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Miranda’s Diary of the Siege of Pensacola, 1781

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The siege and capture of the British forts at Pensacola in April and May of 1781 brought to a climax Spanish participation in the American Revolution. The project was begun by Bernardo de Gálvez, the young governor of Louisiana who had already conquered the British posts in the Mississippi Valley and at Mobile Bay. The British still held out at Pensacola, their principal establishment in the Gulf of Mexico. Gálvez landed there on March 18, and his force was soon augmented by troops from Mobile and New Orleans. It was not until the French and Spanish troops from Havana arrived at Pensacola on April 19, however, that the siege could be undertaken with hope of success.

One of the officers arriving with the expedition from Havana was Francisco de Miranda, whose diary of the enterprise is translated in the following pages. Miranda is best known for his efforts in behalf of Latin American independence, he being its most energetic promoter. He sought in vain the assistance of England, France, and the United States, and led a premature invasion of Venezuela in 1806. In his travels in Europe he became acquainted with a number of young creoles, many of whom were induced by his sincere devotion to the cause of Latin American independence to embrace the same purpose. When the Wars of Independence from Spain broke out in 1810, Miranda returned to his native Venezuela and was given command of the patriot forces. His career ended ingloriously when he was surrendered to Spanish authorities by some of his own subordinates, including Simón Bolívar.

The excerpt from his diary which follows is found in the Archivo del General Miranda, 1750-1785, (Caracas, 1929), vol. I, pp. 150-179. Thanks are due to Mr. Manuel Valles for his assistance in translation. The responsibility for errors which may appear, however, is mine.
Since General Campbell’s service in British West Florida consisted so largely in preparation for and the defense of Pensacola, it is of interest to note that there are several diaries in Spanish and English relating to the siege of and capitulation of Fort George and with it Pensacola and the remainder of West Florida. All of these have been printed. (1) A Gálvez diary: Diario de las operaciones . . . contra la Plaza de Pensacola . . . was printed twice in 1781, in Mexico City and perhaps in Madrid (48 & 44 pp). (2) A translation of this into English was published in the first issue of Louisiana Historical Quarterly (Jan. 1917. vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 4484). (3) General Francisco de Miranda gives a day by day account which is printed in ‘ Archivo del General Miranda,” Caracas, 1929. (Vol. 1, pp. 150-179) as Diario de Panzacola. A translation of this follows here. (4) In the same volume (pp. 141-147) is Diario de lo ocurrido en la escuadra y tropas . . , que atacaba la plaza de Panzacola. (5) Also in the same volume is: A Journal of the siege [sic] of Pensacola West Florida 1781 (pp. 179-191). The writer of the latter is not given, but there is a manuscript journal (6) in the Library of Congress, written by Major Robert Farmar, an officer under Campbell, which is so similar that the main source of both is evidently the same. However, there are facts in each which are not in the other. The latter was edited and published by Buckingham Smith in “Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries” (June, 1860, pp. 166-172).

Diario de Panzacola

Diary of what occurred in the squadron and troops commanded by the Chief of Squadron Don Josef Solano and the Field Marshal Don Manuel de Cagigal, which left Havana on April 9, 1781, in order to aid the Spanish army which was attacking the plaza of Pensacola . . . site of the said plaza . . , its surrendering, etc.

On this day at 7:30 p.m. the governor of the plaza
[Havana] received information that on March 31 last there had been seen from Cape Corrientes 8 large warships and a small one believed to have been enemy, which fired some cannonades. His Excellency called a council and it was resolved to send out all of the ships of our squadron which might be ready under the orders of the chief of squadron, Don Josef Solano, and a detachment of 1600 men under Field Marshall Don Juan Manuel de Cagigal. The idea was to seek the enemy on the coasts of Pensacola, where it appears very probable he may have been directed under the supposition that the place was under attack by Field Marshal Don Bernardo de Gálvez, who landed on and took possession of the island of Santa Rosa last March 9. This news could have been carried by a swift brigateine¹ which was cruising before that place, and which on recognizing our squadron and convoy had retired toward Jamaica under full sail. On the 24th day of the same month the detachments from New Orleans and Mobile, in the number of 4,000 men, had already joined his troops. The naval forces were composed of the ship San Ramón, of 64 cannons—the frigates Clara and Secilia, of 36, the Chambequin Cayman, of 26, and the packet ships Pío and San Gil, of 20. All of these vessels (excepting the San Ramón) already have entered the port without receiving serious damage from the enemy battery, the Red Cliffs, from which came diverse cannonades at the frigates. The convoy passed them, seeking shelter at the island of Santa Rosa, and did not receive injury from the said battery. The San Ramón arrived from the port of Matanzas on the 29th, believing its orders had been complied with, and under the specious reason of not being able to enter. As we are ignorant of her secret instructions, we are unable to decide as to her conduct, which is publicly denounced with ignominy!

8 . . . 9

The troops were reviewed at 3 p.m., and at 5 they were embarked; likewise the artillery, provisions, munitions, campaign stores, etc., all of which were gotten on board this day.
At 5:30 on the following day, signal was made to the squadron to weigh anchor and make sail, and at 11 o'clock the vessels were already outside the port, except for the ships Arrogante, San Gabriel, and Astuto.

At 12 noon the commanding general, seeing that the ships mentioned above still were not able to leave the port that day because the wind from the northeast had already settled, signalled to the squadron to begin a course NW 1/4 W in three columns. In this order we continued under light sail all day, the frigates being constantly exposed.

In the council it was decided that the French squadron under the command of the chief of squadron should not sail with us. Although M. de Montelle had agreed with this, in another council of all the captains and commanders of his squadron which was held on board his ship the previous day, they decided to accompany us.

At 12:30 a.m. signal was made to the squadron to form the fifth order of sail in ordinary lines of convoy, sailing W 5° N. At 6:15 the squadron completed the evolution to sail in convoy lines, maintaining the order and disposition in which they were, and on the route NW 1/4 W.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of this day signal was made to sail diagonally from left to right or in bow and quarter line on the port tack. . . . A little later it was nullified and immediately after that an order was given to form three columns with the admiral at the right and the chiefs in the van, and that there should be a distance of ten cable lengths between his ship and the columns.

