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## SPANISH PENSACOLA, 1700-1763

by WILLIAM B. GRIFFEN

**A**FTER MORE THAN a decade of explorations by Spain along the north and east shores of the Gulf of Mexico, a garrison has founded with all urgency at a bay called Pensacola\* in the latter part of the year 1698 in an effort to keep other foreign powers, namely France and England, from obtaining a foothold in the region. These enemies of the Spanish dominions, so thought the Spaniards, would thus be obstructed from an area from which they could attack Spanish shipping and from which they would be able to penetrate and usurp portions of the northern Spanish colonies, principally Florida and the rich mining areas of New Spain. For the first two-score years of its existence, this bay with its garrison settlement was a much coveted prize for Spain's rivals. Spain herself felt that such an outpost would give her command of the entire Mexican Gulf, although it was soon learned that other areas of the region could also be settled and fortified, as was done at Biloxi and Mobile by the French.

With the advent of Queen Ann's War (known as the War of Spanish Succession in Europe: 1702-1713) and the unification afforded by alliance and the possession by both nations of Bourbon dynasties, much less rivalry obtained between the French and Spanish than between either country and the English. While the French continued to covet Pensacola for strategic and commercial reasons, originally thinking that the Mississippi River might empty there which would prove to be an outlet to the south for her Canadian colonies, some cooperation was exhibited with the Spanish on all levels. Indeed, local mutual assistance between Pensacola and the French settlements, particularly Mobile founded soon after Pensacola, was notable throughout the period, often saving the day for whichever colony might at the time be in need. As the years passed, following the close of Queen Ann's War, French hostility increased, culminating in the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1719-1721) during which France twice captured the garrison settlement of Santa Maria de Galve.

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\* The name *Pensacola*, or *Panzacola* as the Spanish wrote it, came from a small Indian tribe that occupied the area (Swanton, 1952). Until the beginning of the 1720's the Spaniards usually employed the phrase: *Santa Maria de Galve*, although the use of *Panzacola* was not unknown in these early years.

With the termination of this war in 1721, both Spain and France were well aware of their overestimation of the value of Pensacola; and England, with her emphasis on commerce and her general westward expansion, remained in effect the only contender for this area. At the same time, both Latin nations maintained their strong interest in constraining this expansion and labored to keep Pensacola out of British hands. The French returned to their previous practice of lending assistance to the Spanish *presidio*, while concentrating their energies more toward the west in the Louisiana colony in the area of the Mississippi. The Spaniards first attempted to scuttle the port by lowering the water level of the bay. When this ludicrous idea proved impossible, a small garrison was reestablished. In 1763 England finally had her way; winning the region, not by war but by treaty, only to lose it again after twenty years.

#### THE SETTLEMENT

Once the establishment of the garrison settlement at Pensacola became permanent, it was confronted, as it was continually throughout its history, with such crucial problems as those of supplies and the maintenance and rehabilitation of fortifications; not to speak of the vicissitudes of storms, fires, and enemy Indian attacks. It proved to be a constant battle; indeed, the position of Pensacola was often slightly less than precarious. It was even more unfavorable than was that of Saint Augustine over on the east coast of the Province of Florida. \* Saint Augustine had at least developed its own economy to some degree, with its tribute system through the mission chain in corn and other crops and some cattle raising, mainly in the Alachua and Apalache areas, although the latter were decimated in the year 1704 and never fully rehabilitated. Pensacola had virtually none of this, and it was situated on even less fertile soil than was Saint Augustine. It was, with little doubt, one of the most difficult of the posts in the Spanish system of frontier defenses.

At the root of many of Pensacola's perennial problems were the climate, the configuration and infertility of the land, the quality of the personnel - often the majority of whom were convicts - and lastly the delays in subsidy shipments. To make it even

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\* While it is true that the entire area of North America north of New Spain was called Florida at one time, at this period administratively it was not a part of Florida: its garrison and subsidy were entirely separate from those of Saint Augustine and the Florida Province.

worse, the presidio often did not even have an adequate vessel with which to communicate with its headquarters in New Spain, causing it to be almost entirely dependent upon the frequently sporadic arrival of ships from the home base. At times, the Pensacolans were forced to use French bottoms when it was necessary to send an urgent message to the New Spain officials.

Many of the Spaniards who served in the presidio reported the unfavorability of the climate and land of the surrounding area. The engineer Jaime Franck, one of the first, writing in June of 1700, remarked that these had been highly overrated and Pensacola would prove to be much too expensive. It would serve no other purpose than to waste the funds of the Royal Treasury, and to shorten the days of those unfortunate persons who would go to live in it. Furthermore, it would merely be of service to a greedy governor who would be in a position to pocket the money sent for salaries and for fortifications.

Two years later, Commander Don Francisco Martinez, complaining of the general conditions he was obliged to put up with, including the lack of defense, commented acidly on the "exorbitant expense" to the King of maintaining Pensacola and its subsidiary presidio, San Joseph. In 1714, the Viceroy, who had little use for Pensacola, wrote that this maintenance amounted to around 100,000 pesos annually, adding that, apart from the presidio's lack of defensive value, its land was useless and it was constantly ravaged by sickness.

