The Ancient City Occupied St. Augustine As A Test Case For Stephen Ash's Civil War Occupation Model

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THE ANCIENT CITY OCCUPIED: ST. AUGUSTINE AS A TEST CASE FOR STEPHEN ASH’S CIVIL WAR OCCUPATION MODEL

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis intends to prove that Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation from his work, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South*, is applicable to St. Augustine’s occupation experience in the Civil War. Three overarching themes in Ash’s work are consistent with Civil War St. Augustine. First, that Union policy of conciliation towards southern civilians was abandoned after the first few months of occupation due to both non-violent and violent resistance from those civilians. Second, that Ash’s “zones of occupation” of the occupied South, being garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier apply to St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. Finally, Ash’s assertions that the southern community was changed by the war and Union occupation, is reflected in the massive demographic shifts that rocked St. Augustine from 1862 to 1865. This thesis will show that all three of Ash’s themes apply to St. Augustine’s Civil War occupation experience and confirms the author’s generalizations about life in the occupied South.
This thesis is dedicated to my family, my love, and my dear friends.
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PREFACE

Despite numerous writings on the American Civil War, authors continually find new approaches, topics, or sources that add to our understanding of the country’s great conflict. Whether analyzing new social, cultural, political, or military phenomena and events, these additions are often driven by contemporary issues, which stimulate historians to revisit old questions with added vigor. This thesis is no different. With the United States’ War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the question of occupying foreign peoples and lands looms larger than ever for scholars of American history. Military occupation escaped many Americans attention in the nearly forty years since America’s last prolonged occupation experience—Vietnam. However, military occupation of foreign lands by the United States military did not originate in Vietnam, nor World War II Japan and Germany, or the Philippines; but rather in the numerous wars with Native Americans, the Mexican-American War, and the American Civil War.

One of the U.S. Army’s first experiences with military occupation over a civilian population across thousands of square miles occurred during the Mexican-American War. The United States Army under Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott fought the Mexican Army and invaded Mexico and her northern territories. Though U.S. troops did not maintain a permanent presence in Mexico, the country’s northern territories were ceded to, and eventually incorporated in, the United States. American forces in Mexican territory dealt with many issues involved in military occupation like political resistance and military insurgency. This resistance was met with repression, along with numerous political, social, and cultural changes to the occupied areas. The few lessons of military occupation stimulated some American officers like Henry Halleck to contemplate the conduct of war and occupation under international law, but this did not create codified
regulations for such operations. Thus despite these experiences, American military and political officials were ill prepared for the issues involved with prolonged military occupation. It would be these same issues that would be raised over a decade later during the Civil War.¹

Confederates viewed U.S. military units stationed in the South in the secession crisis as occupying forces of an alien nation. Even before South Carolina state forces fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, United States troops controlled forts, rail depots, and cities in the southern states of South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Texas, Missouri, and Georgia. Southern state forces took some of these U.S. Army positions early in the war with the goal of seizing all U.S. government positions and property in southern states. However, areas under Union control only increased as the months and years of war passed, so that by April 1865, Union commanders ruled great expanses of nearly every Confederate state. This meant that literally hundreds of thousands of Union troops and southern civilians interacted with each other on an almost daily basis across the occupied South, leading to many experiences and perspectives.

Despite the work of many capable historians, Florida’s prolonged military occupation remains lightly treated. This thesis seeks to apply Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation described in his work, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865* to a Florida city, with the goal of testing Ash’s conclusions and generalizations. This thesis contends that St. Augustine, Florida serves as a successful test case for Ash’s occupation model applied on the local level and verifies Ash’s assertions that southern resistance led to changes in the United States’ war aims and policy, that this resistance created three unique spheres of influence called “zones of occupation,” and that the conflicts experienced under occupation changed the southern community during the war.²

Authors provided scant treatment to the experiences and perspectives of southerners under military occupation for many years after the Civil War. This treatment was usually indirect, often associated with works on state histories, regimental histories, biographies, and memoirs. Regimental histories were narrowly focused on a particular regiment, detailing the men of the regiment, the battles they fought in, and the places they visited, without any analysis. Henry F. W. Little’s *The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of Rebellion* published in 1896 illustrates this trend. Though the work does contain descriptions of southern cities that the regiment occupied during the war, it only briefly describes the most exciting military events, comments on the appearance of the city, and moves on to the next great event in the regiment’s service.

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These histories paralleled and reflected the national mood of reconciliation after the war. Veterans’ organizations were among the first to adopt the stance of national reconciliation and through their publications they attempted to frame the war as a conflict between white brothers. This focus led to the glossing over of the sacrifices of African Americans, women, Unionists, as well as larger social, cultural, and labor issues that occurred during the war.³

Regimental histories were not the only publications to gloss over military occupation in favor of large battles or political events during and after the war. Reconstruction studies often picked up with the end of the Civil War and focused on postwar political events in the South. One example of these Reconstruction studies is William Watson Davis’ work *The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida*, published in 1913. This work describes Florida from the antebellum period to the end of Reconstruction, the bulk of the book lists the larger military events and politics of Florida from 1860-1877. Considering this book’s political and military focus, only a minor portion of this study deals with military occupation during the war and its affect on the southern home front. The Dunning School, a historiographical viewpoint that emerged from Professor William Dunning at Columbia University in the early twentieth century, also heavily influences this work. The Dunning School argued that Congressional and Radical Reconstruction governments were corrupt, inefficient, and abusive to southern whites and painted the reassertion of southern white Democrat “redemption” rule of state

governments, after the election of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877, as a beneficial occurrence to the South. This line of inquiry was influenced by racial biases associated with Jim Crow, which emphasized the “incapacity” of African Americans to participate in government. This school of thought produced works that demonized African American, northern settler (carpetbagger), and southern Republican (scalawag) involvement in Reconstruction government.4

These two approaches dominated Civil War historiography for the first eight decades after the war and would continue to reemerge in decades of historiography to come. However, questions arose in the 1940s about American military involvement in foreign lands and the historical origins of this precedent. This change can be attributed to American participation in World War II, the emergence of total war, and the subsequent military occupation of Germany and Japan. Historians point to this war as one of the major factors in raising questions among historians about the historical origins for total war and military occupation.5

Howard Palmer Johnson, “New Orleans under General Butler,” and Joseph Parks “Memphis Under Military Rule, 1862-1865,” published in 1941 and 1942, are good examples of the beginning of local studies of the occupied South.6 These works discussed broad tangible consequences of military occupation that occurred inside New Orleans,

Louisiana and Memphis, Tennessee. These works discussed the actions of a leading politician or general in an occupied city; like issues of censorship, expulsions, inflation, social chaos, banditry, guerrillas, prostitution, and many other phenomena of occupied life. These factors are briefly discussed and then abandoned without further analysis for the next local event of fame. Some local studies, like Parks, emphasized the hardships of civilians, who saw economic privations, social change, humiliation, and martial law during occupation. Other historians including Johnson, judiciously discussed some benefits of occupation, like security, economic recovery, sanitation improvements, and public schools. However, authors list events without much analysis. This would be a continuous trend among local studies of the occupied South for several decades.

Shortly after these initial local works on military occupation, historians began exploring macro-historical questions of overarching American experiences with aspects of modern war that they believed originated in the nineteenth century. The first work to discuss military government on a larger scale was Ralph Gabriel’s “The American Experience with Military Government,” published in 1944. The author discusses the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II in his discussion of military government. However, Gabriel pays minimal attention to the Civil War period, devoting less than three pages to the war. Despite this brevity, in only one sentence Gabriel managed to expose one of the major gaps in Civil War historiography when he stated, “The rule of the [Union] generals in the South was one of the longer American experiences with military government.” Though he did not expand on this concept, the author did make clear that further inquiry into military
government and occupation was necessary, because of the latitude given Union generals occupying southern states.⁷

Robert J. Futrell continued this macro approach to military occupation with his article, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” published in 1951. His work claimed that Union commanders often had little or no instructions in the first two years of the war from the Lincoln administration with regards to governing occupied areas. Due to the lack of instructions, Union commanders had to improvise and devise an occupation administration strategy, which in some cases promoted southern local government and legal entities. At the same time, these generals wielded immense power over not just the U. S. Army, but over the civilians in the territory the army occupied. Futrell argued that the majority of actions taken by occupying commanders were well founded, measured responses, and supported local civilian courts and rule. Thus, according to Futrell, Union commanders produced overarching policies aimed at alleviating the suffering of soldier and civilian alike in the occupied South. However, Futrell showed the continuing influence of the Dunning School in his one line about post-war occupation and Reconstruction when he stated, “[a]t the end of Confederate resistance, a majority of Federal Commanders expressed a desire for speedy restoration of Southern governments. Unfortunately, such sound counsel would not prevail, and Federal military government, conceived as a necessity for successful military operations, would be perpetuated for political purposes during the ‘reconstruction’ of the South.”⁸ Futrell, like many scholars, still viewed Reconstruction through the Dunning School of

thought, which viewed the period as corrupt and detrimental to white southerners. Years would pass before scholars judiciously reviewed the Reconstruction era in Civil War historiography. Futrell, however, would not be the last historian who viewed military occupation through the prism of official policy, while ignoring its effect on populations other than white men.9

Large overarching works that viewed wartime occupation like Gabriel and Futrell were few and far between. The majority of scholarship done from the 1940s to the 1980s was typical of the trends established by Parks and Johnson. Scholars like Gilbert Govan and James Livingood who examined Chattanooga and Peter Maslowski work on occupied Nashville were similar in many ways to the earlier studies of Memphis and New Orleans. Local studies continued to be produced on military occupation as historians analyzed specific aspects of occupation. Though authors like Gerald M. Capers improved upon the existing literature of local occupation studies, these additions merely replayed less well-known aspects of military occupation in a particular city. These additions also had limited corresponding analysis that linked the local incidents to larger events of the war, or to similar factors or phenomena occurring elsewhere in the occupied South.10

9 Foner, Forever Free, xxi.
One such factor, African Americans under Union military occupation, received increasing attention from scholars with the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. Historians looked at topics like the care given to freedmen and the enforcement of equal provisions by the army, as well as the extensive relief work of the freedmen’s bureau after the war. Though these works tend to focus on postwar Reconstruction and occupation rather than during the conflict itself, these publications illustrate the divergence of Reconstruction and African American studies from works on wartime occupation, a trend that continues to exist in Civil War historiography. Two early examples of this trend published in 1968 are John Kirkland’s “Federal Troops in the South Atlantic States during Reconstruction, 1865-1877,” and James Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. One historian described Kirkland’s work as a “tedious […] list of duties punctuated by sweeping hypotheses that are introduced and abruptly passed over without development.” 11 Sefton suffered similar problems with large gaps in his treatment of the army’s enforcement of civilian policy. Furthermore, both authors view occupation during Reconstruction in a microcosm, divorced from the war itself when military occupation was first established in parts of the South. 12

As Reconstruction studies diverged into its own category separate from works on wartime occupation, several other topics that affected or were affected by U. S. Army occupation began receiving further treatment during the 1970s with the rise of social history. Not content to just view events from the top down, scholars sought to explore the bulk of individuals who fought in or experienced the war, but were not politicians, army

officers, or the elite. These scholars were primarily concerned with the great unspoken masses during the Civil War including women, slaves, freedmen, poor whites, immigrants, and others who had been glossed over by political and military historians. Social history helped create the second overarching literature theme for Civil War historiography that differed from strict military or political histories of southern occupation. The topic of the Confederate and Union “home front” began rising as an all-inclusive popular research theme that held under its purview the specific topics of social conditions like community, dissent, and women’s studies.13

Subtopics of “the home front,” are: (1) Community studies or how communities change over the course of the Civil War. (2) Works on dissent which focuses on Unionists and guerrillas. (3) Women’s histories that emphasize the role of women as active agents during the war. Each subtopic has its own historiographical trends and patterns which will only be briefly examined here due to their depth. Within community studies, aspects of the Confederate home front like the forging of nationalism, the role of community in morale and motivation, the social make up of secessionists, Unionists, and others were all factors that received attention from the 1970s until today.14 Similarly, in works on dissent, scholars have explored Unionists and guerrillas in greater detail as they have expanded upon the limited analysis in the beginning of the twentieth century, to

provide a deep and vibrant picture of varying degrees of the prevalence of Unionists and guerrillas in the South.¹⁵ Lastly, women’s histories have grown to illustrate the vast roles that women had on the home front, from supporting soldiers to being the primary recipient of U.S. occupation policies and experiences. Each facet of home front studies has affected works on southern occupation in ways that are too detailed to note en masse, except to say that these trends parallel the work accomplished by “occupation” historians, add to their body of work, while reinforcing previous assertions about the chaotic nature of southern society at war.¹⁶

All of these trends intermingled in the late 1980s, producing studies that analyzed other factors of military occupation from freedmen to Unionists to women. These new works provided a more complete picture of the massive changes that rocked southern communities occupied by Union forces. The most representative of these works, both published in 1988, are Stuart C. McGehee’s, “Military Origins of the New South,” and

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Stephen V. Ash’s *Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace in the Upper South.* Both works take the effects of the Union army during the war and show how it affected the Reconstruction period in Tennessee. Each work is interested in specific phenomena, McGehee in freedmen and Ash who focuses on the larger changes to the white community and adjustment to emancipation. However, they both are representative of the effects of social history on occupation studies, which blended political, military, and social history into a powerful synthesis that illustrated the great destruction in Tennessee in a way unmatched by previous works.

Not content to keep his conclusions about community change confined to Middle Tennessee; Stephen V. Ash’s *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865,* published in 1995, tracks commonalities among military occupation throughout the occupied South. Ash details how white southerners initially accepted occupation for fear they would be exterminated. Once white southerners realized the Union adopted a “rose water” or conciliatory approach—meaning that U.S. troops wanted to only punish those they viewed as a small group of fire eating secessionists without harming the greater population—southerners began resisting Union troops. This was done through nonviolent means of insults and refusing to socialize or take the oath of loyalty, as well as violent means such as guerrilla warfare. Ash then discusses his theory of the zones of occupation, three distinct worlds called garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier. These distinct experiences were

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created by the proximity of Union forces in the areas. Union forces concentrated in a single town or city called garrisoned towns. These garrisoned towns were surrounded by no-man’s-land, an area that U.S. troops frequently foraged in and patrolled. This no-man’s-land ran up to the Confederate frontier, an area that was under Confederate control but not immune to Union incursions. Lastly, Ash outlines how the war inflicted changes that shook southern communities. These changes ranged from the depopulation of garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land, which resulted in a refugee crisis and broke up communities due to the depredations of occupation, to the destruction of slavery and race controls in the occupied South.19

Ash’s work remains the single largest occupation model yet employed across the occupied South. The author tried to synthesize the growing body of work done on the occupied South, an approach historians increasingly adopted in the 1990s. However, this work only tracks the privation of southern whites, without giving any consideration to variations among Union soldiers, the actions of African Americans, or black soldiers. This is due to the author’s stated scope of focusing solely on the experience of white southern communities and the changes it underwent. Ash states he decided to maintain his focus on the white southern community under wartime occupation because of the large body of existing literature on African Americans in the occupied South and Reconstruction, reflecting the existing division between occupation, African American, and Reconstruction studies. Furthermore, Ash’s work is representative of a relatively new trend in historiography called “new military history.” New military history attempted to fill the gaps of traditional military history, which analyzed large battles, armies, and tactics, by explaining how battlefield success and failures affected life for civilians on the

19 Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, x.
home front. Though this new trend incorporated works from other fields of history, many of its proponents admit that it lagged behind other groups in adopting new historiographic approaches.\textsuperscript{20}

This new military history influenced scholars of war, military occupation, the home front, Unionists, guerrillas, Reconstruction, international law, and a host of other subtopics. A good example of this influence is Mark Grimsley’s \textit{The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865} published in 1997. Grimsley faulted historians for missing the mark when discussing military policy and the Civil War as the nation’s first total war.\textsuperscript{21} Grimsley argued that too often historians did not delineate how and why Union military policy evolved from a conciliatory approach from 1861-1863, to a pragmatic policy from 1863-1864, to one of “hard war” from 1864-1865. These policies were not uniform and had many caveats and facets that existed throughout all three periods, affecting the southern home front in a variety of ways. Furthermore, Grimsley shows that Union commanders often adapted the orders to the situations on the ground, but in the end, all commanders recognized the validity of labeling some civilians as non-belligerents, preventing them from crossing the precipice into unrestrained total war.\textsuperscript{22} This work shows that the nuance and subtlety is important in delineating the Civil War as different from a total war and is now indispensable for


\textsuperscript{21} For a thorough discussion of the historiography of noncombatants and total war in the Civil War, see: Grimsley, “A Directed Severity,” 1-10.

anyone seeking to cover military occupation. By the end of the 1990s, new military history had furthered the analysis of the war’s impact on southern civilians. Ash with his focus on the general experiences of white southern civilians and Grimsley with his focus on military policy toward white and black southern civilians represented the core approaches to any new military history of the occupied South.

However, this core approach would be disrupted by the last major leap in military occupation studies, represented by Judkin Browning’s recent book, *Shifting Loyalties: The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina*, published in 2011. Browning forges his own approach to occupation studies by explicitly stating that he is neither concerned with policy or large generalizations, but how occupation played out on the ground in one location, Eastern North Carolina. Furthermore, the author has three main thrusts to his focus; that white southerners adapted and shifted loyalties when the situation suited or was necessary and even then it did not mean the repudiation of southern culture and white supremacy, that this shifting confused and angered U.S. Army soldiers, who not only effected occupation but were themselves affected by it, and lastly, that African Americans were not passive players but savvy pragmatists who used U. S. Army soldiers and benevolent societies to obtain the “four pillars of empowerment, escape, employment, enlistment, and education.”

23 This approach makes Browning the most comprehensive in terms of tracking southern white, African American, and Union troop experiences during military occupation in the Civil War. This work also represents how new military history has grown in the past thirty years, by comign topics that were

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commonly separated in wartime military occupation, Reconstruction, and African American studies.

