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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY

by

JORDAN BELL

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Philosophy in the College of Arts & Humanities and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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ABSTRACT

Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing—consciousness, the phenomenal “what it is likeness” of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other. This results in two competing views: Representationalism, which seeks to ground consciousness in intentionality, and Phenomenalism, which seeks to ground intentionality in consciousness. David Chalmers has proposed an alternative view to these which takes consciousness and intentionality as essentially interdependent, neither more fundamental than the other. This thesis explores the motivations for Representationalism and Phenomenalism, outlines their extraneous commitments, and analyzes their merits—as well as assessing whether Chalmers’ view is a defensible middle ground. This involves an analysis of the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental content. I argue that the view which Chalmers advocates is the best supported. Yet, I argue, it could benefit by adopting a thoroughgoing externalism of mental content.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1
Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 4

PHYSICALISM ........................................................................................................................................ 7
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 7
Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism ....................................................................................... 9
Strawson’s Physicalism ....................................................................................................................... 11
Problems for the Non-Reductive view of the Mind ........................................................................ 13
Arguments against the Reductive view of the Mind ........................................................................ 16
The Possibility of Philosophical Zombies ......................................................................................... 16
The Knowledge Argument .................................................................................................................. 17
The Explanatory Gap .......................................................................................................................... 19
The Hard Problem of Consciousness ................................................................................................ 20
Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 21

REPRESENTATIONALISM ...................................................................................................................... 22
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 22
The Transparency of Experience and Content Externalism ............................................................... 24
The Transparency of Experience ......................................................................................................... 24
Internalism and Externalism of Intentional Content ........................................................................ 27
Naturalized Theories of Intentional Content ..................................................................................... 28
Criteria for an Adequate Naturalized Intentionality ......................................................................... 29
Naturalized Theories ........................................................................................................................... 30
Phenomenal Concepts and Nonconceptual Content ......................................................................... 33
Phenomenal Concepts ........................................................................................................................ 34
Non-conceptual Content .................................................................................................................... 35
Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 38

PHENOMENALISM .................................................................................................................................. 40
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 40
INTRODUCTION

Two of the most salient aspects of our mental lives are consciousness and intentionality. When speaking of someone or something being ‘conscious’ we are confronted with ambiguity. An individual may be conscious of an object in the environment, a thought, or it can simply imply being awake. Within philosophy of mind, talk of consciousness is typically taken as talk of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness can be read as having experiences of ‘what it is like’ to a subject. There is something it is like for me to experience the sensation of orange, dread over tomorrow’s test, or pain. Some have argued to extend this treatment to the cognitive domain as well. For example, I might typically believe that clouds are above my head but not entertain it as a thought—marking no phenomenal difference in my mental state. However, once I entertain the belief there is something that it is like to have it as an occurrent thought—which alters the phenomenal character of my mental state (Horgan and Tienson 2002).

Intentionality is the feature of our thoughts which is historically characterized as aboutness. My thought that the ground is wet is about the ground and represents the ground that is targeted as being wet. In order to attribute intentional states to ourselves or others we use sentences with a psychological verb followed by a that-clause with an embedded sentence. This has been taken to evince that intentional states have a psychological mode expressed by the verb (believes, hopes, fears) and content expressed by the embedded sentence (e.g. John believes that the sky is blue).
It is not quite clear what the relationship between consciousness and intentionality amounts to. Yet, there is good reason to think that they are in some way intimately connected—this is in part due to their overlap in attributing experiential states. Consider these sentences:

(a) “John believes that 1+1=2.”
(b) “John is in a state of anxiety.”
(c) “John sees that the chair is yellow.”

It is not obvious that the intentional state expressed in sentence (a) has a phenomenal aspect to it. Similarly it is not obvious that being in a state of anxiety, as in sentence (b), is in any way intentional. Traditionally this has led many to think that consciousness and intentionality are independent, and that, they could be analyzed apart from each other. However, the structure of sentences like (c) have caused many to react against the traditional view that consciousness and intentionality are independent. Sentence (c) follows the analysis of intentional states given above; that is, we have a psychological verb, ‘sees,’ followed by an embedded sentence, ‘that the chair is yellow.’ Additionally, the sentence implies that John is in some sort of phenomenal state. There is something that it is like to see a chair as being yellow.

So, on the face of things, experiential states have both intentional and phenomenal characteristics. Due to this peculiarity, many have been encouraged to address what sort of relationship phenomenal consciousness and intentionality share that connects the phenomena together. There are at least two different routes that have been taken in assessing the relationship between these two phenomena. Chalmers addresses these in his paper “The Representational Character of experience” (2004) and concludes with a third:
(i) The content of phenomenal consciousness is grounded in intentional content.

(ii) Intentional content is grounded in the content of phenomenal consciousness.

(iii) Neither intentional content nor the content of phenomenal consciousness is grounded in the other, but are interdependent.

The view expressed in (i) is known in the contemporary debate as representationalism, more precisely reductive representationalism. Reductive representationalists argue that the contents of phenomenally conscious states are dependent on the intentional content in which they are grounded. Keeping in mind example sentence (a), the representationalist would argue that whatever phenomenal characteristics are attributed in such cases can be wholly accounted for by the intentional characteristics of the state. Thus—phenomenal states are best understood in terms of their intentional structure and can be considered a brand of representational state.

The view expressed in (ii) doesn’t have a proper name; I have labeled it phenomenalism in order to suggest a contrast with the representationalist view. This view is motivated in part by what are perceived to be the failures of representationalists’ attempts at a reductive explanation of intentional content. Phenomenalists argue that consciousness has some sort of priority over intentionality. This is taken to mean that most, if not all, representational states are intentional in virtue of being conscious at some time or connected to conscious states. The key claim of the phenomenalist view is that there is a pervasive sort of intentional content which is had in virtue of the phenomenal character of a state. As such, intentionality is ultimately grounded in consciousness—the converse of the representationalist view.
The final view, (iii), which Chalmers espouses, is the view I find to be most promising. Chalmers defends the idea that neither consciousness nor intentionality holds priority over the other. This view is a sort of non-reductive representationalism—where phenomenal character is accounted for in terms of intentional contents, yet intentional contents make use of phenomenal notions themselves. If Chalmers is right, then attempting to analyze either of these two phenomena in terms of the other is doomed to failure—instead they must be analyzed together.

**Overview**

In Chapter One of this thesis I will overview the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. In short, it says that everything which is exists is ultimately physical. This doctrine is a strong motivating factor in the three accounts of the relation between consciousness and intentionality that I will cover and plays an important role in how these theories are developed. In the first part of Chapter One I will further define physicalism and its motivation. Following that I will distinguish between reductive and non-reductive varieties of physicalism, as they have been typically adopted by representationalists and phenomenalists, respectively. In this section I will also canvas Galen Strawson’s (1994, 2004) version of physicalism in order to draw out ambiguities found in the terms “naturalism” and “physicalism.” Then, in the last section, I will outline various arguments against both varieties of physicalism. A few of these arguments will appear later on in this thesis as they are used as objections to, or accommodated within, a theory.

The next chapter will focus on the thesis of representationalism. In this chapter I will begin by clarifying what representationalism amounts to. The following section will explore the transparency of experience, the central motivation for representationalism. I will also show how
the transparency of experience motivates externalism of mental content which many representationalists accept. After that I will explore the two key building blocks to representationalist theories. The first is naturalized theories of intentional content— theories which attempt to provide theories of intentionality honest to physicalism. The second involves phenomenal concepts and non-conceptual content— these are two different approaches which attempt to accommodate phenomenal consciousness within the representationalist view.

Chapter Three consists of an overview of the second view— phenomenalism. This chapter is intended to mirror the chapter on representationalism. I begin by characterizing what phenomenalism amounts to. Then, I give an overview of its primary motivations and how they support internalism of mental content, the opposite view of externalism of mental content advocated by representationalists. Following that, I canvas Galen Strawson’s “no-problem thesis,” a criticism of naturalized intentionality which attempts to show that the problem of providing a naturalistic theory of intentionality is nothing more than providing a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. Finally I will explore the thesis of Phenomenal Intentionality, this thesis drives at the heart of the phenomenalist viewpoint— that phenomenology is the grounding phenomena for intentionality.

The final chapter is dedicated to laying out Chalmers’ non-reductive narrow representationalist viewpoint. The first section of this chapter focuses on distinguishing between two sorts of representational content— Fregean content and Russelian content. The next section then explains how Chalmers accommodates Fregean content into representationalism, which results in a necessary relationship between consciousness and intentionality— one that doesn’t
ground either phenomenon in terms of the other. I will also consider how Chalmers’ view is compatible with various viewpoints put forth by the other theories. Then I will argue that Chalmers’ is right insofar as it is a non-reductive thesis. However, I also argue that it would be more consistent for him to adopt phenomenal externalism.
PHYSICALISM

Introduction

Physicalism is best understood as the view that everything which exists is ultimately physical. There are two strands of physicalism which have been heavily disputed in the philosophy of mind: reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. In the case of reductive physicalism, if there are such things as: beliefs, hopes, fears, dreams, or perceptions—that is, conscious states and intentional states—then they had better be realized by, and be nothing over and above the physical systems of which they are a part. Another way of stating it is: once God fixed all of the physical facts in the world, he need not do any more work; all of the facts were fixed (Chalmers 1996, pp. 123-124). All of these facts would be captured by an idealized physics—whose fundamental features would be properties such as mass, spin, and charge, but not consciousness or intentionality. In the case of non-reductive physicalism, everything is still taken to be ultimately physical—however that does not imply that everything is ultimately reducible to the terminology adopted by physics. That is to say, there is no magic involved when explaining non-reducible phenomena they are just not fully captured in the terms laid out by an idealized physics. For example, if I am trying to describe how language is acquired in children I would do so in terms of psychological development—the process of socialization, developing syntax and semantics, evolutionary biology, etc., rather than in terms of physics. The doctrine of physicalism, irrespective of being reductive or non-reductive is not without controversy, but it is one held by most contemporary thinkers.
The project of naturalization follows rationally from various philosophers’ commitment to physicalism and the intermingling of philosophy and the sciences. A commonsense understanding of naturalism is: theorizing in a way that is subject to scientific scrutiny. That is to say, all ghosts, magic, miracles, and angels should be left out of our theories in order to maintain naturalistic respectability. Also we should avoid circularity, for example a theory would be circular given this subject matter if it explained consciousness in terms of intentionality and then intentionality in terms of consciousness. In the end our theories will have their place in the natural world by being scientifically examinable as well as being non-circular. If one is committed to physicalist ontology then it is sensible for naturalism to follow.

The doctrine of reductive physicalism has been stock for representationalist theories of intentionality. Often representationalist theories have focused on providing a reductive account of the intentional while eschewing consciousness. Representationalists tend to think that, once the problem of intentionality is solved then consciousness can be intentionalized. However, the doctrine of non-reductive physicalism has been stock for phenomenalist theories of consciousness. Adopting different views of what physicalism amounts to impacts the way in which theories of consciousness and intentionality are developed. In this section I will canvas the two views in greater detail so as to provide the framework which representationalist theories and phenomenalist theories work within. First I will examine the motivations for physicalism simpliciter and then go into depth about the distinction between reductive and non-reductive views.
Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism

The aim of this section is to outline the different views one can take on physicalism, expressly, what falls under the term ‘physical.’ Representationalists are recognized as adopting a reductive approach to intentionality, whereas most phenomenalists are non-reductive. What separates the phenomenalist stance on these issues is what exactly we consider to be a physical phenomenon. Most thinkers adopt the term ‘physicalism’ to express their views yet fail to distinguish between ‘reductive’ and ‘non-reductive’ varieties. The effects of treating the definition of ‘physical’ differently will rear its head later in the chapters on representationalism and phenomenalism, so, it is exigent to examine how different thinkers have spelled out physicalism. First I will analyze how physicalism can be spelled out in terms of supervenience—from there I will look at how supervenience allows for the distinction of reductive and non-reductive views and how they are motivated.

