

1947

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Recommended Citation

Manucy, Albert C. (1947) "Florida in North Carolina Spanish Records, Part II," *Florida Historical Quarterly*. Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 7.

Available at: <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol26/iss1/7>

FLORIDA IN NORTH CAROLINA SPANISH RECORDS

by ALBERT C. MANUCY

PART II

ADMINISTRATION, COMMERCE AND FINANCE

The North Carolina papers show intimately the operation of Spanish colonial government. Even more intimately, perhaps, they reveal its shortcomings through the media of complaints from one side or the other, *residencias* of the various regimes, and innumerable *autos*, *memorials* and *testimonios*. Complaints were to be expected, since politics and personalities were involved. Occasionally, however, there were *bona fide* instances of maladministration or criminal carelessness, such as the well-known cases of Rebolledo in 1657 and Sanchez in 1736.

Rebolledo was charged with profiteering, maltreatment of his subjects, destruction of armament, and failure to maintain garrison discipline. Since there are always two sides to any question, the defendants' replies to such charges are often as revealing as the documentation of the charges themselves.

There is such a mass of material on Sanchez that a book might well be written about this one unfortunate gentleman and his tribulations during the epoch of Jenkins's Ear. Francisco del Moral Sanchez, a veteran of 30 years' military service, took over the reins of Florida government in 1734. Like most governors during this dreary period, he was appalled, but not discouraged, at the Florida situation. "I will defend Florida to the last drop of my blood," he said bravely.¹

Little more than a year later royal officials and even the soldiers were writing indictments of Moral Sanchez. (Intimations of his intrigues with the enemy chanced to come at the very time Spain was involved with the notorious John Savy, concerning whom there are also a few papers in the collection.) When the crown at last

1. Sanchez to Patino, Sept. 8, 1735.

gave credence to the charges against Sanchez, it was seemingly the result of complaints made by the good, straight-backed Bishop of Tricale himself, who had purged the community of its heretics and suppressed the indecent games and dancing. But by then, Sanchez was too deeply involved, imprisoning his officers on charges of treason and perjury. English ships were frequently visiting St. Augustine, apparently with the governor's sanction.

Action came suddenly and dramatically. On March 11, 1737, the sergeant major of Havana's El Morro landed on the shore of St. Augustine bay and marched directly to the Castillo, where he presented his papers and took over the garrison. Sanchez sought sanctuary in the convent, but the padres there were no friends of his.

For almost three years, Sanchez languished, worried and sick, in the prison at Cadiz. His doctors finally won him temporary freedom under the bond of his friend, Francisco de Vargas. The case dragged along interminably; Sanchez' goods, including a fine white horse, were sold in Havana. It is said that Sanchez was hung, but the North Carolina papers do not seem to contain this finale to the biography.

Some of the most revealing documents are those written by incoming governors. New men noticed the condition of the province in detail, and of course the narratives of their wanderings through the Florida wilderness, familiarizing themselves with their domain, give the modern student periodic descriptions of colonial Florida. Such reports are those of Cabrera in 1682, or the summary of Benavides' regime, written in 1723. Salazar wrote a detailed and personal discussion of the evils of the *situado* (subsidy) system and the cumbersome mechanism for getting supplies to Florida. Juan de Ayala sometimes voyaged all the way to Spain to bring back supplies and munitions for the unfortunate at St. Augustine. Ayala's knack for getting back to Florida in the nick of time earned him the title of *padre de la patria* almost 30 years before George Washington was born. For in 1705 Fray Simon de Salas wrote that "when the people saw

the said Sergeant Major [Ayala], with one voice they said, he is the father of his country, because he has always helped them in their greatest need." ²

Instances of trade with foreigners are not rare. Though in general such trade was prohibited, there were times (as in 1683) when it was either buy foreign food or starve. But attempts to improve the supply situation gradually bore fruit. In 1716 the crown suggested to Mexico the practicability of Havana's supplying Florida. Of course, the *situado* still had to originate in the Mexican capital, but there was no ironclad argument for bringing food all the way from Mexico, too. The papers record the loss of more than one of the supply vessels enroute from Vera Cruz, as well as *testimonios* of special aid sent Florida during times of stress (*i. e.*, after 1668 and 1702), and the more routine statements on the usually backward status of the *situado*, the number of guns, munitions, religious and other articles ; and continual reminders from Madrid to Mexico that Florida, an important part of the empire, should be supplied promptly and well. In his turn, the *virrey* seldom lost opportunity to explain that his resources were limited, especially so far as Florida was concerned.

