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Exploring Regional Dynamics: States, International Civil Society, and Regional Interstate Cooperation

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EXPLORING REGIONAL DYNAMICS: STATES, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY, AND REGIONAL INTERSTATE COOPERATION.

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ABSTRACT

Regional cooperation is widely acknowledged as a crucial element in fostering peace and prosperity among nations, yet few systematic studies have investigated the forces that promote and sustain it. This dissertation examines regional cooperation through the lens of states, state-led institutions, and non-state actors. In order to achieve this, the study first aims to undertake a systematic analysis of the correlates associated with regional cooperation, using country pairings to analyze where cooperation takes place. Second, I explore the role of international civil society in promoting regional cooperation. To gauge international civil society, a new dataset on International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) is constructed and introduced.

The first part of my dissertation constructs two datasets on International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). There is no ready-to-use, publicly available data source in the literature for researchers wishing to analyze INGOs systematically. There are a variety of online data sources, but none are based on identified inclusion criteria. I identify as INGOs all United Nations- accredited NGOs and construct two datasets: one of the INGOs and the other of INGOs at the state-year level of analysis. Both datasets can be integrated with other datasets, facilitating engagement with a broad range of research questions. While the INGO-level dataset provides information for 6,595 INGOs from 1816 to 2022, the state-level dataset includes 15,024 state-year observations from 1946 to 2022.

The second part of the dissertation investigates the conditions under which regional countries engage in cooperation. Analyses of memberships in 76 regional organizations from 1945 to 2012 yield several factors as significant forces of regional cooperation. In order of importance, these are joint democracy, joint language, equal material capability, and trade interdependence. I found that weaker countries are more hesitant to cooperate with stronger ones

within regions. At the theoretical level, this research supports a liberal explanation for regional interstate organization, emphasizing factors such as trade and democracy, over a hegemonic realist explanation that centers on power asymmetry.

The third part of the dissertation examines the role of international civil society in regional cooperation. Drawing on the new INGO dataset, I found that the more international non-governmental organizations shared by two countries in a dyad in a year, the more likely the two countries share common memberships in Regional Organizations (ROs), Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). Even after accounting for such factors as democracy, economic status, and alliances, the results yield a robust correlation between the engagement of INGOs and the advancement of regional interstate cooperation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	African Development Bank
AOE	Areas of Expertise
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUC	Africa Union Commission
BSEC	Black Sea Economic and Cooperation Organization
CIE	Contract Intensive Economy
CINC	Composite Index of National Capabilities dataset
CINE	Contract Intensity of National Economies
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
COW	Correlates of War
DCRSE	Dyadic Clustering Standard Error Estimators
ECOSOC	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSO	Integrated Civil Society Organizations Database
IEADB	International Environmental Agreements Database
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
MDG	Millennium Developments Goals
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAS	Organization of American States
RO	Regional Organizations
ROCO	Regional Organization and Cooperation
RTA	Regional Trade Agreements
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization

TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In recent years, acknowledging the growing importance of regional dimensions in the field of global governance, today's global political landscape emphasizes the role of regional dynamics in international relations. Indeed, global politics are getting increasingly shaped by regional organizations, conflicts, economic integration initiatives, civil society organizations, and shared norms and values, all of which jointly affect the behavior of states and non-state actors in the global arena. To date, extensive research has documented that studying regional cooperation can provide meaningful insights into the complexities of regional dynamics, interconnections between regions, dynamics of conflict and cooperation, diplomatic processes, and policy implications (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Lake and Morgan 1997; Katzenstein 2005; Acharya and Johnston 2007; Börzel and Risse 2016). All this body of work suggests that a better understanding of regional cooperation is crucial in the field of international relations.

In this context and attending to the need to study regional cooperation and its impact on the global political landscape, this dissertation aims to examine the intricacies and nuances of regional cooperation efforts through the lens of states, state-led institutions, and non-state actors. More specifically, the two key objectives of this dissertation are as follows: (1) to explore the correlates associated with regional cooperation and (2) to evaluate the role of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in fostering regional cooperation. The theoretical foundation of the present dissertation comprises two contrasting approaches, or groups of theories that concern regionalism—namely, the old regionalism and the new regionalism. The empirical analysis is conducted on two newly developed datasets focused on INGOs.

Regionalism typically refers to the idea or practice of promoting cooperation and integration—which is frequently based on shared geographical proximity, and historical,

cultural, economic, or political ties—among states within a specific region (Hurrell 1995). Regionalism can take various forms—including but not limited to regional organizations, regional economic blocs, regional security arrangements, and other cooperative initiatives among regional states. Furthermore, regionalism can be driven by a broad range of factors, including common challenges, shared interests, as well as the desire to enhance regional stability, prosperity, and security (Buzan et al. 2003; Van Langehove 2011; Börzel 2016).

Regionalism theories are conventionally categorized into old regionalism and new regionalism approaches. The old regionalism theories expound regional cooperation using a top-down state-centric approach. From this perspective, regional cooperation is considered to be primarily driven by states and state-led institutions, with a particular focus on formal intergovernmental agreements and negotiations. While previous research adopting this approach proposed several conceptual frameworks of regional cooperation (Deutsch 1957; Haas, 1958; Hoffman 1966), concerns have been voiced about the need for a more comprehensive and empirical work in this area (e.g., Van Langehove 2011). One of the questions left unanswered in the studies adopting the old regionalism approach is as follows: "Under what conditions do regional countries engage in cooperation?" While the primary factors driving regional cooperation identified in previous research include shared economic interests, common security threats, and regional hegemony, specific correlates of regional cooperation identified to date include economic benefits, trade agreements, democracy, power dynamics, and domestic politics (Börzel and Risse 2016; Baccini and Dür 2012; Bond et al. 2001; De Melo and Panagariya 1995; Efird and Genna 2002; Genna and Hiroi 2004, 2014; Mansfield et al. 2008; Panke 2019). However, despite the abundance of previous work on correlates of regional cooperation, an overarching and holistic analytical framework that would enable conducting a comprehensive

analysis of each correlate is yet to be established. Another concern associated with previous research based on the old regionalism approach is related to the methodological limitations associated with Regional Organizations (ROs) in this field. Specifically, one of the limitations is the scarcity of relevant quantitative studies. Another limitation is that most of regionalism studies published to date are predominantly single or comparative case studies that, while offering valuable insights, still have limited generalizability in terms of forming a broad understanding of the forces driving regional institution building. To address these concerns, in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I empirically investigate possible factors using an overarching analytical framework. The results of the analysis of the data collected from 76 regional organizations for the time period from 1945 to 2012 yield several factors as significant forces of regional cooperation. These regional cooperation forces, in the ascending order of their importance, are as follows: joint democracy, contract-intensive economies, joint language and religion, equal material capability, and trade interdependence. I find that weaker countries are more hesitant to cooperate with stronger ones within regions. On the theoretical level, these findings support a liberal explanation for regional interstate organization, emphasizing factors such as trade and democracy, over a hegemonic realist explanation focused on power asymmetry. Based on the results, I introduce a new framework that incorporates the economic norms of countries in regionalism studies. The results of testing this framework demonstrate that, as compared to the gift-intensive economies, the contract-intensive economies are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior. This finding underscores the significant impact of domestic economic processes on interstate relationships at the regional level.

In contrast to the old regionalism research, scholars of new regionalism argue for a shift towards a more balanced and participatory approach to regional cooperation. Contrary to the top-

down approach leveraged in the old regionalism research, the new regionalism approach involves a bottom-up strategy for regional development and governance, with the involvement of various actors such as civil society organizations, business groups, and other activist groups, in addition to states (Hettne et al. 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). Furthermore, assuming a different perspective on regional integration and cooperation dynamics, the new regionalism approach prioritizes the change of conceptual frameworks and understanding of regional processes. Specifically, from the new regionalism perspective, important stakeholders in regional processes are civil society actors, such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, social movements, and other grassroots organizations. However, one of the limitations of the studies adopting the new regionalism position is overlooking the role of society, which is not subjected to a thorough analysis. Yet, considering the growing impact of INGOs on global and regional affairs, grasping the rapidly changing dynamics of global and regional politics requires an in-depth understanding of the implications of civil society involvement in regional cooperation. In this context, an important trend of the last several decades has been the tremendous expansion of INGOs that have emerged as influential actors in global politics. Accordingly, in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I explore the role of INGOs in different forms of regional cooperation.

Theoretically, there have been many arguments in favor of the important role of INGOs in facilitating regional cooperation. INGOs considerably promote regional cooperation through advocacy, lobbying, monitoring, and technical assistance efforts (Wapner 1996; Willetts 2011; Davies 2019). Fostering collaboration among regional actors, INGOs are reported to promote policy changes and enhance the capacity of regional institutions and stakeholders, thereby contributing to regional cooperation and integration efforts (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

However, while INGOs are frequently engaged in addressing issues within their areas of expertise, their capacity to effectively tackle complex problems may remain limited (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As a result, state and non-state actors in a particular region may seek out suitable institutions that can solve common challenges. At this point, cooperation among states may be facilitated by institutional mechanisms such as regional organizations and agreements in issue areas may (Keohane 1984; Börzel and Risse 2016). Said differently, INGOs can operate as a bridge between state actors and civil society (Willetts 2011). Indeed, INGOs can act as a platform for representing diverse interest groups, including business organizations, environmental groups, and human rights advocates. Additionally, INGOs can play a role in facilitating communication and information-sharing among governments, civil society, and other INGOs within these regional institutions (Clarke 1998; Reeve 2014).

However, an important methodological limitation of empirically studying the impact of INGOs on regional cooperation is that, despite their global proliferation, a systematic analysis is complicated by the lack of readily available, publicly accessible data sources. While several online data sources are available, none are based on the criteria for inclusion adopted in the present investigation. Addressing this gap, in Chapter 2, I construct two datasets on INGOs that specifically focus on UN-accredited INGOs worldwide. The first dataset focuses on INGOs and contains information on a total of 6,595 INGOs for the time period from 1816 to 2022. The second dataset includes information on INGOs on the state-year level, including a total of 15,024 state-year observations covering the period from 1946 to 2022. The two datasets can be combined with other data sources to explore a wide range of research questions. The main source for identifying INGOs in both datasets is the United Nations Economic and Social Council

(ECOSOC), the Integrated Civil Society Organizations Database (iCSO)[1]. Additional information on ECOSOC-identified INGOs is also obtained from publicly available sources such as INGOs' own websites, INGO portals, and the U.N. digital library (including U.N. decisions and resolutions). In this dissertation, the developed INGOs datasets are used to systematically analyze the role that civil society plays in regional cooperation.

Specifically, in Chapter 4, I empirically measure the effect of shared INGOs among countries on regional cooperation. To this end, I employ the following three key indicators: (1) Regional Organizations (ROs); (2) Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs); and (3) Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). While ROs are commonly regarded as the most effective approach to evaluate regional cooperation in the field of regionalism studies, MEAs and RTAs are gaining increasing prevalence among states in shared geographical regions. It is highly plausible that the substantial presence and active engagement of civil society organizations in regional cooperation efforts also influence the dynamics of these agreements. In order to reduce any confounding effects and to enhance the internal validity of the results, I also use several controls—namely, Democracy, Contract-intensive economies, Alliances, and War history. The empirical findings support the theoretical assumptions and reinforce the concept of new regionalism, highlighting the multifaceted nature of regionalism.