Supervenience is the thesis that one set of properties supervenes on a more fundamental set of properties (for literature on supervenience, look to Chalmers, 1996 and Kim, 1993). Expressly, if the set of properties A supervenes on the set of properties B then there cannot be a change in A properties without a change in B properties. This shows that the set of A properties depends in some way on the set of B properties. For example, it is generally accepted that the physical state of a substance (solid, liquid, gas) supervenes on the microphysical properties of that substance. Consider water vapor, liquid water, and ice. The subvenient base of these three physical states of water is H2O. There cannot be a change from liquid water to ice or liquid water to vapor without a change in the structure of the H2O molecules and their relation to one another. So, the property of being liquid water supervenes on the property of being H2O with a
particular molecular formation. The difference between water vapor, ice, and liquid water is determined by the strength of the relations between $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ molecules. This picture can be generalized to include all phenomena captured within the sciences. Thus, biological properties supervene on chemical properties, and chemical properties supervene on physical properties (properties captured by physics). Given the physicalist picture outlined above, it is thought that all phenomena in existence ultimately supervene on physical properties.

The view of nonreductive physicalism as a supervenience thesis is rather innocent. The stronger claim to be made is whether or not reductive physicalism is true; meaning, whether the set of supervening properties can be reduced to—that is, explained without remainder in terms of, the set of properties in the subvenient base. If reduction is possible then the supervening properties are nothing in addition to their subvenient base properties—if reduction is not possible then the supervening properties cannot be fully accounted for in terms of their subvenient base properties. This sort of reductionism is explanatory rather than ontological. Explanatory reduction drives that there is a dependency relation on the physical. For example, the reduction of the intentional to the physical is successful as long as the intentional can be given a physical explanation. On the other hand, ontological reduction would require an identity claim between sets of physical properties and sets of intentional properties. Suffice it to say that many representationalists such as Tye (2009), Dretske (1995), and Carruthers (2000) are after an explanatory reductive form of physicalism, whereas many phenomenalists such as Strawson (1994), Horgan and Tienson (2002), and Siewert (1998) hold a non-reductive form.
Next I am going to outline Strawsonian physicalism, which can be understood as a type of non-reductive physicalism. This will help to draw out the ambiguity in the use of the terms of ‘naturalism’ and ‘physicalism.’ Ultimately, both reductive and non-reductive physicalists are attempting to analyze consciousness and intentionality that leaves the supernatural behind—yet their conception of physical varies greatly.

**Strawson’s Physicalism**

Galen Strawson’s (2004) view of physicalism stresses the place of conscious experience in our conception of the physical. Strawson refers to the typical view taken of the physical (the reductive view) as the “…Greatest Silliness in the history of philosophy…” (2004, pp. 291). For Strawson, the only thing we know certain to be physical is experience—because it is the only thing we know to exist with certainty. Therefore anyone who is a *real* physicalist wouldn’t seek to reduce experience to something else. If we seek a reductive account of experience we have endorsed the Great Silliness. Rather, Strawson thinks, if anything should be puzzling it is the way physics appears to us given our understanding of experience. That is to say, we are acquainted with physical things in virtue of our experience. There is nothing puzzling about that. Yet our acquaintance with physical things via physics, independent of experience, is rather puzzling. The issue with Strawson’s view is that he simply takes phenomenal experience to be fundamental without giving any argument. This leads him to view experience as the starting point for defining physical phenomena.

Strawson says that often our use of ‘naturalism’ is meant to imply this misconceived version of physicalism. Given Strawson’s definition this is to fall in error. Naturalism properly
understood should encompass experience as a fundamental natural fact—irreducible to any other natural phenomenon. What is commonly referred to with talk of naturalism, according to Strawson, is ‘physicSalism,’ (2004, pp. 292) meaning that everything concrete can be explained in terms of physics. So, to ‘naturalize’ a phenomenon would be to bring it under physical theory. Strawson labels the reductionist view as an asymmetry theory, a theory which identifies an asymmetric dependency relationship between mental and physical phenomenon. Either the physical is realized by the mental (i.e. idealism) or the mental is realized by the physical (i.e. most versions of physicalism). Rather, Strawson advocates what he calls an equal-status theory: reality is ultimately both mental and physical, neither more fundamental than the other. For Strawson if experience is taken as a fundamental natural fact in this manner then there isn’t much to be puzzled about in the naturalization of consciousness. I take this to be a broadening of the physical—instead of only admitting objective third-person phenomena into an account of the physical, the sort of phenomena captured by physics, we also include experience as a basic physical phenomenon. If this notion of the physical is adopted, then it is still necessary to distinguish between phenomena that are mental and those that are not. The weight of these views bears on intuitions about experience, first-person knowledge, and subjectivity. In order to develop these intuitions properly it is important that we take first-person knowledge seriously. Yet many, following Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), might be suspicious of the idea that an inherently subjective phenomenon can be part of a shared enterprise like language or science. This point will become clearer in the section on objections to reductive physicalism, as most of the objections are raising epistemic issues about our knowledge of experience and knowledge of external facts.
Problems for the Non-Reductive view of the Mind

Dualist views of the mind date all the way back to the 17th century beginning with René Descartes, and they have faced critical assessment and criticism ever since. Substance Dualism, the thesis that the mind and body are two distinct substances, has exceedingly fallen out of fashion from the time Gilbert Ryle (1949) made his assault on it, characterizing the Cartesian view of the mind as a “ghost in the machine.” However, not long after Ryle’s critique, dualism began to rear its head in another form. In 1970 Donald Davidson published his thesis of anomalous monism in his paper “Mental Events”. Briefly, anomalous monism is the view that the mind, while residing in a single physical substance (monism), is not constrained by physical laws (it is anomalous). Indeed, Davidson argued that there could not be any psychophysical bridging laws, i.e. laws that would connect the psychological laws that govern the mind with physical laws that govern the body. Generally speaking, Davidson’s view is a physicalist theory of the non-reductive variety. As such, many took Davidson’s’ anomalous monism to give hope for the thesis of property dualism, according to which there exists only physical things yet physical things have irreducible mental properties. This weaker form of dualism, like substance dualism, has faced some startling objections that prompt many philosophers to defend a form of physicalism. Let’s take a look at three arguments that pose a problem for mental causation if one embraces property dualism.

The first objection is in regard to the causal significance of non-physical properties (Tye, 2009). Whenever I am thirsty, I willingly move my arm to pick up a glass of water for a drink. Here we have complete physical causal story of the process happening. Various synapses fire in my brain that transmit information through passing neurons, which in turn sends signals through
the muscles in my arm and hand causing them to contract and move so that my hand picks up the glass of water and the movements of my arm bring it to my mouth. After having drunk the water, more signals received from my mouth and stomach send messages to my brain telling me that my thirst is quenched and I no longer wish for drink. If we have a complete causal story in terms of physical processes, then what effect could any non-physical causation have on my desiring a drink and satisfying that desire? The dualist might respond, but what about the desiring for a drink? Surely that isn’t captured in the physicalist account. Even so, we are still left to wonder how a mental desiring has any causal efficacy when the process of drinking the water and all processes prior to it have a complete physical causal history that can be spelled out. There doesn’t seem to be any need for non-physical (that is, mental) causation.

We might set aside the issue of causal significance of mental properties and grant that somehow or other non-physical mental states are connected to physical states—there is yet another knot in the dualists’ causal story. This challenge has best been posed by Jaegwon Kim (1993). Consider an event $E$. We can think of $E$ as the event of my drinking from the glass of water. On a dualist approach, we would like to say that $E$ has been caused by $M$, that is, my mental desiring to drink the water. Though we also want to recognize the physical causal process that led to my drinking the water, we can label this process $P$. Given the dualists’ story, it seems as though event $E$ has been caused by both $M$ and $P$. This can’t be so because both $M$ and $P$ are sufficient causes for $E$. Is it possible that $M$ and $P$ are each partial causes of $E$? No, because as we have already seen at the very least $P$ can completely account for the happening of $E$. What we are left with is either the causal exclusion of the mental (our first objection), or embracing causal overdetermination. A look at our last objection will illuminate the threat of overdetermination.
The final difficulty regarding dualist accounts of the mind is the causal closure of the physical (Kim, 1993). The thrust of this argument comes from the laws of conservation of mass and energy, combined principles in physical theory which most of us learned about in grade school. Expressly, the laws say: the total amount of energy/mass within a closed system stays constant, it cannot be created or destroyed but can be transformed. As a result of Einstein’s theory of special relativity, mass and energy where shown to be equivalent \( E = MC^2 \), and their separate conversation laws were combined. So, the causal closure of the physical is the constraint that we reside within a physical system that is subject to the laws of conservation. If we want to save anything in theorizing about the mind it is mental-to-physical causation. However, if the mind is not a physical phenomenon, then how is it possible for it to have causal efficacy within a closed physical system without thereby introducing new mass or energy into that system and breaking our conservation laws? If we allow non-physical causation within a physical system it results in endorsing overdetermination, which means denying causal closure.

Any sort of dualist approach runs into these issues of denying causal closure, causal overdetermination, and causal exclusion. Yet we certainly want to keep both mental causation and adherence to well tested physical theory. The arguments given against dualism and its’ conflict with our established scientific worldview have persuaded many thinkers to favor a physicalist viewpoint. Representationalists and phenomenalists alike, have committed to physicalism, and its’ implied naturalization, which has led many to develop theories which are loyal to both physicalism and science.
Arguments against the Reductive view of the Mind

There are a number of outstanding objections that attempt to show how the mind eludes physicalist ontology. In this section I will outline the four different arguments that evoke the impression that the mind is something more than the properties captured by reductive physicalism. They are as follows: the possibility of philosophical zombies, the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, and the hard problem of consciousness. These four objections are interrelated and are furnished with the intuition that there is something distinct about experience that the physical fails to capture. It is important to be aware that these arguments are typically taken to be critiquing the reductive view of physicalism. So, if physicalism is non-reductive and broadened to entail that consciousness is an irreducible physical phenomena then these objections don’t have much strength. Being that their force draws from the claim that consciousness is ultimately reducible to non-experiential physical properties, whereas a non-reductive view of consciousness takes experiential properties to be irreducible physical properties. In subsequent chapters I will examine how the phenomenalist and representationalist are able to respond to the worries raised here.

The Possibility of Philosophical Zombies

This argument was formulated by David Chalmers in *The Conscious Mind* (1996). It goes something like this: we can conceive of a world that is a microphysical duplicate of the one we currently reside in. There is the universe and the solar system, with planet earth inhabited by people and animals—everything is physically the same. However, there is one great difference between this world we are conceiving and our own world—the human beings who inhabit it are
all dark inside. Which is to say that, they act in the same ways we do, they hold conversations, drive about in their cars, go to the movies, and shriek when pricked with a needle—they are functionally the same as us, although, none of these physical phenomena are accompanied by an experience. These sorts of beings are considered “philosophical zombies.”

There is nothing logically incoherent about this thought experiment. Even if our evolutionary story is considered there is nothing in that which would attribute conscious experience to a subject, so, zombies could even have the same evolutionary history as we do and be dark inside. This thought experiment rests upon the idea that if something is conceivable then it is logically possible and we can get at important conceptual truths. In this case there is no conceptual entailment from biological properties of beings to their having consciousness. If this is true then consciousness is something in addition to the physical facts in the world. God created all of the physical properties of the world and then additionally created consciousness.

The Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson first developed this argument in his paper “Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982). Unsurprisingly, due to its’ name, this argument has an epistemic footing. The thrust of this argument is to show that physicalism cannot account for the contents of phenomenal experience (or “qualia” as they are called). This is due to the epistemic divide found between facts about qualia and facts about physical properties.

In order to get the argument off the ground we are asked to imagine two distinct cases with special individuals, the case of Fred and the case of Mary. In Fred has an outstanding ability
consistently to discriminate and sort cases of red tomatoes, more so than the common person. So, if we were to place a case of tomatoes in front of Fred he would sort them from the least ripe (when tomatoes are green) to the most ripe (as they grow a darker hue of red), when in fact, most of these tomatoes would appear to be the same color to normal observers. In each instance Fred is asked to do this he has an impeccable ability to sort the tomatoes among the color spectrum in order of ripeness. We ask Fred how he does this and his answer is that he can see the different shades and hues of red very well. Scientists are able to probe Fred’s brain and see that more color-discriminating areas light up as he does this; they are also able to pay close attention to his behavioral patterns as well. That being, it is said the scientists have all the physical facts about Fred and the colors he is sorting that they could possibly have, yet *something* is still left out. The scientists do not have access to the facts about Fred’s experience when he is discriminating each tomato’s color. So, physicalism can’t capture all the facts about experience.