Historians produced many works about specific locales under, or phenomena associated with, military occupation during the Civil War. So many different approaches, topics, and areas received treatment, that it is unwieldy to analyze them all. Nor can a comparison between models be successfully completed without extensive analysis into both approaches to see commonalities and contrasts. To successfully employ models of occupation, each model needs to be tested in a locale to determine its applicability with the goal of ultimately combining both approaches to analyze military occupation. Therefore, this thesis seeks to focus on the most pronounced overarching study of Civil War military occupation, Stephen V. Ash’s *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865*.

Ash’s model was chosen because it was the only model that covered the entire occupied South and provided overarching themes and generalizations about the conduct of military occupation. However, the model is limited because it focuses solely on white southerners, generalizes Union soldiers, fails to capture the complexity of the move from conciliation to hard war, treats African Americans as passive players, and completely ignores black soldiers. The model also overlooks variation and unique attributes, which complicate military occupation, like topography. Despite these flaws, Ash’s model remains the largest occupation study to date and has been utilized by scholarly works on the Civil War. Furthermore, the majority of research for this thesis was done prior to Browning’s comprehensive study on Union occupation and the scope of the Browning’s
work precludes itself from a successful treatment in this thesis. Lastly, Ash’s model has yet to be applied to many areas of the occupied South, particularly Florida.24

This thesis will tackle Ash’s three overarching themes that link together the experience of the occupied South: (1) The Union’s evolving war aims from conciliation to hard war as it incurred southern resistance. (2) The variation in the experiences of southerners residing in three unique spheres of the occupied South. (3) The array of conflicts that followed in the wake of the Union army, which changed the antebellum southern community. This thesis seeks to use a southern city as a test case to see if Ash’s occupation model and his assertions about occupied life apply to a specific city in Florida.25

The southern city to be used as the test case is St. Augustine, Florida. The choice of this city is due to its continual occupation by Union forces from March 1862 until 1868, the prevalence of other garrisoned towns in Northeast Florida, the town’s lack of extensive treatment by Civil War scholars, and the numerous unused primary sources describing the town’s occupation by Union troops and government officials. Historians including Omega G. East, Thomas Graham, George Bucker, David J. Coles, and others


25 Ash, When the Yankees Came, x.
have written works that dealt with the Ancient City during the Civil War. Ash mentions St. Augustine a couple of times in his large occupation study, though in both regards, the work done on St. Augustine is lacking in depth, detail, and perspective, which warrants another scholarly look.

Naturally, this thesis cannot cover every facet of Ash’s work on occupation nor can it fill every gap in the discussion of St Augustine’s Civil War experience, so it is necessary to delineate which portions of Ash’s model will not be addressed. Ash’s generalizations about rural communalism and class conflict will not be explored, for as Ash states, class conflict in the occupied South was the least prevalent of confrontations that influenced community change. Furthermore, because of Ash’s neglect of African American agency and black soldiers, this thesis will also avoid this topic, as the sources and information available is too great to be successfully discussed in the available space. What this thesis will illustrate is that Ash’s three overarching themes are applicable to St. Augustine and are instructive in illustrating how space, time, and events played a role in


27 The reason for using northern sources is twofold, first they are numerous and currently unused in a study of occupation in St. Augustine. Second, according to James McPherson, the letters of Civil War soldiers are reliable because of the lack of censorship and expressed the true feelings of the soldiers, James McPherson, What They Fought For, 1861-1865. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1994): 1.

28 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 193; Gallagher, The Confederate War, 178; Ash’s generalizations about rural communalism and southern society are also difficult to reconcile with Edward E. Baptist’s conclusions about the differences of frontier plantation society from the Old South due to the conflicts that arose when slavery expanded to the Old Southwest and Florida. Baptist argues that patriarchal planter dominated society never replicated itself in the way it existed in Virginia or South Carolina and was made possible only by the concessions of the planter class to yeomen and countrymen, Edward E. Baptist, Creating an Old South: Middle Florida’s Plantation Frontier Before the Civil War. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002): 1-10, 28, 127, 238, 256.
conflicts among Unionists, guerrillas, African Americans, and Union troops in the Ancient City.

In keeping with Ash’s organization, the first chapter of this thesis will briefly overview St. Augustine on the eve of the Civil War to show her southern nationalism, pro-secessionist attitudes, the fear of U.S. invasion, and condition of the city upon the arrival of U.S. Navy gunboats in March 1862. The second chapter will detail the applicability of Ash’s model during the early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. The chapter will introduce and discuss Ash’s three overarching themes that this thesis seeks to test, in the early occupation period: (1) The Union’s policy of conciliation met southern civilian resistance resulting in the Union Army’s change of war aims. (2) The zones of occupation, being garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier, apply to St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. (3) That military occupation caused substantial changes to the southern community. The third chapter will extend the analysis of these three themes to the late occupation period, January 1863 to April 1865. Lastly, the conclusion will overview the successful application of Ash’s occupation model to St. Augustine and will propose future avenues of inquiry into St. Augustine’s occupation.
CHAPTER ONE: ST. AUGUSTINE IN THE SECESSION CRISIS 
AND CONFEDERACY

In his work on occupation, Stephen V. Ash spends a limited portion describing the lead up to the Civil War, merely giving an overview of overarching southern thought on southern nationalism, secession, community, and the coming war. Ash describes many facets of southern communities in the lead up and first year of the war as being: (1) Pro-southern but not uniformly secessionist. (2) Once these communities seceded, they encountered privations from the lack of trade with the North. (3) Southerners feared Union invasion so much that panicked evacuations occurred when enemy troops were sited. In keeping with Ash’s formats this chapter will provide an overview of the years before secession to illustrate the southern nationalism and pro-secessionist beliefs of some of the town’s population, as well as how it fits with Ash’s model. Then this chapter will describe the condition of St. Augustine when U.S. forces landed there in March 1862. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the initial evacuation and occupation of St. Augustine, which left southern civilians cautious and fearful of Union depredations.

Historian Thomas Graham argues that the critical moment for the country and St. Augustine that led to the Civil War came in the fall of 1859 with John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia. This raid was an attempt by John Brown and his followers to initiate a slave insurrection in Virginia by seizing weapons at a government arsenal in Harpers Ferry. Brown, who the St. Augustine Examiner stated was of “Kansas notoriety” and “the distinguished Ossawatomic free-soiler and outlaw,” was known among St. Augustinians for his supporters’ bloody exploits in Kansas, where they killed men with
broad swords in the 1850s. But sectional tension did not just begin with John Brown’s raid. In the decades prior to the war, political wrangling over slavery’s expansion in U.S. territories created crisis after crisis over the fate of the nation. The issue of states’ rights, southern nationalism, and secession was linked to the right of southerners to take their “property” into the territories. Newspapers across the South had mottos and headlines that espoused this belief. The motto of the *St. Augustine Examiner* stated “Equality in the Union and Nothing Less.”

St. Augustine’s newspapers reported in great detail John Brown’s actions, subsequent trial, and execution. Tensions remained high even after Brown and his accomplices were hanged. The fear of slave insurrection haunted the South in the antebellum period, and this attempt by a northerner to incite such an insurrection sent shockwaves throughout the country. Occasional slave patrols, which were in effect for years, were shifted from local citizenry to the Florida Independent Blues. The Blues was a seventy-nine-man militia company raised by John L. Phillips and L. M. Andreu in May 1860 and was eventually integrated into Confederate service in the Third Florida Infantry. With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, the majority of southerners feared that the “Black Republican” would abolish slavery in the states, devastating their way of life economically, culturally, and socially. St. Augustine, like the rest of the South, feared this prospect too. The *St. Augustine Examiner*, on the eve of the

29 *St. Augustine Examiner*, October 29, November 12, 1859 cited in Graham, *The Awakening of St. Augustine*, 86, 245 n2; quoted in *St. Augustine Examiner*, October 29, 1859.


election, answered its own question on “What Shall Florida do?” if Lincoln were elected, “Secede of course!”

Secession was not only favored by many of the prominent men of St. Augustine, but by many women from different backgrounds. Frances Kirby Smith, mother to future Confederate General Edmund Kirby Smith, was an example of the fire-eater spirit among many of the women and men of the Ancient City. In numerous letters to her son serving on the western frontier, Mrs. Smith wrote passionately about secession, which dominated the conversations in St. Augustine. So fervent were her words that her son marveled at her spirit even at the age of seventy. “You are enthusiastic, my dear mother, on the topics of the day. The excitement must be intense, the perils great, when a sober, staid old lady of more than seventy writes as you do.” Other women, like Clarissa Anderson, were less impassioned in their zeal for immediate secession, though she suspected northerners who stayed in St. Augustine were planning “abolitionist plots against the Southern people.” Distrust of northerners and a consistent support for southern independence would be severely tested in the coming years of war and occupation.

As Ash describes across the South, though support for states’ rights, slavery, and southern independence was popular, it was by no means universal. This is also true in the Ancient City. Prominent families in St. Augustine, like the Dunhams, feared that chaos would plunge the city into a calamity it could ill afford, given the city’s years of decline during the 1840s and 1850s. David R. Dunham, a prominent citizen of St. Augustine,

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feared the “Blue Cockade of Secessionists” would ruin the county and state by seceding from the Union. Despite these few dissenting voices, southern nationalism and states’ rights remained popular among most of St. Augustine’s population. This is evidenced by the results of the election of 1860. Democrat John C. Breckinridge, who pledged a U.S. code to protect slavery’s expansion into the territories, outpolled John Bell of Tennessee, who pledged to preserve the Union, by 211 to 74 in St. Johns County.

After the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, the state of Florida began preparing a secession convention in Tallahassee, which delegates from every county would attend to vote on an ordinance of secession. On December 15, 1860, the St. Augustine Examiner states that prominent citizens of St. Augustine convened in the courthouse and nominated Matthew Solana and R. G. Mays as delegates to represent St. Johns County and the seventeenth senatorial district. In a written address accepting his nomination on December 19, 1860, Matthew Solana stated, “I will be up to the spirit of your resolutions, and pledge myself to vote for immediate secession as being the only expedient for our Southern States!” Likewise R. G. Mays in his letter of acceptance stated on December 17, 1860 that, “[I] pledge myself if elected to act in accordance with your instructions, as they entirely accord with my own convictions, and in my judgment is the only course left us consistent with our honor and safety.”

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35 David R. Dunham to Gen. Thomas Brown December 27, 1860, Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, Box 87, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida (hereafter cited as UF); Ash makes note that Unionists were concerned about the prospect of secession and feared for their lives immediately before and after secession across the South, while Revels highlights how many prominent women of St. Augustine worried about secession’s negative impact on the local economy, particularly trade and tourism, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 10-12; Revels, Grander in Her Daughters, 10.

36 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 7-9; Tallahassee, Floridian and Journal, November 17, 1860; Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 88; William W. Freehling contends that almost all disunionists favored Breckinridge to Bell, see: Freehling, The Road to Disunion Vol. II, 339.

37 St. Augustine Examiner, December 22, 1860
A week later on December 29, 1860, the *St. Augustine Examiner* described the popular vote that had occurred on December 22,

The election passed off very quietly and many did not vote there being no opposition and a prevalent opinion among all classes as to the necessity of resistance. Dr. Mays and Mr. Solana will represent ‘old St. Johns’ in the constitutional convention and are both pledged to carry out the will of a large majority of her people—they will vote for immediate and separate state action in the immediate withdrawal of Florida from the Union.38

Secession was adopted by the constitutional convention on January 7, 1861, with both Solana and Mays, voting in favor of the ordinance.

Ash states that across the South with the adoption of secession, trade and tourism with the North ended, which created painful economic stagnation. This also holds true for St. Augustine. With independence, the Ancient City began its year of home rule by cutting off many of the town’s traditional ties to the North. Many Minorcans wanted to prevent the arrival of northern ships, and business owners would not accept money backed by northern banks. Writing years later about the flight of northerners from Florida following secession, John Francis Tenney commented, “the notes of war admonished us that Yankees were neither needed nor popular in the limits of the Southern Confederacy.”39 Hannah Jenckes tried to keep her friends informed of the events going on inside the Ancient City, though she admitted that with the departure of so many people and breaking off ties with the North, things were “dull beyond belief.”40

Confederate mobilization occurred in cities across the South in the months before the firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina. Southerners confiscated United States property

38 *St. Augustine Examiner*, December 29, 1860.
40 Revels, *Grander in Her Daughters*, 34; Trade and tourism disintegrated in St. Augustine because of the flight of northerners and this too matches what Ash asserts occurred across the South after secession, Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 13-20.
before the war to consolidate their strength and end the remaining Union presence in their midst. Florida’s secession convention stated all military installations were to be seized and held, as St. Augustinian David Levy Yulee advised his statesmen that the U.S. government would try to reinforce those forts if left alone. On January 7, 1861, a party of Fernandina and St. Augustine militia confronted Union Ordinance Sergeant Henry Douglas at Fort Marion in the Ancient City. After raising objections, the sergeant relinquished the keys to the fort and the rebels came into possession of three thirty-two pound canons, two eight inch sea howitzers, modified flintlock muskets, and some small arms. Over a week later on January 15, 1861, “authorities” in St. Augustine confiscated a coastal survey ship, the Dana, while the U.S. officer in command was away performing his duties. Northern newspapers were livid; “Federal Rights Violated!” exclaimed the headline in the New York Times and Confederate property seizures remained one of the rallying points for northerners during the secession crisis.

In March 1861, news reached St. Augustine that Abraham Lincoln in his inaugural address pledged he would regain stolen government property. This immediately caused a stir in St. Augustine. Nightly patrols were organized, masters were told to ensure their slaves were in their quarters every night, boats were to be secured at nightfall to prevent anyone from contacting U.S. Navy ships, and the town’s lighthouse was extinguished. On April 19, 1861, Abraham Lincoln announced the U.S. blockade of southern ports. This blockade encouraged many shippers from the town to take up the

wartime job of blockade running, and this endeavor was aided by groups of exuberant young St. Augustinians who extinguished lighthouses up and down Florida’s east coast. Ash asserts that this occurred all over the South in the lead up to war, as nervous Confederates who lived on the coast were aware that they were well within striking distance of Union troops and warships.43

In addition to fear of invasion, St. Augustine, like most southern cities, began experiencing problems from the lack of trade and tourism with the North that exacerbated a growing budget problem after secession. Food prices rose, and citizens began planting crops in their small gardens to supplement their diets with potatoes and other produce. Blockade-runners like the St. Marys would occasionally bring food to St. Augustine, but these shipments were too few and far between to consistently feed the city’s hungry population. Writing to a friend, Benjamin Wright stated that those in St. Augustine who were not “too poor” were leaving, as St. Augustine dealt with provision shortages. Despite these hardships, the ladies of St. Augustine “liberally provided for the families” of the town’s militia, while the soldiers were away on patrol duty. This was greeted with public pronouncements in the St. Augustine Examiner from the company’s officers offering profound thanks for the patriotism and charity of the community.44

Ash also contends that in the first year of the war, not everyone in Confederate service could tolerate the new circumstances and privations associated with

independence. In November 1861, two Confederate army deserters from St. Augustine stole a small sailboat and set out to join the U.S. Navy blockading off the coast. The two deserters made it all the way to Brunswick, Georgia before being picked up by the Union ship *Mohican*.\(^{45}\) Ash details that in many coastal towns of the South, Confederate deserters and Unionists kept contact with Union gunboats right up to occupation. Hannah Jenckes on the eve of the Confederate pullout from St. Augustine commented, “It has leaked out that some one three or four days since had been out to the [Union] vessels, But it is kept secret who it is. S--y and her son in law B. are suspected, at all events a guard of 17 escorted them to the Boats that took the blues to Smyrna. I hope they may be shot.”\(^{46}\)

The St. Augustine Independent Blues were engaged in state service patrolling the coast from January to August 1861. The militia unit was organized into Confederate service on August 5, 1861. The seventy-nine recruits who first signed up that year later grew to ninety-nine, forming Company B of the Third Florida Infantry. The company was unique from other regular Confederate units because the regiment had three recruits of African American or mixed-race descent. Sons and fathers of prominent families like the Dunhams and Phillips’ served in the unit during the war, though many well-to-do citizens like the Anderson’s hired substitutes to serve in their stead. After the regiment’s organization, many companies were sent in late 1861 to help bolster defenses across Northeast Florida, with the Blues remaining in St. Augustine to guard against any incursions by the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, just like St. Augustine, other cities on the

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\(^{46}\) Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 14; Hannah B. Jenckes to Mary Martha Reid, March 10, 1862, MMS 00.611, UF.
coast or near Union-patrolled rivers kept troops nearby to guard against raids from Union troops aboard U.S. Navy gunboats.\(^{47}\)

The town remained quiet for the remainder of the year; only the testing of a cannon that startled the population in November 1861 produced any excitement for the Ancient City. The Blues served in Fernandina for a short time, returning to St. Augustine in late January 1862. Recalling their time in St. Augustine, C. Seaton Fleming of the Second Florida Regiment, wrote that “this service in St. Augustine […] in which the indulgence of an evening entertainment, or a moonlight promenade on the seawall (and not always with one’s file leader as a companion) was not an unfrequent recreation after the less delightful occupation of the day, and was indeed the poetry of war; and the only wounds received by the company were from the arrows of Cupid, who at that time was a successful rival to Mars.”\(^{48}\) Their enjoyable service in the Ancient City would not last long.