Structurally, this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I introduce two newly constructed INGO datasets, explain the variables included in them, and discuss their limitations. In Chapter 3, I first establish correlates of regional cooperation based on a systematic literature review and then empirically investigate the conditions under which regional states promote cooperation through shared membership in regional organizations. Chapter 4 offers a systematic

[1] Retrieved from https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do. Accessed on Nov 12, 2022.

test of INGOs through three indicators of regional cooperation: Regional Organizations (ROs), Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 5.

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CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOs) DATASETS[2]

Overview of the Datasets

International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have had unprecedented growth over the past several decades and have become important players in international politics. Some call INGOs the 'third sector' in global politics, after states and businesses (Kallman and Clark 2016). Today, policymakers worldwide must contemplate INGOs' influence on many issue areas, including economic and social development, environmental policy, gender equality, and human rights.

There is no ready-to-use, publicly available data source in the literature for researchers wishing to analyze INGOs systematically. There are a variety of online data sources, but none are based on identified inclusion criteria. The INGO datasets introduced here address this research need by identifying only UN-accredited INGOs across the world. For each INGO, additional information is provided, including INGOs' start and end years of UN-consultative status, areas of expertise, countries of operation, and millennium development goals. Two datasets are constructed: one of the INGOs and the other of INGOs at the state-year level of analysis. Both datasets can be integrated with other datasets, facilitating engagement with a broad range of research questions. While the INGO-level dataset provides information for 6,595 INGOs from 1816 to 2022, the state-level dataset includes 15,024 state-year observations from 1946 to 2022.

This codebook provides an overview of each dataset. In the first part, I explained the

[2] Kayaalp, Ozgur, 2023, "International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) Datasets", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RHDOJM, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:6LinFr/wTwgaYeitOSaH3Q== [fileUNF]

process of data collection, then, I describe the INGO-level dataset with summaries of the variables. The last part explains the INGO state-level dataset in the same manner. I call the dataset ‘international’ INGOs since all are recognized as having consultative status by the ECOSOC, though some may operate only in one or a few countries. INGOs that do not have ECOSOC consultive status are not included in the data set.

Data Collection and Process

The data collection process for building INGO datasets involves multiple phases, including web scraping, complementing missing data, and data cleaning and preparation. Each phase contributes to the overall quality and completeness of the dataset, ensuring it is reliable and ready for analysis.

The first phase is web scraping that enables the collection of large volumes of data efficiently and can encompass diverse data types such as text, images, or structured data. The data were extracted from the Integrated Civil Society Organizations Database (iCSO) of the UN Economic and Social Council Agency. The database offers advanced search options. First, I narrowed down the results by selecting only "Non-governmental Organizations" as the inclusion criteria in the “organization types” filter. The other organization types like local government, media, and private sector are excluded since they are not theoretical interest of the datasets.

After the search, the database returned a total of 12,517 NGOs, which are displayed across 25 pages. Each NGO's information is provided in PDF format. These files contain relevant details about the International NGOs dataset, including the NGO name, geographic scopes, address, country of activity, establishment year, consultative year, affiliation with NGO

networks, Millennium Development Goals, and area of expertise. Subsequently, with the assistance of a data scientist[3], all the links corresponding to the listed NGOs are identified. Then, a code is written to visit each of these links, including any nested pages, to retrieve the relevant information (The code can be found in Appendix F). This data is organized, tabulated, and stored in a Pandas dataframe. Finally, the dataframe is converted into a Microsoft Excel format for further analysis.

In the second phase, I identified and addressed the gaps or missing values in the collected dataset using various sources and methods. While the iCSO database serves as the primary source, it contains some missing information. For instance, to obtain revoked years of INGOs, I extensively searched the UN digital libraries to extract relevant information from UN decisions and resolutions. For missing information related to the country of activities or area of expertise, I conducted thorough searches on the INGOs' own websites and portals. Additionally, I accessed numerous online databases, including the Yearbook of International Organizations (YIO)[4], the EU Council of Europe INGO database, The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO), idealist.org, and arab.org NGO portal, among others.

The third phase involved data preparation and cleaning. Several tasks were performed to achieve this, such as converting relevant variables into binary measures, removing duplicate records. Some of the name of INGOs are written in different languages than English and have some spelling errors. To standardize these names, first, the names of the INGOs were initially

[3] As iCSO database consist of large amount of NGO data, professional software consulting services were applied to extract the NGO data with automated tools. I would like to thank the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs school for granting the doctoral research funding for this project.

[4] The Yearbook of International Organizations (YIO) is a publication that provides comprehensive information on international organizations. However, it is a paid publication, and access to the complete content require a subscription or purchase.

translated from their original languages to English. This step aimed to provide an English version of the names for standardization purposes. To ensure accuracy and authenticity, the English names of the INGOs were then obtained from their respective official websites. This allowed for obtaining the most up-to-date and reliable English versions of the names. Python string operations and regular expression (Regex) commands were employed to address spelling errors and discrepancies. These measures contributed to refining the dataset and preparing it for further analysis.

Definition of INGOs

Although differences of opinion exist, there appears to be some scholarly agreement that INGOs are independent philanthropic organizations that aim to promote non-commercial interests. INGOs pursue some public purpose or societal interest, such as providing social services or supporting community development (WorldBank 1998; Davies 2019; DeMars 2005; Teegen, Doh, and Vachani 2004; Vakil 1997; Yaziji and Doh 2009). There have been myriad INGOs throughout the world. Many have been only informally organized and are fragile with short life spans. To construct a dataset on INGOs, adopting a clear, practical, and rigorous definitional standard is essential.

The INGO dataset adopts the standard of the ECOSOC, which defines an INGO as "any organization which is not established by inter-governmental agreement including organizations which accept members designated by government authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organizations" (ECOSOC 1968).[5]

[5] Resolution 1296 (XLV) of 25th June 1968).

The ECOSOC accredits INGOs as having a consultative status for INGOs that both apply for this status and are concerned with the three main dimensions of sustainable development that concern the ECOSOC: economic, social, and environmental development.[6] In addition to doing work relevant to ECOSOC, to be accredited with consultative status, ECOSOC has several standards an INGO must meet. These are (ECOSOC 2018 30):

- It must have a transparent and democratic decision-making mechanism and a democratically adopted constitution.
- It must have an established headquarters with an executive officer.
- It must have been in existence for at least two years to apply.
- It should have the authority to speak for its members.
- It should have a representative structure.
- It must have appropriate mechanisms for accountability.
- It must provide the Committee with financial statements, including contributions and other support, and expenses, direct or indirect.

Applying this definition, I include only INGOs that were registered and recognized by the ECOSOC at any time over the temporal domain of the data. The dataset thus excludes INGOs that, for whatever reason, never applied for ECOSOC consultive status or, if they had, were considered to have yet to meet the above standards.

Consultative status creates a tacit contract that benefits both the U.N. and INGOs. On the one hand, the U.N. obtains knowledge from the field - valuable and specialized experts in areas of concern. On the other hand, an INGO that can acquire this status can use it to further its goals. For example, an INGO can make its voice heard by participating in the international meetings of the ECOSOC. Hence, they can share their agenda and activities with global audiences (ECOSOC 2018).

[6] This accreditation is given by the U.N. ECOSOC resolution 1996/31: "... Consultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, to enable the Council or one of its bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations having special competence in the subjects for which consultative arrangements are made, and, on the other hand, to enable international, regional, sub-regional and national organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views" (ibid., Part II, paragraph 20).

The INGO-level dataset

Explanations and limitations

The INGO-level dataset provides 24 variables and 195 country-dummy variables. Two primary years variables are introduced: *Start Year* and *End Year.* The definitions and coding rules are as follows:

- Start Year is the year that the ECOSOC was granted INGO consultative status.[7] Therefore, the dataset contains all INGOs that have ever-had consultative status for at least one year since 1945. For some missing cases of consultative years (8 percent of the total), the Start Year is determined by the INGO's registration year to the ECOSOC and establishment years.[8] For cases with no registration and establishment years (3 percent of the total), the Start Year is retained as missing. Tabular comparisons of these missing years with the variables *Headquarters*, *Area of Expertise,* and *Countries of Activity* yielded no evident systematic basis for these missing data points. For transparency, the original establishment and registration years are retained in the data as the variables *Establishment Year* and *Registration Year*, respectively.

- End Year is when the ECOSOC withdraws an INGO's consultative status if it was withdrawn. Missing values indicate that an INGO has an active status in the last year of the data. According to U.N. sources, since 1999, the ECOSOC committee has monitored the liabilities of INGOs to sustain their consultative status. For example, the ECOSOC committee suspends (later withdraws) the consultative status of an INGO when they do not

[7] ECOSOC has been granting consultative status since 1946.

[8] The ECOSOC does not report some consultative years before 1945, but some NGOs that were established before 1945 report their consultative years as before 1945 (43 cases). I drew on these self-reported consultative years from those NGO websites to reduce the number of missing data points for Start Year.

regularly submit their quadrennial report (ECOSOC 2018). Since 1999 the consultative status of 1,150 INGOs has been revoked by decisions of the ECOSOC. Only these INGOs have non- for End Year. As mentioned, ECOSOC started revoking consultative statutes only in 1999. However, the data indicated that the number of revoked INGOs increased, particularly after 2010.

In an INGO's consultative status application process, ECOSOC requires INGOs to determine their geographic scope.[9] From this information, the ECOSOC identifies INGOs as working at the global, regional, national, or local-community levels (U.N. 2022; Willets 2010). *Global NGOs* carry out operations at the global level. Examples include “Greenpeace” and “Doctors without Borders”. *Regional NGOs* operate in two or more countries and are concerned primarily with regional issues (broadly defined). For example, the “Arab Society for Academic Freedoms” operates in 13 Middle Eastern countries. *National NGOs* operate only in one country. For instance, “Cultura Ecologica" deals with developing an ecological culture in Mexico. Finally, *Local NGOs* are concerned with a specific local issue. An example is “Zero Waste San Diego," which committed itself to promote a healthier environment in San Diego.

The variable *Headquarters* indicates the official address of an INGO: it does not mean the operation country of an INGO, an INGO's country, or countries of concern. In many cases, an INGO's fieldwork country(s) might differ from its Headquarters. This is the case mostly for the Global NGOs.

Although most INGOs concentrate on particular issue areas, some have broader agendas focusing on multiple areas. Some researchers may investigate INGOs according to their fields. I thus provide six binary variables indicating their main Areas of Expertise (AOE). These are

[9] ECOSOC classified NGOs three categories: Special, General, and Roster. These categories are often given by evaluating the type of organization, its scope, or its contribution to ECOSOC.

economic and social development (*Aoe Ecosoc*), sustainable development *(Aoe Susdev*), gender issues and the advancement of women (*Aoe Genwomen*), public administration, population, and statistics *(Aoe Public)*, and conflict resolution, peace and development in Africa (*Aoe Africa).* These areas are identified by the INGOs themselves in their applications for consultative status. An INGO can have more than one area of expertise.