This point can be driven home in imagining the case of Mary. Mary is a scientist who has been raised in a black and white room all of her life. However, she has access to all the information we know about colors and their effects on the brain. She knows how light reflects off of surfaces and interacts with the retinas of the eyes which in turn fire synapses in the brain. Mary spent a good portion of her life learning all of the scientific data about vision and color that is available in this black and white room. She even gains a competence with color words and could tell you when somebody else is seeing a particular color due to their behavioral dispositions. One day Mary is released from this black and white room and for the first time she sees a red wall. According to Jackson the intuition is that Mary has an ‘Aha!’ moment and says to herself: “So *that’s* what red is like.” Upon exiting the room Mary learns a new fact, a mental
fact about what it is like to experience red. No amount of physical information could account for this fact, and thus, reductive physicalism wouldn’t work.

These two cases of Fred and Mary evince the intuition that there is a divide in epistemic access of the way in which we know facts about the physical world and facts about our mental life. Due to this difference in epistemic access between mental facts and physical facts it can be concluded that reductive physicalism cannot capture all of the relevant facts about our experience. If this is true, then reductive physicalism is false after all.

**The Explanatory Gap**

The Explanatory Gap was introduced by Joseph Levine in his paper “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap (1983). Levine develops this argument by building off of the modal arguments that Kripke presents against a version of physicalism. This is another epistemic argument quite similar to Jackson’s so I won’t spend too much time on it.

Levine first introduces an example using pain experiences and then an example using color experiences, I will only consider color experience as it relates to the above examples. Imagine that we identify when some person X is undergoing a color experience as of red with being in brain state R, and when X is undergoing a color experience as of blue with being in brain state B. Each time X experiences red they go into R and each time they experience blue they go into B. We might even add more to the scientific account and say that states R and B not only account for their neurological properties but also every other relevant physiological and behavioral property they undergo when experiencing red and blue respectively. Levine’s objection is simply that—even with all of this information we have no understanding as to why
these particular neurological, physiological, and behavioral properties are accompanied by the experience of particular colors. There is nothing to anchor why it is that when X enters R they undergo a red experience and when X enters into B they undergo a blue experience. The physical information fails to ground an explanation of why certain sorts of physical states are accompanied by certain sorts of phenomenal states. As such, reductive physicalism fails to explain the relationship between qualitative states and bodily states, so, it must be false.

**The Hard Problem of Consciousness**

Finally, the Hard Problem was also introduced by David Chalmers (1995), and can be understood as pressing on the issue that Levine addresses. Chalmers think there are a multitude of so-called “easy” problems of consciousness some of these are: discriminating stimuli, directing attention, and controlling behavior. The scientific story behind these sorts of phenomena may not be complete but we have a good idea of how to provide an explanatory account of them. However, the hard problem of consciousness is providing an explanatory account of experience, experience being the “what-it-is-likeness” of consciousness. There is something that it is like to being an experiencing subject versus being a rock. There is something that it is like to taste an apple or smell cinnamon. Again, it seems entirely perplexing why any sort of brain state or physical state should be accompanied by a phenomenal state. Chalmers thinks that, while we have made progress on the easy problems, the hard problem remains just as elusive as ever.
In this chapter I began by spelling out the basics of physicalism—the view that everything which exists is ultimately physical. I canvassed a supervenience thesis of physicalism and distinguished between two sorts of physicalism, non-reductive and reductive. These views are adopted by the phenomenalists and the representationalists, respectively. Reductive physicalism states that—while the mental is ultimately physical it is not fully captured by physical properties and hence cannot be reduced. Reductive physicalism claims that the mental can be explained without remainder in the terms laid out by an idealized physics. I then outlined Strawsonian physicalism in order to draw out the ambiguity in the use of the words ‘natural’ and ‘physical.’ Following that I canvassed the arguments against non-reductive views of the mind and then against reductive views of the mind.

This chapter on physicalism is meant to provide a background in order to better understand why phenomenalists and representationalists approach their theories from different starting points. Phenomenalists take phenomenal experience as a given and move forward by grounding intentionality in it, whereas representationalists seek to reduce intentionality to physical properties and then attempt to intentionalize phenomenal consciousness.
Representationalism about consciousness, broadly construed, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of conscious states can be accounted for in terms of their intentional content (Tye, 2000). That is, all conscious states have a representational structure. As such, there are two overarching sorts of representationalism acknowledged—weak representationalism about phenomenal character and strong representationalism about phenomenal character, henceforth weak representationalism and strong representationalism.

Weak representationalism is the thesis that the phenomenal character of conscious states supervenes on the states’ intentional content. As I explained in Chapter One, supervenience can be defined as a sort of dependency relationship, thus, if A supervenes on B there cannot be a change in A without a change in B. So, for weak representationalism, there cannot be a change in phenomenal character without a change in intentional content. So, in keeping with Chapter One, weak representationalism can be identified as a non-reductive representationalism. This thesis alone is not very revealing about the nature of phenomenal character itself, rather it only expresses the dependency of phenomenal character on intentional contents. A theory attempting to explain phenomenal consciousness should have something to say about its’ nature—its’ underlying character or necessary features. Consequently, most philosophers have no problem committing themselves to this less austere version of representationalism. Strong representationalism on the other hand seeks to identify phenomenal character with intentional contents—in other words identifying the phenomenal content of a representational state with the
state’s corresponding intentional content. This version of representationalism says something about the nature of phenomenal character, namely, that it is nothing more than features captured by representational contents. As such, strong representationalism can be identified as a reductive representationalism. The claims made by strong representationalists are more controversial, and for that reason strong representationalism will be the focus of this chapter.

To communicate concisely and effectively I will follow Chalmers (2004) and often adopt talk of properties to ground this discussion. This is not meant to reflect metaphysical commitments but to ground language usage for clarity. In doing so it is necessary to flesh out the representationalist thesis given this vocabulary. It goes something like this—representationalism is the view that phenomenal properties (those properties that account for the phenomenal character of a state) are a brand of representational property, such that, whatever phenomenal properties amount to they can be identified with a representational properties. Chalmers (2004, pp.11-15) is careful to mark another distinction that is important to note. He introduces the terms reductive representationalism and non-reductive representationalism, which I adopt. Reductive representationalism is taken to entail that phenomenal properties can be understood as representational properties without appeal to phenomenal notions, whereas non-reductive representationalism is taken to entail that phenomenal properties can be understood as representational properties that must appeal to phenomenal notions. The majority of representationalists are of the reductive sort.

A pressing matter is to answer the question ‘why representationalism in the first place?’ So, in the next section I will explore the transparency of experience, a motivation for espousing
the representationalist thesis generally. Following that I will lay out the groundwork for distinguishing between internalism and externalism of mental content—I will examine how externalism of mental content is excited in part by the transparency of experience. After that I will canvas the representationalist view of intentionality in different naturalized semantic theories. And finally I look at phenomenal concepts and non-conceptual content as methods the representationalists use to accommodate consciousness.

**The Transparency of Experience and Content Externalism**

*The Transparency of Experience*

The most broadly recognized characteristic of the phenomenal character of experience which elicits representationalism is the transparency of experience. This thesis was first articulated by Gilbert Harman (1990) in his influential paper “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” In this paper Harman is refuting the age-old idea that phenomenal properties are available to us through introspection as they are properties of our experiences. Harman’s central claim is that whenever we attempt to examine the properties of our mental representations, we ultimately end up examining properties of the object represented. This section will focus solely on Harman’s argument for the transparency of experience and its role in motivating representationalism by razing the intuition of introspectable phenomenal properties.

The ‘mental paint view’ is the position that stands contrary to the transparency of experience. This view can be spelled out like this: All of our experiences are inherently phenomenal and the way in which these experiences represent, if they are representational, is in virtue of their phenomenal properties. In other words, the phenomenal properties of our
experience are the mental paint which characterize its’ representational properties. We can draw an analogy that makes the mental paint view more lucid and illustrates how its’ name is derived.

The example that Harman uses is a painting of a unicorn, so I’ll go with that. When looking at a painting of a unicorn what the painting represents is a unicorn. The unicorn in this sense is analogous to what my experiences represent. If I am standing in front of an apple tree with my eyes open, attending to the tree, and assuming I am in a veridical state, then my experience represents an apple tree. Going back to the painting, the unicorn itself, as well as the background of the painting (which can be said to be my field of vision outside of what I am attending to) consists of various blotches of paint. If these blotches of paint weren’t there then there would be no unicorn, indeed no painting whatsoever. Due to this we should like to say that the blotches of paint are what constitute the representation of the unicorn. We are able to inspect the painting itself, disregarding what it represents, and examine the various blotches of paint. Drawing back to the analogy, the phenomenal properties of my experience of an apple tree are said to be like the blotches of paint. Upon careful introspection of my experience I can become aware of the various phenomenal properties that constitute the representational properties of my experience. In a nutshell, phenomenal properties are the mental paint which experiences are built out of and mediate the perception of objects. That is the mental paint view.

What can be said about both my experience of an apple tree and the picture of the unicorn is they both have an intentional object—the thing which is represented. In the case of my experience, the intentional object is an apple tree, the intentional object of the painting is a unicorn. Harman argues that the mental paint view fails to notice the distinction between the
properties of the represented object, and the properties of a representation of that object. The
unicorn in the painting is represented as being white, having a single horn etc. My experience of
an apple tree is represented as being six feet tall, having uncountable green leaves and red apples,
a wide trunk etc. The properties of the representation of the unicorn are just various blots of
paint on a canvas. However, the analogy fails when trying to inspect the properties of my
representation of the tree, whenever I attempt to look inwards in introspection it results in my
examining properties of the tree—not my \textit{experience} of the tree, hence the transparency of
experience. In my experience of the tree I have brown sensations, green sensations, and red
sensations but no sense can be made of these color sensations unless they are being attributed to
the object of my experience. I represent the trunk as brown, the leaves as green, and the apples as
red. The mental paint view must then be confused. Phenomenal properties don’t mediate our
perception of objects. Rather, properties of the objects themselves are represented in experience.

Harman’s argument drives representationalism because if phenomenal properties are
neither introspectable nor properties of our experience then they are directly perceived properties
of external objects. If they are properties of objects then how is it possible to account for our
experience of them? Representationalism is the most plausible suggestion. The properties of
external objects enter into the contents of representational states. Another result of this view is
that it excites \textit{externalist} representationalism. Many reductive representationalists also fall into
this category.
Internalism and Externalism of Intentional Content

Recall that supervenience is taken to be a relation in which there cannot be a change in the supervenient properties without a change in the subvenient base (see Chapter one). Roughly, internalism about mental content is the notion that if an individual X is in mental state m then m supervenes only on the non-relational properties of X, where a non-relational property of X is one such that it depends only on the existence of X. Externalism is taken as the negation of internalism. Thus externalism can be defined as the notion that if an individual X is in mental state m then m supervenes not only on the non-relational properties of X but also on the properties of her environment. In laymen’s terms the distinction between internalism and externalism can be considered respectively as the ideas that only the subject is necessary for the psychological phenomena going on inside their heads (internalism) or, that some, if not all, psychological phenomena can only be explained by also appealing to properties of the physical or social environment (externalism).

In Hilary Putnam’s famous paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975) he argues for externalism about natural kind terms, that the meaning of natural kind terms is dependent on the subject and also the subjects’ relation to environmental objects. This has been generalized by many to show that thoughts involving natural kind terms have wide content. Beliefs are prototypical examples of intentional states, and many beliefs involve natural kinds. Hence, many intentional states are also taken to have wide content. As such, if many intentional states are taken to have wide content and since phenomenal states are a class of intentional state (as per representationalism) it should follow that phenomenal states could also have wide content. Due to the transparency of experience this intuition is warranted. The representationalist thesis has,
for many, been taken to be an externalist thesis (Dretske, 1995; Tye, 2000). If we are unable to inspect the properties of our experience via introspection, and end up inspecting the properties of objects represented by our experience, then it is intuitive to claim that the relations we bear to external objects and their properties constitute the contents of our representational states.

**Naturalized Theories of Intentional Content**

Before we can begin solving the puzzle of how phenomenal character can exist within the physical world we must first figure out how it is possible for intentionality to exist within the physical world. If phenomenal content depends on representational content then, to be an honest physicalist with respect to phenomenal character we must first be one with respect to intentional content. Thus we are led to the project of naturalizing intentional content. Just how is it possible that neurons (on internalism) or neurons and their relationships to external objects (externalism) firing in my brain results in my having a thought that represents that the sky is blue? How about any physical state for that matter?