The sluggish slowness and almost impossibility with which our ships have executed these movements is incredible. At the conclusion the Paula never was able to come close to occupying her position despite the fact that we were carrying little sail; and we will attempt later to form a comparative estimate of squadrons based on the number and burden of ships!
At 5:30 a.m. the *Palmier* made signal of the discovery of sails from the WNW, and about 6 o'clock four ships were seen from our topmasts at SE 1/4 E. Two of the largest followed our route, from which we inferred that they were the ships *Arrogante*, *Xan Gabriel*, *Astuto*, and *Renombrado*, which had remained in port. Signal was made to the frigates *Unicorno* and *O* that they should proceed to scout them and determine the number and type of the sighted vessels.

The latitude observed at midday was 23° 39' N, and having sailed for the angle of 88 of the third quadrant the distance of 29 miles, we considered ourselves in longitude 292° 5', bearing the angle of the sounding to the northwest at a distance of 22 leagues.

11 . . . 12

We continued after midday with all sail, hauling the wind from the north on the starboard tack, in formation of three columns. At 4:30 signal was made for all the squadron to lie to, for the purpose of sailing in company with the ships sighted, and at 5:30 the frigate *O* and the brigantines *Lebrel* and *Pájar*o repeated the signals which this ship had made, in order that those which came slowly would understand. During the night we sailed NW 1/4 W with only the main topsails, and at dawn they were already joined in company with the squadron. At 5:45 signal was made to the cutter *Serpent* that she should reconnoiter to the north without losing sight of the signals of this ship; to the *Andromanche* to make for the northwest; to the *O* to the WNW; to the *Unicorno* to the ESE; and at 6:30 to all the squadron that it should sail in three columns hauling the wind on the route indicated, the chiefs placing themselves at the heads of their divisions. At 7 o'clock the *Arrogante* arrived, whose commander notified our general that nothing had occurred in Havana on the day after our sailing, and also the frigate *Mexicana*, which served as hospital ship for the army. Signal was made to the squadron to increase sail, and we hauled up the mainsails and sailed by -the
gallants. The wind blew from the NNE and we continued steering to the NW.

The wind has been increasing, so that at 4 in. the afternoon the gallants were furled and a reef taken in the mainsails. At 5 a.m. signal was made to the O that she should make “NO” at the top of her foremast, which was the recognition signal, and to remain with it at the top of the mizzenmast. She made the signal but not in conformance with the order. At 6:30 p.m. the brigantine Pájaro signalled that she had a damaged mainmast which needed repair at this inconvenient time, for which reason she returned to Havana.

The wind continued fresh from the NE with a heavy swell, and the squadron proceeded with the six principal ships in the ordinary formation of three columns, turning from the NNW. The ship San Nicolás signalled to the Asis regarding taking her place. A short time afterward she was informed that the evolution being performed was not in accordance with the order. And finally she was signalled by the commandant of this ship, who called attention to it at the same time with two hasty cannon shots. But neither on account of these was there better maneuver or more prompt obedience, and we hope later to make an attack with order and discipline!

At 5:45 p.m. the French frigate Andromanche signalled to announce sighting a sail to the NNW. She was ordered to give chase, and likewise the 0 and the cutter Serpent. At 12:30 a.m. we made signal to the squadron to increase sail, and we set the stay and maintopgallant sails. At dawn the wind was fresh from the EXE, the sea light, the horizon calm. Signal was made to the Andromanche (she having lost sight of her chase during the obscurity of the night and having rejoined the squadron), to make soundings, and the Unicorno not having found bottom, she likewise made soundings at 11 and did not find bottom either.
At midday we were in latitude N 26° 26', longitude 29° 0' 24'! 14., . 15.

With the wind fresh from the southeast and a heavy sea we continued sailing toward the northeast, the squadron formed in three columns. At 5:30 the general signalled to take reefs in the maintopsails. They were taken and right after that command was given to steer to the N 1/4 W and to form by evolution the lines of the route indicated by the signal. The Magnàmino damaged her mizzenyard.

At nightfall the horizon was cloudy with fresh wind from the southeast and heavy sea from the northeast, and at 10:30 we took in the maintopsails because the wind had increased. We were making more than 7 miles: At dawn we sighted a schooner, and the Asis, who had it on her flank, was ordered to examine it. At 7 a.m. word came from the cutter Serpent whose commander informed the general of a minor damage. At 8:30 the above-mentioned schooner also came with a Spanish pennant flying, and announced herself to be the Sourris, having sailed from Havana on the 10th and en her way to Pensacola with instructions. She was ordered to remain near this ship and not to separate from her, for any pretext. At 9 in the morning the wind shifted in a squall to the NNW, with cloudy weather, rain, and thunder. The maintopsails were taken in, and at 12 we were in a deadly calm.

15 . . . 16

From midday we continued with foresail and mizzen, hauling the light wind from the north, with some rain and cloudiness. At 1 the light wind changed to the east and we sailed with foresails to N 5° E. At 2 the Andromanche made signal of having sounded 95 fathoms and we found 70 on sand. At 4 p.m. an order was sent to the frigate O to send to this ship its first pilot, who has had some experience on the coast, because we had not brought any harbor, pilot whatever in the whole squadron.
At 5:30 signal was made to the squadron to put about by evolution, the course to steer being W 1/4 NW, in formation of three columns. This movement was executed promptly, and the squadron remained on the other tack following the course indicated with the wind fresh from the SSW. At 10 a.m. we took soundings, and did not find bottom at 110 fathoms. At 12 the wind veered to the WSW. Signal was made to come about and all the squadron executed it, continuing to the SSW with the wind fresh from the west. At daybreak the wind was strong from the WNW, the sea heavy, and the horizon clear. All of the ships of the squadron, in number of 23, were in sight. At 11 a.m. the frigates were sent to reconnoiter and the ship San Nicolás signalled 80 fathoms of bottom, lead-colored; sandy mud.

We found ourselves upon observation in latitude N 28° 36', longitude 29° 12'. According to our observations, the charts of this coast drawn by the pilots of Havana must be very erroneous.

