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Debating Their Beliefs to Victory: How the Beliefs of Presidential Candidates Transform the Rhetoric Used in Presidential Debates

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DEBATING THEIR BELIEFS TO VICTORY:
HOW THE BELIEFS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TRANSFORM THE
RHETORIC USED IN PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

by

AUBREY MARKS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science
in the College of Science
and in The Burnett Honors College
at the University of Central Florida
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Thesis Chair: Dr. Philip H. Pollock

ABSTRACT

As presidential candidates rhetorically articulate their beliefs during presidential debates, they reveal a lot about their underlying ideological beliefs. These beliefs were examined through the lens of an established methodology called the Operational Code, which uses a program to decipher a candidate's beliefs through what they say in debate transcripts. In this study, the belief trends of the Operational Codes of all presidential candidates from 1976-2012 were examined through a rhetorical lens, and it was found that rhetoric was indeed the driving force for the apparent changes in Operational Code beliefs. These changes were examined on a greater level of detail through four case studies, which illustrated the changes in Operational Code beliefs and rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, the incumbent presidential candidates, the 2004 election, and lastly, with the independent presidential candidates.

DEDICATION

For my father, who never thought that I would be interested in following his footsteps in pursuing Political Science and Writing and Rhetoric, but is now proud to say that I am.

To my mother, who taught me that I would learn something new every day.

To Michael, who constantly pushes me to achieve new heights.

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INTRODUCTION

Every four years, the American electorate is given the challenging task of electing a president. In the American political climate, this time of the year means much more than a just a change between leadership. According to James Barber (1977), the Presidency is “much more than an institution” (4). The attitude held towards the presidency is much different from that of Congress, because “the president is a symbolic leader, the one figure who draws together people’s hopes and fears for the political future” (Barber, 1977, 4). Belief systems and ideologies are the driving force in presidential elections. Therefore, when Americans step up to the ballot box to vote for President, they are not just voting for the candidate, but the set of beliefs that he carries with him.

To do that, voters must envision how a variety of presidential candidates and their beliefs would guide their decisions as President of the United States, if elected. From a psychological standpoint, every time a candidate speaks or makes an appearance, he is being judged by voters in areas of “character, leadership, and judgment” (Renshon, 1998, 377). On the campaign trail, candidates speak about their beliefs non-stop, their words rhetorically crafted in one way or another to appeal to American voters. With every word that the candidates say, they are exposing their belief systems to the public. Their words are a representation of their beliefs, and their beliefs are a testament to the articulations of their ideals.

To study this relationship between rhetoric and belief systems in American presidential elections, we must first find a way to analyze the belief systems of presidential candidates. The link between leaders’ behaviors and their personality traits is not only subject to scrutiny by

voters, but also by political scientists and psychoanalysts. Alexander George (1969) argues that while analysts are interested in simplifying and structuring the complex world of political actors, this type of study is essential for the political actor himself as well, as “he too must somehow comprehend complex situations in order to decide how to best deal with them” (200).

A candidate’s beliefs highly contribute to his character and personality, and vice versa (Barber, 1977). According to Barber (1977), a president's personality 1) shapes his behavior in "nontrivial matters" (6), 2) is one that is patterned and consistent and 3) is shaped not only by internal factors, but external environmental factors dominant at the time of his leadership. While Barber’s findings are definitive, his methods severely lack standardization, as Barber believes that the best way to predict presidential character is to “see how they [a president’s motives and beliefs] were put together in the first place” (Barber, 1977, 6). This involves an examination of a president’s childhood, their leadership experiences, self-esteem, motives, etc. In addition, Barber (1977) himself admits that “character provides the main thrust and broad direction—but it does not determine, in any fixed sense, world view and style” (11). In a country where rhetoric itself transforms the face of our political climate, a highly qualitative and controversial method like Barber’s would prove results too ambiguous as a measure of candidates’ belief systems.

A well-established methodology called the Operational Code easily fills this gap. According to Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003), the Operational Code is more reliable than Barber’s methods because the Code works off of “motivational biases rather than simply the products of lessons learned from changing experiences in the political universe” (221). In addition, the Operational Code serves as a “useful ‘bridge’ or ‘link’ to psychodynamic interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems and their role in behavior under

different conditions” (George, 1969, 195). This methodology quantitatively analyzes speech transcripts in order to examine a leader’s belief system.

In summary, the Operational Code represents an actor’s beliefs at the psychoanalytic level—why they believe what they say, the rationality and motivation for what they do. This research method has had significant findings in researching international leaders and their impacts of foreign policy (Walker, 2000). Surprisingly, however, this interest has not widely transferred over to the study of presidential candidates as a group. When these methodologies are used for assessing presidents or presidential candidates, they only focus on presidential rhetoric that spans from the time the leaders first entered and left office, or concentrate on the analysis of one particular candidate during his presidential campaign (Renshon, 1998; Schafer & Crichlow, 2000; Walker & Falkowski, 1984; Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998, 2003). Lastly, the Operational Code has never been used to examine the relationship between the articulations of a leader’s beliefs in relation to the rhetorical situation of the changing political climate.

The purpose of this study was to use an established methodology to answer a new question: What do the beliefs of presidential candidates reveal about the rhetoric of our ever-changing political climate?

Why Presidential Candidates?

As mentioned earlier, the Operational Code is not typically used to study presidential candidates, per say, but the method surely has the potential to reveal a great deal of new information about presidential candidates and their in-group comparisons. The Operational Code reveals a presidential candidate’s belief system, which gives a deeper, even a more sub-conscious, view of his beliefs than what is exposed by his party’s ideology. If a presidential

candidate exhibits these beliefs through his speech during presidential debates, this can be used by the American electorate as a predictor to how they will act and behave in the White House.

Additionally, presidential candidates are an ideal group of what Margaret Hermann (2003) would call a “norming group” (17). First of all, the leaders in this group are competing against each other for the same job, the President of the United States. Secondly, each of them have a considerable amount of experience that qualifies them to run for this position, which means that they have all had a significant amount of time to develop their beliefs. By comparing their Operational Codes, we will be able to determine what beliefs these candidates planned to bring with them to the White House.

Why Presidential Debates?

Even though there are many different kinds of texts that one could use to study presidential candidates, presidential debates are actually ideal because of their natural format and dynamics. Televised presidential debates are a medium through which candidates can express themselves in an environment that is fair game—in other words, it’s ultimately the candidates who are competing on the debate floor, not their fundraisers, their field organizers, or their volunteers. Additionally, the debates themselves provide the candidates a uniform speaking format where all major candidates get the chance to speak in the same forms, such as opening and closing statements, rebuttals, etc. In addition, a study by Schafer and White (2007) confirmed that content analysis of transcripts work best in situations where “the individual is speaking spontaneously under moderate stress levels” (42).

The unsettling dynamics of a debate keep the format a lively one. It’s no secret that candidates are vigorously prepared for their debates weeks ahead of time. By the time they

candidates reach the debate floor, they have already practiced ways to answer every question and give every answer. Even with all of that preparation, however, each candidate still has the looming potential to have a disastrous night. It seems, that no matter how prepared a presidential candidate is, anything and everything can happen.

It is for these reasons why presidential debates are the ideal text to study for this type of content analysis. Based off of Hermann's guidelines, presidential debates contain a perfect mixture of planned and spontaneous speech (1998). According to Hermann, planned speeches or public statements pre-written by a leader and his speech writers "reflect what the leader wants, and is pledging, to be," (as cited in Hermann, 1998, 5). More "off-the-cuff" speech, on the other hand, is more spontaneous, as "leaders must respond quickly without props or aid" (Hermann, 2003, 179). This type of speech can give insight as to what the leader is really like in his private life and behind closed doors (Hermann, 2003). Hermann (2003) also emphasizes the importance of analyzing full, complete texts, as we are interested in the behavior of the leader, not the slant that a reporter might try to create when editing the tapes of an interview. The natural format of presidential debates gives us a perfect combination of planned speech and spontaneous speech, in its full text.

The Operational Code – The History

Over a period of about sixty years, the Operational Code has been transformed as a methodology. Since Leites (1953) published his work on the Operational Code of the Politburo in 1953, there have been numerous improvements to the methodology of using the Operational Code. Unlike Barber's (1977) idea to study a political leader's childhood in order to determine

their character, the Operational Code has been heavily institutionalized; developing theory, typologies, and methods for execution over time.

Nathan Leites (1953) first used the operational code in “A Study of Bolshevism,” published in 1953, in which he analyzed “the precepts of maxims of political tactics and strategy that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics” (George, 1969, 193), or “Bolshevik character” (George, 1969, 201). At the time of its publication, Leites’ work was considered to be more sophisticated in method, in fact, “some thought it introduced a new genre of elite study that might fill some of the needs for a behavioral approach to studies of political leadership” (George, 1969, 192). Leites’ (1953) intention in studying the Bolsheviks by means of the Operational Code was to “discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct” in an attempt to “draw explicit and systematic formulations” from a mass of Bolshevik literature, and to “set them down in a meaningful frame of reference.”

Some years after the publication of Leites’ work, it was re-examined by Alexander George (1969), who claimed that what Leites claimed as “maxims of political strategy” were actually the political beliefs of actors (Walker, 1990, 404). George (1969) believed that Leites’ term “operational code” was a bit misleading, as the term implied that an Operational Code was an automatic recipe that faithfully used in decision making. However, he interpreted Leites’ Operational Code as more of “a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics” as they relate to problem-solving in politics (George, 1969, 196). By definition, George (1969) claimed that “a leader’s operational code should be identified simply as a political belief system in which some elements (philosophical beliefs) guide the leader’s diagnosis of the context for action and others (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the most

effective strategy and tactics in achieving goals.” In his work, George (1969) took Leites’ work and re-examined it through his own perspective, making the Operational Code more replicable and theory-based. George essentially re-organized the ideas produced in Leites’ work into two types of beliefs that he believed were present in the Operational Code, philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

Inspired by George, Ole Holsti (1970), in his attempt to further refine the methodology for the Operational Code, created a typology of the six different types of belief systems political actors could have. He created these typologies by determining how political actors might answer George’s first philosophical questions, “What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?” and “What are the fundamental sources of conflict?” (Holsti, 1970, 123). Based on the answers to George’s questions, political actors would fall into Types A, B, C, or Type DEF of Holsti’s typology. This typology gave political scientists and political psychologists a guideline on how to identify the beliefs of a political actor according to the Operational Code, making the method even more quantifiable in nature and practice. In later years, after the production of multiple case studies that used the Operational Code, Holsti (1977) re-examined these case studies to check the validity of his original typology.

In 1984, while studying the Operational Codes of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State, Walker and Falkowski (1984) further refined Holsti’s typology by creating specific “belief statements” (411) that more specifically defined the political beliefs and motivations that were apparent in each type of belief system present in the typology. This revised typology led Walker and Falkowski (1984, 1990) to claim that the “aggregate pattern of crisis bargaining tactics by

the governments of these decision-makers” tended to correspond to these congruent patterns of motivations and beliefs.

Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) further improved the methodology of the Operational Code in 1998 while studying the Operational Code of President Jimmy Carter. They decided to study the Operational Code through means of the Verbs In Context System (known as VICS) (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998). The VICS method codes certain attributes according to the “utterances” said in rhetorical speech, based on George’s (1969) philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998, 182).

As explained above, the Operational Code has transformed as a result of the work of different studies that sought to add on to the current methodology at the time. The mechanics for the Operational Code methodology are explained below.

The Operational Code – The Method

The Operational Code contains two types of content, philosophical content and instrumental content. The following questions define the Philosophical Content of an Operational Code (George, 1969):

- What is the “essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? (George, 1969, 201)
- What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other? (George, 1969, 203)
- Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? (George, 1969, 203)

- How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction? (George, 1969, 204)
- What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? (George, 1969, 204)

The Instrumental Beliefs of an Operational Code are defined in the following questions (George, 1969):

- What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? (George, 1969, 205)
- How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? (George, 1969, 211)
- How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? (George, 1969, 212)
- What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest? (George, 1969, 215)
- What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest? (George, 1969, 216)

From here, as political actors are examined, their behaviors place them in one of Holsti’s (1970) typologies, Types A, B, C, and DEF. Types A, B, and C, are considered to be “optimistic,” attributing to the claim that those actors who fall in these typologies believe that world conflict is temporary. Types DEF, on the other hand, are grouped together and considered to be “pessimistic” in belief, due to the fact that actors who fall in this typology are claimed to believe that world conflict is ongoing and permanent. These typologies are illustrated in Figure 1 below.

		What is the fundamental Nature of the Political Universe?	
		Harmonious (Conflict is Temporary)	Conflictual (Conflict is permanent)
What are the fundamental sources of conflict?	Human Nature	A	D
	Attributes of Nations	B	E
	International System	C	F

Holsti's typologies (as cited by Walker, 1990, 408)

Figure 1

As mentioned before, Walker and Falkowski (1984) re-organized Holsti's original typologies into more specific belief statements, in order to better define what types of political leaders fall into these typologies present in Figure 2.

Type A
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A "conflict spiral," based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by non-rational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible.
Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interest. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.
Type B
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible.
Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.

Type C

Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. **Instrumental:** Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when reconciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.

Type DEF

Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international anarchy (F). Powerful disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends on the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. **Instrumental:** Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.

Walker and Falkowski's revised Holsti typologies (as cited by Walker, 1990, 411)

Figure 2

The Operational Code currently functions by means of the Verbs in Context System (or VICS), which, as defined by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998, 1999), is “a set of techniques for retrieving belief patterns from a leader’s public statements and drawing inferences about public behavior that are compatible with these beliefs.” The VICS system records “utterances,” defined as “each verb in the statement and the corresponding parts of speech associated with the verb—the subject and object (if it is transitive verb), or the subject and predicate nominative or adjective (if it is an intransitive verb)” (Walker, Schafer & Young 2003, 224). From there, the VICS method attributes six attributes to the data produced from the utterances; “subject, *verb category*, *domain of politics*, *tense of the verb*, *intended target*, and *context*” (Walker, Schafer & Young 2003, 224).

Over time, the Operational Code has been vastly transformed over and over again in order to study the Operational Codes of leaders from around the world. Through these

transformations, there have been developments in the theory and the lenses for analysis in this methodology, resulting in the current methods that are used today. Through a new lens, I was able to analyze how beliefs and the rhetorical articulation of those beliefs in presidential debates have dominated the American political climate.

METHODOLOGY

In order to conduct a context analysis of the speech in presidential debates in order to study candidates' operational codes, I prepared my texts for analysis, processed the texts using a program called Profiler Plus 5.8.4., and analyzed the results from the program. From there, I cross-examined the different results from the belief values, and analyzed how political beliefs determined the rhetoric surrounding those beliefs.