Peter Carruthers (2000) mentions three aspects of the representation relation that make it difficult to paint intentionality as a natural relation. The problematic aspects of representation have to do with: existential generalization, Leibniz’s law, and logically equivalent expressions. There are at least three naturalized semantic theories developed to handle these issues: causal theories, teleological theories, and conceptual role semantics (Loewer, 1997). The purpose of this section is to briefly examine the issues that naturalized semantic theories must solve as well as to provide a sketch of a few attempts at giving reductive semantic theories.
Criteria for an Adequate Naturalized Intentionality

The first difficulty naturalization has to overcome is the problem of existential generalization. If representationalism is taken as an externalist thesis and the subject bears relations to properties outside herself, how can some of these relations obtain? Think of the wider than relation, as in the earth is wider than the moon. Certainly this relation couldn’t obtain if one of these objects didn’t exist. However, Bill can represent a goblin without any such thing existing. Such is the problem of existential generalization, it cannot be generalized that both sides in the representation relation exist.

The problem concerning Leibniz’s Law, which states that identical things share identical properties, is similar. For example: Bill represents that the morning star is the planet Venus. It does not follow that Bill represents that the evening star is the planet Venus, even though “the morning star” and “the evening star” have the same referent. However, it could not be true that Bill points at the morning star without also pointing at the evening star. This issue is also known as the problem of opaque contexts.

The last worry concerns substitution of logically equivalent expressions. If Bill thinks that it is sunny outside or it is cloudy outside it doesn’t follow that Bill also thinks that it is not the case that it is neither sunny nor cloudy outside. The logical structure of the two sentences is equivalent, though Bill could fail to notice this. These three difficulties would need to be accounted for in order to have a successful reductive and naturalized theory of intentionality that the reductive representationalist is committed to.
Naturalized Theories

Causal theories of semantics are an intuitive approach for a naturalist to take. Generally, causal theories say: if a representation $R$ is only caused by instances of property $P$ then $R$ refers to $P$. An example of this would be the tokening of a horse representation, if the tokening of ‘horse’ is only caused by an instance of a horse then the term ‘horse’ refers to a horse. The immediate difficulty with this view is that it does not allow for error, what if an instance of a dog happened to cause the tokening of a ‘horse’ representation? It would follow that the dog is correctly represented by the representation. This is because, by definition, the representation correctly represents anything that can cause it to be activated. There is no room on a purely causal account to explain misrepresentation.

Another immediate difficulty is how fine-grained semantic relations are, meaning, there are instances where the causal relations do not individuate semantic properties. This is made clear by considering the problem concerning Leibniz’s Law above. Tokening a representation of the morning star is caused by the planet Venus, also tokening a representation of the evening star is caused by the planet Venus, but the causal connection with Venus does not clearly distinguish between which semantic property will be tokened. This is just a brief sketch of what causal theories purport and difficulties they face. For a shored up version of the causal theory, look to Fodor (1990).

Another approach that seems promising and most certainly naturalistically honest is through constructing a teleological semantic theory. These theories are designed to explain the truth conditions of mental contents via biological functions as a result of evolutionary history.
and/or developmental history. So, if a certain organism tokens a representation R it is a result of some biological function F that has been determined through natural selection to transfer information about the environment. Consider eyes, for example: the retinas in the eyes pick up various environmental stimuli (such as reflectance, wavelength, etc.) and carry that information through other optical organs ultimately producing a representation of the subjects’ surroundings. If tokenings of R happen to pick out instances of P, and the biological system is functioning properly, then R means P.

The upshot of teleological theories is that they allow for misrepresentation, one of the difficulties for causal theories. For instance, if a dog happened to cause a cat representation it could be explained due to biological function, either that function misfired or dogs have been selected to cause cat representations for evolutionary purposes. So, when confronted with a dog or a cat the subject will express cat-appropriate behavior. This behavior is a result of evolutionary and developmental traits that help the subject behave effectively in the presence of cats. So, when a dog triggers this function, it still represents CAT because the function evolved to detect cats. Teleological theories are held to be the most promising theories in giving a wide and reductionist account of representationalism. The properties represented are properties of the environment, hence wide. Also, representations are products of biological systems; for most teleologists biological function is suitably physicalist. Further writing on teleological theories of content can be found in Millikan (1989) and Papineau (1993).

The last theory of naturalized semantics I want to consider is conceptual role semantics. The main claim behind this theory is that semantic content is constituted, at least in part, by the
functional role that a mental state bears to other mental states of the subject. That is, if I have many different beliefs about dogs, animals, and other four-legged creatures, their meaning is determined by their causal relations to other mental states. Given conceptual role semantics, it is not possible to individuate semantic properties of a state absent of the network of other states they are connected to. The primary motivation for this view is a more general commitment to functionalism about the mind, wherein the mind is a result of the proper functional organization of a system. What is not clear is whether conceptual role semantics can be explained naturalistically. If meaning is determined by relations mental states bear to other mental states then it is difficult to see where wide content enters into the picture, which is typically the bridge to provide a naturalistic and reductive account. Rather, supporters of conceptual role semantics would resort to telling a naturalistic theory in terms of narrow content—which would map representations onto external objects in such a way to help successfully guide behavior. Some suggested philosophers who advocate of conceptual role semantics are Block (1986) and Harman (1982).

If any of the naturalized theories of content are successful then reductive representationalism will have made much headway. I don’t think that any of these theories are successful. Since teleological theories can handle misrepresentation they seem also to be capable of dealing with the problem of existential generalization—perhaps representing something that doesn’t exist is just a misfiring, yet, there is something being represented. For instance, my CAT function could be triggered in the absence of any cats, but something in the world happened to trigger the function, even if it is malfunctioning. A similar story could be given for the case of Leibniz’s Law—the subject could fail to notice the identity of certain objects due to representing
the object differently, in different contexts, for some evolutionary advantage (e.g. representing a glow stick seen in the dark as a light source while failing to represent it as a glow). However, it isn’t clear that biology can be reduced to physics, or that teleology can be made sense of without resorting to some constraint which would determine if a system is functioning properly—such as, normativity or something else inherently intentional. This becomes clear if we ask, what determines a systems proper function? It isn’t obvious that, just because a system functions in some way that it ought to function in that way — just because cats tend to trigger some biological function it isn’t true that this biological function ought to represent cats. Some sort of normativity is needed to ground a systems proper function.

**Phenomenal Concepts and Nonconceptual Content**

The next step in providing a complete representational view of the mind is to intentionalize consciousness, meaning, to show that the problem of reductively naturalizing consciousness is nothing more than the problem of reductively naturalizing intentionality. To do so, the appeal to phenomenal concepts has been used widely by reductive representationalists. The phenomenal concept strategy is a response to the objections against the reducibility of consciousness to the physical mentioned in the earlier chapter on physicalism. Remember, these four arguments are: the knowledge problem, the explanatory gap, the hard problem, and the possibility of zombies. This strategy is meant to alleviate intuitions that seem to demand the existence of something beyond the physical, namely, qualia, by appealing to concepts that ultimately refer only to physical properties. However, there is little agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts (Tye, 2009). In this section I will explore Brian Loar’s (1990) reductive
view of phenomenal concepts and an alternative view espoused by Tye, employing nonconceptual content, which dispenses with phenomenal concepts.

**Phenomenal Concepts**

Loar’s (1990) view is that phenomenal concepts are a type of recognitional concept. A recognitional concept is one we deploy without use of theoretical knowledge (i.e. associated sets of descriptions). When Mary sees red for the first time and says “that’s the color red” she is recognizing a feature. The color term ‘red’ is a recognitional concept that picks out Mary’s physical-functional properties, even though recognitional concepts aren’t mediated by descriptions which pick out these properties. So, the “what it is like-ness” of red is nothing in addition to the physical-functional properties of Mary’s brain when seeing the color red. Mary does not need to have any theoretical knowledge of red in order to deploy the concept but only be disposed to refer to red things as being ‘red.’ As such, Loar’s recognitional concepts are dispositional.

What is strange about this proposal is: why don’t recognitional concepts have sets of descriptions which pick out physical-functional properties? When I utter the term ‘red’ I mean the color of fire hydrants, bricks, red delicious apples, and other red things—this description doesn’t pick out some physical-functional property of my brain that is instantiated every time I see a red thing. Loar’s (1990, pp.84) response is that physical-functional concepts and phenomenal concepts are conceptually independent. Indeed, Loar (1990, pp.84) says that we should expect conceptual independence of the two because basic recognitional concepts do not depend on theoretical knowledge which physical-functional concepts consist of. This view is
persuasive in refuting the knowledge problem—what Mary learns is to recognize ‘red’ via a different mode of presentation, one that happens to involve a visual representation. Her previous theoretical knowledge of physical-functional concepts allowed her to pick out the same properties that she refers to using the phenomenal concept ‘red.’ However, as Tye (2009, pp.49) points out, Loar’s view seems to be lacking in the case of the explanatory gap. It doesn’t help to explain how the “what it is like-ness” of red arises from physical-functional properties of the subject. We might think that Mary exits the room and recognizes the physical-functional properties picked out under a different mode of presentation, yet it isn’t clear how a different mode of presentation explains the gap between theoretical knowledge and non-theoretical knowledge of the same properties, and hence Loar falls short of providing a fully successful theory.

**Non-conceptual Content**

Tye finds motivation for both representationalism and non-conceptual content due to the intensional character of phenomenal discourse, the word ‘intensional’ meaning, how a subject thinks of an object irrespective of its actual character. This was first developed by Roderick Chisholm (1957), and later by Frank Jackson (1977). In his book *Consciousness, Color, and Content* (2000), Tye gives an overview of how the intensionality of phenomenal talk motivates representationalism and how it helps to make sense of the role of non-conceptual content in representationalist theories.

Tye introduces the example spelled out by Chisholm and Jackson of the locution “X looks *F* to *S*,” where *X* is some object, *F* is a sensory property, and *S* is some subject. This locution is
distinct from the locutions “X looks as if it is $F$ to $S$” or “X looks like an $F$ to $S$”, where the first use of ‘looks’ is epistemic, and the second use is comparative. What is distinguishing about the locution “X looks $F$ to $S$” is that it does not bring the property expressed by $F$ under any concept. In order to fully appreciate this idea, let $X$ stand for ‘the dog,’ $F$ stand for the color ‘brown’ and $S$ for the subject ‘John.’ Thus we can translate the three locutions given this interpretation.

(i) The dog looks brown to John.

(ii) The dog looks as if it is brown to John.

(iii) The dog looks like it is brown to John.

It is intuitive to think that if the dog looks as if it is brown then John must grasp the concept of ‘brown,’ because the dog doesn’t actually look brown. Likewise if the dog looks like it is brown, the dog doesn’t actually look brown and so the concept ‘brown’ must be grasped. Locutions (ii) and (iii) express concept deployment, whereas in (i) the dog can look brown to John without deploying the concept of ‘brown’. What is important to take away is that the “X looks $F$ to $S$” locution expresses the phenomenal use of ‘looks’ and captures an exemplary case of phenomenal talk.

So, the phenomenal use of ‘looks’ is intensional just in case the color brown is taken to be some property of the dog, e.g. a reflectance property, that John could fail to notice. If John thinks the dog looks brown he doesn’t necessarily think that the dog has some particular surface spectral reflectance property which causes experiences of the color brown, rather John simply thinks the dog’s color looks brown. The use of ‘intensional’ here simply means the way a subject thinks of an object. The ‘extension’ on the other hand, is the way the object actually is, which the
subject could fail to notice. Consider the famous example of Lois Lane knowing that Clark Kent is Clark Kent, but failing to recognize that Clark Kent is Superman. John knows that the dog looks brown; he doesn’t know that the dog looks to have the surface spectral reflectance property which causes experiences of brown.

Tye argues that the intensional aspect of the phenomenal use of ‘looks’ can best be explained by appealing to the non-conceptual content of representational states. So ‘brown’ expresses a non-conceptual content that enters into John’s visual state. The use of non-conceptual content dispenses with the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is accounted for in terms of phenomenal concepts. Instead, phenomenal character is identified with non-conceptual content. What isn’t clear about this view is what non-conceptual content amounts to. Being that the contents of representational states are typically taken to be composed of concepts, what does it mean for content to be non-conceptual?