The wind maintained its direction from the 4th quadrant and diminished in force. From midday we continued with the 6 principals hauling the wind to the N 1/4 NE, all the squadron together. At 3 the lookout of the top announced that he had seen a vessel to the MNE, and then the ship Guerrero signalled that she was under the lee. Immediately the French brigantine and cutter were ordered to give chase to the northeast, the course followed by the discovered ship which by then could be seen clearly from our round house. She appeared to be a frigate of 30 to 40 cannons. At 3:30 the frigate 0, which was in advance, also gave chase, and consecutively the ship Intrepide, which was the swiftest of all the squadron. At 5 the 0 advised us that the sighted vessel was fleeing, and that she was able to attack with advantage. Half an hour later all the squadron came about and we remained lying to on the starboard tack to the north. We sounded 30 fathoms. At 6 we saw the strange frigate
continuing with force of sail turned from the southeast with the wind from the W 1/4 NW, and our four chasers in pursuit. At 6:30 the 0 signalled that the strange vessel was an enemy, in consequence of which the packet boat Renombrado was sent to take a position halfway between the Intrepide and this ship, in order to repeat the signals of the one or the other vessel. At 7:30 at night signal was made to sail on the starboard tack and all executed it to the WSW with the wind from the west. The stern lanterns were burned during the night, and at 11:30 we sounded upon 60 fathoms. At this hour the wind changed fresh to the NNE, and at this point we changed course to W 1/4 NW, firing some rockets at 2 a.m. in order that the pursuing vessels should know our position. At 5 a.m. the Lebrete spoke us, and her commander informed the general that the frigate pursued, having disappeared at 8 o’clock, the ship Intrepide made signal to reunite, and all were sailing to rejoin the squadron. They believed the ship to be English because they had seen distinctly in the poop the boom or casa escota which the English used. The Intrepide made the same conjecture, because of which we believed positively the place was Cape Corrientes, and that without delay we were about to attack the English a counter-blow. At 6 we sailed and at 9:30 signal was made to the squadron asking to know the general state of the troops and crews which came on board, in order to form, if necessary, a body of all and to attack the enemy in whatever situation we might find him. The admiral behaved with the greatest gallantry and generosity on this occasion, offering even the last individual on board, and I believe positively that with the good intelligence and harmony that existed between both generals, and consequently in all the forces, we should overcome the greatest obstacles which might present themselves.

We have seen this day on three or four occasions various large. tree trunks thrust into the sea, no doubt by the large rivers; Mississippi and Apalache.
At midday we lay to awaiting the reports which had been requested, and at 2:30 signal was made that the squadron should steer to the NW 1/4 W. At 3 all of the reports being assembled, we all sailed under full sail. On taking a sight of the sun we counted 22 vessels, only the *Unicorno* being absent; and since her detachment the day previous to give chase she had not appeared. At 5:30 a.m. the *Andromanche* was ordered to take soundings, and signalled 128 fathoms. Afterwards she was sent to reconnoiter to the north and the Renombrado was ordered to follow her, in order to relay her signals. At 7 signal was made to the squadron to reduce the distance between ‘ships to half a cable’s length, and a little later, to form the line of battle on the port tack, in inverse order on this ship; This movement having been executed, signal was made for the squadron to steer the course signalled from the 0 in the order in which they were. The maneuver was executed badly (as almost all the others) being distinguished particularly by the errors of the *Asis*; the *San Gabriel* and the *Magnánimo*, with the *Triton*, were not far behind. The frigate *O* was reporting the same that the preceding ships had neared the pursued vessel on: the previous day and adding that they had made French and Spanish recognition signals, and that it had not replied correctly. From the reports given it was found that our fleet could provide up to 1,400 troops. the 800 French who had joined our detachment already formed a corps of 3,800 men. Latitude observed as 29° 13', longitude 29° 46'.

After midday we continued steering to the W 1/4 NW, and the squadron rejoined in the formation of 3 columns. At 6 believing ourselves in the meridian of Pensacola, signal was made for the squadron to lie to on the port tack, and for a signal to be given to steer N 1/4 NW. At 12:30 at night signal was made for the squadron to sail, several rockets being discharged in order to indicate
the movement to the scouts and ships of the squadron. Each ship appeared at daybreak with her signal number at the masthead, and the *Andromanche* and *Renombrado* were ordered to explore to the north. To the *Lebrete* was sent, with instructions from the admiral, an order to see if the port of Pensacola were ours, or whatever activity might be noted. The same instructions were remitted also to the commander of the *Andromanche*, M. Rabenel. At 6:45 signal was made for the squadron to form the order of pursuit (in two lines of bowline) and to force sail in the said order, making the formation on this ship. We sailed with all canvas, and at 9 sounded 20 fathoms.- We then steered to the N 1/4 NE with the wind from E 1/4 SE. At 10 the *Andromanche* signalled land to the NNE, and we found ourselves in 15 fathoms of sand.

[Arrival at Pensacola Bay]

19 . . . 20

At 12 land was sighted from our topmast, bearing to the north at a distance of 5 leagues. We continued toward it until we reached a distance of 2 leagues, in 10 fathoms of water. From here we could see distinctly all the coast, the island of Santa Rosa, and the entrance to the port. Likewise we saw a frigate which appeared to be of 30 cannons which was anchored within the port along with some lesser craft. At 2 o'clock we saw the arrival of the frigate *Andromanche* and the brigantine *Lebrete* which had run along the coast from the island of Santa Rosa toward the west, and they signalled us of our being masters of the port. On receiving this information we hauled up the pennant and affirmed the flag with a cannon shot. At 2:30 the *Andromanche* made signal of finding herself aground. The general immediately ordered the frigate 0 and the brigantine *Renombrado* to go to her aid; also the launches of the warships which were nearest to her. At 4 signal was made to the squadron to come about, with the wind to the east. At 5 word came from the *Lebrete*, whose commandant informed the
generals he had completed his mission and had spoken at the mouth of the port with the commander of the sloop-of-war Carmen, Don N. Sapiain, who informed him of finding the army of Señor Galvez already on the continent and making hasty preparations for the siege (which had not yet begun). He reported also that this general had been slightly wounded in one finger of his hand and in the abdomen by a musket shot by savages’ from the woods surrounding the camp. At 5:30 the major of the army embarked in the said brigantine with letters of both generals of sea and land for Señor Galvez, informing him of the object and circumstances of his commission. All night the squadron continued on the same route, and at 5:30 the commander of the cutter Serpent informed the general the same as the Librete had, adding that the Andromanche had sailed that night at 8:30 with the aid of the launches and boats of the squadron which had been sent for that purpose, and by lightening her water supply and 12 or 13 cannons of her artillery.