First and foremost, I collected transcripts of presidential debates ranging from 1976-2012 election cycles. Based on the historical background on American presidential debates, it is clear that presidential debates did not become truly "regular" until 1976 (Schroeder, 2000). So, by analyzing the fifty-five presidential debates that took place during that particular time period, I was using a text sample that is rhetorically expected in regards to its regularly scheduled appearances. These presidential debate transcripts were obtained at no cost from the website of the Commission on Presidential Debates.

From there, I prepared my texts for analyzing using Profiler Plus 5.8.4. This program is specifically designed to analyze Schafer's methodology for the Operational Code using the Verbs in Context System. Unlike other programs where a user would have to manually input their own codes or key words, Profile Plus 5.8.4. has "pre-sets" of the codes that Schafer used to study the Operational Code. To prepare each presidential debate transcript for processing, I had to separate the difference lines of text spoken by each presidential candidate in order to make sure that I would be analyzing the candidate's own words, not those of his opponent's or the moderator's.

Once this was done, I processed the prepared debate transcripts through Profiler Plus, and the program gave me a mass data set, outlining the different scores for each candidate for the various beliefs and values of the Operational Code. This data sheet is available in Appendix I.

The values I chose to research were P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2.

- P1 – Nature of the political universe.
- P2 – Prospects for realization of political values.
- P4 – Belief in historical control
- I1 – Approach to goals (direction of strategy)
- I2 – Pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)

From here, I ran the results using a means comparison analysis for these different values in IBM SPSS in respect to my research questions. I first ran a means comparison analysis that compared election years with belief scores of each party. I ran a second means comparison analysis that compared the belief scores for each individual debate.

In order to better understand the rhetorical situations and historical data associated with each debate, I referenced different sources of historical data and rhetorical theory. Materials on rhetorical theory were obtained through *The Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece* and various scholarly articles. Historical data (i.e. domestic and international events that surrounded each presidential debate) were obtained through election information as available in the *Change and Continuity in Elections* series. So-called “winners” and “losers” of debates were determined through historical data as described by the Change in Continuity in Elections Series (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rhode), as well as through Gallup Polls and reactions from the

FiveThirtyEight Blog written by Nate Silver. These sources all cited the historical winners and losers of presidential debates.

By using the established methodology of the Operational Code while also putting my own twist on analyzing its results, I was able to create a General Results Overview (available in the next chapter), in which I was able to see the results from a full-scale vantage point. However, in order to better create a more comprehensive analysis that would be able to characterize the trends emerging from different election cycles, I decided to divide up the most significant trends from my analysis into four different case studies, available in the chapters that follow.

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

In considering how beliefs have dominated election cycles through the history of presidential elections, I had originally chosen to answer the following research questions below. For a clearer view of the results, please refer to Appendices D-I.

What Beliefs Are Apparent And Consistent Over Time?

Walker (2000) suggests that tracking certain characteristics over time create predictions about what future actions a leader might take, as well as any possible shifts in behavior that might occur.

In examining the evolution of beliefs from 1976-2012, it was found that belief values rose and fell together for almost every election, with only some anomalies.

As I examined the profiles of presidential candidates that have debated in two or more election cycles, I discovered that candidates' beliefs change from when they first debate to become president to when they are debating to keep themselves in office. Not a single incumbent candidate had consistent belief scores when comparing one round of debates to the next.

Are Certain Beliefs Exclusive To Party Lines?

The Democratic and Republican parties have dominated the American political system for hundreds of years, and so have their candidates. With the exception of John Anderson and Ross Perot, candidates have either debated as a Democrat or a Republican.

In examining whether Democratic and Republican candidates have similar operational code scores in-party, it was found that scores are not consistent on the basis of party. In other words, scores rose and fell together in terms of party lines.

In examining Democrat belief systems against Republican belief systems, it was found that they had very similar beliefs from election to election. In this way, it was clear that each party molded their beliefs and their candidate to the historical factors of the election.

Do “Winners” And “Losers” Of Debates Have Similar Beliefs?

For presidential debates, one of the most pertinent goals of the candidate is winning the debate. Whoever wins the debate provides extra momentum for their presidential campaign in the short run, and that surge of momentum in the campaign cycle could mean extra percentage points in the polls.

In finding out of there were certain beliefs that all debate and elections winners or losers share, it was evident that presidential candidates were all over the map—in other words, there was no specific evidence from the Operational Code scores that could necessarily determine a winner or loser of a debate, or the election.

It can be inferred that articulated beliefs are a product of rhetorical statements, in some form or another. Therefore, when a candidate speaks about his beliefs, he is presenting his thoughts in a rhetorical manner. When the beliefs of a candidate change, the way in which he speaks about them are bound to change as well. In other words, beliefs and the words used to articulate them act together as a unit. In examining the case studies that follow, the relationship between Operational code beliefs and debate rhetoric will be examined on a closer level. I will examine the answers to the following questions:

Over time: What was the rhetorical and historical situation for each election, and how do these factors account for the ways that belief scores rise and fall the way they do?

By Party: How or in what ways were parties and candidates changing their beliefs to match the exigency of what the election called for?

Winners/Losers: Which candidate was able to master the art of debating rhetorically, and why did it work (or not work) so well?

One election cycle at a time, presidential candidates have highly influenced the belief systems and the discourse of the American political climate. Candidates shape their discourse according to the beliefs that they hold to be true. As their beliefs change, the way in which they articulate those beliefs will change as well. The following case studies will use the Operational Code to look at belief systems with a new rhetorical perspective. In doing so, the results shed light on how and when our political environment began to mirror the current state of politics in the United States.

RHETORICAL THEORY OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Considering that the articulation of beliefs change the rhetoric of the presidential debates, there are certain rhetorical factors that affect the way in which beliefs are articulated. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the rhetorical concepts that will be used to explain this phenomenon in the case studies that follow, and to also provide a basis for the results presented in the General Results Overview.

The Rhetorical Situation as Defined by Grant-Davie

Rhetor

According to rhetorician Keith-Grant Davie (1997), a rhetor is defined as “those people, real or imagined, responsible for the discourse and its authorial voice.” For the intents and purpose of this discussion, a rhetor is primarily the presidential candidate themselves, but the candidate is not the only rhetor in play during presidential debates.

Grant-Davie (1997) notes that rhetors “play several roles at once.” Candidates as rhetors are no different—they do not speak just as themselves, but as their political parties, their speechwriters, or even their major campaign contributors. In addition, when building their own *ethos*, or credibility, the rhetor might play several roles at once, that when pulled together, form the composite rhetor of the candidate. For example, when Barack Obama ran for president in 2004, he played several roles at once as a rhetor. He was the moderate and the liberal, the young but experienced Senator from Illinois, the tenacious but patient leader, the man that grew up from nothing and graduated from Harvard, the father of his children, and the aspiring leader of

his political party—all of whom he was and would be if elected to be President of the United States.

As rhetors, presidential candidates have to take what they've prepared for weeks or months and let it unfold into the proper setting of the debates. According to Consigny (1997), rhetors use both integrity and receptivity in their speech. Debate-wise, integrity, "a measure of consistency they take from situation to situation" can be thought of as the long-rehearsed talking points and stump speeches that candidates give during debates, things that still work in the debates, but have also worked during other rhetorical situations, such as campaign rallies. However, in the ever-changing rhetorical nature of debates, a candidate cannot survive a debate on integrity alone. He also must have receptivity, "the ability to adapt to new situations and not rigidly play the same role in everyone one" (Grant-Davie, 1997). This concepts highlights the spontaneous nature of debates, while illustrating that no matter how much a candidate has prepared, he must be prepared to be flexible and change with the rhetorical situation as it ebbs and flows during the debate.

Audience

Grant-Davie defines audience as "those people, real or imagined, with whom the rhetors negotiate through discourse to achieve the rhetorical objectives" (1997). In terms for audiences for presidential debates, the rhetors address several audiences: the American electorate and its many constituents of all different races, economic classes, and standing, the candidate's opponent and his campaign, the base and outsiders of his political party, his dissenters, and the

independents. There are, of course, an infinite amount of audiences that the candidates must face—an enormous task for one person to attempt to master.

As much as a presidential candidate will try to resonate with his diverse audiences as possible, it is something that he might not be able to ever master completely. However, the degree to which a candidate can effectively resonate with his audiences will reflect how close (or how far away) he is to winning the presidency. If the candidate's rhetoric does not sit well with his audiences, he risks throwing away his chances for the presidency.

Constraints

Constraints are defined by Grant-Davie (1997) as “factors in the situation's context that may affect the achievement of the rhetorical objectives.” The candidate as the rhetor must maneuver around and through constraints in order to be successful in the debate.

A candidate's own integrity and receptivity act as contradictory constraints, as the president must work within the constraints of what he has prepared, but must remain calm and respond when the debate throws him a fork in the road. In this high-pressure situation, the president must maneuver existing constraints to make sure that something he spontaneously says does not cost him a vital audience, or worse, the election.

The setting of a presidential debate itself has many constraints. For one, the format of the debate, whether it be formal or town-hall style, constrains how the moderator controls the debate and who asks the questions in the debate. The rules regarding format and timing, tirelessly negotiated between both campaigns and the Commission on Presidential Debates, also greatly constrains the candidates, as they are limited by limits on timing, rebuttals, closing statements,

and the subjects that each debate contains (i.e. domestic or policy issues, or more specifically, issues such as taxes or the War in Iraq). In addition to the subjects presented to each debate, the questions that are asked regarding each subject provide a constraint to the candidates, as they not only dictate the debate itself, but also test the candidates' ability to use their receptivity to match what they've practiced to answer the question at hand. To make it harder, historically, debate moderators have chosen to keep the debate questions to themselves prior to the start of the debate. As once stated by moderator Jim Lehrer during the first presidential debate of 2000, "The questions and the subjects were chosen by me alone. I have told no one from the two campaigns, or the Commission, or anyone else involved what they are" (CPD, 2000). Finally, the medium of the debates, usually broadcast through television and radio, provide constraints for the candidates, as they must navigate certain debate tactics pertinent to this medium. Constraints are also created by debate speech and rhetoric as the debate plays out. Candidates are often constrained by what their opponents level against them, and are forced to respond against their opponent's allegations instead of talking about the issue at hand.

However, constraints should not just be considered as negative factors that hinder candidates during debates. There are also constraints that the rhetor can harness to his advantage (Grant-Davie, 1997). For example, the constraint of time could be considered to be a hindrance if the allotted time does not allow enough time for the candidate to express his ideals. However, if the candidate has already expressed his ideals and has time to spare, he can use this extra time in the spotlight to highlight his stance on another issue, a popular move used by presidential candidates to clear up "falsehoods" portrayed by their opponent about themselves.

Exigence

Exigence is defined as “the matter and motivation of the discourse” by Grant-Davie (1997). Exigence is not just about *what* the candidate says, but *why* they are saying it. Exigencies of the candidates will include what they are speaking about, why that speech is needed, and what that speech is trying to accomplish (Grant-Davie, 1997).

A rhetor, or in this case, a presidential candidate, must respond to the exigence of the presidential debate in a way that resonates tightly with his audiences within the given constraints. It is imperative that he does this, because if his exigency does not respond to the situation that he faces, he risks losing his audience or his own credibility.

Another aspect about responding to the exigency of a presidential debate is the debate’s timing in the election. In many debates, such as in the 1992 debate Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush and Ross Perot, or in the 2008 debates between Barack Obama and John McCain, the economy took a sudden downturn during the debate period. Both Clinton and Obama succeeded greatly in utilizing the rhetorical concept of *kairos*, Greek for timing, by capitalizing on the situation of the bad economy, and using rhetoric to face this problem head-on and use that situation to their advantage.

Kairos as a Driving Force

Kairos, in the Greek language, means the timing of rhetoric. However, *kairos* means much more than just “timing” itself. According to Debra Hawhee (2004), “*Kairos* marks force. *Kairos* is thus rhetoric’s timing....quality, [and] direction.” Continuing with the example above, it wasn’t just Clinton or Obama’s timing that helped them to successfully capitalize on the bad economy, it was the hard-hitting force and relevant quality of their rhetoric that made them

successful, as they were able to resonate with their audience and make them realize how important it was to elect them as president because of the current economic situation.

Hawhee (2004) also talks about how *kairos* is a word used in the ancient culture that relates to the art of weaving. She mentions how *kairos*, in variation, is used to describe “where threads attach to the loom; the act of fastening these threads...that which is tightly woven.” In regards to rhetoric, this related example of the word *kairos* helps to describe not just the force of *kairos*, but the fact that a successful usage of *kairos* requires an intense level of relevancy. In other words, “woven,” in a weaver’s case, translates to “relevant to the times” in a rhetor’s case. The situation in which the timing of *kairos* takes place must be relevant to the audience. Continuing with the example above, the reason why capitalizing on the bad economy worked so well for Clinton and Obama was because the bad economy affected every person in the American electorate, and they were looking for a solution to make the situation better. While talking about the environment might resonate with only those that care about the environment, the economy is a relevant and close-to-home topic for every voter.

In the scholarship of rhetoric, there are two basic models for *kairos*, the accommodation and creation models of *kairos*. The accommodation model, spearheaded by rhetorician James Kinneavy (2004), dictates that “*kairos* directs the rhetor to consider to adapt to the tones and moods of the situation at hand...the character of the audience to which the speaker must suit his language and argument.”

Baumlin formulates a creation model of *kairos*, one where the “rhetor-in-charge creates his or her own operates...who operates mainly with the awareness of *kairos* responds simultaneously to the fleeting situation at hand...both a hunter and maker of unique

opportunities...ready to address improvisationally and confer meaning on new and emerging situations” (Hawhee, 2004). Baumlin’s creation model of kairos relates heavily to Cosigny’s concept receptivity, both capturing the importance of the rhetor’s ability to speak toward new situations. The creation model of kairos and receptivity can help describe the way in which all debates differ from one another, as well as the fact that no matter how much a candidate prepares for a debate, he cannot predict the outcome or his performance during the debate until that moment arrives.

Conclusion

Using the constituents of the rhetorical situation—rhetor, audience, constraints, and exigence—will give a different perspective when interpreting Operational Code belief changes. Kairos is the driving force for most of the results presented in the results overview. Based on the findings presented in the results overview, it seems that candidates and parties tailor their rhetoric based on kairos—in other words, their beliefs (and the rhetoric articulating those belief) change with the exigence and kairos of every election in order to appeal with the audience, the American electorate.

This explains why mean scores by party are not consistent from election to election, yet rise and fall together with every election, and why winners and losers were not consistent from debate to debate. Rhetorically and methodologically, the beliefs of candidates and parties are only are articulated based on what they think the American people will vote for.

With every election, there are different beliefs of the audience that the candidates must appeal to, and ideally, the candidate who was able to match his beliefs with the beliefs of the American electorate won the election.

It is important to remember the relationships between rhetoric, audience, constraints, exigence and kairos, as they will illustrate why beliefs changed in the way that they did, and to what extent throughout the years. As candidates are analyzed in the upcoming case studies, they will be evaluated on whether they were able to connect with their audience in a way that wins them the presidency. This also includes how well each candidate effectively capitalized on their exigency through the use of kairos, using the timing of their campaign and the debates to their advantage.