Finally the Floridians learned that Havana merchants had applied to furnish them with supplies. That was in 1719. And by 1721 the crown was instructing the governor on the fine points of collecting duties from the merchants. From 1732 to 1758 there are sundry documents relating to contracts for the supply of St. Augustine and Apalache - documents in such detail that the student can even learn contemporary prices. Much material relates to the Royal Company of Havana, which handled most of the legitimate Florida trade. It is no surprise to find that some of the masters sailing under the company flag were Englishmen. And Jesse Fish, representative of a New York firm, had come to St. Augustine even before the War of Jenkins' Ear. In 1738 the Bishop of Tricale remarked that all Englishmen had been expelled, except for Fish, whose presence was deemed necessary for the pro-

2. Salas to the crown, June 14, 1705.

curement of flour and meat from New York. In 1751, one Caleb Davis rendered a bill against the governor for supplies, provisions and other articles purchased by the Spaniards over the 1733-1751 period. The account totaled 140,000 pesos, and many well-known *Floridanos* were customers of "Senor Devis."

During those turbulent years of commercial struggle between Spain and England, Davis was not the only unlucky merchant. One Frenchman named Amblard shipped to St. Augustine on an English vessel. His papers were not in order, so his goods were confiscated and he was banished. Money from the sale of his goods went for repair of the king's works. A similar case occurred in 1759, when the merchandise of three Englishmen allegedly engaged in illicit commerce was confiscated.

Financial complaints were sometimes minor, but nonetheless illuminating. Quiroga in 1688 plaintively claimed he had journeyed to Florida at his own expense. The royal officials owed him six months' salary and refused to pay. Montiano once accused the royal officials of spending foolishly 12,000 pesos earmarked for "conservation of Florida." Madrid told him to procure a chest with three locks-and jangle one of the keys in his own pocket!

INDIAN AFFAIRS

It is an exceptional paper which fails to mention those "wards" of the crown - the Indians. In 1648 the governor and his officials were enjoined to observe carefully the royal dictates relating to occupation of Indian lands, and in general to hold the spiritual and temporal welfare of the red man close to heart. The necessity for periodic reminders is shown in other texts, notably the *testimonios* of 1654, wherein Jose de Prado and others pointed out the need for mules. Not having mules, the governor had employed Indians instead, a circumstance which pleased neither the Indians nor the more conscientious of their Spanish friends. Frontier exigencies may have allowed some justification for the less humane practices, but the crown was adamant with insistence on careful treatment of the natives. Such policy did not mean, however, that

the Indian was not to be employed on work that directly benefited him. When the Tolomato village of the *Mico Santiago* was moved near to St. Augustine at the outset of the 1660's, the crown directed that Indian labor might be used in construction of a road to connect the new town with others, though at the same time it was made very clear that aboriginal labor was not to be used on *other* work without pay.

Nor was the Indian protected from white man alone. The Spanish also felt responsible for such incidents as the invasion of Guale by "cannibal" Indians from the north - a 1662 forerunner of what was to occur more or less regularly in later years.

Colonial administrators usually took their responsibilities seriously, and more than once suggested improvements in caretaking methods. Such an instance was the idea of Juan Menendez Marques in 1667, who, citing the governor's impositions upon a certain *casique*, recommended that a "defender" of the Indians be appointed. Some years later an Indian protector was actually appointed. By then, however, the situation had greatly changed. When Marques made the original suggestion, the religious were accusing the governor of mistreating the Indians; but when the latter appointment came, it was with the allegation that the *religious* were causing the abuses. The crown handily settled the dispute by abolishing the office of protector and instructing the officials to handle such matters through regular channels.

Reports on abuses generally found their way to Madrid in minute detail. In fact, if comprehensive reports failed to arrive, Madrid asked for them. The collection contains numerous letters demanding explanation of "vexations" committed against the Indians. And Spanish officialdom, together with the *casiques* themselves, were not loath to send prolix reports.

Not all complaints were about physical mistreatment of the natives. Fray Juan Moreno bewailed the fact that the religious staff was too small to give the Indians at work on the Castillo proper spiritual care. The governor disagreed, but the Council of the Indies inclined to favor

the padre. The fact remained that a recommendation from the Council did not mean that the friars would be on their way to Florida the next day. Reality no doubt sustained the governor's opinion.