At 12:30 the entire squadron tacked, sailing the turn of the land with the wind weak from the southeast. At 4:30 General Don J. M. Cagigal, his son and his two aides-de-camp, and also the Adjutant of the Navy, Vriarte (who had come from land on board the San Luis in the morning), transferred to the cutter Serpent to go ashore and confer with General Gálvez regarding that which was most convenient for complying with his commission. Not having sent more than one naval pilot to the ship San Luis, we resolved to take the step of using the frigate Andromanche to enter the port, but having found the frigate we were told that Ugartse, the major of Solano, had taken the pilot the previous night to enter the port... in the brigantine Lebrete, in which, as we said before, he had embarked. The wind having become very light we were not able to make the port. About 8 we found ourselves caught-on the coast of the island of Santa Rosa without knowledge of the passage, for which reason we
cast anchor immediately. Consequently we remained on board, receiving the best treatment from the naval lieutenant, M. La Lonne, commander of the said vessel, whose character was amiable and generous; he was distinguished generally. During the night we fired sever! cannonades and rockets, with the idea that these signals might be heard or seen by our detachment on the island of Santa Rosa or by the frigates which were in the port, and that they might send us a pilot. But as it turned out we were too far distant and they did not hear them. At 8 in the morning we raised anchor and made sail in search of Point Siguenza of the said island, sailing with the wind very light.

21 ... 22

from the southeast, and at 2:30 p.m. we were on the said point of the entrance of the port, opposite the barranças coloradas, where the enemy had his battery called the Red Cliffs. At this point a pilot boat of the place arrived alongside in which came the naval lieutenant Villavicencio. He directed us in as best he could according to his knowledge of the entrance, although not without the ship touching the bar. On passing before the said batteries the enemy fired 14 well-aimed cannonades of heavy caliber on us. By chance none struck the ship. There are two explanations, nevertheless, as to why this fire did not damage the vessel as it passed before them on this occasion. The first is that the distance at which our ships passed ordinarily is greater than it appears on the surface of those waters (in my opinion it is more than 1,050 meters). The other is that the battery being considerably inflexible, the shot is fixed and consequently very uncertain. 8

[The landing]

At 4 p.m. the naval captains Don Miguel Alderete; commandant of the convoy, and Don Josef Serrato, came on board to pay their respects to General Cagigal. They escorted us with their boats, and an hour later we dis-
embarked in the first redoubt which the navy had, on the opening or bay which led to our Camp, to which place were carried all who volunteered to go to the camp. From here we followed by land to the camp itself, which was about a quarter of a league distant.

General Gálvez received us with many expressions of pleasure and friendship toward our General Cagigal. All the army welcomed us with infinite joy, for not only were they fatigued with the endless and not well-combined marches they had made in the 42 days since they had disembarked at the island of Santa Rosa, but by the various camps which they had occupied, the entrenchments and so forth (seven counting this one), the construction of revetments, fascines, and other defenses. Besides this they considered all their work useless, and were in despair of the enterprise. The army numbered, including militia and Negroes, 3,701 men. Of these 500 were out of action, and so they were able to count on only 2,006 regulars for the attack. The garrison numbered 800 regular troops, 200 seamen, and 1,000 savage Indians for the woods. Thus their conjecture was not unfounded. With the consolidation of our detachment, 1,504 troops of our navy, and 725 French, the army amounted to 7,803 effectives.

Sunday, April 22

At 9:30 in the morning General Cagigal, in company with the commandant of artillery, the quartermaster general, the major general of the army, and his aides-de-camp, went on horseback to reconnoiter the terrain and the distance for opening the trench, and to establish the first one. They put it about 600 meters from the enemy fortification, covered by some scattered inclines which there are intervening. A short time later the enemy, having perceived it, began his first artillery fire upon the followers of the general and a party; of light infantry which accompanied him. The operation was suspended, and the enemy fire resulted in only one man being wounded.
Today the troops began disembarking in the boats and launches which had been sent for this purpose, and although the enemy fired upon them on passing before the Red Cliffs, no damage was done. An Irish soldier deserted.

Monday, 23d

Today the disembarking of all the troops and our accoutrements for opening the trench was completed, continuing with that vigor which the new-reinforcement had added. The encampment for the recently-arrived troops also had been laid out, with the order that it should be immediately protected by bulwarks, for, being in the midst of woods and surrounded by savages who hid in the forest and insulted us at all hours, this operation was indispensable.

An Irish drummer went over to the enemy, which is nothing extraordinary.

[A skirmish]

Tuesday; 24th

The engineers and artillery chiefs having gone out at 6 in the morning to continue their operations for laying out the attack, they were supported by a party of light infantry. They encountered the enemy awaiting them in ambush, and a skirmish began which lasted until 9 o'clock. At the sound of the firing five companies of our light infantry, who supported the first, came out, and ours separated because of finding itself within the immediate range of a cannon: Our operations were interrupted, and we sustained, 1.5 soldiers and 2 officers wounded.

In the afternoon at 4 our advanced posts saw some parties of infantry and Indians who, conducted by some mounted officers; advanced with assurance. Our light infantry came out and they retired after a skirmish which did not produce a wounded man among us. Missing was one Irish soldier, whether killed or deserted we did not know. From the plaza came a Spanish Negro slave.
who had been taken prisoner a short time earlier. After dusk we saw that the enemy had made a general discharge of his artillery on all sides of Fort George, and following this another volley of musketry which surprised us to the point that afterwards we supposed that it was a salute in celebration of the triumph which the royal troops under the command of Lord Cornwallis had achieved: against the Anglo-Americans commanded by General Greene [Green?]. Three of the cannon facing our camp were loaded with balls which entered the camping place.

The troops continued their labors on the trenches, which were almost completed. The, said entrenchment was formed of heavy pines and stakes filled with a sandy clay of a thickness of about 7 feet, and its corresponding foss, which has to be pounded by heavy artillery in order to attack it.

At 12 the frigate captains Alderete, Goichea, and Serrato embarked with General Cagigal and other officers to test whether the cannon would be able to injure the enemy fort from the sea, approaching it in an armed brigantine which carried two cannons of 24 pounds. They found that in 14 feet of water (depth enough to carry frigates) the ball beat strongly on the slope of the counterscarp of the enemy fortification, although the cannon had an elevation of 12°. The enemy responded with his, and the balls struck near the brigantine, a new proof of the capacity of the artillery from that point.

Wednesday, 25th

At 6 in the morning of this day our engineers and artillery officers going to conclude the operations on the terrain of the proposed entrenchment, supported by a party of light infantry, encountered two companies of enemy infantry which were formed upon the same terrain marked out by us the previous days. At their sides were two parties of savages who fired in good order and more regularly than they were accustomed to do. We began a skirmish, sustained by 5 companies more that were ready,
and it lasted until 7:30, when both troops retired. We had 6 men wounded, and from the enemy came over a dragoon (French Parisian) who appears to be a great rogue. One time he assured us that the salvo which we saw the previous night, was for the celebration of St. George's Day, and another time that it was in consequence of British arms having achieved a victory over the North Americans, which news they had received at that point by courier from Georgia.