In March 1862, Confederate forces in the city were ordered to remove some of the cannons and all of their troops from St. Augustine’s defense. This was due in part to Robert E. Lee’s opinion that “the garrison at St. Augustine only serves as an invitation to attack,” when he toured the coastal defenses of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.\(^{49}\) The tactical situation in Florida was further complicated when Confederate Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, ordered Confederate forces to

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\(^{47}\) Coles, “Ancient City Defenders,” 69-74; Ash states that many southern units followed similar patterns prior to being incorporated into Confederate forces and these patrols played out all over the South prior to the war, Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 20-21.


abandon all coastal defenses of Florida to protect the state’s inland rivers, like the St. Marys River. This was done because if these rivers were controlled by the U.S. Navy, the river could serve as a highway to take Union gunboats up into Georgia and Alabama. This withdrawal of Confederate manpower left less than 1,726 effective troops inside Middle and Northeast Florida by the time Union gunboats began anchoring off Florida’s east coast near Fernandina and St. Augustine on March 12, 1862. Lee’s recommendation, combined with the military reversals at Shiloh, Forts Henry and Donelson, and the evacuation of Nashville in the Western theatre during the Spring campaign of 1862, caused Benjamin to withdraw many Confederate units from Florida, and ensured St. Augustine would be left defenseless.50

Ash contends that with the manpower drain occurring all over the South prior to Union occupation, southerners reacted quickly, often packing up and evacuating their town at any sign of approaching Union troops, fearful of what Union soldiers might do to the defenseless population. After the sighting of an unidentified ship off the coast on March 9, 1862, the city’s defenders were ordered to evacuate the town the following day. Around thirty men accompanied by wagons left the city at ten at night while the rest of the company evacuated in small boats. In addition to these troops, about a fifth of St. Augustine’s southern civilians streamed out of the town rather than face the prospect of occupied life. As an act of symbolic resistance in the face of retreat, a group of women

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50 Middle Florida is considered to be between the Suwannee and Apalachicola Rivers, while Northeast Florida is the area from Fernandina to New Smyrna extending inland to the west bank of the Satilla, St. Marys, St. Johns River and Lake George. Commander C. R. P. Rodgers to Flag-officer S. F. Du Pont, March 12, 1862, ORN, Series I, Volume 12, 596; Omega G. East, “St. Augustine During the Civil War,” Florida Historical Quarterly 31 (October 1952): pp. 75-91, 75-77; William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990): 37; Coles, “Ancient City Defenders,” 77; Ash showed that many towns across the South met similar fates, as Confederate authorities were forced to move troops from home defense to strategically vital sectors of the Confederacy, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 13-16.
chopped down the flag pole in the center of the town to prevent the U.S. flag from flying on it.  

Occupying St. Augustine was not originally part of the Union’s plan to subdue Florida. But in an effort to curb blockade running in Florida, Union troops occupied Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine. General George B. McClellan advised that St. Augustine should be occupied along with Fernandina to prevent this illicit trade. The Unions’ original plan was to capture Jacksonville first and use the gunboats to transfer two regiments of infantry with light artillery up the St. Johns River to Picolata and then turn east to march the eighteen miles to St. Augustine, capturing the city from the rear.  

However, these elaborate plans proved unnecessary. On March 11, 1862, the U.S. Navy ship Wabash anchored off the mouth of St. Augustine’s harbor. This ship was there to help blockade the port without plans to occupy the town, however, after seeing a white flag raised above Fort Marion, Commander C. R. P. Rodgers accompanied by a small party of men, arrived at the wharves and was greeted by the acting mayor, Christobal Bravo, along with a throng of onlookers. Once they made their way to the town hall where the city council was convened, the formal surrender ceremony was conducted, and St. Augustine was handed over to the Union. Once this was accomplished, Commander Rodgers, “called upon the clergymen of the city, requesting them to reassure their people and to confide in our kind intentions toward them,” hoping to assuage the southern fears of Union pillage and destruction.  

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51 For southern fear of Union depredations see: Ash, When the Yankees Came, 20; Hannah B. Jenckes to Mary Martha Reid March 10, 1862; East, “St. Augustine During the Civil War,” 75-77, 86-87; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 37; Coles, “Ancient City Defenders,” 77; ORN Series I, Volume 12, 596; Buker, “St. Augustine and the Union Blockade,” 4.  
52 East, “St. Augustine During the Civil War,” 78-79.  
Despite the surrender, no U.S. troops were present inside St. Augustine until Union troops arrived in town over a week later. On March 18, 1862, a detachment of Marines from one of Commander Rodgers’ ships landed in St. Augustine and took control of the city. The Marines remained there until March 24 when they loaded back onto transports and the Fourth New Hampshire’s company took over control of St. Augustine. After the Marines departed, the mayor and city council asked Flag Officer Du Pont to keep the Marines stationed in the town on account of their “good conduct and discipline of troops.” This request, though graciously received, was not accepted, and volunteer army units would be the primary occupying force in St. Augustine. The Union forces occupying the city would remain there till the close of the war and into Reconstruction.54

Ash states that when Union troops first occupied towns, they sought to conduct themselves as professionally as possible and offered bold pronouncements about reconciliation, friendship, and promises of leaving the general population alone and unmolested. From the moment Commander Rodgers accepted the surrender of St. Augustine on March 11, 1862, Union forces attempted to alleviate the concerns of the anxious southerners whose city they now occupied. The calling of the clergy and the kind actions of the Union Marines are all examples of early attempts to win over the southern population. Additionally, on March 20, 1862, General Thomas W. Sherman released a circular stating to the people of East Florida that,

The troops of the United States have come amongst you to protect loyal citizens and their property from further molestation by the creatures of a rebel and usurped authority, and to enable you to resuscitate a Government which they have ruthlessly endeavored to destroy. All loyal people who return to or remain at their

54 Coles, “Ancient City Defenders,” 77; Buker, “St. Augustine and the Union Blockade,” 3-4; Ash, When the Yankees Came, 20.
homes in the quiet pursuit of their lawful avocations shall be protected in all their
rights within the meaning and spirit of the Constitution of the United States. The
sole desire and intention of the Government is to maintain the integrity of the
Constitution and the laws and reclaim States which have revolted from their
national allegiance to their former prosperous and happy condition.55

These pronouncements alone were not enough to entice the great majority of
southerners to declare themselves with the Union in those areas now occupied by the
Union. In St. Augustine, Commander Rodgers commented “there are many citizens here
who are earnestly attached to the Union, a large number who are silently opposed to it,
and a still larger number who care very little about the matter.”56 Despite all the
reassurances Rodgers made to the congregations and the good conduct of the Marines,
some citizens still loathed the presence of Union troops. Rodgers noted that there was
“much violent and pestilent feeling among the women” of St. Augustine, a sentiment that
Ash contends was common across the occupied South. For their part, the majority of St.
Augustinians would watch and wait before testing the patience of the new occupiers.57

St. Augustine’s Confederate experience fits with Stephen V. Ash’s points about
southern towns on the eve of the Civil War. Many St. Augustinians were committed to
southern nationalism, St. Augustinians suffered economic hardships after secession, the
town was fearful of U.S. invasion, some citizens welcomed the Union soldiers, while
most civilians watched and waited. All of these experiences are described by Ash as

55 For early Union proclamations of friendship see: Ash, When the Yankees Came, 24-28; Brig. Gen. T. W.
Sherman to People of East Florida, March 20, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 6, 251.
56 Comdr. C. R. P. Rodgers to Du Pont, March 12, 1862, ORN, Series I, Volume 12, 595-597 cited in
Buker, “St. Augustine and the Union Blockade,” 4; Sarah Anne Rubin discusses issues of patriotism and
nationalism among southerners in her work, Sarah Anne Rubin, Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the
Confederacy, 1861-1868. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005): 2-4, 50; Browning,
Shifting Loyalties, 3-4, discusses similar conditional nationalism.
57 Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 102; Ash discusses initial hatred of Union troops by women in
Ash, When the Yankees Came, 43-44. Ash describes how most southerners watched and waited in the first
months of occupation, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 27.
prevalent in the South up to initial Union occupation. St. Augustine had many parallels to other southern cities and suffered similarly during the coming tragic war.
CHAPTER TWO: ASH’S MODEL IN THE EARLY OCCUPATION PERIOD, 1862-1863

This chapter will focus on applying Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation to St. Augustine in the early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. First, this chapter will discuss Ash’s zones of occupation. These zones were three unique worlds in the occupied South: garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier. These three zones will be applied to St. Augustine, which will illustrate how the garrisoned town was isolated by a dangerous countryside subject to frequent Union and Confederate raids called no-man’s-land. This resulted in the isolation of garrisoned towns leading to economic privations. Civilian non-violent resistance led to martial law and an eventual rise of guerrilla warfare. This resistance and the unique topography of Northeast Florida created a region of Confederate control that was subject to occasion Union raids called the Confederate frontier. Then, this chapter will discuss Ash’s assertions that the insults against soldiers, persecutions of Unionists, and irregular warfare that occurred in St. Augustine and no-man’s-land led to a change in Union war aims. This change was spurred by frustrated and confused Union soldiers who slowly pursued harsher policies of martial law, reprisals, the targeting of southern property, and expulsions of southern civilians. All of this inflicted painful changes to the regions population that will be illustrated by the sharp demographic decline of St. Augustine in the early occupation period.

In his work *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865*, Stephen V. Ash called areas under direct occupation by U.S. troops garrisoned towns. In essence, a garrisoned town was a small island of Union control in a
sea of “Rebeldom.” Garrisoned towns had many facets to their occupation experience such as: fear of attack, defiance, martial law, inflation, supply issues, humanitarian efforts, and prostitution all behind U.S. defenses. These defenses created safe havens for Unionists, beacons for African American self-emancipation, and brought a level of normality to everyday life inside the garrisoned town. Garrisoned towns contained Union troops, usually five companies or a whole regiment in strength, with some artillery and cavalry if lucky. These troops occupied defensible towns and forts rather than spread U.S. troops all over the countryside, which would weaken their control and negate the impact of their concentrated firepower.

Due to lurking rebel forces and civilian resistance, the garrisoned town was surrounded by an ever changing and potentially hostile countryside. This zone, called no-man’s-land, was subject to Union patrols and Confederate raids. No-man’s-land was not static. It could expand as U.S. troops garrisoned other nearby towns extending the range that their pickets, patrols, and foragers could penetrate. No-man’s-land could also contract, as Union troops came under ambushes in the area or if the Union war effort suffered a strategic setback and was forced to abandon a city. Lastly, there was the Confederate frontier, an area at the farthest extent of Confederate authority. This zone was farther away from garrisoned towns but still experienced Union raids, which were rare by comparison with the intrusion felt by no-man’s-land.


59 Ash, *When the Yankees Came,* 77-92.

60 Ash, *When the Yankees Came,* 77-80.
In the occupation’s initial stages, Union authority was decidedly weak outside of the garrisoned town and often provisions were non-existent. Union troops often stuck close to the town proper until pickets had ensured the area immediately outside the town was safe from Confederate irregulars. U.S. troops in St. Augustine did not dare venture too far from Fort Marion, for fear of Confederate attack. The four companies of the Fourth New Hampshire who had relieved the Marines at St. Augustine anxiously locked themselves up in Fort Marion awaiting reinforcements, as it would take a few days before the requests for reinforcements reached the commanders at Hilton Head, Fernandina, and Jacksonville. In the meantime, troops fed starving citizens when they could, but refused to expose themselves outside of the town to find additional supplies. It was not until April 15, 1862 that three additional companies of the Fourth New Hampshire, provisions for sixty days, and 60,000 cartridges landed in St. Augustine, fresh from the evacuation of Jacksonville.

During the interlude, some Union officers and soldiers thought the town could be easily overrun. For instance, in late March 1862 Colonel Louis Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers, then commandant of St. Augustine, was not even sure his two hundred men could hold the town if attacked. Brigadier-General H. G. Wright, then stationed at Jacksonville on March 27, 1862 denied Bell’s request for reinforcements,

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It is no doubt true that you cannot with your present strength successfully defend the town from any attempt in force against it; and I should therefore advise that you confine your undertakings mainly to the fort and its surroundings, leaving the defense of the place, to some extent at least, to the inhabitants. […] This, at any time, is all they could demand. In their present attitude, judging from your views as to their want of loyalty, it is more than they have a right to expect.63

Union troops early on were not willing to bet their safety on the loyalty of the community.

Charles A. Cressy, a Union soldier in the Fourth New Hampshire, shared his commander’s view and stated several times in his journal that there were constant rumors of attack on the lightly defended city. For example, on April 9, 1862, Cressy records that the all of the companies went up to the fort at nightfall with all their arms and equipment, fearing an attack on the city.64 Rumors of attack were not just benign fears that went unnoticed by Union commanders and troops. Rather, these rumors and fears led to false alarms, panicked gun fire, and stressful movements of entire companies. These companies routinely trudged from the St. Francis Barracks on one end of town, where many of the Fourth New Hampshire were stationed, over to Fort Marion on the other side of town for protection against possible attacks. Other times soldiers could be woken up by “the long roll” in the middle of the night, where they had to form lines of battle and could wait for an attack for hours. Tensions ran high in town for good reason, as Confederate sharpshooters took shots at Union pickets in town on one occasion.65

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64 Charles A Cressy, April 9, 1862; Leander Harris to Wife July 13-14, 1862.

These frequent alarms, the issues arising from the defiance of southerners in town, and the small two hundred man garrison, led Union forces to renege on their initial statements that the inhabitants of St. Augustine would not be molested. Despite Commander Rodgers’ assurances that municipal government would continue to function, local government in St. Augustine under Mayor G. A. Pacetti lasted from March 25, 1862 to April 12, 1862, ending when martial law was declared. Writing to General Benham, Colonel Bell explained he found, “a constant communication was kept up between the inhabitants of this city and the enemy and that members of the city government would not assist me in preventing it, I placed the city under martial law.” Though Colonel Bell reported he believed the residents wanted martial law, subsequent actions proved otherwise. This fits with Ash’s assertions that situations like the one Bell found himself in is similar to many Union commanders across the occupied South, as both Generals Butler and Sherman suspended local municipal government shortly after taking possession of New Orleans and Memphis respectively.

All over the occupied South, Ash claims local commanders fretted about what to do with self-emancipated slaves, especially as the government refused to establish a firm policy. This is true too for St. Augustine, as Colonel Bell in the same note to General Benham, asked the decisive question that could affect the course of the Civil War. “I have the honor to request instructions as to slaves belonging to disloyal men. I have retained such slaves, furnishing them with food and compelling them to work, and simply

67 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 83-88, 176; Capers, Occupied City, 64-66; Parks, “Memphis Under Military Rule,” 32-34.
excluding other slaves from the fort.”68 It would be some time before concrete answers were provided.

Martial law did not immediately put an end to non-violent civilian resistance, especially on the part of women. In May 1862, a group of girls went to the remains of the flagpole that was chopped down and kissed its pieces fervently in front of the U.S. troops. When Union soldiers burned down the pole’s stump in frustration, the women came the following day and took the remains for keepsakes. Though Union troops mocked the display, Colonel Bell was less amused.

Certain women having conducted themselves, last evening and this morning, in a manner grossly insulting to the United States Forces stationed here, by collecting together in the Plaza and there openly manifesting their disloyalty to the United States, I have ordered that hereafter any woman who shall be guilty of any open and offensive exhibition of disloyalty, shall be considered as having forfeited immunity from punishment by reason of her sex, and shall be held in strict arrest. And furthermore, if any such disgraceful scene is reenacted, I shall enforce the full vigor of Martial Law in the city.”69

Colonel Bell, like General Butler in New Orleans, would not tolerate open defiance. Security demanded it.

After martial law was imposed, some soldiers maintained their fear of attack while others felt secure inside the garrisoned town. In St. Augustine, Union soldiers became cynical of potential attacks on the city and casually brushed off rumors of large rebel forces lurking in the area. On July 13, 1862 Leander Harris described that officers had received reports that a party of “800 guerrillas” were in the woods surrounding the city. This was not the first time that reports of large guerrillas forces in the area, though


each report proved to be unfounded. Due to these repeated rumors, Harris claimed that he “shall not lose any sleep on that account!”

The lack of skirmishes around St. Augustine in the first two months after initial occupation, Ash claims, is not unique and in fact occurred across the occupied South. This lack of outright violence occurred for several reasons: (1) Southerners in garrisoned towns were afraid to openly resist Union forces for fear of rape and destruction that they expected to be exacted on them. (2) Most of the South’s manpower was drained by mobilization and conscription, offering few available men to fight off the U.S. Army. In addition, white male southerners who did stay behind were often young boys, old men, home guard units, and Unionists, none of whom would oppose the magnitude of U.S. power being brought to bear in Northeast Florida. (3) Guerrillas reflected broader communal morale, as civilian resistance to Union rule increased, so did guerrillas when available manpower enabled it.

With garrisoned towns cut off from their surroundings due to martial law and growing violence from Confederate irregulars, local economies were broken. St. Augustine’s antebellum economy was directly linked to its access to the interior of Florida. The closest access point for materials and people coming from the coast to the interior and vice versa ran through Picolata on the east bank of the St. Johns River. During the antebellum period, goods, slaves, and tourists floated up the St. Johns River, disembarked at Picolata, and then had to travel overland by stage coach on bad roads for

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70 Leander Harris to Wife, July 13-14, 1862, The Leander Harris Papers, Milnes Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH (hereafter cited as UNH). Ash states that the occupiers did not distinguish between confederate cavalry, partisans, and guerrillas, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 48.

71 Ash gives these reasons as to why guerrilla warfare did not immediate happen when U.S. troops arrived in the South, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 34, 47-48.
eighteen miles, a journey which could take over three and a half hours.\textsuperscript{72} This connection between St. Augustine and Picolata lasted for decades during the antebellum period and remained intact during the first year of Confederate rule of Florida. During the period of Confederate control, Picolata was used to ferry Florida’s state militia between Northeast Florida and the rest of the state, continuing the town’s tradition of being the western gateway to St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{73}

This connection between St. Augustine and Picolata came to an end with the declaration of martial law in St. Augustine in April 1862. Garrisoned towns were at times completely cut off from the surrounding countryside and other towns for weeks or months at a time. This is true for the connection between Picolata and St. Augustine, which isolated the families, communities, as well as the businesses of St. Johns County, causing additional social and economic strain to the area.\textsuperscript{74} Without tourists from the North to visit the two cities and the halting of goods coming in from the interior or coast by the Union blockade, St. Augustine and Picolata were deprived of their most lucrative businesses. Additionally, businesses that had resided in the region for years were slowly pushed farther and farther away from roving Union patrols originating in the Ancient City.

Privations inside garrisoned towns multiplied under these isolated conditions. In St. Augustine these privations can be illustrated in the writings of A. H. Young of the Seventh New Hampshire, who observed that though some citizens in town were worth


\textsuperscript{73} Sastre, “Picolata on the St. Johns,” 223.

