An Empirical Analysis of the Association Between Types of Interventions and Civil War Onset

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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TYPES OF INTERVENTIONS AND CIVIL WAR ONSET

by

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B.A. University of Florida, 2012

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in the Department of Political Science in the College of Sciences at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2015

Major Professor: Nikola Mirilovic
Quantitative studies have focused on economics, social structures, and lack of political freedoms as being elemental factors for civil war onset. However, these studies have neglected the possibility of a civil war being an unintended consequence of international military intervention. I conduct an empirical analysis of the association between military intervention and civil war onset by collecting data for twenty countries within the Middle East/North African regions from 1980 to 2000. Using the International Military Intervention data set, I categorized “international intervention” into nine different types, all of which were regressed with intrastate war data derived from the Correlates of War project. Two logit regression analyses were used to obtain the results, one of which analyzes civil war at time t and the independent variables at t-1. Additionally, marginal effects were computed to reflect accurate estimates. Overall, the data revealed that certain types of interventions are conducive to civil war onset, such as those pursuing terrorists or rebel groups across the border, gaining or retaining territory, and humanitarian interventions. Other types of interventions, such as those for social protection purposes, taking sides in a domestic dispute, and for the purpose of affecting policies of the target country, has a negative association with civil war onset. Two case studies, the 1953 U.S. intervention into Iran and the 1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan, reflects the observed findings of the two regression models.

The occurrences of international military interventions and civil wars have increased
dramatically since the end of World War II; therefore, it is important to have a better understanding of the association between the two events. To my knowledge, this is the first study that has categorized different types of interventions under which results indicate that the purpose of a military intervention does effect the likelihood of civil war onset. Scholars may develop this study further with the goal of establishing a better understanding of both phenomena so that we can find more efficient ways of preventing them.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I would also like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Lanier, who has aided me immensely with the methodology portion of this thesis. Assembling a panel data set is complex; thus, I am most appreciative to Dr. Lanier for assisting me with ideas on how to accomplish this ambitious data-collecting and data analysis project.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Sadri for being a member on my committee. His expertise on the Middle East / North African regions are most respected and I am grateful that he took the time to sit on my committee.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, intrastate war has been the dominant form of conflict while becoming more serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars. In fact, among the 225 general conflicts that occurred in the world from 1946 to 2001, 163 of the conflicts have been identified as internal conflicts.\(^1\) Perhaps what is more alarming is that ninety-five of these internal conflicts have occurred in the short period between 1989 and 2001.\(^2\) The figure below demonstrates intrastate war experiencing a short decline in 2001, then proceeds to increase in 2003.

The consequences of intrastate conflict are often devastating, resulting in displaced citizens, economic turmoil, regional instability, and often result in the creation of havens that breed terrorists. Because of the severity and robust increase in intrastate conflict, scholars are finding it increasingly important to understand the causes of these conflicts, in addition to conditions existing in a particular state that make it more prone to civil war.

One condition in particular is whether the state experiencing the intrastate war was victim of a foreign intervention prior to the civil war breaking out. International military intervention is nothing new. In fact, it has been occurring for centuries and has consequently created the world order as it is today.

\(^2\) Ibid.
Figure 1. The Number of State-Based Armed Conflict by Type, 1946-2007
Source: 2008 Uppsula Conflict Data Program/Peace and Conflict Research.
However, the advents of global mobility and aeronautical technology have made international military intervention become easier, quicker, and much more intense now than it was a century ago.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between international military intervention and civil war onset, generally, and whether the purpose of the intervention makes a difference as to whether or not civil war is likely to ensue, specifically. It must be noted that discussing foreign intervention as a result of civil war exceeds the scope of this thesis. Rather, I am analyzing the link between a foreign military intervention occurring, and civil war onset resulting. Several scholars have suggested that specific conditions existing within a state make civil war more likely to occur. This thesis analyzes whether or not foreign military intervention is a condition that precipitates civil war.

Because modern resources have made it relatively easy for one state to intervene into another, governments often have a variety of reasons as to why it is intervening into a sovereign state. I examine nine different purposes of intervention: social protection for citizens in the state being intervened, pursuing rebel or terrorists forces across the border, protecting economic interests, intervention for humanitarian purposes, intervention for acquisition or retention of territory, intervening for strategic purposes in terms of pursuing ideological goals, protecting military and/or diplomatic interests of the intervener, taking sides in a domestic dispute, and intervening for the purpose of affecting domestic policies of the target state.
When intervening, states have the option to do so unilaterally or multilaterally, in addition to taking a military or non-military approach. Only unilateral military interventions are of interest in this work. As we see in chapter five, the purpose of the intervention does effect whether civil war onset will occur within the target state.

**Research Question**

The research questions this thesis seeks to answer are twofold: foreign military intervention does facilitate civil war onset. However, the type of foreign military intervention strongly effects whether or not civil war onset will occur. To answer these questions, I gathered data on intrastate wars that have occurred in 20 countries located in the Middle Eastern / North African regions during a twenty-year period, (from 1980 to 2000).

I also collected data on international military interventions that have occurred within those countries and the same time period. Because a foreign intervention can have long-term effects on the intervened country, it is a basic assumption in this thesis that if a civil war occurred within one year following an intervention, there is an association between the two events.

**Originality**

Although there has been ample work done on the causes of civil war, there has been no association between foreign military intervention and civil war onset. Similarly, there is an
abundance of literature regarding foreign military intervention in general, but the focus of those findings are typically restricted to either third-party interventions in civil wars or justifications of doing such without any regard to its effect on causing civil war.

Furthermore, there is little literature that categorizes the purposes of interventions; rather, “intervention” is considered to be all-encompassing. Generalizing “intervention” can be potentially misleading because the term itself means ‘intrusion’ or ‘interference’ and implies acts that encourage war. However, there are purposes of intervention whereby the motivation for direct interference is benign, such as humanitarian or social protection interventions.

Although mere imperialism or colonialism may have been the main driving motivation in the past, modern advances in technology and simplicity have given government leaders expansive purposes to intervene into another country. Therefore, it is highly statistically useful to disaggregate the different types of intervention purposes so that government leaders are better able to predict what the potential consequences of intervening into a country will be, notably civil war.

Of the nine categories of purposes of intervention explored in this thesis, the data reveal that civil war onset is positively associated with interventions for the purpose of pursuing a terrorists or rebel across the target country’s border, humanitarian interventions, acquiring or retaining territory, and protecting military property, diplomatic, and economic

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interests.

By contrast, interventions for purpose of affecting social policies of the target country, taking sides in a domestic dispute, social protection, and strategic inventions with the purpose of advancing ideological goals all have a negative association with civil war onset. These results invite questions as to why this pattern exists, and whether there are other factors that make a country more prone to civil war. Such questions are explored in the next chapter.

Roadmap

Following this chapter is the literature review, which indicates two strands of scholarship: civil war and foreign military intervention. The former addresses the causes of civil war and conditions that are conducive to civil war onset. The latter strand of scholarship discusses the nine purposes of intervention in detail. The third chapter discusses the overall theoretical intuition, which involves three theories that attempt to explain why civil war occurs. Also, understanding why countries intervene in others is best explained by the Realist school of thought.\(^4\) Arguably since international security and power considerations are critical factors that shape the foreign policy behavior of states.

The fourth chapter discusses the methodology of this study, which include the justification for selecting the Middle Eastern/North African regions for the years 1980 and 2000. I will also explain the advantages and disadvantages of conducting a pooled cross-sectional time

series, in addition to discussing the data sources, variables, and hypotheses. The fifth chapter will explain the results of the two regression models, which will determine whether any hypotheses were correct. Chapter five will also include the limitations in this study as well as areas for future research.

The sixth chapter introduces two case studies: the 1953 United States led intervention into Iran (codenamed “Operation AJAX”) and the 1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan. The U.S. and the Soviet Union intervened in countries in the same region for the purpose of both strategy and choosing sides in a domestic dispute, yet civil war broke out in Afghanistan, but not in Iran. The data results are consistent with the two case studies, which is elaborated on in chapter six.

The seventh chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the overall thesis. There are three appendices: appendix A lists all of the interventions, categorized by type, that were used in this study, in addition to a brief description of each. Appendix B lists the civil wars that were analyzed in this study, and also gives a brief description of each. Finally, appendix C provides the exact year that data were collected for Alesina’s fractionalization data set, discussed in detail in chapter four.
CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE

The literature review will begin by explaining how civil war is measured in this thesis. Scholars often offer their own operationalization of civil war as there is no standard operational definition to follow; therefore, it is imperative to discuss whose measurement of civil war that I will be using. Additionally, I will make the distinction between “civil war” and “armed conflict,” as the terms are often mistakenly used interchangeably despite having entirely different meanings and criteria.

This chapter then divides into two strands of scholarship: the first pertinent only to civil war and the second discussing the work done on foreign military interventions. I will begin the discussion of the civil war strand by briefly examining the motivations and feasibility of engaging in civil war on an individualistic level. I will also introduce competing arguments explaining why individuals rebel and incentives they may have in doing so.

Still within the civil war strand, I will then present several arguments offered by scholars on the causes of civil war such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within a state, the economic status of the state, regime type, extent of political freedoms, and the effect that natural resources have on instigating civil war. Additionally, some scholars argue that conditions such as terrain, population size, and whether the country was previously colonized are also conducive to civil war onset; therefore, those arguments will also be discussed.

The second strand (foreign military intervention) will discuss in detail the nine different
purposes of intervention. As mentioned in the previous chapter, neither the consequences nor effects that foreign military intervention have on civil wars themselves will be discussed. Instead, I adhere only to the actual purpose or motivation of the intervention itself. Long-term consequences of foreign intervention will also be explored, as many have been shown to alter the conditions within the intervening state, which could facilitate or contribute to the likelihood of civil war onset.

Measuring Civil War

To understand civil war, we must first be able to describe it, and this may be particularly true of war given that it consistently changes over time. In the empirical literature, there has been incredible growth in studies due to the compilation of quantitative data sets; yet, there is no consensus as to how civil war should be measured.\(^5\) Since I use the Correlates of War (COW) intrastate war data set (version 4.0), I will use the COW Project’s operationalization of “civil war.”

Prior to 1994, the COW project defined a “civil war” as any armed conflict that involved: (1) military action internal to the metropole; (2) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war; (3) the active participation of the national government; and, (4)

effective resistance by both sides.\textsuperscript{6} The metropole refers to areas integrated under the central government, whereas nonintegrated areas (the periphery) faced restrictive governmental provisions.\textsuperscript{7} To be considered a civil war, the military action had to occur within the boundaries of the metropole.

A territory was regarded as part of the metropole if there were no constitutional provisions denying the subjects the right to participate in the government. The federal district was considered to be integrated if there were no restrictive provisions based on ethnicity, race, or religion.\textsuperscript{8}

In 1994, the COW Project began slightly modifying and updating its war typology and coding rules. The reasoning for these changes included the desire to: expand the war typology to include additional types of armed conflict, modify the metropole distinction, change the coding of some of the variables to make them more comparable to all of the war types, and, to alter some of the coding practices that had been perceived as “Eurocentric.”\textsuperscript{9} Also, there were a number of growing armed conflicts that did not fit comfortably within the existing COW categories; therefore, the COW project refined its criteria of what is now referred to as “intrastate war,” as opposed to the formerly used “civil war.”

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
More broadly, Small and Singer changed the criteria of being a legitimate member of the international community. Historically, a state had to have a population of 500,000, it had to be sovereign, and it had to be recognized as such by the United Nations. However, the criteria has been changed to only reflect the necessary recognition by the international community, most notably through the United Nations as the territory being intervened belonging to that state.

Currently, “intrastate war” is based on the following main characteristics: (1) mutual military action was involved; (2) there must be at least 1,000 battle deaths during the course of the civil war; (3) the national government at the time was actively involved; and, (4) there must be effective resistance, which is measured by the ratio of the weaker to the strong forces that occurred on both sides.

With regard to the first criterion, the primary change in the new typology was removing the distinction between the metropole and the periphery within intrastate war. Thus, all military action resulting in war that takes place within the recognized territory of a state will automatically fall under the intrastate war category; whereas, a non-state entity outside its border will be considered an extra-systemic war.

Additionally, the requirement of mutual military action is instrumental in distinguishing

10 Small and Singer, 211-12.
intrastate war from one-sided violence, such as massacres. Thus, incidents that involved large-scale massacres of disarmed combatants or prisoners outside of combat operations will not be considered mutual military action. Consequently, condition one will not be met. Also, “hide-and-seek” operations that do not involve any combat over an extended period of time but nonetheless kills several troops through disease will also not be considered military action.

With regard to the second criterion, Small and Singer modified the type of member to be considered in the 1,000 battle death threshold. Before discussing this modification, it must first be noted that authors frequently use the terms deaths and casualties interchangeably, despite the different meanings whereby the latter includes both those who died and the number wounded. Keep in mind, the COW Project includes only the number of deaths to meet the 1,000 threshold; causalities are not included.

Prior to 1994, Small and Singer included civilian deaths in this 1,000 battle-death figure because it was difficult to distinguish the combatants from the civilian population. However, including the non-state-participant deaths in the total number of deaths to meet the 1,000 threshold had significantly increased the number extra-state wars, and was not properly categorizing the intrastate from the extra-state wars. Therefore, the current requirement for

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 14.
17 Ibid., 16.
18 Ibid., 17.
the 1,000 battle-related deaths include only those among the qualified war participants. This includes personnel killed in combat as well as those who subsequently died from combat wounds or diseases contracted during the war. 20

Additionally, the 1,000 threshold has been relaxed to reflect 1,000 battle-deaths in total, as opposed to annually. However, Small and Singer have been criticized for abandoning the annual death threshold because an end to the war would be coded when violence dropped below 1,000 deaths. Since there is no longer an annual death count, multiple war start dates could be coded in what is essentially the same conflict, should levels of violence fluctuate widely. 21

Organized armed forces are a requirement in the definition of war, and since most states possess them, the members of the interstate system were considered to be the predominant actor in war. Membership in the interstate system was based on criteria of population, territory, sovereignty, independence, and diplomatic recognition. A state is to be qualified as a war participant by meeting either one of the two criteria: a minimum of 100 domestic fatalities or a minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat. 22

Since non-state armed groups are generally smaller than states and have fewer resources than states, the individual does not have to meet the above mentioned requirements to be considered as a war participant. Instead, the non-state armed groups are considered to be a war

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Sambanis, 819.
22 Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 18.
participant if it either commits 100 armed personnel to the war or suffers twenty-five battle-related deaths.\textsuperscript{23}

Once the participants in the war have been identified, researchers must determine who is fighting whom within the state. The party that caused the greatest number of battle-deaths was considered to be doing the bulk of the fighting; this ensures that researchers are properly identifying war participants that are engaged in the violence that is at the core of the war.\textsuperscript{24}

The third criterion, the active involvement of the national government, requires that the government of the state fight against a non-state entity.\textsuperscript{25} The central government is defined as those forces that were at the start of the war in de facto control of the nation’s institutions, regardless of the legality or illegality of their claim.\textsuperscript{26}

The COW Project considers national military forces, local police, and citizens who do not rebel, to be considered as part of the government.\textsuperscript{27} The non-state participants can include regional geopolitical units, non-territorial entities, or non-state armed groups that have no defined territorial bases, so long as the war is fought within the borders of the state.

The last criterion, effective resistance, requires that for a conflict to be considered a war, it must involve armed forces capable of effective resistance on both sides.\textsuperscript{28} There are two

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{24} Sarkees, “Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 19.
\item\textsuperscript{25} Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State War,” 2.
\item\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 2-3.
\item\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 3.
\end{itemize}
criteria for defining effective resistance, the first being that both sides had to be initially organized for violent conflict while being prepared to resist the attacks of their opponent. The second is that the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains, despite being unprepared to do so. The purpose of this last criterion is to differentiate intrastate wars from massacres or general riots by unorganized individuals.29

When determining whether an armed conflict constitutes as an intrastate war, it is important to measure the duration of the conflict. The duration typically relies on the war’s start date, end date, and breaks in the hostilities. The COW project considers intrastate war’s formal declaration as being the opening date, but only if it is followed immediately by sustained military combat.30 Should the hostilities precede the formal declaration, then the first day of combat is used. In the event that there is no declaration, then the sustained continuation of military battle, producing the requisite number of battle deaths, is treated as war with the first day of combat used for computing duration.31

The end date of the armed conflict may be an armistice or cease-fire agreement, as long as the conflict does not resume thereafter.32 If the armistice fails to halt the hostilities or there is

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28 Ibid., 2.
29 Ibid.
30 Small and Singer, 66.
31 Ibid.
32 “Codebook for the COW Typology of War,” 20.
a delay between the cessation of military action, then the end date is the day that clearly
separates the close of sustained military conflict. Essentially, an intrastate war ends if: (1) there
is a truce or other agreement that ends combat for a year or more; (2) the apparent defeat of one
side, assuming there is no formal surrender or truce; or, (3) twelve consecutive months pass
without 1,000 battle-deaths, in which the termination date of the war would be the last day that
the 1,000 threshold was met during the previous twelve months.\textsuperscript{33}

An exception to properly calculating a war’s duration is if there is a break in the fighting.
If the fighting stopped for 30 days or less, then there is not considered to be a break. However,
if there was a cessation of hostilities that occurred for more than 30 days, then there was
considered to be a break, in which the end date would be noted and a second start date would be
noted when the war resumed.\textsuperscript{34} Breaks are not considered when measuring the overall duration
of the war.

Sambanis offers a much more detailed measurement of civil war that is much different
than the definition offered by the COW. First, the parties must be politically and militarily
organized, and their political objectives must be publically stated. Similar to the COW, the
government must be a principal combatant.

However, Sambanis argues that in the absence of a functioning government, the party
representing the government, or claiming to control the state domestically, must be a combatant
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 22.
in order to be considered an internal conflict. He also insists that insurgency groups must be locally represented and must recruit locally.

Furthermore, the start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths. If the death total is not reached, then the war is considered to have started in that year only if the cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000. However, this presents a problem with wars that do not reach 500 in the first year because researchers may not know whether the conflict should be considered a civil war until after three years, should the death count not reach 1,000. This additional stipulation could create prolonged confusion among researchers in regards to labeling the conflict improperly.

Like Small and Singer, Sambanis also includes “effective resistance” in his measurement of civil war; however he requires the weaker party to inflict at least 100 deaths on the stronger party to qualify as effective resistance. Sambanis also argues that if the fighting ceases and peace results for at least two years, then the civil war is considered to have ended. However, he offers no justification as to why there must be two years of peace, and not one or three. It would be useful for readers to better understand his measurement of civil war if he explained why he requires two years of peace, as opposed to any other time period.