The papers are full of Indian matters which seldom reach the history books, such as the Choctaw uprising of 1675, the 1677 battle between the *Apalachinos* and the Chisca (Yuchi) Indians, trouble with the Apalachicolas in 1682, 1695 and 1703, the Guale hostilities of the 1680's, the 1697 insurrection at Mayaca, and sidelights on the Yamasee revolt of 1715, not to mention the numerous lesser attacks on Spanish or Spanish Indian outposts. Florida governors, instructed to "achieve the end [peace] without violence,"³ were invariably teetering upon the horns of a dilemma.

As the archivist knows, many important details relating to a specific event may not appear on paper until years after the actual occurrence. The fight between the *Apalachinos* and the Chisca is one of the best examples. It occurred in 1677. In 1680 Cabrera complained that the government was giving too few presents to the Indians. The trouble, Cabrera indicated, was in Mexico. The *virrey*, perhaps ignorant of the differences between Mexican and Florida Indians, simply refused to pay for presents. But, said Cabrera, if we stop this business of giving presents, we shall have trouble.

The crown agreed and sent a thousand yards of printed cloth in lively colors for the Apalache *casiques*, reward for their valor in the battle long past. Certain of the Timucua *casiques* also received special gifts during Cabrera's regime. He gave them swords in appreciation of their resistance against English-influenced warriors from the north.

But weapons were not a usual Spanish gift to red allies, as Cabrera was duly reminded in 1687 by royal instructions to recover the weapons of all deceased soldiers and see that the Indians received no additional arms. And many years passed before the Spanish reversed this policy

3. Crown to Cabrera, Nov. 10, 1682.

of keeping firearms away from their Indians. The British, on the other hand, seemed to have either more faith or less scruples. Montiano in 1743 said the English were continually winning away Indians with presents of guns, food, and such like. He took the practical view, and suggested that Spain attempt to match British generosity by establishment of an Apalache store to supply the Indians with firearms-and even *firewater* if they wanted it!

In the last quarter of the 17th century most complaints on behalf of the Indians deal with 1) the matter of drafting Indian labor for fortification work, or 2) the inroads of the heathen Indians from English country. Many letters refer to Spanish efforts to obtain freedom for unfortunates who were captured and sold into slavery at Charleston, and as late as 1693 the *Junta* at Madrid stated that Florida Christian Indians were being sold by the English in the Windward Isles, and suggested that representations be made to London.

True, all Indian news was not bad news. Several villages with former English connections returned to Spanish allegiance before 1700, as a sort of prelude to later and similar events. The North Carolina papers contain a royal order to the governor, pointing out the rather obvious fact that the best means of resisting the English was to secure the friendship of the Indian. Part of the program involved teaching Spanish to the red men.

Often, however, Spanish policy rubbed Indian fur the wrong way, so to speak. In 1680 Florida officials reported that certain *casiques* had granted land and levied tribute upon their subjects with the governor's tolerance. Naturally Madrid decreed against such practice, since grants and taxes were strictly royal prerogatives.

During the late 17th century (according to the records), Spanish arms chastised the red man on remarkably few occasions. One such was in 1695. Torres reported Choc-taw hostilities to the Charleston governor: English redskins had robbed San Carlos mission and taken away 42 mission Indians. Following the complaint with action, Torres sent out a force that burned villages and captured some of the miscreants. Charleston was much aggrieved,

calling attention to the fact that the Spanish invasion was contrary to the article of peace.

The next year, Torres was confronted with a similar situation. Enemy Indians killed some of the religious in the Jororo conversion, and fled. The Jororo, no less disturbed than the Spanish, came to Torres, who gave them lands and settled them in villages closer to Spanish guns.

Even before Moore's raids in the Apalache country, the *Apalachinos* had felt the heavy hand of British-sponsored enmity. In 1702 the Spanish ambassador at Rome acquainted the Pope with the martyrdom suffered by certain Christian Indians, who lost their lives due to the "rigor" of the English.

After 1700, the records show more and more Indians coming under Spanish protection, such as it was. Indians at the mouth of the St. Johns and the Yvitachuco Indians moved closer to St. Augustine, and of course some 161 pueblos of the Yamasee in 1715 rendered obedience to Spain. The governor reported with elation that the preliminary envoys of the Yamasee spoke for all of the heathen and Christian Indians in the province of Carolina. Then came the Great Casique of Caveta, with more than 50 vassals, to make friends. Such progress looked good on paper, but was in fact a mixed blessing. Poverty-stricken St. Augustine was hard put to find money and food to take care of aboriginal friends. As early as 1708, the governor suggested that some Indian families might better be sent to Havana.