\textsuperscript{74} Sastre, “Picolata on the St. Johns,” 223-224, 227, 229; Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 77, 79-81 83, 91.
“thousands” they were in reality destitute as all their worth was in “Florida money,” which resulted in nearly one third of the population being supported by Union provisions. Colonel Louis Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers requested food shipments from captured ships off the Florida coast, because the civilians of St. Augustine had so little food and the Fourth’s own rations were dangerously low. Supplies were slow in coming due to the lack of transport vessels, the isolation of St. Augustine, and bureaucratic wrangling between the Department of the South and the War Department. The overall effects of waiting nearly a month to receive supplies led various commanders to take matters into their own hands. Without orders Colonel Bell, whose men had recently helped capture a marooned Confederate blockade-runner, distributed food to the townspeople and his men who were all on limited rations.

These food shortages and supply problems led some U.S. soldiers to focus on what they described as the “lazy” attitude of the white population of St. Augustine. Soldiers like Corporal J. Milton Durgin and Second Lieutenant Calvin Shedd of Company A, Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, marveled at how oranges and flowers could grow at nearly all times of the year, which prompted Shedd to wonder why so many local plots of land were not being utilized by the town to grow the food they

75 A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862 Andrew Hale Young Papers 1827-1890, MS 132 July-December 1862, Rauner Special Collections, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.
77 Ash in another work briefly describes how bureaucratic wrangling, manpower shortages, and command turnover resulted in problematic issues inside the Department of the South. Furthermore, the Department of the South could not effectively engage in offensive operations and suffered from strategic malaise, “no matter who commanded the Department of the South it seemed that his strategic vision never amounted to anything more than ensuring the success of the navy’s blockade,” Stephen V. Ash, Firebrand of Liberty: The Story of Two Black Regiments That Changed the Course of the Civil War. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2008): 16. On feeding St. Augustine with provisions from sunken blockade runners see: Col. Louis Bell to Lt. Comdr. Nicholson, April 4, 1862, ORN, Series I, Volume 12, 709-710.
desperately needed and begged for.\textsuperscript{78} Some officers and their wives took it upon themselves to make gardens while they resided in the town. Union officers kept these small plots and the fruits of their labor were rarely shared with the men under their command. As a result, many soldiers risked confrontation from guerrillas or hungry civilians and simply picked the fruit of the occupied townspeople, or the groves that resided outside the town limits, at their own peril.\textsuperscript{79}

Garrisoned towns were isolated and surrounded by a dangerous, fluid, and unpredictable no-man’s-land. No-man’s-land varied greatly during the war based on local campaigns, grand strategic movements, and a general fear of being surprised or ambushed. These areas saw frequent visitations from Union troops, which viewed no-man’s-land as under their control, despite its susceptibility to Confederate, partisan, or guerrilla attacks. Garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land were by no means static or permanent; in many cases a garrisoned town could be evacuated to reinforce other Union garrisoned towns in the area. This would change the whole strategic outlook and expand or contract no-man’s-land based on the distance to the next Union garrisoned town. A good example of this happening in Northeast Florida was the evacuation of Jacksonville, Florida, three separate times before a permanent U.S. Army presence was established in 1864.\textsuperscript{80}

In part of the early occupation period, roughly March to October 1862, no-man’s-land extended six miles outside of St. Augustine in all directions. This limited extension

\textsuperscript{78} Ash states that northern scorn over southern society and perceived laziness occurred over much of the occupied South. Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 34-35; J. Milton Durgin to Sister, September 24, 1862; Calvin Shedd to Wife, October 19, 1862.

\textsuperscript{79} For Union requisition of food see: Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 53-54; Calvin Shedd to Wife, March 26, 1863.

\textsuperscript{80} Troops abandoning Jacksonville bolstered St. Augustine’s defenses, \textit{War of the Rebellion}, Series 1, Volume 6, 100; East, “St. Augustine During the Civil War,” 75-77; Nulty, \textit{Confederate Florida}, 48, 85, 100.
is for three main reasons: (1) St. Augustine’s garrison lacked cavalry. This limited the range of effective patrols in the area as any patrol would be by foot, through tough undergrowth where opportunities for ambush abounded. This confined Union soldiers to six miles distance around St. Augustine before returning to the Ancient City when not using main roads. (2) Only a few major roads connected St. Augustine to Jacksonville to the north, Picolata to the west, and New Smyrna to the south. These roads were rough, lacked proper maintenance, and traversed wild terrains of palmettos, swamps, and pine forests. Only the road to Picolata could guarantee the Union control one way for eighteen miles. However, this required U.S. Navy gunboats to anchor off Picolata for such deep excursions. (3) St. Augustine’s distance from the St. Johns River precluded it from being able to engage in the successful naval raids that extended from Jacksonville and Fernandina on the St. Johns and St. Marys River. Any transport of troops from St. Augustine had to leave her harbor, travel north to the mouth of the St. Johns River, pass Jacksonville and proceed up river into the Confederate frontier. From there troops could only disembark at small docks in places like Picolata, Palatka, and Welaka. The latter two were still under Confederate control in 1862.81

81 On St. Augustine’s lack of cavalry see: Report of Col. Haldimond S. Putnam to Lieut. Col. Charles G. Halpine, March 12, 1863 War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 224; Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph C. Abbott, Seventh New Hampshire Infantry to Col. H. S. Putnam, March 10, 1863, 224-225. Ash describes the reasons why the Department of the South had so few troops, which limited the amount of forces that could be deployed in Florida, thereby explaining why St. Augustine’s detachment lacked cavalry, see: Ash, Firebrand of Liberty, 16-17, 74-75, 84. On descriptions of the route to St. Augustine see: Sastre, “Picolata on the St. Johns,” 211. No historian has attempted to break Northeast Florida into zones of occupation, George Buker came close to delineating zones of occupation, but he listed all of Northeast Florida from Fernandina to Welaka as under Union control with a small section from Lake George to New Smyrna labeled as “contested,” Buker, “The Inner Blockade,” 75. The delineations argued here are derived from marching distances from St. Augustine based on testimony from U.S. soldiers. Charles A. Cressy Diary, July 20, 1862 shows that Union troops with water and rations could scout six miles outside of the town into no-man’s-land when avoiding roads. Sailing distances from Picolata to Welaka also affect the extent of no-man’s-land, see: George Buker, “The Inner Blockade of Florida and the Wildcat Blockade-Runners.” North & South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society 4, no. 2 (January 2001): pp. 70-85, 75. For a map of the zones of occupation in Northeast Florida, see Appendix A of this thesis.
According to Brigadier General H. W. Benham, a general in the Department of the South, St. Augustine, as well as much of Florida, lacked any type of reliable land-based transportation. To make things worse, there were precious few gunboats and even fewer transport and supply ships, all of which were subject to removal to another theatre of the war. This meant that Union troops at St. Augustine were alone in covering the vast stretch of no-man’s-land, where the only other forces available were engaged in the occupations of Jacksonville and Picolata. As commanders would complain the entire war, St. Augustine’s garrison did not contain a cavalry detachment, which made pursuing any raiders from the Confederate interior nearly impossible.\footnote{82 Brig. Gen. H. W. Benham to General M. C. Meigs, May 23, 1862, \textit{War of the Rebellion}, Series I, Volume 14, 344-346; For commanders’ complaints in the late occupation period see: Col. Francis A. Osborn to Brig. Gen. J. W. Turner, January 1, 1864, \textit{War of the Rebellion}, Series I, Volume 28, Part I, 752-753;}

One default in Ash’s model is he does not note how the conflicts in no-man’s-land were complicated by natural topographic features such as mountains to hide in, or rivers to use as highways for shuttling troops. Topography could affect the strategic situation and this important feature is glossed over by Ash in his work. In Florida, the value of the St. Johns River for both Union and Confederate forces in the Civil War cannot be overstated. It served as a natural border between the Confederate frontier and no-man’s-land and as a highway for Union gunboats to patrol and raid deep into Northeast Florida. Furthermore, the land in Northeast Florida was routinely described as one big, desolate, pine desert, which complicated overland movements by both Union and Confederate troops. In addition, Union gunboats floated up and down the St. Marys and St. Johns River to create an “inner blockade” on Florida’s rivers, strangling trade even further. This
was very effective in concentrating the blockade, as ships off the coast could be blown off their positions by the storms and rough seas of the Atlantic Ocean.\(^{83}\)

Throughout the conflict, both sides maneuvered to cut the river and the rest of the state off from each other, thereby denying important resources, information, and mobility to the enemy. In March 1862 just after the occupation of St. Augustine and Jacksonville, both Confederate and Union forces destroyed small boats up and down the St. Johns River in an attempt to prevent Unionists, deserters, and slaves from relaying information to the other side. Union commander Maxwell Woodhull estimated that over one thousand small boats were destroyed by Union forces along the St. Johns River to prevent the movement of, or the flow of information to, guerrillas. Confederate General Joseph Finegan wanted to achieve similar limits of information flowing to Union gunboats and ordered all people of questionable loyalty along the east bank of the St. Johns River to ten miles inland on the west bank of the St. Johns River for close surveillance. In October 1862, Captain J. J. Dickison was ordered to remove all slaves with absent owners and freedmen to the west bank of the St. Johns River for similar reasons.\(^{84}\)

One factor Ash describes that is applicable to Northeast Florida is the plight of the Unionists in no-man’s-land. Though many Union officers questioned the loyalty of St. Augustinians, Unionists from all over no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida were proving that their loyalties lay with the old flag. Information flowed between garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land, many of the alarms and rumors given to Union troops came in from these Unionist residents in the countryside, making them targets for Confederate


irregulars. Confederates recognized this problem and thought they knew how to solve it. J. W. Pearson of the Ochlawaha Rangers stated “at least three-fourths of the people on the St. Johns River and east of it are aiding and abetting the enemy; we could see them at all times through the day communicating with the vessel in their small boats. It is not safe for a small force to be on the east side of the river; there is great danger of being betrayed into the hands of the enemy. I fear this will be no better until martial law is proclaimed and several of them hung,” with three or four specific people in mind. Other men made good on their threats to kill Unionists in no-man’s-land. In June 1862, “Confederate guerrillas” hung a man outside of St. Augustine. 85

The combat leader of Confederate attempts to thwart Union control of no-man’s-land on the east side of the St. Johns River was Captain J. J. Dickison, commander of Company H in the Second Florida Cavalry, whose raids and presence would be feared and guarded against by Union forces for the entire war. Dickison’s reputation, exploits, and strategic influence were well known among Union forces and southern civilians alike. Though a member of the regular army, Dickison’s Confederate cavalry employed guerrilla-style tactics, which suited Northeast Florida’s heavily timbered countryside of no-man’s-land where, with the small number of troops he had available, he was able to harass Union scouts and foraging parties. 86


86 Mary Elizabeth Dickison, Dickison and His Men: Reminiscences of the War in Florida. (Louisville: Courier-Journal Job Printing Company, 1890): 46; East, “St. Augustine during the Civil War,” 89; Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 125-126, 129-130; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 56, 133, 196, 201. This fits with Ash’s work on occupation as he discussed how guerrilla warfare became endemic in no-man’s-land that surrounded garrisoned towns, though Confederates infrequently assaulted the garrisoned towns themselves, where Union forces were strong enough to turn away traditional Confederate attacks, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 21-22, 34, 47-49; Other historians of occupation discuss similar issues of raiders,
The effect that irregular forces in no-man’s-land had on occupation is illustrated in the letters of J. Milton Durgin, a corporal in the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers. Durgin writes of the need for excessive picket patrols, “We have a great deal of Picket Duty to perform for fear of the guerrillas, a great number of who, hover around the place ready to enter and burn and plunder when an opportunity presents itself for them to do so without much danger to themselves.” Picket duty took soldiers to the very edges of Union control in no-man’s-land around St. Augustine. The frequency with which pickets shot into the darkness at any sign of movement is a testament to the strain that Union troops were under. Andrew Hale Young, a member of Colonel H. S. Putnam’s Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, stated that Union lines extended less than half a mile outside of the town proper, with Union forces essentially “contained” within St. Augustine. Nervous Union pickets and an inability to expand pickets beyond the edges of St. Augustine indicates the effectiveness of J. J. Dickison and his men of the Second Florida Cavalry at inhibiting an effective Union presence in the no-man’s-land around St. Augustine.


87 J. Milton Durgin to Sister, September 24, 1862.
88 J. Milton Durgin to Sister, September 24, 1862; for descriptions of garrisoned forces “contained” see: A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862.
attempts to disrupt Union positions, made his presence well known to Union troops in the area and was considered a serious threat by U.S. authorities.\textsuperscript{89} During ventures Union troops made outside the garrisoned town on fatigue duty (the gathering of supplies, chopping wood, etc.) soldiers fell prey to unexpected guerrilla raids from Captain Dickison, who took small amounts of Union troops prisoner and persecuted Unionist residents of the east bank of the St. Johns River. Residents were held and prevented from relaying rebel movements to Union forces, and on more than one occasion, civilians were killed for not supporting the guerrilla fighters.\textsuperscript{90}

An example of the danger of no-man’s-land can be illustrated in the summer of 1862, when guerrilla warfare became problematic for Union troops in Northeast Florida. The New York\textit{Herald} reported that, “The inhabitants [of St. Augustine] are not privileged to go out because of bands of guerrillas who are everywhere organizing. This has produced a reign of terror in the neighborhood. Guerrillas do not hesitate to kill those who differ from them.”\textsuperscript{91} This resistance drove General Benham to propose harsh measures for those who resisted Union army rule; any irregular force that injured loyal Unionists "contrary to the laws and usages of war shall be visited fourfold upon the inhabitants of disloyal or doubtful character nearest the scene of any such wrongs when

\textsuperscript{89} Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 24-30; Sastre, “Picolata on the St. Johns,” 229-232.
the actual and known perpetrators cannot be discovered."92 This chaotic situation in Northeast Florida ensured that the strategic situation would constantly be in flux. Unionists outside of the garrisoned city of St. Augustine were still exposed, but Union troops inside garrisoned St. Augustine, were secure from direct attack.

Under the protection of Union gunboats, Confederates could only watch as Union troops disembarked from their trips up the St. Johns River to raid, free slaves, and protect Unionists. As many small boats were destroyed on the St. Johns River by both sides, crossing Confederate forces into Northeast Florida from the Confederate frontier on the west bank became perilous, as gunboats could cut off these detachments of Confederate irregulars from their bases. Union troops were increasingly sent out farther into no-man’s-land to raid and search for guerrillas. Confederates had already ravished no-man’s-land when they forced the removal of disloyal southerners into the Confederate frontier. Now it was the turn of Confederate sympathizers in no-man’s-land’s to suffer. This occurred when stern though liberal orders were issued from Major-General David Hunter on June 20, 1862. These orders allowed Union forces to expel any civilians who refused to take the oath of allegiance and to heavily iron and imprison any guerrilla that was captured. Though General Hunter forbade the death penalty for captured guerrillas, he did suggest the arming of African Americans and Native Americans to thwart any further attacks against loyal civilians in and around St. Augustine. 93

On the west bank of the St. Johns River near Palatka and on the east and west bank south of Welaka, lay the Confederate frontier. Ash claims that this zone of occupation was occasionally subject to U.S. Army raids but rarely under sustained Union

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93 Chas. G. Halpine to Col. Louis Bell, June 20, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 356-357.
occupation and subject to Confederate authority. Due to the lack of manpower not just in the Department of the South, but all over Union-occupied territory, the Union could not hold effective control of this region of the Confederate frontier. Instead, Union forces were held up in garrisoned towns and could only travel as far around these bastions of Union control as their horses, ships, or legs would take them. This left an area outside of regular Union patrols with little-to-no Union control. However, this did not prevent the Confederate frontier from being penetrated by Union forces with enough supplies and transportation. In Northeast Florida, this Confederate frontier followed the east and west bank of the St. Johns River, south to Picolata and Gainesville and the Confederate interior to the west of Palatka. 94

Any attempt to push across the St. Johns River required a strong force and reliable transportation to achieve the objective. However, these were the two things that St. Augustine’s garrison lacked during its early occupation. 95 Writing to Quartermaster General M. C. Meigs Brigadier General H. W. Benham stated, “Land transportation as horses, mules, and wagons, your department has not furnished us, and they could have been but of limited use if you had. Our only means of movement therefore for attack or defense is by vessels, and they must be steamers.” 96 General Benham saw the strategic problems of the Department of the South. It was too big, had too many places to blockade or occupy to prevent blockade-runners, and the entire department crawled with

94 For description of Confederate frontier see: Ash, When the Yankees Came, 13-14, 76-77. See footnote 79 and Appendix A of this thesis for a discussion and map of the extent of no-man’s-land and Confederate frontier in Northeast Florida.
95 Abstract from Return of the Department of the South, Maj. Gen. David Hunter, U.S. Army, commanding, for June 1862-May 1863, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 362, 367, 451, 453, 461, 486, this shows that St. Augustine’s force never exceeded 1,000 troops; Brig. Gen. H. W. Benham to General M. C. Meigs, May 23, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 344-346, shows the lack of transports were available to garrisons in Florida.
Confederate cavalry, partisans, and guerrillas. Only armed steamers could safely transport men in substantial force to dissuade most attacks by Confederate irregulars who were attempting to deny the Union control of the St. Johns River and Northeast Florida.

