel & Wachsmann, 2010). These early mass-detention facilities were small in number, had a lower population, and their function was not murder until they were transformed into sites of unbearable atrocity during wartime (Goeschel & Wachsmann, 2010).

In conjunction with Goeschel and Wachsmann (2010), this paper asserts that there are essentially four stages that explain the development and evolution of the concentration camps. The early camps (1933-4); second, the formation of the Schutzstaffel (SS) camp system (1934-7); third, the expansion of the camp system (1937-9); fourth, mass execution (1940-45). Regarding the first stage, the camps were essentially used as weapons of domestic political terror, interning around 150,000-200,000 enemies of the state (Goeschel and Wachsmann, 2010). During the second stage, the camp system came to fruition. No longer was the camp system an improvisation of the desires of the Nazi party. With the SS now aiding in the establishment and control of these facilities, their function and use became more efficient and expansive. In the third stage, the number of concentration camps increased as the ratio of political prisoners and communists to social undesirables began to shift towards the latter. During this period, even Jewish prisoners were eligible for release, and most were (Goeschel and Wachsmann, 2010). The transition to the fourth stage of camp evolution coincides with Hitler's *final solution*.

First, it must be noted that by 1939, nearly half of all German Jews had left Germany (Bauer, 2001). Nearly 234,000 Jews in the pre-1938 nation were subject to the final solution (Blau, 1950). The term, *final solution* was used for the first time in an order from Göring to Heydrich on July 31, 1941, that stated, "...I further commission you to submit to me promptly an overall plan showing the preliminary organizational, substantive, and financial measures for the execution of

the intended final solution of the Jewish question” (Bauer, 2001, p. 220). For the Jews in Germany, they were to be deported eastward. In 1941, the year all German Jews were to be marked with the Star of David, Hitler stated on October 6th that “all Jews have to be removed from the protectorate, not only to the General Government but straight on to the east. ... Together with the Jews of the Protectorate, all the Jews of Vienna and Berlin must disappear” (Browning, 1994, p. 477). Hedrick also announced, “the Führer wishes that by the end of the year as many Jews as possible are removed from the German sphere” (Browning, 1994, p. 477). With this, on October 18, 1941, Hitler gave the order to deport all Jews to the east and to ban Jewish emigration from the Third Reich (Browning, 1994, p. 478). Heydrich continued, “In the course of the final solution, the Jews should be brought under appropriate direction in a suitable manner to the east for labor utilization” (Bauer, 2001, pp. 224-225). He would further explain that those who could not work would succumb to the fate of *natural selection*, i.e., annihilation (Bauer, 2001).

Beyond the pre-1938 borders of Germany, the rest of Europe was not made safe for the creation of more living room for a new Aryan future that Hitler hoped for. With the end of the Nazi reign of terror in 1945, only about 19,000 of the original 540,000 German Jews remained in Germany itself, a 96.4% decrease (Blau, 1950). After 1939, 131,500 of the remaining Jews were deported, 61,500 emigrated, and 21,646 deceased- a much lower death rate than much of Europe, especially Poland (Blau, 1950). Fundamentally, Hitler and his party had achieved their goal, in part, to extinguish any and all Jewish presence in Germany.

Table 3

Core Components of Nazi Policy in Relation to German Jews

- i. First used exclusion from economy, society, and forced relocation; last resort method was extermination.
- ii. Attempts to de-nationalize the group.
- iii. Attempts to dehumanize the group.

Comparative Analysis – Policy Implementations of the People’s Republic of China Relating to the Uyghur Population of Xinjiang

Many refer to China, with its Han ethnic majority, as a “culturally homogenous” nation-state with little tolerance for anti-secularism and any thought outside the PRC Han-Chinese norm (Clarke, 2013, p. 110). With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1st, 1949, and the assertion that Mao Zedong’s China-controlled Xinjiang, the new country was seemingly on a rough path- Han secularism versus Islam and separatism.