CASE STUDY: RONALD REAGAN, 1980-1984

INTRODUCTION

Out of any other candidate studied in this thesis, Ronald Reagan is the one that was able to nearly unite the entire nation with his rhetoric, with victories in 45 states in 1980, and victories 49 out of 50 states during his re-election in 1984. His role as “The Great Communicator” in the face of this overwhelming victory is quite significant in terms of the Operational Code. Interestingly enough, Reagan was a leader who won the presidency and his re-election by landslides during a time period in which the lowest Operational Code mean scores were exhibited, by both him and his Democratic opponents Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale. While Carter’s scores are completely different from Reagan’s it seems that Mondale’s scores were somewhat closer to Reagan’s, possibly signifying that Mondale attempted to be closer rhetorically to Reagan.

This chapter will focus on Ronald Reagan in terms of his Operational Code scores as shaped in presidential debates between 1980-1984. This chapter will also focus on Mondale’s attempts to imitate Reagan’s Operational Code scores, as well as significance of this finding.

Reagan’s Role As A Rhetor In The 1980-1984 Elections

The Election of 1980

As the opposition against the Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter who had an ill-fated presidency, Ronald Reagan gained ethos, or credibility, as a rhetor by opposing Carter on many issues, but more importantly, being the kairotic answer to many of America’s problems.

For example, one of the problems with President Carter's stance on inflation was that, according to Abramson et al. (1982), he placed it "at the top of his economic priorities" at a time when inflation was at record highs. Therefore, as Abramson et al. (1982) put it, "Carter, as president, was held responsible by many for high inflation and interest rates..." Reagan, coming in with his plans of supply-side economics, was, in a sense, the kairoitic anecdote that would cure Carter's Democratic fiscal policies that had led to high inflation and interest rates.

In regards to the two party platforms at their respective conventions, it seems that Reagan and the Republicans were out to change foreign policy direction from that of the Democrats as well. Since it was perceived that President Carter terribly handled the Iran Hostage Crisis, Reagan's foreign policies again swept in as relief for Carter's perceived ineffectiveness.

Carter supposedly "got mean" during the election, but what else was he supposed to do when his own popularity was dropping due to the fact that his opponent was the supposed kairoitic anecdote to all that he had done wrong during his presidency?

The results of the 1980 election made it pretty clear that Reagan had entranced America as a rhetor with his rhetoric and beliefs. Reagan won 50.8% of the popular vote and forty-four of the states, while Carter had won only 41.0% of the vote and only six states plus D.C., while Anderson won 6.6% of the popular vote and zero states. These results showed America's need to get rid of Carter and replace him with someone like Reagan, a person who they felt had what it took to lead them through the 1980's with confidence and vigor that had been absent from the presidency for so long.

The Election of 1984

As a president who had to defend his own record, Reagan's role as a rhetor had changed quite a bit from the 1980 election. No longer was he the one that was rallying against an opponent, but he was trying to garner his same supporters with a presidential record.

During his first term as president, Reagan's implementation of supply-side economics resulted in a brief recession in 1982, however, the economy miraculously recovered between 1983-1984. Unemployment had also actually gone down during Reagan's term to 8.2% in 1983. In addition, the inflation rate at the time of Reagan's re-election was below 5%, which was significantly less compared to the rate of inflation of when Carter had run for re-election, which was 13.5% at the time. Lastly, Reagan's approval rating at the time that he left office stood at a whopping 61% (Abramson et al., 1986). It seems like what Reagan had promised he had mostly delivered, which was good, because the American people were desperate for results when they had elected him back in 1980, and were satisfied enough to elect him again in 1984.

For the election of 1984, the Democratic Party that was automatically "on the defensive" throughout the election, trying to justify "why a Democrat should be elected instead of Reagan" (Abramson et al., 1982). Considering that Reagan's ethos as a rhetor, his relevant exigence during the election, and his strong kairotic ties with the issues that he articulated during his campaign, this was a poor choice of rhetoric exigence for the Democrats, as if they were willing putting themselves in front of a speeding train.

Reagan's scores for value P1 decrease to the lowest P1 score out of all other presidents. In 1980, he held a P1 score of .2250, which dropped to .0650 in 1984. This means that Reagan

believed that the nature of the political universe was hostile more so than any other presidential candidate.

Reagan's P2 scores follow this same pattern. Reagan's P2 score in 1980 was .0500, which dropped to -.0200 in 1984, against, making his score the lowest score out of all of the other presidential candidates. This demonstrates that Reagan was the most pessimistic out of the other presidents regarding the realization of his political values.

Reagan's score for P4 actually increases between 1980-1984, changing from .2650 to .3300. Reagan's I1 score decreased during this time period, while his I2 score decreased. His I1 score decreased from .3700 in 1980 to .3350 in 1984, while his I2 score increased from .1050 in 1980 to .1250 in 1984. This means that from the time period between running for office and his re-election, Reagan believed in more conflict-oriented tactics but more cooperative strategies.

Since Reagan's belief had a significant standing in regards to the amount of votes he received in the 1980 election, this sent out a clear message to his Democratic opponents. Mondale, attempting to capture the kairos that Reagan had during the 1980 elections, had articulated his beliefs in a similar manner—not in a manner that strayed against the views of the Democratic Party, but in a way which communicated that, on a very fundamental and basic world, was looking at the same world and election period as Reagan.

How Reagan's Opponents Measure Up; Mondale's Mistake

When comparing Reagan to his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, it seems as if the Democrats were attempting to match their rhetoric to the tone of the 1984 campaign, bending their rhetoric to act more like Reagan's resulting in low scores across most of the values. Mondale's scores sometimes come close to Reagan's, but considering that Reagan

overwhelmingly won both the popular and electoral votes, it's clear that his ideas still separated him from Reagan, even though his belief scores were in the vicinity of Reagan's.

Carter and Mondale react quite differently to Reagan in regards to their mean scores for the value P1. Carter's P1 score of .5000 dropped to Mondale's score of .1400 in 1984. Reagan's P1 score plunged as well, as he scored .2250 in 1980, and .0650 in 1984. It seems that kairos and historical factors seem responsible for the fact that both parties plunged in scores from 1980-1984, but there's more to the story. In 1980, Carter was very high up in comparison to Reagan on this value, and essentially made no effort to be like Reagan on this score. Noting Carter's losses, Mondale tried to make his rhetoric a little more like Reagan's in order to win the election. This attempt, however, was unsuccessful, because he had rhetorically articulated that he believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile than Reagan had articulated it to be. It seems like Mondale's rhetoric on this value changed because of kairos, but also because he wanted to get on a level that was close to Reagan's beliefs, even though their campaign ideas were completely different.

The Democrats had a similar reaction in mean scores with value P2, as Mondale's scores dropped to be in the same ballpark as Reagan's scores. The Democrats' scores for P2 dropped dramatically from 1980-1984, while Reagan's changes between scores during this time period are not that significant. Carter's mean score for P2 in 1980 was .3600, while Mondale's score in 1984 was .0350. Reagan's score in 1980 was .0500, and in 1984, it had dropped to -.0200. This essentially means that the Democrats believed that Carter's mean score had been too high for this value in 1980, considering his loss. So, with Mondale, they sought to match his beliefs/rhetoric more towards Reagan. They did this to a significant degree with a mean score difference of

.3250, but they did not go far enough, as Mondale's score still sits above Reagan's mean score for this value in 1984.

Going along with their instincts to articulate the situation of the 1984 election, their scores for I1 and I2 show that tried to hard in this regard. The Democrats' score for I1 fell significantly between 1980-1984, but Reagan's scores barely decreased during that time. Both Carter's and Reagan's I1 score was .3700 in 1980, but in 1984, Mondale's score dropped down the Democrats down to .1650, while Reagan's had barely decreased at .3350. Similar findings were discovered with value I2, where the score decreased for the Democrats from .1200 to .0350, but increased for Reagan, from .1050 to .1250. In both of these cases, Mondale, possibly trying to rhetorically match Reagan, went too far with his efforts in this regard, rhetorically articulating that he believed in more conflicted-oriented strategies than Reagan did, which did not resonate well with the American people.

With the P4 value, the Democrats followed the same trend as Reagan, but still were not close enough to make an impact. The scores for P4 actually increased during this period. In 1980, Carter's mean score for P4 showed that he had the lowest belief in his ability to control historical development out of every election cycle, .1700, in 1984, Mondale's score was .2580. Reagan's score rose as well, although with a much smaller influx than the Democrats', from .2650 in 1980 to .3300 in 1984. Mondale, again, tried to match his rhetoric in regards to Reagan, but still came up short with a lower score than Reagan had in 1984.

When comparing Reagan's mean scores to those of the Democrats, it is clear that the Democrats realized that they needed to change their outlook when they reflected upon Jimmy Carter's performance in the 1980 election. Walter Mondale's Operational Code scores in the

1984 election came relatively close to Reagan's at times, but he still lost the election in an ass-kicking defeat against Reagan.

Conclusion

Reagan's rhetoric was a strong force attributing to his landslide victories in the 1980 and 1984 elections. In his first election, Reagan gained ethos as a rhetor by acting as the kairotic answer to America's problems. He won 50.8% of the popular vote and 44 states in his first election, and an overwhelming victory for his kairotic rhetoric. In his second election, Reagan's exigence changed as a result of his incumbency, but his kairotic connection with the American people was still strong.

In the 1984 election, Reagan exhibited some of the lowest Operational Code scores out of all of the presidential candidates that were studied. Out of the candidates that were studied, Reagan believed that the nature of the political universe was the most hostile, and he was the most pessimistic about the realization of his political values. In regards to his other Operational Code beliefs, Reagan believed in more conflict-oriented tactics but more cooperative strategies.

As shown by the plunge in the Democrats' Operational Code scores from 1980-1984, it is clear that the Democrats were not happy at all with Carter's performance in the 1980 election. Therefore, for the 1984 election, the Democrats chose a candidate that saw the world through a Reagan-like pair of eyes on the fundamental level. It turns out that Reagan's beliefs carried such a strong segment of the population that the Democrats found the need to imitate him with Walter Mondale. Although this attempt by Reagan's opponents was unsuccessful, it further exemplifies how Reagan was able to divulge beliefs and rhetoric that were so relevant to the American electorate at that time.

CASE STUDY: THE INCUMBENTS

INTRODUCTION

In general, incumbents tend gain a lot of benefits from their incumbency. In fact, it's a candidate's incumbency that makes them more likely to win their election. However, a candidate's incumbency does not automatically determine a win or a loss for their re-election. A candidate must rely on what he has learned in office to make a plea to the electorate for why he deserves a second term. Incumbency also means a shift in rhetorical exigencies for the rhetor (the candidate). No longer is the candidate part of the opposition, trying to fight against someone else in office. He now has to use what he's experienced and accomplished in office to defend the reason why he deserves another four years in office.

Below is Figure 3, which contains the names and election years of incumbent candidates, whether they won or lost their re-election, and whether their mean scores for their values increased or decrease in value from their first election to the second. There were a few basic trends that will be described and asserted throughout this chapter.

Candidate	Win/Lose Incumbency	P1	P2	P4	I1	I2
Carter '76/'80	Lose	Increase	Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease
Reagan '80/'84	Win	Decrease	Decrease	Increase	Decrease	Increase
H.W. Bush '88/'92	Lose	Increase	Increase	Decrease	Decrease	Decrease
Clinton '92/'96	Win	Decrease	Decrease	Increase	Decrease	Increase
W. Bush '00/'04	Win	Decrease	Decrease	Stagnant	Decrease	Decrease
Obama '08/'12	Win	Increase	Increase	Increase	Decrease	Decrease

Figure 3

P1, P2, and P4 – Candidates Who Won their Re-Election, and Why

Values P1, P2, and P4 can comfortably assert who won their re-elections and why others did not, depending on whether the candidates increased or decreased on these values. Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush all won their re-election campaigns. Obama won his incumbent election as well, although his scores demonstrate an anomaly, which will be explained later in this chapter.

This particular trend starts with a quick analysis of value P1, citing a candidate's belief regarding the nature of the political universe. This belief reveals whether the candidate believes that the nature of the political universe is hostile or friendly. With Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush, they all show a decrease in the P1 value when comparing their mean scores for their first and re-election campaigns. This means that all three candidates had thought that the nature of the political universe was more hostile than they did when they first stepped into office. Reagan had a P1 score .2250 in 1980, but the score dropped to .0650 in 1984. Clinton had a decrease in this score from 1991—1996, scoring .4733 to .4450, respectively. W. Bush had a decrease in his mean scores, scoring .4233 in 2000 to .2033 in 2004. Throughout their presidencies, these candidates' views regarding this belief became increasingly hardened and pessimistic.

These candidates, along with their decreased scores for P1, also show a decrease in value for P2. This means that at the same time that candidates were learning about a more hostile view of the universe, their pessimism regarding the realization of their political values increased. So, in other words, they might have attributed the non-accomplishment of their political goals to the external nature of the political universe. Reagan had a decrease in this value, scoring .0500 in 1980 and .0350 in 1984. Clinton also had a decrease in his value from 1992-1996, scoring .2500

and .2450, respectively. Lastly, W. Bush had a decrease in this score, scoring .2133 in 2000 and .0776 in 2004.

The value of P4 actually posits an opposite or almost stagnant reaction in relation to increases and decreases for values P1 and P2. This points to a rise in belief of historical control for Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush. In relation to the other values, this might come from an assumption that while the candidate might not have all of their political goals accomplished from a more hostile world, both external values, they still feel that their internal political efficacy is still high. Reagan's scores illustrate this opposite increase, rising from .2650 in 1980 to .3300 in 1984. Clinton's scores also rise from 1992-1996 from .3133 to .3300. W. Bush's scores are stagnant, staying motionless at .3667.

This trend indicates winning values for the successful incumbents that carry this trend. The losing value of those that don't follow this trend can be exemplified by H. W. Bush's unsuccessful re-election campaign in 1992.

Bush's Unsuccessful Incumbent Election

Bush did not win his re-election against Clinton in 1992. In accordance with the model mentioned above, this was because George H. W. Bush did not think that the nature of the political universe was more hostile after his first term in office, and that he was increasingly optimistic about the realization of his political goals.

For P1, Bush scored .3100 in 1988, and scored .3800 in 1992, meaning that Bush thought that the world was more friendly in 1992 than he did in 1988, which is different from the other incumbents that had won before and after him. In 1988, Bush's debate rhetoric surrounded the idea of turning America into a "kinder and gentler nation" (cite?).

BUSH: Because I mean it when I say I want a kinder and gentler nation. This election is about big things. And perhaps the biggest is world peace. And I ask you to consider the experience I have had in working with a President who has revolutionized the situation around the world. America stands tall again, and as a result, we are credible. (CPD, 1988)

It's as if, in 1992, he really believed that he had created that "kinder and gentler" nation (CPD, 1988), because in his eyes, rhetorically defending his presidential record, he believed that the nature of the political universe was friendlier.