These events naturally produced a sizeable mass of documents, such as letters, reports, lists, *autos*, *testimonios* and so on, which variously locate villages, explain tense situations, describe ceremonies, gifts, and occasionally list the names of individual Indians. Evident throughout is the continuous attrition that destroyed the red man. The 1719 raid on Ayachin, a short league north of St. Augustine, where a small force of Indian raiders killed Spanish subjects and burned the village, was an almost routine instance. Incidentally, Captain Ygnacio Rodrigues Rozo was courtmartialled for that one. He had failed to give his soldiers the proper orders. Due to that

fact and other personal matters of even more incriminating nature, he eventually landed in the prison at Cadiz.

During the decade of the 1740's, the Yuchis were wooed consistently by both Spanish and English, and Montiano was jubilant in 1748 when he reported that the Yuchis had declared themselves Spanish vassals. He proposed to settle them with their Yamasee cohabitants near Apalache. At the talks held in St. Augustine, some of the Yuchis offered to act as emissaries to other nations for the purpose of extending Spanish allegiance even farther afield. Montiano's lengthy, detailed reports are a mine of information, including as they do thumbnail sketches of Indian psychology, politics and economics.

Spanish successes were countered by later English moves. The Apalache commandant found the English again active among the Yuchis at Caveta, whereupon the governor deduced that the English planned to place an Indian king of their own choosing at the head of the nation. Late in 1754 Spanish apprehensions were allayed somewhat by reassurances from the "emperor" himself, but the last documents of the decade mention punitive action against Yuchis who had attacked Spanish Indians. Captain Jose de Leon, who led the expedition, meticulously listed the effects taken from the Yuchis in the affair.

THE RELIGIOUS

A 1656 document may be the first in the North Carolina papers to specify the urgent need for more padres in the colony. But this theme was a major one, composed much earlier and sounded with monotonous regularity throughout the long Spanish regime.

Of course the documents show the growth of the mission system into the "golden age" of the 17th century. They also show, with hard clarity, the difficulties of bringing Christianity to the aborigines. A most revealing letter happens to be that of the Bishop of Cuba to the crown: clergymen "decline" to volunteer for the hazardous Florida field. The Bishop's persuasive pastoral letter, calling for volunteers, is also in the collection.

Continuing effort on the part of the crown and the re-

ligious executives did bring recruits to Florida from time to time-plus the money to keep them going. In 1693, for example, the crown seemed especially concerned about the new conversions at Carlos and Ays, and additional Franciscans reached Florida a few years later.

Used as they were to danger, sometimes the Florida padres found themselves in untenable positions. An appeal from the Franciscans at San Luis in 1704, asking either aid or removal from what they termed (in fine understatement) a "dangerous" area, is one of the few papers to show that the padres ever thought of going any way but forward. Even then, three years later the records state that the friars were continuing their work in the western area in spite of the enemy. Such tenacity in the face of the fearful devastation visited upon the Apalache country by the wild Irishman Moore shows very clearly the deep devotion the padre had for his work.

The zeal of one man in particular earned prominent mention in the documents. Antonio de Florencia, said the governor in 1710, had procured peace and union amongst the natives. In addition, Fray Antonio had developed a plan for removal of the English threat. Florida officials liked the plan so well that they authorized him to go to Spain to sell the plan to Madrid.

Bishop Calderon's account of his 1674-1675 visitation to Florida has been published. Hardly less informative for religious matters are other papers of later date, though the convenience of finding them in a single report is usually lacking. The Bishop of Tricale, who began residence in Florida in 1736 and experienced the siege of St. Augustine, recorded certain ecclesiastical and other statistics (example: Florida had 1509 inhabitants in 1736). Tricale's letters cover a multitude of subjects, not the least of which was the work of the religious among the slave refugees from the English colonies.

Fray Blas Pulido certified a list of the number of Indians converted to Catholicism in 1723; a certificate in 1670 listed the religious ornaments carried off by the pirates during the sack of St. Augustine in 1668. Information on early education is available in a 1693 letter ap-

proving the plan that Franciscans teach *la gramatica* in the convent. The plan had originated with the people of St. Augustine, who were too poor to send their children to Havana for education. The friars, of course, were the only available teachers.