In 2000, the 189 member states of the U.N. adopted the U.N. Millennium Declaration to address development and make substantial progress toward eradicating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women (U.N. 2000).[10] The declaration also proposed that all INGOs with consultive status must adopt at least one of these Millennium Developments Goals (MDGs) (Brinkerhoff, Smith, and Teegen 2007). I thus provide eight binary variables indicating INGOs' MDGs. As with areas of expertise, an INGO can have more than one MDG.

I provide 195 binary variables indicating countries associated with the INGOs. This can include the countries of concern by the INGO, or the presence of some civil society organizations in the country linked with the INGO' countries of activities from the iCSO database. The country's presence or association with the INGO must not be inferred as exiting throughout the lifetime of the INGO. Rather, the binary measures indicate the countries to which an NGO is concerned when it applies to ECOSOC.

[10] (U.N., A/RES/55/2).

Table 1: INGO Dataset Variable List

Variable name	Description	Measurement
Ncode	The numeric four-digit code that identifies each INGO in the dataset.	Integer
INGO Name	The string variable contains the full name of the INGO.	String
Start Year	The year was granted consultative status by the UN-ECOSOC.	Date (Year)
End Year	The year consultative status was revoked by the U.N.	Date (Year)
Headquarters	The country where the INGO's Headquarters or secretariat is located.	String
Global NGO	The geographic scope of the INGO is global.	Binary
Regional NGO	The geographic scope of the INGO is regional.	Binary
National NGO	The geographic scope of the INGO is within a single country.	Binary
Local NGO	The INGO's geographic scope is local (that is, focused on a particular location within a country).	Binary
Aoe Ecosoc	Area of expertise is economic and social development.	Binary
Aoe Susdev	Area of expertise is sustainable development.	Binary
Aoe Genwomen	Area of expertise is gender issues and the advancement of women.	Binary
Aoe Public	Area of expertise is public administration, population, and statistic.	Binary
Aoe Africa	Area of expertise is conflict resolution, peace and development, and NEPAD[11].	Binary
Mdg Disease	Main Development Goal is to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.	Binary
Mdg Education	Main Development Goal is to achieve universal primary education.	Binary
Mdg Gender	Main Development Goal is to promote gender equality and empower women.	Binary
Mdg Poverty	Main Development Goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.	Binary
Mdg Child	Main Development Goal is to reduce child mortality.	Binary
Mdg Development	Main Development Goal is a global partnership for development.	Binary
Mdg Maternal	Main Development Goal is to improve maternal health.	Binary
Mdg Environment	Main Development Goal is to ensure environmental sustainability.	Binary
Establishment Year	The establishment year of the INGO.	Date (Year)
Registration Year	The year applied for consultative status.	Date (Year)
Countries of Activity	Countries of activity of 195 countries (Alphabetically ordered)	Binary
Version	Version Mar2023.	

[11] The New Partnership for Africa's Development.

The INGO state-level dataset

Explanations and limitations

A range of studies suggests that Western, democratic, or higher-income countries might be more likely than others to originate INGOs. To render the dataset useful for studies at the state level, I derived five count INGO variables by their geographic scope from the INGO-level dataset. The data are converted to the state-level annualized time series by considering an INGO's start and end years. Since the U.N. started to grant consultative status as of 1946, the dataset covers the INGO observations between 1946 and 2022. I determined the *Country Name* (Cname) as the country in which INGO's headquarters is located. In many cases the exact countries of activity are not clear in the data. Some INGOs are located in the country of concern, while others (mostly Global NGOs) are located in Western countries. For this reason, I used the Headquarters of the INGOs, the most reliable country data available.

INGOs without Start Year are necessarily omitted from this coding. Overall, the dataset contains 3,874 Global, 2,582 Regional, 3,459 National, and 2,178 Local INGOs between 1946 and 2022. At the state level, the *All INGO* variable captures all types of INGOs and is calculated as the sum of them for each state-year.

I aggregate five expertise areas of INGOs. It refers to the total number of INGOs that a country has in a given year by area of expertise. In the same fashion, I created eight discrete variables by Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of INGOs. They allow for the investigations of states' INGOs with specific MDGs for any pattern of relationships.

Table 2: INGO State-year Dataset Variable List.

Variable name	Description	Measurement
Ccode	The numeric country code as used in the Correlates of War Dataset.	Integer
Cname	Country name.	String
Year	Calendar years between 1946 – 2022 are set as time series.	Integer
All INGO	The number of all INGO types headquartered in that country.	Discrete
Global NGO	The number of global NGOs headquartered in that country.	Discrete
Regional NGO	The number of regional NGOs headquartered in that country.	Discrete
National NGO	The number of national NGOs headquartered in that country.	Discrete
Local NGO	The number of local NGOs headquartered in that country (certain location within the country).	Discrete
Aoe Ecosoc	The number of INGOs whose area of expertise is economic and social development.	Discrete
Aoe Susdev	The number of INGOs whose area of expertise is sustainable development.	Discrete
Aoe Genwomen	The number of INGOs whose area of expertise is gender issues and advancement of women.	Discrete
Aoe Public	The number of INGOs whose area of expertise is public administration, population, and statistic.	Discrete
Aoe Africa	The number of INGOs whose area of expertise is conflict resolution, peace and development, and NEPAD.	Discrete
Mdg Disease	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.	Discrete
Mdg Education	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to achieve universal primary education.	Discrete
Mdg Gender	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to promote gender equality and empower women.	Discrete
Mdg Poverty	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.	Discrete
Mdg Child	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to reduce child mortality.	Discrete
Mdg Development	The number of INGOs whose MDG is a global partnership for development.	Discrete
Mdg Maternal	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to improve maternal health.	Discrete
Mdg Environment	The number of INGOs whose MDG is to ensure environmental sustainability.	Discrete
Version	Version Mar2023.	

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CHAPTER 3: THE CORRELATES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION: A REGIONAL DYADIC APPROACH[12]

Introduction

Under what conditions do regional countries engage in cooperation? Regional cooperation refers to countries' political and institutional mechanisms to support their common interests related to geographic criteria. Regional organizations (ROs) are institutionalized cooperation bodies between two or more states that agree to abide by a set of primary rules (Panke 2019). Since World War II, joint membership in ROs has steadily proliferated, particularly after the collapse of the USSR (see Figure 1). Earlier theorists suggest that these formal organizations have become the main actors of this era rather than states (Keohane and Nye 1973). Others emphasize the changing dynamics of regional orders of contemporary world politics (Katzenstein 2005; Solingen 1998). While some ROs have achieved remarkable levels of cooperation, from economic integration to conflict resolution, like the European Union (EU), others have progressed very little or failed altogether. Is it sufficient for regional institutional cooperation just to be geographically clustered in a certain region? Is the success of the EU due to the fact that it is composed of democratic countries? Much uncertainty exists regarding the incentives encouraging countries to engage in regional cooperation since the world of regions, states, and their organizations might have idiosyncratic features.

Most regional integration theories have identified shared economic interests, common security threats, and hegemony within or outside the region as the primary factors behind regional cooperation (Börzel and Risse 2016). Some empirical assessments exist on these

[12] Kayaalp, Özgür. 2023. "The correlates of regional cooperation: A regional dyadic approach." Politics & Policy 00: 000– 000. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12526.

factors—in particular, those concerning economic benefits and trade agreements, democracy, power preponderance, and domestic politics (Baccini and Dür 2012; Bond et al. 2001; De Melo and Panagariya 1995; Efird and Genna 2002; Genna and Hiroi 2004, 2014; Mansfield et al. 2008; Panke 2019). These scholars provide reliable and interesting insights. However, there is not yet an overarching study analyzing each correlate and detecting generalizable patterns with a holistic analytical framework. The methodological limitations associated with ROs in this field is another concern. While few studies have been quantitative, many regionalism studies have been conducted with single or comparative case studies (Söderbaum 2016). While such case designs are fitting for developing insights and understanding individual cases, their limited generalizability makes them less suitable for forming a broad understanding of the likely forces behind regional institution building.



Figure 1 The trend of joint membership of the regional organizations by year (1945–2012).

The present research can be seen as one contribution to the existing regional cooperation knowledge by analyzing the determinants of regional cooperation with large-N at the dyadic level. I argue that the dyadic approach may allow for the investigation of continuous cooperative interactions between states much more than state-level analysis. Analyses of most countries from 1945 to 2012 show the following factors as significant correlates of regional organizational membership. In order of impact, these are: capital distance, joint democracy, joint language, trade interdependence, contiguity, and joint religion. Contrary to the common assumption that hegemons facilitate regional cooperation, I argue that weaker countries are more hesitant to cooperate with stronger ones in the regions. This study thus aims to make an interesting contribution at the theoretical level in regionalism studies, as it seems to privilege a liberal explanation of ROs (trade, democracy) over a hegemonic realist explanation (power asymmetry). I also introduce a new framework to regionalism studies involving the economic norms of the countries. I find that contract-intensive economies are more likely to cooperate with each other, which implies the important impact of domestic economic processes on interstate relationships at the regional level.

The next section discusses the correlates of regional cooperation in some depth and elucidates how dyadic relations contribute to understanding regional cooperation. I then explain the research design and present a regional dyadic analysis demonstrating the importance of controlling for clustering with dyadic data. Finally, I summarize the arguments and present several concluding remarks.

The Conceptualization of Regional Cooperation

This article conceptualizes dependent variable-regional cooperation based on the joint membership of ROs between two countries. In international studies, scholars often apply dyadic counts of shared membership of international organizations (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2008; Gartzke 2007; Kinne 2013; Mitchell 2006; Russett et al. 1998). Institutionalists argue that international organizations work as the platforms that help states to overcome their collective action problems and solve coordination problems (Keohane 1984), hence, regulating state behavior and interests (Schimmelfennig 2003). States are willing to participate in international organizations and share membership with others when their shared associations do not conflict with future relations (Oneal et al. 2003). It is reasonable to say that increasing joint memberships in the same organizations of the same states over the years may indicate progressive efforts of trust and cooperation. In the regional context, countries in common regions might also benefit from cooperation when they are in the same ROs and share memberships of ROs. Hence, given that a pure state-level analysis may not allow for the investigation of continuous cooperative interactions between states, the dyadic context might be a useful approach to understanding the dynamics of regional cooperation.

There is no ideal consensus on the definition of regional organizations in literature. I draw on Börzel and Risse's (2016) definition that ROs are institutions with three specific characteristics. First, ROs have primary rules with compliance monitored by institutional bodies, such as a secretariat. Second, at least two or three members must be actively involved. Third, the criteria for membership must be related to a geographic location in some way. Therefore, a geographical context separates ROs from international organizations.