BUSH: I just thought of another...big difference here between me. I don't believe Mr. Perot feels this way, but I know Governor Clinton did because I want to accurately quote him. He thinks, I think he said, that the country is coming apart at the seams. Now, I know that the only way he can win is to make everybody believe the economy's worse than it is. But this country is not coming apart at the seams, for heaven's sakes. We're the United States of America. In spite of the economic problems, we're the most respected economy around the world. Many would trade for it. We've been caught up in a global slowdown. We can do much, much better, but we ought not try to convince the American people that America is a country that's coming apart at the seams. I would hate to be running for president and think that the only way I could win would be to convince everybody how horrible things are. Yes, there are big problems, and yes, people are hurting. But I believe that this Agenda for American renewal I have is the answer to do it, and I believe we can get it done now, whereas we didn't in the past, because you're going to have a whole brand new bunch of people in the Congress that are going to have to listen to the same American people I'm listening to. (CPD, 1988)

In a rhetorical situation where other incumbents have addressed a more hostile political universe, Bush denies it in the excerpt above. Slyly defending his own economic record as president, he tries to discredit his opponents by claiming that the economy is not as bad as their rhetoric portrays it to be. While he does recognize that “yes, there are big problems, and yes people are hurting,” the way that he masks it in saying that the economic situation is not as bad as portrayed to be was not cutting it for the American people. Since they were suffering through a bad economy at the time, their ears tended to perk more towards Clinton, who embraced the portrait of a bad economy in his opposing rhetoric against President Bush.

For value P2, he scored .1050 in 1988 and .1833 in 1992. This reveals that Bush was more optimistic about the realization of his political values in 1992 than when he first stepped into the Oval Office in 1988. This makes sense in relation to his P1 score, that he thought that a somewhat friendly nature of the political universe was why he was more optimistic about the realization of his political values. It is, however, different from that of other winning incumbents.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I think one thing that distinguishes is experience. I think we've dramatically changed the world. I'll talk about that a little bit later, but the changes are mind-boggling for world peace. Kids go to bed at night without the same fear of nuclear war. And change for change sake isn't enough. We saw that message in the late 70s when heard a lot about change, and what happened, that misery index went right through the roof. But my economic program is the kind of change we want. And the way we're going to get it done is we're going to have a brand new Congress. A lot of them are thrown out because of all the scandals. I'll sit down with them, Democrats and Republicans alike, and work for my agenda for American renewal, which represents real

change. But I'd say, if you had to separate out, I think it's experience at this level. (CPD, 1992)

Since Bush believed during his re-election campaign that the political universe was friendlier than it was when he first walked into office, it makes sense that he believed that a friendlier world could result in the realization of his political values. Departing from the rhetoric of incumbents past and future, Bush's confidence that he's going to get "a brand new Congress," due to external factors that "a lot of them are thrown out because of scandals," which, he seems to think, works in his favor, seems to account a little bit for Bush's increased optimism for the realization of his political values.

For P4, Bush scored .4200 in 1988, and .3667 in 1992. Therefore, Bush believed that he had less control over historical development at re-election than he did on his first day of office. His P4 degree does decrease in opposite accordance with his P1 and P2 scores. This might have been because he had an opposite way of thinking than the other winning incumbent candidates, as he might have thought because there was a somewhat friendly political universe in which he could be optimistic that his political values would be realized, in which he didn't have to rely on internal political efficacy.

Barack Obama – The Incumbent Anomaly

Unlike other incumbents, Obama did not have decreases for the values of P1 and P2, and did not have an opposite reaction in his value for P4. These trends for Obama's scores are opposite in numbers and similar in pattern to that of his fellow successful incumbents, Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush. Obama had an increase for the value of P1, scoring .2800 in 2008, and scoring .3467 in 2012. Obama had an increase for the value of P2 as well, with a mean score of

.1133 in 2008, and a score of .1533 in 2012. Finally, for the value of P4, Obama had an increase in score, from .3033 in 2008 to .3200 in 2012. So, if Obama was had a successful incumbent re-election just like Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush, why do his score increases for P1, P2, and P4 act as anomalies?

It starts off with the assumption that Obama had a similar rhetorical strategy as his other successful incumbent candidates during his first election. Like Reagan had rallied against Carter, like Clinton had rallied against H. W. Bush, and like W. Bush had rallied against Clinton, Obama had rallied against the lame-duck president, George W. Bush. Much of his campaign and debate surrounded the argument that, by electing his Republican opponent John McCain, that voters would be voting for a president that acted like George W. Bush 2.0. So, in regards to his “fight against” kind of rhetoric, Obama had begun at the same starting point as the other successful incumbent candidates. Therefore, Obama’s anomalies do not begin with questioning his Operational Code scores in 2008, it begins with asking why they increased instead of decreased in 2012 when he ran for re-election.

Even though all of the other successful incumbent presidents had a complicated exigence as presidents defending their records in office, Obama’s was slightly more complicated during his election in 2012. Like the other incumbents, Obama had to defend his presidential record, and ferociously establish and articulate why a Republican should not be elected over him as president at that time. Reagan did not have to do this to the degree of severity that Obama had to, as Walter Mondale was an easy opponent to fend off and shut down. Clinton was in the same boat. In terms of his presidential record, he portrayed it as a long list of achievements and accomplishments that deserved to be added to, and didn’t have to do too much damage to fend off Bob Dole in the

debates. Out of the other successful incumbents, Bush had to forcefully fend off Kerry in the wake of 9/11 and anti-war sentiments that Kerry was trying to capitalize on. So, if Obama had a similar exigence, why was it that Obama's scores increased while Bush's decreased?

Obama had to portray a better America in his beliefs. He, like Reagan, continually asked voters, in the debates and on the campaign trail, if they were better off than they were four years ago. In order to stay true to that sentiment, he had to believe in a better world himself. The increases in Obama's scores might have been the product of what Obama had already portrayed the world to be in 2008, and the increase in scores illustrates his attempt to bridge that gap with his rhetoric in 2012. Since he had pretty negative views regarding the Bush presidency in 2008, he had to make the point that he had actually made a difference in improving this negativity through his four years in office.

His increase in the value for P1 illustrated that he believed that the nature of the political universe was more friendly as a result of the actions that he had taken as president in office. In 2012, he stated:

OBAMA: You know, four years ago we went through the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Millions of jobs were lost, the auto industry was on the brink of collapse. The financial system had frozen up. And because of the resilience and the determination of the American people, we've begun to fight our way back. Over the last 30 months, we've seen 5 million jobs in the private sector created. The auto industry has come roaring back. And housing has begun to rise. But we all know that we've still got a lot of work to do. And so the question here tonight is not where we've been, but where we're going... Now, it ultimately is going to be up to the voters -- to you -- which path

we should take. Are we going to double on top-down economic policies that helped to get us into this mess or do we embrace a new economic patriotism that says America does best when the middle class does best? And I'm looking forward to having that debate. (CPD, 2012)

In this statement, Obama strikes a very stark and deep contrast between the historic situation between the reasons why he was elected in 2008, and why he should be elected today in 2012. His values for P2 indicate the same trend, that he was more optimistic about the realization of his political values, due to what he felt that he had accomplished during his first time in office.

Obama's score for P4 also increases, which is opposite to the trend that is apparent with the other successful incumbents. While other incumbents believed that their political efficacy had increased due to their more hostile views about the nature of the political universe and their increased pessimism regarding the realization of their political values, Obama held that the opposite was true. By the time of re-election, Obama had believed that the nature of the political universe had become friendlier, was more optimistic about the realization of his political values, and that he had increased control over historical development. Obama makes it very clear that he, as president, has accomplished certain achievements for the American people, and constantly attributes these achievements to himself. His plans for the future are also very centered on himself as well, as demonstrated by the statement from one of the 2012 debates below:

OBAMA: When I walked into the Oval Office, I had more than a trillion-dollar deficit greeting me. And we know where it came from: two wars that were paid for on a credit card; two tax cuts that were not paid for; and a whole bunch of programs that were not paid for; and then a massive economic crisis. And despite that, what we've said is, yes,

we had to take some initial emergency measures to make sure we didn't slip into a Great Depression, but what we've also said is, let's make sure that we are cutting out those things that are not helping us grow...we went after medical fraud in Medicare and Medicaid very aggressively, more aggressively than ever before, and have saved tens of billions of dollars, \$50 billion of waste taken out of the system. And I worked with Democrats and Republicans to cut a trillion dollars out of our discretionary domestic budget. That's the largest cut in the discretionary domestic budget since Dwight Eisenhower. Now, we all know that we've got to do more. And so I've put forward a specific \$4 trillion deficit reduction plan. It's on a website. You can look at all the numbers, what cuts we make and what revenue we raise. And the way we do it is \$2.50 for every cut, we ask for \$1 of additional revenue, paid for, as I indicated earlier, by asking those of us who have done very well in this country to contribute a little bit more to reduce the deficit. (CPD, 2012)

In this statement, when clearly outlining how the deficit has been reduced, he attributes these steps to himself, demonstrating how he has directly affected historical development in regards to the reduction of the deficit.

As demonstrated, it is clear that Obama's increased scores for values P1, P2, and P4 between his election to office in 2008 and his re-election in 2012 are anomalies, but they show how his changing exigency and his rhetoric caused these increases. In 2008, Obama had painted a very dark picture of the United States with his rhetoric, and in 2012, as the defending incumbent president, had to put more optimistic faith in the situation that he had worked so hard to improve during his first term in office.

Conclusion

As rhetors, incumbent presidents change during this period, due to the lessons that they have learned with their experience in office regarding their beliefs. Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush showed a decrease in P1 between their first and second elections, signifying that they increasingly believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile. These three candidates also showed a decrease for P2, showing an increasing pessimism regarding the realization of their political values. This might be because the candidates might have attributed the non-accomplishment of their political goals to the increasingly hostile universe. These candidates also showed an increase for P4, meaning that they believed more in their effect on control over historical development. This might come from an assumption that while they might not have accomplished their goals as a result of a hostile political universe, their political efficacy still ranked very high.

George H.W. Bush, who, in 1992, lost his re-election race, did not exhibit this winning pattern. In contrast to the other candidates, he believed that the nature of the political universe was friendlier, he was most optimistic about the realization of his political values, and that he had less control over historical development than he did when he first entered office.

Obama's score make his the anomaly of the successful incumbent presidential candidates. He exhibited an increase for P1, P2, and P4, meaning that he believed that the nature of the political universe was friendly, he was more optimistic about the realization of his political goals, and that he had a higher sense of historical development. This unique increase in scores was due to the fact that Obama's rhetorical task was slightly different from that of Reagan, Clinton, or W. Bush. Since Obama's rhetoric portrayed the historical situation so negatively in his first election

in 2008, he had to rhetorically craft a sentiment that the country was in a better place as an incumbent president.

This trend outlining successful incumbent victories shows how presidents must shift their rhetoric from their first election to their re-election. It will certainly be interesting to learn if this incumbent trend regarding the relationship between the values of P1, P2, and P4 continues in the future, but if it does not, it is clear that this trend does shine light on the changing rhetoric of incumbent presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.

THE 2004 ELECTION CASE STUDY: THE CLOSE RHETORIC BETWEEN GEORGE W. BUSH AND JOHN KERRY

INTRODUCTION

The ultimate goal of campaign rhetoric is for candidates and their campaigns to match their rhetoric to the audience's needs and expectations. While some presidential candidates miss the mark on rhetorically articulating their beliefs to their audience, John Kerry and George W. Bush were both spot on for their presidential debate rhetoric in 2004. The 2004 debates contained the closest mean scores across all values; P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2. Bush's changes in beliefs as an incumbent in the 2004 election also illustrate well the change in exigence between elections, and Kerry's similarities to Bush's scores exemplify the Democrat's ability to pick an effective challenger against their opponent. This case study is going to explain the scores and their similarities, and the significance of those similarities.

The 2004 Election and the Candidate's Exigence in Relation to Kairos

Looking at the historical occurrences that surrounded the 2004 election, there was a very tight focus surrounding debate issues, which explains one reason for why the scores are so close. Right after the 2000 Presidential Elections, the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks occurred. Not long after, new-to-office President Bush declared a War on Terror, and proceeded to invade Afghanistan to hunt down Osama Bin Laden. Soon after, President George W. Bush invaded Iraq, calling for the urgent removal of Saddam Hussein, claiming that Iraq was harboring weapons of mass destruction. At first, the war was portrayed to be a quick and easy invasion, however, after it was found that there were no weapons of mass destruction to be found in Iraq or a foreseeable end

date to the war, the Iraq War turned sour in the eyes of the American electorate, creating a significant anti-war sentiment across the nation.

These historical factors had created a roaring kairotic exigence that was desperate for a response during the 2004 election. Since these international events were the most significant events that had occurred in the past four years, there was a tight focus on these issues during the presidential debates, which illustrates, in part, Bush's and Kerry's mean scores were so similar. According to the Commission on Presidential Debates, all three debates featured questions surrounding these foreign policy issues (CPD, 2012).

Through a kairotic lens, in an immediate post-9/11 world, there was no room for a friendly view of the universe in the eyes of the American electorate—terrorism was abundant and a fearful force to be reckoned with in the world. To match this sentiment, Bush and Kerry resonated this same message throughout their presidential debate rhetoric. While Bush portrayed himself as a decisive leader who would defend America against terrorism, Kerry tried to capitalize on the current anti-war sentiments (CPD, 2012).

Bush and Kerry's presidential debate rhetoric illustrate their successful use of kairos to resonate with their audience's more fearful and cynical attitudes toward terrorism, as exemplified by the drop in mean scores for P1, P2, I1 and I2 dropped from 2000-2004. Essentially, this means that they both saw the nature of the political universe as more hostile, they were more pessimistic about the realization of political values, and they believed that more conflict-oriented strategies and tactics were necessary as a result of the post-9/11 era.

In regards to the decrease for P1, nature of the political universe, it was clear that the candidates were responding to the kairotic exigence of living in a world more prone to terrorism,

revealing that they believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile than in the 2000 debates:

BUSH: After 9/11, we had to look at the world differently. After 9/11, we had to recognize that when we saw a threat, we must take it seriously before it comes to hurt us. In the old days we'd see a threat, and we could deal with it if we felt like it or not. But 9/11 changed it all. (CPD, 2004)

As stated here, Bush depicts that the nature of the political universe has become more hostile because of the events that occurred on September 11th. As a result of a more hostile post-9/11 world, this mean that cooperative strategies and tactics would no longer be enough to work in the real world or to satisfy the American people, which is why the candidates chose to use rhetoric that echoed this conflict-minded sentiment.

The decrease for I1 and I2 can be accounted for the fact that terrorism increased the need for a more conflict-oriented world strategy and tactics, war (as opposed to a more cooperative strategy or tactic, like diplomacy).