In *Consciousness Revisited*, Tye (2009) elucidates the conditions for an experience $E$ to have non-conceptual content: “…(i) $E$ has correctness conditions; (ii) the subject of $E$ need not possess the concepts used in a canonical specification of $E$’s correctness conditions.” (2009, pp.103) So what makes a particular content non-conceptual is that the subject need not bring the content under any sort of concept to undergo the experience, that doesn’t mean that the content *could* be brought under a concept and used to form thought by another subject. So there really is no distinction between the nature of conceptual content and non-conceptual content. Tye is making an epistemic point in that one can be *acquainted* with, or directly aware of particular properties of experience, and thus have knowledge of them without having descriptive
knowledge, or knowledge that they have a deeper nature. Thinking back to the example with John, he can be acquainted with the color brown and the dog can look brown to him without knowing that the color brown has a deeper nature which satisfies the description “the surface spectral reflectance property which causes experiences of brown.” If Tye is right about non-conceptual content then there might be hope for replacing the phenomenal concept strategy with one that is aligned with both representationalism and externalism, as non-conceptual content is a type of representational content that demands being in the acquaintance relation with the properties experienced of external objects.

Summary

In this chapter I explored the notion of representationalism and the overarching themes that pervade throughout. The introductory section consisted of spelling out a few views one could take on the notion of representationalism and I decided to focus on a reductive-externalist version, as many representationalists fall into this category. This consists of a theory which attempts to show that consciousness is grounded in intentionality; there cannot be a change in phenomenal properties without a change in representational properties. The second section involved motivating representationalism and externalism given Harman’s doctrine of the transparency of experience—whenever we attempt to inspect properties of our experience we end up inspecting properties of the objects represented. In the third section I gave a brief sketch of how intentionality can be accounted for given reductive physicalism and some of the problems the doctrine of naturalized semantics faces. I believe that reductive accounts will not be successful due to the problems that naturalized semantic theories face as well as the objections against reductive physicalism that concern consciousness. Finally in the last section I examined
how the representationalist seeks to accommodate consciousness into the intentional schema by either reducing phenomenal character to a type of recognitional concept or by identifying it with nonconceptual content which enters into the contents of representational states. Nonconceptual content looks to be a promising view to replace the phenomenal concept strategy. The next chapter focuses on phenomenalism, the converse view to representationalism.
PHENOMENALISM

Introduction

The term ‘phenomenalism’ does not capture a type of positive theory about phenomenal consciousness in the way that representationalism does. In fact the term captures an overlap in espousing aspects of consciousness and intentionality which representationalism fails to accommodate; it might be better characterized as a shared negative theory. That is, most phenomenalists have been less concerned with giving an account of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and have been more concerned with using features of these phenomena to argue against the positive theories put forward by representationalists. Oddly enough this has resulted in developing views about where the two phenomenon overlap. That being said, the best way to characterize phenomenalism is to say that—where representationalism is the view that consciousness is grounded in intentionality, phenomenalism is the view that intentionality is grounded in consciousness (Chalmers 2004, pp.2). In other words, that any sort of theory put forth by the phenomenalist will pride phenomenal properties over representational properties. According to the phenomenalist only, conscious states or states connected to them can be really intentional. Not only that but, there is a basic sort of intentionality which accrues solely in virtue of phenomenal character.

Recall that nonreductive representationalism only claims that the phenomenal properties of a state supervene on its representational properties. Given Chalmers’ description of phenomenalism, one could say that it is the converse view of weak representationalism, where the weak representationalist says that phenomenal properties supervene on representational
properties, the phenomenalist says that representational properties supervene on phenomenal properties. Phenomenalism spelled out like this is akin to the ‘mental paint view’ explored in the section on the transparency of experience. Neither view commits one to saying something about the nature of phenomenal properties. So, on the face of things the phenomenalist view, like weak representationalism, also doesn’t reveal much about the nature of phenomenal properties—aside from the fact that, whatever they may be, they are not identifiable with representational properties. It is my view that this facet of phenomenalism is both beneficial and disadvantageous to the phenomenalist. On the one hand, it releases the project of analyzing consciousness and intentionality from the confinement of the representationalist thesis. On the other hand we should like our theories to say something more about the nature of phenomena, about what the phenomena in question really is.

The umbrella term ‘phenomenalist’ describes a variety of different views. In this chapter, I aim to develop the most important of these views and the ones which seem to have the most overlap in writings. The areas covered in this chapter should not be taken to reflect the views of all thinkers who resist representationalism, but only as views that have stood out to me as the strongest points to be made against it. In the first section, I will examine how phenomenology is typically taken to be narrow with respect to content, and how this motivates an internalist view for the phenomenalist, as opposed to the externalism of most representationalists. From there, I will lay out some phenomenalist critiques on the program of naturalizing semantics which attempt to show that if the program is to be saved we must take a different approach. Finally, after drawing out some pitfalls of representationalism, and considering what motivates phenomenalism, I will then examine the view that consciousness grounds intentionality. The last
section will take up the majority of this chapter as it has the most overlap in the literature and Kriegel’s (2013) piece treats it as a research program in and of itself.

**Phenomenology and Content Internalism**

In this section I will explore the phenomenalist motivation for the narrowness of phenomenal content. I will attempt to show why grounding consciousness in intentionality or vice versa creates a tension forcing one to generalize one’s arguments in support of narrow or wide content *tout court*. Also, I will examine how the phenomenalist might respond to the transparency of experience as introduced by Harman.

**The Narrowness of Phenomenology**

Chalmers notes that:

“*It is widely believed that phenomenal properties depend only on the internal state of the subject. It is also widely believed (following the arguments of Putnam 1975 and Burge 1979) that most representational properties depend not only on the internal state of the subject, but also on the subject’s environment.”* (2004, pp.15)

Here Chalmers is drawing the distinction between narrow content and wide content, or internalism and externalism. Traditionally phenomenal properties are taken to be narrow—depending only on the internal state of the subject. Whereas intentional properties are taken to be wide, depending not only on the subject’s internal state, but also the subject’s environment. As such, we have a stark difference in the way representationalist theories and phenomenalist theories progress. If the phenomenalist grounds intentionality in consciousness they will attempt to generalize the narrowness of phenomenal content into the representational realm. Conversely,
for the representationalist, they will attempt to generalize the wideness of representational states into the phenomenal realm or they will have to hold a narrow view of both phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.

Why generalize arguments for the narrowness of phenomenology or the wideness of representational states? Surely if one wishes to show a dependency on either consciousness or intentionality then they must show that the contents of the supervening states are determined by the contents of their subvenient base. If some states are taken to be wide and others to be narrow it is not clear there is a proper dependency relation. For instance, if representational properties are taken to be wide, and intentionality supervenes on phenomenal properties which are taken to be narrow, then there could be a change in the external factors that determine the wide representational properties without a change in phenomenal properties. This dissolves the initial formulation of the supervenience relationship—that there cannot be a change in intentional properties without a change in phenomenal properties. Conversely, in the case of narrow phenomenal properties supervening on wide intentional properties, it is plausible that a narrow phenomenon could supervene on a wide phenomenon. However, it is not clear which wide intentional properties are relevant in specifying the base for narrow phenomenal properties. So, if we are to take phenomenalism to be true then all contents must be narrow. If we take representationalism to be true, then we at least need to be able to specify which wide representational properties the narrow phenomenal properties supervene on.

The Twin Earth arguments given by Putnam (1975) and the “arthritis” example given by Burge (1979) have given strong intuitions towards the idea that many representational contents are wide. Putnam invites us to imagine a place called Twin Earth, it is exactly like earth in every
possible way except for one thing—instead of their lakes, oceans, and rivers being filled with H2O, they are actually filled with XYZ. The Twin Earthians still use the term ‘water’ to refer to this substance, and it has the same surface features that the water of our acquaintance has. The idea is that when those of us on Earth utter the term water it refers to H2O, when Twin Earthians utter the term water it refers to XYZ. So, it is concluded that the truth conditions of our thoughts about water depend on the stuff we are acquainted with, that is H2O, whereas the truth conditions of Twin Earthians thoughts about water depend on XYZ. So, this sort of intentional content is wide. Burge makes a similar point with the term ‘arthritis.’ My concept of arthritis might vary from yours in terms of its descriptive content, though what we mean when we utter the term ‘arthritis’ is essentially what doctors and other professional would deem to be ‘arthritis.’ So, we have another sort of wide content. This sort depends on external socially determined norms.

As such, what isn’t very clear is why we should take phenomenal contents to be narrow. The narrowness of phenomenology is espoused by Chalmers (2004) as well as Horgan and Tienson (2002) with little argument given. It seems to me to be something more like a natural attitude we have towards our phenomenal states, or an unexamined assumption. A popular way to draw out this intuition is thinking of the brain in the vat thought experiment. Simply put, the thought experiment asks to imagine a phenomenal duplicate of myself that isn’t actually in a similar environment or even embodied, rather, it is just a brain in a vat that is hooked up to a computer and receiving various stimuli inputs which result in a massively illusory experience. This experience is so phenomenally rich that I wouldn’t be able to tell whether or not I was actually a brain in a vat or whether the surrounding environment is real. This thought experiment
is logically possible, and so, it seems that phenomenal properties are really only dependent upon states of the brain and causal connections to stimuli. If this is true then phenomenal properties are narrow, while going into a phenomenal state might depend causally on stimulus from the environment the properties in the environment are not constitutive of our phenomenal experiences. This is, at least, the traditional way to view phenomenal content which has come under scrutiny in the wake of externalist arguments.

**Mental Paint**

Given these intuitions it doesn’t really seem plausible that the environment plays much of a role in determining phenomenology, but phenomenal externalism does have its defenders (Lycan, 2001; Noë, 2004). This draws back to the transparency of experience in the chapter on representationalism. The intuitions from that argument pull in the opposite direction—when examining the properties of our experience we actually examine the properties of the object experienced. This sounds like a funny thing to say if I am a brain in a vat. Introspecting would just lead to inspecting stimulus being received from the computer I am hooked up to. Surely that can’t be correct. What the phenomenalist wants to say is that there is such a thing as mental paint—that is, phenomenal properties of the experience when are not exhausted by representational properties. Loar (2003) and Block (2003) both give arguments in favor of it.

Block considers the case of perceiving a tomato. I can perceive an actual tomato or I can be hallucinating and perceive a phenomenally identical tomato. It isn’t clear what the transparency of experience says about cases of hallucination. This is similar to the objection raised by the brain in the vat example. What properties am I inspecting if there is no actual object that my hallucination represents? Block (2003, pp.9) insists that the qualia, which is
common between the actual perception of the tomato and the hallucination of the tomato, is introspectable. He also considers Lycan’s (1995) representationalist view that attempts to account for this likeness in experience without resorting to qualia. Block (2003, pp.10) states that, Lycan can respond by saying that the subject can be aware of a type of mental property, a demonstrative mental property that the experience is representational; in other words, that the likeness between veridical perception and non-veridical perception of the tomato is introspectable by becoming aware of properties which reveal something like—‘that I am representing a tomato as being red’ in both cases of perception and hallucination. However, Block (2003, pp.10) finds this proposal unsatisfactory because even if an individual doesn’t grasp the concepts of representation or intentional content they can still be aware of the likeness between veridical and non-veridical experiences that share the same phenomenal character. Hence, there must be mental paint.

Loar (2003, pp. 25) on the other hand thinks that we can find evidence of the existence of mental paint in a particular sort of mental phenomena, namely, the phenomena of directedness. Directedness, that is, intentionality, seems to be built into perception. Whenever you have a visual experience it is directed at something—what is interesting about this is that the directedness is a property of the experience, not a property of the objects the experience represents. As such it doesn’t seem possible to occlude directedness from experience and we have found evidence of mental paint. That is, it doesn’t seem possible to conceive of having an experience which isn’t about or directed at something, intentionality is essentially part of the experience. So, Loar takes it, that intentionality is dependent upon the phenomenal aspects of an experience.

46
In the section on phenomenal intentionality I will explore the impact of Loar’s view as it has been taken to show that intentionality is a feature of consciousness. Next I will examine a critique by Strawson (1994, 2004) of naturalized semantic theories that has driven intuitions away from representationalism and towards a phenomenalist view.

**The No-Problem Thesis**

In Galen Strawson’s book *Mental Reality* (1994) he spends a chapter attempting to dissolve the problem of intentionality. The aim is to show that the problem of intentionality, the problem being to give a naturalistic account of it, is nothing more than the problem of giving a naturalistic account of experience. He calls this view the “no-problem thesis.” The criticisms he weighs against the program of providing a naturalistic account of intentionality which eschews consciousness gives motivation for the phenomenalist project. So, here I will outline a few thought experiments that he uses to argue this point.