Finally, Sambanis insists that the war must take place within the territory of a state that is 

35 Sambanis, 829.
36 Ibid., 830.
37 Ibid., 831.
a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater. Although the per capita death measure would allow the population threshold to be relaxed, it still presents a problem for those countries that have a population of less than 500,000, yet meet all other conditions to constitute as a “civil war.”

For example, Malta has a population of 419,000 while Iceland has a population of only 332,000, yet both are completely sovereign states that are recognized as such by the international community. It seems fallacious that the death count during a conflict is required to exceed the normal threshold of 1,000 battle deaths simply because the population is not greater than 500,000.

Fearon and Laitin also have their own operationalization of “civil war,” in that it involves fighting between a state and non-state group who seek to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use violence in order to change government policies to achieve certain goals. Additionally, the conflict must have killed 1,000 people over the course of the fighting period, with a yearly average of at least 100 deaths. Finally, at least 100 civilians and/or participants must have been killed on both sides to constitute as a “civil war.”

38 Ibid. at 829
The last criterion is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition; however, including civilian deaths may still categorize the conflict as “civil war” despite being terrorist attacks or ethnic cleansings. Another criticism is the overall 1,000 deaths: it is too low because under this criterion, a conflict may continue for twenty years and still be labeled as a “civil war,” so long as there are 1,000 deaths, with 100 occurring annually. This relaxed approach inappropriately classifies low levels of violence as being civil wars, and could lead researchers to include cases in which there is no real threat to the state or political order.

This literature review now turns to the differentiation between “civil war” and “armed conflict,” as the two are often inappropriately used. “Civil war” must not be confused with “armed conflict;” rather, the former is a type of the latter. Armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns governments or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths.41

Armed conflict is divided into three main subsets: (1) minor armed conflict; (2) intermediate armed conflict; and, (3) civil war. Minor armed conflict consists of at least twenty-five battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.

Intermediate armed conflict consists of at least twenty-five battle-related deaths per

year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year. Civil war requires at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.\textsuperscript{42} Armed conflict is generally used to measure the level of intensity of conflict. However, in this thesis, I am only concerned with the third subset of armed conflict: civil war.

Similarly, armed conflicts are also distinguished by type. Following the COW Project’s definitions, there four different types of armed conflict: first, there is interstate armed conflict, which occurs between two or more states. Second, extrastate armed conflict, which occurs between a state and non-state group outside its own territory. Armed conflict is also divided into colonial war and imperial wars.

The third type is internationalized internal armed conflict, which occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with interventions from other states. Finally, there is internal armed conflict, which occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.

This thesis focuses only on internal armed conflict, which is also referred to as either “intrastate war” or “civil war.” The reasoning for the interchangeability is because different scholars refer to internal conflict as either an “intrastate war” or “civil war,” despite having the same meaning. Therefore, to be consistent with the literature, each word will be referenced as the author uses it, bearing in mind that the two terms have essentially the same meaning.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid at 619.
Causes of Civil War

Between 1989 and 2000, there have been a staggering 465 conflicts, while there have been a relatively modest 19 intrastate conflicts with foreign intervention, and 18 interstate conflicts.43 This disparity in the quantity of these conflicts is curious and has led political scientists to conduct empirical research in the attempt to discover the causes of these multifarious wars. Table 1 illustrates the quantity of armed conflicts between 1989 and 2000.

Over the past decade, there have been numerous quantitative studies that have been published with little consensus among scholars as to what directly causes civil war onset. Some scholars have argued that ethnic and religious fractionalization are strong determinants of civil war onset.44 While advocates of the “ethnic fractionalization fueling internal conflict” argument may agree that ethnic diversity is conducive to civil war onset, the reasoning varies widely.

Tanja Ellingsen (2000) analyzes the relationship between multiethnic states and domestic conflict from 1946 to 1992 to determine if, and to what extent, ethnicity influenced civil war onset.45 Ellingsen looks at three different aspects of multietnicity that may influence whether a country becomes involved in domestic conflict or not.46

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46 Ibid., 232.
Table 1. Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict, 1989-2000

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The first is the degree of fragmentation within a country, being both the size and number of the largest linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups. Ellingsen found that countries in which the size of the dominant group is less than 80 percent of the total population are more prone to domestic conflict than countries in which the dominant group equals or is higher than 80 percent of the total population.47

The second aspect of multiethnicity is the size of the largest minority group within the country. The presence of numerous groups often means that each group is small and, in turn, no minority group is large enough to mobilize to start conflict.48 The data supported her second hypothesis: conflict is higher in countries with several different ethnic groups than in those with few ethnic groups.

The third aspect of multiethnicity that Ellingsen explores is the ethnic affinities to other countries.49 She argues that a minority within one country may be a majority within another. Consequently, this affects the size of the minority and its identification.50 Therefore, race, religion, and the language that represents a minority group in one country may not represent a group within another.51

Ellingsen used Singer and Small’s Correlates of War data set for civil war data in

47 Ibid., 233.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 234.
51 Ellingsen, 234.
addition to using Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data set for armed conflict. Relying on regression analysis, her overall findings demonstrate that multiethnicity (measured in of the above-mentioned ways) has a strong and significant impact on domestic conflict.

This is mainly attributed to the state’s lack of recognizing and strengthening minority groups in addition to denying them equivalent political and economic rights. Giving minority groups the right to cultural self-expression without fear of political or economic repression could prevent them from mobilizing and creating conflict within the state.

Although Ellingsen’s study has shown that multiethnicity within countries often results in domestic conflict, it does not correlate with countries such as Madagascar, Gabon, or Cameroon, all of which are highly multiethnic, yet have never experienced a civil war.

For example, according to Alesina’s, et al.’s fractionalization data, Madagascar has an ethnic fractionalization score of .8791. The closer the score is to 1.000, the more ethnically heterogeneous the country is. On the other hand, the closer the score is to 0.000, the more ethnically homogeneous the country is. By having a score .8791, Madagascar is highly ethnically heterogeneous yet has never experienced a civil war. Similarly, Gabon has an ethnic fractionalization score of .7691 while Cameroon is even more multiethnic, having a score of .8635.

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52 Ibid., 245-46.
54 Ibid., 156.
55 Ibid., 185-86.
In the context of Ellingsen’s reasoning, Madagascar, Gabon, and Cameroon should have all experienced domestic conflict as a result of being highly multiethnic, yet they have not.

Examining the relative minority size within Madagascar, we find that more than nine-tenths of the population is Malagasy, which is divided into approximately 20 ethnic groups. The largest and most dominant of the 20 ethnic groups is the Merina, which represents approximately a quarter of the 23.6 million citizens, while the other nineteen ethnic minority groups represent only a fraction of the population.

With a population of 1.7 million, Gabon has approximately 40 ethnic groups, in which the Fang account for more than one-fourth of the population whereas the Sira, the Nzebi, and the Mbete, jointly account for about one-third of the population. In regards to Ellingsen’s measurement of “multiethnicity,” the size of these minority groups are relatively large, yet have not mobilized to start conflict.

Finally, Cameroon has a population of 22.5 million, which is represented by an astounding 250 ethnic groups. The Bamileke and the Bamoun constitute 38 percent of the population while the Bakas account for about 18 percent of the population. The Fulani

also account for 18 percent while the Bassa accounts for roughly 12 percent. There are several minority groups that are equal in terms of size, with no ethnic group dominating the overall population. Therefore, Cameroon meets the criteria for civil war set by Ellingsen, yet the country has not experienced civil war or domestic conflict.\(^{59}\)

What these three countries do have in common is that they are all former colonies of the French, and have gained their independence in 1960 as a result of the Algerian War. Also, all three countries currently have republican governments. These striking similarities could help explain why Madagascar, Gabon, and Cameroon are anomalies to Ellingsen’s study. However, it is unlikely that multiethnicity alone will be enough to explain why civil war occurs.

Similar to Ellingsen, Sambanis argues that ethnic heterogeneity is among the most significant and robust determinants of civil war onset.\(^{60}\) He analyzes the differences that exist between the causes of identity by means of ethnicity and religion, and nonidentity civil wars by using a cross-sectional time-series data set that includes economic, social, and political variables for 161 countries observed annually over a period from 1960 to 1999.\(^{61}\)

His findings reveal that politics is more important that economics in causing civil war because the deprivation of political rights causes repression, and may fuel rebellion against the


\(^{60}\) Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1).” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 no. 3 (2001), 266.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 268.
state. Also, ethnic heterogeneity significantly increases the risk of civil war, determined by using the Ethnolinguistic fractionalization date set, created by Taylor and Hudson in 1972.62

Interestingly, Sambanis also argues that regional characteristics also influence patterns of civil war onset due to their ethnic makeup, resource endowments, and the degree in which they include intermeddling countries.63 Civil wars occurring in neighboring countries may increase the risk of civil war in another due to ethnic groups becoming involved within ethnic conflicts in other countries.64

Sambanis labels “good neighborhoods” as having open political institutions that are not prone to internal conflict. Additionally, good neighborhoods are able to help states overcome their political problems and offer mediation that prevent conflict escalation. By contrast, “bad neighborhoods” have weak political institutions, which may cause political and economic grievance in other neighboring countries as a result of uncontrolled domestic ethnic hostility.

The data showed that countries having land borders with countries experiencing civil war due to ethnic hostilities are significantly more likely to experience a civil war of their own.65 Although regional unrest can certainly contribute to the likelihood of civil war onset in a neighboring country, Sambanis offers no root-cause explanation as to why civilians would want to rebel against their own government.

62 Ibid., 279.
63 Ibid., 268.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 279.
Surely, there must be an alternative reason as opposed to simply “everyone else is doing it.” Additionally, Sambanis’s analysis cannot explain whether the spread of neighboring unrest fueling civil war is due to ethnic war spreading physically across borders to other ethnic groups or if information effects influence patterns of mobilization and violent conflict in neighboring states.66

In the same vein as Sambanis’s argument for good/bad neighboring countries fueling civil war, Taydas et al. focuses on the importance of institutional quality.67 He argues that the absence of good quality institutions and effective governance structures creates suitable conditions for emergence of civil war.68 Unlike Sambanis, Taydas focuses on the lack of good quality institutions within the state that is experiencing the civil war, rather than the effect that these institutions have on neighboring countries.

Taydas’s overall argument is that states with high institutional-quality levels are less likely to experience civil war onset.69 This is mainly because these institutions will be responsive to the needs of their citizens in addition to solving problems beyond the use of only military action. By contrast, a low institutional quality may lead to states losing the loyalty of its citizens, which would increase the likelihood of civil war.70

66 Ibid., 275.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 196.
70 Ibid.
The quality of institutions is measured by three components: corruption in the government, the rule of law tradition, and bureaucratic quality.\textsuperscript{71} These three components are appropriate since they demonstrate the ability of a government to implement institutional norms and rules that provide services in an efficient and non-discriminatory manner.\textsuperscript{72}

Taydas’s empirical analysis covers the years 1984 to 1999, in which the International Country Risk Group (ICRG) data set is used to gauge the quality of institutions.\textsuperscript{73} 124 states are included in the study, all of which have a population of at least half a million in 1990. The findings reveal that states with poor institutional quality in the form of high corruption, low respect for rule of law and poor-quality bureaucratic systems were more likely to experience civil war.\textsuperscript{74} By having poor-quality institutions, the legitimacy in the government is decreased, which creates grievances among the population and can, in turn, facilitate the emergence of conflict.

To measure for corruption, Taydas uses the ICRG’s measurement of corruption in the government, which ranges from zero (being the most corrupt) to six (no corruption).\textsuperscript{75} This variable measures the following: financial corruption in the form of demands or special payments, bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, and secret party

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 199.
  \item \textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 202.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 209.
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 212.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
funding.\textsuperscript{76}

However, Taydas does not explain how the ICRG gathers its data that includes these types of corruption. Because corruption is not public information and is most often done in secrecy, it is incredibly difficult to accurately determine whether officials are indeed corrupt.

Furthermore, Taydas argues that the prevalence of poor governance, which is measured in the form of corruption, decreases citizens’ faith and confidence in the political system altogether.\textsuperscript{77} It also creates a gap between ordinary citizens and state institutions that generates distrust, dissatisfaction, and grievances within the entire political system. As this gap widens, the risk of internal conflict increase and “…existing tensions between groups can worsen.”\textsuperscript{78}

There are two problems with this particular argument: first, it is assumed that the citizens are aware of the corruption, but the findings do not address situations in which there is massive governmental corruption, yet the citizens are not aware. If citizens are not aware of the corruption taking place within the government, then it is unlikely that a gap will be created, thus neither generating distrust nor dissatisfaction with the political system. Therefore, it would be useful to not only gauge the corruption within an existing government, but also the citizens’ awareness of such corruption.

Secondly, Taydas argues that existing tensions between groups could worsen as a

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 199.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
consequence of citizens’ distrust with the government; however, he does not address which groups are being referenced. Thus, it is unclear whether he is referring to ethnic groups, political organizations, rebel groups, etc.

Overall, Taydas offers a compelling argument on the usefulness of good quality institutions as a preventative of civil war onset. While I agree that good quality institutions are immensely important for sustaining peace, it is not the sole cause of civil war onset because there must be incentives for citizens to rebel, which is not addressed in Taydas’s study.

Other studies suggest that civil wars generally result from a combination of greed, opportunity, and grievance. The initial motivation to rebel is the subject of much controversy, and much of the debate has been based on the ‘greed versus grievance’ discourse. Grievance generally refers to repression or suffering; whereas, opportunity generally refers to rebels having enough freedom to organize and access to finances, weapons, and soldiers.

With regard to the root cause of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler have introduced their own conceptual dichotomy of greed versus grievance. Rebellions generally occurs when grievances are severe enough that citizens want to engage in some type of violent protest.\(^\text{79}\)

Such rebellions are motivated by grievances, which refers to the discontent and frustration that citizens have due to high economic inequality, ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, or political exclusion.\(^\text{80}\) More generally, grievance can also be created from a sense

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of injustice, including relative deprivation, collective disadvantages, and inequality that provide groups with motivation to use violent means against the government.\textsuperscript{81} Foreign military intervention could cause or disrupt any of the four mentioned grievances, thus fueling internal conflict. This is expounded on later in this chapter.

Contrarily, rebellions that generate profits from looting are motivated by greed, which then generates profitable opportunities for rebels.\textsuperscript{82} Oil, diamonds, timber, and other primary commodities are generally the more contestable resources over which rebels rise against their respective governments.\textsuperscript{83} Over the years, Collier and Hoeffler have broadened their original conceptualization by shifting from greed to “opportunity,” referring to the factors that facilitate internal violence and influence the feasibility of action, which extends beyond just greed.\textsuperscript{84}

According to Collier and Hoeffler, civil war is to be viewed as the outcome of an expected utility calculation; whereby, potential rebels would evaluate their expected gains from war and compare gains with expected losses.\textsuperscript{85} This cost-benefit analysis is considered to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 570.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Collier and Hoeffler, 564.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars.” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} 49 no. 3 (2005), 319.
\end{itemize}
“opportunity costs” of forgoing productive economic activity. Therefore, rebellion is a rational decision.

To help explain rebellion, Collier and Hoeffler test three indicators of opportunity and four indicators of grievances and determine which theory best explains the rebellion phenomenon.

In an empirical investigation of conflict, Collier and Hoeffler considered three qualitative indicators of opportunity, namely those that help finance rebellion: extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments. The natural resource indicator was proxied by the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP for 161 countries over a period of thirty-five years starting in 1960 and ending in 1995. The subsequent five years was then considered to be an ‘episode’ and compared to those in which a civil war occurred and to those that were conflict-free.

Collier and Hoeffler then proxied the size of a country’s diaspora, the second source of rebel finance, by its emigrants living in the United States. By using U.S. Census data, diasporas living in other countries are neglected; however, doing so ensures uniformity in the aggregate in that all are in the same legal, organizational, and economic environment. The emigrant population is then taken as a proportion of the population in the country of origin.

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86 Collier and Hoeffel, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 565.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
The third source of rebel financing, from hostile governments, is proxied as the willingness of foreign governments to finance military opposition to the incumbent government. The data is collected during the Cold War, in which each great power supported rebellions in countries allied to the opposing power.\textsuperscript{89} However, eleven of the seventy-nine wars occurred after the cold war; therefore, results for this variable may be slightly skewed since there is no data offered for the eleven wars.

The study then turns to four qualitative indicators of grievances mentioned earlier: ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality.\textsuperscript{90} Since ethnic and religious hatred can generally only occur in societies that are multi-ethnic or multi-religious, the indicator is proxied as fractionalization and polarization.

The second indicator, political repression, was measured by the Polity IV data set, which measures political right on a scale from zero to ten, with zero meaning no political rights and ten representing substantial political rights. Political exclusion represents the minority, which may be most vulnerable if the largest ethnic group constitutes a small majority. If the largest ethnic group constitutes 45-90 percent of the population, it is referred to as ‘ethnic dominance,’ which results in the exclusion of the minority groups.\textsuperscript{91}

Economic inequality was measured by the GINI coefficient and by the ratio of the top-to-

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 568-69.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 570.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 571.
bottom quintiles of income; whereas, asset inequality was measured by the GINI coefficient of land ownership.\textsuperscript{92}

After conducting a logit regression for all seven opportunity and grievance indicators explained above, the data revealed that extortion of natural resources was highly significant while subventions from hostile governments was not. The diaspora variable was positive and significant in that a large diaspora considerably increases the risk of repeat conflict through rebel financing.\textsuperscript{93} However, because people tend to emigrate to the United States when civil wars occur, the size of the diaspora may be proxying the intensity of conflict. In turn, the results may be spurious and could be why the data indicates that intense conflicts have a high risk of repetition.

In regards to grievance as the explanation of rebellion indicators, the data revealed that the ethnic and religious tensions were insignificant. Ethnic and religious fractionalization, religious polarization, and ethnic dominance were all insignificant.\textsuperscript{94} As expected, repression increases the risk of conflict. Finally, neither the income inequality nor land inequality variables were significant.

As Collier and Hoeffler argue, the results indicate that the opportunities for rebellion helps to explains civil conflict better than the objective indicators of grievance, which add little

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 572.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 575.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 576.
Overall, factors such as inequality, political rights, and ethnic and religious identity have been ruled out as causing internal conflict. Instead, explaining opportunity as conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed-motivated and not grievance-motivated.96

A problem with Collier and Hoeffler’s study is that they take an individualistic approach in regards to grievance indicators. The model assumes that every participant of the conflict must experience inequality, ethnic or religious hatred, political exclusion, or repression. However, many rebels may not be motivated at all; rather they are simply free riders that seek incentives by others that have already laid the groundwork.