BUSH: And I saw a unique threat in Saddam Hussein, as did my opponent, because we thought he had weapons of mass destruction. And the unique threat was that he could give weapons of mass destruction to an organization like Al Qaida, and the harm they inflicted on us with airplanes would be multiplied greatly by weapons of mass destruction. And that was the serious, serious threat. So I tried diplomacy, went to the United Nations. But as we learned in the same report I quoted, Saddam Hussein was gaming the oil-for-food program to get rid of sanctions. He was trying to get rid of sanctions for a reason: He wanted to restart his weapons programs. We all thought there

were weapons there, Robin. My opponent thought there were weapons there. That's why he called him a grave threat. (CPD, 2004)

In this statement, Bush expresses his belief that diplomacy was not working well enough in his dealings with Saddam Hussein, hinting that further action was necessary. Like Bush's statement above, Kerry leaned more toward war, a conflict-based strategy and tactic, in his sentiments as well. Rhetorically, both were responding to the need for conflict-oriented strategies in this more hostile environment, exhibiting qualities that the American people wanted in a president at the time.

George W. Bush: Learning the Consequences of 9/11 in Office

The 2004 debates also showcased how incumbent candidates “learn” after spending their first term in office. While all presidents in the study showed that they had “learned” throughout their time in office, the September 11th attacks had taught President George W. Bush to look at the world from a more cynical perspective. For all belief values, George W. Bush's scores had significant decreases. His P1 values had dropped from .4233 to .2033, a difference of .22. His P2 values had decreased from .2133 to .0767, a difference of .1366. His P4 values had remained the same at .3367. His I1 values had dropped from .5933 to .4267, a difference of .1666. Finally, his I2 values had decreased, from .2500 to .1867, a difference of .0633. By the time that the 2004 elections had come around, President Bush believed that the universe had changed for the worst since 2000.

He believed that the political universe was more hostile, and that he had less control over historical development before. During the 2000 presidential debates, he stated:

BUSH: First question is what's in the best interests of the United States? What's in the best interests of our people? When it comes to foreign policy that will be my guiding question. Is it in our nation's interests? Peace in the Middle East is in our nation's interests. Having a hemisphere that is free for trade and peaceful is in our nation's interests. Strong relations in Europe is in our nation's interest. I've thought a lot about what it means to be the president. I also understand that an administration is not one person, but an administration is dedicated citizens who are called by the president to serve the country, to serve a cause greater than self, and so I've thought about an administration of people who represent all America, but people who understand my compassionate and conservative philosophy. (CPD, 2000)

In 2004, his stance had become more hostile:

BUSH: This nation of ours has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideology of hate. And that's what they are. This is a group of killers who will not only kill here, but kill children in Russia, that'll attack unmercifully in Iraq, hoping to shake our will. We have a duty to defeat this enemy. We have a duty to protect our children and grandchildren. The best way to defeat them is to never waver, to be strong, to use every asset at our disposal, is to constantly stay on the offensive and, at the same time, spread liberty. (CPD, 2004)

It's obvious that the presidency gave George W. Bush a much different, more hostile view of the world. As demonstrated by the debate rhetoric above, in 2000, Bush talked about a less hostile environment, speaking of peace in terms of our national interest. This is drastically different from the stance he developed after his post-9/11 presidency in 2004, where he speaks of "an ideology of hate," and a motivation to defeat the enemy. George W. Bush had been able to take

what he had learned during his first term in office and rhetorically articulated these newfound beliefs of a more hostile world to win the 2004 election.

He was also more pessimistic about the prospects for the realization of his political values, and now believed that conflict-oriented strategies and tactics were the most effective ones in the universe.

BUSH: I agree with him. The world is better off without Saddam Hussein. I was hoping diplomacy would work. I understand the serious consequences of committing our troops into harm's way. It's the hardest decision a president makes. So I went to the United Nations. I didn't need anybody to tell me to go to the United Nations. I decided to go there myself. And I went there hoping that, once and for all, the free world would act in concert to get Saddam Hussein to listen to our demands. They passed the resolution that said, "Disclose, disarm, or face serious consequences." I believe, when an international body speaks, it must mean what it says. Saddam Hussein had no intention of disarming. Why should he? He had 16 other resolutions and nothing took place. As a matter of fact, my opponent talks about inspectors. The facts are that he was systematically deceiving the inspectors. That wasn't going to work. That's kind of a pre-September 10th mentality, the hope that somehow resolutions and failed inspections would make this world a more peaceful place. He was hoping we'd turn away. But there was fortunately others beside myself who believed that we ought to take action. (CPD, 2004).

One reason for Bush's increased pessimism regarding the realization of his political values is his articulated experiences with the United Nations in dealing with Saddam Hussein. In this experience, it's clear that his political values were not realized to his satisfaction. As a result, he

rhetorically articulated his desire for more conflict-oriented tactics and strategies where he says that “there were others beside myself that believed that we ought to take action.” This excerpt further illustrates the increases in Bush’s pessimism regarding this value, as he had learned during his time in office that cooperative-oriented strategies and tactics were not enough to see his political values realized in office.

John Kerry: The Embodiment of Kairos Himself

John Kerry, as a candidate himself, embodies kairos as a rhetor. In order to properly meet the needs of an American electorate who saw the world just as cynically as President Bush did, the Democrats needed someone who was well-versed in foreign policy, who could echo these same sentiments, as well as have the capability to credibly criticize the President’s misguidance in handling the major events in his presidency that caused these sentiments in the first place. In order to fulfill the need of the “foreign-policy president” in a post-9/11 world, the Democrats thought that it would be wisest to choose Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts as their candidate. Kerry, a celebrated and experienced war veteran and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the most qualified foreign-policy experts in the Democratic Party (this still stands today, as he currently serves as Secretary of State under President Barack Obama). The similar of mean scores between John Kerry and George W. Bush exemplify the Democrats’ extraordinary effort in picking a candidate who could give their opponent a healthy source of opposition during the debates and the election.

While Kerry was very closely matched with President Bush in mean belief scores, he might have rhetorically overshot his cynicism, citing his overall loss in the election. For every value except for P4, his belief in historical control, he had scored lower mean scores than Bush.

Kerry's overshot cynicism lies in his exigence in trying to rhetorically defeat President Bush. As President, George W. Bush's exigency had the task of responding to a cynical world, but one in which he was still able to lead. Kerry's exigence had the harder task of responding to a more hostile world and criticizing the president's actions in addressing that hostile world, leaving him little room to do much else in his presidential debate rhetoric.

Kerry rhetorically articulated that he believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile than Bush, just under by .0266.

KERRY: Now, how do we achieve it is the most critical component of it. I believe that this president, regrettably, rushed us into a war, made decisions about foreign policy, pushed alliances away. And, as a result, America is now bearing this extraordinary burden where we are not as safe as we ought to be. The measurement is not: Are we safer? The measurement is: Are we as safe as we ought to be? And there are a host of options that this president had available to him, like making sure that at all our ports in America containers are inspected. Only 95 percent of them -- 95 percent come in today uninspected. That's not good enough. People who fly on airplanes today, the cargo hold is not X-rayed, but the baggage is. That's not good enough. Firehouses don't have enough firefighters in them. Police officers are being cut from the streets of America because the president decided to cut the COPS program. So we can do a better job of homeland security. I can do a better job of waging a smarter, more effective war on terror and guarantee that we will go after the terrorists. (CPD, 2004)

In the excerpt above, it is obvious that Kerry is spread pretty thin with the amount of things that his exigence has to respond to in this one passage. Kerry has a very complicated exigence, as he

has to refute the President's record and contrast it with his own stance and policies of how he would do better, also while resonating with the American people as he articulates his beliefs. This complicated exigence is illustrated many times in the statement above where Kerry first sets up his rhetoric by portraying a country in need ("America is not as safe as it ought to be"), presenting an alternative option to the American people ("The measurement is, 'Are we as safe as we ought to be?"), contrasting himself from the president ("not good enough"), and establishing himself as the alternative leader ("I can do a better job of waging a smarter, more effective war on terror..."). This was an awful lot for Kerry to exude in less than a moment's time, illustrating why his multi-faceted exigence essentially bogged him down in the rhetorical articulation of his beliefs, portraying himself as the more negative candidate in this aspect.

Kerry's P2 values were only .0100 lower than Bush's, and his I2 values were only .0034 lower than Bush's scores, exhibiting only slightly more pessimism regarding the realization of his political values and conflict-oriented tactics than President Bush.

KERRY: I can make American safer than President Bush has made us. And I believe President Bush and I both love our country equally. But we just have a different set of convictions about how you make America safe. I believe America is safest and strongest when we are leading the world and we are leading strong alliances. I'll never give a veto to any country over our security. But I also know how to lead those alliances. This president has left them in shatters across the globe, and we're now 90 percent of the casualties in Iraq and 90 percent of the costs. I think that's wrong, and I think we can do better. I have a better plan for homeland security. I have a better plan to be able to fight the war on terror by strengthening our military, strengthening our intelligence, by going

after the financing more authoritatively, by doing what we need to do to rebuild the alliances, by reaching out to the Muslim world, which the president has almost not done, and beginning to isolate the radical Islamic Muslims, not have them isolate the United States of America. I know I can do a better job in Iraq. I have a plan to have a summit with all of the allies, something this president has not yet achieved, not yet been able to do to bring people to the table. We can do a better job of training the Iraqi forces to defend themselves, and I know that we can do a better job of preparing for elections.

(CPD, 2004)

Again, this cynicism comes from the fact that Kerry's complicated exigence had multiple tasks—refuting the president, promoting his own presidential agenda, and resonating with the American electorate. He even started off the above opening statement by immediately contrasting himself with President Bush. Every time he mentioned a “better plan,” or a “better job,” he was trying to strike Bush within his rhetoric. It was in this way that Kerry had to out-bet the President with his beliefs, since he figured that simply matching George W. Bush in his rhetoric was not going to be enough. Kerry's score, slightly lower than Bush's, exemplifies his struggle with his exigence in this way.

It seems, according to the data, that Kerry's extra degree of cynicism held the key to President Bush's successes in the election. Interestingly enough, however, John Kerry won the two debates that Bush had lost, the third debate between them resulting in a tie.

Conclusion

The 2004 Presidential Debates illustrate just how closely George W. Bush and John Kerry were able to match their exigence to the kairos of the post-9/11 world.

The September 11th Terrorist Attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the War on Iraq created a roaring exigence and tight focus that the candidates were eager to respond to during the 2004 presidential debates. In responding to this exigence, the candidates tailored their beliefs to match the kairos of the time, which was more hostile and pessimistic than it was in 2004. These historical events had caused a decrease in all scores, P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2, which spawned from the negative rhetoric articulated about these events. Both Bush and Kerry saw the nature of the political universe as more hostile, they both were more pessimistic about the realization of their political goals, and they believed that more conflict-oriented strategies were necessary in a post-9/11 era.

Bush, the defending incumbent President, had taken the pessimistic lessons he had learned in office, and used it to win re-election as the President who would lead the country through these difficult times, which explains his decreases in scores across the board. Kerry embodied kairos as a presidential candidate, being one of the most qualified and electable foreign policy experts in the Democratic Party, he was able to echo Bush's concerns about living in a post-9/11 world while credibly criticizing his incumbent opponent. Even though Kerry's scores were very similar to Bush's it seems that Kerry overshot his cynicism due to his complicated exigence in the 2004 debates, citing his loss in the 2004 election.

Both Kerry and Bush were highly accurate in their ability to capitalize on the kairotic beliefs and events of the 2004 election, something that was never accomplished in the debates that took place before their election or after.

INDEPENDENTS: JOHN ANDERSON AND ROSS PEROT, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a very dominating two party system. As a result, independents tend to be left out or pushed to the side of major party candidates for a couple of reasons. First, when independents run as candidates in presidential election, their popular ideas get swallowed or stolen by the major party candidates. It is in this way that independents pull major party candidates more to the left or to the right, but this ends up harming independents in their own candidacy. In addition, independent candidates tend to take away votes from each of the major party candidates.

In studying the Operational Codes of independent presidential candidates John B. Anderson and Ross Perot, it further proved that third party candidates don't work well in the US two-party system because they are either not mainstream enough or rhetorically accurate enough to win. John B. Anderson's Operational Code beliefs had rhetorically missed the mark compared to the Operational Codes of his major party candidates. Ross Perot's Operational Code mean scores, which often fell between those of his major-party opponents, illustrated how he was able to take away some of his major-party opponents' voting population, but not to a high enough degree to win the presidency.

John B. Anderson: Rhetorically Missing the Mark

John B. Anderson was a representative in the U.S. House for his district in Illinois. Although he was originally a Republican during his time in the House, he declared himself as an Independent for the 1980 presidential election, and made it onto the ballot in all fifty states.

Anderson's candidacy and platform were considered to be right-winged, but not as much as ultra-conservative Reagan. John B. Anderson received 6.61% of the vote, while Democrat and incumbent President Jimmy Carter won 41.04% of the vote and 7 states, and Republican winner Ronald Reagan won 50.75% of the vote and 43 states.

Jimmy Carter, the Democratic incumbent, had spent four years in office. Many in the electorate had thought that Carter had handled the Iran Hostage crisis in a terrible manner (Abramson et al., 1982). In addition to the hostage crisis, a poor economy had emerged during Carter's presidency, resulting in inflation and high unemployment rates (Abramson et al., 1982). According to Abramson et al., Carter tried to defend his position in office by giving off the vibe that "Reagan is awful. Don't vote for him" (1982). Reagan, the Republican challenger, heavily criticized the Carter presidency, claiming that "Carter was a failure, but I will do better. Here is my program. It is different from his, so you know that I will not repeat the same mistakes" (Abramson et al., 1982). As the Independent candidate, Anderson had to foster a position between the two major party candidates, portraying himself as "different from and preferable to both Reagan and Carter (Abramson et al., 1982).

ANDERSON: President Carter was not right a few weeks ago when he said that the American people were confronted with only two choices, with only two men, and with only two parties. I think you've seen tonight in this debate that Governor Reagan and I have agreed on exactly one thing - we are both against the reimposition of a peacetime draft. We have disagreed, I believe, on virtually every other issue. I respect him for showing tonight - for appearing here, and I thank the League of Women Voters for the opportunity that they have given me. I am running for President as an Independent

because I believe our country is in trouble. I believe that all of us are going to have to begin to work together to solve our problems. (CPD, 1980).

Anderson's strategy might have not been the best idea, as most of his Operational Code scores were way off from those his fellow major-party opponents. Reflecting upon the percentage of the vote that he received from the American electorate, it is clear that his strategy of trying to stand out from his major party opponents left him out in the cold instead. This was because, in regards to kairos, the American electorate was looking for a conservative like Reagan to replace Carter, as they were dissatisfied with his performance in office. Anderson had the easy task of speaking with an exigence that separated himself from liberal Carter, but also had to distinguish himself from also-conservative Reagan in the same exigence—a much more difficult task. By putting himself in a place that distanced himself from both candidates, even the one favored by the audience in terms of kairos, Anderson ended up articulating beliefs that did not resonate with the American electorate in a manner that was appropriate to their needs, wants and expectations in a president at the time.