#### THE FORT

The wooden fort called San Carlos de Austria, a four-bastioned stockade with a parapet of sand fill, was a constant source of preoccupation. Statements from two men who knew the castillo in the beginning years provide both rather accurate prognostication of its subsequent history and excellent summary of the continual complaints that were to follow.

In June of 1700 when Franck was writing, the fort was already rotting, and its construction, which was still in process, was a task, in Franck's opinion, that in effect would never be finished. The location of the fort was poor: it was dominated by the Barranca of Santo Tome and the strong winds constantly caused the sands to shift with detriment to the structure. Furthermore, it would be virtually useless for defense owing to the poor

quality of men employed to man the base. In any event, the available artillery in its location at that time was not sufficient to prevent enemy vessels from entering the bay. In December of 1702, the time of the English siege on Saint Augustine, with the fear that the hostilities might spread to Pensacola, Commander Don Francisco Martinez reported that the fort was hardly worth the name, consisting "solely of a quadrangle of logs which would serve only as a stopping-over place for the enemy."

The wide entrance into the bay posed a serious problem of defense, a problem that was never fully solved. It was frequently requested that at least a small fortification be put up at Punta de Siguenza in order to be able to better cover the area with the available fire power. This was a task, however, that was not effectuated until the latter part of 1718 and San Carlos remained almost the sole defensive structure of Pensacola until destroyed after its second capture by the French.

In 1712, Governor Salinas Varona asked that San Carlos itself be moved across the bay to Santa Rosa Island. Apart from the usual advantages to general defense, he also pointed out the advantage in water supply. On the mainland water holes could not be made in the sand near the shore because of the unceasing encroachments of the sea, a situation that reduced the supply the greater part of the year for San Carlos to that provided by one cistern. On the island there were eight small creeks of fresh water and sea-shore water holes could easily be sunk.

Although the fort was in constant disrepair, the vicissitudes undergone by the other buildings of the presidio were even worse. Fires were forever ravaging the structures. One of the worst conflagrations was that of November 23, 1704, in which the royal buildings, warehouses, guard house, and bread ovens were burned. The powder magazine was the only thing that escaped. Both the French at Mobile and the Viceroy of New Spain sent relief after this tragedy. One of the principal reasons for such disasters was the use of flimsy roofing material, palm thatch, which soon became dry and completely inflammable. Again, when enemy Anglophile Indians attacked in 1707, all buildings outside the fort were destroyed.

#### *Sustenance*

The garrison was supplied almost entirely from New Spain and shortages in provisions were frequent because of delays in

the shipments. At times, the ships bearing the needed victuals and munitions would be destroyed by storms and treacherous reefs. Not all provisions came from New Spain. Often the French settlement of Mobile, or some other, would furnish the presidio with enough to tide it over until the arrival of the subsidy ship, an arrangement that worked to the benefit of all concerned since as likely as not the French were the needy party when the Pensacola larders were relatively well stocked, and reciprocation was the procedure.

Occasionally supplies would come from other sources, as in the year 1700 when Saint Augustine sent some extra corn that it could spare, and in 1702 when the Pensacolans resorted to Apalache for the same product.

There was an attempt, however, to produce some foodstuffs locally. Jaime Franck in his report of June 4, 1700, complained of the sterility of the soil, as it consisted only of sand and some pine groves and would not produce either corn or wheat. For two consecutive years a field was sown in a large section of the forest that had been cleared away. Even with daily care and irrigation by some of the Indians and convicts, only a few radishes, cauliflower, melons, and squash were harvested. Nor was there a single fruit tree in the area, such as those found in New Spain or Apalache. Attempts to raise crops, nevertheless, were continued. In a plea for supplies from Salinas Varona, on July 15, 1713, it was stated that the need for food had been increased with the loss of the crops during the preceding two years.

Animal husbandry was also practiced to some slight extent. In the first decade after the founding reference to sheep raising is made and immediately preceding the end of the first Spanish occupation cattle come into the picture. Governor Don Miguel Roman de Castilla in the spring of 1761 reported that there were three haciendas (plantations) in the area which already had over fifteen head of cattle and that other (unstated) products of the soil had begun to be produced. These, he felt, within two to three years would afford enough meat to supply the entire presidio of Pensacola, possibly somewhat of an overstatement. The haciendas, San Antonio, La Luz, and Santisima Soledad, respectively seven, three, and two leagues distance from Pensacola, were destroyed together with the Indian towns of Punta Rasa and Escambe during the Talapoosa uprising of that same year.

Thus the settlement proved to be a continual drain on the Royal Treasury. The only economic return of the area was that of furnishing ships' masts for the Spanish navy. The supply ships from New Spain the greater part of the time would return to their home port with cargoes of tree trunks.