The literature emphasizes economic interdependence, democracy, security threats, and cultural identity issues as the primary factors behind regional institution building (Börzel and Risse 2016; Fawcett and Gandois 2010; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Milward et al. 1992; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; Solingen 1998). Most recent research suggests that countries' economic type is also a potential factor in regional cooperation (Mousseau 2019a). The author addresses each correlate separately.

The Correlates of Regional Cooperation

Trade interdependence

Institutionalists could interpret the liberal international arrangements for trade and international finance as responses to the need for policy coordination created by interdependence (Keohane, 1984). This idea can also be assumed for regional relations, where the interdependence between partners is more intense than global. Regional countries need a coordinator who could allow them to negotiate rules and commitments regarding trade transactions and reduce information asymmetry. The preliminary functionalist ideas consistently emphasize that trade invigorates the economic relations of states and that integration in one area will have spillover effects in other areas. This spillover effect of interdependence strengthens political ties, which establishes the basis of long-term cooperation (Copeland 1996). Cooperation in economic, financial, and technical matters gradually becomes a political union and paves the way for supranational institutions.

There are two main reasons states are more likely to trade and cooperate within their regions than outside it. The first can be apprehended through the insight of the gravity model in

economics. According to this model, the closer the geographic distance between two states—considering their economic size—the more bilateral trade flows should be expected (Hegre 2009; Isard and Peck 1954). Distance increases transport costs and, everything else being equal, countries with larger economies trade more than those with smaller ones. The emergence of the European Common Market in the 1950s—and its gradual evolution into community and union—is almost an ideal case of the gravity model effect and functionalist and neo-functionalist expectations on how interdependence should promote RO over time.

The second reason states are more likely to trade and cooperate within their regions rather than outside of them is to seek security from the competitive pressures of globalization. States seek membership in regional bodies to protect themselves from the negative externalities of global markets (Breslin 2002; Schirm 2002). In this respect, it is highly conceivable to establish regional trade agreements that unite regional countries' markets, economies, production processes, and political-strategic forces. Hence, ROs function like a platform that enables the members to reduce transaction costs, create new free trade markets, and bring in foreign investment.

Many studies support the role of trade in promoting RO formation and participation in various ways. Kim and others (2016) report that regional partners are keener to participate in ROs because they facilitate trade between them, allowing members preferential access to their markets by relaxing the rules. By doing so, they pave the way for regional economic institution building in which countries regulate and cooperate with their trade relations (Fishlow and Haggard 1992; Mansfield et al., 2002). Analyzing the regional cooperation efforts of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and Southern African Development Community (SADC), Krapohl and others (2014) support the view that

developing countries expect to increase their trade volume through regional cooperation because they both protect themselves against global competition and benefit from this through increased investment and exports. Analyzing states, Panke (2019) reports the economic benefits from trade as the foremost force for participation in ROs.

Yet, the evidence for trade causing RO participation is limited due to the lack of quantitative dyadic-level analyses. Of all the above studies, only Panke analyzed ROs participation in a large-N framework. Although this study marked a significant advance in our understanding of the factors that promote regional cooperation, theoretical and methodological concerns should be raised. First, Panke's monadic approach is less likely to predict regional cooperation than the dyadic one because there are differences among states in terms of economic size, geography, and influence sphere. Panke's state level assumes that states are homogenous entities. Some states with larger economies or that are geographically larger might have more RO membership than smaller-scale countries. For example, in a monadic approach, France might have more RO membership than Belgium, but that might not imply that France is a more cooperative country than Belgium on a regional scale. But a dyadic relationship describes the interaction between two states. The degree of cooperation is contingent upon the other country's wish. A similar problem comes out regarding the trade variable in Panke's (2019) study. A country can engage in intra-regional or extra-regional economic transactions with other countries. When predicting regional cooperation, taking all economic indicators or trade values of a country might nevertheless cause a sampling error. Therefore, trade should be only considered with countries in common regions when measuring trade at the regional scale.

Overall, the only way to determine if trade integration is a factor in regional cooperation in ROs is to examine pairs of countries in a dyadic framework. Therefore, in the analyses below,

I test the hypothesis that as trade interdependence increases, participation in regional organizations increases (Hypothesis 1).

Does democracy promote regional cooperation?

The literature is mixed regarding how regime type can affect participation in ROs. Research on democratic peace implies that democracies should be more likely than autocracies to participate in ROs because they tend to cooperate more (Leeds 1999; Mousseau 1997). This research suggests the "dyadic" hypothesis that democratic countries may be more likely than autocratic countries to participate in ROs, but only with each other.

The alternative to the dyadic hypotheses is the "monadic" one: the idea that democratic countries may be more likely than autocratic countries to participate in ROs, regardless of the regime status of the other state in the dyad. Several studies support the idea that liberal democracies promote more democracy through international organizations (Boehmer et al. 2004; Pevehouse 2005; Russett et al. 1998). Van der Vleuten and Hoffmann's (2010) analyses of the EU, Organization of American States (OAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) support this effect. They found that the enforcement of democracy on members depends on the democratic identity of the leading regional powers in the ROs.

Still, a third trend of thought suggests that authoritarian states may be more likely than democratic states to form and participate in ROs. Two views that stand out in this proposition concern the alliance in authoritarian regimes and domestic regime security. Authoritarian states might form ROs as a form of alliance in opposition to the Western global order (Rittberger and Schroeder 2016). This is accepted as mostly true since the Soviet Union and China had poor

relations until the fall of the former, but later, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed, ostensibly to address regional security issues but possibly, in part, to contain West- ern dominance. The other idea is that stronger countries in authoritarian formations try to foster mutual support with the flow of information exchange—and they might even redistribute their resources to weaker ones to keep them in the network (Obydenkova and Libman 2019).

Other scholars argue that regional cooperation among authoritarian regimes proliferates because it is a legitimization tool at home and abroad (Obydenkova and Libman 2019), which makes ROs beneficial for the regime's survival. Valbjørn (2016) argues that the Arab League was deliberately designed to counter regionalization effects, which might be a concern for regime security, and help legitimize member states. On one hand, autocratic leaders try to increase their popularity in the eyes of domestic elites and citizens by projecting the image of having close relations with regional countries. On the other hand, they obtain additional material, informational, and ideational resources from ROs to continue their existence (Debre 2021, 2022). Regarding theoretical context, while the present study examines cooperation in regional democracies through ROs, Debre's (2021, 2022) “dead of the regimes” through ROs should also be borne in mind. Overall, both studies give an implication that ROs play an important role in regime boosting for both regime types.

Although the literature yields two hypotheses on regime type, monadic and dyadic, the dyadic hypothesis might be useful to deepen and broaden our understanding rather than the more problematic democratic–autocratic relations. Thus, the dyadic test examines if democracies are more likely than autocracies to participate in regional organizations with each other (Hypothesis 2).

Stronger-weaker neighborhood

Relative power suggests the ability of a country to influence others to pursue its goals and, perhaps, it is one of the main discussions in international relations (Kugler et al. 2021). Power-centric paradigms vary depending on whether power parity might affect the level of cooperation. Realists would expect alliance formation as a function, not of regime type or ideology, but of relative capability (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016; Mearsheimer 1994; Walt 1985). Balance-of-power realism suggests that weaker states tend to ally together when a stronger state emerges or enters the region from afar (Walt 1987). Hegemonic realists, on the other hand, expect the opposite: that if there is a stronger power, or "hegemon," in a region, it will ease tensions among the weaker powers and smooth the path toward cooperation (Gilpin 1987; Mattli 1999; Organski and Kugler 1980). Weaker countries will join ROs because they help them address security and non-security challenges (Acharya 2012; Barnett and Solingen 2007; Fawcett 2004).

Power transition theory is also a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of power relations between countries in a regional system. Organski argues that the international system is characterized by a hierarchical structure (Organski 1958). When a rising power begins to catch up with an established power, tensions and conflicts may arise as the established power seeks to maintain its dominance, and the rising power seeks to increase its influence and status. If the rising power continues to grow and challenge the established power, a power transition may occur, where the rising power ultimately becomes the dominant power in the system (Organski and Kugler 1977, 1980).

In this context, Lemke and Reed (1986) suggest that the relationship between countries depends on their individual relative power in the international hierarchy and their satisfaction

with the status quo. As regards the cooperation perspective, Efird and Genna (2000), claim that, this "satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the dyadic status quo is a crucial element that determines the probability of a favorable cooperative decision" (274). This status quo depends on the factors that both weaker and stronger countries mutually exchange. In a dyadic relation of countries, the satisfied country is the one that is content with the current status quo, including the distribution of power, resources, and benefits. On the other hand, the dissatisfied country is unhappy with the current status quo and seeks to change it. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction can arise from various factors, such as economic and political conditions, trade patterns, security arrangements, access to resources, and technological exchanges. As power transition theory expounds, a weaker country can overtake the stronger one in time. According to Efird and Genna, once this power transition occurs, the likelihood of regional cooperation being established increases if the countries are content with the existing status quo. Although this study does not measure the status quo factor, when considering power asymmetry as determinant, it should be undertaken for further studies. In this research, I expect that as power asymmetry between states increases, participation in regional organizations increases (Hypothesis 3).

Economic norms theory and contract-intensive economies

In recent years, scholars of development and conflict have begun to pay attention to the existence of two distinct kinds of economies in history: "gift"-intensive and "contract"-intensive (Mousseau et al. 2003; North et al. 2009)—concepts long known in the fields of anthropology and sociology. A contract-intensive economy is where most households obtain their material needs by engaging in a contract with strangers in the open marketplace. Examples include the

countries with advanced market-oriented economies, like most members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A gift-intensive economy, by contrast, is one where households band together into groups based on norms of reciprocity, such as mafias, clans, tribes, feudal vassalages, and political parties. Examples of countries with gift-intensive economies include most countries of Latin America and Africa. A contract or gift-intensive economy is not defined by income or region but by economic norms: some OECD members have gift-intensive norms, such as Mexico, and some Latin American and African countries have contract-intensive norms, such as Chile and Botswana (Mousseau 2018).

There is reason to expect that countries with contract-intensive economies may be more likely than others to participate in ROs. Economic norms theory highlights that everyone is materially better off in a contract-intensive economy when everyone else in the marketplace is also better off (Mousseau et al. 2003). The result is a reliable voter consensus on the value of economic growth. In contrast, groups of households compete for state rents in gift-intensive societies, frequently voiced with identity and ideological claims. As a result, distributive issues can sometimes outweigh economic growth issues. Thus, leaders of contractualist states are under more steady and intense pressure to produce economic growth than leaders of gift-intensive states, and participation in ROs is an obvious means for pursuing economic growth. In this respect, like the democracy hypotheses, I expect the dyadic expectation stems from the possibility that shared norms and interests may cause countries with contract-intensive economies to be more likely to cooperate only with each other (Hypothesis 4).