Anderson's belief in his ability to control historical development, much different than that of Carter's and Reagans, did not sit well with the American electorate. Anderson's mean score for P4, .3200 falls way above Reagan's and Carter's scores, .2650 and .1700 respectively. Even though Anderson was ideologically close to conservative Reagan, he was very different on this value from his Republican counterpart. Anderson's high belief and articulation of his own control of historical development shows that he was rhetorically "off" on this value.

ANDERSON: I believe that all of us are going to have to begin to work together to solve our problems...and therefore, I think you ought to consider doing something about it, and

voting for an Independent in 1980. You know, a generation of office seekers has tried to tell the American people that they could get something for nothing. It's been a time, therefore, of illusion and false hopes, and the longer it continues, the more dangerous it becomes. We've got to stop drifting.

By asking the American people to “do something about it,” he’s rhetorically reflecting his own values on the American people, implying that he’s going to “do something about it” and blow past the “generation of office seekers that [have told] the American people that they could get something for nothing” like major-party candidates Carter and Reagan. In this way, Anderson was over-compensating for his desire to stand out, because he wasn’t exactly on point about major parties. As illustrated by the statement above, it was clear that he thought that the American people did not want a major party candidate at all—but the truth was, they weren’t fed up with the major party system just yet, it’s just that they desperately wanted someone else in office.

Other scores which illustrate Anderson’s failed attempt of standing from the major party candidates are his mean scores for I1 and I2, citing his beliefs for the approach and pursuit of goals, respectively. Anderson’s mean score for I1 of .5800 is way, way above Reagan’s (.3700) and Carter’s (.3700), which had an identical mean score for this value. This shows that the parties and candidates hit this value right on the money in terms of audience, believing and saying that a somewhat cooperative-oriented strategy was the best in the universe. On the other hand, it shows that Anderson’s belief that a very cooperative-oriented strategy was the best in the universe, his belief as an independent candidate that did not resonate with the mainstream American electorate. Anderson’s mean score for I2, .1900, is a little above Reagan’s mean score

of .1050 and Carter's mean score of .1200, which are pretty close together. While Reagan and Carter were relatively close in believing that less cooperative tactics were most effective at the time, Anderson was not mainstream enough in believing that somewhat cooperative tactics what were most effective for the time period.

Anderson's score for P2, the prospects for the realization of his political values, actually falls in-between those of his major-party opponents. Anderson's mean score, .1800, falls right between Carter's at .3600 and Reagan's at .0500. While Carter was optimistic about the prospects for the realization of his political values, Reagan was almost pessimistic. While it's possible that Carter's optimism in this regard could be a factor in the debates that relates to his loss in the election, it was Anderson's in-between attitude on this belief that did not resonate well with the American electorate.

ANDERSON: When these Presidential Debates were held just four years ago, I remember the incumbent President, who was willing to debate, President Ford, telling the American people that they simply ought not to vote for somebody who promised more than they could deliver. Well, we've seen what has happened. We haven't gotten either the economies in Government that were promised; we haven't gotten the 4% inflation that we were supposed to get at the end of Mr. Carter's first term. Instead we had, I think, in the second quarter, a Consumer Price Index registering around 12%. And nobody really knows, with the latest increase in the Wholesale Price Index - that's about 18% on an annualized basis - what it's going to be. Let me say this. I think my programs are far less inflationary than those of Governor Reagan...I've been very careful - I have been very careful in saying that what I'm going to do is to bring Federal spending under control

first. I would like to stand here and promise the American people a tax cut, as Governor Reagan has done. But, you know, it's gotten to be about \$122 difference. Somebody worked it out. And they figured out that between the tax cut that Governor Reagan is promising the American people, and the tax cut that Jimmy Carter is promising in 1981, his is worth about \$122 more. So you, dear voters, are out there on the auction block, and these two candidates are bidding for your votes. And one is going to give you \$122 more if you happen to be in that range of about a \$20,000-a-year income. I'm going to wait until I see that that inflation rate is going down, before I even begin to phase in the business tax cuts that I've talked about. But I think, by improving productivity, they would be far less inflationary than the consumption-oriented tax cut that Governor Reagan is recommending.

In this passage, Anderson basically tried to lay himself in a position between that of Carter and Reagan by saying that he is not going to bring federal spending under control until the inflation rate comes down. However, this plan did not resonate well with the American people because the third option he provided is one that said, "wait and see." The American people did not think that they had time for a "wait and see" kind of plan to control federal spending, they wanted a plan of action that was different from Carter's which was why voters chose Reagan for the Presidency.

The only value that held Anderson relatively close to a major party candidate was P1, citing his belief about the nature of the political universe. Anderson's mean score for P1, .2500, came close to Reagan's score of .2250, which were both well below Carter's mean score of .5000. This exhibits how Anderson was ideologically conservative like Reagan, who both saw the nature of the political universe as more hostile than Carter.

The Operational Code scores of independent John B. Anderson show that this belief rhetorically missed the mark for the election of 1980. As an independent, Anderson's beliefs were not mainstream enough to win a significant amount of votes from the American electorate, further illustrating how independent candidates do not work well in the United States' dominating two-party system.

Ross Perot: Not Enough to Win the Presidency

Ross Perot was an American businessman from Texas that decided to run for office as an independent in 1992. Perot's campaign and rhetoric capitalized on the American electorate's fear of the looming deficit, as well as his independence from the Democratic and Republican parties. He ran as an independent candidate in 1992 against Democrat Bill Clinton and Republican incumbent President George H. W. Bush. Perot was able to get his name on the ballot in all 50 states. Perot ended up receiving 19% of the popular vote, while Bush received 37% of the vote, and Clinton won with 43% of the vote (Abramson et al., 1995). Perot was one of the main deciding factors that made Bill Clinton one of the few presidents to actually win the presidency with less than 50% of the vote (Abramson et al., 1995). Perot's substantial share of the popular vote had taken away votes from the two major party candidates, but not enough to become the first independent president.

George H. W. Bush, the Republican incumbent, had a relatively good first term as president. He had done a good job with the Persian Gulf War, and had high approval ratings at the time (Abramson et al., 1995). The only problem was, the 1992 elections were more focused on domestic issues, such as the economy, leaving little chance for Bush to shine in his area of expertise, foreign policy. The public had fears about the looming federal budget deficit, and the

economy worsened as Election Day drew closer (Abramson et al., 1995). Clinton and Perot were able to capitalize their campaign rhetoric around the deficit, Clinton citing his famous tagline, “It’s the economy, stupid!” while providing a plan to lessen the gap between the rich the poor, while Perot was able to use his stance as a successful businessman to speak out against NAFTA and the national debt (Abramson et. Al, 1995). While Perot’s Operational Code scores showed that he was definitely mainstream enough in the eyes of the American electorate, it appears that he was not rhetorically accurate enough to win the election.

Perot’s Operational Code score for P1, citing his belief in the nature of the political universe, illustrate this sentiment. Perot’s mean score of .4000 falls between Clinton’s score of .4733 and Bush’s score .3800, meaning that his beliefs and rhetoric were not off the chart’s like Anderson’s. However, Perot’s score is closer to Bush’s score than Clinton’s. Perot and Bush saw the political universe much more hostile than Clinton did, which is why they both lost the election.

PEROT: But I just find it fascinating that while we sit here tonight we will go into debt an additional \$50 million in an hour and a half. Now, it's not the Republicans' fault, of course, and it's not the Democrats' fault. And what I'm looking for is who did it? Now, they're the 2 folks involved so maybe if you put them together, they did it. Now, the facts are we have to fix it. I'm here tonight for these young people up here in the balcony from this college. When I was a young man, when I got out of the Navy I had multiple job offers. Young people with high grades can't get a job. People -- the 18- to 24-year-old high school graduates 10 years ago were making more than they are now. In other words, we were down to 18% of them were making -- 18- to 24-year- olds were making less than

\$12,000. Now that's up to 40%. And what's happened in the meantime? The dollar's gone through the floor. Now, whose fault is that? Not the Democrats. Not the Republicans. Somewhere out there there's an extraterrestrial that's doing this to us, I guess. And everybody says they take responsibility. Somebody somewhere has to take responsibility for this. Put it to you bluntly, American people. If you want me to be your president, we're going to face our problems. We'll deal with our problems, we'll solve our problems. We'll down our debt. We'll pass on the American dream to our children, and I will not leave our children a situation that they have today. When I was a boy it took 2 generations to double the standard of living. Today it will take 12 generations. Our children will not see the American dream because of this debt that somebody somewhere dropped on us. (CPD, 1992)

By contrasting what the world was like when he “was a young man” to the current economic situation, Perot is exemplifying that the nature of the political universe is more hostile than it used to be, resulting in the current economic plight. Even though he uses this contrast to put down the two major parties (and sarcastically, the “extraterrestrials”) and raise himself up as the “above politics” solution to America’s economic problems, the fact that he still portrays the nature of the political universe as more hostile attributes to his loss in the election.

The results are similar for Perot’s standings for P2, his beliefs regarding the realization of his political values. Perot’s mean score for P2, .2000, falls between Clinton’s mean score of .2500 and Bush’s score of .1833, but again, is closer to Bush’s score than it is to Clinton’s. This shows that as an independent candidate, Perot was close in appealing to this value, but was not close enough, as his opponents had scores that were more polarized. Clinton’s score, being the

highest of the three candidates, showed that he was the most optimistic about the prospects for the realization of his political values. Illustrated by the fact that Perot's was closer to Bush's score, the lowest of all three candidates, it was clear that Perot's score might have been moderate and not "off," but his optimism was not as high as Clinton's. Rhetorically, with an economy that was worsening, Clinton's optimism in this regard was what the American people needed in a president.

For I1, Perot's scores again illustrate his mainstream qualities but also illustrate how he did not win the election with his beliefs regarding the approach of goals. I1 had the largest range out of all of the values for the 1992 election, with Clinton at the top of the range and Bush on the bottom, and Perot in the middle. Perot's mean score of .4767 falls right between Clinton's score of .5833 and Bush's score of .2433. In this case, it's not like Perot is off on this score, it's just that he did not believe that a cooperation-oriented strategy was effective to the effect that Clinton did, illustrating why voters might have gravitated more towards Clinton than they did to Perot.

Perot's scores for the pursuit of goals are very much like his scores for other values. Perot's mean score of .1733 falls between Clinton's score of .2533 and Bush's score of .0633, but is slightly closer to Clinton's. Like the mean scores for I1, the mean scores for I2 have a large range, with Clinton on top, Perot in the middle, and Bush on the bottom. Again, Perot was able to position himself as someone who believed that somewhat cooperative strategies were the most effective in the universe to a degree that was in between the Democrat and the Republican opponents, but apparently, it was not enough.

PEROT: If the American people want to do it and not talk about it, then they ought to -- you know, I'm one person they ought to consider. If they just want to keep slow dancing

and talk about it and not do it, I'm not your man. I am results-oriented. I am action oriented. I've dealt my businesses. Getting things done in three months that my competitors took 18 months to do. Everybody says you can't do that with Congress. Sure, you can do that with Congress. Congress -- they're all good people. They're all patriots but you've got to link arms and work with them. Sure, you'll have arguments. Sure, you'll have fights. We have them all day every day. But we get the job done.

This statement is not very out of the ordinary from other generic campaign stump speeches of presidential candidates, talking about getting rid of the gridlock in Congress in order to get something done. During an election where the economy was in bad shape, the American electorate wanted something to be done, and felt that there wasn't enough time to a president that would argue back and forth with Congress. Therefore, while Perot's statement above is powerful, it does not set him above or apart from the other candidates.

P4 was the only value for which Perot did not score between the two major-party candidates. Perot's score of .2667 falls way below Clinton's score of .3133 and Bush's score of .3667. Like Anderson, Perot was way off on portraying this value through his beliefs and his rhetoric because his score on this value was much lower than those of the scores of his major-party counterparts. In this way, Perot was not able to appeal enough to the kairos of that election.

Perot's Operational Code scores illustrate how mainstream his ideas were to the American electorate at the time, but also why he did not end up winning the election of 1992.

Conclusion: The Difference Between Anderson and Perot

Major-party candidates usually count on their political parties to hustle votes for them, by way of providing a familiar ideology that voters can relate to, money, resources, and experts. To

major-party candidates, these things are considered to be automatic, but independents must provide these things for themselves. Therefore, while major-party candidates can coast by during elections on things other than their beliefs and ideas, beliefs and ideas are what set the independents apart from their major-party candidates.

For John B. Anderson, his beliefs deterred people from voting for him. Anderson received 6.61% of the vote, and zero states. He ran against incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter and Republican Ronald Reagan. As an independent candidate, Anderson had to rhetorically separate himself from his two major-party opponents. As exemplified by most of his mean scores for the Operational Code belief values, it's obvious that his beliefs were not rhetorically ready for the time period. Anderson's scores for P4, I1, and I2 were rhetorically far off from both Carter's and Reagan's scores. Anderson's belief scores exhibit that he rhetorically missed the mark in terms of kairos and audience.

As for Perot, his beliefs were not "off" like Anderson's—Perot was able to rhetorically and kairotically match his beliefs to the audience during the election of 1992, however, it just wasn't enough to win him the presidency. Perot had earned 19% of the vote during his run for office, and similarly, his Operational Code scores were much more mainstream than Anderson's. Perot, running against Republican incumbent George H.W. Bush and Democratic challenger Bill Clinton, had crafted his rhetoric to capitalize on America's fears about the looming deficit. Perot's Operational Code Scores for values P1, P2, I1, and I2 fell between those of Bush's and Clinton's. While his rhetoric was certainly kairotic and mainstream, it was not enough for him to win the election.

With both of these candidates, it seems that their beliefs were not rhetorically matched enough for the audience to vote to disrupt the long-dominant two-party system of the United States. Anderson's beliefs left him out in the cold compared to his major-party opponents, causing him to receive 6.61% of the vote. While Perot was able to rock the boat with his 19% of the vote, he did not receive enough votes to tip the boat over. These results further prove that independent candidates do not work well the United States' dominant two-party system. Both Anderson and Perot were not able to become the first non-major-party candidate to win the presidency, and the rhetorical articulations of their beliefs illustrate one factor in that result.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this research project, I set out to find 1) what beliefs were apparent and consistent over time, 2) if beliefs were exclusive to party lines, and 3) whether winners and losers of debates have similar beliefs. The answers that I found were clear cut and simple. The answers that I found were clear-cut and simple: In examining the evolution of beliefs from 1976-2012, it was found that belief values rose and fell together for almost every election, with only some anomalies. In examining whether Democratic and Republican candidates have similar operational code scores in-party, it was found that scores are not consistent on the basis of party. In other words, scores rose and fell together in terms of party lines. In finding out of there were certain beliefs that all debate and elections winners or losers share, it was evident that presidential candidates were all over the map—in other words, there was no specific evidence from the operational code scores that could necessarily determine a winner or loser of a debate, or the election.