Town’s that bordered no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier that had once been commercial connections between coastal cities like St. Augustine and Florida’s interior were not spared the economic dislocation that affected garrisoned towns. For instance, Picolata became a desolate town and by the end of the war, only two houses remained standing out of the half dozen that had survived the Second Seminole War. Supplies from Florida’s interior were shut off as U.S. Navy gunboats in the area guarded against Confederate troops and supplies crossing into Northeast Florida. Though Picolata would be periodically occupied by Union troops after the summer of 1863, its value as an economic connection to St. Augustine ceased to exist.97

With Picolata cut off from St. Augustine, the Ancient City’s only income came from the meager trade between citizens in no-man’s-land, or in town with Union troops. This trade between soldiers and civilians was easily interrupted. Supplies were scarce as a result of the few U.S. Navy transports coming into St. Augustine, which also led to the inconsistent pay for Union troops. In fact the payment of Union troops was so inconsistent that months could pass without soldiers receiving compensation, further depriving the garrisoned town of income.98

98 Transports were never consistent, but A. H. Young contends that mail and supplies came into St. Augustine about once a month in late 1862, A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862. Young in this letter says that Union troops had not been paid in nearly five months September 19, 1862; Calvin Shedd placed the time between mail and supplies around two to three weeks, Calvin Shedd to Wife, December 21, 1862, April 17, 1863; St. Augustine had supply troubles through much of its occupation. For examples of the lack of supplies in 1862-1863 see: Lieut. Col. Louis Bell to Brig. Gen. H. W. Benham, April 15, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 333-334; Louis Bell to Lt. Comdr. Nicholson, April 4, 1862, ORN, Series I, Volume 12, 709-710; A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862; Calvin Shedd to Wife, October
Ash states that as the summer of 1862 waned, attacks on Unionists, the defiance of southerners, and the danger to U.S. troops, caused Union officers across the occupied South to run out of patience. Local commanders had wide latitude in exercising their authority. Generals like Benjamin Butler and William Tecumseh Sherman often instigated policies without clear direction from Washington, based solely on their understanding of the strategic situation and local population’s loyalty. This is another default in Ash’s study, as he paints a oversimplified transition between conciliation and hard war. Historian Mark Grimsley states that there was no clear transition between conciliation, pragmatism, and hard war policies that occurred after 1863. Department commanders, judging events on the ground, often created policies which fell between conciliation and hard war. Military necessity, reprisals, and lack of discipline, among other things, could influence how occupation played out locally. In the end, policies or procedures of occupation first enacted by Union troops were often later adopted by the U.S. government.99

Union soldiers went through stages in their actions and adapted to their interactions with southern civilians, ranging from conciliation to subjugation. Some southern civilians remained defiant, even if it was not through overt military means. However, actions towards southern civilians were never uniform and the application of even basic orders could receive some startlingly different results. For instance, U.S. conciliatory policy in 1862 stipulated that cooperating southerners could petition garrison

10, December 5, 6, 21, 1862; this fits with Ash’s assertions that garrisoned towns often had supply issues and high inflation, which forced U.S. forces to care for civilians inside the town Ash, When the Yankees Came, 77-83, 86, 88.

99 Ash does note that there are inconsistencies in conciliation but does not explore this point further, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 57. For wide latitude among Union commanders see: Gabriel, “The American Experience with Military Government,” 637; Futrell, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” 181. For Mark Grimsley’s assertion that there was no clear transition to hard war, see: Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 1-6, 13, 15, 35, 155.
commanders for the return of their slaves if the slave had fled into Union lines. Departmental commanders did not uniformly uphold this policy. For example, Colonel Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire was arrested in July 1862 for violating Major-General David Hunter’s orders not to return any slaves to their masters.\textsuperscript{100}

Colonel Bell believed the charges were because of the actions of his provost marshal, who had expelled a group of African American women after labeling them “prostitutes.” As no owner had come forth requesting their return, the provost marshal was also in violation of U.S. policy on returning slaves. Bell, in a letter to his wife and later to the editor of the \textit{Independent Democrat}, a newspaper in New Hampshire that spread rumors about Bell’s conduct, claimed that he had never ordered the returning of any slaves, only the removal of those “prostitutes” of the town who posed a danger to the health of his men. Writing home to his wife, he explained that, “I feel easy for […] I have tried to conscientiously do my duty towards the negroes according to my best judgment setting them free whenever I could and making their bondage less hard when I could not free them.” Hunter, an avid abolitionist, clearly disagreed.\textsuperscript{101}

Writing months later, A. H. Young commented on the treatment that African Americans and white St. Augustinians received from the Fourth New Hampshire. Young stated that “Bell is as true a man as I am” but his officers were abusive towards African Americans. These “pro slavery officers” complained that they fought “for union and the

\textsuperscript{100} Though Bell was arrested, he was never tried. For comparison of conciliation see: Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 25-27, 28-31, 32, 34-37, 52-56, 81’ Grimsley, \textit{Hard Hand of War}, 1-6, 13, 15, 35, 155. For works on St. Augustine that discuss conciliation in St. Augustine see: East, “St. Augustine during the Civil War,” 80; Revels, \textit{Grander in her Daughters}, 83; Graham, “The Home Front,” 35-38.

\textsuperscript{101} Louis Bell to Wife, August 5, 1862; Louis Bell to Editor of the \textit{Independent Democrat}, September 16, 1862, UNH; Ash comments that the expulsion of prostitutes occurred across the occupied South due to commanders fear of the health of their men, Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 85-86; Louis Bell to Wife, August 5, 1862. For Hunter’s abolitionism see: Edward A. Miller, \textit{Lincoln’s Abolitionist General: The Biography of David Hunter}. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997): 79, 98-99; Ash, \textit{Firebrand of Liberty}, 82-83.
constitution as it was” not on the question of “if they considered a negro as good as a white man.”102 Young then went on to describe how in one instance when Colonel Bell was away, Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton, a commander under General Hunter, visited the town and was “mobbed in regular southern style by soldiers who should have protected him” because the general tried to impose loose restrictions on African Americans’ ability to move inside St. Augustine “as they pleased.”103

The latitude given to regiments and departmental commanders not only created substantial inconsistencies in the ways that particular Union regiments dealt with southern civilians and African Americans in St. Augustine, but also affected the issue of expulsions which occurred across the occupied South. During the stay of the Fourth New Hampshire, limited expulsions of Confederates occurred. However, these initial deportations would be small in comparison to the large expulsions to come under the Seventh New Hampshire. These expulsions occurred after a Unionist was murdered outside of town in September 1862. Union forces initiated a policy of requiring southern civilians to take the oath of allegiance or be forced outside the lines. Such a policy had actually been in effect since June 20, 1862, when General Hunter granted Colonel Bell liberal orders to expel anyone outside the town regardless of sex due to resistance and rising guerrilla violence. However, these measures were never adopted under the Fourth New Hampshire. Only with the arrival of the Seventh New Hampshire did southern civilians with family members serving in the Confederate army find themselves deprived of their homes and either forced into strange quarters or transported out of St. Augustine

102 A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862, his emphasis.
103 A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862.
altogether, destined for Fernandina, Florida or Hilton Head, South Carolina. Ash’s model is also insufficient when dealing with the decision to expel Confederate sympathizers from garrisoned towns. Ash describes expulsions as common from 1863 on, but does not discuss them in great detail in late 1862, when they occurred in the Department of the South. This makes St. Augustine unique and represents another flaw with Ash’s model.

Many times Union troops were ahead of the administration in terms of implementing policy on the ground. This was true of Union soldiers in St. Augustine who, with General Hunter’s blessing, had early on abandoned conciliation for “hard war.” Hard war, a term first adopted by historian Bruce Catton, is a specific form of warfare that strategically targets not just military personnel and material, but also civilian property thereby denying materials for the enemy army. Historian Mark Grimsley popularized the term hard war in his work on Union military policy and distinguished it

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104 Ash claims that expulsions occurred all over the occupied South, Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 60-71, 203; Chas. G. Halpine to Lieut. Col. Louis Bell, June 20, 1862, *War of the Rebellion*, Series I, Volume 14, 356-357, this source has been used widely to discuss expulsions that occurred in St. Augustine in 1862. However, these orders to the Fourth New Hampshire are backed up with examples of expulsions actually occurring months later under the Seventh New Hampshire, a fact that has not been delineated in previous works, see: Graham, “The Home Front,” 34; Graham, *The Awakening of St. Augustine*, 106, 113; Revels, *Grander in Her Daughters*, 119-120. Graham seems to combine orders of the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire in his discussion of the September 1862 expulsion. Revels similarly cites sources that occur months apart and does not delineate the fact that the Fourth New Hampshire did not take part in the expulsions of September 1862, see: Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry to Maj. W. P. Prentice, September 23, 1862, *War of the Rebellion*, Series I, Volume 14, 386. This record shows that the Seventh New Hampshire was garrisoned in St Augustine at the time of the expulsion. Graham and Revel both cite this but fail to note it was the work of the Seventh and not the Fourth New Hampshire. Furthermore, both the Young papers and Cressy diary have never been consulted before for St. Augustine expulsions. Charles A. Cressy of the Fourth New Hampshire never mentions a single organized expulsion in his diary. While A. H. Young of the Seventh describes the expulsions in several of his letters. This testimony along with the official records prove that the Seventh New Hampshire, not the Fourth, was responsible for the expulsions of September 1862 see: Charles A. Cressy Diary June 20 to September 10, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan, September 7, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan September 15, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan, September 19, 1862.

105 In his discussion of garrisoned towns in 1862, Ash fails to mention expulsions, a flaw in his model, Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 76-92.

from “total war.” Citing historian Mark E. Neely, Jr.’s work on “total war” in the Civil War, Grimsley agreed with Neely’s assertion that the Civil War was not a total war because, “the essential aspect of any definition of total war asserts that it breaks down the distinction between soldiers and civilians, combatants and noncombatants, and this no one in the Civil War did systemically, including William T. Sherman.” 107 Though the Civil War was not a total war with indiscriminate killing and plundering, Union forces after 1863 dropped the policy commonly known as conciliation. This policy respected loyal southerners’ property, in the hopes of maintaining the loyalty of the border slave states.108

In 1862, conciliation was still Union policy, but several episodes in the occupied South show that soldiers simply conducted reprisals when threatened and attacked. For example, Charles A. Cressy in the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers described how the men of his regiment destroyed property often frequented by guerrillas. After being called out on the “long roll” because of an alarm, the regiment went inside Fort Marion and shelled the woods and fields surrounding the city. Afterwards, two companies went out three miles from St. Augustine to the Fairbanks house and discovered horses that had been left behind by the Confederate irregular troops. As a consequence of this, troops

from another company in the Fourth New Hampshire marched out of St. Augustine the following day and tore down the Fairbanks house and then took whatever goods and furniture they could carry away.109

These actions on July 17-18, 1862 preceded any official War Department policy that advocated the targeting of southern property. However, these actions came on the heels of General Hunter’s orders concerning goods, slaves, and civilians in the Department of the South issued on June 20, 1862.110 These Union soldiers were frustrated by months of garrison duty, false alarms, and harassment by guerrillas. In response to these stresses, U.S. soldiers took it upon themselves to tear down the Fairbanks house and plunder the goods inside. This reprisal was not solely done out of revenge but also to remove any shelter or point of organization for Confederate guerrillas operating on the east bank of the St. John’s River.111 Unfortunately, no records survive of the action in the official records, which explains why previous authors have not recorded this early example of reprisals by frustrated Union troops. Calvin Shedd from the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers corroborates the story. In a letter to his wife, Shedd described a skirmish in the vicinity of St. Augustine and mentions “the remains of the Fairbanks house,” which “our soldiers”—meaning soldiers from the Fourth New Hampshire—“had burnt.”112

As occupation progressed, this defiance held consequences for men and women in the town. Defiance and opposition to taking the oath of allegiance led to the expulsions of

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109 Ash discusses reprisals by Union troops and this fits with St. Augustine’s experience, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 75, 126; Charles A. Cressy Diary, July 16-18, 1862.
110 Chas. G. Halpine to Lieut. Col. Louis Bell, June 20, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 356-357.
111 For accidents involving Union troops in St. Augustine during the early period see: Calvin Shedd to Wife, November 27, 1862; for treatment of the fatigue of garrison duty, see: Browning, “‘I Am Not So Patriotic as I Was Once,’” 217-220.
112 Calvin Shedd to Wife March 11, 1863.
hundreds of men, women, and children from the town. In addition, wide latitude could also bring about inconsistency in actions towards southern civilians. On October 12-16, 1862, Calvin Shedd outlined what he felt were some of the differences between the relations of the citizens with the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire,

The Citizens liked the 4th first rate for they used to abuse the Niggers & let the whites do just as they pleased, let them pass out in the lines pretty much as they liked when the 7th came here everything is changed Abbot & Put(nam) just made the Men & Women take the Oath of Allegiance or go outside the Lines, it made an awfull Growl, but it was no use they had to take it, quite a number of the women had to go, their Husbands being in the Rebel Army they were Rebel too & had to leave. I dont think there is a real hearty Union man in Town, they take the oath for convenience sake, so they can stay at home.113

With the departure of the Fourth New Hampshire from St. Augustine in September 1862, the Seventh New Hampshire took over occupation duty of the Ancient City. Colonel Haldimand S. Putnam, learning from the example General Hunter made of Putnam’s predecessor Colonel Bell, and frustrated by continued resistance, implemented Hunter’s harsher policy that required the population to take the oath of allegiance or be forcibly expelled.114

When orders arrived in town from Hilton Head, the town’s population, age fourteen and up, was crowded into the Presbyterian Church for the purposes of signing the oath of allegiance. Once there the assembled was addressed by a member of the provost guard, ”I do not know whether to address you (alluding to the ladies present), as

113 Calvin Shedd to Wife, October 12, 1862; Letters from A. H. Young also corroborate Shedd’s assessment; A. H. Young to Susan September 9, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan, September 15, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan, September 19, 1862.
114 No official policy from the Lincoln administration dealt with expulsions during 1862, Hunter routinely went beyond Lincoln’s orders when he first issues his own Emancipation proclamation for the Department of the South and his institution of harsher penalties for declining to take the oath of allegiance, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 32, 34-37; Ash, Firebrand of Liberty, 56, 69, 193; Grimsley places the general acceptance of expulsions in the high command around March 1863 with Halleck’s orders to General Rosecrans, Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 145.
ladies or women, as all Broadway crinolined women are called ladies.\textsuperscript{115} After announcing the purpose of the meeting and collecting the signatures of those who took the oath, the remaining southern civilians were registered as disloyal and told to prepare for “a free ride” into rebeldom. This expulsion had come at the behest of General Rufus Saxton, acting commander while General Hunter was being relieved.\textsuperscript{116}

Several hundred women and children were transported out of St. Augustine in mid-September 1862, and A. H. Young described his return from guarding a group of them onboard the steamer \textit{Burnside} bound for Hilton Head. Young was detailed to accompany the refugees who had dubbed the event the “anti-loyal female expedition to St. Johns River.” Young told “the wealthy people of St. Augustine” who were all “of course indignant” that he was detailed to them because of his good looks and on the account of his blood that came from “one of the finest families in the north” and he would “compensate for the badness of the ship.”\textsuperscript{117} His efforts appeared to have returned the “good nature” of the ladies onboard, though he then admits that he should have just saved his breath since soon thereafter, all of the refugees succumbed to seasickness, destroying their remaining “good nature.”\textsuperscript{118} Young joked “I am happy to say that about all the best looking girls remained […] I will write more about this. Some of the scenes were very comical.”\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117}A. H. Young to Susan, September 19, 1862.
\textsuperscript{118}A. H. Young to Susan, September 19, 1862.
\textsuperscript{119}A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862, Young’s anecdote illustrates that Union troops who initially found the theatrics of women more amusing than threatening as women remained defiant towards Union soldiers even when forced out of town. Historians like Nina Silber and Michael G. Wade in their works on occupation, noted that similar trends of defiance among women and the bemusement of Union soldiers at women’s actions occurred in other cities outside of Florida, Nina Silber, \textit{“Intemperate Men, Spiteful..."}\textsuperscript{119}
News of the expulsions was reported in southern newspapers like the *Charleston Mercury*, which described the deportations of families from St. Augustine. The paper reports that “The steamer left for the St. John's River with some fifty families--about 150 women and children huddled together, without a bed to rest on, or any accommodations whatever, and kept two and a half days outside without food or water save what they took with them, and in their sea sickness were refused even water to drink.”

These expulsions by Union forces were conducted with little to no warning to the citizens of St. Augustine; from martial law being declared under the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers to forced deportations under the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, these wartime measures shattered the antebellum community as Ash describes in his work. During a very short time period, Shedd and other officers estimated that Union forces removed around three hundred people from the town and transported to places like Fernandina or Hilton Head. No records detailing the remaining population in December 1862 exist. Only the letters of Sam Walcott, a company clerk for the Seventh Connecticut, provide an estimation of the town’s remaining population at around 700 whites and 300 African Americans in mid-1863. Both Confederate and Union troops were displacing hundreds of civilians, and while it is not yet clear what became of all these refugees, several military records and correspondence indicate that some St.

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120 The *Charleston Mercury*, October 15, 1862.
Augustinians tried to return to their city, even crossing through the dangerous and desolate wasteland of no-man’s-land to do so.¹²¹

This chapter has shown that Ash’s model of occupation works for St. Augustine during the early period. St. Augustine was a garrisoned town, surrounded by a violent and menacing no-man’s-land where irregular forces persecuted Unionists and frustrated Union troops. This no-man’s-land ran up to the St. Johns River by 1863 and was bordered by the Confederate frontier which stretched from the western side of the St. Johns River to Florida’s interior. In St. Augustine, as with the rest of the occupied South, both violent and non-violent resistance led to frustration and conflict, which shaped the progression of occupation in garrisoned towns, resulting in the gradual abandonment of the conciliatory policy for hard war. Defiance, once greeted with bemusement, eventually was greeted with arrests and forced expulsions of Confederate families, sympathizers, and those who the Union army no longer cared to feed. Lastly, these events of occupation shattered the antebellum community, leading to demographic change with the expulsions of white southerners and the influx of African American and white refugees. This all applies to the garrisoned town of St. Augustine where defiance resulted in expulsions and the driving out of over three hundred white residents, significantly changing the city from its antebellum condition.