Ideational drivers: Joint language and religion

Constructivist approaches draw attention to intersubjective structures as ideational drivers of international cooperation, such as ideas, norms, identities, knowledge, culture, and discourses (Katzenstein et al. 1998; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). Indeed, states sometimes prefer a particular institutional structure with specific shared characteristics and values such as common language and religion. In his Theologico-Political Treatise, Baruch Spinoza thought that "a universal public religion could bolster civic solidarity, channeling religious passions into social benefits" (Steinberg, 2008 182). While the Pan-Arabism movements that flourished at the beginning of the century paved the way for the Arab League (Acharya 2012), cooperation and the ever-increasing interdependence of European states formed a unique collective identity (Wendt 1992). There are very few studies on common religion and international cooperation. Baccini and Dür (2012), in their dyadic analysis, found a correlation between a common language and the diffusion of preferential trade agreements but did not find any association with a common religion. It is known that Abrahamic religions often invoke solidarity among those who have the same religion. Further, some states commission their religious affiliations to engage in transborder missionary activities. These findings suggest that ideational drivers encourage regional states to establish regional institutional building. Dyads with a joint language are more likely to establish regional cooperation (Hypothesis 5), and those with joint religion are more likely to establish regional cooperation (Hypothesis 6).

Research design

As this research concerns the presence or absence of cooperation between regional states, I employ a dyadic analysis approach—pairings of countries. The dyads are aggregated annually in a panel structure in line with available data. The units are nondirectional, meaning that there is just one observational unit for each dyad year and not two observations for each direction in the dyad (e.g., India to Russia and another for Russia to India). Nondirectional dyads are the appropriate unit of analysis, as all the hypotheses above are nondirectional in form.

Dependent variables

Regional cooperation is designed as a dependent variable and operationalized as Joint RO membership. The data are drawn on Panke and Starkmann's (2019) Regional Organization and Cooperation (ROCO) III dataset. They identify 76 ROs from 1945 to 2015. First, I converted the state-level data (the membership of each 76 ROs) into a dyadic level, then I summed the number of shared memberships of ROs for each dyad year.

Some ROs have their own philosophy and guiding principles that operate within a democratic framework like the EU. The membership in these ROs depends on how well the member state meets the democratic condition (Pevehouse 2002). For example, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) explicitly proclaim that "Inter-American cooperation for integral development is the common and joint responsibility of the Member States, within the framework of the democratic principles and the institutions of the inter-American system" (1948, Article 31).[13] To address this concern, I created a new variable *Controlled Democratic ROs*. I

[13] Organization of American States (OAS), Charter of the Organisation of American States, 30 April 1948. Retrieved from: https://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp. Accessed May 31, 2023.

measured ROs[14] that require democratic stipulation from its members. I operationalized Controlled Democratic ROs if both countries are members of those ROs, as “1”, otherwise is coded as “0”. By doing so, I could attempt to account for the potential confounding effects of being a member of democratic ROs on the relationship between the "Democracy" variable and Joint RO membership. Hence, this approach helps to isolate the unique contribution of the "Democracy" and provides a clearer understanding of its impact on the Joint RO.

Independent variables

The main potential predictors of the correlates of RO are trade interdependence, regime type, power asymmetry, contractualist economy, and cultural variables. All the independent variables lagged one year behind the dependent variable in response to endogeneity concerns in observational data (Bellemare et al. 2017). For Trade Interdependence, I applied the formula of inverse hyperbolic sine— approximates the natural logarithm—due to skewed distribution and zero-valued observations.

Trade Interdependence is a continuous variable; its data are obtained from the Gleditsch Trade dataset (Gleditsch 2002). The data covers bilateral trade flows (i.e., exports and imports) between countries from 1948 to 2006 and includes data on both goods and services. Gleditsch used the Gravity Model to estimate the expected volume of bilateral trade flows between each pair of countries in their dataset. Gleditsch, then compared the estimated trade flows to the actual trade flows to calculate the trade interdependence between the two countries. The trade interdependence measure takes into account both the volume and the direction of trade flows

[14] The ROs that is used for the Controlled Democratic RO variable are: European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization of American States (OAS).

between the countries (Gleditsch 2002). Mousseau et al. (2003) note that these data are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which does not report trade between countries where little or no trade has occurred. Accordingly, they treat missing values as 0 over the temporal domain of the data, 1952- 2002 (Mousseau et al 2003, p.289). I adopt their approach and missing values are converted to zeros in the observed data.

To gauge democracy, the V-dem dataset v11.1 (Coppedge et al. 2021) is used. I draw upon the Electoral Democracy index, a continuous form of democracy. They conceptually take essential elements of representative democracy measurements: liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or others. The index is created by taking the weighted average of freedom, fair elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage indices. To test the dyadic hypothesis (democracy–democracy), I created the Democracy Low variable that extant literature often used. This variable is based on the "weak link" approach, which assumes the strength of the relationship depends on the one with a lower degree between dyads (De Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Dixon 1994; Russett et al. 1998). This assumption is used by Oneal and Russet (1997 273) for the argument "the likelihood of dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less constrained of the two states in a dyad." I apply this weak link assumption and assert the likelihood of regional cooperation is determined by the less constrained of the two states in a dyad. Hence, higher values of dyads indicate that both countries in a dyad are democratic.

For Power Asymmetry, the data are taken from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden 2020). Following Efird and Genna's (2002) suggestion, I gauge power asymmetry with gross domestic product (GDPs) of the dyads as GDPmax/ (GDPmax + GDPmin). While GDPmax is the maximum value in the dyad, the minimum is GDPmin. Maoz and others (2019) used this formulation for Composite Index of National Capabilities dataset (CINC). Similarly, I

applied GDP since the formula "measures the extent to which the relative capabilities of dyad members deviate from parity" (Maoz et al., 2019 821). Therefore, the score implies whether the higher or lower relative capability of dyads predicts regional cooperation.

Data for economic type is drawn from the Contract Intensity of National Economies (CINE) dataset (Mousseau 2019b). The data are aggregated annually with coverage from 1816 to 2019. The continuous form of Contract Intensive Economy (CIE) tests dyadic hypotheses of economic types of dyads. CIE is coded as the lower value in the dyad.

Joint Language and Joint Religion are dichotomous concepts. Drawing on data from the World Religion dataset (Maoz and Henderson 2013), the countries are identified where majorities are associated with the following major religious categories: Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, and others, with all other countries coded as zero. If both countries in the dyad share a common religion, Joint Religion is coded as 1. If not, it is coded as 0. Similarly, the World Factbook identifies the five most common languages: English, French, Arabic, Spanish, and Portuguese.[15] If majorities of both countries in the dyad speak the same language, Joint Language is coded as 1, and if not, it is coded as 0.

Control variables

In presenting the results, I include the factors of RO memberships that must be exogenous from those that can be endogenous to other factors in all tests as a precaution. Capital Distance, Geographic Contiguity, and Peace Years are all exogenous, as none can be reasonably caused by the other investigated variables, at least in the short term. Contiguity and Capital distance have

[15] Accessed on March 19, 2022. Available online at https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/.

traditionally been used in whether pairs of contiguous states (relevant or political dyads) estimate either conflict or cooperation in international relations studies (Gleditsch 2002; Lemke 1995; Lemke and Reed 2001). Both factors are important as "the propensity for trade between states is highly dependent on distance" (Gleditsch, 2002 720). In spatial economics, longer distances inhibit business as it increases costs. Also, where shared borders foster economic, cultural, social, and political ties between states and nonstate actors, kinship relations may promote immigration and trade (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). Hence, both factors are considered relevant extraneous variables because economic, social, and cultural interactions between states can be more likely in countries close to each other. Contiguity is drawn from the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al., 2002). Although the original classification system for contiguity consists of five categories, which separate the water contiguity from 12 miles up to 200 miles, I assume the coding as 1, which covers both land border and all water distances. Coding 0 means no close border between dyads. For Capital Distance, Gleditsch and Ward's (2001) data on inter-capital distance are used, applying the natural log for skewness.

Literature examining Kantian "perpetual peace", or "liberal peace" yields that trade, democracy, and international organizations are interrelated and have a separate pacifying effect (Beck et al. 1998; Gartzke 2007; Mousseau et al. 2003; Oneal and Russet 1997). Surprisingly, these variables have not been used to predict regional cooperation yet. Therefore, I believe that the duration of peace should also be controlled because states might not reach mutually advantageous regional cooperation when they are in conflict. The data are taken from COW Militarized interstate disputes v4.01 (Dyadic) (Maoz et al. 2019). It is a discrete variable that suggests maxi- mum peace years in the dyads.

Dyadic clustering standard error estimators

Although much empirical research in international relations has been carried out using dyadic data, an important critique of this approach concerns dyads' dependency on each other. In other words, when dyads are members of multilateral events such as an alliance, war, and Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) membership, there might be other members that have causal relations to that event (Cranmer and Desmarais 2016; Erikson et al. 2014; Poast 2010, 2016). For example, errors for the UK–France trade may be correlated with those for any other country pair that includes either the UK or France. Therefore, causality might not be unique for dyads and may be contingent upon another confounding member, affecting statistical inference.

Political scientists offer novel solutions to address this methodological concern, such as the k-adic unit of analysis[16] (Poast 2010, 2016), network analysis[17] (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Maoz, 2012), and dyadic clustering standard error estimators (DCRSEs) (Aronow et al. 2015; Cameron and Miller 2015; Carlson et al. 2021). However, neither network analysis nor k-ads entirely solve the problem of multilateral events (Poast 2016). One-way clustering-robust analysis (generalized linear models) is appropriate for heteroskedastic and state-level models; nevertheless, it fails to account for error correlation in dyads. After analyzing many dyadic analyses, Carlson and others (2021) found that the dyadic clustering method provides more accurate, asymptotic, statistical significance tests and confidence intervals. DCRSEs eliminate the biases that stem from interdependence among observations. It does this by using a multi-way decomposition approach, which assumes that the members of each dyad have clusters, and these

[16] K-ad is a unit of analysis containing more than two members ($k > 2$).

[17] Network analysis investigates actors' relations that tie each other through certain connections.

clusters intersect with other clusters. Cluster-robust variance estimators adjust these common clusters and eliminate the intervention of common errors (Aronow et al. 2015).

Analysis and Discussion

Results

Table 3 presents the outcomes of the regression analysis on the joint RO memberships of dyads using the DCRSEs method. Model 1 measures Trade Interdependence and Joint RO membership relations with controls. Its significant coefficient (β=.01) supports the argument that economic benefits may be an important driver of regional cooperation. This finding accords with liberal theories of interdependence on a regional basis. It is also consistent with Panke's state-level analyses: "The stronger RO member states engage in trade, the more emphasis they place on tackling potential negative side-effects caused by past cooperation by cooperating even more in additional, neighboring policy areas"(2019, 493). This rational behavior of states can be seen in many organizations. Although there has been a long history of turbulent relations and antagonism between Turkey and Russia since the 17th century, growing interdependence driven by bilateral relations catalyzed the Black Sea Economic and Cooperation Organization (BSEC) and forced them to change their geopolitical strategies.