However, finding the answers to these questions did not constitute the end of the quest to examine Operational Code beliefs as articulated in presidential debates by presidential candidates. These answers gave way to more detailed, more thought-provoking questions about the rise and fall of beliefs during election cycles. In studying the candidacy of Ronald, it was found that Reagan's electoral victories were so significant that other opponents tried to match on certain belief levels, but still came up short. In studying the incumbent candidates in this study, it was found that incumbents comfortably had similar score patterns regarding the relationships between their mean scores for P1, P2, and P4, citing their view of the nature of the political universe, their optimism or pessimism regarding the nature of political values, and their sense of

control over historical development. Lastly, the study of the two independent candidates in the study, John B. Anderson and Ross Perot, further proved through Operational Code beliefs the reasons why independent presidential candidates don't succeed in the dominating two-party system of the United States. In studying the 2004 election between John Kerry and George W. Bush, it was found that these two candidates had the closest rhetoric of all of the election cycles due to their rhetorical articulations regarding the post-9/11 era, but since Kerry overshot his rhetorical cynicism in expressing his beliefs, Bush came out on top.

Still, there are many questions left unanswered throughout these case studies regarding the relationship between rising and falling Operational Code scores and the rhetorical situation. Options for further study could include looking at the difference in scores that candidates had from individual debate to debate, post-Cold War era rhetoric and how that impacted the Operational Code scores of candidates in those elections, and how the integrity and receptivity of certain candidates affected the way in which they scored for certain values of the Operational Code.

Rhetoric and beliefs are two major driving factors in presidential debates and campaigns. Pulling from the rhetorical situation of each election, presidential candidates have been able to successfully win the presidency based on their beliefs and their rhetoric. Presidential debates add to this rhetoric momentum, allowing candidates to express their viewpoint, and more importantly, the chance to triumph over their opponent. By examining Operational Code scores of presidential candidates through the beliefs they articulate through a rhetorical lens, it is even more apparent how rhetoric truly drives the beliefs that have dominated the American political system for years.

APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL CODE SCORES AND VALUES

Value Name	Philosophical Meaning	How It's Calculated	Degrees of the Value	Interpretation
I1	Approach to goals (direction of strategy)	Calculated by subtracting the number of negative verbs from the number of positive verbs and dividing the result by total number of negative and positive verbs.	-1 (Extremely Conflict) through +1 (Extremely Cooperation) -1 (extremely) -.75 (very) -.50 (definitely) -.25 (somewhat) 0.0 (mixed) +.25 (somewhat) +.50 (definitely) +.75 (very) +1.0 (extremely)	He/she believes that a _____-oriented direction is the best strategy in this universe. He/she believes that a definitely cooperative -oriented direction is the best strategy in this universe. (-.50)
I2	Pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	Calculated by multiplying each verb by the scale values associated with its coding category, summing the results, then calculating the average (mean) score and dividing it by three.	-1 (Extremely Conflict) through +1 (Extremely Cooperation) -1 (extremely) -.75 (very) .50 (definitely) -.25 (somewhat) 0.0 (mixed) +.25 (somewhat) +.50 (definitely) +.75 (very) +1.0 (extremely)	He/she believes that _____ tactics are best under this condition. He/she believes that somewhat cooperative tactics are best under this condition. (+.25)
I3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	Takes into account the dispersion of verbs. Employs a measure of dispersion, the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) which assesses the variation in the distribution of observations among the six categories for self and others. Calculated separately for self and other attributions, the IQV scores is subtracted from 1.0 to	0.0 (Risk Averse) through 1.0 (Risk Acceptant) 0.0 (Very Low) .25 (Low) .50 (Medium) .75 (High) 1.0 (Very High)	As a leader, he/she is relatively _____ to risk. As a leader, he/she is relatively very acceptant to risk. (.93)

		estimate the predictability of this value.		
I4a	Timing of Action: flexibility of coop/conf tactics	Calculated by subtracting the absolute value of the balance index for cooperation/conflict from one.	0.0 (Flexibility) through 1.0 (Flexibility) 0.0 (Very Low) .25 (Low) .50 (Medium) .75 (High) 1.0 (Very High)	A leader's propensity to shift between cooperative/conflictual tactics is _____. A leader's propensity to shift between cooperative/conflictual tactics is extremely low. (.07)
I4b	Timing of Action: Flexibility of word/deed tactics	Calculated by subtracting the absolute value of the balance index for words/deeds from one.	0.0 (Flexibility) through 1.0 (Flexibility) 0.0 (Very Low) .25 (Low) .50 (Medium) .75 (High) 1.0 (Very High)	A leaders propensity to shift between word and deed tactics is _____. A leader's propensity to shift between word and deed tactics is high. (.74)
Punish	Utility of Means: Conflict Means (I5) (Deeds)	A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs The medium proportion of equal utility each this value is .16. Proportions that exceed or fail to reach that level are assigned higher or lower descriptions of utility. Can be analyzed proportionately or by its descriptor.	0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility) 0.0 (Very Low) .08 (Low) .16 (Medium) .24 (High) .32 (Very High)	A leader's propensity to punish is _____. A leader's propensity is very high. (.31)
Threaten	Utility of Mea	A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs	0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility) 0.0 (Very Low) .08 (Low) .16	A leader's reliance on threaten tactics is _____.

	ns: Con flict Mea ns (I5) (Wo rds)	<p>The medium proportion of equal utility each this value is .16.</p> <p>Proportions that exceed or fail to reach that level are assigned higher or lower descriptions of utility.</p> <p>Can be analyzed proportionately or by its descriptor.</p>	(Medium) .24 (High) .32 (Very High)	A leader's reliance on threaten tactics is very low. (.02)
Oppose	Utili ty of Mea ns: Con flict Mea ns (I5) (Wo rds)	<p>A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs</p> <p>The medium proportion of equal utility each this value is .16.</p> <p>Proportions that exceed or fail to reach that level are assigned higher or lower descriptions of utility.</p> <p>Can be analyzed proportionately or by its descriptor.</p>	<p>0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .08 (Low) .16 (Medium) .24 (High) .32 (Very High)</p>	<p>A leader's reliance on oppose tactics is _____.</p> <p>A leader's reliance on oppose tactics is medium. (.15)</p>
Appeal	Utili ty of Mea ns: Coo pe ra tive Mea ns (I5) (Wo rds)	<p>A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs</p> <p>The medium proportion of equal utility each this value is .16.</p> <p>Proportions that exceed or fail to reach that level are assigned higher or lower descriptions of utility.</p> <p>Can be analyzed proportionately or by its descriptor.</p>	<p>0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .08 (Low) .16 (Medium) .24 (High) .32 (Very High)</p>	<p>A leader's reliance on appeal tactics is _____.</p> <p>A leader's reliance on appeal tactics is very high. (.30)</p>
Promise	Utili ty of Mea	<p>A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs</p>	<p>0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .08 (Low) .16</p>	A leader's reliance on promise tactics is _____.

	ns: Coo pera tive Mea ns (I5) (De eds)	<p>The medium proportion of equal utility each this value is .16.</p> <p>Proportions that exceed or fail to reach that level are assigned higher or lower descriptions of utility.</p> <p>Can be analyzed proportionately or by its descriptor.</p>	(Medium) .24 (High) .32 (Very High)	A leader's reliance on promise tactics is low. (.07)
Reward	Uti lity of Mea ns: Coo pera tive Mea ns (I5) (De eds)	<p>A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs</p> <p>The medium proportion of equal utility each this value is .16.</p> <p>Proportions that exceed or fail to reach that level are assigned higher or lower descriptions of utility.</p> <p>Can be analyzed proportionately or by its descriptor.</p>	<p>0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .08 (Low) .16 (Medium) .24 (High) .32 (Very High)</p>	<p>A leader's reliance on reward tactics is _____.</p> <p>A leader's reliance on reward tactics is high. (.25)</p>
P1	Nat ure of the poli tical univ erse	<p>Calculated by subtracting the number of negative verbs from the number of positive verbs and dividing the result by total number of negative and positive verbs.</p>	<p>-1 (Extremely Hostile) through +1 (Extremely Friendly)</p> <p>-1 (extremely) -.75 (very) .50 (definitely) -.25 (somewhat) 0.0 (mixed) +.25 (somewhat) +.50 (definitely) +.75 (very) +1.0 (extremely)</p>	<p>He/she believes that the political universe is _____.</p> <p>He/she believes that the political universe is somewhat hostile. (-.25)</p>
P2	Pros pect s for reali zati on of poli tical	<p>Calculated by multiplying each verb by the scale values associated with its coding category, summing the results, then calculating the average (mean) score and dividing it by three.</p>	<p>-1 (Pessimism) through +1 (Optimism)</p> <p>-1 (extremely) -.75 (very) .50 (definitely) -.25 (somewhat) 0.0 (mixed) +.25 (somewhat) +.50 (definitely) +.75 (very) +1.0 (extremely)</p>	<p>He/she believes that the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals are _____.</p> <p>He/she believes that the prospects for</p>

	values			realizing fundamental political goals <i>are somewhat pessimistic</i> . (-.25)
P3	Predictability of political future	<p>Takes into account the dispersion of verbs. Employs a measure of dispersion, the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) which assesses the variation in the distribution of observations among the six categories for self and others.</p> <p>Calculated separately for self and other attributions, the IQV scores is subtracted from 1.0 to estimate the predictability of this value.</p>	<p>0.0 (Predictability) through 1.0 (Predictability)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .25 (Low) .50 (Medium) .75 (High) 1.0 (Very High)</p>	<p>A leader's beliefs with scores of ____ attribute _____ predictability to others and self.</p> <p>A leader's beliefs with scores of .08 attribute <i>very low</i> predictability to others and self.</p>
P4	Belief in historical control	<p>A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs</p> <p>The number of self or other attributions as a percentage of the total number of self or other attributions varies between 0.0 and 1.0.</p>	<p>0.0 (Control) through 1.0 (Control)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .25 (Low) .50 (Medium) .75 (High) 1.0 (Very High)</p>	<p>A leader with a score of ____ believes that he/she has a ____ degree of control over historical development.</p> <p>A leader with a score of .47 believes that he/she has a <i>medium</i> degree of control over historical development.</p>
P5	Role of Chance	<p>Calculated by multiplying the leader's scores for the beliefs regarding predictability of the political future and the degree of control over historical development, and subtracting the product from one.</p> <p>The logic of the index is</p>	<p>0.0 (Chance) through 1.0 (Chance)</p> <p>0.0 (Very Low) .25 (Low) .50 (Medium) .75 (High) 1.0 (Very High)</p>	<p>A leader with an index of ____ attributes a _____ role to chance.</p> <p>A leader with an index of .96 attributes a <i>very high</i> role to chance.</p>

		that the higher the predictability of the political future and the greater the leader's belief in his or her ability to control historical development, the less the role of chance.		
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APPENDIX B: DEBATE WINNERS AND LOSERS

Election Year	Debate Date	Winner	Loser(s)	Citation
1976	September 26	Gerald Ford - R	Jimmy Carter - D	Schroeder - pg 101
	October 6	Jimmy Carter - D	Gerald Ford - R	Schroeder - pg 101
	October 22	Jimmy Carter - D	Gerald Ford - R	Schroeder - pg 101
1980	September 21	Ronald Reagan - R	John Anderson - I	Change and Continuity, Pg 45, 1982
	October 28	Ronald Reagan - R	Jimmy Carter - D	Change and Continuity, Pg 45, 1982
1984	October 7	Walter Mondale - D	Ronald Reagan - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 58, 1986
	October 21	Ronald Reagan - R	Walter Mondale - D	Change and Continuity, Pg 60, 1986
1988	September 25	George H. W. Bush - R	Michael Dukakis - D	Change and Continuity, Pg 49, 1990
	October 13	George H. W. Bush - R	Michael Dukakis - D	Change and Continuity, Pg 50, 1990
1992	October 11	Ross Perot - I; Bill Clinton - D	George H. W. - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 57, 1995
	October 15	Bill Clinton - D	Ross Perot - I; George H. W. Bush - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 60, 1995
	October 19	Ross Perot - I	Bill Clinton - D; George H. W. Bush	Change and Continuity, Pg 61, 1995
1996	October 6	Bill Clinton - D	Bob Dole - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 35, 1999
	October 16	Bill Clinton - D	Bob Dole - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 36, 1999
2000	October 3	Al Gore - D	George W. Bush	Change and Continuity, Pg 37, 2003
	October 11	George W. Bush - R	Al Gore - D	Change and Continuity, Pg 38, 2003
	October 17	George W. Bush - R	Al Gore - D	Change and Continuity, Pg 38, 2003
2004	September 30	John Kerry - D	George W. Bush - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 41, 2006
	October 8	Tie	Tie	Change and Continuity, Pg 41, 2006
	October 13	John Kerry - D	George W. Bush - R	Change and Continuity, Pg 41, 2006

2008	September 26	Barack Obama – D	John McCain – R	http://www.gallup.com/poll/110779/Debate-Watchers-Give-Obama-Edge-Over-McCain.aspx
	October 7	Barack Obama – D	John McCain – R	http://www.gallup.com/poll/111058/obama-rated-winner-second-presidential-debate.aspx
	October 15	Barack Obama – D	John McCain – R	http://www.gallup.com/poll/111256/obama-viewed-winner-third-debate.aspx
2012	October 3	Romney	Obama	http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/polls-show-a-strong-debate-for-romney/
	October 16	Obama	Romney	http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/instant-reaction-polls-show-narrow-obama-advantage-in-second-debate/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
	October 22	Obama	Romney	http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/obama-unlikely-to-get-big-debate-bounce-but-a-small-one-could-matter/