### *Garrison*

In the early years, the garrison was reported to consist of a total of 220 places (not all of which were necessarily filled). Don Francisco Martinez, in 1702, described this number as comprising one hundred and fifty infantrymen in two companies, twenty artillerymen and sailors, and fifty convicts for labor. The next year, Don Andres de Arriola advised that there were one hundred and ninety-three men to man the Pensacola base. However, another governor in 1708, Don Sebastian de Moscoso, during a period of intense Indian hostilities, reported that there were only a little over one hundred, many who did not have sufficient equipment, some not even swords. In 1713, two hundred and twelve places in the presidio were said to be filled, but these included twenty-five women.

These figures are fairly representative of the military population throughout the entire period. However, they do not indicate the total of the able-bodied defenders of the post as many men were constantly off from duty because of sickness, many died owing either to malnutrition or to enemy attacks, and others were captured by Indians, usually allies of the English. These conditions caused many men to desert; others merely rebelled, occasionally incited by their officers.

From the time of the founding, it was customary to recruit convicts for duty in Pensacola, either as soldiers or as laborers, and this situation was often one of the sharpest of the many thorns in the sides of her commanders. Arriola wrote in 1702 that because of this most of the men did not deserve to hold military posts. Two years earlier, Franck had written that the run of the men at Pensacola were not only a discredit to the Royal Arms, but that they were the greatest enemies of the Crown. The desertion rate was extremely high. However, because of the bad name of Pensacola in New Spain, it was virtually impossible to recruit volunteers.

In the early years, the plan was apparently to hold down these convicts, troops, or laborers, with regular infantry taken

from the armada. Later, even this practice was for the most part abandoned.

### *Civilians*

Apart from the military population, there were non-military persons such as religious personnel and the aforementioned laborers. The latter, both convict and Indian, included such occupations as carpenters and blacksmiths. In 1704, three Franciscan chaplains were reported; in 1713, there was only one, a Frenchman who spoke very poor Spanish. In the early portion of the period the hospital was manned by the medico-friars of the order of San Juan de Dios, but apparently by 1713 there was not even one of these men left at the base to perform this valuable and needed service.

An interesting aspect of the history and growth of Pensacola at this time is that of the female population. When the presidio was first founded it consisted strictly of soldiers and convict labor. In the spring of 1704, Arriola found there four Spanish families, plus Tabaza, Chacato, and a few Apalachino Indians, who had come to Pensacola, driven from their homes in Apalache. Seemingly, there were no other women than those included in the above groups. Two years previously this had almost certainly been the case as he had implored the Viceroy to send women to the presidio owing to the unhealthiness of a large group of men without female companionship. This request was subsequently turned down for moral reasons on the grounds that one evil could not rectify another. By 1713, as referred to above, there were at least twenty-five women in the presidio, as these were listed as receiving subsidy. While the growth of their numbers is not continuous, over one hundred women were reported in August of the year 1760 by Governor Don Miguel Roman de Castilla during Indian hostilities. This is about the same number as given for the evacuation in 1763.

### *An Informative Letter*

A letter, written less than two years after the founding of the presidio by a Captain of Infantry, Don Phelipe Serrano y Perea, recapitulates many of the background conditions there:

Sir,

It is not unknown that a person while lacking both the opportunity and energy to meet his obligations should recognize his indebtedness with the desire to satisfy them. Thus, Your Lordship, . . . while bearing in mind the wretchedness of this retreat and exile that the Senor Count of Montezuma, Viceroy of New Spain, has granted me in remuneration of my misfortunes. . . .

There was the principal reason why I was issued a special Royal Decree with a recommendation for one of the vacant positions in the Windward Fleet, and a second Decree conceding me compensation for the entire time I was held prisoner in France until the moment I was reinstated in the said Fleet . . . . . When the occasion arose . . . . . for the vacancy, I was obliged to accept duty in the austere solitude of the presidio of Santa Maria de Galve, alias Panzacola, as commander of one of the two infantry companies.

These companies are composed of troops of convicts and villainous men, who are such, as much because of their crimes as because of their character. There is no reason why this situation, which is not of my doing, should be to my detriment, and especially, when the French population is so proximate that we are only twenty-five leagues from it . . . . .

Not of less moment and consequence is the manner in which we here are supplied. At best, our daily ration has been eight ounces of bread, or corn, and another eight of meat, without any kind of vegetable or other sustenance than salt water to season it. At the time of payment of salaries, the two reals stipulated in the regulation of the amount of daily rations are stricken off completely without either having been eaten or drunk up. This, Sir, is not the worst. This amount is even reduced to the point of not granting it, as has happened during the starvations that this post has undergone from the time of its establishment; and, it has always been in need of this miserable ration. This has forced us to nourish ourselves with bitter acorns and tree roots which has been the source of so much sickness and death and has caused the entire kingdom of New Spain to hold this place in horror: it was first necessary to settle it in all its sterility, and now it has been consumately parched by the terror occasioned from the delayed measures for supplying it, plus worse provisions that are sent with full knowledge that we have no other recourse in this wilderness.