To the extent that the PRC has de-nationalized Uyghurs, this method of *problem-solving* used by the Nazis over 75 years ago is essentially nonexistent. In fact, the Chinese government has actively attempted to suppress separatist movements and *re-educate* Uyghurs to become *more Chinese* and less *extremist*. Historically, some of the most violent and sincere separatist initiatives have taken place within Xinjiang (Lai, 2002). These separatist motives are driven, in part, by a “complex mix of history, ethnicity, and religion - fueled by poverty, unemployment, social disparities, and political grievances” (Davis, 2008, p. 15). The Chinese government has responded to these with varying severity. From police and military intervention to economic development,

the Chinese government has stated its goal is to “undermine Uyghur calls for independence” and solve the problems driving this threat to Chinese unity (Davis, 2008, p. 17).

Compared to the Jews of Germany during the Holocaust, there was an effort on the part of the PRC to increase the economic situation of the Xinjiang region. However, the benefit reaped by the Uyghur population was disproportionately lower than that of the Han population in the same areas. With the establishment of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the nation attempted to develop loosely populated portions of the region in 1954. Slightly less than a year later, China formalized the existence of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, headed by Seypiden Aziz (a Uyghur Muslim himself), yet, Chinese general Wang Enmao (replacing Wang Zhen) indeed controlled the territory as the First Secretary of the CCP in Xinjiang and commander of the Xinjiang Military Region (Millward, 2021). Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China, as mentioned previously, the government has consistently denounced the idea that Xinjiang is anything but a part of China. Yet, the development of this region has wavered for decades- severely lagging that of coastal areas.

Migration has been a popular method for increased modernization for nearly two centuries. According to Millward (2021), the Qing dynasty allowed Han settlement in the region starting in 1831; in 1947, Han Chinese individuals within Xinjiang constituted roughly 5% of the population compared to the 40.6% - 43.0% in 2000- depending on the inclusion of “non-registered migrants” (pp. 432-434). Comparatively, the Uyghur population in 2000 was about 8.35 million, and the Han population was approximately 7.49 million (Millward, 2021). Nicholas Becquelin has argued that his policy of *accelerated migration* was intended to increase security and dilute ethnic dissent and separatist tensions (Millward, 2021). While it was the goal to advance the development of this

region via migration, which was relatively successful in building new cities and transforming farming landscapes, these migration programs disproportionately favored the Han migrants-further increasing tensions between the ethnic minorities of the area.

On January 1st, 2000, the People's Republic of China sought to deal with the development issues and disproportionate growth of the country's interior more directly with the announcement of the Great Development of the West program. In Lai's 2002 article, *China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects*, the author describes issues that may *complicate* the progression or success of the program. One such argument seemingly echoes the conclusion brought by Nicholas Becqueline in that, while the program is partially intended to secure national security and unity, the "Han population tends to receive better education and possesses higher skills" (Lai, 2002, p. 460). Written before many of the tensions increased due to this program, Lai (2002) predicted that this program would increase competition between Han and ethnic minorities.

September 11, 2001, became a crucial year, not only for the American "War on Terror" but also for the "crack down" on "separatism, extremism, and terrorism" in Xinjiang (Davis, 2008, pp. 17-18). In a speech on June 17, 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated, "We have to fight against the three evils of separatism, extremism, and terrorism" (Davis, 2008, p. 18). This implies that the Chinese government would act swiftly and sincerely against any threat in these forms.

Han-Uyghur violence would mark 2009 as an escalatory period between the two ethnic groups. Several hundred Uyghur workers who were relocated under a special program that transferred individuals from Xinjiang to factories in eastern China found themselves under attack from Han workers from the same factory in which they worked together (Ryono & Galway, 2014).