Additionally, grievance itself is difficult to proxy. For example, researchers cannot assume that because a state is highly fractionalized or has a dominant ethnic group, the diversity will fuel ethnic hatred and cause minorities to rebel.

Similarly, it is impossible to know whether a person made the decision to rebel due to religious polarization, unless of course that person is surveyed or asked directly by the researcher, both being highly unlikely to produce honest answers. Therefore, because grievance as motivation is so personal and may be different for every rebel, Collier and Hoeffler are working with assumptions as opposed to raw data that do in fact represent the rebels’ motivation to rebel.

95 Ibid., 588.
96 Ibid., 589.
Regan and Norton argue that grievance-based issues are at the core of the process that leads to civil conflict, but only becomes salient when rebel leadership begin to have difficulty motivating soldiers.\textsuperscript{97} To avoid defection, rebel leaders must pay selective benefits to the rebel participants.

Doing so is much easier when extractable resources are contested and controlled by the rebel forces. Therefore, grievance is the foundation by which protest and rebellion movements occur but resources are necessary to obtain so that selective benefits can be paid to the rebels in the attempt to keep the rational rebel soldier supporting the rebellion.\textsuperscript{98} This will, in turn, offset government efforts to lure the rebel soldiers away.\textsuperscript{99}

To test their hypotheses, Regan and Norton conduct logit analysis on a number of variables including discrimination, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and access to extractable resources. Respectively, the data is derived from various sources: the Minorities Against Risk scale to measure discrimination, Sambanis’s data on fractionalization, and various data from the Diamond Registry, the National Gemstone Association, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency to determine rebels access to extractable resources.

Although much of the current debate suggests that access to resources facilitates the mobilization process, the data revealed that extractable resources (using diamonds, gemstones,

\textsuperscript{97} Regan and Norton, 319.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 322.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
and opiates) has no relationship with the onset of protest or rebellion.\textsuperscript{100} In fact, access to these resources may actually decrease the probability of civil war onset.

Disappointedly, Regan and Norton do not expound on why natural resources may decrease the likelihood of the civil war onset. Perhaps the reason why there is no relationship between the two is because of the lack of access rebel leaders have to the resources. Another reason could be because diamonds and gemstones are usually mined in industrialized states, and rebellion tends to occur more in underdeveloped states.

Shifting the discussion to the correlation between government repression and civil war, lagging levels of political repression is generally a strong predictor of the level of civil unrest. Regan and Norton used the Political Terror scale to determine whether there is a correlation between civil unrest and governmental repression.\textsuperscript{101}

The results indicate that when a country is highly autocratic, there is a considerably lower probability of violent rebellion.\textsuperscript{102} Contrarily, when the political institutions allow some forms of popular participation, the likelihood of rebellion increases.\textsuperscript{103}

According to these results, if a state engages in high levels of political repression, then the likelihood of nonviolent protests decreases significantly, whereas if a state does not repress, protests will increase significantly. Yet, results also suggest that highly repressive states have a

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 334.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 328
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 333.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
far greater probability of experiencing a civil war. This seems counterintuitive because it does not follow the main argument that grievance-based issues are at the core of the process that leads to civil conflict.

For example, if rebel leaders use state resources to incentivize participants of the protest, the rebellion will likely continue and turn violent in the attempt to further the goals of the rebellion. Citizens in highly repressive states, arguably, have more grievance-based issues than those in low repressive states; therefore, it would seem that highly repressive states would have more civil wars than low repressive states.

Although Regan and Norton briefly state the results of the data, they do not expound on the reasons why the results undercut their main thesis. Being experts in the field of political science, it would have been helpful to understand the logic, or at least theories, as to why the results rebut their main argument.

One way in which a rebellion or protest will cease is if the rebel leaders are not able to use state resources to pay the soldiers’ for their labor. Regan and Norton focus on precious stones and illegal opiates, as discussed above, since the two are easily extractable, localized, and highly valuable.\(^\text{104}\) However, precious stones are often mined in industrialized countries that, in general, experience less rebellion than others. Therefore, focusing on resources such as oil, coal, and other fossil fuels could have led to different results that could refine our understanding of the

\(^{104}\) Ibid., 334.
correlation between extractable resources and civil war onset.

Regan and Norton also found that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity significantly increased the likelihood of both rebellion and civil war, whereas more homogeneous states are less likely to experience rebellion.\textsuperscript{105} Although the scholars do not explain this relationship in detail, it seems to be consistent with reasoning the offered by Sambanis and Ellington, discussed earlier in the chapter.

There is ample literature on the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset, and it is perhaps the most debated cause of civil war. Contrary to Regan and Norton, Fearon and Laitin completely disregard the argument that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity makes a country more prone to civil war.\textsuperscript{106} Rather, it is conditions such as poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations that make civil war more likely to occur.\textsuperscript{107}

To test their theory, Fearon and Laitin gathered data for 161 countries, all of which had a population of at least half a million in 1990, for the years 1945 to 1999.\textsuperscript{108} Data were gathered from the commonly used Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, the CIA Factbook, and Grimes and Grimes’s data on languages spoken within a country’s population.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 332.
\textsuperscript{106} James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” \textit{American Political Science Review} 97, no.1 (2003), 75.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 73.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 78-9.
\end{footnotes}
The results indicated that ethnic and religious fractionalization as cause of civil war were statistically insignificant when using the Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index and the CIA Factbook. Even when using the Grimes and Grimes data that measured the proportion of the largest ethnic group and the log of the number of languages spoken by at least one percent were equally insignificant. The ethnic diversity measures do show a strong relationship with civil war onset, however, this relationship ceases when income is controlled for.

Fearon and Laitin also found little evidence that a civil war will break out where political grievances are strongest. If this were so, then political democracies and states that observe civil liberties would be not be expected to experience civil war, whereas dictatorships would. Furthermore, states that discriminate against minority religions or languages would be more likely to experience civil war. However, when comparing states exhibiting these characteristics to per capita income, the data does not reflect these expectations.

Civil violence is explained by neither ethnic nor religious grievances, but rather conditions that favor insurgency. Insurgency is defined as technology or military conflict that is characterized by small armed participants that conduct guerilla warfare from rural based areas. Governments that are weak are attractive for insurgencies, and there is often a propensity for brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive rebel forces.

\[\text{Ibid., 84.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., 75.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., 76.}\]
Although grievances may motivate rebels, it is unlikely that factors of grievances will be the sole cause of civil war. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin completely refute the commodity exports fueling civil war argument, offered by Collier and Hoeffler, by finding no significance from the data exemplifying the relationship between exports and civil war.\textsuperscript{114}

Interestingly, mountainous terrain is significantly related to civil war onset. For example, countries that are half “mountainous” have a 13.2 percent chance of civil war occurring, whereas the chances of civil war occurring is cut into half for countries that are not mountainous.\textsuperscript{115} The logic behind these results is that insurgency is favored by rough terrain because the rebels have local knowledge of the population and geography of the country.\textsuperscript{116} By knowing the landscape of the country thoroughly, rebels are able to hide from superior government forces.

Per capita income is also strongly significant in that $1,000 less in income is associated with 41 percent greater annual odds of civil war onset.\textsuperscript{117} Even within the poorest regions (such as former colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) those countries that estimate $1,000 or less in income corresponds to a 34 percent chance of civil war breaking out.\textsuperscript{118}

Although the overall study is a valid contribution to the literature, Fearon and Laitin prematurely dismiss the effect that ethnic fractionalization has on civil war onset. For example,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 85.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 76.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 83.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
they argue that conditions favoring insurgency, such as state weakness marked by poverty, a large population, and instability are better predictors of civil war onset, as opposed to grievances such as economic inequality, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization.\textsuperscript{119}

However, decolonization is argued to be the cause of the robustness of civil wars during the twentieth century, given that states became abruptly financially burdened and militarily weak.\textsuperscript{120} Because a state is poor and has a weak government and military does not in and of itself make it more conducive to civil war. There has to be some underlying reason why citizens would rebel against their government. Of course, a country that has rough terrain may make it easier for citizens to rebel, but it is not the reason that they rebel in the first place. In fact, deeply rooted ethnic hatred that has been suppressed by colonization then unleashed during decolonization would be a better explanation for civil war onset as opposed to state weakness or poverty.

Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin have argued that countries with a lower per capita income are more likely to experience civil war. However, there is no reason or justification given for this argument. In countries that have a large ethnic majority and several minorities may experience high income inequality, whereby the minorities rebel due to grievances. The findings offered by Fearon and Laitin are interesting nonetheless, but it would give more credibility to the study if theories were offered that justified the results from the data.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
Another study regarding the effect of ethnic division on civil war was conducted by Marta Reynal-Querol.\(^\text{121}\) In contrast to Collier and Hoeffler, it is not the economic factors that are more conducive to civil war. Instead, the factors gear more towards ethnic and religious characteristics.\(^\text{122}\) Rather than restricting the study only to ethnic heterogeneity as many scholars have done, Reynal-Querol analyzes the effect that religious polarization and animist diversity have on the incidence of ethnic civil war.\(^\text{123}\)

Using the Barro’s data set, which is derived from the World Christian Encyclopedia, Reynal-Querol gives special importance to the religious dimensions of ethnicity.\(^\text{124}\) The results indicated a positive and significant effect of animist diversity on the onset of ethnic civil war.\(^\text{125}\) Even when including religious polarization and animist diversity together, the results are still positive and statistically significant.\(^\text{126}\)

Furthermore, religious polarization was found to be more important as a social cleavage that can develop into civil war, more so than linguistic differences.\(^\text{127}\) These important religious differences are a strong predicator for explaining domestic conflict.

\(^\text{122}\) Ibid., 40.
\(^\text{123}\) Ibid., 40.
\(^\text{124}\) Ibid., 38.
\(^\text{125}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{126}\) Ibid., 41.
\(^\text{127}\) Ibid., 52.
Perhaps the reason why scholars are finding such different results when controlling for ethnic fractionalization is because each researcher uses a different definition of “ethnicity.” For example, Fearon and Laitin define an ethnic group as, “a group larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a conventionally recognized ‘natural history’ as a group.”\(^{128}\)

Marta Reynal-Querol defines ethnicity as a combination of language, religion, and color, whereby the tensions caused by linguistic differences and the loss of communication that they generate can emerge in a situation very different from those generated by religion.\(^{129}\) These linguistic and religious differences causes splits within societies, and form the basis of identifying with a particular ethnic group.

Other scholars, such as Sambanis and Regan and Norton, rely on Horowitz’s definition of ethnicity. Horowitz defines “ethnicity” as “being based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”\(^{130}\)

These different definitions of “ethnicity” are likely to result in different categorizations of ethnic groups, as the criteria will be different for each researcher. Scholars studying the causes of civil war should use the same operationalization of “ethnicity” so that there is more cohesion for


\(^{129}\) Marta Reynal-Querol, 32.

this particular argument within the literature.

Turning away from the ethnic, economic and political repression grievances, other scholars have focused on regime type as an indicator of civil war onset. Hegre et al. argue that domestic violence is associated with political change and contrary to what has been argued in the literature thus far, intermediate regimes are actually most prone to civil war.\textsuperscript{131}

By conducting an empirical analysis that uses data from 152 countries from the years 1816 to 1992, Hegre et al. explore the direction and magnitude of political change.\textsuperscript{132} Generally, well-established democracies and autocracies have a lower hazard of civil war than intermediate regimes.\textsuperscript{133} Countries experiencing political change are also conducive to civil war because the central government is seen as vulnerable, thus giving rebels an opportunity to come to power.

The researchers also used the Correlates of War data to contract their dependent variable, Polity IV for one of their independent variables (regime change), and various other data resources for the control variables.\textsuperscript{134} The data revealed that regimes that score in the middle range on the democracy-autocracy index have a significantly higher probability of civil war than either fully developed democracies or autocracies.\textsuperscript{135} Additionally, regime change strongly

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 36-7.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 42.
increases the probability of civil war. These results offer an interesting question as to whether
democratization facilitates civil war; however, this issue exceeds the scope of this thesis and,
therefore, will not be addressed.

Overall, Hegre et al. offer an interesting analysis on the relationship between
regime type and civil war onset. To have a better understanding of the contemporary effect that
regime type and regime change have on likelihood of civil, perhaps Hegre et al. should have only
included civil wars that occurred after the end of WWII. The causes of civil war were much
different in 1816 than they are in more recent years due to the advancement of technology.
Therefore, including those that occurred 200 years ago may not provide the most accurate
information for contemporaneous purposes.

Additionally, Hegre et al. did not give any reason as to why an intermediate regime
would be more conducive to civil war onset. The researchers cited several scholars that have
offered their own theories on why regime change affects the likelihood of civil war, but do not
take a formal position or offer any theories of their own. Perhaps citizens may feel more
aggrieved from transforming from an autocracy to democracy, or vice versa, therefore they rebel
against the government to promote their own ideological views.

Another theory may be that the rebels regard the government as being unstable due to the
fact that it does not have a coherent regime type, given that the government is neither fully

\[136\] Ibid.
democratic nor autocratic. Either the grievance based or opportunistic based theory may be a reason why rebels would violently resist their government.

In general, grievance-based motives of civil war onset, such as ethnic and religious fractionalization, and democratic and autocratic regimes, have received inconsistent support within the existing literature.\(^\text{137}\) There is little consensus as to whether grievances are the direct cause of civil war partly because the evidence is at odds with such a large body of theoretical literature that focuses on greed-based motives because of the economic disparity among citizens in poverty-stricken regions.\(^\text{138}\)

Bodea and Elbadawi attempt to clear up the muddiness of the numerous arguments relevant to economic and regime type conduciveness to civil war onset. They do so by conducting a study that incorporates all of the variables tested by the notable scholars while providing a concise literature review that compacts exactly who said what. Given the overwhelming literature on civil war and contradictory theories, such a compacted study is helpful for new researchers.

To start, Bodea and Elbadawi argue that the combination of low income and low standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violence, regardless of social characteristics within a society. High income reduces the risk of civil war because


\(^{138}\) Ibid.
richer countries have a greater capacity to react to emerging rebellions. Additionally, in wealthier countries the opportunity costs of rebellion are larger.\textsuperscript{139} This is similar to the economic argument presented by Collier and Hoeffler.

The researchers also investigate the role that social fractionalization and regime type have on the onset of political violence.\textsuperscript{140} Referring to the Polity IV data set, full autocracies involve repressed political participation with no official elections; partial autocracies involve either a small degree of competitive political participation or elections for the executive; and partial democracies have a higher degree of political participation and elections.\textsuperscript{141} Interestingly, interregnum periods and transition periods were characterized by either the collapse of the state or reciprocity between characteristics of the new and old regimes.\textsuperscript{142}

Similar to Regan and Norton, Bodea and Elbadawi found that extractable resources, notably diamonds, gemstones, and opiates, were statistically insignificant.\textsuperscript{143} Even when including oil exports, the results were still insignificant. In contrast to what Fearon and Laitin argued, the presence of mountainous terrain was did not affect the likelihood of civil war.

Bodea and Elbadawi found that richer countries do experience less violent contestation of political unrest, while countries with a higher per capita displayed a lower chance of

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 17.
experiencing civil war. While Fearon and Laitin found that anocracies are more prone to civil war than autocracies and democracies since they are weak and incoherent regimes, Bodea and Elbadawi found that democracies are less likely than autocracies to experience civil war. In fact, the researchers did not find all anocracies to be weak political regimes because they have the ability to contain all types of conflict.

The problem with anocracies as being prone to civil war is not because they are an unstable mix of democratic and autocratic features, as Fearon and Laitin assert, but the problem is that they have both institutional openness and political participation channeled through networks rooted in traditional identities. Furthermore, the countries that were most vulnerable to conflict are partial democracies, given that they are open to recruitment of leaders and political participation faces a large risk of conflict.

Fearon and Laitin’s measures were used to capture the degree of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization in societies, in addition to Reynal-Querol’s polarization measures to test the effect of social diversity. As hypothesized, all three types of fractionalization increase the risk of civil war.

\[\text{References}\]

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 18.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 15.
150 Ibid., 20.
Specifically, ethnic fractionalization remains statistically significant when religious and linguistic fractionalization are included. Contrary to Reynal-Querol’s findings, all three aspects of polarization are insignificant, which supports the hypothesis that there is a monotonic relationship between ethnicity, religion, languages, and civil war.\textsuperscript{151}

The reason that ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization are so prone to civil war is because existing lines of identity and contestation will provide motivational and informational advantage to potential rebel leaders to grow a rebel organization.\textsuperscript{152} However, fractionalization is not likely to affect lower levels of violence, such as coups or riots, because they require other types of organizational advantages such as insider police and military information. Thus, that is why lower levels of violence tend to be more sporadic and lack cohesive organization.\textsuperscript{153}

To sum, this model provides an excellent theory for grievance factors, particularly social fractionalization and democracy, as strong determinants for civil war.\textsuperscript{154} This theory suggests that both grievances, in addition to economic factors, are relevant in the analysis of political violence, and the failure of the civil war literature to account for these findings will only stagnate the progression of understanding the causes of civil war.

To conclude this portion of the literature review, there has been ample empirical research conducted particularly over the last twenty years regarding the causes of civil war, yet there is

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 23.
little consensus among scholars. There have been a modicum of studies conducted on the relationship between foreign military intervention and civil war onset, by which the latter is a consequence of the former. However, no study has categorized interventions by type.

Therefore, it is the goal of this thesis to contribute to literature on civil war by determining whether foreign military intervention facilitates civil war onset. If the data reveal that there is causal relationship, then determining which purposes of intervention are most conducive to civil war onset will be important in the further understanding of the causes of civil war onset.

**Types of Foreign Military Interventions**

Why countries intervene militarily into the internal affairs of another is a difficult question to answer, which may explain why comparatively few political scientists have attempted to answer it. Perhaps the lack of explanation is because each intervention is unique and circumstantial. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize “intervention” itself. Nevertheless, there have been researchers who have attempted to tackle this complex topic. Although the studies have tended to be either case specific or relating to the morality of intervention, neither of which are of any interest in this thesis.