Recourse was found only on one occasion, and among the very savages that inhabit it, which was not a little luck, at the beginning when we were obliged to gratify them in order to win their friendship and to instruct them in the Christian faith. The latter has been carried out with ease by our French neighbors by buying the Indians with gifts which we Spaniards did not have and for which reason we have never seen the aborigines again. Goodness knows that at the present we need their friendship, and it is solicited with all earnestness so that they will support us in the present situation, especially since the troops are stirred up and keep us ever watchful and vigilant. The latter, since they are convicts, are the greatest enemies we have here. If now, at the beginning, we are so close to the end, in what condition will we be afterwards?

All of these causes and reasons, Sir, force me to recur to the great commiseration of Your Lordship in order that, while you are reminded of my past misfortunes and of my deplorable remuneration for them in this wretchedness, I can prevail again upon the powerful protection of Your Lordship in order to free myself from this ruin. There is no just excuse to continue in this peril while being aware of the risk, moreover, when my grief is only increased by finding myself neither in the position nor place to be able to keep up my obligations to my mother and unmarried sisters. . . .

I place the matter of the relief from my position here in the hands of Your Lordship, as my Lord and as the person from whom I have

received so much and from whom I hope to receive more. Consequently, I feel at liberty to tell Your Lordship that my request is only to leave this exile with a good record for the purpose of continuing in the Royal Service in the Windward Fleet, whether it be a post granted by the authority of His Majesty or one with only the salary of a captain at half-pay . . . .

For this purpose I am remitting to Your Lordship the attached certification from the commander who at present governs this presidio as there are no Royal Treasury Officials. Thus, it will be evident that I am continuing to serve the position of Captain without a single supplement.

Of the positions of officers I must inform Your Lordship. Their creation by the Senor Viceroy was fruitless. The staff officers are a remarkable endproduct from whose income of Mexican monies an entire infantry regiment could be maintained besides the garrison. Moreover, these officers are scarcely in token possession of their positions, as in no way can they claim to serve any purpose for the defense of the presidio. The garrison was maintained previously at the order of the Chief Commander and his assistants. . . .

This is the extent of what I have to report to Your Lordship in compliance with my duty. May God protect Your Lordship the many years that He can, that I wish and deem necessary.

Santa Maria de Galve, October 24, 1700

My Dear Sir

Your Most Humble servant at your obedience  
[signed] Don Phelipe Serrano y Perea  
[rubric]

Senor Don Martin de Sierralta, My Lord.

During the early years after the founding Sergeant General Don Andres de Arriola was tireless in his work to build and maintain the presidio. On one of his many visits to the base to deliver the subsidy, after making some preliminary measurements, he called a meeting of the military officers to decide the question of a new fortification on Santa Rosa Island to complement the defenses of the fort San Carlos on the mainland. At this time, July 1701, he had with him his engineer officer, Don Juan de Siscara. The fortification was in effect decided upon by the officers with the exception of Siscara, who dissented.

This seems to be one of the many times Siscara disagreed with the practical Arriola who had little respect for the opinions of his engineer. The latter reported that a certain type of stone suitable for construction purposes was abundant in the area. Arriola, after inspecting it, stated that it was nothing more than "sand mixed with some clay" that disintegrated on contact with water.

On December 16, 1701, the Frenchman Iberville arrived in Pensacola on his way to settle and fortify Mobile Bay some twelve leagues to the west. With an exchange of notes, Sergeant Major Martinez, the officer left in command during Arriola's many absences, requested that Iberville desist from carrying out the orders he carried from his government. The latter refused, stating

that the interests of his Crown were also those of the Spanish government. He did lend one of his ships to the Spaniards in order that they could advise the Viceroy in New Spain and receive instructions.

The presidio was, during this period, slowly being built up in the face of many setbacks. In 1701, Arriola had a hospital established and staffed it with two surgeon-friars whom he had brought with him from Veracruz, while repairing some of the batteries and rebuilding the guard house that had been damaged in the fire. The hospital was put up none too soon as the next year a severe epidemic broke out among the men on the voyage to the settlement in June. The sickness spread to the presidio, decimating the men. One of the friar-surgeons, Fray Joseph de Salazar, wrote of Arriola during the epidemic, stating that the latter on seeing the great lack of facilities for so many sick purchased a house of boards from one of the soldiers for additional hospital space. By the time of this writing, all the medicine was gone and the only cure possible was that of divine intervention. Salazar implored the Viceroy to send medicine, sheets, and pillows.