The parliamentarian of Pensacola, Stevenson, was in our camp and dined with the general. The motive of his coming had not been announced, but it was believed that he was a representative of the people of the town, and having seen the practice with the cannon the preceding day feared some injury to their houses in case that our ships approached to attack the fort from that direction. We know that in virtue of the assurances that our general has given to the neighborhood, the major part of the families that had retired toward Georgia have already returned to their homes, opened their shops, and re-established their commerce, etc.

Thursday, 26th

At 2:30 in the afternoon there came out 5 companies of grenadiers and light infantry. (the brigade of marine grenadiers among them) commanded by M. Bolling, captain of grenadiers stationed in New Orleans, with two field pieces, to support our engineers in the operation of laying our two batteries of cannons and mortars which we wished to establish at night, at the time of opening the trenches. We encountered the enemy formed upon the land next to his fortification, awaiting us in the number of 3 or 4 companies and a sufficient number of Indians who were formed on the flanks of the said troops. The moment that these discovered us they began the clamor and shouting of battle, advancing toward the wood on the left wing; supported by the English infantry with the idea, it seemed, of cutting off a company of our light infantry which was somewhat isolated. But meeting
with our-troops, who, perceiving the movement; had also advanced in that direction, both parties began to skirmish and to beat the woods with the two field pieces each. Our cannon made the savages retire from the woods, and the English, after having fired some rounds toward our center, withdrew to their previous position; We did the same thing, and the fort opened a heavy fire which made it necessary for us to abandon the enterprise. The troops returned to the camp at 6:30 without having accomplished what had been planned. From the fort the enemy fired 16 cannonades and two bombs, which produced no results whatever.

Being resolved, nevertheless; on opening the trenches this night, at 9:30 Brigadier Giron went out with 700 workmen and 700 armed grenadiers and light infantry to support them, 4 field-pieces and all the necessary equipment- and tools and munitions to form and open the said trench, batteries, and so forth. The night was cloudy and rainy, with the result that our noted engineers were not able to find the points and marks laid out the previous days. Everyone retired at 3 in the mornings fatigued, drenched, and without having accomplished anything. Thanks be to God!

On this day a deserter of Waldeck came over.

Friday, 27th

At 7 a.m. information was received that the enemy was cutting down the pines and woods between their fortification and our laid-out parallel. Four companies of light infantry were ordered to prevent them from continuing with impunity the said operation, but the commanding officer of this troop, losing sight of this object, which was the only idea the general had in mind, took up a bad position with his troops and began an inopportune skirmish. Despite having been supported by two more companies of infantry and two field pieces, we were obliged to retire; as much from the superior fire of the enemy cannon and howitzers, which played upon the flanks of our troop from the parapet as from the
gunfire and field pieces of the enemy attacking us from the woods. The skirmish lasted two hours, until General del Caso was informed. Finding us with 5 soldiers dead, 14 men and 3 officers wounded; he commanded (at 12) that the said troops should withdraw and that 4 other companies should relieve them, placing them at a respectable distance, beyond the range of the artillery of the plaza, and that at the same time they should accomplish the object of the earlier order, that is, to impede the enemy cutting down the above-mentioned woods.

At 6 in the afternoon the said companies retired and the enemy remained in the woods, apparently constructing a redoubt which enfiladed jointly the parallel line marked out by our engineers.

I do not know if it was because of this event or that of two Germans of our foreign troops having deserted in the afternoon, but when the troops and officers of the previous day were already formed for going out after dusk to repeat the operation of the previous day an order came for everyone to retire, and nothing was done that night. Others pretended that this change was the result of the engineer-in-chief having explained that his plan of attack was imperfect! revoked it, and would not be responsible for the success of an attack in that direction, etc.

Two deserters from the enemy garrison came over and the naval captain Alderete saw from the port that the enemy had hanged a man. According to what the deserters said he was a sergeant of our regiment of Flunders who, some days earlier must have deserted (he was a trained subject, somewhat of a mathematician) and they surprised him taking some dimensions of the artillery and with plans of the fortifications in his possession, which characterized clearly and sufficiently the crime.

Saturday, 28th

Today we saw from a distance that the enemy had built a redoubt on the edge of the woods in which
had sustained the skirmish the day before, upon our marked-out lines. At 9:30 a.m. our engineers with 200 workers went out, supported by 3 companies of grenadiers and infantry, to reconnoiter and seek another route toward the post which we intended to attack. Effectively they found a road, sufficiently clear and suitable for the purpose, which the hauling of wood and other uses had formed previously. They made their reconnaissances without being molested by the enemy who, believing undoubtedly that our attack would be by the upper part, in which we had previously made repeated observations and so forth, waited for us in the woods toward where the port could be seen. They had been hauling artillery since morning. This work was concluded happily in about half an hour. At 6:30 p.m. two or three of our companies of grenadiers came out to occupy the post laid out in the morning. Immediately after this, at 7:30, all the rest of the detachment composed of 700 workers and 800 men-of-arms with all their equipment necessary for opening the trench in this direction went out. The enemy without doubt awaited us at the other place marked out formerly and which was about 1,000 meters distant. The workers did not feel the work and thus we concluded it with the greatest facility, all our troop being found under cover at daybreak. Chief of the entrenchment was Brigadier Giron. From the plaza came 3 deserters, and from our camp 3 grenadiers from the New Orleans troops and two Irish riflemen went over.

[Trench building and skirmishing]

Sunday, 29th

At dawn all our troops were found under cover of a trench of about 800 meters at a distance of about 500 meters from the enemy fortifications on the one side and $00 on the other, which seemed an immense work for 700 workers unless we consider the openness of the sandy terrain. Immediately that the enemy perceived our work with the light of day, he began a cannon and mortar fire, lively at the beginning, slower later, until at 11 a.m.- it
ceased. It had produced for us only two dead and one wounded. Our trenches, with 4 and 8 pounders fired on the enemy detachments and Indians that permitted themselves to be seen over the glacis of the fortifications, and with some field pieces also fired over our trench guards.

In the afternoon we observed that, the enemy stepped on the breastworks and rammed and repaired the parapets and terrepleins through the section which the fire had damaged. The effect was that made no doubt by the vibration and clatter of artillery over recently-made fortifications composed of wood and sandy clay. Nevertheless it seems to have as much strength as can be given to this type of work.