The first thought experiment goes like this: Imagine two people (A and B) having qualitatively identical experiences as of thinking about a particular real statue S located in a particular place. The first person, A, has had some sort of causal connection with this statue, either from visiting it, seeing it, or something of that sort. The second person, B, has no causal history with the statue, their experience of it is from a ‘freak brainstorm’ as Strawson (1994, pp.179) puts it. The intuition is that A has an experience that is about S, whereas B’s experience is not actually about S. The causal connection that A has had with the statue is what accounts for A’s experiential state to rightfully be called about S. Since B lacks this causal connection there is no way her state can be said to be about S. So, Strawson (1994, pp. 180-181) says, what is
puzzling about persons A and B is their having contentful experiential episodes; however, the intentional aspect of their states varies solely due to causal connections—there’s nothing puzzling about that. A’s experience is about S because she has had a causal connection with S, B’s experience is not about S because she lacks the causal connection. This entails that even if we accept that intentionality is divorceable from experience, whatever difficulties arise in naturalizing intentionality are nothing more than the difficulties of naturalizing consciousness. That is to say, if the problem of intentionality were solved naturalistically, then we would still be left with the problem of analyzing experience.

The next thought experiment aims to answer the question can entities which lack experiences possess intentionality? If not, this would create a deep issue for the representationalist program. Remember the sort of representationalism I’ve considered seeks to identify phenomenal consciousness with reductive representational states. If entities which lack experience cannot be intentional then intentionizing consciousness was doomed from the beginning.

This thought experiment is as follows: Imagine two different scenarios, the first of a cat chasing a mouse, and the second of a heat seeking missile locking onto a helicopter. Then consider whether or not the cat has an intentional state about the mouse and whether or not the missile’s representation of its target is intentional. Strawson (1994, pp. 187) thinks that, if we say yes to the cat, but no to the missile then our intuitions suggest the cat’s experience is what accounts for its state being intentional and the missile’s lack of experience for its corresponding lack of intentionality. Or, we could allow that the missile has intentionality due to it being
designed by intentional beings, namely, humans. Strawson thinks that this sort of intentionality wouldn’t be considered original or intrinsic, merely a derived sort. The missile wouldn’t have *real* intentionality like us humans. Lastly, we could allow the missile has intentionality irrespective of its creators. Yet Strawson (1994, p.188) thinks this view also endorses the no-problem thesis because we can easily explain that sort of intentionality. And we would also end up with an overabundance of intentional entities, such as, as Strawson (1994, p.188) mentions, a pool of water reflecting an image. Even that pool of water would be considered intentional. What Strawson is driving at is that—even if we accept non-experiencing entities have intentionality, there is nothing puzzling about that sort of intentionality. So, still, explaining experience is the real troubling factor.

Strawson’s thought experiments lend themselves to the idea that the only original sort of intentionality is found in experience, so, trying to naturalize intentionality while eschewing experience isn’t possible. These sorts of intuition have led many to believe that intentionality must be grounded in consciousness itself—hence phenomenalism. In the next section I will explore a quite distinct sort of intentionality from the sort found in naturalist programs, one that embraces the phenomenal.

**Phenomenal Intentionality**

The thesis of phenomenal intentionality is the most important aspect among the phenomenalist camp as it has gained the most support and recognition in recent years. Terence Horgan and John Tienson (2002) have defined phenomenal intentionality as follows: “There is a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (2002, pp.520). This view creates an essential connection between
intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Horgan and Tienson are sure to make it clear that this connection is not merely nomological, but expresses a by virtue of relation. This relation can best be understood as a necessary conceptual link between consciousness and intentionality. They believe that since this sort of intentionality is grounded in phenomenology, then it must have narrow content, and, if this is true, then all theories of intentionality which seek to ground intentionality in external relations (i.e. most naturalized programs) are mistaken. In this section I will outline their argument for these views.

In order to get their argument off the ground, Horgan and Tienson first consider two other theses, the intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. These theses are just as their names suggest: there is a pervasive intentional content encountered in phenomenal states, and there is pervasive phenomenological character encountered in intentional states.

**The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality**

I will first consider the intentionality of phenomenology. Currently I am undergoing many different phenomenal experiences. There is a yellow high-lighter to my right, causing an experience of yellow, there is a feeling of my mouth being dry and an ache in my back from terrible posture, I can hear the hum of the air conditioning unit running outside my apartment, and feel the warmth from my laptop on my hands as I type. All of these various sorts of experiences, the array of sensations my modalities perceive are experienced as being in the world. They are presented as properties of objects: yellowness of a highlighter, humming of the A/C, warmth of the computer.
There are many other phenomenal states that are constantly being experienced, such as my sense of bodily balance and being presented with the scene in my field of vision. Accompanying all of these rich phenomenal experiences are intentional states which attribute properties to the objects around me. Therefore it seems as though our phenomenal states are deeply connected to our intentional states. This sort of view is widely accepted, it seems strange to try to think of phenomenal states while occluding the intentional. What is the sensation as of yellow, absent of attributing it to a highlighter, or a school bus, or the sun? The intentionality of phenomenology and its strong intuitive pull is largely the reason for adopting representationalism; however, what the representationalists don’t buy into is the phenomenology of intentionality.

A good example of the phenomenology of intentionality, which Horgan and Tienson mention, and which I find to be the most compelling, was introduced by Strawson (1994, pp.5-13). Strawson asks us to think of a Frenchman named Jacques and an Englishman named Jack who each only speak the language from their countries of origin. Jacques and Jack are sitting together in a room listening to a radio broadcast, and the broadcaster is only speaking in French. Both Jacques and Jack are having a similar phenomenological experience in virtue of hearing the noises coming from the radio. However their experience differs in a key way, being that the broadcast is in French, Jacques is having an experience of understanding. Jack on the other hand doesn’t understand anything that’s being said, because he only speaks English, his phenomenological experience lacks a certain property that Jacques’ experience has. What marks this distinction in phenomenology is the intentional states which accompany Jack’s and Jacques’ listening to the radio broadcast. Jacques is able to comprehend the words and sounds coming out
of the radio resulting in his experience of understanding. As such, this experience can be said to have the character it has in virtue of his intentional states.

As it turns out, phenomenology and intentionality seem to be deeply interwoven. There are many phenomenal states one undergoes which don’t seem sensible if their inherent intentional aspects are subtracted. Also, there are various intentional states which one enters that seem to have an underlying phenomenal character; the experience of understanding had by listening to a speaker of your native tongue is only one of them, we might also consider the “what it is likeness” of having particular occurring thoughts—such as the phenomenal difference between thinking that the moon is on fire versus that the moon is underwater. Different intentional states are characterized by different phenomenal characters.

**The Thesis of Phenomenal Intentionality**

The claim behind the thesis of phenomenal intentionality is this: there is a kind of intentional content such that any two phenomenal duplicates will share similar intentional states in virtue of their shared phenomenology. The other two theses, the intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality are used as evidence for this claim—there is a pervasive kind of intentional content affiliated with our phenomenal states and there is a pervasive kind of phenomenal content affiliated with our intentional states. So, if intentionality and consciousness are so deeply connected it is at least plausible that there is a sort of intentional content had in virtue of phenomenology. Phenomenal intentionality is taken to be intrinsic intentionality, which all other states are intentional in virtue of being connected to (Loar, 2003; Kriegel, 2013).
A key point to this thesis is that intentional states are accessible for accuracy in virtue of their phenomenology. The idea that phenomenology constitutes conditions of accuracy has been developed at length by Charles Siewert (1998). To get this point across imagine a phenomenally identical duplicate of yourself, and nothing else about this duplicate. Horgan and Tienson (2002, pp.524) stress the importance of this “and nothing else” clause, in order to build in an epistemic veil of ignorance, so that only phenomenology is considered. Imagine you both are having a visual experience as of a green apple at time T. In order for these perceptual experiences to be veridical they must be caused by a green apple located in the correct part of your visual fields at time T. So, if the experiences accurately reflected reality it would be because of the existence of an actual green apple causing the visual experience. However, it can be said that the experience, which your duplicate undergoes, by itself provides the intentional content that determines which class of properties would satisfy having the experience. Other intentional states cannot contribute to this sort of content because they were left out by hypothesis. Your experience would also have this sort of intentional content in virtue of sharing the same phenomenology. If the two of you were actually hallucinating a green apple it doesn’t change the fact that there is a class of properties that could accurately satisfy your perceptual experiences, these specify what would make them veridical experiences.

So, two phenomenal duplicates have something important in common determined by their phenomenology—phenomenal intentional content, or their conditions of accuracy on intentional states. Thus there are two ways to look at truth-conditions, from the conditions of accuracy internal to phenomenology and from the objects and properties in the world needed to satisfy these conditions. Phenomenal intentional contents are the accuracy conditions determined
by phenomenology. As such, any phenomenal state has conditions of accuracy as a part of it, that is, phenomenal intentionality. Since phenomenal states and intentional states are so strongly interwoven, given the above theses, it looks to be that most of our mental life has a pervasive phenomenal intentional content. Insofar as there is something it is like to be in a state, there is some phenomenal intentional content determined by its phenomenal character.

Phenomenal intentional content is at the heart of the phenomenalist program, if this thesis is accepted then there is surely an important sort of intentionality rooted only in consciousness, providing a starting point for those who have argued against representationalism to begin building a positive theory that grounds intentionality in consciousness. As such, many have taken phenomenal intentionality to be the basis of mental content—meaning that, for some, phenomenal intentionality is the original source of intentionality, and other representational states have derived intentionality by having a connection to this sort of intentionality (Loar, 2003; Kriegel, 2013). Also, if we accept the controversial claim that phenomenology is wholly narrow, and if we also accept the phenomenalist thesis that intentionality depends on phenomenology it is plain to see that phenomenal intentional content would also have to be a narrow sort of content. These views combine together begin to make a strong case for content internalism by opening the doors for phenomenalists to generalize arguments for narrow content into the intentional realm.
Summary

In this chapter I have outlined the overarching sort of view that defines phenomenalism, as well as its basic tenets. The first section was dedicated to characterizing a sort of shared negative thesis that rejects representationalism by grounding intentionality in consciousness. Following that, I went over a few arguments for the narrowness of phenomenology and some phenomenalist attempts to defend mental paint. Then I outlined Strawson’s “no-problem thesis” which evinces the intuition that conscious experience, not intentionality, is the more difficult problem to solve in our theory of mind and the only source of original intentionality. Finally I explored the arguments for phenomenal intentionality—an important and pervasive intentional content that accrues solely in virtue of a subject’s phenomenology. Due to the phenomenalists being generally committed to a non-reductive view of the mind, their theories were less concerned with giving a naturalistic explanation and more concerned about drawing on our intuitions about consciousness.
CHALMERS’ NONREDUCTIVE REPRESENTATIONALISM

Introduction

In “The Representational Character of Experiences,” David Chalmers (2004) argues for a non-reductive version of representationalism that seeks to satisfy the intuitions of both phenomenalists and representationalists alike. So far we have seen that the phenomenalists pride consciousness over intentionality and the reductive representationalists pride intentionality over consciousness. It is fair to say that their views express relationships of constituency. In the case of phenomenalism, the most important intentional content of representational states is constituted in virtue of phenomenology. In the case of representationalism, the phenomenal content of conscious states is constituted in virtue of their representational character. Chalmers takes issue with both of these approaches as giving priority to one phenomenon of the over. Instead he seeks to show how both intentionality and consciousness are so intimately interwoven that one cannot take precedence over the other.

In this chapter I will analyze Chalmers’ version of non-reductive representationalism and explore whether it is a more satisfactory breed of theory than either the reductive representationalist stance or the phenomenalist stance. In the first section I spell out the distinction Chalmers draws between Russellian contents and Fregean contents. From there I will outline Chalmers’ view as it adopts the use of Fregean contents to arrive at a narrow and non-reductive type of representationalism. This will also include Chalmers’ response to the question of whether his theory is compatible with the narrowness of phenomenology as well as the
transparency of experience. Following that I will argue that Chalmers’ should adopt wide phenomenal properties.

**Russellian Contents Versus Fregean Content**

Chalmers argues for a version of representationalism that identifies some classes of phenomenal properties with certain representational properties, more specifically, with a class of perceptual properties. He calls the position he defends Fregean Representationalism.

Most representationalists are largely Russellian with respect to content. Russell (1903) argues that mental contents are propositions, where propositions are complexes which can consist of universals and particulars. Being in a representational state involves standing in the *acquaintance* relation to the constituents of a proposition. Thus, if I believe that Jack is tall, I stand in a relation to the proposition <Jack is tall>—where the relation involves being acquainted with *Jack* and the universal *tallness*, which are the constituents of the proposition.