Such were the fortunes of Santa Maria de Galve during the first years. In 1707, the presidio was plagued with the very common maladies of short rations, faulty equipment, and sick, underpaid, underfed, and rebellious troops. On August 12, some twenty to thirty enemy Indians moved in on the outskirts of the camp outside of the fort and began to burn houses that belonged to friendly Ocataze Indians. A few of these were taken prisoners, including women and children. While the enemy was sacking some of the dwellings, Sergeant Major and Interim Governor Don Sebastian de Moscoso had one of the artillery pieces fired. In the confusion of the flight of the enemy, a sailor and an Indian captured previously at an outlying guard station, together with some of the Ocataze Indians, managed to escape to the castillo. The alert was sounded for the remainder of the night and the next day inspection patrols were sent out, but the enemy was not located.

The succeeding day ten men, including three convicts, disappeared while out a little distance from the fort washing clothes. On the third day following, a troop of some three hundred Indians attacked the castillo and put the garrison to battle for a period of three hours. Twenty-four hours later the enemy hit again, utilizing the standing buildings for cover while firing and sacking

the houses. Eventually they retired, taking with them the four horses that belonged to the presidio, plus clothing and other movables filched from the dwellings.

Shots were again exchanged with the Indians on the 18th and more enemy appeared on the scene carrying an English flag which they placed on one of the houses within sight of the fort. Moscoso again caused an artillery piece to be fired, an event that only excited the enemy and intensified the battle until night-fall. The Indians then set fire to the camp outside the castillo which was reduced to ashes.

On the 19th the camp site was inspected for salvage during which time the harrassing natives managed to take one prisoner, following this up with a like capture the next day. With this last episode the assault let up, although rumor had it during the month of September that the enemy was returning. On this account, eight Apalachinos fled the presidio, and the next month a number of persons, Spanish and Indian, were captured while out some distance from the protection of the fort where they would go to bathe and to wash clothes.

Then, on the 27th of November, there appeared in front of the castillo an Indian band, including some forty horses, accompanied by several Englishmen. The Spaniards were sent a demand for complete surrender, which they emphatically refused. Around dusk the stockade was besieged by the English and their some two hundred Indian allies. The battle pitch increased with the onset of darkness, the strongest point of the offense being placed at the barranca of the sea side. This attack lasted the rest of the night.

The succeeding day the same two Englishmen, who had gone to the fort the day before, reappeared with the same message which in turn elicited a similar response on the part of the Spaniards. Moscoso, with the intention of fighting it out, then put himself to the task of making a thorough inspection of his defenses. The most appalling thing was the few able-bodied troops he had at his disposal: many men died in the preceding few months and the majority of those remaining were suffering from one kind of malady or another. He issued a plea to the non-combatant convicts to take up arms to assist the military, offering them their freedom when hostilities were over. They gave their assent and were distributed arms. During the afternoon a few

shots were exchanged, killing one Spaniard; three more were wounded that evening.

On November 29, a few skirmishes took place, and on the 30th one of the men captured the previous month while out cutting wood returned with a message from the English to the effect that the latter were giving up the fight.

One week later, Monsieur de Bienville arrived from Mobile with over one-hundred reinforcements, tardy but not unwelcome. This was the last relatively large scale Indian attack reported for some time, although minor skirmishes did occur, and occasionally men would disappear. On June 3, 1708, Moscoso recounted that he had not undergone another actual attack, but a few roving bands had been sighted and one ensign, who later escaped, had been captured in March while hunting with some Indians, plus two convicts who disappeared the same day.

These hostilities loom large in the local history of Pensacola. During the year 1712, the governor Don Gregorio de Salinas Varona reported that the presidio had been besieged by Indians, once in March which lasted the greater part of the month, when the French governor at Mobile offered his assistance with supplies, arms, and munitions. Enemy Indians attacked at least twice again but, fortunately, had not made another appearance by January of the following year.

At this time, 1713, Salinas was still short subordinate officials to assist him. There was no Sergeant Major, a post second in rank only to the governor. One commanding officer had been captured in the company of twenty-four soldiers and convicts who were out on a wood-cutting detail. Three of these men, in addition to a friar, were killed. This loss made the defense of Pensacola almost impossible. Moreover, the remaining lesser officials were worse than the soldiers they commanded; they constantly incited the men, oftentimes to request the impossible.

As he and other governors before him had done, Salinas Varona in the spring of 1717 renewed his plea for a small fortification at Punta de Siguenza, French activity in the Gulf region was increasing and an unidentified ship had arrived at Pensacola and had indulged in some reconnaissance. This would not have been possible with the oft-requested defense work on the tip of Santa Rosa Island. He also urged that more Spanish vassals be settled in the area.

*France vs. Spain at Pensacola*

Salinas' fear of French encroachments was not ill-founded. A year later, on May 12, 1718, the French occupied St. Joseph's Bay. In the same year they founded New Orleans. Then on May 13, 1719, a French force from Mobile captured the small battery at Punta de Siguenza on Santa Rosa Island that had been established only a few months before. An officer with some soldiers dispatched from San Carlos that day were also taken prisoners. On the following day the Spaniards on the mainland could descry three ships bearing French flags which began to fire on the fort. The ensuing battle lasted about three hours but the Iberians, under a new commander, Don Juan Pedro Matamoros de Isla, could not resist the French forces and were obliged to capitulate. It was then that the Spaniards received their first notice of the war between France and Spain that had broken out in Europe in January.