During the night of June 26th, Han individuals attacked the migrant workers in and around their dorms profusely on the false accusation that Uyghurs had raped a Han woman at the factory. Later, in July of that year, the riots in Urumqi marked another escalation. A spiraling of events after a primarily peaceful Uyghur-led protest, in response to the incident in Guangdong, occurred in Urumqi People's Square leading to the violent suppression of the demonstration. Uyghur rioting flared up nearby, beating Han individuals and burning property. Through early July, violent clashes sprung up back and forth between both ethnic groups. State media reported that Uyghurs were primarily responsible for the damage. The PRC would further collective treatment and punishment against the Uyghur populations of Xinjiang.

In conjunction with the Lhasa riots of 2008, the events in 2009 transformed Beijing's approach to Xinjiang development. According to Millward (2021), the CCP has made assimilation a staple of its approach to modernization in the region. In 2010, the CCP expanded the Counterpart Assistance for Xinjiang program, further directing economic investment into the Xinjiang region. Yet, once again, favoring Han Chinese individuals and communities over Uyghurs. Furthermore, this program and other modernization efforts have led to the destruction of historical Uyghur architecture, such as the demolition of 85% of the religious city of Kashgar, which forced much of its population into high-rise buildings in the name of earthquake protection.

Furthermore, Sufi shrines, graveyards, and mosques such as Keriya Heytgah (Aitika), the largest mosque in the region (constructed in 1200), was destroyed between late 2017 and early 2018. Similarly, the Grand Mosque in Kargilik (over 400 years old) was destroyed in late 2018. Over 100 mosques had been completely torn down during the same period or had substantial restructuring. Although many mosques had been repaired or rebuilt- this was widely publicized in

the state media. “Satellite images from 2020 showed barren dirt where these structures had stood a few months or years earlier” (Millward, 2021, p. 545).

Rather than institute a similar exclusionary (Jewish) policy that dominated the Nazi era, the newest addition of the developmental attempts on behalf of the PRC in the Xinjiang region, the government has attempted to assimilate Uyghurs into the Han norm. The Xinjiang region has been subject to many investments in teaching traditional Chinese culture. The investment approach uses terminology such as *national language (gouyu)* to replace the *Han language (Hanyu)*, teaching Confucianism and classic Chinese literature in a region where the traditional culture is strong and seen as more significant than Han culture (Millward, 2021). Mandarin-only or Mandarin-based education has become a staple of investments in the region, slowly excluding Uyghur teachers unable to provide Mandarin instruction and slowly easing the language into many areas. Furthermore, starting in 2011, an effort to discourage women from wearing head and face coverings began (Project Beauty). A common practice was now being branded as backward and outdated. Other campaigns to discourage fasting during Ramadan and other religious staples such as beards on young men grew in intensity.

These early efforts to assimilate the non-Han population seemingly stalled or fell behind. Violent instances between citizens and police increased from 2013 to 2015 (Roberts, 2018). Regardless of the situation or cause of the violence, the PRC has consistently labeled any incidents of unrest in the region as *terrorism*. Although, there were several attacks in 2013 and 2014 involving Uyghurs that led to the 656-715 deaths (Roberts, 2018). This has led to an intensification of *development* and *anti-extremist* policies.

In resemblance to the verbiage used by the United States and its “War on Terror”, May of 2014 was marked by an intensification of “Strike Hard” (Clarke, 2013; Trevaskes, 2016). Under the control of President Xi Jinping, the CCP has cracked down on what they consider “challenges to national security” internally (Cai, 2017, p. 80). With the passage of the new National Security Law of 2015, the CCP has begun, at least legislatively, focusing on these threats and *de-extremification*, “including activities of the Uyghur minority population” (Finnegan, 2020, p. 7). According to the CCP, the target of this legislation was the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Finnegan, 2020).

Mass surveillance and data collection programs that store information such as banking, social media, biometric information (face scans and other genetic or physical identifiers) fed into the Integrated Joint Military Operations Platform (IJOP), which takes advantage of facial-recognition video surveillance to track individuals (Leibold, 2020). According to the Chinese government, this program helps identify *extremism* as it takes place or even before it occurs. Such markers of extremism include owning illegal religious books, posters, maps, etc., instructing religion, keeping beards, wearing full-face coverings, and much more. In part, the IJOP system, in accordance with a system that enables Han-Chinese to live among Uyghur communities and point out any *suspicious activity* to authorities, led to additional legal action against individuals suspected of *extremism*.