Before discussing the different types of international interventions analyzed in this thesis, there needs be a distinction made between “invasion” and “intervention.” An invasion is a military offensive in which combatants from one geopolitical entity aggressively enters territory
controlled by a sovereign nation. Combatants generally invade a nation with the objective of conquering, liberating, or establishing either control or authority over a territory. Consequently, the government of the sovereign nation may be forced to partition part of the country, or it may be forced to relinquish the sovereignty of the country altogether.

An invasion can be a cause of war, it can be a part of a larger strategy to end a war, or it can result in an interstate war, should the target country choose to defend its land. Invasions are typically strategic in both planning and execution.

In this thesis, I define “foreign military intervention” as: “the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country, or a group of countries in concert, across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or actions by troops already stationed in the target state.”

Thus, an invasion tends to be hostile and self-interested for the intervening country in its nature. By contrast, an intervention is a broader term, and can include many different types of motivations for conducting the intervention. Therefore, I will refer to interventions throughout this study, rather than defining them as “invasions.”

This thesis focuses on nine types of interventions, the first which occurs when an

156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
intervener intervenes for the purpose of taking sides in a domestic dispute. The second type of intervention occurs when the intervener attempts to affect domestic policies. The third type of intervention is motivated by protecting a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country. Fourth, a country may decide to intervene in a sovereign country for the purpose of pursuing a Rebel or terrorist forces that happens to be crossing the border of the sovereign country.

A country may also decide to intervene for the purpose of protecting economic or resource interests of self or allies. The most common intervention that occurred in between 1980 and 2000 in The Middle East and North African regions was the strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing ideological goals. The seventh type of intervention is humanitarian with goal of saving civilians. This type is particularly common in the 21st century. The eighth type of intervention occurs when a country is attempting to acquire or retain territory that is in danger of being deprived from the intervener.

Finally, a country often intervenes for the purpose of protecting military property or diplomatic interests. Any other purpose not mentioned above, even if related to foreign military intervention, exceeds the scope of this thesis and will, therefore, not be discussed.

In regards to the first type of intervention, Pearson argues that there are four reasons why a country may intervene into a domestic dispute of another country. First, the domestic conflict in the target state might be of interest to the leader of the intervener state, and result in troops
being dispatched into the target state. Second, domestic conflict may exist in the intervener state and the leader may seek external conflict diversions by sending troops into the target state.

Third, as a consequence of forces independently moving into the target state and causing conflict or disruption, the intervener might be obligated to send in reinforcements. Fourth, if troops in the target country become embroiled in long foreign commitments, the home-front population may grow disunified and rebel. The intervener may dispatch troops to assist either the central government or rebels.

Pearson compared data on foreign military interventions from 1960 to 1967, in addition to domestic conflict during the same period. The results indicated that domestic conflicts were not sufficient conditions for outside foreign military intervention; however, countries with ample domestic conflict were far more likely to be intervened in than those that did not experience conflict.

A large body of literature focuses on third-party interventions in a particular type of domestic dispute, civil wars, whereby the intervener dispatches troops to reinforce either the central government or the rebels. An intervener’s choice to intervene in a civil war depends on

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159 Ibid., 264.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., 268.
163 Ibid., 271.
whether the intervention will allow the goal to be achieved in a short period of time with minimal costs.\textsuperscript{164} Decisions to intervene in a civil war are also affected by dynamic processes within the target state, rather than on fixed country characteristics.\textsuperscript{165}

Interventions in civil wars, regardless of which side the intervener supports, influences the course and nature of the warfare in civil wars.\textsuperscript{166} Foreign assistance by means of intervention alters the balance of military capabilities between the two sides, which, in turn, is responsible for altering the form of warfare that emerges within a particular time and place during the civil war.\textsuperscript{167}

Similar to the first type of intervention, states may also choose to intervene in an attempt to affect domestic policies of the target state. For example, when a central government is absent or dysfunctional, a state may attempt to affect domestic policies by intervening with the goal of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{168} Foreign governments often assume that it can intervene in a state that has either a fragile or failed government by reconstructing the state most favorable to the intervener.\textsuperscript{169}


\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 63.


\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{168} Christopher J. Coyne, “Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy.” \textit{Foreign Policy Analysis} 2, no. 4 (2006), 344.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
However, this assumption often overlooks the possibility of either the intervention failing or implementing a regime change that will result in rebellion by the citizens; thus, sparking civil unrest. This misdiagnoses has led to interventions that have created ineffective policies and perverse outcomes.\textsuperscript{170}

States may also intervene for the purpose of protecting a socio-ethnic faction or a minority group. Fox (2001) suggests that a state will intervene into another to protect an ethnic minority due to having a similar religious affiliation with the citizens of the target state. The ethnic affinity one government has for the citizens of another state is due to emotional ties created by shared ethnic identity that can create a feeling of responsibility for oppressed citizens of the same ethnicity living elsewhere.\textsuperscript{171}

Furthermore, the majority of foreign interveners have a similar religion to those minorities on whose behalf they intervene.\textsuperscript{172} Interestingly, religious conflicts that involve Christian or Muslim minorities have attracted foreign military intervention approximately ten times as often as conflict involving other religious minorities.\textsuperscript{173} These findings strongly indicate that religion is an important influence on the decision to intervene for the purpose of protecting socio-ethnic factions.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{170}Ibid., 356.
\textsuperscript{172}Ibid., 522.
\textsuperscript{173}Ibid., 525.
\textsuperscript{174}Ibid., 526.
Perhaps another reason why a country intervenes in another for the purpose of protecting an ethnic faction or minority is because the international community has a “responsibility to protect.” Under this doctrine, the Genocide Convention has set the precedent for a moral obligation that has driven the world to continue the evolution of universalistic agreements, in addition to the encouragement of government to protect all persons from harm.

In turn, the International Criminal Court has been established to hold persons and governments accountable that do not uphold this morality standard. Therefore, every government in the international community has a moral obligation to intervene in a country should any citizens need protection. More often than not, it is either an ethnic faction or a minority group that needs protection.

A country may intervene in another if the intervening government is actively pursuing a specific group of rebels or terrorists. Azam and Thelen found that the United States, in particular, have intervened in various countries militarily, motivated by pursuing terrorists as opposed to having a geo-strategic interests. In fact, a deployment of U.S. troops reduces the number of terrorist attacks coming from the target country.

In the same vein, Sheehan collected transnational terrorism data from 1993 through 2004

175 Martin L. Cook, “Accountability for International Intervention/Protection Activities.” Criminal Justice Ethics 29, n. 2 (2010), 129.
176 Ibid., 139.
178 Ibid.
and found that the number of United States foreign military interventions had substantially increased in the last twenty years due to the “Global War on Terror.”\textsuperscript{179} In the unfortunate event that a country is a haven for terrorists or is host to a rebellion group being pursued are conditions conducive for foreign military intervention.\textsuperscript{180} Military interventions tend to be more hostile if an intervener intervenes for the purpose of attacking terrorists that are being harbored by the target government.\textsuperscript{181}

Economic or resource interests are another reason why a country might intervene in another. Albosnoz insists that foreign military intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias, in addition to destinations where foreign direct investment is highly profitable.\textsuperscript{182} Absent a motive to protect foreign direct investment, a government is unlikely to intervene.\textsuperscript{183}

However, middle and small powers are unlikely to be in a position to intervene to protect economic interests because most of their economic ties are to large powers.\textsuperscript{184} Contrarily, great powers are much more likely than small and middle powers to intervene in an effort to protect

\textsuperscript{179} Ivan Sascha Sheehan, “Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threat? A Time-Series Intervention Analysis.” \textit{Studies in Conflict & Terrorism} 32 (2009), 743.


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 200.

\textsuperscript{184} Pearson, “Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention,” 441.
economic interests.\textsuperscript{185}

A government’s interest in another’s natural resources can also be a motive for military intervention. For example, dependence on oil for energy, the necessity of water for its citizens, and the lucrative nature of diamonds or gems can be a reason why a country would intervene in another.\textsuperscript{186} By intervening and confiscating the valuable resources, the intervener has the potential to generate both wealth and political power.\textsuperscript{187}

However, the consequence of intervening for economic or resource interest could make civil war more likely to occur because the intervener may be perceived as an economic imperialist.\textsuperscript{188} As a result, the intervention may provoke violent retaliation or may fuel instability that causes citizens to rebel against their government since it would be seen as weak for allowing the intervention to occur.

Countries have been intervening in sovereign nations for the purpose of strategically pursuing ideological goals since the recognition of nation-states. A relatively more recent phenomenon, however, is intervening strictly for the purpose of democratizing a country. If a democratic country were to intervene in a non-democratic country, democracy can have a positive impact on the target state if the intervener were to promote free and fair elections during

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 445.  
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 393.  
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 410.
perhaps an even more recent phenomenon, nuclear arms, is another reason why countries may or may not intervene in others. Tillema argues that since overt military intervention is the most grievous form of punishment, obtaining nuclear weapons may prevent foreigners from invading and, thus, serves as a deterrent. Therefore, if a country has a nuclear weapon, it is less likely to be intervened.

The theory of “nuclear paralysis” suggests that military forces have lost much of its traditional utility for great powers in the nuclear age due to their fear that armed conflict may expand to nuclear war, resulting in catastrophe for everyone. Those countries that do not have nuclear weapons are particularly vulnerable, and great powers may intervene at leisure given that they generally have the resources to do so.

Humanitarian intervention is perhaps the most commonly discussed type of intervention within the literature. Intervening for humanitarian purposes is justified by implementation of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, which is enforced by the United Nations. The doctrine suggests that sovereignty is not an absolute right, and states forfeit aspects of their sovereignty when they fail to protect their citizens from crimes of atrocity. Such crimes include genocide,

190 Tillema, 179.
191 Ibid., 182.
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.\(^{193}\)

A country may also intervene for the purpose of either acquiring or retaining territory. Pearson suggests that an intervention could occur whereby the intervener may use fear of contagion as an excuse to justify the intervention in order to conceal the real interest, which is taking territory while the target state is preoccupied in a domestic dispute.\(^{194}\) Clashes in disputed territories may also facilitate foreign military interventions.\(^{195}\)

No surprisingly, interventions for the purpose of acquiring territory are most likely to occur within 3,000 miles of the intervener’s capital.\(^{196}\) Neighboring states that tend to be unstable by nature are more vulnerable to intervention. Furthermore, interventions against the target state reduce the government’s ability to maintain full control over the entire national territory due to its coercive and administrative capacity being diminished by the intervention.\(^{197}\)

This gives the intervening country not only an advantage in acquire the targeting country’s territory, but also an incentive to do so. Consequently, the target state’s inability to maintain control may provide opportunities for rebel groups to have greater access to state resources and other essential materials.\(^{198}\) The instability caused by the intervention could create

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\(^{193}\) Ibid., 809
\(^{195}\) Pearson, “Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention,” 435.
\(^{196}\) Ibid., 453.
\(^{198}\) Ibid., 352.
conditions that are conducive for civil war onset.

Finally, a county might intervene in the target state to protect diplomatic or military interest, such as military bases, embassies, or diplomats. In rare circumstances, though it has occurred, a government may relocate bases into the country that the government is planning on invading so as to use the protection of the base as an excuse for invading. It is more common, however, for a government to invade a country in an effort to protect military bases that were already physically present in the target country.

Consequences of Foreign Military Interventions

The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ushered in a new basis for the modern international system of independent states. Under the treaty, the principle of sovereignty of nation-states was recognized, in addition to the agreement of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of other state. Despite this fundamental agreement among the international community, however, foreign intervention has become quite prevalent in the Post-WWII world.

The second strand of scholarship in this chapter discusses the general consequences that foreign military intervention has on the target state. Surprisingly, there has been little work done

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on the impact that foreign interventions have on the countries that are intervened. Consequently, the field of international affairs has little understanding of the impacts that military interventions can have on the target states.\textsuperscript{202}

Concluding the section will include the justification as to why certain types of international military interventions matter more than others. For example, some types of interventions, such as those that aim to take sides in a domestic dispute or acquire territory of the target country, have negative consequences on the target country. Meanwhile, other types of interventions, namely those that are conducted for humanitarian purposes, generally have a neutral effect on the target country.

Pickering and Kisangani collected data on military ventures for 106 underdeveloped countries from 1960 to 2002 and found that large scale military interventions do not have a significant impact on governing institutions, the target state’s economy, or the target citizens’ physical quality of life. Contrarily, hostile interventions into non-democratic states can decrease economic growth in addition to negatively impacting governing institutions.\textsuperscript{203}

The reason why there is so much difficulty in determining what, if any, consequences are by intervening into a sovereign state is twofold. First, there is a tremendous number of factors that need to be considered in order to predict the consequences, such as: the purpose of the


\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 375.
intervention, whether the intervenor was a rival or friend of the target state, the amount of troops dispatched, the types of weapons, if any, that are used, the duration of the intervention, and the conditions of the targeting country. There are several other factors that must be considered; the ones listed are simply those that are fundamental to determining the extent of the consequences of the intervention.

The second reason why it is difficult to determine the consequences is because “intervention” cannot be generalized since every foreign military intervention is unique. Determining the consequences of an intervention must be analyzed on a case by case basis, given the uniqueness of every intervention. For example, there is no country that has the same ethnic fractionalization, GDP, or population size as another. Therefore, it would not be possible to explain the consequence that every intervention will have on a target state since no two are exactly alike.

What can be determined, however, is whether external interveners intend to spark civil conflict by intervening in the target state. Generally, if civil war should follow an intervention, it is an unintended consequence of the interveners. Although the intervening country may create conditions that are conducive to civil war onset, it is unlikely that it is intentional.

Depending on the purpose of the intervention, citizens may welcome, be neutral, or may resist the intervention. How the central government and target state’s citizens’ react to the intervention could also be a strong indicator in determining whether civil conflict will ensue.
For example, if a country intervenes for the strategic purpose of democratizing the target state, and provides foreign aid and military assistance that keeps the target county’s government in power, there is a low probability that internal conflict will occur.\textsuperscript{204} By contrast, if a neighboring state takes advantage of the target state’s weak government or military, and intervenes with the purpose of acquiring territory, there is a high probability that internal conflict will ensue the intervention.\textsuperscript{205}

In the former scenario, the citizens’ of the target state would likely benefit from the excess of foreign aid given by the intervener. Thus, such interventions would likely be welcomed and the intervener should not expect resistance. However, in the latter scenario, it is unlikely that the citizens in the target country would welcome such intervention given that their land is being taken from them by a foreign presence. Thus, internal conflict would be expected.

The reason why some international military interventions matter more than others is attributed to the consequences that are expected to follow.\textsuperscript{206} For example, if the unintended consequence of internal conflict within the target country ensues the intervention, then the capacity for extremist groups, the targeting of minorities, and in some cases even genocide, could occur.\textsuperscript{207} If a government had knowledge of such consequences prior to conducting the


\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. at 247.

intervention, the intervener may have decided against it, given the hindrance of genocide on a systemic level.

International military interventions may be direct and hostile in nature, or they may be a more indirect and mild in their methods.\textsuperscript{208} Hostile interventions may reduce the target regime’s ability to maintain full control over the entire national territory by diminishing its coercive and administrative capacity.\textsuperscript{209} Consequently, safe haven possibilities may arise for neighboring rival groups and facilitate the transnational spread of arms and other illicit activities that increase the risk of civil conflict in surrounding countries.\textsuperscript{210}

By contrast, supportive interventions, such as those for humanitarian purposes, are likely to bolster the coercive capacity and enhance the military capacity of the regime.\textsuperscript{211} In turn, the balance of power will shift in favor of the target leadership over key rival groups. Interventions that occur in countries with a collapsed government and civil society are generally neutral in their nature.\textsuperscript{212} Because of the instability that already exists within the target state, such interventions have a neutral effect on the target state.

An international military intervention does not always precipitate negative consequences;

\textsuperscript{208} Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, “Perfecting Tyranny: Foreign Interventions as Experimentation in State Control.” \textit{The Independent Review} 19, no. 2 (2014), 166.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid. at 358.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid. at 354.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. at 355.
rather, it may actually prevent a war from occurring. An intervention for the purpose of taking sides in a domestic dispute could be used as leverage to bolster a particular party’s position, which would force the weaker side to hold out in a prolonged struggle. In turn, the weaker side would likely surrender, given that the adversary has foreign reinforcement at its avail should the conflict escalate.

Knowing the particular type of intervention could assist government leaders in being able to predict the consequences of the intervention, regardless of whether it will have a positive or negative effect on the target state. Therefore, categorizing the types of interventions, as opposed to simply generalizing all types as “intervention,” could be useful by avoiding unfavorable consequences.

Steve Chan, “Loss Aversion and Strategic Opportunism: Third-Party Intervention’s Role in War Instigation By the Weak.” Peace and Change 37, no. 2 (2012), 181.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL INTUITION

While the previous chapter discussed the causes of civil war, this chapter discusses explanations for the causes of civil war theoretically. To do that, political scientists have proposed three theories to help explain why civil wars occur: the primordialist view of civil conflict, the rationalist explanation, and the relative deprivation theory.

The latter two are aligned with the greed vs. grievance theories discussed briefly in the previous chapter. The primordialist view is introduced in this chapter and the rationalist and relative deprivation theories are expounded on because all the three competing theories are the underlying theme of civil war.

The primordialist view focuses on explaining ethnic civil war, whereby ethnicity is an exceptionally strong affiliation that is rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past atrocities that make violence difficult to avoid.\textsuperscript{214} Within an ethnic group, people identify with one another by being bound together through a common heritage that is either real or presumed to be real.\textsuperscript{215} Being a part of an ethnic group satisfies an individual primal need to belong to a group in an anarchic “Hobbesian” world.\textsuperscript{216}

Furthermore, primordialist argue that the deep and long standing differences between

\textsuperscript{214} Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” 8.
\textsuperscript{216} Timothy M. Frye, “Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule.” Journal of International Affairs 25, no. 2 (1992), 607.
ethnic groups causes conflicts in societies that are ethnically diverse.\textsuperscript{217} Because of the deep cultural, biological and psychological nature of ethnic cleavages, conflict is rooted in intense emotional reactions and feelings of mutual threat.\textsuperscript{218} Therefore, when an ethnic groups is threatened in any way or an event occurs that sparks resemblance of a negative historical event, the ethnic group will resort to violence.