The key claim behind Russellian representationalism is this:

To be in a phenomenal state is to represent Russellian contents in a phenomenal manner. To see yellow, e.g., is to represent something as being yellow. This involves standing in the acquaintance relation to an object and the color yellow. Thus, phenomenal states represent the world in virtue of standing in the acquaintance relation to the extensions of its propositional constituents (e.g. the Twin Earth example, where H2O is a constituent of my thoughts about water on Earth and XYZ is a constituent of my thoughts about water on Twin Earth).
Recall that extensions are the objects or properties picked out by a term, whereas intensions are ways we can know of these objects or properties such as, e.g., a set of descriptions. What this means is that for most representationalists, the contents of a representational state are individuated in terms of the extensions of their constituent concepts, that is, they advocate Russellian contents. The content of the belief that Jack is tall would thus be individuated in term of the ordered pair <Jack, tallness> which demarcates the aggregate of the particular Jack having the property of tallness. For representationalists who adopt the Russellian view of contents it follows that the veridicality of representational states are dependent upon whether or not the properties picked of their representational contents are satisfied given the way the world is.

What is important to take away from this characterization is that phenomenal properties, for the typical representationalist, are identified with a type of representational property—namely, a property with a distinct manner of representation (visual, tactile, auditory, etc.), involving Russellian contents. In the case of colors, the phenomenal property is equivalent to representing a Russellian content that involves making a color attribution. Chalmers objects that the views that identify phenomenal properties with Russellian contents cannot accommodate these three intuitions about color:

“…(i) color experiences attribute colors to objects; (ii) colors are intrinsic properties; (iii) there can be veridical phenomenally identical color experiences (in different subjects) of objects with relevantly different intrinsic properties.” (2004, pp.22)
Taken together Chalmers says these three claims “entail that phenomenally identical color experiences can attribute different properties to objects,” (2004, pp.22) which Russelian representationalism cannot make sense of without denying one the above claims. For example on a dispositionalist view of color, dispositional properties to cause color experiences are attributed to objects—Chalmers finds this counter intuitive, we attribute color properties to objects, not dispositional properties. He thinks that this can be avoided if phenomenal properties are identified with representing the sort of content that he embraces, that is, Fregean contents.

Unlike Russell, Frege (1948) does not believe in singular propositions. When we entertain a thought, our access to it is mediated by a “sense” or mode of presentation (a way of conceiving of the object). Thus the sense of a concept is one distinct mode of presentation of that concept. There is a distinction to be made here between the reference of a term and its sense. The most typical example is of the ‘morning star’ and the ‘evening star.’ Both the morning star and the evening star have the same referent—they refer to the same object, namely, the planet Venus. Yet the sense of the concepts varies between their associated descriptive contents. The sense of the ‘morning star’ is captured by ‘the object that appears in the eastern sky as the sun rises,’ and the sense of the ‘evening star’ is captured by ‘the object that appears in the western sky as the sun sets.’ Despite this difference in sense, the expressions refer to the same object.

The contents of mental states are propositions, yet propositions are complexes which never consist of particulars as constituents. Thoughts about particulars are always mediated by a mode of presentation, which is an element of thought can be expressed by, e.g., “the so-and-so”.
Chalmers extends this basic picture to include thoughts about properties—they are always presented to us via some mode of presentation.

If I believe that Jack is tall, I stand in a relation to the proposition $<$Jack is tall$>$—but the relation doesn’t involve being acquainted with Jack and the universal *tallness*. If these objects are presented to me, it is via the elements of the proposition, i.e., via concepts, which can be characterized by descriptive contents rather than extensions.

The key claim about Fregean representationalism:

To be in a phenomenal state is to represent something as being a certain way. To see yellow is to represent something as being yellow. Any objects or properties that are presented to the subject are presented via modes of presentation—a descriptive content contributes to the conditions of satisfaction of the mental state. So, we can see Fregean contents as the intensions of mental states, and Russellian contents as the extensions.

In order to account for cases of hallucination, the Russellian generally invokes a property-involving depiction of contents, without an appeal to objects. If one must be acquainted with the objects that are the extension of the propositional constituents—then it seems counter-intuitive for cases of hallucination to be possible. However, if one is merely acquainted with properties involved in the propositional constituents of a hallucinatory experience then they aren’t committed to the existence of particular objects. The Fregean, on the other hand, doesn’t need to make this move, since modes of presentation do not commit one to the existence of particular objects. Rather, she is committed to modes of presentation as abstract objects, meaning a sense
which specifies a description of the way the world would have to be in order for an experience to be veridical. It should be clear now that the distinction between Russellian contents and Fregean contents is that Fregean contents are constraints on the properties or objects expressed in Russellian contents. That is to say, Fregean contents consist of descriptions, or modes of presentations, of the properties that Russellian contents are composed of.

Chalmers’ View

Chalmers finds the thesis of Fregean contents promising: Mental contents present objects to us, and when they do the objects are presented to us via modes of presentation. When I think about the Evening Star, it is presented to me via an aspect of content, which is captured by, e.g., ‘the object that appears in the western sky as the sun sets’. A belief may count as true as long as the mode of presentation of its content is satisfied by things in the world.

Chalmers distinguishes two varied types of representational properties (2004, pp. 3-4). One class of representational properties is pure and the other class is impure. Pure representational properties are taken to be those which represent a certain intentional content. Impure representational properties are those which represent a certain intentional content in a particular manner. It is easiest to understand this distinction given an example. Think of a mental state attributed to Tom: “Tom sees that the coffee is black.” The corresponding pure representational property is simply representing the coffee as being black, while the corresponding impure representational property also captures the manner of representation, in this case visually representing the coffee as being black. That is to say, pure representational properties are captured by the contents embedded in the ‘that’ clause of representational states,
whereas impure representational properties are captured by the manner of representation (sees, believes, dreams, hears etc.) taken together with the content embedded in the ‘that’ clause.

Chalmers (2004, pp.4) takes it that the key claim behind representationalism is making an equivalency (or biconditional entailment) claim between phenomenal properties and, for most representationalists, impure representational properties. He finds it promising to extend the use of modes of presentation to the contents of mental states (2004, pp. 25), which results in Fregean representationalism. He argues that recognizing this additional feature of contents supplies us with the necessary tools to make the needed equivalency claim between phenomenal properties and impure representational properties. In doing so we can work out a theory of Fregean content that defends a view of how, despite initial appearances, contents between perceptual states and intentional states can vary, even though they might be directed at the same object. The pull of Fregean contents is their use of phenomenal notions in states that are represented phenomenally. For example, the Fregean content of any given phenomenal experience will always involve something like: “the property that causes this phenomenal experience”—incorporating the phenomenal character of the experience itself into the intentionality of the overall experience. Allowing phenomenality to seep into the contents of representational states, by being mutually entailed with certain Fregean contents, allows Chalmers to claim a non-reductive view of contents by marking the phenomenal’s contribution to what is typically taken to be purely intentional.

We can spell out the view as something like this:

Consider these examples of an intentional state and experiential state:
1. x believes that the grass is green. (a non-occurrent belief)

2. x sees that the grass is green.

What makes the non-occurrent belief in 1 true? The fact that grass is green. What makes the experience in 2 veridical? Not, according to Chalmers, just the fact that grass is green, but rather the fact that grass has the property that normally causes that sort of experience and that this property is the cause of the experience at the time it is undergone. We wouldn't say all of this about a non-occurrent belief. The veridicality of the experience requires it to have a certain environmental cause at the moment of the experience. This is not something we would require for the non-occurrent belief that grass is green to be true. So, the conditions of satisfaction between the class of representational states that are mutually entailed by phenomenal states and the class of representational states that are identified with purely intentional states vary—being that satisfaction conditions are mediated by modes of presentation this implies a difference in Fregean contents. The upshot of this argument is that it synthesizes these two intuitions: (i) intentional content is an important contributor to phenomenal character and (ii) phenomenal character makes a contribution to intentional content. Thus, if Chalmers’ view is correct, we would then have a mutual dependency between certain phenomenal properties and certain impure representational properties.

Towards a Non-Reductive Wide Representationalism

Since representationalism is largely motivated by the transparency of experience it is important that we ask—is this view compatible with the transparency of experience? The answer is a decisive yes. Indeed, Chalmers (2004, pp. 28) says that the transparency of experience is
expected when modes of presentation are involved. When we attempt to introspect the
phenomenal character of our experience we do so by deploying concepts—however having the
experience doesn’t require concept deployment. As such, when examining our experience, we
look through the mode of presentation and perceive the properties of the object; however we are
still able to become aware of the Fregean content of our experience as well. Similar to Tye
(2009), Chalmers appeals to non-conceptual content to make sense of this notion. Remember
non-conceptual content as it was introduced in the section on representationalism; these are
contents that don’t need to be brought under a concept in order to be represented. If an infant is
having an experience of its current visual field it doesn’t yet have the necessary concepts to
introspect its experience, but the infant still has some sort of experience. So, if I attempt to
introspect the phenomenal red sensation I have when I look at my blanket, I do so by inspecting
the blanket—because I deploy the concept of redness and attribute it to the blanket—however
‘redness’ qua non-conceptual content, is the mode of presentation and doesn’t require concept
deployment. I can direct my attention to the representational state and represent to myself that a
particular property of the blanket is causing the experience and arrive at the Fregean content of
my representational state—though this isn’t necessary to undergo the experience.

*Non-Reductive Representationalism*

I take it that there is another way to think about Fregean contents, in light of the previous
discussion on phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality is intentional content which
is wholly determined by phenomenology, this sort of intentional content provides conditions of
accuracy for a given phenomenal state. Fregean contents are quite similar to that. On Chalmers’
view Fregean contents are the modes of presentation of objects or properties, which provide
conditions on extension for these objects or properties. Since Chalmers is making an equivalency claim, having certain phenomenal properties entails having certain Fregean contents and vice versa. So, this is a different way to think about phenomenal intentional content. Instead of claiming that phenomenal intentional contents are had in virtue of phenomenology we would say that phenomenal intentional contents simply are modes of presentation. That is, they are a class of representational properties, Fregean contents, which mutually entail a class of phenomenal properties.

Chalmers’ theory provides an answer to a question that the phenomenalists don’t have a good response to: couldn’t this reworked notion of phenomenal intentional content, as a sort of Fregean content, be determined by the intentional properties of a mental state rather than its’ phenomenal properties? Given the equivalency claim this isn’t a very sensible question. Fregean content are intentional properties, yet they also make incorporate phenomenology. So, intentionality and consciousness are wholly intertwined, they each entail the other. In order to show that Fregean contents are wholly intentional it would be necessary to show that they can be spelled out without the use of phenomenal notions—the same goes for our theory of intentionality.

If we are willing to accept the equivalency claim between Fregean representational properties and phenomenal properties, then we have good reason to think that both consciousness and intentionality are non-reductive phenomena. Recall that the general difficulty with giving a reductive account of the mind is found in accounting for phenomenal consciousness. This is reflected in the “no-problem thesis” put forth by Strawson, the Hard Problem put forth by
Chalmers, and the difficulties that reductive representationalists face when attempting to intentionalize consciousness. Thus phenomenality is usually explained by a non-reductive supervenience relation to the physical brain states and processes that support it. In contrast, traditionally, it has been thought that giving a reductive account of intentionality will be successful. Given this equivalency claim we now have reason to think otherwise. If consciousness and intentionality are inseparably connected then we cannot give an analysis of one without giving an analysis of the other. As such, the intentional aspects of thought which were once thought to be problems that could be solved by reductive explanation, or at least nothing more than the problem of analyzing experience, are now part and parcel with analyzing consciousness and therefore cannot be given a reductive account.

**Phenomenal Externalism**

Now we can ask, is Chalmers view compatible with the narrowness of phenomenology? He says that it is (2004, pp.27) but doesn’t provide much support, so I will explore whether or not it is. There are two different ways his view can be spelled out in order to preserve narrowness of phenomenal properties:

(i) If Fregean contents are a sort of representational property that are equivalent to phenomenal properties, and phenomenal properties are simply taken to be narrow, then it is obviously true his view is compatible with narrowness of phenomenal properties.
(ii) If on the other hand we decide that Fregean contents are not actually equivalent to certain phenomenal properties—then narrowness can still be preserved if phenomenal properties are taken to be narrow by hypothesis.

Yet if (ii) is accepted Chalmers’ representationalism is dissolved. In order to preserve representationalism, then, (ii) should be rejected, so, Chalmers supports (i).