Since the end of 2016, the PRC has detained an estimated one in eleven Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region since Chen Quanguo, the new Xinjiang Party Secretary as of August 2016, initiated a vast expansion of “concentrated educational transformation” (Roberts, 2020; Matacic, 2019). Among the first detained were “the cultural, commercial and political elites of Uyghur

society, including hundreds of professors, editors, and publishers who had produced, under state auspices, the language and literature textbooks later criticized as *separatist*” (Millward, 2021, p. 559).

“To manage such numbers, Xinjiang administrative units and *Bingtuan* settlements called for private corporate bidders to construct and outfit a network of large internment camps surrounded by high walls, barbed wire, and watchtowers, secured inside with locked cells, locked corridors, and ubiquitous video surveillance, and controlled by guards armed with stun guns, tasers, tear gas, and spiked clubs—all detailed in tenders openly published online by Xinjiang local administrative units” (Millward, 2021, p. 560).

A comparison can be made between the concentration camps and migration policies during the Holocaust and those within China. As stated previously in this thesis, when the remaining Jews of Germany had clearly not left the country, they were either forcefully deported to extermination camps outside pre-1938 German borders or exterminated in camps within these borders. Uyghurs within Xinjiang detained in concentration camps (not currently known to be extermination camps) are still within the region. Beyond the *re-education camps*, though, many Uyghurs are sent to forced labor facilities in other parts of the country, where they are subject to educational training.

There is a seemingly unlimited amount of conflicting information between personal accounts, Western intelligence sources, and the official statements from the PRC. Personal accounts describe places of forced re-education paired with physical and psychological torture. The official word from the Chinese government denies any claims of torture. The general trend asserts that these institutions are purely educational, providing individuals with job training and uprooting *extremist* thought. Yet, it must be noted that the PRC initially denied the existence of such concentration camps and, upon United Nations investigatory challenge, admitted to their existence but assured the world these camps were re-education camps focused on tackling

extremism in the region. Once again, it pays to look at the words of Chinese organizations themselves.

Although the current concentration camps within the Xinjiang region are not known to be mass-extinction camps, many policies have seemingly led to a significant stall in population growth. Millward (2021) argues that due to the harsh repercussions of many policies, such as the infamous One-Child Policy, the Uyghur population growth rate fell by 84% between 2015 and 2018. Another striking statistic comes from intrauterine device (IUD) implants specifically which aid in pregnancy prevention. In China during 2014, 2.5% of IUDs implanted were done in Xinjiang compared to an incredible 80% in 2018. Even sterilizations are not consistent when comparing Xinjiang to the rest of the country. While the rate of sterilizations within the country was 33 per 100,000, sterilizations within Xinjiang increased and was tallied at 243 per 100,000 in 2018. According to Zenz (2021), not a single individual was recorded as born outside the bounds of government planning. 88% of women of “childbearing age” in Kizilsu (a Chinese autonomous prefecture) had “adopted long term effective birth measures” (p. 4). It has been concluded by scholars such as Zenz (2021) that there is a clear “intent to reduce ethnic minority population growth in order to increase the proportionate Han population in southern Xinjiang” (p. 17). He further backs this assertion by pointing directly to the ideology and language used by Chinese academics and officials and many of the policies themselves.