There are two stands of thought within the rationalist explanation for causes of civil war. The first is analogous to the “greed” argument presented by Collier and Hoeffler, whereby rebels are modeled as rent-seeking entrepreneurs who are driven more by greed than as victims of either discrimination or victims of a repressive state.\textsuperscript{219} The second strand is offered by Fearon and Laitin, who focus on indicators of state strength as an explanation of rebellion.\textsuperscript{220}

The rational explanation of civil war emphasizes the economic motivations for conflict, void of any psychological or sociological factors. Their economic model assumes that potential recruits make a rational decision to join the rebellion, in which their decision is based on a cost-benefit analysis.\textsuperscript{221}

However, rather than the recruits themselves making the decision to join the rebellion, many rebel armies use coercion in their recruitment process.\textsuperscript{222} Threats and punishments can be

\textsuperscript{217} Horowitz, 311.
\textsuperscript{218} Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War.” \textit{Journal of Economic Literature} 48, no. 1 (2010), 16.
\textsuperscript{219} Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 589.
\textsuperscript{220} James Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”
\textsuperscript{221} Hoeffler, “On the Causes of Civil War,” Chapter 9, 183.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid.
used as selective incentives, whereby it is rational for the rebel leader to use force rather than
reward to solve the lack of membership problem. Such incentives include wages, opportunities to loot, promises of reward after the conflict is over, or physical protection from the opposing side.

The second strand of rationalist explanations is expounded on by Fearon and Laitin. They posit that civil war is likely to occur in states with conditions conducive to rebel organization, such as economic growth, low income per capita, or mountainous terrain. These conditions will either decrease the rebellion’s opportunity cost or decrease the capacity of the state, which will result in the mobilization of an insurgent movement.

Fearon suggests three mechanisms which are compatible with rationalist explanations for civil war. All three are directed towards bargaining failure that results in civil war. Firstly, asymmetric information regarding the strength of the rebellion results in opponents not knowing their relative military capability. For example, if one party is overly optimistic of the chances of success, there may be no peaceful outcome by which both parties recognize as mutually beneficial. Therefore, either side may believe to be stronger than the other due to asymmetric information, and has no reason to refrain from engaging in violence.

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224 Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 16.
225 Fearon and Laitin “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” 85.
227 Ibid.
The second reason for bargaining failure is attributed to the inability of states to arrange a settlement due to commitment problems. Mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms. In other words, neither side is able to come to an agreement to prevent war because the government is likely to renege on the settlement in the aftermath of the war. Therefore, a settlement is not attainable given the inability for either side to fully commit to the terms set forth during negotiations.

The third rationalist explanation offered by Fearon is less compelling than the first two, but is still a possible explanation as to why civil war occurs. States might be unable to attain a peaceful settlement that both parties agree on due to issue indivisibilities. Thus, there are some issues that are so important to either side that compromise is not feasible. Some examples include places of special religious or cultural significance, or whether abortion should be both legal and morally acceptable in a particular state.

Finally, relative deprivation theories argue that civil wars occur when a particular group within the state becomes sufficiently aggrieved and begin mobilizing for political change. This argument is aligned with the grievance-based theories discussed in the previous chapter.

Because of the inequality between either the state and its citizens or between citizens within the state, persons begin rebelling due to frustration. Frustration does not necessarily

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228 Ibid.
229 Ibid., 381-82.
lead to violence, but when it is prolonged and sharply felt, anger results and civil war eventually breaks out. Just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of the individual, relative deprivation produces collective violence by social groups.232

Relative deprivation does not only include income inequality, but also social conditions such as political rights or civil liberties. Feelings of relative deprivation arise when desires become legitimate expectations, yet the desires are blocked by society.

Many scholars have extended Gurr’s work by focusing on the roles of democratic and authoritarian regimes in providing adequate social conditions by which citizens are able to express discontent peacefully. Hegre, in particular, argues that lack of political rights is a strong factor for the onset of civil war.233 Since there has been an increase in political rights granted to citizens in the last two centuries, those citizens whom are still deprived of political rights may begin to grow frustrated. As this sense of unfairness and frustration spreads among communities, persons begin to collectively rebel.

An assertion in the relative deprivation theory is that social and temporal comparisons are an essential component in assessing whether one is deprived. Both of these comparisons can be subsumed within the process of counterfactual comparisons between an individual’s current outcomes and the outcomes that might have been.234

232 Ibid.
Counterfactual comparisons involve mental simulations, wherein individuals imagine what their outcome might have been if circumstances had been different.235 Once individuals begin sharing their feelings or imagery thoughts to others, collective actions beings and those that feel deprived seek what they are deprived of through violent means.

Given that I am analyzing the relationship between foreign military intervention and civil war onset, it is doubtful that primordialist theory will be able to explain why civil war occurs. With the exception of the interventions that occur for the purposes of protecting social factions or minorities, none of the other eight types of interventions would create conditions causing civil war that can be explained by common heritage or ethnic group identity.

In other words, if civil war onset could be explained by the primordialist theory, that would indicate that foreign military interventions have no effect on the target country in terms of creating civil conflict, given that it would be inevitable due to the deep rooted ethnic ties. However, as the data has shown and is discussed in chapter 5, income inequality and regime type do seem to be factors that are conducive to civil war onset.

The rationalist explanation appears to be the most applicable theory for the cause of civil war, particularly Collier and Hoeffler’s economic model. For example, countries with a higher GDP such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco did not experience civil war; whereas countries

235 Ibid., 266.
with a lower GDP such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen experienced several civil wars between the years 1980 and 2000.

Additionally, Fearon and Laitin’s rationalist explanation could also shed light on why civil war occurs. For example, there was economic growth in Lebanon from 1990 to 2000, while the last civil war that occurred after 1980 was in 1989. Perhaps it was economic growth that prevented civil wars from occurring. As a consequence of economic growth, rebels do not have as much opportunity costs as they would if there was a lower GDP with high inequality.

Finally, it is unlikely that the reason civil wars occur can be explained by the theory of relative deprivation. Although several of the civil wars that occurred in the sample size within this study did have a Political Terror value of “4” or “5” (elaborated on in chapter 5), there were several other instances where the Political Terror value was at “5,” yet no civil war occurred.

It is true that political repression does contribute to the likelihood of civil; however, the data in this study does not reflect it being a sole reason why civil war would occur because the R-Squared is only .04 when only civil war onset and political terror are regressed.

Furthermore, a country with a higher GDP is likely have more resources to contribute to its citizens through assistance programs; therefore, economic inequality would not likely be significant enough to spark a rebellion.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the methodology of this thesis. First, the unit of analysis is discussed and justified. Next, I provide a description of the data sets that are used, in addition to justifications for using them. I also list my hypotheses regarding the connection between the independent or control variables and the dependent variable. Finally, I provide a detailed explanation of the formal quantitative method that I used to test the variables’ relationships.

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis consists of countries, all of which are in the Middle Eastern and North African regions. My sample consists of the following 20 countries located in the Middle East and North Africa: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

I did not include countries that border the Caspian Sea, namely Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Tajikistan, because there is, arguably, Russian presence that I did not want to account for in this study. Russian presence would have to be controlled for given that the decisions in each respective country’s government is not entirely its own. Given the complexity of controlling for Russian presence, the countries bordering the Caspian Sea are
omitted from this study. Iran is the only country that does border the Caspian Sea, but I included it in the sample because it shares a border with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; therefore, it is presumed that internal events could affect surrounding countries.

Data were collected for each country from 1980 to 2000. I begin my data analysis in the year 1980 because that is the year following three major events occurred in the Middle East, all of which occurred in 1979: the Islamic Revolution erupted in Iran, consequently overthrowing the Shah and establishing the Islamic Republic, which is still intact today. In the second event, the Russian army invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979 in an effort to maintain the power of the Amin government. Both the first and second events are used as case studies and are, therefore, explored in detail in Chapter six.

Finally, Saddam Hussein formally came to power in Iraq 1979, which reinstated the power of the Sunni Muslims and eventually worsened the tension between Sunnis and Shiites. I selected the year 2000 as the last year I collected data was because I did not want to include data that may be affected by the 2001 U.S. invasion into Afghanistan or the 2003 U.S. invasion into Iraq. The presence of the U.S. affected the Polity score of both Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to causing a decline in the economies. Therefore, accounting for these changes in only two of the 20 countries I analyzed would have created inconsistencies within the overall results.

There are several reasons why I selected the Middle East/North Africans region for this study. Firstly, the Middle East is one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world; therefore,
it is an excellent starting point for researchers who seek to analyze political conflict, or in this case, civil war onset. For example, it is host to the sixty-seven-year-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is one of the most enduring conflict to have ever occurred.  

The region has also hosted the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq, which had numerous international participants. Another example is the interstate war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988, which destabilized the region for nearly a decade and resulted in devastation for both country participants.

The region is also near other long-term conflict zones, including the Horn of Africa, the Caucasus, and the Sudan. Because of the internal and regional instabilities, close ties between the Middle Eastern and arms-producing governments. Thus, only encouraging the conflict within the region.

Perhaps this is why there are so many foreign military interventions by countries within the Middle East. See table 2 for the quantity of interventions by regions. When unstable countries dispatch troops to pursue military goals, the target country is generally in the same region. The table below shows the number of foreign military interventions both before and after the Cold War.

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237 Ibid.

Table 2. Interventions by Region, 1946-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Per Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cold War (N=690)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Cold War (N=425)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown, the majority of military interventions that occurred before the end of the Cold War did so in the Middle East. Although that number drops to 48 after the Cold War, it is still a substantial number of interventions. Perhaps the number decreased because of the Gulf War or the U.S. invasions into Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003.

Aside from the altruistic purposes of intervention, the Middle East/North African region is attractive to foreigners who seek power. Because of the quantity of interventions that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa, in addition to the various purposes of these interventions, this region is ideal for this research.

Second, because of the continuous conflict in the region, first world countries, either independently or through the United Nations, have spent decades sending troops that attempt to calm down the contentious areas and protect civilians.

Third, the Middle East lags behind in economic, social, and political development. Therefore, this stagnation could be reason why there is so much conflict in the region. It would be exceedingly unproductive for researchers to use first-world countries, which have experienced either very little or no civil wars at all, as their samples for studying causes of internal conflict. Additionally, the Middle East is characterized by authoritarian regimes, oil-dependent economies, and ethnic diversity, all of which have been linked to causes of civil war.

Finally, all of the countries in the sample are dominated by Islam, which encompasses the

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239 Ibid., 142.
240 Ibid.
continuous contention between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. There are several scholars who are either advocates or opponents of the theory that ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization are conducive to civil war onset. Because the Middle East and North Africa are highly fractionalized in all three respects, it is the quintessential region to test this theory.

**Data**

This thesis tests nine independent variables, seven control variables, and consists of one binary dependent variable. The nine independent variables all derive from the International Military Intervention (IMI) data set and are the types of intervention. Although the interventions are more for a purpose or motivation for the intervention itself, I refer to them as “types” for simplicity.

Thus, the nine types of interventions are: (1) take sides in a domestic dispute; (2) attempt to affect domestic policies; (3) protect a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country; (4) pursue a rebel terrorist forces across the border; (5) attempting to protect economic or resource interests of self or others; (6) strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing ideological goals; (7) humanitarian purposes with the goal of saving civilians; (8) attempt to acquire or retain territory; and, (9) protect military property or diplomatic interests.

Following the order above, I have coded these nine independent variables as follows: domestic; policy; social, pursuit; economic; strategic; human; territorial; and, diplomatic. All of
these variables were discussed in detail in chapter two. All nine independent variables are used as dummy variables, with “0” indicating a foreign military intervention had not occurred, and “1” indicating that the specific country did experience a foreign military intervention.

When creating my dataset, I listed each of the twenty countries in column A, and listed each year from 1980 to 2000 in column B for each country. Columns C-K represents the nine types of interventions, in which each year for each country has either a “0” or a “1.”

The IMI data set covers the period from 1946 to 2005, by which I am only collecting data for the years 1980 to 2000. The data set includes 667 cases of military interventions that have occurred across international boundaries by regular armed forces of independent states in the regions of Europe, the Americas (including the Caribbean), Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East/North Africa.241

Note that data for the years 1946 to 1988 were first collected by Fredrick Pearson and Robert Baumann (1993). Data from the years 1989 to 2005 were collected by Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering (2008). The update of the IMI data set extended from the original data set from 1988 and to ensure consistency across the entire 1946 to 2005 time span, all coding and operationalizations are the same.242

The researchers have defined military intervention operationally as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.” Transport of troops, regardless of where the troops are sent from, into a fighting zone is considered intervention.

The data include forceful interventions, which refers to the use of troops in some form of deterrent or forceful role; the interventions are not referring to troops reinstating infrastructure or acting as administrators for medical relief programs, even if the latter may influence the course of battle.

Overall, the IMI data set catalogs any purposeful dispatch of national troops into another sovereign country, regardless of whether it is neutral, or supports or opposes the target government. The reason that I used this data set, as opposed to others that consist of foreign military interventions, is because it categorizes the motives behind the state uses of military force. This data set is one of very few intrastate conflict data sets that have attempted to do so.

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244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., 5.
The researchers have used dummy variables that indicate whether troops were dispatched to pursue the motive for each of the nine types of intervention.

Because of the increase in the occurrence of civil wars since the end of WWII, it is becoming increasingly important to study intrastate conflict. There is already ample literature discussing the causes of civil wars; however, there is little literature on the motivations of countries to intervene. These data, paired with the Correlates of War data set (hereafter COW), could assist researchers in determining whether a specific motivation of intervention would facilitate civil war in the target country.

Kisangani and Pickering (2009) acknowledged this use when they stated: “Researchers can focus on specific types of motivating issues to add new knowledge to our understanding of forceful state activity, or they can group them into broader categories similar to Regan’s (2002) analysis of economic and military intervention into civil wars.”248

Next, I turn to the control variables. Each will be discussed separately, as there are different data sets that must be described in detail. The first control variable is “gross domestic product” (GDP). As it defined by the World Bank, GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.249

As explained in the literature review, countries experiencing economic inequality

(relative to other countries, not individuals) and poverty have been argued to be causes of civil war. Collier and Hoeffler are among those who vehemently argue that factors that increase the domestic military or financial viability of rebellion correlate with conflict; more so than factors leading to grievances such as lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious fractionalization.\textsuperscript{250}

In regards to the data, all monetary figures are in U.S. dollars and were converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. The following data were missing from the World Bank data set: Afghanistan: 1982 to 2000; Iraq: 1980 to 2000; Iran: 1991 and 1992; Lebanon: 1980 to 1987; Libya: 1980 to 1989; and, Yemen: 1980 to 1989.

Therefore, for purposes of completeness, I gathered all data that was missing from the Statistical Division from the United Nations. The United Nations also converted the current and constant price series into U.S. Dollars by applying the corresponding market exchange rates as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is highly doubtful that the exchange rate reported to the IMF would skew the GDP figure.\textsuperscript{251}

Since STATA converts the GDP figures into scientific notation, it may be difficult to interpret the logit regression results. Therefore, I divided each GDP figure by one million. Consequently, the place values for the decimal numbers are represented in the tens, ones, and tenths places. These place values are translated into trillion, billion, and million, respectively.

\textsuperscript{250} Collier and Hoeffler, 587-9.

The data for the second and third control variables, Polity and Democratic scores, were derived from the Polity IV data set. Polity IV consists of data on political regime characteristics and transitions that have been collected from the year 1800 to 2013.252 The data set itself is an annual, cross-national time-series and polity-case format that codes democratic and autocratic patterns of authority in all independent countries with a population greater than 500,000 in 2013.253

The Polity Score captures a country’s regime authority, which is referring to qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. The term “Polity” itself is defined as a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government.”254 The score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).255 To obtain the Polity score, the researchers subtracted the “autocratic” score from the “democratic” score.

Afghanistan is the only country that is missing both Polity and Democratic scores; the years missing are: 1980 to 1988 and 1993 to 1995. Scores are missing for 1980 to 1988 because the government was interrupted from a foreign presence.256 Scores are missing from the years 1993 to 1995 because there was no government; the country was in anarchy.257

253 Ibid., 4.
254 Ibid., 1.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid., 17.
The “Democratic” score was obtained by analyzing three different elements: first, “the presence of the institutions and procedures though which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders.” Second, the existence and extent of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Finally, the civil liberties guaranteed by the government in addition to acts of political participation. Means of these democratic principles also include the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, and freedom of the press. The “Democratic” score ranges from zero to ten; the closer the score is to zero, the less democratic a country is.

The purpose of testing these two control variables is to determine whether regime type effects civil war onset. The majority of scholars who are mentioned in the literature review have either been advocates or opponents of the hypothesis that the more autocratic a government is, the more prone that country is to civil war. It will be interesting to determine whether, and to what extent, this argument has any merit. Additionally, it will be interesting to know whether there is any association between how democratic a county is affects the likelihood of civil war.

The ethnic fractionalization data compiled by Alberto Alesina (2003) and associates will be used for the fourth, fifth, and sixth control variables. The data set measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in various countries. It also takes into account

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257 Ibid.
258 Ibid., 14.
259 Ibid.
racial characteristics (ethnicity) while examining the effects of ethnic fragmentation on both economic growth and the quality of institutions and policy.\textsuperscript{260} The dataset covers 190 countries and territories.

Alesina, et al. gathered their data from Encyclopaedia Britannica, CIA’s World Factbook, Levinson’s Ethnic Groups Worldwide, Minority Rights Groups International’s World Directory of Minorities, and Mozaffar & Scarritt.\textsuperscript{261} A score of “1” implies a highly heterogeneous country; whereas a score of “0” refers to a perfectly homogeneous country.\textsuperscript{262}

The only problem with using Alesina’s data is that it is not a time series data set. Rather, the data set is cross-sectional, whereby the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization scores are given for one specific year per country.

The only country that was missing ethnicity data was Yemen, and I supplemented the missing score with Fearon’s fractionalization data. I did so because he also included data on linguistic and religious fractionalization per country. There were two other data set that I found which used a time series for each of the three fractionalization scores; however, the data set lacked both reliability and validity because the researchers only relied on the CIA’s World Factbook to obtain the data. This is problematic because relying on one source, without comparing results to other sources, may yield inaccurate results. Therefore, Alesina’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{260} Alesina et al., 157.
\item \textsuperscript{261} Ibid., 189.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
fractionalization data is the most credible of the three.

To account for the missing data for nineteen of the years (as only one was reported by Alesina), I replicated each of the three fractionalization scores for all twenty years. For example, in 1995 Afghanistan had an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.7693, a linguistic fractionalization score of 0.6141, and a religious fractionalization score of 0.2717.

Therefore, for all of the years between 1980 to 1994, and 1996 to 2000, I used these same scores. It is unlikely that a country’s fractionalization would alter substantially; therefore, this method is justified. Appendix C is of a chart that reflects each of the three fractionalization scores that Alesina entered for the actual year, per country.