What is interesting is that—if Fregean representationalism is true, even though Chalmers takes Fregean contents to be narrow, he has opened up a new path for those who support wide representational properties to show phenomenal properties are wide via showing that Fregean contents are in fact wide. Chalmers helps himself to narrowness of representational properties by taking the opposite route in the equivalency claim, by taking phenomenal properties to be narrow he also takes Fregean contents to be. I think that if Chalmers wants his view to be consistent he should preserve representationalism, and reject narrowness of phenomenal properties and representational properties. Hence he should adopt a third alternative:

(iii) If it can be shown that Fregean contents are actually wide contents, and the identity claim is still upheld, then we have shown that phenomenal properties are in fact wide—and phenomenology is not narrow.

Why should we think that Fregean contents are wide? First off—Chalmers doesn’t provide any stand-alone argument for narrowness of phenomenology. Secondly, Chalmers admits that his view is consistent with the externalist arguments of both Putnam and Burge (2004, pp.16). In fact he says:
“...it is possible to hold on quite general grounds that all mental states have a sort of narrow content, in addition to any wide content they might have. On the latter sort of view, although two corresponding “water”-beliefs of subjects on Earth and Twin Earth may differ in that one is about H2O and the other is about XYZ (wide content), the beliefs will also have a significant narrow content in common, perhaps characterizing the relevant liquid in qualitative terms.” (2004, pp. 17)

Yet, if we are willing to accept that there is a sort of intentionality which is wholly intertwined with phenomenology (Fregean content), there doesn’t seem to be a compelling reason to treat it differently from other representational properties. If we accept a narrow view of phenomenologically-dependent intentionality, as on Chalmers’ view, we are then committed to two sorts of intentional content which are different in kind (one wide and the other narrow).

The thesis of phenomenal externalism isn’t completely alien either; some of its supporters are Alva Noë (2004, 2009), William Lycan (2001), and Fred Dretske (1996). Noë’s version in particular asks us to rethink our theoretically driven view of perception. Generally perception has been taken to be a passive phenomenon; various things in the environment cause us to go into perceptual states, we don’t have to do anything to perceive. However on Noë’s view perception is essentially enactive—meaning that we perceive in virtue of actively participating in and engaging with our environment. As Noë says:

“Experience has content only thanks to the established dynamic of interaction between perceiver and world.” (2004, pp.16)
Not only that but perceptual content is *virtual*—meaning that the content of experience is not always represented to us, but is accessible to us, thanks to our sensorimotor and cognitive skills (2004, pp.215). Currently I am sitting in my room typing— the visual experience I am undergoing is dependent upon various movements of my eyes focusing on salient features of my environment, as well as standing in particular relations to objects and properties of my environment that also stand in relation to one another. The tactile experiences I undergo from typing are dependent upon my feeling around for the proper keys to hit as well as looking at the keyboard and my monitor. As such, the entirety of my phenomenal experience is constituted by my engagement with the environmental surroundings, by my standing in particular relations to my surroundings, and by my various biological functions that have developed and enabled me to do so. So, on Noë’s view consciousness is not something localized to properties of the brain or body—but something constitutively determined by entering into various enactive relationships with the environment. Indeed, Noë’s externalism is pervasive as he claims that meaning is essentially relational as well:

“Meaning is relational. And the relation itself thanks to which our thoughts and ideas and images are directed to events, people, and problems in the world is the fact of our being embedded in and our dynamic interaction with the things around us. The world is our ground; the world provides meanings.” (2009, pp. 164)

On such a “pure theory” (as I call it, a theory either wholly wide or wholly narrow) it is more intuitive to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. In this case, they are both the result of relations with the environment: the way in which I perceive
depends upon engagement with my environment, beliefs are formed given these various interactions and meaning is given to the experiential states undergone. Beliefs that are unconscious are intentional insofar as they are developed by past engagements with my environments, and beliefs formed develop the way in which we can represent the world providing richer experiences. As such, a thoroughgoing and enactive externalism provides a tidy picture of intentionality and consciousness both dependent upon one another and both being constituted by participating in the world around us.

If Chalmers rejects the narrowness of phenomenology then his view would be consistent with the view put forth by Noë. Elsewhere Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued for an active externalism with respect to cognition. This thesis states that objects of the environment constitute part of our mind insofar as they aid us in cognitive processes. Noë draws a parallel to his enactive externalism and to the active externalism put forth by Clark and Chalmers. Stating that:

“In some cases, Clark and Chalmers argue, the vehicles of content cross boundaries, looping out of the head into the world.” (2004, pp. 221)

This is the same thing that Noë is arguing for—except his view is with respect to the vehicles of phenomenal content. The point Noë is making is that, even though cases like the brain in the vat may be possible, we have yet to show that neural states of the brain are sufficient for experience because we have assumed that neural duplicates are possible without duplicating patterns of interaction with the environment. These patterns of interaction are crucial to resulting neural states. Thus, phenomenal experience is, in part, constituted by patterns of interaction between the brain, body, and the environment. So, Chalmers’ view can be consistent with a full-blown
externalism, and his view can be consistent with Noë’s view, if he would extend his active view of externalism to the phenomenal.

**Summary**

In this chapter I outlined Chalmers’ view of representationalism. This consisted of distinguishing between Russellian and Fregean contents. Russellian contents are the sort endorsed by most representationalists, composed of complexes of properties and objects. Fregean contents run parallel to Fregean senses, they are composed of conditions on extension of Russellian contents—that is, descriptions which map onto Russellian contents. Chalmers’ finds it promising to identify phenomenal properties with these sorts of contents. He argues that this theory is a non-reductive and narrow representationalism, which views intentionality and consciousness as wholly interwoven, neither phenomena being more fundamental than the other, and hence, endorses a theory that is a hybrid between phenomenalism and representationalism.

I then examined how Chalmers’ theory finds its place as a non-reductive view by tying intentionality and consciousness together, then I explored how it accommodates transparency of experience, the narrowness of phenomenology, as well as internalism and externalism of mental content. First I compared Fregean contents and phenomenal intentional content—I take it that they are one in the same. Then I argued that Chalmers, in order to hold a more consistent view, should reject narrowness of phenomenology and endorse phenomenal externalism. If we are apt to think that many intentional states are wide and—if phenomenal properties are mutually interdependent on representational properties, we have good reason to think they are also wide.
Then I briefly outlined a view of phenomenal externalism put forth by Alva Noë which is more parsimonious than Chalmers’ view as it is a thoroughgoing externalism.
CONCLUSION

Physicalism

In the Chapter One I defined the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism—everything which exists is ultimately physical. This doctrine comes in two varieties: reductive and non-reductive. Reductive physicalism states that: the mental realm supervenes on the physical properties of the world and can be fully accounted for in terms of physical properties. Non-reductive physicalism states that: although the mind is completely physical—it cannot be fully captured by appealing to physical properties alone. Also, I outlined Strawsonian physicalism in order to show that there is an ambiguity in our use of the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘naturalism’ which can lead to confusion in contemporary discussion. The end of the chapter consisted of different arguments against both reductive and non-reductive physicalism.

The importance of this doctrine is exhibited in the way in which theorizing about the mind progresses. For Representationalists committed to reductive physicalism they attempt to first show how intentionality can be accounted for physically and then accommodate consciousness into the intentional framework. Phenomenalists, who typically commit themselves to a non-reductive view, have attempted to explain intentionality by grounding it in consciousness—which need not be explained by resolve to physical properties. This doctrine also sets the background for the motivations of Representationalist and Phenomenalist theories generally—as attempts at showing how consciousness and intentionality are physical phenomenon.
Representationalism

In Chapter Two spelled out the thesis of representationalism—particularly focusing on the thesis of reductive representationalism. So, if representationalism is the view that consciousness can be accounted for in terms of its intentional structure, reductive representationalism is a form of strong representationalism, that is, seeking to identify phenomenal properties with representational properties without appeal to phenomenal notions. The first section was devoted to outlining the transparency of experience as espoused by Harman (1990). In effect this thesis states that whenever attempting to introspect the qualities of our experience we do so by inspecting the properties of the objects experienced. As such, our phenomenology is inherently representational—it objects as being a certain way, or having particular properties. I also noted that this view is taken to be a motivation for externalism of mental content, the view that the contents of mental states supervene on the properties of the subject but as well as the relational properties the subject has within their environment.

After that I outlined the typical approach taken by reductive representationalists in order to be honest physicalists—first by showing that intentionality can be accounted for naturalistically and then showing how consciousness can be intentionalized. It is not clear whether any of the naturalized semantic programs can make sense of intentionality without appealing to consciousness or intentionality itself, thereby failing at being fully reductive. The usual approach to intentionalizing consciousness has been to appeal to phenomenal concepts—this approach falls victim to the critiques laid against reductive accounts of mental states I outlined in the chapter on physicalism. So, I also explored the appeal to non-conceptual content
as put forth by Tye (2009) which is a useful notion for representationalism and might be better suited to handle consciousness than phenomenal concepts.

**Phenomenalism**

Chapter Three focused on the Phenomenalist thesis—which states that intentionality is ultimately rooted in consciousness. The thrust of this thesis is best seen as a backlash against representationalism which seeks to take consciousness more seriously. Closely tied with phenomenalism is the narrowness of phenomenology, the idea that phenomenal content is wholly narrow. Whereas many representationalists have sought to expand externalism to the phenomenal realm, phenomenalists have sought to expand narrowness into the intentional realm. In order to do so they have attempted to show that first, reductive accounts of intentionality cannot account for consciousness. This is supposed to be evident in the “no-problem thesis” put forth by Strawson (2004), wherein the problem of intentionality is taken to be nothing over the problem of consciousness. So, even if we accepted a naturalized theory of intentionality solving that issue wouldn’t put us in a better place to figure out consciousness.

As such, phenomenalists have attempted to work in the opposite direction of the reductive representationalist and endorsed the thesis of phenomenal intentionality. This states that there is an important sort of intentional content that accrues solely in virtue of phenomenology. Phenomenal intentional content is taken to be the conditions of accuracy for an experience to be considered veridical. Since many most phenomenalists take phenomenal content to be narrow this is easily seen as a sort of narrow intentional content which provides a starting point to show that all intentional content is narrow. However, it’s unclear whether or not
phenomenal intentional content actually does accrue in virtue of phenomenology rather than the subject’s intentional properties.

**Chalmers’ Non-reductive Representationalism**

In Chapter Four I outlined the view that David Chalmers (2004) espouses; a non-reductive narrow representationalism. Chalmers draws a distinction between Russellian and Fregean contents—he thinks that representationalists are typically Russellian; they attempt to identify phenomenal properties with intentional contents that are characterized by complexes of properties and objects. Instead he argues we should endorse Fregean Representationalism by identifying phenomenal properties with Fregean contents, contents that run parallel to Fregean senses. These contents are seen as conditions on extension for Russellian contents. Chalmers’ assumes that phenomenology is narrow, and so, takes it that Fregean contents are also narrow. Ultimately, Chalmers’ prides his view in being a hybrid which doesn’t take either intentionality or consciousness to be more fundamental than the other, as well as allowing for both wide and narrow contents.

First I compared Fregean contents to phenomenal intentional content. To me these are strikingly similar sorts of content. However, the *in virtue of relation*, that phenomenal intentional content leaves open to interpretation, is made into a mutual dependency claim on the Fregean content view. Phenomenal properties simply entail Fregean contents and vice versa. This ties consciousness and intentionality tightly together so that both are grounded in the other. This sort of interdependency presses on two issues: the reductive versus nonreductive position, as well as the internalist versus externalist position. If intentionality is so deeply related to consciousness
and consciousness cannot be reductively explained, it is plausible that a reductive account of intentionality is also not possible. On the other hand, if wide intentionality is so interwoven with consciousness it is plausible that phenomenal content is also wide.

Chalmers’ theory is appealing for these reasons: It helps to capture a variation of phenomenal intentional content as put forth by the phenomenalists, it preserves the transparency of experience that motivates representationalism, it creates interdependency between consciousness and intentionality, and puts forth a non-reductive account of consciousness which helps to explain why naturalized theories of intentionality have failed. However, I think that, in order to remain consistent and have a parsimonious theory Chalmers’ should reject the narrowness of phenomenology and endorse a thoroughgoing externalism about both phenomenality and intentionality. I remain agnostic as to whether or not the view expressed by Noë (2004) is persuasive; however, it suggests that there is good company found in endorsing phenomenal and intentional externalism.
REFERENCES