Regarding any de-humanization of Uyghurs like that of the Jews in Germany, in general, this has not been attempted to any extent other than to describe the population as vulnerable to the *disease of extremism*. Hence their supposed need for re-education. Uyghurs in the region have not been described writ-large and in intentional propaganda campaigns as non-human or at the same

level as Satan. Zenz (2021) states that non-Han Chinese individuals are often referred to as “problems” that threaten an otherwise “healthy” society (p. 17). Millward (2021) provides a quote from the Xinjiang Communist Youth League:

“If we do not eradicate religious extremism at its roots, the violent terrorist incidents will grow and spread all over like an incurable malignant tumor. Although many people who have been indoctrinated with extremist ideology have not committed any crimes, they are already infected by the disease. There is always a risk that the illness will manifest itself at any moment, which would cause serious harm to the public. That is why they must be admitted to a re-education hospital in time to treat and cleanse the virus from their brain and restore their normal mind. We must be clear that going into a re-education hospital for treatment is not a way of forcibly arresting people and locking them up for punishment, it is an act that is part of a comprehensive rescue mission to save them” (pp. 561-562).

Table 4

Core Components of Chinese Communist Party Policy in Relation to Uyghur Muslims

- i. Attempted *re-education* and financial investment efforts to make individuals and communities fit the Han-Chinese *norm*.
- ii. Direct attempts to de-humanize individuals through their treatment and portrayal in propaganda.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims on the part of the People's Republic of China and the treatment of Jews in Germany on the part of the Nazis are, individually, infinitely complex. This thesis has sought to provide a so-called lay-of-the-land regarding the extent to which two broad variables within each case are similar or dissimilar. This paper has compared the ideologies of the People's Republic of China to Nazi Germany and the policies of each respective party regarding an individual ethnic minority within them.

Regarding ideology, it was determined that there are two essential components to Nazi ideology that drove the Holocaust. First, Germany used a contradictory form of Judaism to weaken the members of the religion and bolster the Nazi ideology itself. Second, Germany used Jews to blame much of the nation's problems. The extent to which the ideology of the ruling Chinese Communist Party resembles the core components of Nazi ideology is minimal. While China has seemingly over-ascribed the term extremism and attempted to label many parts of Muslim culture as outdated or regressive, it has not reached the levels of Nazi-antisemitism propaganda. In order to do so, it would most likely have to openly and actively renounce every aspect of Islam as evil and a threat to society, which it currently has not done in the mainstream. The Asian nation has also not ascribed blame to Uyghurs for much of the country's issues. Besides a potential threat to loosely defined unity, and actual threat of extremism, China would need to extend blame for any economic drawbacks or pitfalls; a wrongful mixing of blood; or treat Islam as a race of subhuman, Satan-like cancer within Chinese society, preventing the nation reaching its full potential.

Concerning the antisemitic policies of Nazi Germany, three core components were derived: Jews were excluded from the economy and society, subjected to forced relocation, and exterminated as a last resort; there was a sincere attempt to de-nationalize the group; there was a sincere attempt to dehumanize the group. Regarding the first component, Uyghurs have not been excluded from the economy. Although severely flawed, there have been attempts to bring the Xinjiang region *up to date* with the coastal regions of the nation. Uyghurs have not been excluded from the society to the same extent. There are attempts to bring non-Han individuals into the mainstream of Chinese society via ethical and non-ethical means, but it cannot be said that the response of the CCP has been to outright exclude the Uyghur population. Some Uyghurs have been relocated to forced labor camps outside the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to eastern portions of China or *re-education* concentration camps within the region, making this case only slightly like the relocation efforts and concentration camps of the Nazis. In order to make the case of the Uyghurs identical to that of the Holocaust, the Chinese government would need first to attempt to encourage emigration while excluding Uyghurs from society and the economy over time; then force emigration; and when emigration is no longer an option, exterminate the remaining individuals. While the situation in Xinjiang and the forced labor facilities across China are of grave concern, they are not nearly identical to those of the Holocaust- according to our current knowledge. They are perhaps more similar to the early concentration camps within Germany that interned political prisoners and the Jewish elite. At this time, prisoners in Nazi camps were eligible for release, like Uyghurs- although many are released from Xinjiang into forced labor across China.