Model 2 reports the impact of democracy on RO membership. As can be seen, the dyadic hypotheses have empirical support (β=.24). The positive and significant coefficient of Democracy implies that as the democracy level increases in dyads, they share much more RO membership. One plausible explanation is that democracies can make more credible commitments than other regimes (Lai and Reiter 2000; Pevehouse 2003). In other words, they

are likely to eliminate the fear of cheating better than other regimes. Although debated continuously, previous studies indicate many pacifist features of democracies. For instance, they are more likely to be involved in economic arrangements with each other (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002; Pevehouse and Russett 2006), are keen to join international organizations because they help bolster their institutions (Oneal and Russett 2001) and are said to reduce the frequency of violent conflict (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Mousseau 2018, 2019b). Democratic dyads are also more likely to share more institutionalized IGO membership (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2008). On a regional scale, Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2008) assert that if a country's domestic institutions have pluralistic characteristics, such as the number of institutional veto players and the homogeneity of preferences among those veto players, then it is likely to choose to participate in regional cooperation arrangements.

While it is difficult to claim the monadic hypothesis, it would seem reasonable to say there is no correlation among autocratic dyads; otherwise, we would expect a negative correlation. Overall, consistent with previous literature, this outcome has reinforced the conviction that like-minded democratic regional states look for regional cooperation more than others.

The coefficient of Controlled Democratic ROs is 2.10. Even when controlling for this effect, it is seen that democracy is still positive and significant, which implies that democracy is an important factor in regional cooperation. Hence, it is plausible to suggest that there might be a relationship between the democratic stipulation of regional organizations (ROs) and regional cooperation. Democratically oriented ROs often share common values, principles, and governance structures based on democratic norms. This common democratic foundation can

foster a greater sense of trust, transparency, and shared understanding among member states, which can facilitate regional cooperation.

The analysis's compelling finding is the relationship between Power Asymmetry and Joint RO. Contrary to expectations, its negative coefficient (β= -.11) indicates that as relative capabilities in dyads converge or become equal, they are more likely to cooperate through ROs. In contrast, if the relative capabilities between dyads diverge, their gap widens, and they are less likely to join the same RO. The findings imply that weaker states are reluctant to cooperate with stronger states in the region, contrary to the hegemonic paradigm that suggests stronger states promote cooperation in regions. This result contradicts the balance of power expectation, at least on a regional scale. A plausible explanation might be that weaker states in a region may be reluctant to cooperate due to fear of being dominated rather than allying with stronger neighbors. As mentioned earlier, another possible reason might be explained with Efird and Genna's (2002) theory. The asymmetry between countries might be associated with the status quo and depend on the degree of satisfaction. Weaker states hesitate to cooperate stronger because they do not get adequate rent from the cooperation. Although my findings align with previous research, it's important to acknowledge that changes in power dynamics between dominant and subordinate countries within a region should also be taken into account when interpreting the results.

Table 3: Models of the Correlates of Regional Cooperation, 1945 – 2012 (Dyadic Clustering Standard Robust Estimation)

	(Model 1) (1946 - 2002)	(Model 2) (1946 - 2014)	(Model 3) (1946 - 2014)	(Model 4) (1946 - 2014)	(Model 5) (1946 - 2014)	(Model 6) (1946 - 2002)
Trade interdependence	.00***					.00
	(.01)					(.00)
Democracy		.36***				.45***
		(.11)				(.11)
Controlled Democratic ROs		2.10***				1.62***
		(.19)				(.25)
Power asymmetry			-.11***			-.07*
			(.01)			(.03)
Contract-Intensive Economies				.14***		.04***
				(.03)		(.01)
Joint language					.61***	.08
					(.13)	(.16)
Joint Religion					.07***	.02
					(.01)	(.01)
Contiguity	.36***	.31***	.32***	.42***	.40***	.51***
	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.10)	(.09)	(.10)
Capital distance	-.55***	-.45***	-.56***	-.61***	-.50***	-.38***
	(.08)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Peace years	.00***	.00*	.00***	.00***	.00***	-.00***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Constant	4.79***	6.07***	4.98***	5.22***	4.26***	3.85***
	(.38)	(.31)	(.45)	(.43)	(.47)	(.53)
r^2	0.35	.48	.36	.39	.36	.44
Observations	404,395	650,793	550,341	543,057	482,140	311,083

*Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.005, ** p<.01, * <.05*

Model 4 tests dyadic hypotheses of contract-intensive economies. The positive coefficient of CIE confirms that dyads, where both states have contract-intensive economies, are more likely than others to cooperate in ROs (β =.14), as expected from economic norms theory (Mousseau 2018, 2019b). In contractual economies, since the most salient feature is the welfare of everyone in the marketplace (Mousseau 2019b), they might not want to risk any benefits of ROs. As such, they tend to be more transparent and coherent with like-minded actors.

For the culture variables, the findings are consistent with expectations in the Model 5, however, they are not in Model 6. Model 5 reports that dyads that speak the same language are more willing to cooperate at the regional level (β=.61). Baccini and Dür (2012) also found a positive correlation between preferential trade agreements and a shared language. The existence of special bonds between regional dyads makes normative convergence a plausible motive for cooperation, as evidenced by the emergence of the Arab League (Solingen and Malnight 2016) and Latin American and francophone organizations. In terms of Joint Religion, results imply that having the same faith might motivate regional cooperation in dyads. "Contrary to popular belief even in Western Europe, what might be considered the bastion of secularism, religion still holds a significant position (Barker 2017, 3). On the other side, the Arab League is a regional community that keeps regional states together through a distinct concept of the Islamic community known as the "Ummah". An interesting implication from the ideational model is that sharing the same language, rather than religion, might be a more important factor in overcoming barriers among regional states. Despite sharing the same religion, geographic proximity, and historical ties among Turkey, Iran, and the Arab world, there are still deep political cleavages

among them, impeding regional cooperation. This might imply why joint language is much more significant than joint religion.

I also used a multivariate model to see all correlates impact on regional cooperation in Model 6. As seen, Trade Interdependence and cultural variables are not significant although other variables are significant in this model. This implies that the initial correlation between trade interdependence and regional cooperation may be coincidental or unrelated to each other. rather than direct causality. As seen, when additional variables are included in the multivariate model, such as the presence of democracy, CIEs or power asymmetry, the relationship between trade interdependence and regional cooperation becomes non-significant or weak. A plausible explanation might be that contract intensive economies and democracies often share common values, principles, and governance systems, which can foster both trade interdependence and regional cooperation. For example, Contract intensive economies are more likely to cooperate with each other as markets force them to do so. When regional states with CIEs want to cooperate through regional organizations, the existence of CIEs can indeed override the influence of trade as a driving factor. The emphasis on contractual obligations and the reliance on legal frameworks in CIEs create a shared understanding and commitment to upholding agreements. This shared commitment can provide a strong foundation for cooperation among CIEs within regional organizations (Mousseau 2018). Overall, by including these additional factors in the analysis in Model 6, I attempted to control for their potential confounding effects. If the correlation between Trade interdependence and the Joint RO diminishes or becomes statistically insignificant after accounting for these factors, it suggests that the initial relationship may have been driven by the influence of these confounding variables.

Likewise, Joint Language and Joint Religion are insignificant in Model 6, though they predict regional cooperation in Model 5 as in constructivist expectation. We know that this is indeed evident, since many ROs has been built on narrative of identity like Pan-Arabism in Arab League, European identity, The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States etc. However, as seen, this trend is affected when other factors are involved in it. When countries rely on each other for economic growth and prosperity as in democracies and CIEs, they might have incentives to cooperate irrespective of their identities. Economic interests can often outweigh identity-based differences, leading to collaboration and cooperation. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies have diverse cultural landscapes, reflecting the wide range of cultures, traditions, and beliefs within the region. In addition, global issues, such as climate change, terrorism, or pandemics, require collective efforts and cooperation from all nations. The urgency and magnitude of these challenges often necessitate cooperation irrespective of national identities to effectively tackle them.

Control variables are significant in all models. The result of Contiguity and Capital Distance shows that as distance decreases, states are more likely to establish cooperation at the regional level. Short distances bring actors together because they can exchange information and knowledge, which may not be possible in faraway countries (Knoben and Oerlemans 2006). Also, where shared borders foster economic, cultural, social, and political ties between states and non-state actors, kinship relations may promote immigration and trade (Brinks and Coppedge 2006).

Significant and positive Peace Years imply that dyads tend to cooperate more as they have a longer period of peace. One reason is that credible commitment is essential for states when entering an agreement (Keohane 1984). This result updates these views that even regional

states may want to be sure whether the other side will keep its commitments. Thus, peaceful years can be a sign of the other's credibility. Longer peace times may provide a robust signal for states when they intend to cooperate at the regional level.

Robustness checks

I applied two robustness checks with fixed effects for both time and spatial dimensions. These are used in analysis to account for unobserved heterogeneity that is specific to individual time periods or country. Scholars suggest that this helps to mitigate omitted variable bias and improve the validity of the estimated coefficients (Allison 2009; Anselin and Arribas-Bel 2013).

Model 7 reports time fixed effect results. The results mostly align with Dyadic Clustering Standard Robust Estimations. While Democracy, Controlled Democratic ROs, CIEs, Joint Language and Religion are significant and positive, Power Asymmetry is negative and significant. One notable difference is that Trade is significant and has negative coefficient (-.00) which is inconsistent with the results in the Models 2 and 6. Another observation is that standard errors are relatively lower in this model. Lower standard errors in fixed effect results can have important implications. It suggests that the estimated coefficients are more robust, meaning that the observed relationships between the independent variables and the Joint RO are more likely to reflect true associations rather than being driven by random chance.

The spatial fixed effect results in Model 8 suggest a mix of outcomes. By including this post-estimation, I aimed to isolate the spatial relationships between dyadic countries from country-specific factors that are not time-varying. The findings indicate that Democracy, Controlled Democratic ROs, CIEs, and Power Asymmetry are all statistically significant and

exhibit a positive direction. As seen, unlike other models, Power Asymmetry has a positive sign in this model. The sign change between these two models can occur due to the different perspectives and assumptions they incorporate. In the time fixed effect model, where the analysis focuses on within-dyad variation over time, the negative and significant sign suggests that as power asymmetry increases within a dyad over time, the likelihood of joint membership in regional organizations decreases. This implies that when there is a significant power asymmetry between two countries within a dyad, they are less likely to form joint memberships in regional organizations over time.

On the other hand, in the spatial effect model, which examines between-country variation (spatial heterogeneity or dependencies between dyads), the positive and significant sign indicates that as power asymmetry increases across regional countries, the likelihood of joint membership in regional organizations also increases. One possible explanation is that when utilizing spatial fixed effect models, there might be unobserved spatially correlated factors that influence the dependent variable. These factors may arise due to various spatial processes, such as spatial spillover effects or diffusion (Kuminoff et al. 2010; Anselin and Arribas-Bel; 2013), or local interactions between dyads that are in the same region. For example, power asymmetry among neighboring countries can drive them to seek joint memberships as a means of addressing power differentials or pursuing strategic interests. This conjecture aligns with the theoretical framework of Alliance theory. Neighboring countries characterized by higher power asymmetry may engage in joint memberships within regional organizations as a strategy to consolidate their power and enhance their influence (Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 2001). According to Waltz (1979), weaker states seek alliances with stronger states to bolster their power and leverage. This behavior can be seen as a form of balancing against dominant or hegemonic powers, as posited by the

neorealist approach. By participating in joint memberships, less powerful states gain access to collective resources, enhance their bargaining power, and establish a counterbalance to the influence exerted by dominant powers.