News of the loss of the fort, and with it Pensacola, was received by the Viceroy on June 29 from Don Gregorio de Salinas Varona, who had been recently transferred to the governorship of St. Joseph's Bay, and preparations were immediately begun to ready an expedition to retake the base. In the early part of July, fifteen ships sailed from Havana under the command of Don Alfonso Carrascosa de la Torre, on an expedition in the Royal Service. Soon after departure, this force captured two French frigates on their way to Havana to deposit the governor, officers, and troops of the captured Pensacola. Carrascosa then returned to Havana where it was decided to change his fleet's original destination to Pensacola. He sailed July 19, his forces augmented by the extra assistance sent by the Viceroy. He had with him some 1,200 troops, including one hundred and fifty men from the Pensacola garrison.

This expedition arrived in Pensacola on August 14, 1719. The day was calm and Carrascosa entered the bay, disembarking one hundred men at Punta de Siguenza. He then proceeded to surround the castillo of San Carlos and the ships anchored in the bay. As the Spaniards commenced firing, the enemy abandoned its two frigates, scuttling them by fire. One was saved, although the flames consumed the other, and the some one hundred and twenty men who escaped from the vessels retired to the castillo, thereby augmenting that garrison. Artillery fire continued until

six o'clock that evening. Carrascosa demanded capitulation, conceding the French until ten o'clock the next morning to decide. They gave up, and Don Juan Pedro Matamoros was back in the governorship. The captured French garrison numbered three hundred and fifty, of which forty deserted to the Spanish. The remainder were sent to Havana.

But the French were soon to retake the presidio, and not to relinquish actual possession until late in 1722 when they returned it to Spain as part of the articles of peace of the War of the Quadruple Alliance.

### *Punta de Siguenza*

Don Alejandro Wauchope was chosen to repossess Pensacola this second time. He departed from San Juan de Ulua, New Spain, on November 10, 1722, with three ships: a frigate, a packet-boat, and a sloop, arriving at his destination on the 25th. The next day, Wauchope went ashore where he encountered the French Infantry Lieutenant, Jean Baptiste Rebut and the seventeen soldiers under his command, plus the only shelter left that also doubled as the fortification, a miserable hut. Here Wauchope received official possession of Pensacola, including the artillery, munitions, and other military supplies.

He carried with him the ridiculous orders mentioned above to determine the feasibility of making a cut across Santa Rosa Island which would drain and thereby lower the water level of the bay sufficiently to close off the entrance to large vessels of war. If this were not practicable, a fort was to be constructed at Punta de Siguenza, to be manned by one hundred and fifty men, comprising infantry and artillery. The garrison of San Joseph was to be transferred to the new Pensacola.

Wauchope in studying the defense possibilities of Punta de Siguenza, found it completely useless to fortify as it was "a low spot of extremely loose sand, full of marshes and besides, on digging to a depth of two palms, water is encountered that issues forth as a spring." Not only this: in foul weather the sea washed completely over the location. A fort could feasibly be built farther from the shore but this would render it virtually useless for defense. He picked a spot, about one-half a mile from the site originally planned for the castillo, and which enjoyed the protection of the first trees of the island. The best fortification would

be a quadrangular fort with a total of forty-eight cannon, one-half to be 18-pounders and the remainder 12-pounders, manned by three hundred places, rather than the one hundred and fifty carried in his orders. Investigation was also made regarding possible materials for construction since the sand was too loose to support such heavy materials as tabby, brick, or stone. Moreover, stone, if used, would have to be brought in from Havana. Wood, felt Wauchope, would be satisfactory as it was to be found in relative abundance and of such quality that it would endure for years, wet or dry, above or below ground.

He also recommended another fort, opposite Punta de Si-guenza on the mainland but not at the location of the old San Carlos because the latter had been dominated by sand dunes and the sea had undermined it. The site he suggested, situated on the dune named "El Almirante" (one of those that had dominated the old fort) would afford a great advantage in warding off any enemy ship that might attempt the entrance of the bay.

Wauchope sent his ships to the Bay of San Joseph to fetch the garrison there, which returned with Captain Pedro Primo de Rivera and sixty soldiers, plus artillery, supplies, cables, and bark. A few days earlier, a French launch had arrived at the presidio to transport the troops of the previous owners to their own territory.

Despite recent hostilities, relationships with the French were again quite excellent. But by this date Wauchope had received orders from the Viceroy for the Spanish to cease intercourse with their Gallic neighbors for fear of the illicit trade that might (in all probability, would) take place. He later confirmed these orders in a plea to keep the presidio well supplied, stating that the entire French policy was "to introduce trade under any pretext and to return home with the proceeds." He emphasized the necessity to keep adequate food on hand, since many times in the past Pensacola "would have been abandoned had it not been for French aid."