The reason I control for ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization is because fractionalization in general, being a potential cause of civil war, is perhaps one of the most contentious arguments within the literature. The empirical research conducted by Fearon and Laitin (2003) have demonstrated that there is no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset.\textsuperscript{263} Meanwhile other scholars have reported empirical results that are favorable to the argument of fractionalization being a strong indicator of civil war onset.\textsuperscript{264}

I am also using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) to measure political repression, the seventh control variable. The scale ranges from 1 to 5; “1” indicates no political repression and “5” indicates severe political repression whereby no citizens have the right to promote

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{263} Fearon and Laitin, 84.
\textsuperscript{264} Regan and Norton, 328.
\end{footnotesize}
ideological views; rather, only those construed by the leader are promoted.265

The following is a detailed breakdown of the description for each score: a score of “1” reflects countries that are under a secure rule of law, whereby citizens are neither imprisoned for their ideological views nor tortured for any purposes.266 A “2” reflects a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity in addition to few citizens being tortured or beaten under exceptional circumstances.

A score of “3” indicates extensive political imprisonment whereby citizens or political participants are executed. Additionally, government officials detain persons without trial. With a score of “4,” a country’s civil and political rights violations have expanded to a large number of the population; murders, disappearances, and torture are common. Finally, a score of “5” reflects terror that has expanded to the whole population and leaders place no limits on the means with which they pursue their ideological goals.267

The reason I am testing both Polity IV and PTS is because Polity IV not only measures how democratic a country is, but it also measures regime type. PTS, however, measures repression in the context of political and civil rights violations.

Data for the PTS were collected by data from the Amnesty International and the State Department. However, I rely on score reported by the State Department since is provides more

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266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
data than Amnesty International collected. Fortunately, the researchers created the data set as a time-series. The following are missing data from the PTS: Lebanon, from year 1980 to 1988; Yemen, years 1985, 1986, and 1988. The researchers who gathered the PTS data did not indicate why data were missing from Lebanon and Yemen for those particular years stated above.

The dependent variable is civil war, and I use the COW Intra-state War data set (2014). Because of the detailed description of the operationalization of civil war that was given in Chapter Two, I will not elaborate on criteria for determining an armed conflict is a civil war. Similarly, because of the numerous variables involved in this data set, I will only elaborate on the variables that are used in this study.

Generally, the COW Project is an academic study of the history of warfare and was founded by David Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. The project is currently in its fourth version, which includes data collected from 1816 to 2010, constituting a total of 334 intra-state wars. Although the COW Project has multiple data sets, only the Intrastate War data set is used in this thesis. “Intrastate war” is defined as a war that predominately takes place within the recognized territory of a state.268

Within the COW typology of war, intra-state wars have been subdivided into three general types, which are based up on the status of the combatants: (1) civil wars that involve the government of the state against a non-state entity; (2) regional internal wars that involve the

268 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State War V.4.0. Definitions and Variables;” 1.
government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity; and, (3) inter-communal wars that involve combat between two or more non-state entities within the state. Civil wars are then subdivided further into two types: those attempting to take control of the central government, and those disputing local issues.

It is important to note that intra-state wars are classified as “internationalized” when one or more outside state intervenes in the war. The war will remain “internationalized” as long as the intervenor does not participate in the bulk of the fighting. If the intervenor does take over the bulk of the fighting, then the war will cease to be labeled as an intra-state war and it will, thus, be transformed into a different classification. This is an important detail for this study, since the focus is not only on intrastate wars, but also foreign military intervention. Similar to the coding of the IMI data, the variable “civil war” is also a dummy, whereby “0” indicated no civil war occurred and “1” indicating that one had occurred.

Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and variable type for all 17 variables that are used in this study. The purpose of the table is to compare the variables with one another in an attempt to provide the reader with a clear understanding of how each variable is measured.

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269 Ibid., 2.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid. at 4.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Std.Dev.</th>
<th>Type</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>Independent / Binary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
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<td>.067</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>.250</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Independent / Binary</td>
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<td>Pursuit</td>
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<td>Economic</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicfract</td>
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<td>.039</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.236</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.008</td>
<td>.746</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>Control / Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religfract</td>
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<td>.002</td>
<td>.789</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>Control / Continuous</td>
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<td>Politerr</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>Control / Ordinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>Dependent / Binary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypotheses

Overall, I hypothesize that the type of the intervention strongly effects whether civil war will occur within the intervened state. Civil war onset is an unintended consequence of the intervener for those purposes that are directed towards self-interest, as opposed to helping citizens in the intervened state. Hypotheses one through nine are the key hypotheses; whereas, hypotheses ten through sixteen are the hypotheses relating to the control variables. Note that the hypotheses are pertinent to all regression results: the logit regression models accounting for and omitting the lagged independent variables, in addition to the marginal post-estimations.

H1: An intervention for the purpose of resolving a domestic dispute, which is occurring within the target state, will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

H2: An intervention for the purpose of affecting domestic policies of the target country will likely increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

H3: An intervention for the purpose of protecting a socio-ethnic faction or minority will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

H4: An intervention for the purpose of pursing rebel terrorist forces across the border will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

H5: An intervention for the purpose of protecting the economic interests of the intervening country will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

H6: An intervention for the purpose of strategically pursuing ideological goals will increase the
likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H7**: An intervention for humanitarian purposes will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H8**: An intervention for the purpose of acquiring or retaining territory will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H9**: An intervention for the purpose of protecting military property or diplomatic interests will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H10**: A high Gross Domestic Product will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H11**: An autocratic government of a country will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H12**: A democratic government of a country is will decrease the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H13**: High ethnic fractionalization within a country is will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H14**: High linguistic fractionalization within a country will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**H15**: High religious fractionalization within a country is will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.
**H16:** High political terror that a government enforces on its citizens will increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

**Pooled Analysis**

The data in this study are organized with a pooled time series cross sectional analysis, which consists of the combination of time series and cross-sectional data. This approach provides the researcher with an efficient method of analysis and improved estimates of the variables being studied.\(^{272}\) In essence, time series (regular temporal observations of a unit of analysis) are combined with cross-sections (observations on a unit of analysis at a single time) to form one data set.\(^{273}\)

The main advantage with combining cross sections with time series is that the researcher is able to capture variations across different units in space, as well as variation that emerge over time when one unit of analysis.\(^{274}\) This approach is ideal for this study because I am analyzing the effect that different types of interventions have on civil war onset. My data are limited to the Middle Eastern / North African region; therefore, it is necessary to include the comparative component. Also, time series analysis is essential since I am analyzing the effect that an intervention has on the target country, namely, civil war onset.

For example, if a country intervenes in another in 1980, I need to record whether a civil

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\(^{273}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{274}\) Ibid. at 7.
war has occurred in any of the years after 1980. Of course, there must be an endpoint at which an intervention has an influence on the target country’s stability, which is why I lagged the independent variables (discussed in the next chapter). Nevertheless, both comparative data and time series are necessary to test my variables. Therefore, I constructed a panel data set; whereby all string variables (namely the country year) are converted to longitudinal data.

Aside from the advantage of creating a pooled cross sectional time series (PCTS) design mentioned above, there are three additional advantages to using the PCTS. First, both time series and cross-sectional analyses, independently, limit the sample size that can be used in either data set. Limiting the number of spatial units and available data over time may violate basic assumptions of standard statistical regression analysis, namely spatial autocorrelation.

The small sample shows an imbalance between the explanatory variables. However, because of the “country-year” observations in pooled PCTS designs, researchers are able to test the impact of a large number of predictors of the change in the dependent variable within the framework of multivariate analysis.

Second, pooled PCTS models permit the inquiry into theoretically important variables that often escape analytical notice within simple cross-sectional or time-series studies. In other

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276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
words, regression analysis in pooled PCTS data relies upon higher spread of data in respect to each study independently.

Third, using pooled PCTS allows the researcher to capture the variation of the variables that emerge through time and space simultaneously.\textsuperscript{279} For example, instead of testing a time series model for only one country using time series data or testing a cross-section model for multiple countries at one point in time, the PCTS model allows testing for many countries through whatever time period the researcher chooses.

However, despite these advantages, PCTS may encounter several problems.\textsuperscript{280} First, regression error term tend to not be independent across periods; rather, they might be serially correlated in that errors in the country data at a specific period of time are correlated with errors in that country at a prior time period.\textsuperscript{281} This is connected to the second implication in that such errors in country i at time t are correlated with errors also in country j at time t. This inadvertently may create errors for other countries when, independently, there should be none.

The third complication is regarding heteroskedastic errors, such that the error term may have differing variances across ranges or subsets of nations.\textsuperscript{282} PCTS models are particularly vulnerable to those errors because the scale of the predicted dependent variable may

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., 174.
differ between countries over different periods of time.

In the same vein, errors tend to conceal unit and period effects because heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation are functions of model misspecification (referring to when an independent variable’s value is correlated with the error term). The misspecification, which is problematic for pooled data, is the assumption of homogeneity of the independent variables across units and time periods. Therefore, if researchers assume that the units and time periods are homogeneous, as the OLS estimation requires, and they are not, then the least squares estimators will be biased by not accounting for the possibility of heterogeneity existing among the variables. Consequently, the least square estimators will unlikely be a good predictor of the dependent variable for cross-sectional units and the time periods, and the results may become heteroskedastic.

Finally, since the processes linking dependent and independent variables tend to vary across subsets of nations or periods, errors tend to reflect some varying causal heterogeneity across space, time, or both. Similar to the previously discussed complication, misspecification could occur and the estimated constant-coefficient models will not accurately capture the causal heterogeneity across time and space. The next chapter discusses how these complications are

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284 Podesta, 11.
285 Ibid.
286 Hicks, 172.
287 Podesta, 12.
addressed and rectified to produce accurate results.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I will first discuss and justify the regression model that I have specified and estimated, in addition to a detailed discussion of the results of the regression analysis. The analysis section will also address whether any of the hypotheses listed in Chapter Four were statistically supported. The second section will discuss the limitations of this study, while the last section will address recommendations for future research pertinent to this particular area of study.

Analysis

The software program that I used to conduct my data analysis was STATA. Not only am I familiar with STATA, but it is also appropriate to use for analyzing longitudinal data. To specify and estimate the regression, I used a cross-sectional time-series regression with autoregressive disturbances.²⁸⁸

The following is the standard formula for conducting nonlinear regression analysis: \( y = f(\beta, x) + \epsilon \).²⁸⁹ In the formula, “\( Y \)” reflects the dependent variable, while “\( f \)” represents the functional form.²⁹⁰ “\( \beta \)” represents the parameters that are to be estimated, and “\( X \)” refer to the predictor variables, all of which are the independent and controlled variables. Finally, the “\( \epsilon \)”

²⁸⁸ StataCorp. 2011. *Stata Statistical Software: Release 12*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
²⁹⁰ Ibid. at 414.
represents the random error, which is assumed to be normally distributed, in addition to being independent of the errors for other observations.\footnote{Ibid.}

The nonlinear regression formula in the context of this study is as follows:

\begin{equation}
\text{y} = \text{civil war (std. error/t-value/pr}>|t| \cdot \text{ i.domestic i.policy i.social i.pursuit i.economic i.strategic i.human i.territory i.diplomatic gdp polity democracy ethnicfrac lingfrac religfrac politer)} + \text{random error.}
\end{equation}

I instructed to STATA that my data set was longitudinal; whereby, the panel is “country” and the time is “year.” Doing so was necessary so that STATA would produce results in the context of analyzing the data set as a PCTS model, as previously discussed in Chapter Four.

Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous dependent variables. The predicted values of the regression are to be interpreted as predicted probabilities and the coefficients interpreted as effects.\footnote{Leanne C. Powner. \textit{Empirical Research and Writing: A Political Science Student’s Practical Guide}. Sage Publications. (2015), at 102.} Unlike the coefficients in other regression models, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or General Least Squares (GLS), the coefficients in logit do not have intrinsic substantive interpretation attached to them.\footnote{Empirical Reasoning Lab. 2014. “More Advanced Regression Models.” March 12, 2015. https://erl.barnard.edu/stata/more-advanced-regression-models} Therefore, the marginal effects for the binary variables must be calculated using a post-estimation approach to interpret the coefficient. The marginal effect is an approximation of how much the dependent variable is expected to
increase or decrease for one unit change in an explanatory variable controlling for other independent variables. Only key marginal effects that are statistically significant will be discussed following the discussion of the regression analyses.

Because the functional form is non-linear, the interpretations of the individual coefficients do not have the same linear relationship. Therefore, to accurately interpret the model in terms of determining what assertions the independent variables and control variables may have on the dependent variable, it is imperative to calculate the marginal effect of each binary variable while other the other variables are held at their means. Fortunately, STATA has a command that computes the marginal effects in addition to proving the standard error, z-score, and p-value for each variable.

When deciding whether a researcher should use fixed or random effects for the regression analysis, the selection of a computational model should be based on the expectation about whether the study shares a common effect size, in addition to the goal in performing the analysis. It makes theoretical sense to use the fixed-effect model if two conditions are met. First, if the researcher believes that all the cases included in the analysis are functionally identical. Second, if the researcher’s goal is to compute the common effect size for the

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identified population, and not to generalize to other populations.\footnote{Ibid.} In this study, random effects are used.

By contrast, random effects should be used when the researcher is accumulating data from a correlation of cases that had been performed by researchers operating independently because it would be unlikely that all of the studies were functionally equivalent, given that all were conducted independently.\footnote{Ibid. at 214.}

To decide between fixed or random effects, I conducted a Hausman test, whereby if the test statistic is not statistically significant, then the preferred model is random effects. Alternatively, if the null hypothesis was significant, then the preferred model is fixed effects. The Hausman test tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the repressors, whereby the null hypothesis indicates that they are not.\footnote{Ibid.} After performing the Hausman test, the null hypothesis was not significant; therefore, I used random effects.

In regards to how the standard errors for the regression coefficients were calculated, I used the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators (VCE). Additionally, I used the observed information matrix (OIM), which is the matrix of second derivative, usually of the log-likelihood function.\footnote{Oscar Torres-Reyna, \textit{Data and Statistical Services: Panel Data Analysis Fixed and Random Effects Using STATA} (v.4.2). Princeton University (2007), 29.} The OIM estimator of the VCE is based on asymptotic maximum-likelihood
The VCE obtained in this way is valid if the errors are independent and identically distributed normal, which in this case they are because the explanatory variables are not dependent on one another. Although the estimated VCE is known to be reasonably robust to violations of the normality assumption, at least as long as the distribution is symmetric and normal-like, it will then produce accurate standard errors. Clustering is also important since I am using panel data, and because I had already indicated to STATA that my data is longitudinal prior to estimating any regressions, STATA automatically accounts for clustering based on a systematic program tool.

I estimated two regressions: the first without lagging the independent variables and the second lagging the independent variables by one year. The reason I chose to lag the types of interventions by one year in the second regression is because an international military intervention may take time to influence the stability of the targeted country.

For example, if country x intervenes in target country y in 1985 (regardless of the type of intervention), it may be months before the effects of the foreign presence are felt. Civil war could break out a year after the intervention has occurred, and it still is linked to the intervention. Therefore, I lag all independent variables by one year to account for this possibility.

As table 4 indicates, seven of the nine types of military interventions were statistically

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302 Ibid.
significant without lagging the independent variables. In the logit model, the coefficient for interventions for purposes of taking sides in a domestic dispute has a negative relationship with civil war onset. It is also statistically significant. This is theoretically expected because such interventions are generally more hostile because it is unlikely that the adverse party will welcome the intervention; thus, they are more likely to create civil unrest.
Table 4. Logit Regression Analysis of the Onset of Civil Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (Civil War)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Civil War – Lagged Interventions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Intervention</td>
<td>-1.14 (11.3)</td>
<td>-1.16 (9.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Intervention</td>
<td>-7.98 (9.61)</td>
<td>3.17 (9.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Intervention</td>
<td>-1.51 (15.1)</td>
<td>2.01 (1.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit Intervention</td>
<td>2.91 (1.49)**</td>
<td>-3.16 (3.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Intervention</td>
<td>.437 (10.2)</td>
<td>2.16 (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Intervention</td>
<td>4.26 (11.2)</td>
<td>-5.85 (10.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>4.89 (16.0)</td>
<td>-7.02 (1.98)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Intervention</td>
<td>35.7 (6.48)</td>
<td>-16.3 (9.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic / Military Intervention</td>
<td>4.40 (14.9)</td>
<td>2.36 (7.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-.117 (.120)</td>
<td>-.563 (.279)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-1.33 (1.01)</td>
<td>.050 (.324)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.051 (.057)</td>
<td>-.236 (.869)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>3.16 (3.09)</td>
<td>-.562 (1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>-9.72 (3.10)**</td>
<td>-2.51 (2.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>4.45 (6.56)</td>
<td>-1.71 (2.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>3.73 (1.34)*</td>
<td>1.72 (.571)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.05 (5.33)</td>
<td>-7.59 (3.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
p<.01*, p<.05**, p<.001*** indicates significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
However, when the independent variables are lagged by one year, domestic intervention is no longer statistically significant and actually is negatively associated with civil war. Perhaps it is because tensions among both parties are high when the intervention first occurs, then begins to dissipate once the intervening presence has been in the target country for a substantial amount of time. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the regression model indicating the lagged variables since domestic intervention is not statistically significant. However, the null hypothesis is rejected for the logit regression model.

Intervention for the purposes of affecting the target country’s policies has a negative relationship with civil war onset in the logit model. The variable was not statistically significant. It may seem counterintuitive that the likelihood of civil war decreases when a country intervenes to affect policies; however, perhaps the foreign intervention prevented the target country from developing a civil war due to the very policies that were affected by the intervening country.

Another reason civil war does not occur may be because governments of the target country do not know that the motive is such. For example, the IMI data set, understandably, does not include data on what the target country’s government may have believed the purpose of the intervention to have been. Therefore, the government of the target country could simply be ignorant of what the real motive was, thus, being more welcoming to the intervention as opposed to resisting it.

When the types of interventions are lagged by a year, the policy intervention variable is
not statistically significant in the logit model. Also, the relationship with civil war onset is positive. Perhaps either government officials or the rebels discovered the intervener’s policy-changing motive; as a result, hostilities increased causing civil war to break out. In contrast to the domestic intervention hypothesis, the policy intervention null hypothesis is rejected for the regression model lagging the independent variables. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected for the logit regression model.

An intervention for the purpose of social protection produced the expected regression results: the variable is negatively associated with civil war onset, but it is not statistically significant in the logit regression model. It is expected that an intervention for the purpose of protecting a particular social groups would not spark a civil war because such interventions are generally non-hostile. Thus, there would be little incentive for rebels to react negatively to the presence of the intervenors.