CHAPTER THREE: ASH’S OCCUPATION MODEL IN THE LATE OCCUPATION PERIOD, 1863-1865

This chapter will briefly discuss St. Augustine’s condition at the start of 1863. This will highlight the changes to St. Augustine in its first year under Union control by illustrating the physical scars that occupation left on the town. Then this chapter will discuss Ash’s zones of occupation in the late period by covering the changes and expansion of no-man’s-land around St. Augustine because of the inner blockade. Next, this chapter will show that Ash’s assertions that Confederate irregulars’ harassment of Union patrols and persecution of Unionists in no-man’s-land increased after 1863 applies to the countryside surrounding St. Augustine. Then this chapter will discuss how garrisoned towns served as beacons of freedom for African Americans and as a result were targeted by Confederate generals, though the unique topography of Northeast Florida prevented large-scale assaults. Though major assaults would never be adopted, continued guerrilla war would rage in no-man’s-land and on the St. Johns River. These attacks resulted in further expansions of no-man’s-land as Union soldiers spread out across Northeast Florida in an attempt to protect Unionists. Lastly, this chapter will detail the strength of Union control, the breakdown of Confederate resistance, and will highlight the changes to the antebellum community that Ash describes from mid-1863 to the end of the war, evidenced in a massive demographic shift.

Ash contends that garrisoned towns across the occupied South, like St. Augustine at the start of 1863, were a shell of their former selves. Many businesses were closed, food was short, roads in disrepair, and the population was significantly smaller. In January 1863, citing concerns over short supplies and the fact that white southern families had relatives in the rebel army, Union forces again evicted a large number of
people from the town. The expulsions that took place in 1863 appear to have been conducted in a more orderly fashion than the September 1862 expulsion. However, they were still shocking and traumatic for white southerners. One unwelcomed shock for white southerners was both black and white troops guarding the transports that took these women to Fernandina and elsewhere, which was viewed as an insult by southern refugees. Second Lieutenant Calvin Shedd of Company A, Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, described the lamentations of the women in town and their remonstrance at being forced out. Even with the scenes of heartbreak at families being forced from their homes, Shedd stated “the Women have been awfull bitter on us & I dont pity them,” despite the fact that they would be thrust “out in Rebeldom where it is morraly certain they will suffer for food & clothing. but the sin & blame lays at the Doors of Rebels not us; as they sow they & their Families must reap. & the crop of Misery will be extremely large while Death is knocking at every door.” 122 Many of these women verbally lashed out at abolitionist Union officers, who chided the women on the journey. After the expulsion, the number of whites in town numbered around 700 people, with 300 African Americans as well. By mid-1863, the population of St. Augustine was estimated at 400 to 500 civilians as compared to 1,914 citizens that resided there in 1860.123

Valentine Chamberlain of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers upon visiting St. Augustine in February 1863 stated “the glory of this town has departed. The streets are desolate, the inhabitants of secessh proclivity [?] have been recently sent away. The same day that we arrived about 80 left— more than half however were children. Some have left since. The first lot were set over the lines from here. The men are mostly off in the rebel

122 Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 77, 70-81, 91, 177, 190; Calvin Shedd to Wife, January 31, 1863.
123 Calvin Shedd to Wife, January 31, 1863; Graham, *The Awakening of St. Augustine*, 116; Revels, *Grander in Her Daughters*, 120
army.\textsuperscript{124} Union soldiers were more or less responsible for the damage done inside the garrisoned city. In late February 1863, Calvin Shedd reported that soldiers broke into sutler shops, vandalized the stores, and stole over one hundred dollars’ worth of merchandise.\textsuperscript{125}

Though St. Augustine obviously bore the scares of occupation, the town was not completely destroyed or pillaged. Sam Walcott of the Seventh Connecticut found a great many “bananas & a few date trees and the woods all about is full of the sour or wild oranges.” Valentine Chamberlain managed to find a good supply of lettuce and peas in town. Both soldiers confirm that the growing season helped alleviate some of the supply issues inside the garrisoned town.\textsuperscript{126} As occupation settled, despite the expulsions of citizens and the damage done by soldiers, the garrisoned city found some semblance of order and balance that only the Union army could ensure. Sam Walcott remarked that the Catholic cathedral chimed its bells and held service every day. This shows that St. Augustine suffered less destruction than what Ash described in other garrisoned towns. However, on the whole, garrisoned towns were damaged far less than no-man’s-land, and churches were only able to operate on a regular basis inside garrisoned towns.\textsuperscript{127}

By the beginning of 1863, the relationship between garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier had changed. The St. Johns River was under an “inner blockade” by Union gunboats off Mayport Mills and Union steamers regularly traveled

\textsuperscript{124} Valentine Chamberlain to Friends, February 18, 1863, UF (transcribed by Nicole J. Milano).
\textsuperscript{125} Calvin Shedd to Wife, February 26, 1863.
\textsuperscript{127} Sam Walcott to Brother, May 14, 1863 cited in McGuire, “A Connecticut Yankee in St. Augustine,” 62; Ash, When the Yankees Came, 89-90, 104-105, 114, 190.
up to Palatka, Welaka, and beyond in the hunt for blockade-runners. In addition, Union units travelled greater distances from St. Augustine out beyond the pickets for firewood because foragers had consumed all the lumber surrounding the city. This task became more dangerous as the expulsions that occurred across the occupied South were often followed by threats of retaliation from Confederate and irregular forces. This is also true for St. Augustine, where the expulsions of defiant St. Augustinians by Union forces elicited a response from Confederate forces, who began to cross the St. John’s River in force and increase attacks because their families were now gone.128

George Buker in his work on the Union’s inner blockade argued that St. Augustine’s quiet occupation experience was due to the blockade of St. Johns River. He contends that these gunboats made Confederate irregulars cautious about crossing onto the east bank of the river for fear of being cut off from their bases. However, St. Augustine was by no means quiet and despite the Union’s gunboats, no-man’s-land would continue to be dangerous for Union soldiers and Unionists. With many southern families no longer in St. Augustine, guerrillas were free to harass Union troops at will. Traveling outside of a garrisoned town during the late occupation period was dangerous without large well-armed parties, as many soldiers around St. Augustine would soon find out. In early January 1863, three men, including a lieutenant, were captured less than ten miles outside of town by Confederate cavalry.129

128 Buker, “The Inner Blockade,” 79-80; Calvin Shedd to Wife, February 8, 1863; Ash concludes that guerrillas did operate more after expulsions, which fits with St. Augustine as well, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 46-49.

129 Buker, “The Inner Blockade,” 79-80; Another interpretation of St. Augustine’s relatively quiet occupation is the nature of garrisoned towns and the strategic relationship with no-man’s-land during the Civil War, as few towns were recaptured by direct Confederates assault, Ash, When the Yankees Came, The New South, January 17, 1863, University of South Carolina Digital Libraries, http://digital.tcl.sc.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/NSN&CI sopTR=162&CISO SHOW=159&REC=19
Of course, it was not just U.S. soldiers who had to fear attack from Confederate irregulars. The violence of Confederate irregulars against Unionists or those Floridians who did not directly aid the Confederate cause is evidenced in the writings of Calvin Shedd. Shedd reported that a man came over the lines on February 8, 1863, and told the soldiers of the Seventh New Hampshire that guerrillas had come to his house, robbed him of over a hundred dollars, and murdered his son who refused to go with them.\textsuperscript{130} Shedd lamented that Union soldiers could not give protection to those neutral civilians out in no-man’s-land, who were subjected to the deprivations of Confederate guerrillas. “I wish we might just get hold of them [Confederates] for a few minutes.” Even better in Shedd’s opinion would be if the rebels actually attacked the city, so they could get “a taste of [the] old fort.”\textsuperscript{131}

The debacle that befell the Seventh New Hampshire in March 1863 is another example of the danger that no-man’s-land contained. On March 11-15, 1863 Calvin Shedd described a great “excitement” around St. Augustine. According to the statements of Colonel Putnam and Lieutenant Colonel Abbot in the \textit{Official Records of the War of the Rebellion}, Captain Dickison and around eighty of his men attacked the advanced picket of the Seventh New Hampshire two miles outside of town. In response Colonel Putnam sent out Lieut. Col. Abbott with over 120 men to attack Dickison’s camp. Abbott’s attack was discovered before they could reach the Confederate camp and the Dickison’s men retired under the cover of scattered fire from their rear guard. Again we see the importance of cavalry here for the security of foragers leaving garrisoned towns

\textsuperscript{130} Most Union soldiers did not distinguish between Confederate raiders, partisans, or guerrillas and labeled most incidents as guerrilla violence, and prosecuted them accordingly, Calvin Shedd to Wife February 8, 1863; Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 48.

\textsuperscript{131} Calvin Shedd to Wife, February 8, 1863.
into no-man’s-land. St. Augustine for much of its occupation lacked any cavalry. This limited the effective control that Union forces could have in no-man’s-land. More important, as Dickison’s men were mounted, Lieut. Col. Abbott was not able to effectively pursue. The whole affair led to the capture of one Union sergeant and four enlisted men.132

Despite the dangers that existed in no-man’s-land, garrisoned towns could be places of limited normality. The Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Eighth New York had passed their time in St. Augustine relatively quietly, with the occasional raid on rebel cattle breaking the peace. Charles Briggs, a surgeon in the convalescent hospital at St. Augustine partook in nightly social events with pretty young ladies, lived in a well-furnished house, and ate fine food at the Magnolia House.133 The start of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut’s time in St. Augustine followed this pattern. However, normality did not mean that the town was prosperous. The regimental history of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts states that barely 500 people were present in St. Augustine during 1863, and they were almost entirely dependent on the U.S.

132 Report of Col. Haldimond S. Putnam to Lieut. Col. Charles G. Halpine, March 12, 1863 War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 224; Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph C. Abbott, Seventh New Hampshire Infantry to Col. H. S. Putnam, March 10, 1863, 224-225; Calvin Shedd to Wife, March 11, 1863. Shedd contends that the leader of the advanced picket, 2nd Lieutenant Andrew J. Lane, Company C, actually fled, and caused the rest of the picket to retreat in panic. Shedd was “forced to [believe the account] by unimpeachable testimony” from Company C, the unit on advanced picket and engaged in the fight. Shedd further claims that Lieut. House, a longtime friend of Lane’s, pressured Lieut. Col. Abbott and Col. Putnam not to report the incident. Furthermore, Shedd repeatedly tells his wife not to tell anyone about the incident, lending credibility to the cover up since the incident is not discussed in the official records. If the story is true it appears that Lane had a shot at redemption, when Colonel Putnam was killed and Lieut. House injured at Battery Wagner months later. Lieut. Lane took over the charge on the fortifications, perishing at the top of Wagner’s breastworks, Little, The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of Rebellion, 116-128. The incident on March 11 around St. Augustine only receives a single page of treatment in the regimental history of the Seventh New Hampshire, Little, The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion, 92.

government for rations. Major Dudley W. Strickland of the Forty-Eighth New York confirmed this in his correspondence, stating that until the growing season started, little food stuffs could be produced, as well as there were no stores in town were provisions could be bought. He added copious notes detailing the feeding of the destitute population.134

Garrisoned towns were often too strong to be attacked directly by irregular forces, but with their presence as beacons for African American self-emancipation, many Confederates realized that something had to be done to prevent the drain of manpower from no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier to garrisoned towns. Confederate generals like P. G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Confederate Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, inquired about assaults on St. Augustine and Fernandina. Confederate generals in the area, including General Joseph Finegan, commander of the Department of East Florida, recognized the strengths of the garrisoned towns, but also their vulnerability given the long distances between garrisons and the lack of viable transportation necessary for quickly massing men to defend against an assault. These Confederate generals also recognized that St. Augustine and Fernandina served as what Beauregard’s chief of staff Thomas Jordan described as “abolition garrisons,” or places that were sapping the strength of the Confederate war effort by enticing slaves to run away and seek protection from U.S. forces. Ash states how Confederates attempted to curb black freedom by trying to isolate these garrisoned towns as much as possible.135

From the outset of the war, Confederate forces had struggled to maintain a presence on the east bank of the St. Johns River to disrupt Union foraging parties into no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier, to capture runaway slaves, and to prevent southern Unionists from aiding U.S. forces. Though J. J. Dickison’s cavalry was specifically deployed for this purpose and was effective in reducing these activities, his forces were insufficient for general assaults against garrisoned cities. However, with larger forces, generals like Beauregard contemplated the possibility of destroying the “abolition garrisons.” Responding on July 28, 1864, General Joseph Finegan informed chief of staff Jordan and General Beauregard of the inadvisability of direct assaults against St. Augustine and Fernandina. Such an attack was possible, but highly unadvisable, claimed Finegan. Not only did he lack the heavy siege guns necessary to attack Fort Marion, but also,

the possession of Saint Augustine would be entirely useless to us so long as the enemy holds the Saint Johns River, by which he is able to cut off all communication that that town, except from a point so far south as to render the supplying of a garrison there next to impracticable.136

Transportation through Northeast Florida, which was described as “one great pine forest” was difficult for both Union and Confederate forces.

Ash’s model is both applicable and flawed when applied to this situation. Ash’s model is instructive, as it helps illustrate that zones of occupation were never uniform and were always subject to the amount of cavalry or river transportation available and how arduous it was to transverse the surrounding environment, i.e. rivers, swamps, or pine forests. With Union forces in virtual command of the St. Johns River, protracted exposure of large land forces in Northeast Florida would become untenable and a waste of

Confederate resources. This makes St. Augustine break with Ash’s larger model for two reasons. Ash does not detail major attempts to retake garrisoned cities by direct assault and instead focuses on the irregular warfare that permeated the occupied South. The role that topography, specifically the St. Johns River, played in major role in discouraging Confederate assaults against garrisoned towns, which is unique to Northeast Florida. This desire to destroy the Union’s hold on a specific garrisoned town, St. Augustine, is not entirely unique, as Confederates desired to retake Nashville in 1864.137

With the proposed attack on St. Augustine rejected by General Finegan, St. Augustine continued to enjoy its peaceful respite from war. Like most cities in the occupied South, the local commander was engulfed in administrative paper work for the day to day running of the town. The commander of the post, Colonel Osborn, spent more time going over purchases and ration quotas, saying, “I seem to have set up a retail grocery store without any profits.” 138 In addition to this large amount of paperwork, residents trying to make his acquaintance, or asking to go outside the lines or bring in a relative from outside, or requesting for their property or his protection regularly interrupted the Colonel. Union troops did not stay idle for long; soldiers partook in the occasional raid into the no-man’s-land around St. Augustine, like one on November 9, 1863, which returned with twenty-five head of cattle, soothing the hunger of the soldiers in town with ample roast beef.139

138 Roe, The Twenty-Fourth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, 238.
139 Quoted in Roe, The Twenty-Fourth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, 244; Ash states that most commanders in the occupied South had similar work loads, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 83-84.
Union troops would have to go farther and farther into no-man’s-land from garrisoned St. Augustine to obtain supplies and firewood. This exposed foraging parties to possible attacks from Dickison’s cavalry. Thanksgiving and Christmas passed without signs of attack and Union troops and Unionist civilians enjoyed splendid celebrations with festivities and food that was enjoyed by all. However, 1863 would end in tragedy for the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut. On December 30, 1863 a party of woodchoppers about two miles outside of St. Augustine in no-man’s-land were attacked by Dickison’s cavalry, with twenty four men captured and several others killed by the Confederates.

The lack of cavalry and the inability to penetrate deep into no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier in the first years of occupation, continued throughout the war, further exacerbating the strategic situation of Northeast Florida. As Colonel Francis A. Osborn of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts stated on January 1, 1864, “If I had a company of cavalry, I am confident I could have overtaken them [Confederate irregulars], and not only have rescued my own men, but also have captured some besides, for from their trail they were mounted on small horses.” This became especially problematic when Union forces began occupying Picolata and Palatka, which created more garrisoned towns capable of projecting effective Union control, spreading no-man’s-land across Northeast Florida. This again illustrates the fluidity of no-man’s-land, which saw both U.S. and Confederate raids during the late occupation period. While the Confederate frontier on the west side of the St. Johns River only received cursory raids

140 Roe, *The Twenty-Fourth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, 244-249.
during 1863, Union encroachment would grow as more and more forces were transported to Florida for the greatest concentration of troops and the largest battle Florida would see in the Civil War.

As Union soldiers concentrated in Jacksonville and Baldwin, and Confederate forces concentrated west of Lake City in the weeks leading up to the Battle of Olustee, St. Augustine’s garrison was used to further disrupt beef supplies and put Confederate troops on guard, in hopes of keeping them disoriented as to the direction of the Unions’ main invasion route into Middle Florida. On February 7, 1864, 200 men from the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts left St. Augustine and crossed the St. Johns River. They returned to the Ancient City with two rebel soldiers, a civilian who had sugar for Dickison’s cavalry, and forty-five head of cattle. This was the last major raid conducted by the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut during their stay in St. Augustine. The majority of both regiments was transferred to Baldwin and Jacksonville and would join the rest of the army there as it prepared to move towards Lake City and the Confederate interior.143

This raid also illustrates the problems caused by Union soldiers pillaging farms and homes in no-man’s-land during cattle raids. In this instance, the officer in charge of the raid paid farmers for the produce taken by his soldiers. Even at this stage in the war, some Union officers were conciliatory to southern civilians. This stands in stark contrast to the depredations that officers of the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire allowed during their time around St. Augustine early in the war, when official Union policy was against such acts of aggression on civilian property. Ash mentions that some northerners

debated the constitutionality of a hard policy, but he never states that some officers or soldiers did not engage in hard war even after 1864.144

After the U.S. debacle at Olustee on February 20, 1864, Union forces retreated from their advanced positions back to the safety of the garrisoned towns of Jacksonville, Fernandina, and St. Augustine. Though Confederate forces had stopped Union forces from holding a permanent stronghold on the west bank of the St. Johns River, they failed to follow up their victory, allowing U.S. soldiers to further regroup and entrench in their garrisoned towns. Both Union and Confederate troops poured into Florida during the late days of February and early March with around 10,000 Union troops stationed in the Florida in the weeks after the battle.145 Despite the relatively large Union Army in Florida, St. Augustine, which was left with only two companies during the Olustee campaign, was still too weak to project Union power into the Confederate frontier and beyond.

Ash discusses at length how Unionists were the most susceptible during periods of time in which large concentrations of Union and Confederate forces remained miles apart. This distance did not stop Confederate irregulars and Union troops from laying waste to no-man’s-land in between them. One such instance of this appears on April 26, 1864, when a force of 400 Confederate cavalry crossed onto the east side of the St. Johns River for the purpose of arresting the local Union men and to confiscate all their horses, cattle, and provisions. Thirty Unionists attempted to flee for St. Augustine, but seventeen were caught and summarily hanged on the spot. This blatant war crime enraged U.S.