In January, two sloops, sent from New Spain, arrived in Pensacola with four months' supplies for two hundred men and four salary payments, sufficient to include the men from San Joseph. In early February, he decided to depart, taking with him eighty-four persons, including men, women, and children, of the

people left over from St. Joseph's. Twenty eight more persons were left for the frigate to transport later to Veracruz. Wauchope set sail for the latter port on February 13.

*The Settlement on Santa Rosa Island*

Alejandro Wauchope had arrived in Pensacola on November 25, 1722. By February 13 of the following year the new settlement planned on Santa Rosa Island had begun to take shape. At this time it was reported that there had already been built a warehouse forty feet long, twenty feet wide, and twenty feet high from cedar boards and nails from Veracruz; a powder box made of the same material fifteen feet long, ten wide, and five high, covered with hides; a paymaster's office of the material from Veracruz, twenty feet long, nine wide, and nine high; two barracks, each forty feet long, eighteen wide, and eight high, constructed of the same material except for the roofs which were brought in from San Joseph; a house for Captain Pedro Primo de Rivera, twenty feet long, ten wide, and ten high, made of boards from San Joseph and nails from Veracruz; a powder magazine ten feet long, eight wide, and eight tall, constructed of boards from San Joseph; twenty-four small buildings built also of San Joseph material, roofed with bark, for the dwellings of the workmen, convicts, and other persons of the populace; eight large houses for the top officers; a cook oven for bread; and a look-out of thirty-seven cubits in height, built between two trees with steps leading up to it. Such was the shape that the new Pensacola was taking at Punta de Siguenza where so often before it had been requested to put up at least a small defensive work.

Thus the Pensacola on Santa Rosa Island remained until the year 1752 when on November 3 it was almost entirely destroyed by a severe hurricane. Little is known of its history during these long years. No doubt the day-by-day story was similiar in its broad outlines to that which has been reviewed to this point. Following this storm, some of the inhabitants moved to the blockhouse of San Miguel which stood several miles up the bay from the old fort of San Carlos; the rest remained on Santa Rosa where they threw up another blockhouse some little distance from the site of the old Punta de Siguenza.



PENSACOLA ON SANTA ROSA ISLAND, A.D. 1743. Drawn by Dom Serres.

(Originally published in Roberts: *Account of Florida*. London, 1763.  
View from the north. 1. Fort. 2. Church. 3. Governor's house.  
4. Commandant's house. 5. A well. 6. A bungo.

*The Third Pensacola*

Then, in the early part of 1757, a new governor, Don Miguel Roman de Castilla y Lugo, after a shipwreck on the French island of Massacre, arrived and took over the place of San Miguel which was to become the new presidio of Pensacola.

On August 26 word was received from Monsieur de Bell, the French commander at Mobile, that the pagan Talapoosa Indians were moving up to attack Pensacola and Santa Rosa de Apalache, irate over the killing of one of their caciques at the latter place. Pensacola did not yet have a stockade since the Santa Rosa garrison had been moved to the mainland; the effective troops were greatly reduced by disease, and there was little powder and few fire-arms - the warehouse possessed a scant thirty extra flints. With this news, a number of defensive measures were taken.

Since there was no adequate fort when Roman de Castilla arrived, he had given orders for a stockade to be erected. This had not yet been carried out, although wood was being cut some eight leagues away. While waiting for the lumber to arrive, Roman ordered set up three batteries for which he readied eleven swivel guns and fourteen cannons, mounted on almost unserviceable carriages, dispersing five advanced batteries of two cannon each on the perimeter. The troops numbered one hundred and fifty men, including sergeants, corporals, and sailors, and twenty-five civilians.

He wrote the French commander at Mobile to send thirty to forty Indians to join the natives of Escambe in an attempt to obstruct the enemy at a place called Xarea. He also asked for an armourer to come and repair the Spanish arms. The French denied the request for the Indians, stating that they did not wish to offend the other indigenous nations involved.

A portion of the lumber for the stockade arrived and the area for a fort with four semi-bastions was marked out, comprising within its confines a church, warehouse, barracks, hospital, houses, and a few other buildings. The two sides of the fort that protected the east and the north were finished at one hundred and thirty-three *varas* and one hundred and ninety two *varas* \* respectively.

In September, the Franciscan missionary from the pueblo of Punta Rasa arrived, accompanied by some of the Indians of his

\*Approximately 33 inches.

flock, with the report that a large body of the enemy was on its way to Pensacola. On the 18th, word was received from Apalache that the Talapoosas were laying siege to that place. Aid was requested and Roman replied with a shipment of food.

Andres Escudero, a trusted Indian cacique who had been sent to the Talapoosas, returned on October 10 with the report that this enemy had changed its mind about attacking Pensacola. Roman, who considered the Indians highly untrustworthy, decided that work on the stockade must be continued immediately. This was finished by the 15th with the exception of the section that fronted on the sea.