At 7 in the evening all the trench guards were relieved and also a number of the workers and two or three companies of soldiers. On the preceding day the chief of the trenches was Colonel Pineda. Our work continued all night and we have outlined a battery of mortars over the right side, which is the fascine of the Queen and the Prince of Wales. The enemy, however, kept up a constant mortar and cannon fire from 7:30 p.m. until 5:30 a.m. with very great accuracy that has produced only 3 soldiers dead and an officer wounded on our side.

Monday, 30th

The enemy fire has continued on the same terms as the previous days, in such a manner that it has retarded our work on the trenches considerably. We have gained only the building of a fascine, widened it a little through its widest part, and raised one-half of the parapet of the mortar and cannon battery outlined yesterday. The guards and workers were happily relieved at 7 o'clock by the same number of people less 200 soldiers. The chief was Colonel Espeleta. Some parties of savages came through the nearby woods toward our camp and covered by them they fired on our advanced positions. The latter answered them immediately with field pieces and rifles, and they retreated after having mortally wounded a
soldier in our camp who was resting in his tent. From here they retreated under cover of the woods to the shores of the bay where our launches come through to unload whatever they have on board. And surprising 6 sailors who negligently were fishing on the opposite side of the swamp, they killed them or carried them away as prisoners.\textsuperscript{16}

Today at noon the French frigate \textit{Andromance} entered the port to fire on the enemy fortifications from the sea at the same time as our trench batteries. On passing before the Red Cliffs they fired on one another and she received only two or three hits, which did not cause much damage.\textsuperscript{17} An enemy deserter has arrived.

\textbf{Tuesday, May 1}

We have had only energetic and well-directed fire from the enemy on our trenches. The latter have been widened more and we have already almost finished building the fascines and also the parapet of the battery mentioned before, its platform, etc., having mounted on it 4 mortars and 9 24 pounder cannons. Some savage parties have been seen in the woods near our camp in the same bay, and they have killed one of our sailors who was bathing. The guard and trench workers have been relieved under the same fire that the enemy continued all day and which produced 3 dead and 8 wounded. The chief was naval captain Carnizosa, owing to the sickness of Colonel Longoria. The general visited the trenches at 3 p.m.

\textbf{Wednesday, May 2}

At 9 a.m. our battery opened fire with 6 cannon and 4 mortars, with not very considerable effect. The enemy fire was superior, and thus we have been able only to annoy him. The troops of the trenches were relieved at the regular hour. The chief was M. de Botdréu. The trench was extended through the right side to a distance of about 300 meters toward the redoubt of the Queen, at which the general apparently was directing the attack; We also have laid out a battery in this spot. Our wounded have been 8.\textsuperscript{18} The general went ‘out this morning’ with
SIEGE OF PENSACOLA

Saturday, May 3

The enemy fire upon us and our trenchworks on the left has been the most lively and continuous so far, but it has produced only 8 dead and one wounded. The trench was relieved at the accustomed hour with an equal number of troops and workers. The chief was General Figuerola. Our efforts have produced only the transportation of materials and other things for the battery laid out the previous day. The general visited the trenches at 4 p.m. Three German deserters came over.

[A sally from Fort George]

Friday, May 4

Today the enemy fire started as usual and about 10 a.m. it stopped. In the morning around 7 o'clock the second-in-command of the trenches, Don Andrés Tachn (a naval captain) observed that from the plaza some parties of enemy troops were emerging, and he informed the commander of the trenches, Don Pablo Figuerola, who ignored the information. At 12:30 the enemy began a lively fire of mortars, cannons, and howitzers over the Queen's redoubt and works to the left of our parallel, which attracted the attention of as many of us as heard it in the camp, but not so the commanders and chiefs of the trenches, who had started to eat. They believed themselves as safe and out of risk as in the plaza mayor of Madrid. The rapidity and good accuracy of the enemy fire forced our unwise and inexperienced troops to remain under cover of their entrenchments, not taking any more risks than those which could come from the artillery; and under this concept only two sentinels re-
mained exposed on the left side observing the enemy movements toward the Queen’s redoubt, facing the place from which the enemy fire was coming. All this preparation did not have any other purpose than to cover and protect against a hand to hand attack they had planned against our redoubts to the left of the parallel. The troops that Tacón had observed coming out of the enemy forts in small parties in the morning were a force of 200 regulars, and they had taken over the right of the fort in the form of a half-moon. They hid in the low places in the terrain toward that part and, covered by the woods, they came closer with great silence and order toward our works mentioned. Being in this place they signalled the fort to commence fire. The latter, after having practiced with the greatest accuracy on the terms stated, signalled to inform them that they had finished and that the one to follow was to be without shells, to intimidate the trenches and to keep the soldiers from coming out of the parapets. In this fashion the enemy hidden a short distance from our trench perceived it (a white flag). Eighty of them with bayonets fixed thrust themselves upon our troops in the redoubts, attacking them from the rear. The soldiers that were inside the trenches did not expect such a risk and had stacked their arms. The unwise officer had begun to eat, and consequently they had relaxed the vigilance which the occasion required. An inexperienced guard alone observed the fort, and with so little attention that he did not perceive the extraordinary signals.

[ Advanced redo&t captured ]

They found themselves surprised, gave up the position, and fled in haste that introduced a general disorder in the rest of the troops in that part. The enemy under these circumstances was not resisted in taking the advanced redoubt, which we abandoned immediately, and following with bayonets those who were retreating from the forward trench they wounded and killed as many as they
found in the intermediate branch between this redoubt, and the second one, which was at a distance of about 60 meters from the other, and they took control of this one also. They captured 5 field pieces that we had. They set fire to the fascines and gun mounts, redoubts and trenches and retreated, carrying with them the silver utensils that they found on the table of the commander of the trench, the buckles and money of the dead and wounded, who amounted in number to about 35 or 40. On their side they had only a sergeant wounded who later died, and they all retreated supported by the other 120 men who awaited them in the woods, shouting with gaiety and throwing their hats in the air. Our major general (who works with little confidence in these matters) was barely able to arrive with some troops and to retrieve two of the stationary cannons whose carriages were almost burned, before the enemy had retreated. We found that the first company of the grenadiers of the Irish regiment had been the one most advanced and the first to be surprised. This one began to take flight and introduced disorder into the first grenadiers of Mallorca who followed it screaming "We are lost! We are bayonetted!" And both communicated it to the second regiment of marines, whose 3 companies were the ones that guarded the left and the redoubts of our mentioned parallel. The captain of the first, Don Hugo Oconór, and the lieutenant, O'Daly, were gravely wounded and taken prisoner. We know that O'Daly, who lost an arm, died an hour later in the fort. The captain of the Mallorca regiment, Don Salvador Roquerol, died in the same place, run through with bayonets. The second lieutenant died a little later, as did the two sergeants. The lieutenant Don N. Jaramillo remained gravely wounded and was taken prisoner. All of these brave officers were dead, and just like the rest of the soldiers whose wounds had been received from the front. they were buried facing the enemy, with all military honors and accompanied by the generals, chiefs; and officers that were ‘then in the camp; The
general made his peroration and ordered that the rest should be abandoned to Christian mercy so that they could be buried. The left and the redoubts mentioned above were guarded immediately with 5 grenadier companies and the trench guard was relieved at the usual hour, always remaining the amount of 3 more companies of grenadiers. The chief was captain Pereda.