144 Grimsley admits that there was deviation from the hard war policy in the later period, calling it a “directed severity,” Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 1-5, 219, 222; Ash, When the Yankees Came, 56.
officials, who immediately began organizing regular patrols in force from Jacksonville to Picolata, with a substantial portion of St. Augustine’s garrison participating in these sweeps.\footnote{Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 20, 23, 29, 108-130, 178, 205; Browning, “‘I Am Not So Patriotic as I Was Once,’” 229, 232; Brig. Gen. William Birney to Lieut. Col. E. Smith, April 26, 1864, \textit{War of the Rebellion}, Series I, Volume 35, Pt. II, 70-71; it was later discovered the 400 men was an exaggeration, S. Livingston Breese to Commander Geo. B. Balch, April 28, 1864 \textit{ORN}, Series I, Volume 15, 415; John Reiger was the first to focus solely on the depredations of Florida in the Civil War, and Daniel L. Schafer discusses the attempts of Union forces to protect Unionists in the area, but both fail to mention the Confederate raid that killed seventeen Unionists. No historians of Florida or St. Augustine have discussed this incident before, John Reiger, “Deprivations, Disaffection, and Desertion in Confederate Florida.” \textit{The Florida Historical Quarterly}, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jan., 1970): pp. 279-298, 295; Schafer, \textit{Thunder on the River}, 222-223. For an overview of works on guerrilla warfare and the persecution of Unionists in historiography see page 11 of this thesis.}

As a result, Union forces fanned out across no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida until the end of the war. The Seventeenth Connecticut during this time guarded St. Augustine, while the Seventy-Fifth Ohio Volunteers, the First South Carolina, the Thirty-Fifth Colored Infantry and other units, patrolled Northeast Florida. This dispersal’s goal was to spread Union protection across Northeast Florida, in an attempt to stop Confederate cavalry and irregulars from harassing the Unionist population. Union troops set out routinely from Jacksonville and St. Augustine towards Palatka, Picolata, and other garrisoned towns on the St. Johns River. Union troops, both black and white, worked in close concert with each other, relying on their comrades to guard their flanks and rear as Union forces tried to thwart any Confederate movements in the area.

Another consequence of the actions of Confederate irregulars, Union troops planned a raid into the Confederate frontier in response to Captain Dickison’s efforts to clear all the area in front of St. Augustine of Unionists.\footnote{Commander George B. Balch to Commodore S. C. Rowan, April 30, 1864 \textit{ORN}, Series I, Volume 15, 414; S. Livingston Breese to Commander Geo. B. Balch, April 28, 1864 \textit{ORN}, Series I, Volume 15, 415.} This was one of the deepest raids into the Confederate frontier and originated near St. Augustine. On April 26, 1864, General William Birney and the men of the First South Carolina Infantry, the Thirty-Fifth
Colored Infantry, and the One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth New York Mounted Infantry, boarded the U.S. steamers *Mary Benton* and *Harriet Weed* at Picolata near St. Augustine. With them was the U.S. gunboat *Ottawa* as protection and the expedition travelled down the St. Johns River all the way to Welaka, Florida. Once there, the troops confiscated molasses, freed slaves, burned cotton, requisitioned cattle, and protected Unionists, many of whom joined their ranks as scouts. Using the freed slaves as cattle drivers led by Unionist scouts, two to three droves of cattle, about 1,000 total, with a number of horses were sent just north of St. Augustine to graze in between there and Jacksonville.148

Confederates did not allow U.S. troops to operate uninhibited in no-man’s-land. The most powerful way to deny them dominance in this area was to take the fight to the river itself. Tired of the power of Union gunboats which prevented larger incursions into no-man’s-land, Confederates began lining the St. Johns River south of Jacksonville with “torpedoes,” or modern day naval mines chained to the floor of the river underneath the water’s surface. These deadly devices had an almost immediately impact. In less than two months, three Union ships were destroyed on the river with dozens dead, wounded, and captured.149

Captain Dickison had another surprise in store for U.S. Navy gunboats, which had travelled the St. Johns River almost unmolested for the entire war—cannons. In May 1864, south of Palatka, Dickison and his men waited for the U.S. gunboat *Columbine* to pass by. Taking aim with their field pieces, the Confederates opened fire, destroying the propeller and raking the deck with grapeshot. After several minutes of effective fire, the

gunboat struck its colors, with a total loss of twenty dead and sixty-five wounded.\footnote{Buker, “Inner Blockade,” 81; Schafer, Thunder on the River, 225.} Despite these few successes, the Confederate frontier would continue to be raided and no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida was coming under tighter and tighter Union control.

As the war dragged on, Ash states that Union control increased as Confederate control broke down. An indication of the strength of Union control in 1864 can be seen in the writings of John C. Gray, Jr., who stated “the people of the east side of the St. Johns are called Florida Yankees and the majority of them are Union men.”\footnote{John E. Reiger, “Florida After Secession: Abandonment by the Confederacy and Its Consequences,” Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 50, 139; Buker, “Inner Blockade,” 82.} Confederates recognized this issue, noting that it caused them many problems concerning military intelligence. Confederate Major General Patton Anderson was discouraged by the fact that once Union troops crossed into Northeast Florida, he was completely unable to account for their movements to reinforce either Jacksonville or St. Augustine. The no-man’s-land between Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and Picolata was “wholly within the enemy’s possession and […] it was impossible to keep ourselves well advised of all his movements on that side of the river.”\footnote{Ash, When the Yankees Came, 214-225; quoted in Buker, “Inner Blockade,” 82.}

Confederate resistance was breaking down in Northeast Florida and Confederate ability to raid around St. Augustine was significantly curtailed. Union commanders were so confident of their security that they began contemplating moving their heavy artillery out of Fort Marion in St. Augustine to Jacksonville or Palatka, “as St. Augustine cannot be approached by any force except small squads of cavalry.”\footnote{Brig. Gen. J. W. Turner to Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, March 14, 1864; War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 35, Pt. 2, 18.} With this security, St.
Augustine began exporting beef that was gathered in no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida for the purpose of feeding the rest of the Department of the South.\footnote{Lieut. Col. M. R. Morgan to Israel R. Sealy, April 4, 1864, \textit{War of the Rebellion}, Series I, Volume 35, Pt. 2, 35.}

Despite the extension of Union troops into no-man’s-land, Captain Dickison continued to harass Union troops on the east bank of the St. Johns River. Justus M. Silliman, a soldier in the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers who served in St. Augustine, Jacksonville, and Volusia, Florida, detailed how his regiment was spread out across Northeast Florida, leaving it open to attack from Dickison’s cavalry. This is also unique to St. Augustine, as Ash states that it was uncommon for Union troops to spread out over large geographic areas.\footnote{Justus Mitchell Silliman, \textit{A New Canaan Private in the Civil War: Letters of Justus M. Silliman, 17th Connecticut Volunteers}. (New Canaan: New Canaan Historical Society, 1984): 71-73; Ash, \textit{When the Yankees Came}, 77, 92.}

Despite these sweeps of Union forces, Confederate cavalry still managed to cross to the east side of the St. Johns River and wreak havoc wherever they went. Even though officers knew of the danger of leaving a garrisoned town unescorted, such risks became more and more frequent as Union forces attempted to control all of Northeast Florida. However, this net of Union troops may have led some officers to become too relaxed and careless as many Union officers attended dances and socials outside the lines with growing frequency. Security was becoming so lax, that even Colonel William H. Noble of the Seventeenth Connecticut was captured by rebel forces while on a carriage ride on the Jacksonville Road; Noble was accompanied only by one other unarmed officer and a few ladies.\footnote{Little, \textit{The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of Rebellion}, 215-217; Silliman, \textit{A New Canaan Private in the Civil War}, 90; Graham, “The Home Front,” 41.}
Ash argues that by this time civilian resistance was dropping precipitously and war weariness was taking effect. In late 1863, Union soldiers and government agents reported the many of the South’s population were tired of the war and eager to rejoin the Union. Seeking to begin a process of reconciliation, Abraham Lincoln issued the Amnesty and Reconstruction proclamation on December 8, 1863. This allowed states that had joined the Confederacy to re-enter the Union, if ten percent of the state’s 1860 voting population would take the oath of allegiance. Led to believe that loyal citizens in southern states could easily match this quota, politicians quickly used the well-intentioned act to fulfill their own designs. One such man who used these reports of widespread demoralization was the head of the Florida Direct Tax Commission Lyman Stickney. Stickney convinced Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase to begin attempts to create a new state government. Seeking to challenge Lincoln in the coming election, Chase sent Stickney to Northeast Florida to gauge the feasibility of organizing a state government.157

On December 19, 1863, a Unionist meeting in St. Augustine put forward a series of resolutions that repudiated the rebellion and called for a process to readmit Florida as a state. As part of this process, Stickney began a sale of homes belonging to Confederate families for delinquent taxes on December 21, 1863. The sales were moderately successful, occurring over a week, and raised $19,329 in cash. These sales were also deemed illegal by other members of the Florida Direct Sales Tax Commission for not

publicizing them and for not waiting the required period of time, as well as for the
number of corrupt agents who purchased real estate for themselves in town. Stickney
himself bought a lot in St. Augustine and began fixing it up while other commissioners
purchased a lot for Lincoln’s secretary, John Hay.  

As the Union presence in Northeast Florida increased with the efforts to organize
the state, officials and business interests in St. Augustine began showcasing themselves
as model examples of pro-Union feeling. The Emancipation Proclamation celebration
was one such showcase; with bands, banners, speeches, and meals attended by whites and
freed slaves alike. But such displays could not prevent the recognition of the political
reality. John Hay, Lincoln’s secretary, travelled through Northeast Florida with the goal
of obtaining 1,100 signatures required to establish ten percent of the loyal population. In
St. Augustine alone, Hay and others managed to collect 446 signatures. However, Hay’s
efforts ended when Confederate General Joseph Finegan turned back Union General
Thomas Seymour’s army at Olustee on February 20, 1864.  

As part of the move to organize Florida into a loyal state, a thorough count of
occupied East Florida’s population was taken by Union authorities in early 1864. The
federal military census of 1864 shows the massive population displacement that occurred
during the Civil War in St. Augustine. The 1,914 residents of St. Augustine registered in

Augustine, 128; Graham, “The Home Front,” 44; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 69-73; Schafer, Thunder on
the River, 175-176.
159 Smith, “Carpetbag Imperialism in Florida, Part II,” 288; Graham, “The Home Front,” 44; Nulty,
Confederate Florida, 119; Florida State Genealogical Society, Census’ department of the South, November,
1864: for Jacksonville, Fernandina and St. Augustine, Florida: ordered by the Department of the South,
Census of 1864). The federal military census of 1864 has yet to be utilized in studies of Civil War St.
Augustine, despite hundreds of pages of demographic data. The census includes the name, height, eyes,
complexion, gender, age, place of birth or whether they were a contraband, last residence, former owner if
applicable, date into the department, whether they had taken the oath of allegiance, rations given, and
commanders’ comments. The census is not perfect. There are gaps in the information either to error or
negligence, but the majority of the census is intact and provides a vivid view of St. Augustine in 1864.
the U.S. census of 1860 declined to 1,436 in 1864, a twenty-five percent drop. In addition, of the 1,436 individuals recorded in the census, 996 were listed as original residents of St. Augustine or forty-eight percent of the original population.\(^{160}\)

Tracing the origins of many of the newcomers is difficult due to the incomplete records, but what can be discerned is that twenty-three northerners moved to St. Augustine between 1862-1864 from New York, Vermont, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. 509 people on the census are listed as contrabands, this was the term written down for any black individual. That leaves 927 residents who are presumably regarded as white. Only 655 white civilians are listed as original residents of the town, far below the 1,175 listed in the census of 1860, or forty-five percent of the original white population. Out of the 509 African Americans, 341 were listed as original residents. The census data makes clear that the number of African Americans who lived in St. Augustine in 1860 dropped from 739 individuals to 341 by 1864, a fifty-four percent drop. Out of the original residents of the town, whites were in the majority with fifty-one percent of the native population. Ash notes that whole communities were altered as many of the original inhabitants fled, were expelled, or were absent in Confederate service.\(^{161}\)

The twenty-five percent drop in the town’s total population is startling alone, but it pales in comparison to the forty-eight percent population drop of original residents of the town. Additionally, white original residents of the town fell by roughly forty-five

\(^{160}\) The Federal Military Census of 1864, 170-225. The census lists 1,436 individuals who remained in St. Augustine, though this obviously conflicts with the numbers provided by Sam Walcott, Calvin Shedd, and subsequent historians who estimated the Ancient City’s population at between 800 and 1000 people. The federal military census provides the clearest enumeration of how many civilians resided in occupied St. Augustine in February 1864, with definitive figures that until now have only been hinted at by historians.

\(^{161}\) The Federal Military Census of 1864, 170-225. An additional fifteen individuals have their last residence listed as St. Augustine, but curiously does not list them as old residents. Even if they were old residents, their addition would not alter the percentage of original residents listed in the census. Ash, When the Yankees Came, 178, 196, 202-203.
percent while African Americans fell by fifty-four percent. This drop in the town’s population can be corroborated by the testimony of soldiers like Calvin Shedd and A. H. Young of the Seventh New Hampshire, Sam Walcott, and news correspondents who witnessed the series of expulsions beginning in September 1862. What can explain this massive demographic change to St. Augustine? Firstly, the town’s population contributed ninety-nine individuals to the St. Augustine Blues, Company B, Third Florida Infantry. In addition, many wealthy St. Augustinians began leaving the city during the economic slump in the months leading up to the occupation. Union soldiers Shedd and Young recorded in their letters the forced expulsions of a number of St. Augustinians during the summer of 1862 and throughout 1863. Though a number did return, many did not due to selling off of their possessions or the hardships of travelling vast distances across no-man’s-land. Lastly, many African Americans in East Florida joined the Union army and many of these recruits came from St. Augustine.¹⁶²

The incomplete information unfortunately leaves us with a fragmentary picture of the city’s African American population and arrival of refugees. For instance, 464 of the 509 African Americans are listed with their slave-master’s names recorded in another column. Another fragmentary list shows 432 people residing in St. Augustine who are not listed as original residents of the city. Despite this large number of people, the fragmentary nature of the sources states that only 352 people or thirty-five percent of the

¹⁶² Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 121; Graham, “The Home Front,” 34; Coles, “Ancient City Defenders,” 75; Calvin Shedd to Wife, February 8, 1863; Calvin Shedd to Wife, February 21, 1863; A. H. Young to Susan September 9, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan, September 15, 1862; A. H. Young to Susan, September 19, 1862; Revels, Grander in Her Daughters, 119-120; Schafer, Thunder on the River, 86; Daniel L. Schafer, Florida History Online, “Black Floridians and the Civil War: The 21st, 33rd, and 34th United States Colored Infantry Regiments” http://www.unf.edu/floridahistoryonline/CIR/index.htm.
total population in St. Augustine have the date that they arrived in the Ancient City recorded from 1862 to 1864.\textsuperscript{163}

The 1864 census details the amount of rations given out to the residents and refugees in St. Augustine. In May 1863, eighty-five white and sixty-seven black families were on government aid after fourteen months. Furthermore, historian Tracy J. Revels in her work on Florida women during the Civil War, places the total number of people receiving rations at 321, with an estimated total cost of $35,000 for the entire period.\textsuperscript{164} Historian J. Britt McCarley in his work on the Quartermaster Department and Union soldiers’ rations, lists in detail the typical garrison ration. This consisted of twelve ounces of pork or bacon or a pound and four ounces of salt beef and a pound and a half of hard bread or a pound and six ounces of soft bread.\textsuperscript{165} In addition, for every one hundred rations, fifteen pounds of beans, ten pounds of rice, ten pounds of coffee, fifteen pounds of sugar, four quarts of vinegar, three pounds and twelve ounces of salt, and thirty pounds of potatoes (when practical). According to the 1864 census, 335 individuals received rations in February alone, with half or quarter rations going to most of the population, unless it was a mother with children. Union troops in St. Augustine were doling out 236 complete rations per day.\textsuperscript{166}

St. Augustine certainly proves Ash’s assertions that across the occupied South, the antebellum community was significantly changed by the years of war, deprivation, and dissatisfaction. The town was fed by U.S. troops from the time of its occupation

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\textsuperscript{163} The Federal Military Census of 1864, 170-225; Ash notes that many towns swelled with refugees during the war despite the influx of refugees, St. Augustine is unique as it never reached its pre-war population level, unlike Nashville and Memphis which exceeded its own, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 81.
\textsuperscript{164} Revels, Grander in Her Daughters, 127, Revels notes the number of people receiving rations, but not the total amount of full rations given out.
\textsuperscript{166} The Federal Military Census of 1864, 170-225.
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through the close of the war. Humanitarian efforts did not win over southerners and
civilian resistance led to martial law, restrictions, and finally expulsions that rocked the
community. It cannot be overstated how great the damage to the community was.
Notwithstanding being one of the most stable occupation locations in the country, St.
Augustine never-the-less suffered greatly during the war. Losing forty-eight percent of its
original population with a loss of twenty-five percent in overall population numbers, the
demographic shock to the community would be felt for the remainder of the decade.