In April, 1758, over one-hundred Talapoosas and Apiscas came to Pensacola to affirm the peace. Together these two groups elected Escudero as the Governor General of their newly formed provinces, Roman assenting as he felt that the arrangement would offer good control of these new subjects. Some of the caciques were granted the Spanish title of *Capitan de Guerra*; the head chief was given that of *Capitan Comandante*.

Roman de Castilla on April 18 commented on his own satisfaction with this peace settlement. The Talapoosa tribe was one of the most feared on the continent; they occupied the area between the French at Mobile and the Spanish territory to the east, constituting a wedge to the north. In effect, he reported to the Viceroy, now that such a fierce nation had allied itself with the Spanish cause, the latter's relations with the French and English would be greatly improved. Roman exhorted his superior to augment supplies as, in order to maintain peace, it would be necessary to make proper and adequate distribution of gifts, corn, and chile. It was, however, not a year later when Roman complained that the lack of provisions at Pensacola with which to favor the Indians made the continuance of the peace extremely difficult. The fort, no longer on the island, could easily be reached by the Indians should they decide to go on the warpath.

Peace did reign, nevertheless, for the following three years. During this time, according to Roman, Spanish jurisdiction was extended to over thirty leagues from Pensacola, aggregating two Indian pueblos to the Spanish government which were located in such favorable areas that they would easily serve as buffers against heathen Indians. Three haciendas were developed, and the pueblos of Punta Rasa and Escambe made good progress.

Then, on February 2, 1761, the Alibama Indians hit the town of Punta Rasa with a surprise attack. Three soldiers, a

woman, and one small girl were killed. On the 9th the light cavalry unit stationed at Escambe was also attacked. From this point the enemy moved on to Pensacola, destroying the haciendas and burning the dwellings and towns of the Spanish Indian allies. Seven persons were lost, including four workers and one soldier, murdered practically in plain sight of the presidio; movement was restricted to an area a cannon shot away from the fort.

The uprising was general. A message was sent to the Talaupoosas but by May no answer had been received. There were barely one hundred and twenty men in garrison at Pensacola, most of these useless, and it had been necessary to call back from Punta Rasa twenty artillerymen and forty-three cavalrymen, only nineteen of the latter who were properly outfitted. The Indians from Escambe and Punta Rasa were moved in to the castillo, but only some twenty-five men were able-bodied enough to be pressed into service. The cavalry was employed to escort the inhabitants to a nearby creek for water and to patrol the area immediately adjacent to the castillo; there were scarcely enough men left to man the four semi-bastions and the artillery, leaving the curtains almost defenseless. It almost goes without saying that all kinds of supplies and munitions were short.

Roman managed to get the wives of some of the officers out of the presidio to Havana and other places and lamented the fact that he had no other safe place to put the over one hundred remaining women with a like number of children. To make matters worse, on August 12 of the previous year, Pensacola had been struck by a severe hurricane that damaged or destroyed almost all the buildings of the presidio; the populace was living in extreme discomfort.

Roman de Castilla also felt that the most effective defense of the presidio was hampered by the system prevailing at that time regarding the infantry and cavalry. He had objected strongly to the reform introduced in 1757 to reduce the two hundred man garrison by fifty men and with this number to form a light cavalry unit.

A new governor, Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla, was commissioned in 1761 to go to Pensacola to put down the Indian uprising begun earlier that year. He took possession on October 21. The place was in shambles. The troops had been practically unquartered as the barracks had had no roofs since the hurricane of the previous year; there had been many Indian hostilities; and the men under the previous command had sometimes been mistreated.

One other charge concerning a practice current throughout the period and much of the Spanish Indies was that of illicit trade. Roman had indulged in this type of activity. Indeed, soon after Ortiz arrived a ship from the English house of William Walton in New York arrived at the presidio to trade, expecting to find, apparently, the two persons with whom they had dealt with one time previously, Governor Don Miguel Roman and the Paymaster, Don Juan de Ituarte. Ortiz seized the ship and held it in custody. At the time Ortiz was writing, there were fourteen small stores, privately owned and with slight stocks, but with excessive prices. Roman, it was known, had also possessed a store of his own from which he dispensed goods, drinks, and comestibles.

For the next two-year period, under the governorship of Ortiz Parrilla, the Pensacolans endeavored to rebuild and to develop the presidio. When the British took over in 1763, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, they were quite unimpressed. The fort was in poor condition, possessing forty-four pieces of artillery of miscellaneous sizes, and the woods had been allowed to grow too close to the structure, a potential impediment to adequate defense. Since the 1761 attacks, the Indian pueblo of Punta Rasa had remained within the confines of the presidio. Almost all the buildings encountered by the English had been built during Ortiz' term.

Upon consummating the transfer to the British, and with some delay owing to efforts to obtain enough transports, Ortiz sailed from the presidio with somewhat less than eight hundred evacuees, including over one hundred Christian Indians, plus their movable effects. A few of the people went to Havana; the majority departed for Veracruz where they arrived in September of 1763.

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