Table 4: Robustness Checks Temporal and Spatial Fixed Effects.

	(Model 7) Temporal fixed effect (year) (1946 – 2002)	(Model 8) Spatial fixed effect (dyad id)^ (1946 – 2002)
Trade Interdependence	-.00***	.00
	(.00)	(.00)
Democracy	.35***	.29***
	(.00)	(.00)
Controlled Democratic ROs	1.68***	1.71***
	(.00)	(.00)
Power Asymmetry	-.09***	.01***
	(.00)	(.00)
Contract-Intensive Economies	.03***	.02***
	(.00)	(.00)
Joint Language	.11***	
	(.00)	
Joint Religion	.06***	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)
Contiguity	.55***	.01
	(.00)	(.02)
Capital Distance	-.37***	-.14
	(.00)	(.00)
Peace Years	-.00***	.00***
	(0)	(.00)
Constant	3.91***	1.06***
	(.01)	(.05)
Observations	311,083	230,813

*Standard errors are in parentheses*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

^ Unique dyad id is obtained with multiplication with 1000 of the sum of COW code of country *i* and country *j*.

Conclusion

This investigation aimed to assess the conditions under which regional states promote cooperation through shared membership in ROs. There can be many causal facts behind the increase in the trade volume of one state; however, a mutual gain in the trade volume between two states can only be attributable to the interactions between dyads. For this reason, other international relations events like alliance formation, probabilities of conflict, and regional cooperation must be investigated through a dyadic unit of analysis in nature. A novel DCRSE method eliminates the independence problems stemming from dyads that share a joint member; consequently, I achieved more fine-grained results.

It is plausible that several limitations may have influenced the results obtained. The first is reverse causality concerns. To address this, I lagged independent variables one year behind the dependent variable. While the lagging approach may not completely resolve this concern, it is possible to account for the time delay between cause and effect, reducing the risk of reverse causality (Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky 2017). Second is that some explanatory variables, such as democracy, trade, alliance would have been examined with interaction terms. Further work on correlates with interaction models would help us to enhance the understanding of regional cooperation.

The evidence from this study implies that in order of importance, if two neighbors are democratic, speak the same language, have the equal material capability, have increasing trade, close geographically, and share the same religion prima facie make normative convergence is a plausible motive for states' desire to cooperate on a regional scale.

I intended to test the hypothesis of hegemonic realism on the regional level. The idea that stronger regional power promotes more cooperation is not supported. In contrast with previously

thought, I found that power asymmetry negatively correlates with joint ROs. In other words, weaker countries are more hesitant to cooperate with stronger ones in the regions. However, it should be noted that satisfaction and the status quo might be factors that can influence the success and sustainability of regional cooperation between states. If the status quo is stable and functioning well, member states are more likely to remain committed to the cooperation. However, if the status quo is perceived as unfair or ineffective, member states may seek to renegotiate the terms of the cooperation or withdraw altogether.

Nevertheless, these results may not rule out the influence of regional hegemons in their regions. A likely explanation is that the measure of power asymmetry at the dyadic level might not gauge regional hegemon. As theoretical underpinnings highlight, we need further insights into regional hegemons and cooperation. To what extent do they promote stability and peace in their region? Perhaps, Keohane might be right by claiming that a hegemon no longer matters in the new international political order, and cooperation can still happen without a hegemon. At least, the result confirmed this on a regional basis.

This study offers the application of a new variable for cooperation dynamics in contractualist economies. The results of models 2 and 6 indicate that contractualist economies with reciprocal benefits are more inclined to cooperate with like-minded regional states. These outcomes hint that the assumption of capitalist peace is also convincing at the regional level.

These findings will contribute to our understanding of the determinants of regional cooperation behaviors of the states at the theoretical level. It seems to privilege a liberal explanation of regional organizations (alliance, trade, democracy) over a hegemonic realist explanation (power asymmetry). The correlates can also be applied as a model to investigate the absence of regional cooperation through ROs in some regions or sub-regions of the world. New

regionalism scholarship has drawn attention to the increasing role of non-state actors in regionalism (Hettne 1999; Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). Unlike a state-centric synthesis of this phenomenon, further studies will empirically need to be undertaken with the question of how and under what conditions these actors shape regional cooperation.

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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING BRIDGES: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOs) IN FOSTERING REGIONAL COOPERATION

Introduction

International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have become increasingly involved in global and regional politics over the past few decades, advocating for various social, economic, and political issues across borders. This trend is reflected in the significant increase in the number of INGOs, which now operate at the local, national, regional, and global levels (Figure 2). As of 2022, 6,595 U.N.-accredited INGOs were operating at different levels with diverse expertise areas and development goals. Despite being commonly associated with philanthropic endeavors addressing issues such as human rights, environment, economic, social, and sustainable development, INGOs also play an active role in shaping global and regional governance.

As new regionalism scholarship expounds, this global expansion of INGOs has implications for regional governance. As INGOs engage in regional politics, their increasing presence and influence may impact the dynamics of regional cooperation like regional organizations or environmental agreements. The exact nature of this impact, however, remains a subject of scholarly inquiry. Among the important questions yet unanswered in the literature are the following: Can the presence of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in countries lead to increased formal cooperation among countries in common regions? In other words, do INGOs serve as pressure groups that prompt governments to address trans-border issues?

Seeking to address these gaps in the literature, this article contributes to the regionalism research agenda in two major ways. First, I offer a comprehensive test of INGOs through three indicators of regional cooperation: Regional Organizations (ROs), Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). In regionalism studies, the examination of ROs is widely considered the most efficacious approach for assessing regional cooperation. MEAs and RTAs are nevertheless increasingly becoming more prevalent among states in shared geographical regions. It is highly plausible that these agreements are also influenced by the substantial presence and engagement of civil society organizations in regional cooperation efforts. Second, I introduce a new INGO dataset to the literature (Kayaalp 2023). The dataset contains all INGOs in the world that have ever had consultative status granted by the UN between 1946 and 2022.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review the theoretical arguments of regionalism and civil society literature on the relationship between INGOs and regional cooperation. This is followed by the presentation of my theoretical framework for how dyadic INGO interaction can attenuate the likelihood of the formal regional institutional design. Section 3 describes the research design. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.



Figure 2: The proliferation of INGOs since 1946

Literature Review

INGOs, Regionalism, and Regional Cooperation Concepts

To date, there is no generally accepted definition of international NGOs in the literature (Vakil 1997; Gordenker and Weiss 1995; Davies 2019). Keck and Sikkink introduced the term *transnational advocacy networks*, which they define as "networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation" (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.89). The ECOSOC categorizes INGOs based on their geographic scope. While global NGOs—such as Greenpeace and Doctors without Borders--carry out operations on the

global level, regional NGOs operate in two or more countries in the same region and are concerned primarily with regional issues (UN ECOSOC 2018; Vakil 1997; Willetts 2011). This paper's analytical framework for INGOs is based on those accredited with consultative status by the UN-ECOSOC. This privileged status enables these INGOs to be recognized in international politics and to have their voices heard at U.N. meetings, where they engage in lobbying and networking with other important actors.[18]

Table 5: Old Vs. New Regionalism

Old regionalism	**New regionalism**
Actors: States and Regional Organizations	Actors: States and Non-state actors (Business and Civil society actors)
Centered around protectionist trading schemes or security cooperation	The role of non-state actors and informal processes of political, social, economic, and cultural interaction.
Rationalist theories Economic-centric	Constructivist and Reflectivist approaches Participatory Societal and Environmental centric

The theoretical underpinning of the present study on INGOs' involvement in regionalism is entrenched in earlier regional integration theories. For the sake of clarity, Table 5 depicts the difference between two concepts: Old and New Regionalism. Conventionally, regionalism refers to the process of developing institutional cooperation and integration among a group of neighboring states or regions. Regionalism involves the formation of a regional bloc or organization that coordinates policies, establishes common rules and regulations, and promotes economic, political, and social integration among member states. (Nye and Keohane 1971; Katzenstein 2005; Van Langehove 2011; Carlsnaes, Simmons, and Risse 2012). Earlier

[18] Throughout the paper, international and regional NGOs are interchangeably used as INGOs, as both types of activities are essentially trans-border, accordingly, national- and local-level NGOs are excluded from my investigation, as their scopes are limited to only one country.

regionalism theories—collectively referred to as "old regionalism"—considered states as central actors for formal arrangements in a certain region and was primarily centered around protectionist trading schemes rather than security cooperation (Deutsch 1957; Haas, 1958; Hoffman 1966). The approach was based on the idea that the best way to promote economic growth was to develop unique resources and industries, create free trade areas, lift trade barriers between states.

On the other hand, these ideas have been largely criticized for its narrow focus on economic growth and its neglect of social and environmental concerns (Neumann 1994; Mansfield and Milner 1999; Melo and Panagaryia 1995; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Hettne et al. 1999). Scholars of new regionalism advocate for a more balanced approach to cooperation and claim that regional cooperation should be a bottom-up and participatory approach for the regional development and governance. Non-state actors and their transnational equivalents—such as business corporations, interest groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—are not merely drivers of region-building but are also directly involved in this process (Söderbaum 2004; Börzel and Risse 2016; Hettne 1999; Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; Katzenstein 2005). Hence, the principal theoretical foundation of this study is framed within the tenets of the new regionalism approach.

In this paper, regional cooperation between states is the dependent variable, which I seek to explain with the presence of INGOs in regional dyads. Regional cooperation is a widely studied concept in the fields of international relations and political science. According to Acharya and Johnston, it refers to the process of collaboration among states within a particular geographic region to address common challenges and achieve common goals (Acharya and Johnston 2007). Similarly, Mattli and Slaughter define regional cooperation as the process by which states engage

in joint action to solve common problems, promote economic growth, and foster regional security (Mattli and Slaughter 1998). Other notable authors who have written on regional cooperation include Haas, who argued that it could lead to the emergence of new regional identities, and Katzenstein, who highlighted the importance of institutional design in successful regional cooperation efforts (Haas 1958; Katzenstein 2005). Overall, regional cooperation is considered a critical aspect of modern governance, and it has been studied extensively in both theoretical and empirical research. Some authors view regional organizations (ROs) as indispensable elements of regional cooperation. However, many regional interactions—including treaties, environmental agreements, trade agreements, and free-trade zones—are also features of cooperation between states (Stein 1982; Young 2011).

Within the existing literature, limited attention has been devoted to examining the impact of INGOs on regional cooperation, with the majority of studies being either theoretical or based on single-case analyses of specific INGOs. These investigations have centered around two main themes: the first is concerned with the role of INGOs in facilitating regional cooperation, while the second examines the diverse forms of regional cooperation in which INGOs are involved.