The final year of the war in 1865 did not pass by without incident. Months of
occupation duty, the spreading out of Union forces across Northeast Florida from
Jacksonville to Palatka, increased U.S. control to a greater extent than it ever had in
Florida. Union gunboats controlled the St. Johns River, while U.S. raiding parties
penetrated deep into no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier, confiscating cattle,
supplies, and assisting African Americans escaping to freedom. One raid did not end well
for Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Wilkinson and his detachment of forty cavalrmen, sent to
Volusia to confiscate cotton, as Captain Dickison’s men surprised them and captured the
entire party.167

The small skirmishes that occurred across Florida in the waning months did little
to change the war’s outcome. By April 9, 1865, General Robert E. Lee had surrendered to
Union forces, effectively ending major combat operations in Northern Virginia. Shortly
after Lee’s surrender, John Wilkes Booth assassinated Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s
Theatre. The two events occurred so close together that news of the surrender and

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167 Schafer, Thunder on the River, 225-237; Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 130; War of the
Rebellion, Series I, Volume 47, 166; William Burr Jones to Father, February 9, 1865 MC 16.7, Box 5,
Folder 7D, SAHS
assassination reached St. Augustine on the same steamer.\textsuperscript{168} The Civil War in Florida officially closed on April 26, 1865, when General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered all forces in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida. With the close of the conflict, soldiers and civilians began thinking about the future and the coming struggle of rebuilding their lives. Andrew Anderson, a native of St. Augustine living in New York, lamented Lincoln’s death, fearing it would bring terrible retribution from the North on the South. Already disturbed with the death and destruction that the war had wrought, Anderson wrote his wife, “I wonder how many of the Augustinians of the olden time will ever come back.”\textsuperscript{169}

According to Ash, the war was over, but other battles that had not been resolved during the war entered a new phase. Though the major question of Union authority had been answered by military conquest, three factors remained that would plague Reconstruction: politics, race, and class. With Lee surrendered and the future unclear, military control remained over St. Augustine, with civil government shut down and martial law in place until 1868 when the local court system resumed. White southerners employed numerous methods to fight African American freedom and equality when deprived of civil government, while some U.S. Army officers used military occupation policy to try to promote some sort of equality between the races. Q. A. Gillmore began issuing orders in the Department of the South that would regulate race relations in occupied southern towns. On April 30, 1865 Gillmore’s order decreed, “Negroes are at all times, whether a truce exists or not, and at all places, whether within or beyond the lines, to be treated like white men, subject to such special instructions touching their

\textsuperscript{168} Graham, \textit{The Awakening of St. Augustine}, 130-131.
\textsuperscript{169} Andrew Anderson to Clarissa Anderson, April 16, 1865, Anderson Papers, MC 10, Box 2, Folder 55, SAHS, quoted in Graham, \textit{The Awakening of St. Augustine}, 131.
education, support, and colonization as have been given by the War Department to Brevet Major-General Saxton.”

Union officials were not always consistent in their destruction of racial controls and were at times sympathetic to the lamentations of southern whites in regards to the freedoms of African Americans. Southerners were not powerless either, as shown by the petition to Ulysses S. Grant to keep an all-white occupation force in the town. For instance, the collector of customs in St. Augustine, Thomas G. Foster, and sixty-nine other individuals petitioned Ulysses S. Grant against the removal of the Seventh U.S. Infantry for two African American regiments stating that, “negroes will be negroes” and would retard northern tourists, increase crime, and attract more African Americans to migrate to St Augustine, whose inhabitants were mostly women and children. African American troops never did take up permanent occupation in St. Augustine though they did they guard refugees from St. Augustine during one of the expulsions of 1863.

Ash also briefly discusses the observations of visitors and returning people who described the scenes of destruction across the occupied South. John Francis Tenney, who visited Florida prior to the Civil War, returned to the state in 1865 and bought a piece of land in Northeast Florida. Tenney made several trips to St. Augustine and Jacksonville on business after purchasing a home and acres of land in Orange Mills. Tenney described St. Johns County and the countryside around St. Augustine as desolate, “the principal

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sufferers were the cattle owners, whose stock was gathered up and transported north for
the use of the Union troops.”

Tenney further states that St. Augustine “retained its old
time appearance and methods of living and doing,” signaling that despite the
demographic shifts, the imposition of military rule, and the alteration of race relations, St.
Augustine remained remarkably similar from when Tenney last visited in 1861. The fact
that much of its old architecture survived the war is evidence that unlike other garrisoned
towns, St. Augustine did not witness the type of vandalism and destruction to the degree
that plagued towns like Jacksonville, which had several square blocks burned during the
war. This makes St. Augustine unique in its ability to avoid large wholesale destruction
of entire city blocks.

173 Tenney, Slavery, Secession, and Success, 23.
174 Tenney, Slavery, Secession, and Success, 23-24. For the burning of Jacksonville see: Ash, Firebrand of
Liberty, 170, 173-174, 176, 177, 179, 180-181, 195. The reason for St. Augustine’s ability to avoid
destruction is most likely due to the convalescent hospital and the city’s reputation as a haven for the
wounded and sick.
CONCLUSION

According to Stephen V. Ash, the damage incurred by the war and military occupation left scars on the towns and landscape of the occupied South. Ash states that communities were completely changed by the war from the physical damage and depopulation, as well as the destruction of slavery. Like much of the occupied South, St. Augustine was changed by the Civil War. Some of these changes were positive; slavery was removed from the Ancient City, fortifications surrounded the city, new piers were built, businesses reopened, and trade and tourism resumed. The city’s old architecture remained intact; making St. Augustine unique in its avoidance of large scale physical damage to the city’s buildings that were hallmarks of other garrisoned towns like Jacksonville. Lastly, the presence of Union soldiers in the town up to 1868 may have even led to the Ancient City avoiding the racial violence of the Ku Klux Klan that appeared elsewhere in Florida after the Civil War.175

Other changes were less positive. Though gardens were blooming in St. Augustine and the architecture was intact, the many trees in town had been chopped down, caused by the army’s voracious need for fuel and entrenchments. Orange trees were picked clean by Union soldiers and hungry civilians. Roads in town were in poor condition and filled with trash as no maintenance was done in nearly five years. Furniture in homes had been stolen or hacked up for fuel or out of petty vandalism. Houses that had once belonged to white southerners now were in the possession of northern emigrants, Unionists, and prominent businessmen who had bought them at the Tax Commission

175 Ash, *When the Yankees Came*, 229-235; Graham notes that incidents of organized violence by whites against African Americans in St. Augustine were rare, Graham, *The Awakening of St. Augustine*, 138.
auctions. Finally, forty-eight percent of the town’s original inhabitants had left or were expelled, leaving the city eerily empty.

Confederate soldiers, Unionists, and other refugees slowly returned, but what happened to many of these refugees still remains a mystery for historians. Some refugees travelled to the interior of Florida, as was the case of Frances Kirby Smith who settled in Madison during the war. Many of St. Augustine’s displaced population settled in Middle Florida. Families such as the Putnams, Gibbs, and Smiths lived in Quincy and Madison, while a small “St. Augustine colony” headed by Dr. P. M. Myers established itself in Monticello. Other refugees travelled far and wide; Gumersindo Antonio Pacetti, one-time mayor of St. Augustine, resided in Cuba after the war, even holding a dinner in honor of Confederate General and former Vice President John C. Breckinridge in June 1865. With the war over, many Confederates fearing retribution after Lincoln’s assassination went into exile in Cuba.176

The destruction in no-man’s-land surpassed that of the garrisoned city. Trees had been chopped down around town for fuel and to clear fields for effective fire to defend St. Augustine. Houses outside of town had been torn down or vandalized by Union soldiers in reprisals to guerrilla activity. Lumber yards, salt works, and other business interests were burned and confiscated by both Union and Confederate forces. Horses and beef herds had been either slaughtered or confiscated, leaving the countryside depopulated of livestock. The railroad to Ticoi which had been started near St. Augustine before the war was torn up. The boats along the St. Johns River that U.S. and Confederates forces destroyed to prevent the crossing of people and information from one

side to the other now stifled the resumption of trade between the coast and Florida’s interior. Lastly, the population in no-man’s-land suffered due to persecutions of Unionists, Confederate sympathizers expelled by Union soldiers, while slaves and disaffected southerners were removed by Confederates to Florida’s interior. By 1865, all of these actions left the countryside deserted.

For those St. Augustinians who remained or returned to the Ancient City after the war, many wondered if their confiscated property would be returned or if compensation would be delivered. Union forces, enabled by the confiscation acts, requisitioned property and materials that could aid in the Union war effort from suspected Confederates sympathizers. However, no historian has ever been able to quantify how many St. Johns and St. Augustine civilians were Unionists who had their property confiscated. The Southern Claims Commission, a Congressional body designed to reimburse Unionist southerners who had their property requisitioned, recorded sixteen individuals from St. Johns County who were part of the claims process. The records indicate that out of the sixteen claims, only four were paid out, and the amounts paid were less than the requested amount. Given that well over ten percent of the population of St. Augustine took the oath of allegiance, it is logical to assume that the payouts by the claims commission never compensated the majority of southerners who had their possessions confiscated.177

The three overarching factors of Ash’s occupation model, conciliation’s abandonment due to southern resistance, the zones of occupation, and changes to the southern community can be successfully applied to St. Augustine’s Civil War experience.

177 United States, House of Representatives, Commissioners of Claims, Records of the Commissioners of Claims (Southern Claims Commission) 1871-1880. (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1945), Record Group 217, Rolls 13 & 14: 89, 120, 133, 141, 184, 190, 214, 220, 242, 243, 244.
The first chapter set up the discussion of these overarching factors in keeping with Ash’s model by highlighting the lead up to war, the fear of invasion, the evacuations of Confederates, and the condition of the town upon initial Union occupation. In the antebellum period, southerners in St. Augustine had brought the question of secession to the forefront of public debate. Prior to secession, men organized themselves into units for home defense, while women did everything in their power to support them. Once secession was adopted, these men and women carried their state out of the Union, tightened slave controls, increased patrols, confiscated U.S. government arms and property, and nervously watched the coastline for any sign of Union gunboats’ approach. Once U.S. forces landed, southerners braced for the very worst, finding instead bold proclamations of friendship from conciliatory Union officers. These southerners, rather than openly resist at first, watched and waited as U.S. soldiers first took control of these towns.

The second chapter discussed the three overarching factors of Ash’s model in the early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. The first factor was resistance to Union occupation and the eventual abandonment of the Union’s conciliatory approach. In St. Augustine, like much of the occupied South, Union troops found that southerners would not greet them as liberators, but as invaders. Women were openly defiant and privations began multiplying for soldiers and civilians alike. Violent resistance began to rear its ugly head in the form of Confederate irregulars who persecuted Unionists, caught escaped slaves, and attacked U.S. pickets and patrols. Frustrated by southerners, vengeful for the deaths of friends at the hands of partisans, U.S. forces abandoned conciliation
slowly, engaged in reprisals, and started the process that led to expulsions of hundreds of southern civilians.

The next factor applied to the early occupation period in the second chapter was the creation of three unique zones of occupation due to the resistance of southerners. These zones Ash labeled as: garrisoned towns that experienced direct Union presence, no-man’s-land that surrounded these garrisoned towns and were frequented by Union soldiers, and the Confederate frontier that was subjected to rare Union raids. These zones of occupation were successfully applied to St. Augustine; the Ancient City was a typical garrisoned town, surrounded by a no-man’s-land that stretched from the east bank of the St. Johns River all the way to New Smyrna, with a Confederate frontier extending from the west bank of the river. Union forces from St. Augustine and Confederates from the frontier raided and skirmished with each other in this no-man’s-land. The Confederate frontier experienced rare raids at the hands of Union troops who used Florida’s unique topography to ship troops up and down the St. Johns River.

The last factor that was applied to the early occupation of St. Augustine was changes to the community. Southern communities, according to Ash, were substantially changed by military occupation. The resistance from southern civilians caused Union soldiers to burn down homes in no-man’s-land that were frequented by guerrillas, destroy boats to prevent trade and mobility, impose harsher penalties on disloyal persons, beginning a process that eventually led to forced expulsion. The damage to no-man’s-land, the depopulation it and St. Augustine suffered, and the economic stagnation all confirms Ash’s generalizations about changes made to southern communities during the early occupation period and are applicable to St. Augustine, Florida.
These three factors, conciliation abandoned, zones of occupation, and changes to the community all continued into the late occupation period. As 1863 dawned, U.S. troops abandoned conciliation wholesale as expulsions of southern civilians increased, with hundreds of women and children placed on transports and shipped out of St. Augustine. Guerrilla warfare in no-man’s-land became problematic, with dozens of Union soldiers being captured and killed, while Unionists were still persecuted and in many instances killed. All of these events and factors taken together inevitably led to significant changes in the southern community. These changes to southern communities are best exemplified in the forty-eight percent drop in original inhabitants of St. Augustine.

Though Ash’s model is applicable to St. Augustine, it is by no means perfect. There are several facets of Ash’s argument that are more complex than he depicts and other aspects of the occupied South which he glosses over. Ash presents several arguments pertaining to the rural community and the accepted social order of planters, plain folk, and slaves that existed prior to the war. However, works by other historians have illustrated that such uniformity never existed in the South. Edward E. Baptist is one such historian who challenges the depiction of a uniform “Old South,” and illustrates that the expansion of slavery, class conflict, and the nature of the frontier created differences in the Old Southwest as it was gradually settled.178

Ash’s model also predates Mark Grimsley’s work on Union war policy toward southern civilians and Ash’s description of the changes to Union war aims fails to capture the nuance and complexity of this change. Ash also fails to treat African American slaves, freedmen, and soldiers in his work, focusing instead on white southerners

178 Baptist, Creating an Old South, 246-256, 281.
attempts to curb black freedom. Ash’s focus reflects the division between wartime occupation, Reconstruction, and African American studies in Civil War historiography in the 1990s.

With the war over, the reader is confronted with one last drawback of this study, because Ash ends his analysis at the end of the Civil War, and does not take the conflicts that he delineates during the war into the Reconstruction period. The efforts of white southerners to curb black freedom, which he briefly covers in his work, are not extended to the end of the war. This is a lost opportunity to explore the new conflicts and methods that white southerners employed to fight against orders of racial equality, exemplified by the order of General Gillmore. One is left wondering if the changes incurred during the war lasted throughout Reconstruction and if the destruction of slavery led to any temporary or sustained changes in race relations. Furthermore, Union troops and African Americans appear as passive players by the end of the war. Union troops appear to casually back away from the South despite a few pronouncements about social equality. African Americans are portrayed as passive victims awaiting the resurgent wrath of southern whites during Reconstruction. Both generalizations do little to clarify the experiences of these groups at the end of the Civil War.179

With the evolution of new military history into the twenty-first century, historians like Judkin Browning have attempted to bridge this gap with comprehensive studies of Union soldiers, African Americans, and white southerners in the occupied South. This thesis serves as a stepping-stone for future studies of St. Augustine during the Civil War. With Ash’s model successfully applied to the Ancient City, a following study applying Browning’s conclusions to St. Augustine and St. Johns County is required to test his

179 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 229-235.
assertions and to replicate his scope that bridges the divisions that existed in military occupation historiography. With that accomplished, a book length study that incorporates both approaches should be attempted for St. Augustine, St. Johns County, and all of Northeast Florida.

As the sources indicate, Stephen V. Ash’s assertions about the changing of Union war aims due to southern resistance, the zones of occupation, and the changes in the southern community ring true for St. Augustine. Prior to the war, like most southerners, St. Augustinians feared that in the coming war, Union barbarism would unleash a torrent of destruction, rape, pillage, and suffering that would touch every corner of the South. This fear led most St. Augustinians and southerners to flee or grudgingly accept U.S. rule in the hopes of preventing the destruction of their town. Once it became clear to St. Augustinians that Union policy intended to be conciliatory, resistance began to blossom in the forms of non-violent insults and social snubs from citizens to outright violence from Confederate raiders, partisans, and guerrillas. This resistance over time induced the Union to adjust their war aims, adopting hard war policies that evicted St. Augustinians from their homes, confiscated their property, and changed the accepted racial and social mores, which had operated for decades. All of these circumstances combined to change the white southern community. This resulted in a forty-eight percent drop of original inhabitants, leaving empty homes, destitute families, broken kinship ties, and new problems of race relations.
APPENDIX B: OCCUPYING UNION REGIMENTS FOR ST. AUGUSTINE
The Union occupation of St. Augustine lasted from March 1862 to 1868. In the course of that time, eight regiments served in the city. A table of the progression of Union occupation will highlight the high turnover rate in the Department of the South. It was not at all uncommon for companies from different regiments to occupy St. Augustine at the same time, moving in and out of the town based on the military expeditions being launched in the Department of the South, like the attempts to take Charleston in 1863 or the Olustee campaign in 1864. Furthermore, requests for troops from other commanders in different military departments could draw away troops, like during General Ulysses S. Grant’s Virginia campaign in 1864. The following table simplifies the issue of multiple companies in St. Augustine by listing the regiment in command of the post. This topic of troop rotation and the effect on the occupied South is not covered in Stephen V. Ash’s work and illustrates one of St. Augustine’s unique occupation factors.180

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fourth New Hampshire</td>
<td>March 1862 to September 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh New Hampshire</td>
<td>September 1862 to June 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Connecticut</td>
<td>June 1863 to August 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortieth New York</td>
<td>August 1863 to September 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts</td>
<td>September 1863 to February 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Connecticut</td>
<td>September 1863 to February 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeenth Connecticut</td>
<td>February 1864 to July 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Regular U.S. Infantry</td>
<td>July 1865 to 1868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX C: COMMANDERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH
The order of the commanders of the Department of the South, like the regiments who served in St. Augustine, is convoluted. As illustrated, the commanders of the Department of the South changed often. This high rate of turn of among commanders affected the occupation of the town, as soldiers and civilians were forced to readjust to commander’s leadership style. This high turnover rate no doubt created an air of uncertainty about the fate of the town and how policy would be implemented. Though Stephen V. Ash does discuss the wide latitude that commanders were granted without clear orders from the Lincoln administration, he does not analyze how the quick turnover of commanders could affect the implementation of occupation policy.\textsuperscript{181}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas W. Sherman</td>
<td>June 1861 to March 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hunter</td>
<td>March 1862 to September 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John M. Brannan</td>
<td>September 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ormsby M. Mitchell</td>
<td>September 1862 to October 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John M. Brannan</td>
<td>October 1862 to January 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hunter</td>
<td>January 1863 to June 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy A. Gillmore</td>
<td>June 1863 to May 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John P. Hatch</td>
<td>May 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John G. Foster</td>
<td>May 1864 to February 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy A. Gillmore</td>
<td>February 1865 to June 1865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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