The People's Republic of China has not attempted to de-nationalize the Uyghur population to the same extent that Jews were stripped of their ability to be truly German. While Uyghurs have

been subject to treatment that would suggest the PRC considers them outside the Han-Chinese norm and thus require assimilation, the Chinese government would, at a minimum, need to pass laws similar to that of the Nuremberg Laws, which stripped Jews of their citizenship, prevented marriages with *true Germans* and disallowed Jews to fly the German flag.

Furthermore, there has been some level of dehumanization on the part of the PRC towards Uyghurs in Xinjian, yet it has not reached the levels of 1930s and 40s Germany. The Chinese dehumanization of Uyghurs can be seen in many of their statements and beliefs that they are the *other*, *weeds*, or *problems*, and a group that needs saving from the disease of extremism. Nevertheless, the treatment of this ethnic minority would need to evolve into something of a propaganda campaign to paint them as literal non-humans or a separate race entirely. Compared to Nazi propaganda and intentions, as far as we know, the Chinese government has not planned to exterminate the *Uyghur Race* and display their remains in Museums. However, it must be noted that there seems to be significant evidence pointing to an attempt to reduce the ethnic minority population in southern Xinjiang. This begs the necessity for future research into cultural and ethno-genocide.

While it has been concluded that many aspects of the two cases studied here are highly dissimilar, it has not been concluded that there are no atrocities or that the term genocide should not be attributed to the treatment of the Muslim minority in Xinjiang. What has been concluded, the Holocaust still stands unique. Considering the analysis of this paper, the Nazi Genocide is still the only case in history in which a government attempted to eliminate an entire ethnic minority from the face of the Earth. This paper's research, discussion, or conclusion is by no means an

exoneration of the ideology or policies of the People's Republic of China; that much must be crystal clear. This paper strongly recommends that future research be conducted on this topic.

Regarding the limitations of this paper, there have been few historical comparisons of the Uyghur situation. This paper has relied heavily on content pertaining to each case, isolated from another. The time-sensitive nature of this project creates the potential for missing information that may be key to further analyzing the questions within the thesis. With the mass of material available and produced, future research must continue to re-examine this comparative analysis and the facts therein.

This research was further complicated by using specific sources while excluding others. Much of the available material relevant to this study is biased in some manner. Therefore, choosing appropriate sources to conduct this analysis was particularly extensive. With such a controversial topic, this thesis was forced to exclude many partisan sources and heavily research the authors of the sources themselves as evidence provided by certain sources does not always reflect reality.

Regarding the future exploration of this topic, many questions arise. Is the response of the People's Republic of China proportional to the actual level of extremism? If not, to what extent, if any, has the Chinese government overstepped? These questions could be answered via a forensic analysis of the available data from public sources. Information analyzed could include CCP government documents, propaganda, international organization reporting (United Nations), or intelligence data gathered by reliable government sources. To determine the appropriateness of the response on the part of the CPP regarding Uyghur extremism, one should further analyze the existence of propaganda used to support national or regional policies. Furthermore, comparing the proportionality of the accusations and reasoning behind the CCP's policies to its actual response

could be further analyzed via comparative case analysis to determine the norms regarding proportional policy.

Another question: Is the international response to the situation proportional to the perceived severity of the situation? What is the level of similarity or proportionality of the international response to the Holocaust to the global response to the situation in Xinjiang? Analyzing these questions could potentially reveal the repetition of past mistakes. As stated in the thesis, history often rhymes. So, indeed our mistakes can too. Therefore, research must be conducted to determine whether there is enough or disproportionately more information regarding the Uyghur Crisis to justify the current response of the international community. Such a question could be analyzed similarly to the research in this piece. Conducting a comparative analysis of the proportionality of the response to accusations and cases of potential human rights abuses would provide a decent path for clarification.

Furthermore, this thesis's suggestion is to conduct research that is not constrained by anything but the expectation of the quality of content. If the academic and professional community is to put meaning to the phrase *never again*, it must answer these questions and many more.

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