However, when types of interventions are lagged one year, the social intervention variable is no longer statistically significant, and is positively associated with civil war onset. When a country intervenes to protect a particular social group (for example, an ethnic group or minority), civil war does not occur within the same year of the intervention and there is no statistically significant relationship with civil war onset. Perhaps one year after the protection, other groups begin to feel aggrieved because one group is being favored over another. Over time, those not benefiting from the protection may begin to organize and attempt to either oust
the interveners or those being protected. Thus, civil war ensues. The null hypothesis is rejected for the regression model without the lagged independent variable. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged variables.

This finding of the social protection intervention variable as having a positive relationship with civil war is at the core of the grievance–based argument that Taydas (2011), and Regan and Norton (2005), argued. Similarly, the finding is in line with Regan and Norton’s (2005) argument that ethnic or religious hatred could form grievances that lead to civil war. Although the social protection intervention variable is not specific to minority or ethnic groups, such groups are included in the social variable within the IMI’s data set. The findings here are contrary to Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) argument that citizens’ grievances were not enough to increase the likelihood of civil war onset.

Intervention for the purpose of pursuing rebel terrorist forces across the border has a positive relationship with civil war onset and it is highly statistically significant in the logit regression model. This can be explained by the fact that foreigners are generally unwelcome guests in the context of intervening without the permission of the target country’s government. Thus, to intervene in a sovereign country to catch rebels who may not even be a threat to the host country, may cause citizens to resist the interveners and lash out in violence of their presence.

Another possible theoretical explanation is that perhaps the rebels or terrorist groups who are being chased across the border have connections to citizens of the target country. Thus, when an intervening country attempts to catch the rebels, those related citizens are then called on
for reinforcement, which creates a “side-taking” atmosphere whereby rebel supporters begin arming against non-rebels. As a result, civil war breaks out.

The pursuit intervention variable is no longer significant in the logit model when the independent variables are lagged by one year, and the relationship with civil war changes to negative. A possible explanation as to why the pursuit intervention variable changes to negative a year after the intervention may be because the intervening force caught the rebels or terrorist group(s) before the violation could escalate.

Another possibility is that the mission to pursue the individuals may have been covert; thus, the intervener captured the target and left the target country before anyone discovered either the troops or the purpose of being there. The null hypothesis is rejected for both model forms.

Interventions for the purpose of protecting economic or resource interests of the intervener, as well as interventions protecting military property or diplomatic interests, were statistically significant in the regression without lagging the variables. Both economic and diplomatic intervention variables have a positive relationship with civil war onset. Although the relationships remain positive with civil war onset after lagging the independent variables by one year, the economic and diplomatic variables are no longer statistically significant.

These results are theoretically sound because a foreigner invading to protect its economic interest would likely facilitate an immediate reaction, given that the economy affects large
numbers of citizens living in the target country. Therefore, when a foreign presence invades for the purpose of protecting its economic interest, it could, in turn, tarnish the economy and negatively impact the society as a whole. This potential harm to the economy may likely provoke a volatile and immediate response, whereby civil unrest would break out. The null hypothesis is rejected in the regression model without lagging the independent variables; however, it is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged variables.

In the same vein, a country intervening to protect its diplomatic interests or military property may cause rebels, particularly, to organize and fight for the military equipment. In fact, the equipment could have been looted and, when foreign troops enter the country to reclaim its property, rebels would raise arms to protect it. Similar to the economic intervention hypothesis, the null is rejected for the diplomatic intervention hypothesis in the regression model without the lagged independent variables; however, it is not rejected in the regression model including the lagged independent variables.

Strategic intervention with the goal of stability, regional power balances, or pursuing ideological goals produced the most counter-intuitive results. The independent variable is highly statistically significant, and has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both models. This is surprising given that it was the second-most frequently occurring type of intervention out of the nine that were tested, as shown in table 5. Despite there being numerous strategic interventions, the data shows that there is a negative relationship with civil war onset.
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis is rejected in both regression models.
Table 5. Relative Sum of International Military Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Intervention</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Intervention</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Intervention</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit Intervention</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Intervention</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Intervention</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Intervention</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic / Military Intervention</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 0 minimum; 1 maximum
One explanation for the negative association with civil war could be that the government of the target country simply did not know that the intervener had the motivation to strategically sending troops as a means of pursing its ideological goals, similar to the reasoning for the social policy intervention mentioned above. Another explanation could be that the intervener only invaded countries that it knew would create the least resistance or chaos; thus, civil war would not likely follow the intervention. For example, if a country seeks to gain regional influence, it could intervene into a country that it has a good relationship with; therefore, intervening into the target country would be more accepting of its citizens. To test these theories, a larger sample size is needed, which is a limitation in this study and is addressed in the next section.

The humanitarian intervention coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in the logit mode. Contrary to what was expected, the variable has a positive relationship with civil war onset. Interestingly, the relationship with civil war onset changes to negative when the types of interventions are all lagged by one year. The humanitarian intervention coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in the regression model including the lagged independent variables.

Generally, humanitarian missions do not create internal conflict within the target country because most are seen as peacekeeping missions.303 Perhaps, the Middle Eastern / North African region is unique in this respect, given that the relationship with civil war is positive in the logit model. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the logit estimation, but it is rejected when lagging the independent variables by one year.

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303 Pencey, 578.
The last independent variable to be discussed, intervention for the purpose of attempting to acquire or retain territory, produced similar results as the humanitarian intervention variable mentioned above. Territorial intervention is not statistically significant and the data reveal a positive relationship with civil war onset. However, lagging the independent variables by one year changes the relationship with civil war onset from positive to negative. The null hypothesis is not rejected for both models given that the variable is not statistically significant.

A potential reason why there may be a positive relationship in the same year as the intervention as opposed to a negative one a year later may be because of the occurrence of military interventions that have occurred by neighboring countries, given the geographic convenience. Should the target country be experiencing internal conflict, even at a minimal level, countries geographically proximate to the target country may take advantage of the target country’s vulnerability and intervene for the purpose of acquiring territory belonging to the target country.

Thus, by an intervenor invading for the purpose of acquiring territory could exploit the conflict and cause it to intensify. After the area has either been acquired or the intervener withdraws a year after the intervention, civil war would be unlikely to break out.

Next, I turn to the results for the control variables. Expectedly, the GDP variable has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both estimations, and is statistically significant only in the lagged independent variables estimation. Thus, as a country’s GDP increases, the
likelihood of civil war onset decreases. Therefore, there does seem to be an association between low GDP and civil war. The null hypothesis is rejected in the regression model including the lagged independent variables, but is not rejected in the specification without the lagged the independent variables.

The Polity variable is not statistically significant in the first regression model, and it had a positive relationship with civil war onset. However, Polity has a negative relationship with civil war once the independent variables are lagged by one year. The negative relationship was expected because it is theoretically sound that the less autocratic a country is, the frequency of civil war onsets decreases. This relates back to the grievance arguments: citizens who are aggrieved by the state will are more likely to rebel against the government.

These results are contrary to what Hegre, et. al (2001) found because it is not intermediate regimes that are more conducive to civil war onset, but rather autocracies that tend to be associated with civil war onset. The null hypothesis is not rejected in the first regression model, but is rejected in the second, when the types of intervention variable are lagged by one year.

The democracy variable also had the theoretically expected relationship with civil war onset in that the more democratic a country is, the likelihood of civil war onset decreases. Democracy is not statistically significant in either of the estimation models. These results support Bodea and Elbadawi’s (2007) findings that democratic countries have a negative
relationship with civil war onset. The null hypothesis is not rejected in either regression models, given that the Democracy variable is not statistically significant.

I hypothesized that the more ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized a country is, the more likely civil war would occur. The results for ethnic and religious fractionalization were the same in terms of statistical significance in that the variables were not statistically significant in either of the regression models. Similarly, ethnic and religious fractionalization have a positive relationship with civil war onset in the first regression model. Thus, as the ethnic and religious fractionalization increases within a country, as, too, will the frequency of civil war onset.

However, the variables change from having a positive relationship to a negative relationship once the independent variables are lagged by one year. It is surprising that the more ethnical and religious fractionalization there is in country, the less likely civil war will occur. My initial thought was perhaps all of the twenty countries in the sample size were similar in terms of fractionalization scores, thus having a modicum effect on civil war. However, table 6 shows, the countries were highly diverse from one another in terms of Alesina’s (2003) fractionalization scores. Nevertheless, these are the observed findings. Therefore, the null hypotheses for the ethnic and religious fractionalization variables are not rejected.
Table 6. Relative Variation between Fractionalization Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Alesina’s (2003) fractionalization data
The positive association between religious fractionalization and civil war onset after lagging the independent variables could be attributed to the fact that the dominant religion in both the Middle East and North African region is Islam, and there are many different factions within the religion. Therefore, citizens may be more likely to have religious hatred for those not following their faction of religion. For example, Islam is not just a system of faith, but it is a way of life. Namely, the Shiites and Sunnis are two religious factions that split in the eighth century because persons were unable to decide whether it should be a friend to Mohammad or bloodline to succeed the Prophet Mohammad after his death. The split has diversified even further throughout the last two centuries with some factions becoming more Islam fundamentalists while others more pro-Western. This diversification within the Islam religion could be why a high level of religious fractionalization has a positive relationship with civil war onset.

By contrast, linguistic fractionalization is statistically significant in the first estimation, but not statistically significant when the independent variables are lagged by one year. Linguistic fractionalization has a negative relationship with civil war onset in both regression models. Thus, as the linguistic fractionalization increases in a country, the likelihood of civil war onsets decreases. The null hypothesis is rejected in the first regression model, but is not rejected in the specification that includes the lagged independent variables.

Finally, the political terror variable is highly statistically significant and has a positive relationship with civil war onset in both regression models. Thus, the more politically repressive

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a government is, the more likely civil war will occur. The null hypothesis is rejected in both regression models. This results are not surprising because the more repressive a government it, the more citizens will begin to feel aggrieved, and are more likely to rebel against the government.

Some scholars have argued that the more repressive a country is, the less likely citizens will rebel due to the strong hold that the government has on its citizens. However, this may be true for protests and other minor forms of resistance, but it is not the case for civil war onset, as the data has shown.

When accounting for the marginal effects, holding all other independent variables at their means, the likelihood of a pursuit intervention resulting facilitating civil war onset increases by 8%. When a diplomatic intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war goes up to 15%.

When a strategic intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war occurring a year after the intervention increases by 28%. When a territory intervention occurs, the likelihood of civil war occurring within a year after the intervention increases by an outstanding 87%.

Limitations

This research is limited to 20 countries all within the Middle Eastern and North African Regions, in which twelve civil wars occurred within the time period that is studied. Analyzing the effect that 129 international military interventions have on a limited twelve civil wars may
not yield enough explanatory power. Therefore, the study would be strengthened if there were a larger number of civil wars to analyze.

Additionally, using a time series data set for the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization scores may have produced more finite results for those three control variables. Although a country’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious oval makeup does not alter substantially over a 20 year period, it does vary slightly as citizens are constantly relocating in terms of immigrating and emigrating, in addition to new citizens being born and other dying on a daily basis. Thus, the ethnic composition, particularly, of a country will naturally fluctuate. It would be interesting to determine whether, and to what extent, the regression results change if a time series data set was to replace Alesina’s fractionalization data that was used.

A third limitation of this study is the absence of existing literature that there are on topics such as consequences, and types of foreign military interventions. Although scholars have conducted studies regarding the effects that third party interventions have on civil wars, there has been little work completed on the consequences that military interventions have on the targeted country. Granted, it is difficult to generalize the consequences of an intervention, given that each intervention and target country are indeed unique. However, it would be advantageous for this study if there were at least some studies that made an attempt to generalize the consequences that the interventions have had on the target country. Such studies would provide a more theoretically-grounded insight as to what the conditions are in in the target country after the
intervention. The conditions could then be compared to the different causes of civil war that scholars have argued in an attempt see if there are any patterns of post-intervention conditions linking to the causes of civil war.

There is even less work that has been done on the different types of foreign military intervention. It is surprising that scholars have generalized “intervention” where the purposes of the intervention makes such a large difference in the effect of the target country. For example, welcomed interventions are less likely to cause civil unrest, whereas hostile interventions are more likely to internal violence. Also, the number of troops makes a difference in the outcome of the intervention.

Also, it is unlikely that a country sending 500 troops into another for a humanitarian mission will create chaos in the targeting country. Contrarily, a country sending 10,000 troops for a social protection mission is likely to cause resistance of acceptance by the rebels, given not only the large amount of troops, but also the type of intervention. Because the central theme of this study is civil war being an unintended consequence of international military intervention, having a lack of existing literature on the different types of interventions is certainly a limitation.

**Future Research**

This thesis not only contributes to the existing literature by examining the relationship between international military intervention and civil war onset, but it also sets the precedent for further research on different types of interventions. Scholars could expand this study to test not
only countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but also other regions, namely Africa. Civil war tends to be experienced in underdeveloped countries; thus, Africa would be a fascinating region to study in the context of foreign intervention and civil war. Not only does Africa consist mainly of developing countries, but it has been host to numerous foreign military interventions and civil wars since WWII.

COW covers the time period from 1816 to 2010, while the IMI data set includes data from 1946 to 2005, thus, researchers could take on the ambitious tasks of conducting a systemic study in which all interventions since WWII are regressed with all civil wars post-WWII. Such a large sample size could produce more conclusive results that will refine our understanding of the impact that international military interventions has on civil war onset. Furthermore, additional control variables could be added to the study, such as whether a country has been formerly colonized or not. The IMI data set includes such information for every country, and it would be useful to know whether a country’s colonial history has any relationship with civil war onset.

The theoretical expectation is that there is pattern of interventions by a former colonizer in to a former colony. However, it would be an interesting study to determine whether the data supports the theoretical expectation.

Anecdotally, the Middle East and North Africa are all former colonies of the United Kingdom; however, most great powers have never been colonized. Thus, colonization may have an impact on whether a country is likely to experience internal conflict when a former colonizer
intervenes into the country that it once colonized.

For example, Lebanon was invaded by France, a former imperial power, in 1982 for domestic, social, strategic, and diplomatic purposes. One year after the intervention, civil war occurred. Another example is the 2004 French invasion into the Ivory Coast, also a former France colony, which led to an outbreak of civil war. Such patterns warrant further investigation.

Another variable to possibly examine is the number of troops; for which the IMI has also provided data for. Given that the IMI has provided data on the number of troops that were sent for each intervention, it may useful to use this data as a control variable. The number of troops sent into the target country could affect whether civil war will ensue because it could be a strong determinant of whether citizens of the target state feel threatened by the foreign presence. It is unlikely that the presence of 100 troops will make the citizens of the target country feel threatened; however, a presence of 500 may cause citizens to feel threatened, or perhaps repressed. Thus, a theoretically understandable reaction would be for the citizens to rise up in rebellion.

Additionally, it may be interesting to examine how many troops are dispatched generally for each type of military intervention. If there is a pattern of similar quantities of troops being dispatched for each respective type of intervention, then perhaps it is not type of the intervention that is conducive to civil war onset. Rather, it may be the amount of troops that intervene into the target country that affects the likelihood of civil war onset.
CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES

Interestingly, Iran and Afghanistan are both Middle Eastern countries with similar ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization whereby all citizens are governed by similar repressive political structure. Yet, the joint invasion led by the United States and Great Britain in Iran in 1953 did not result in civil war; whereas, the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 did result in civil war. In this chapter, I will analogize the two case events and dissect the differences in an attempt to explain why civil war occurred in Afghanistan but did not occur in Iran. First, a brief description of the facts for each case is needed.

**1953 United States intervention into Iran**

The 1953 intervention into Iran, named “Operation TP-AJAX,” was a joint covert operation whereby the U.S.’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Great Britain invaded Iran with the objective of overthrowing the elected government and, instead, consolidate the power of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.\(^{305}\)

Great Britain had an economic interest in Iran, as they were owners of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Prior to the invention, the Iranian government began questioning whether their government was actually receiving the royalties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that they

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were due. Therefore, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh requested an audit from the British government, in which the British denied. As a consequence of the denial, Mosaddegh nationalized the oil company, requiring an equal share in the oil revenues.

In 1952, the British then embargoed, causing economic tensions in Iran that resulted in unpopularity for the Iranian Prime Minister. Tehran had failed to find ways of getting alternative oil sources; as a result of the failure, the budget began mounting deficits and economy began to deteriorate.\(^{306}\)

The royal court began getting frustrated with Mosaddegh’s attempts to continuously undermined the monarchy, so the British government announced that the Shah had intended to leave the country for medical purposes.\(^{307}\) The Iranian citizens interpreted, as the British had intended, that the Shah leaving was a signal of his displeasure with Mosaddegh. Thus, the public began to grow increasingly intolerant of the Mosaddegh administration.

Taking advantage of both the unpopularity of Mosaddegh and vulnerability of the Iranian economy, the British sought help from the United States in overthrowing Prime Minister Mosaddegh and reinstating the pro-Western Shah, whom did not question the financial activities of the British.

This incident had made the U.S. government aware of the opposition groups both within

\(^{306}\) Ibid., 5.
\(^{307}\) Ibid.
and outside Iran’s parliament.\textsuperscript{308} It also revealed that there were many citizens still loyal to the Shah, and encouraged the idea that the Shah would be accepted back into office by the people, should the U.S. support it.\textsuperscript{309} The U.S. feared that the continuing deteriorating economy would pave the way for the “Tudeh,” Iran’s communist party, to overthrow Mosaddegh and take control of the government.\textsuperscript{310} Therefore, the CIA coordinated with the British intelligence agency, mi6, and together they launched a propaganda campaign that evolved into pro-Shah riots, resulting in the deaths of 800 Iranian citizens.\textsuperscript{311}

The Shah, whom was hiding in Italy at the time the riots occurred, returned to Iran to reinstate him as the Prime Minister. Given that the economy under the control of Mosaddegh’s administration, the former leader was blamed and the citizens favored the reinstatement of the Shah. Once in power, the embargo was dropped and the economy began growing. Additionally, the riots ceased and no further civil violence erupted. Thus, the coup was successful and the Shah subsequently ruled as an absolute monarchy for twenty-six years.

Both Great Britain and the U.S. intervened in Iran for the purpose of affecting domestic policies. Great Britain also intervened for the purpose of protecting economic interest. In addition to seeking to affect domestic policies, the U.S. also intervened for the strategic purpose of promoting ideological goals.