APPENDIX C: LIST OF CANDIDATE CODES AND CORRESPONDING DEBATES


Debate Date and Candidate	Code
September 23, 1976 Carter	Carter 1.1
October 6, 1976 Carter	Carter 1.2
October 22, 1976 Carter	Carter 1.3
October 28, 1980 Carter	Carter 2.1
September 23, 1976 Ford	Ford 1.1
October 6, 1976 Ford	Ford 1.2
October 22, 1976 Ford	Ford 1.3
September 21, 1980 Reagan	Reagan 1.1
October 28, 1980 Reagan	Reagan 1.2
October 7, 1984 Reagan	Reagan 2.1
October 21, 1984 Reagan	Reagan 2.2
September 21, 1980 Anderson	Anderson 1.1
October 7, 1984 Mondale	Mondale 1.1
October 21, 1984 Mondale	Mondale 1.2
September 25, 1988 Bush	HW Bush 1.1
October 13, 1988 Bush	HW Bush 1.2
October 11, 1992 Bush	HW Bush 2.1
October 15, 1992 Bush	HW Bush 2.2
October 19, 1992 Bush	HW Bush 2.3
September 25, 1988 Dukakis	Dukakis 1.1
October 13, 1988 Dukakis	Dukakis 1.2
October 11, 1992 Clinton	Clinton 1.1
October 15, 1992 Clinton	Clinton 1.2
October 19, 1992 Clinton	Clinton 1.3
October 6, 1996 Clinton	Clinton 2.1
October 16, 1996 Clinton	Clinton 2.2
October 3, 2000 Bush	W Bush 1.1
October 11, 2000 Bush	W Bush 1.2
October 17, 2000 Bush	W Bush 1.3
September 30, 2004 Bush	W Bush 2.1
October 8, 2004 Bush	W Bush 2.2
October 13, 2004 Bush	W Bush 2.3
October 11, 1992 Perot	Perot 1.1
October 15, 1992 Perot	Perot 1.2
October 19, 1992 Perot	Perot 1.3
October 6, 1996 Dole	Dole 1.1
October 16, 1996 Dole	Dole 1.2
October 3, 2000 Gore	Gore 1.1
October 11, 2000 Gore	Gore 1.2
October 17, 2000 Gore	Gore 1.3
September 30, 2004 Kerry	Kerry 1.1
October 8, 2004 Kerry	Kerry 1.2
October 13, 2004 Kerry	Kerry 1.3
September 26, 2008 Obama	Obama 1.1
October 7, 2008 Obama	Obama 1.2
October 15, 2008 Obama	Obama 1.3
October 3, 2012 Obama	Obama 2.1
October 16, 2012 Obama	Obama 2.2
October 22, 2012 Obama	Obama 2.3
September 26, 2008 McCain	McCain 1.1
October 7, 2008 McCain	McCain 1.2
October 15, 2008 McCain	McCain 1.3
October 3, 2012 Romney	Romney 1.1
October 16, 2012 Romney	Romney 1.2
October 22, 2012 Romney	Romney 1.3


**APPENDIX D: MEAN SCORES COMPARISON TABLE – BY PARTY AND
YEAR**


Year	D1R2I3	P1	P2	P4	I1	I2
1976	1 Dem	.1933	.0333	.2167	.4400	.1933
	2 Repub	.4600	.2767	.2467	.5600	.3300
	Total	.3267	.1550	.2317	.5000	.2617
1980	1 Dem	.5000	.3600	.1700	.3700	.1200
	2 Repub	.2250	.0500	.2650	.3700	.1050
	3 Indep	.2500	.1800	.3200	.5800	.1900
	Total	.3000	.1600	.2550	.4225	.1300
1984	1 Dem	.1400	.0350	.2850	.1650	.0350
	2 Repub	.0650	-.0200	.3300	.3350	.1250
	Total	.1025	.0075	.3075	.2500	.0800
1988	1 Dem	.4600	.2250	.3350	.4300	.1750
	2 Repub	.3100	.1050	.4200	.4850	.2050
	Total	.3850	.1650	.3775	.4575	.1900
1992	1 Dem	.4733	.2500	.3133	.5833	.2533
	2 Repub	.3800	.1833	.3667	.2433	.0633
	3 Indep	.4000	.2000	.2667	.4767	.1733
	Total	.4178	.2111	.3156	.4344	.1633
1996	1 Dem	.4450	.2450	.3300	.5400	.2600
	2 Repub	.3900	.1900	.3650	.5400	.2300
	Total	.4175	.2175	.3475	.5400	.2450
2000	1 Dem	.2967	.1400	.3600	.5700	.2967
	2 Repub	.4233	.2133	.3667	.5933	.2500
	Total	.3600	.1767	.3633	.5817	.2733
2004	1 Dem	.1767	.0667	.3600	.4133	.1833
	2 Repub	.2033	.0767	.3367	.4267	.1867
	Total	.1900	.0717	.3483	.4200	.1850
2008	1 Dem	.2800	.1133	.3033	.2600	.0700
	2 Repub	.4033	.1700	.3267	.1933	.0467
	Total	.3417	.1417	.3150	.2267	.0583
2012	1 Dem	.3467	.1533	.3200	.1367	.0433
	2 Repub	.2767	.1067	.3600	.2433	.1233
	Total	.3117	.1300	.3400	.1900	.0833


Total	1 Dem	.3156	.1456	.3076	.3940	.1672
	2 Repub	.3238	.1435	.3373	.3938	.1665
	3 Indep	.3625	.1950	.2800	.5025	.1775
	Total	.3229	.1482	.3196	.4018	.1676


**APPENDIX E: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS FOR ALL OP.
CODE VALUES**
















APPENDIX F: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS BY DEBATE












APPENDIX G:


**MEAN COMPARISON TABLE OF OP. CODE SCORES BY
WINNER/LOSER OF PRESIDENCY AND YEAR**


		Report Mean				
Year	POTUS1 Yes2No	P1	P2	P4	I1	I2
1976	1.0	.1933	.0333	.2167	.4400	.1933
	2.0	.4600	.2767	.2467	.5600	.3300
	Total	.3267	.1550	.2317	.5000	.2617
1980	1.0	.3167	.1533	.2333	.3700	.1100
	2.0	.2500	.1800	.3200	.5800	.1900
	Total	.3000	.1600	.2550	.4225	.1300
1984	1.0	.0650	-.0200	.3300	.3350	.1250
	2.0	.1400	.0350	.2850	.1650	.0350
	Total	.1025	.0075	.3075	.2500	.0800
1988	1.0	.3100	.1050	.4200	.4850	.2050
	2.0	.4600	.2250	.3350	.4300	.1750
	Total	.3850	.1650	.3775	.4575	.1900
1992	1.0	.4267	.2167	.3400	.4133	.1583
	2.0	.4000	.2000	.2667	.4767	.1733
	Total	.4178	.2111	.3156	.4344	.1633
1996	1.0	.4450	.2450	.3300	.5400	.2600
	2.0	.3900	.1900	.3650	.5400	.2300
	Total	.4175	.2175	.3475	.5400	.2450
2000	1.0	.4233	.2133	.3667	.5933	.2500
	2.0	.2967	.1400	.3600	.5700	.2967
	Total	.3600	.1767	.3633	.5817	.2733
2004	1.0	.2033	.0767	.3367	.4267	.1867
	2.0	.1767	.0667	.3600	.4133	.1833
	Total	.1900	.0717	.3483	.4200	.1850
2008	1.0	.2800	.1133	.3033	.2600	.0700


	2.0	.4033	.1700	.3267	.1933	.0467
	Total	.3417	.1417	.3150	.2267	.0583
2012	1.0	.3467	.1533	.3200	.1367	.0433
	2.0	.2767	.1067	.3600	.2433	.1233
	Total	.3117	.1300	.3400	.1900	.0833
Total	1.0	.3163	.1397	.3177	.3960	.1563
	2.0	.3308	.1584	.3220	.4088	.1812
	Total	.3229	.1482	.3196	.4018	.1676


**APPENDIX H: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS BY
WINNER/LOSER AND YEAR**











**APPENDIX I: ORIGINAL OP. CODE SCORES FOR ALL CANDIDATES
AND DEBATES**

Candidate Name Electoral District	Year	Electoral Year	S ₁ +3	S ₂ +2	S ₃ +1	S ₄ -1	S ₅ -2	S ₆ -3	O ₁ +3	O ₂ +2	O ₃ +1	O ₄ -1	O ₅ -2	O ₆ -3	I ₁	I ₂	I ₃	I ₄	I ₅	P ₁ +3	P ₂ +2	P ₃ +1	P ₄ -1	P ₅ -2	T ₁ +3	T ₂ +2	P _{OT} U _S	W ₁ #L	D ₁ #R						
Carter 1.1	1976	1	4	1	3	2	0	1	31	2	37	10	0	29	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.1	0	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	1	16	109	1	2	1	
Carter 1.2	1976	1	4	0	14	4	0	9	12	3	33	14	3	26	0.2	-0	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.3	0	0.1	0.5	0	0.1	0.1	-0	0.1	0.3	1	31	91	1	1	1
Carter 1.3	1976	1	5	1	14	4	1	1	19	2	24	5	2	20	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.2	0.5	0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	1	26	72	1	1	1
Carter 2.1	1980	2	4	0	9	2	0	4	36	4	29	11	1	11	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.2	0	0.1	0.5	0	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.2	1	19	92	1	2	1
Ford 1.1	1976	1	3	0	9	2	0	2	19	0	22	10	0	7	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4	1	0.1	0	0.1	0.4	0	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	1	21	58	2	1	2
Ford 1.2	1976	1	5	1	15	5	0	0	20	4	30	9	1	7	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0	0	0.2	0.6	0	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.3	1	26	71	2	2	2
Ford 1.3	1976	1	4	0	9	3	1	1	21	4	28	6	1	13	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.2	1	18	73	2	2	2
Reagan 1.1	1980	1	4	0	16	2	1	5	18	0	25	7	0	19	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.2	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	1	28	69	1	1	2
Reagan 1.2	1980	1	5	0	18	7	0	5	22	6	37	11	2	30	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.1	0	0.2	0.5	0	0.1	0.2	0	0.1	0.2	1	35	108	1	1	2
Reagan 2.1	1984	2	10	3	12	4	1	3	15	2	22	10	0	20	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.7	1	0.2	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0	0.1	0.4	1	38	69	1	2	2
Reagan 2.2	1984	2	7	3	19	4	0	10	14	5	31	26	4	20	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.2	0	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2	0	-0	0.1	0.3	1	43	100	1	1	2
Anderson 1.1	1980	1	1	0	14	3	0	1	10	2	13	3	4	6	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.1	0	0.2	0.7	0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	1	19	40	2	2	3	
Mandale 1.1	1984	1	3	1	22	11	2	4	27	1	47	20	1	22	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.5	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	1	43	118	2	1	1
Mandale 1.2	1984	1	5	1	26	17	2	6	31	4	31	20	5	40	0.1	0	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.1	0	0.3	0.5	0	0.1	0	-0	0.1	0.3	1	57	131	2	2	1
HW Bush 1.1	1988	1	12	2	44	7	0	5	15	0	40	17	1	12	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.1	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.9	70	85	1	1	2
HW Bush 1.2	1988	1	3	2	28	10	3	7	16	0	43	11	0	19	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.9	58	89	1	1	2
HW Bush 2.1	1992	2	3	3	25	15	0	4	15	5	38	11	2	18	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.4	0.1	0	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	1	55	89	1	2	2
HW Bush 2.2	1992	2	5	3	22	6	0	7	22	4	32	10	0	13	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.2	0	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.4	1	43	81	1	2	2
HW Bush 2.3	1992	2	3	2	16	9	1	10	18	2	30	11	1	9	0	-0	0.1	1	0.6	0.2	0	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.9	41	71	1	2	2
Dukakis 1.1	1988	1	15	0	36	9	2	3	34	6	64	10	2	23	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.1	0	0.1	0.5	0	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.9	70	139	2	2	1
Dukakis 1.2	1988	1	10	0	37	10	2	3	36	6	52	14	3	21	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.1	0	0.2	0.6	0	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.3	1	67	132	2	2	1
Clinton 1.1	1992	1	2	1	37	9	0	1	35	1	32	3	1	19	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.1	0	0.2	0.7	0	0	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.9	50	91	1	1	1	
Clinton 1.2	1992	1	3	1	32	5	0	0	25	2	46	5	1	13	0.8	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.2	0	0	0.1	0.8	0	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.9	41	92	1	1	1
Clinton 1.3	1992	1	11	4	17	7	2	5	33	2	44	16	2	21	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.1	0	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	1	46	118	1	2	1
Clinton 2.1	1996	2	14	2	47	9	2	3	50	10	62	22	6	32	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.1	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	1	82	182	1	1	1
Clinton 2.2	1996	2	25	1	41	9	0	11	53	4	70	10	4	23	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.8	0.1	0	0.1	0.5	0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.9	87	164	1	1	1
W Bush 1.1	2000	1	13	4	52	13	0	3	49	5	50	11	5	22	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.1	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.9	90	142	1	2	2
W Bush 1.2	2000	1	10	1	55	8	0	3	32	4	48	12	3	28	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0	0	0.1	0.7	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	1	77	127	1	1	2
W Bush 1.3	2000	1	9	5	43	10	0	7	34	7	69	14	4	20	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.1	0	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.9	74	148	1	1	2
W Bush 2.1	2004	2	16	7	40	11	5	9	42	6	44	21	4	26	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4	1	88	143	1	2	2	
W Bush 2.2	2004	2	7	3	32	10	2	6	30	2	51	23	2	31	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.1	0	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	1	60	139	1	3	2
W Bush 2.3	2004	2	10	9	26	7	2	3	29	0	43	17	1	37	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.1	0	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	0	0.1	0.3	1	62	127	1	2	2
Perot 1.1	1992	1	4	0	17	0	0	3	22	2	24	10	1	22	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.1	0	0	0.7	0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	1	24	81	2	1	3
Perot 1.2	1992	1	4	2	12	2	3	3	26	5	37	7	0	11	0.2	-0	0.1	0.8	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.3	1	31	86	2	2	3	
Perot 1.3	1992	1	10	3	19	5	0	5	24	2	40	6	5	15	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.1	0	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	1	42	92	2	1	3
Dale 1.1	1996	1	13	5	48	6	0	7	32	5	52	15	1	36	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.1	0	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	1	79	141	2	2	2
Dale 1.2	1996	1	9	3	36	12	0	3	31	4	53	16	1	11	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.1	0	0.2	0.5	0	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.9	68	116	2	2	2
Gore 1.1	2000	1	22	4	38	8	6	7	46	4	46	21	5	28	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4	1	85	150	2	1	1
Gore 1.2	2000	1	9	2	41	6	1	3	20	0	32	10	1	21	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.1	0	0.1	0.7	0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.9	62	84	2	2	1
Gore 1.3	2000	1	11	4	23	9	0	3	26	3	51	15	10	12	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.1	0	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.3	1	50	117	2	2	1
Kerry 1.1	2004	1	3	2	22	6	2	3	28	5	29	21	2	40	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.2	0	0.1	0.5	0	0.2	-0	-0	0.1	0.3	1	48	125	2	1	1
Kerry 1.2	2004	1	17	1	52	11	2	12	35	1	51	16	3	33	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.1	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	1	95	139	2	3	1
Kerry 1.3	2004	1	20	7	29	3	5	9	36	3	41	18	3	23	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4	1	78	124	2	1	1	
Obama 1.1	2008	1	9	0	30	14	2	18	32	3	51	19	3	29	0.1	-0	0.1	0.9	0.7	0.3	0	0.2	0.4	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	1	73	137	1	1	1
Obama 1.2	2008	1	3	0	24	3	2	5	31	2	60	19	3	35	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	1	42	150	1	1	1
Obama 1.3	2008	1	9	4	31	18	4	3	37																										

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