The order of this day was announced by the commander, of a body of 1600 light infantry given to Field Marshal- Don Manuel de Cagigal. Two Negresses and a Negro slave, deserters from Pensacola, came over.

Saturday, May 5

At 9:30 in the morning, by order of the general, the commander of the trench on the day of the surprise, Don Pablo Figuerola, was placed under arrest, and Brigadier Giron was named prosecuting attorney to try the case.

This morning, the wind having blown hard from the southeast, all the squadron hastily made full sail. At 12:30 p.m. the greater part of the boats and launches had left to help the ships Triton and Dragon into the port that day or the day following, as they were completely lightened at the end of the shelling of Fort George from the bay, as has been mentioned before. They left most of their anchors in the water. These are judged to be lost because with time the buoys sink on this coast. Some of the launches ran aground on the, island of Santa Rosa and others will be lost along the coast. Later we will know the positive results of this disgusting incident.

The enemy fire has been lively and well-directed. We had 9 dead and 11 wounded. From the fort we have received a deserter who mentions nothing of importance.

At the regular hour the trenches were relieved. Their chief was naval captain Zabala. A wall was constructed of cotton bales and sand bags over the left wing of our parallel to cover the workers and to shelter the construction of the battery and cannons laid out before.

Sunday, May 6

A heavy rain and strong wind-which. came at 1 o'clock
in the morning flooded our camp, tore down our tents, and gave us a terrible night. There was not a single bed that was not made into soup because all the tents were rotten. This lasted until 5 in the morning, when each one spread his rags out in the sun. The trenches were flooded likewise, and you can imagine the work that the troops had standing in water up to their waists. It was said in the morning that the battery of the Red Cliffs had been abandoned by the enemy, and the general sent a party of Indians to reconnoiter and make sure of the fact. These returned at 7 in the evening with two prisoners of the Waldeek regiment who had separated a distance from the fort, and they assured us that the news was false. It is a curious thing to see the manner in which these savages conduct their prisoners. In the midst of the procession they are led by the hands by an Indian who seizes them and controls them, and all with the greatest silence. They continue in order, manifesting their joy in their appearance and from time to time they repeat their shout of victory in a low, muffled tone. The general paid them triply for having brought the prisoners alive, and this appears to me the only means of making these barbarians observe the laws of hospitality, through the medium of interest.

The trenches were relieved at the usual hour by the same number of troops. The chief was General Pineda, because Brigadier Giron was in council. We have placed two howitzers over the redoubt on the left where they have had very good effect, being manned principally by the artillerymen and French who can handle them very accurately. The number of dead and wounded has been considerably higher than the previous day. The captain of the grenadiers of Aragon, Arriola, and his lieutenant, Molina, were wounded. Likewise the captain of the grenadiers of Navarre, Bargas (who died a few hours later), as well as his lieutenant, Garcia.

Monday, May 7
At 12:30 a.m. the principal chiefs of the camp met in
the tent of the major general to start a sudden attack that the general had planned against the enemy battery or the Queen's redoubt. Eight hundred men were to be commanded by the brigadier Giron, guided by a deserter of the same guard and another American officer who was dismissed from the British service in Pensacola, and led by the lieutenant colonel, Caron de Les [Carondelet]. The Irish captain, O'Neill, and the French captain of light infantry, M. Amarithon, who commanded 100 men of his troops, prepared to attack the said battery in 3 distinct divisions, for which purpose they carried ladders and hatchets, etc. But not having arranged the hour of departure accurately, the result was that at 3 a.m. they were still in the trenches. The commander informed the general that it appeared too late to him, and that the moon was very bright, which caused the retirement of the people and the abandonment of the project. According to what we have learned through the enemy, with the vigilance with which they were awaiting us the fort was impenetrable. The attack would have been very costly for us.

The work on our trenches and the construction of the much-desired battery at the left continues slowly. Despite the damage by the enemy howitzers and bombs which we experience each day, that is the only remedy against this cruel evil, unavoidable by any other means. Thanks to the activity and knowledge of our engineers and artillery officers!

In the trenches there were 5 dead soldiers and some wounded, among them the sergeant major of the trench, Urraca, and the Irish sub-lieutenant, Fitzmorris, who died from a cannon-shot.

The enemy savages have fired some rifle-shots upon our advanced guard of the camp. They killed one soldier and wounded another. Some soldiers of the said position went after them and killed two (whose scalps they took) and wounded 4. They also carried off a soldier as prisoner whom they destined to 'avenge the death of a
relative who had been killed in Mobile. But the humanity of General Campbell remedied this misfortune at the cost of 200 pesos fuertes and a gift of rum, etc. The chief of the trench was Colonel Espeleta. The cold today was in excess of that we have experienced in this climate. A deserter from regiment Number 60 arrived.

[The British Queen’s redoubt blows up]

Tuesday, May 8

The fire of the enemy batteries has continued with the same degree of activity and accuracy as the preceding days. It caused sufficient damage in our trench on which we had at last succeeded in speeding up the work, even to constructing the battery on the left mentioned previously, which was to mount 8 or 10 cannons of 24 pounds. These can start firing tomorrow at a distance of about 420 meters from the circular battery or Queen’s redoubt.20 At 9:30 in the morning we heard from the camp a great explosion which alarmed us generally without, our being able to ascertain the danger. The major-general went immediately to the section of the trench from which the noise was heard, and we saw a great column of smoke rising toward the clouds, and later we found out that the explosion had been inside the circular fort mentioned before, which battery was all in flames, and was caused by a grenade from our howitzers. The general and chiefs present (leaving the camp in charge of General Cagigal), went immediately with some troops to the trench and assured themselves of the effect by sight of the damage. The troops advanced under command of Brigadier Giron through the left branch and under cover of the same battery that was burning. They took this position. The speed and courage with which it was executed forced the enemy to retreat to a nearby position, the redoubt of the Prince of Wales, which must be about 200 meters distant from this one; and ours took possession without much opposition. Later 4 cannons that were in the third redoubt were set up and our troops
were entrenched. General Cagigal proposed immediately that the frigates in the port should come near and attack Fort George from the sea. General Gálvez was informed and he issued the corresponding order to Captain Alderete, but he did nothing despite the fact that the situation was the most favorable that could have happened.