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid. at 6.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid. at 7.
Both of the great powers intervened in Iran for the purpose of affecting Iran’s domestic policies by attempting to manipulate the oil agreement that Great Britain had with Iran. For example, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company paid a royalty to the Iranian government for the oil that was extracted. The profits of the company, however, were taxed by the British government and these taxes were greater than the royalties that the Iranian government received from the company.

Mosaddegh had nationalized the oil in an effort to avoid the exorbitant taxes. Reinstating the Shah would reverse Mosaddegh’s policy, and transactions with the British would resume. In fact on the day of his appointment, the new prime minister announced his intention of resuming business with Great Britain.

Although the United States did not have ownership of the oil company, it was nonetheless advantaged by having business resume with the British because it, too, would have oil supplied to it. Additionally, the Shah was pro-western and anti-communist; therefore, the U.S. government would have friendly relations with the Iranian government if the Shah, and not Mosaddegh, were in power.

Great Britain also intervened in Iran for the purpose of protecting their economic interest. This is largely because oil exploration generally requires a huge investment, which must be made prior to producing any profits. Therefore the British had already invested a large amount of money prior to Mosaddegh’s policy of nationalizing the oil.
The Iranian government refraining from paying the tax on the oil that was extracted would undercut the entire petroleum business that the British had invested in.\textsuperscript{312} This is why the British government initially demanded the continuation of the business, and when Mosaddegh administration refused, the embargo was placed on Iran. To protect their economic interest, Great Britain was incentivized to invade and conduct the regime change.

The U.S. intervened in Iran for the strategic purpose of promoting ideological goals because the government wanted Iran to be pro-western so that the U.S. could remain a major player in the Middle East. There has been ample work on U.S. exerting hegemony in the Middle East; however, reasons beyond the fact that the U.S. has ideological goals that it wants to pursue exceeds the scope of this thesis.

The data has shown that interventions that occur for the purpose of strategically pursuing ideological goals has a negative relationship with civil war onset. Similarly, interventions attempting to affect domestic policies of the target state are more likely to result in civil war onset a year after the intervention has occurred; whereas, the intervention has a negative relationship with civil war onset within the first year of the intervention occurring. Additionally, interventions for the purpose of protecting economic interests has a negative relationship with civil war onset.

In light of the U.S./UK joint intervention into Iran, in addition to what the data has

\textsuperscript{312} Timo Kivimaki, “Democracy, Autocrats and U.S. Policies in the Middle East,” \textit{Middle East Policy} 19, no. 1 (2012), 70.
revealed, the observed findings support the association between the types of interventions that occurred and the absence of civil war onset that followed. For example, the data showed that interventions for the purposes of affecting policies of the target state, economic interests of the intervener, and strategic purposes were all three negatively associated with civil war onset.

These three motivations were the justification for the U.S. and the UK intervention into Iran. However, as the data has shown and the facts in the Iranian case study have revealed, civil war onset did not occur after the intervention. Thus, the data supports the relationship between intervention and civil war onset in the Iranian case study.

However, there are other factors that may mitigate the likelihood of civil war onset, absent of any association with the foreign military intervention. For example, the intervention into Iran was covert, the leader was unfavorable, and the regime change was favored by the Iranian citizens. Referring to the first factor, the fact that there were no present military troops and the riots were staged, the citizens were not alarmed because they were not threatened by an outside presence.

Also, Mosaddegh’s administration allowed, or at least it was perceived to have allowed, the economy to deteriorate. Consequently, the citizens began affirming the regime change, especially given that the economy was not in decline when the Shah was in power before Mosaddegh was elected.

In sum, there are factors that may mitigate the likelihood of civil war onset, regardless of
the purpose of the intervention. The better understanding that researchers have on factors, conditions, and types of interventions that effect civil war onset, the better they will know how to prevent it. In the section below, I contrast this case with the 1979 Soviet Union invasion into Afghanistan, in which civil war did occur following the intervention.

1979 Soviet Union intervention into Afghanistan

The target state in the Soviet intervention did not enjoy the same successful aftereffect as the target state did in the US/UK invasion. In 1978, the centrist Afghanistan government was overthrown by left-wing military officers, who then handed power over to two Marxist-Leninist political parties, the Khalq and Parcham.\textsuperscript{313} This coup is known as the “Saur Revolution.”\textsuperscript{314} Together, these two political parties formed the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

The party immediately forged close ties with the Soviet Union, given their similar socialist policy goals. Thus, just months after the PDPA rose to power, a friendship treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{315} Even prior to the official signing of the treaty, the Soviet Union had been a major influence in terms of policy making in Afghanistan, notably due to the immense amounts of economic aid, military equipment provided to the PDPA.


\textsuperscript{315} Hilali, 121.
government, in addition to military training.\textsuperscript{316}

As a consequence of the PDPA consolidating power, Muslim tribal-based insurgencies, the mujahideen, began uprising by internally fighting with PDPA supports. The mujahideen were composed of two alliances: the Peshawar Seven and the Tehran Eight, which were both a multinational insurgent group that were funded by the U.S. government to help overthrow the Soviet-backed regime in power.

In 1979, the PDPA called on the Soviet Union to provide military support and assist in calming down the unrest. However, the presence of the Soviets exacerbated a nationalistic feeling and caused the rebellions to grow in alarming numbers.\textsuperscript{317} Two months after the Soviets invaded, civil war broke out and lasted until the Soviets withdrew in ten years, claiming the lives of approximately 1.2 million citizens. Following several assassinations within the PDPA administration, Babrak Karmal became the leader of the PDPA party; thus, president of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{318}

The government of President Karmal, a Soviet puppet regime, was utterly ineffective and the lack of leadership was blamed by Moscow for the problems of Afghanistan. President Karmal was not able to consolidate his power, thus stepping down. In 1986, the former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD) and Soviet-backed Mohammad Najibullah was elected

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{318} Rodric Braithwaite, “The Russians in Afghanistan.” \textit{Asian Affairs} 42, no. 2 (2011), 219.
After six years in office, Najibullah’s government collapsed as a result of the Russian government withdrawal of forces, thus ending its aid to the Afghan government. One of the mujahideen rebels, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became the next president in 1992, and was recognized as such by the United Nations.

Focusing strictly on the invasion, the Soviets had four objectives when invading Afghanistan: (1) to ensure that the government of Afghanistan remained friendly to the Soviet Union; (2) to limit, or if possible exclude, American influence; (3) to limit the effect of fundamental Islam on their own republics; (4) to extinguish the drug traffic, which was a massive problem.  

The first objective speaks to the interventions for the purposes of both selecting a side in a domestic dispute and to affect policies of the target state. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to aid the PDPA against the mujahideen; therefore, they were clearly intervening to take sides in a domestic dispute. Additionally, the Soviets wanted to remain on good terms with the Afghan government so that they could influence policy making both during and beyond the conflict.

The second objective is an example of an intervention for the strategic purpose, namely an effort to maintain regional power by preventing the U.S. from exerting any influence in Afghanistan. The third and fourth objectives are also examples of interventions for strategic

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319 Brown, 73.
320 Braithwaite, 217.
purposes, but for different reasons than the second objective.

Limiting the effect of fundamental Islamism on the Russian people is an attempt to keep the region stable; therefore, the purpose of intervening into Afghanistan, for objective three, was to contain fundamental Islam. Similarly, the fourth objective is a reason to intervene for the purpose of strategically attempting to stabilize the Soviet Union by stunting the drug traffic from entering the intervener’s country.

In sum, the civil war that occurred as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan is reflective of what the data revealed. For example, an intervention for the purpose of taking sides in a domestic dispute is not only statistically significant, but also has positive association with civil war onset. Thus, the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan for the purpose of militarily supporting the government may have very well been the reason why civil war occurred.

The data also shows that interventions for the purpose of affecting policies of the target country have a positive relationship with civil war onset once the independent variables are lagged by one year. Thus, this, too, could have affected the instability of Afghanistan, which made civil war inevitable. Although the Soviet Union also intervened into Afghanistan for strategic purposes, which has a negative relationship with civil war onset, the strong correlation that the other two interventions have with civil war onset could have independently caused the civil war to occur.

The facts in this event are strikingly different than those in the 1953 US/UK invasion in
Iran. For example, the Soviet Union intervention was overt because assistance was actually requested by the PDPA administration. Also, the centrist government led by Mohammad Daud Khan, was not necessarily disfavored by the people. In fact, he created a new Afghan constitution in 1977, improving rights for women, which was widely accepted within the country.

Finally, unlike the citizens in Iran, the regime-change that ousted Khan and implemented the PDPA was not favored by the majority of the people, namely the mujahideen. Perhaps these factors affect whether an intervention will facilitate civil war onset. Although there are only two cases discussed, it is nonetheless a starting point to understanding the effect(s) that international military interventions have on civil war onset.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the association between foreign military intervention and civil war onset, generally, and whether the purpose of the intervention makes a difference as to whether civil war is likely to follow the intervention, more specifically.

Running two regression models using the logit regression for data that has been collected for twenty countries in the time period from 1980 to 2000 has produced both expected and surprising results. Overall, the data shows that one of the nine types of interventions is statically significant. When lagging the independent variables by one year, there is still one type of interventions that is statistically significant. Of the control variables, only linguistic fractionalization and political terror were statistically significant, while GDP, polity, democracy, and political terror were all statistically significant after lagging the types of interventions by one year.

The empirical results show that civil war onset is positively associated with an intervention for the purpose of pursuing a terrorists or rebel across the target country’s border. By contrast, humanitarian intervention is statistically significant and has a negative association with civil war onset once all independent variables are lagged by one year.

The results of the control variables seem to be in the accordance with Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and in some respects, Fearon and Laitin (2003). The data has shown that the higher the GDP is in a country, the less likely civil war will occur. This is the underlying
premise of Collier and Hoeffler’s economic model. Similar to Fearon and Laitin, the ethnic and religious fractionalization variables were not statistically significant and have a positive effect on civil war onset. Interestingly, the two variables have a negative association with civil war onset one year after the intervention occurred. However, neither variable was statistically significant.

By contrast, the linguistic fractionalization variable is significant and is negatively associated with civil war onset. As expected, the political terror variable is statistically significant and has a positive association with civil war onset, with civil war occurring in the same year as the intervention and one year after.

Since WWII, intrastate war has been the dominant form of conflict while becoming more serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars. The increase in intrastate wars is alarming because it creates not only instability within its relative region, but also creates a haven for terrorist whom take advantage of the vulnerability of the state. Therefore, understanding the causes of civil wars is becoming increasingly imperative.

The IMI data has been incredibly useful for this study in that it has categorized interventions that have occurred in all regions of the world over the last sixty years. Using a particular region in a twenty year period, I was able to regress these different types of interventions with civil wars that have occurred by the using the COW data set. The regression models have shown that international military interventions can have an effect on civil war onset, and the type of interventions do make a difference as to whether civil war is likely to occur.
This study contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that the term “intervention” should not be generalized. Each type of intervention may produce different consequences for the target country. Knowing the consequences of a particular intervention is important because it may result in unfavorable consequences that the intervenor had not intended to create. If such consequences of an intervention are able to be predicted, then leaders are less likely to intervene for that particular purpose. Governments should be cautious when intervening particularly for either humanitarian purposes or for the purpose of pursing a rebel or terrorists group across the target country’s border since the data has shown that such interventions increase the likelihood of civil war onset.

With the increase in both intrastate wars and international military interventions, I invite scholars to develop this research further to determine whether there is an association between the two occurrences on a systemic level. Understanding not only the consequences of international military intervention, but also the causes of civil war onset could aid governments by preventing either occurrence in the future.
APPENDIX A:
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS, IMI DATA SET
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervener Country</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Type of Intervention</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>09/04/1980</td>
<td>07/13/1982</td>
<td>Policy Strategic Territorial Diplomatic</td>
<td>Shell and Retaliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>09/22/1980</td>
<td>08/20/1988</td>
<td>Policy Economic Strategic</td>
<td>Gulf war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>09/30/1980</td>
<td>02/28/1982</td>
<td>Policy Pursuit Strategic</td>
<td>Afghanistan war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>11/12/1980</td>
<td>08/20/1988</td>
<td>Policy Economic Strategic Diplomatic</td>
<td>Gulf war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>07/07/1981</td>
<td>06/07/1981</td>
<td>Policy Strategic Territory Diplomatic</td>
<td>Destroy reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>06/30/1981</td>
<td>07/31/1982</td>
<td>Domestic Strategic</td>
<td>Post-Dhofar-Bidwill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>07/11/1981</td>
<td>07/14/1981</td>
<td>Policy Economic Territory</td>
<td>Kashmir-line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>12/31/1981</td>
<td>12/31/1981</td>
<td>Policy Economic Strategic</td>
<td>Protect royal family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational forces in Egypt</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>03/10/1982</td>
<td>12/31/1988</td>
<td>Policy Humanitarian</td>
<td>U.S. led MNF in Sinai-Riggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Policy Types</td>
<td>Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>06/06/1982</td>
<td>06/30/1985</td>
<td>Domestic, Social, Economic, Strategic, Territory</td>
<td>Lebanon civil war Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>06/24/1982</td>
<td>06/24/1982</td>
<td>Policy, Humanitarian, Diplomatic</td>
<td>Lebanon civil war Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>07/13/1982</td>
<td>08/20/1988</td>
<td>Policy, Economic, Strategic, Territory</td>
<td>Gulf War</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>08/21/1982</td>
<td>09/20/1982</td>
<td>Policy, Social, Strategic, Humanitarian</td>
<td>Evacuating PLO</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>08/21/1982</td>
<td>09/20/1982</td>
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<td>Evacuating PLO</td>
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<td>Evacuating PLO</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>08/27/1982</td>
<td>09/20/1982</td>
<td>Policy, Social, Strategic, Humanitarian</td>
<td>Evacuating PLO</td>
</tr>
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<td>Iraq invades Kuwait &amp; establishes a provisional govt.</td>
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<td>Canada provides 18 combat aircraft &amp; 3 ships to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield</td>
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<td>France provides troops &amp; Legion, 32 combat aircraft, and large carrier groups to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield</td>
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<td>French troops, air, navy part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait</td>
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<td>Italy provides 8 combat aircraft, 2 frig, 1 supply ship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield</td>
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<td>Sweden evacuates foreign national from Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Pakistan intervenes in Saudi Arabia to protect Mecca and Medina from potential Iraqi invasion</td>
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<td>Australia provides 2 frigates and 1 supply ship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield</td>
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<td>U.S. moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Iran</td>
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<td>Germany sets up relief base in Iran for Iraqi refugees</td>
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<td>Russia attacks rebel bases in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Turkish ground and air attacks on Kurds in Iraq, intermittent but within 6 months of each other</td>
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<td>Iranian planes bomb suspected rebel basis in Iraq</td>
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<td>Iraq crosses into Kuwait to retrieve military equipment</td>
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<td>Iranian forces attack Kurdish rebel basis in Iraq</td>
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<td>U.S. build up in Kuwait to respond to Iraqi border build-up</td>
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<td>UK bolster US forces opposing Iraq border buildup</td>
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<td>French send frigate to aid force in defending Kuwait</td>
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<td>Oman sends naval forces to defend Kuwait</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>01/12/1994</td>
<td>12/24/1994</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Bahrain sends naval and air forces to defend Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>01/12/1994</td>
<td>12/24/1994</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>UAE sends troops and 6 mirages to defend Kuwait</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>12/07/1995</td>
<td>01/10/1995</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Yemen clashes with Saudi Arabia over ill-defined demarcation line</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>07/27/1996</td>
<td>07/31/1996</td>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>Iran carries out raids against Kurdish rebels in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>09/18/1996</td>
<td>12/15/1996</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>US buildup of troops in Kuwait after Iraq’s provocation</td>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
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<td>U.S./U.K./Turkey</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>01/01/1997</td>
<td>05/01/2003</td>
<td>Policy Social</td>
<td>Op. Northern Watch to defend no-fly zone in Northern Iraq and provide humanitarian aid to Kurds in N. Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>09/29/1997</td>
<td>09/29/1997</td>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>Iran carries out air raids against opposition group in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>04/20/1998</td>
<td>04/20/1998</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Indian troops fire on Pakistan troops along Kashmir border</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>08/20/1998</td>
<td>08/20/1998</td>
<td>Policy Strategy</td>
<td>U.S. uses cruise missiles to attack suspected terrorist facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>09/16/1998</td>
<td>09/18/1998</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Pakistan air raids intended to aid Taliban government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>07/19/1999</td>
<td>07/19/1999</td>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>Turkish air raids against PKK in Iran</td>
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APPENDIX B:
CIVIL WARS, COW DATA SET
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Name</th>
<th>War Type</th>
<th>Side A</th>
<th>Side B</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Location Fought</th>
<th>Side A Deaths</th>
<th>Side B Deaths</th>
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<tr>
<td>Second Chad</td>
<td>Civil war over local issues</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Citizens within state</td>
<td>Dec. 1980</td>
<td>Oct. 1981</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1000, including target deaths</td>
<td>1000, including initiator deaths</td>
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<td>Hama</td>
<td>Civil war for central control</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>Nov. 1981</td>
<td>Feb. 1982</td>
<td>Regional internal</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>Civil war over central control</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Shi’ites &amp; Druze</td>
<td>April 1983</td>
<td>Feb. 1984</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Fifth Iraqi Kurds</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Jan. 1985</td>
<td>Sept. 1988</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
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<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>Civil war for central control</td>
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<td>Leftist Factions</td>
<td>Jan. 1986</td>
<td>Jan. 1986</td>
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<td>Fifth Lebanese</td>
<td>Civil war for central control</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Shiite and Kurdish</td>
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<td>Shiites &amp; Kurds</td>
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<td>March 1991</td>
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<td>Islamic Front</td>
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<td>June 1992</td>
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<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>Feb. 1994</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
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<td>Iraqi Kurd Intern.</td>
<td>Inter-commun</td>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>KDP</td>
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<td>Sixth Iraqi Kurds</td>
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APPENDIX C:
ALESINA’S FRACTIONALIZATION DATA (EXACT YEAR)
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>0.6141</td>
<td>0.2717</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>0.3394</td>
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<td>Bahrain</td>
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<td>0.2021</td>
<td>0.4344</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>0.1979</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.3689</td>
<td>0.3694</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>0.7462</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.3436</td>
<td>0.5525</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>0.6745</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.7920</td>
<td>0.0758</td>
<td>0.0570</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.4841</td>
<td>0.4683</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
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<td>0.4373</td>
<td>0.3567</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.7456</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
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