Not all reports on the Franciscans are complimentary. Perfect harmony between the administrative heads of Florida and the religious was rare for any extended time. Cabrera, the target of more than one attack by the padres, retaliated in 1686. Some of the trouble had started in 1683, when pirates were marching up Anastasia Island. Doing his best to put the Castillo in shape for the expected assault, Cabrera "attended to work . . . with innumerable curses and horrible oaths, which with great scurrility and evil example, with numberless infamous outrages, frightened every person without exception . . ." ⁴ The words were "so perfidious, scandalous and vile" that the anonymous reporter of the incident said he lacked the courage to set them down on paper, whereby we have evidently lost some choice Spanish phraseology. In spite of Cabrera's impiety, the pirates were stopped and the crown decorated him.

Whether Cabrera's report that the Franciscans had beaten an *Apalachino* to death was actually retaliation or not, his letter is rather typical of complaints registered against the padres from time to time. Often there was more to the story than ill treatment of the natives. In 1692 Quiroga accused the Franciscans of profiting from the agricultural work of the Indians, but his complaint was rooted in the fact that the friars refused to sell him food for the soldiers. The crown, said Quiroga, gives the friars all they need, yet they plant crops for themselves and the Church in order to buy church ornaments! Quiroga wanted the crown to make them furnish food for his garrison.

4. Recon de lo zucedido May 20, 1683. Extracts from this document are translated in National Park Service Source Book No. 3, *The History of Castillo de San Marcos and Fort Matanzas from Contemporary Narratives and Letters* (Washington, 1943).

AGRICULTURE

Farming and its allied practices were a concern of practically every man in Florida. One of the first documents in the collection relating to the subject is the 1650 report of Nicolas Ponce de Leon and Salvador de Zigarroa, summarizing the efforts of Benito Ruiz to promote agriculture and stockraising. Such reports usually rhapsodize over the verdant pastures next door; that is, they stress the infertility of the St. Augustine area on one hand, and point out the fertile westward lands on the other. Nor do they fail to mention such catastrophes as the great storms of 1674 and 1707, when St. Augustine was flooded and even the wells polluted.

Many farming experiments were carried on through the years, but as is pitifully obvious from the papers, most experiments never reached full flower. Cabrera grew wheat around the Castillo. At his house, he experimented successfully with tanning leather, a possible indication that 17th century executives were quite used to earthy odors around the house.

At least one experiment backfired, however. In 1693 the governor enthusiastically reported that maize was successfully planted up to the very bastions of the Castillo. In no uncertain terms Madrid reminded him that cornfields were excellent cover for the enemy; henceforth no maize was to be planted within a musket shot of the fort.

Stockraising did become a sizeable industry. Salazar and others reported considerable development by 1689, with the garrison a ready market. Though there is little mention of stockraising in the records after this period, the cattle ranges north of St. Augustine lasted until the incursions of the English almost half a century later.

Verbally the crown encouraged these projects; in practice he was apt to stifle them. As early as 1677 Salazar said he needed 100 foot soldiers to replace native recruits, who had fields and cattle to attend to. He had (he noted incidentally) been granting lands. During the 1680's additional grants were made. Correspondence on such mat-

ters is voluminous, and finally in 1685 Florida petitioned the crown to pity the poor soldiers and assign them lands, for without land, they could not exist. Three years later the crown cited the regulations for conserving arable and pasture lands-and the petitions for grants were denied.

MISCELLANY

The collection contains several maps, including two 17th century plans of Castillo de San Marcos, three plans of the Apalache forts (1680,1682,1718), a plan of the *casa fuerte* at Apalachicola, and a map of the east coast from the St. Johns to the St. Marys river. To my knowledge, none of the maps is duplicated elsewhere in the U. S., except in the Stetson papers.

A very large percentage of the documents naturally deal with fortification, especially construction of the great Castillo at St. Augustine, smaller forts at Apalache and elsewhere. Several papers mention work on the town walls of the presidio. Fortification data in the North Carolina papers begin about 1655, when Rebolledo bleakly pointed out the condition of the wooden fort, lack of labor for repairs, and then suggested a project for building a stone fort. Other letters detail the condition of the garrison and its materiel, in addition to providing information on labor and constructional progress. A graphic notation came from one royal official in 1673: the garrison of the unfinished Castillo was only 15 men. As late as 1702 there were only 130 effectives in the entire *presidio* - hardly enough to mount guard.