[Fort George surrenders]

At 3 p.m. the enemy in Fort George raised the white flag and some officers advanced to confer over capitulation. General Gálvez attended personally and the conference lasted until 11 at night. We later found out that 1.08 of their best troops and two marines were blown up in the redoubt.

Wednesday, May 9

At 7 in the morning Sergeant Major Campo came to our camp with full authority to complete the capitulation, and at 2 in the afternoon everything was finished; we conceding to the guard the honors of war. At 3:30 General Gálvez, with two companies of grenadiers, went to take possession of the city and was very well received by the people of the vicinity.

Thursday, May 10

On this day the generals and their aides-de-camp remained housed in the city. At 3 in the afternoon General Gálvez and 6 companies came to take possession of the fort. The guards came out, forming at a distance of 150 meters from the fort, gave up their flags and arms to our troops which were formed in front of them. The guards were relieved consecutively of the surrendered forts, lowering the British flag and raising that of Spain, and thus was concluded this military scene, with no little embarrassment to the defeated ones.

On the following day we sang a Te Deum and later we began the shipment of the troops and reinforcements, etc.
1. It is called the Childers, 18 cannons, and is lined with copper.

2. Thus we infer the state in which our squadron is usually found relative to naval tactics, signals, etc.

3. YOU can note that in this hour the said frigate came with pontas de correr and other preparation & for danger that not one of the other ships of the squadron, even the smaller ones, had taken. But it might not seem strange when it is known that her commander in similar circumstances made a votive offering in the streets and temples of Havana, with a foresail on his back, shoeless and with one pant leg missing, which comical scene attracted the attention of the women and monks as the news spread. The former came to see the white legs of Aristizabal and the latter to admire, the monastic religion of that military man;

4. Note that this frigate started to chase without any order and according to what we learned later, it started to attack the enemy ship alone, which was the Ulysses, of 44 cannons, lined with copper, which after 3 or 4 hours of combat overcame her that night and took her to Jamaica. This English frigate had come from Jamaica convoying a storeship that was bringing artillery and munitions to help the military establishment, and furthermore it brought 300 or 400 troops. It saw that it could not give such help because the port was taken, etc. The transport left for Jamaica on recognizing 'out squadron and seeing the frigate that imprudently got under their artillery. Taking advantage of the opportunity, she left us outwitted.

5. 'Look here, commander, if the ship that you were chasing was inferior to yours, why did you make the signal that you made yesterday? Why did you give the French and Spanish recognition signals, so that if he was not a friend he might recognize you and better assure his escape?

6. Likewise died from another rifle-shot Colonel Rey
Rebollo who commanded some companies of grenadiers somewhat advanced.

7. Through the operations that our engineers had previously to measure this distance they found it to be about 1,095 meters.

8. If on Point Siguenza of the island of Santa Rosa there were a similar battery the entrance would be very dangerous and perhaps impracticable.

9. Our people brought a dead savage whom they found on the battlefield with a shot in the head, and he has been the only one dead or alive that we have been able to take during the siege.

10. This idea was advanced by General Cagigal and it would have had a good effect if we had continued sending frigates to shell from that point, as the enemy confessed. Later it would have been impossible to resist 3 days more because they did not have ammunition with which to answer from that side. But instead we brought almost all of their fortifications under our fire.


12. Through the enemy we have learned later that their idea was to draw our troops through that section, engaging them in the woods and cutting them off from the rear with a party of 200 of their best troops which had been sent to this point at 6 o'clock in the morning. But the guide was drunk and mistook the trail and the opportunity was lost. Our troops were saved from this unavoidable risk to which the indiscreet commander exposed them only by this circumstance.

13. You should not find it strange that it is mentioned here that on the second day we placed the gun-carriage in the trench, since our troops have no experience, in these matters nor theoretical knowledge. The trench turned out to be 'nothing but a ditch, and their first entrenchments around their camps nothing but fences for the cattle. The ditch was always left through the interior part and no one could convince them that it
should be otherwise. Experience and reflection won out in the end. No profession requires more practice and constant application than the military.

14. One likewise could see over their bulwarks several officers and women examining our trenches and works; with telescopes.

15. He was M. Ganden, sub-lieutenant of the Louisiana regiment. He died 3 days later.

16. We have learned through deserters that 3 of these were killed, two wounded, and one unhurt who 'was carried to Campbell who paid them for the dead and wounded the stipulated price and for the prisoner 20 pesos and a cask of rum. In this fashion this officer tries: to improve the fate of prisoners who are unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of these barbarians.

17. From as many ships or frigates that have fired at the said battery none had the accuracy of this frigate, by confession of the enemy officers who commanded it.

18. The hospital frigate Mexicana came in today and received some shots from the enemy battery Red Cliffs on passing before it, proof of what we have said before concerning the difficulty there would have been in reinforcing the port if there had been a battery on Point Siguenza.

19. It is said that this measure was requested by the accused officer.

20. It is said that our hopes concerning this battery were mistaken, and that it could fire only 5 cannons. This certainly is a good one!

For a description of Fort George which capitulated to Gálvez, see Florida Historical Quarterly vol. vi (April 1928) pp. 220-234: Cubberly, “Fort George (St. Michael) Pensacola.”

For a detailed plan of the siege and capture by Gálvez, see Florida Historical Quarterly vol. xx p. 280. This is reproduced from the original in the General Clinton Papers, the William L. Clements Library of Americana,
the University of Michigan. The reproduction is contained in "British and Spanish Fortifications of Pensacola, 1781-1821" by Stanley Faye, which also contains facts from the Spanish official account not in the other sources.

A journal of Field Preacher Stuernagel of the Waldeck regiment, a part of the British force in the fort, describing their part in the defense is contained in Von Eelking, "Deutsche Halbstruppen" 2 vols. (Hanover, 1863).

The Spanish volunteers of Louisiana who served at the siege are listed in Year Book of the Louisiana Society, Sons of the American Revolution for 1921 p. 34. Because of this action these are entitled to membership in that organization.