Florida was occasionally visited by an engineer from Havana to aid in building the forts. Ignacio Daza was imported from that city to begin work on the Castillo: other specialists such as Juan de Siscales, Bruno Caballero (at Apalache), and the well-known Arredondo, came to inspect or advise from time to time. In later years, there was a resident engineer.

A comprehensive letter on fortification is Montiano's in 1743, complaining of the lack of Mexican cooperation, though in spite of the financial difficulties Montiano said that 200 convicts and a few slaves were working con-

sistently to improve the defenses, particularly on the earthworks around St. Augustine, and at Matanzas tower. Beyond doubt, however, one of the most valuable letters was written by the commandant of Apalache, Juan Isidoro de Leon, in 1745. Leon's lengthy epistle minutely described the the Apalache fort and for good measure included a discussion of Indian affairs written with extreme readability, not to say verve.

The biographer will find a wealth of unexploited material in these papers. There are many memorials on behalf of the "little" people-fellows like Pedro de Florencia, with 22 years' military service, or Francisco de Canezares, wounded during the 1668 pirate attack on the presidio. Juan Fernandez de Florencia was cited for service against the Chactaws at San Nicolas and San Carlos; Juan Bautista Terrazas submitted a record of 58 years service; Jose Bergambre served bravely against the pirates at Matanzas. Salvador de Zigarroa is a biography with unusual possibilities, for some of his family were casualties in the 1668 attack, and Zigarroa himself was instrumental in obtaining Mexican relief for St. Augustine at the time.

Widows figure largely in the petitions: In 1702 the *Junta* at Madrid favorably considered the case of Catarina de Pedrosa, widow of a soldier killed by the Indians; and in 1744 Montiano forwarded the memorial of Francisca and Manuela Rexidor, orphans "of their mother," petitioning permission to go to Havana because all in St. Augustine were so poor that the family could not make a living. Juan Cordero Mazias requested a transfer to Havana because Florida would not support his family. Mazias reminded the crown that his dependents included the widow of Francisco de Aguilar, killed after 49 years in the king's service. Mazias himself had been 21 years an artilleryman.

As for personal data on the governors-though the drama of a Pedro Menendez is lacking, governors were very human, to say the least, and the evidence of the fact is variously commendatory, condemnatory, and amusing. Even Montiano, the lion of the 1740 siege, found himself censured in cramped, anonymous handwriting for 1) faulty construction of the Castillo parapets, 2) loss of the

ship *San Gaetano* (wrecked in a storm off the coast), and 3) tardy payment of dragoon salaries. Madrid tossed the indictments aside as obviously the work of malcontents.

There are strange stories about foreigners in Florida. Joseph Bailey's account of his capture by the Spanish when he was bound for Charleston in 1670, and his subsequent forced travels to other Spanish cities, the records of the British fugitives from Charleston in 1674 (Diego Flamenco, Tomas Vide, Jugo Jordon, Carlos Miter, to give their Hispanized names), and other men who became Spanish prisoners during those days, eventually to become respected residents-these records show that Spanish San Agustin held definite attraction for some. Juan Collins, one of the prisoners, is worth special mention, for he gained royal recognition of his long and faithful service.

There was Carlos Robson, who held the office of surgeon to the presidio, though Cabrera said he was no surgeon. And there was Ransom, condemned to die, but gaining sanctuary after a miracle and earning a responsible job in the Castillo armory. Jesse Fish, English merchant of the middle 1700's, was an important St. Augustine figure, and the records contain data useful for study of his unique career. John McCoy, who died shortly after his advent in 1754, brought three Germans with him, along with his wife and nine slaves-all ostensibly to practice the Catholic religion in Florida.

The sum of the papers is this - a rather well-balanced picture of Florida's difficult colonial days. Life in our so-called "atomic age" may see uncertain. If so, the story of Florida's dark days should be not only consoling to us today, but downright encouraging. Bloodthirsty savages, scheming English devils (to take the purely Spanish viewpoint), ruthless pirates, poverty, nakedness and hunger, disease and death were at the shoulder of every *Floridano*. There were labor problems. Politics reared its ugly head. Friction among administrators, the padres, and the creole cliques was continual. No wonder Corcoles wrote feelingly in 1707, "It has broken my heart to see our people suffer such afflictions."