The Role of INGOs in Facilitating Regional Cooperation

With regard to the first theme, INGOs play a significant role in regional cooperation by promoting cooperation, collaboration, and coordination between regional states (Stroup 2019). Regional states here are defined as those that share a common geography and have political or socio-cultural connections. As representatives of civil society, INGOs play a crucial role in bridging the divide between state actors and civil society. (Schwartz 2004). They can provide a

platform for the representation of various interest groups, such as business organizations, environmental groups, and human rights advocates. INGOs can also facilitate communication and information-sharing between governments, civil society, and other INGOs (Schroder and Lovell 2012). Having said that, civil society encompasses a broader spectrum of actors and functions. They can indeed act as a protector of public interests, such as environmental groups advocating for sustainability, but it can also include antagonist groups, like climate denial organizations, that may oppose the public good. According to Gramsci's perspective (1971), civil society can be influenced by elite interests or generate and protect public interests. Without a vibrant civil society, business/capital and the State may operate without necessary checks and balances. Therefore, I should sound a note of caution that as conceptualization, the present research analytical framework assesses the spatial dimension of the civil society organizations, and a comprehensive assessment of civil society should require holistic understanding of its role, contributions, and challenges within a specific context.

In addition to the diverse roles and functions of civil society, INGOs can contribute to regional cooperation in several ways (Willetts 2011; Davies 2019). Firstly, they can advocate for policies that promote regional cooperation and integration. For example, environmental NGOs can advocate for policies that reduce pollution and promote sustainable development across borders (Wapner 1996). INGOs with consultative status from the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) regularly participate in UN meetings and express their views on such international platforms (UN ECOSOC). Perhaps, one of the most important strategies of INGOs is lobbying activism, which they leverage to enhance their impact for necessary reforms. Accordingly, Finnemore and Sikkink referred to INGOs as "norm entrepreneurs" since these organizations construct their own cognitive frames as a way of political strategy at international

conventions (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Davies 2019). For example, after WWII, through its successful lobbying and building norms, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) achieved a special status in the Geneva Conventions that will be treated like a state in disputes over protecting civilians and wounded soldiers (Willetts 2011).

Secondly, INGOs can monitor the implementation of regional agreements and policies to ensure that they are effectively implemented and enforced (Raustiala 1997; Brown and Timmer 2006). The EU regards INGOs as legitimate stakeholders for participatory democracy in Europe and actively invites INGOs in policy development processes (Golubevic 2021).[19] This can help increase regional states accountability and promote trust and confidence in regional institutions (Pallas and Urpelainen 2011). The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has been involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The WWF works with governments to ensure that CITES provisions are properly enforced and helps to develop tools and guidelines for monitoring and reporting on the trade of endangered species (Reeve 2014).

INGOs can also provide technical assistance to regional actors to enhance their capacity to effectively implement regional policies and programs. For example, INGOs can provide training and support to government officials, civil society actors, and other stakeholders on issues related to regional cooperation (Clark 1992). The UN might be the most salient beneficiary of the specialized competence of the INGOs. INGOs that have consultative status give and report expert analyses to the UN on issues directly from their experience in the field (ECOSOC 2018).

[19] Expert Council on Ngo Law Conf/Exp (2021), European Practices Related to Participation of NGOs In Policy Development.

Despite INGOs' active involvement in their respective expertise areas, their capability to handle the issues could be limited (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In such situations, state and non-state actors in a region are likely to seek appropriate institutions that could solve the common problems (Risse 2016). This idea has been used to account for the emergence of an array of regional institutions—ranging from the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (Börzel 2016) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).

The Diverse Forms of Regional Cooperation in Which INGOs are Involved.

The second theme in the literature is the diversity of forms of regional cooperation in which INGOs are involved. There are three main types of regional cooperation in relation to the abovementioned functions of INGOs: Regional Organizations (ROs), Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).

INGOs and Regional Organizations (ROs)

INGOs can play an important role in advocating for the establishment of regional organizations and building the capacity of governments and civil society organizations to create and manage them effectively. According to Börzel, a regional organization is a set of formally institutionalized rules, procedures, and actors that coordinate and regulate activities in a given geographic space that cuts across national borders. Panke describes three features of ROs; ROs must have a headquarters, at least three member states, and identified with a certain geographic

region (Börzel 2016). Given that regional organizations are typically comprised of member states collaborating to address common challenges and achieve shared goals within a defined geographic region, it is reasonable to anticipate a positive and complementary association between INGOs and ROs.

The dynamics between INGOs and ROs can be seen in many successful institutionalized organizations. For instance, Francis suggests that the Africa Union Commission (AUC), the African Development Bank (ADB), and the United Nations played an instrumental role in advocating for establishing the AU, which has become major African regional organization (Francis 2017). Likewise, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'s relative success in regional integration was argued to stem from its greater involvement of civil society participation in processes such as agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy implementation (Reinold 2019). To summarize, along with performing a supporting role in formulating and implementing state policies, INGOs that operate in countries in common regions might lead governments to build formal regional organizations that are ability to solve the common issues (Risse 2016). In this sense, we can expect a linear relationship that:

H1: Countries with a larger number of shared INGOs are more likely to share common memberships in Regional Organizations (ROs) than countries with fewer shared INGOs.

INGOs and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)

Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are international treaties or agreements that address environmental issues and seek to achieve a common goal through cooperation among

participating countries (Mitchell 2003). MEAs cover a wide range of environmental issues, such as climate change, biodiversity conservation, marine pollution, and hazardous waste management. The role of INGOs in MEAs is to provide technical expertise, facilitate public participation, and hold governments accountable for their commitments (Sprinz 1992). However, environmental issues could be areas of the most conflictual or confrontational interaction between INGOs and states. Extant research on this relationship—including, but not limited to, ocean governance (Vance and Rangeley 2018), deforestation (Wehcamp et al. 2018), international environmental agreements (Mitchell 2003), climate change, and epistemic communities (Gough and Shackley 2001)—demonstrates that environmental activism play an important role in framing environmental policy, mobilizing public support for environmental conservation, and protecting endangered species by pressuring and raising awareness among countries (Willetts 1982; Wapner 1996). Particularly Environmental NGOs have become an integral part of the negotiating process on the global level (Wapner 1996). As noted by Raustiala, "the participation of environmental NGOs enhances the ability, in both technocratic and political terms, of states to regulate through the treaty process" (Raustiala 1997 p.736).

Indeed, NGOs' involvement has been seen on many relevant occasions. According to Stroll, over 1,500 accredited NGOs were reportedly involved in the climate change negotiations in the Kyoto Protocol (Stroll 2021). Johnson argues that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) might not have been signed without the influence of environmental INGOs like Greenpeace (Johnson 2000). In this context, it is reasonable to anticipate that INGOs will pursue shared goals and function as a means of exerting pressure on governments concerning transnational environmental issues. INGOs have the potential to contribute to the advancement of civic responsibility at large (Hudson 2002). Also, the involvement of INGOs in

regional environmental cooperation may be strengthened by the implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) aimed at addressing specific environmental challenges on both regional and global scales. Based on these premises, the following hypothesis can be posited:

H2: Countries with a larger number of shared INGOs are more likely to have environmental agreements than countries with fewer shared INGOs.

INGOs and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)

Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are agreements between two or more countries within a geographic region that aim to promote trade and economic integration.[20] RTAs cover a wide range of issues, such as reducing trade barriers, harmonizing regulations and standards, and protecting intellectual property rights (Howse, Eliason, and Trebilcock 2005). INGOs play an important role in promoting the development and implementation of RTAs that prioritize social and environmental considerations. By providing technical expertise, facilitating public participation, advocating for social and environmental considerations, and monitoring progress, INGOs can help to ensure that RTAs contribute to sustainable and equitable economic development. By providing technical expertise, facilitating public participation, advocating for social and environmental considerations, and monitoring progress, INGOs can help to ensure that RTAs contribute to sustainable and equitable economic development (Green and Blumer 2012; Edwards and Gaventa 2014). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was a proposed trade agreement between 12 Pacific Rim countries to deepen economic ties and reduce trade barriers.

[20] WTO, Regional trade agreements and the WTO. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm. Accessed March 30, 2023.

Environmental and labor groups, including INGOs such as Greenpeace and the Sierra Club, raised concerns about the potential negative impacts of the agreement on the environment and labor rights. These groups advocated for including environmental and labor standards in the agreement and for greater transparency in the negotiation process (Rimmer 2016; Haggard 2020). If so, we should also expect that INGOs might exert their influence on regional states and facilitate the creation of trade agreements:

H3: Countries with a larger number of shared INGOs are more likely to have regional trade agreements (RTAs) than countries with fewer shared INGOs.

Research design

The present study's empirics rely on large-N statistical analysis with the panel data covering the time period from 1946 to 2022. The reason underlying the selection of the study period was two-fold. First, since being granted consultative status by the UN in 1946, INGOs have captured attention as key actors in the post-World War II international order. Second, the decision was driven by the availability of observational data in the datasets.

As noted by earlier scholars, cooperation can be achieved when two actors' expectations converge (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Milner 1992). Dependence solely on the examination of states at the level of aggregation may not suffice in the examination of ongoing cooperative interactions between them. Conversely, a dyadic framework that centers on bilateral relationships between states may provide significant perspectives on the mechanics of regional collaboration. This is evident in other categories of multilateral international occurrences, such as the formation of alliances and international agreements. Accordingly, the unit of analysis is dyad years in

which each observation in the dataset represents a pair of states in a specific year. I design dyads as non-directional. This approach assumes that the relationship between the entities is mutual and that both entities can influence each other equally.

One constraint of this study is the potential for reverse causation, whereby alterations in regional cooperation could also lead to changes in the effect of INGOs. For example, it is possible that certain international organizations require their member states to promote civil rights and facilitate the participation of INGOs in decision-making processes. Thus, it is essential to recognize possible errors while interpreting the study's results. A common approach to address this shortcoming, scholars have recommended the adoption of a panel data model wherein independent variables are lagged (Bellemare et al. 2017). Accordingly, in this research, all independent and control variables are lagged by three years to alleviate concerns related to reverse causation. I opted for a three-year lag in my analysis, as longer time lags have the potential to capture changes over a longer-term trend and reflect more enduring shifts in the data, given that the UN's application of the consultative process for INGOs may vary over time.

Dependent variables

The principal contention of this study entailed the use of "regional cooperation" as the primary dependent variable, which was operationalized through three forms of institutional design memberships, namely, Regional Organizations (ROs), Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA), and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). Given that the objective of this research is to examine cooperation at the regional level, I restricted my analysis to dyads located in adjacent regions. Inclusion criteria are based on multi-regionality and shared geographical formation. For

instance, countries with overlapping regions (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkey) were coded as both in Asia and Europe; similarly, several Middle Eastern countries in Asia were coded as both in Asia and Africa. Countries from Oceania are grouped together with Southeast Asian countries. Similarly, countries that share the Pacific Rim are categorized in a similar manner.[21]

Joint RO was a discrete variable drawn upon the Regional Organization and Cooperation (ROCO) III dataset (Panke and Starkman 2019). ROCO is a state-level dataset that provides data on the membership of 76 ROs of the states between the years 1946 and 2015. I first converted the data from monadic to dyadic by operationalizing Joint RO as the total number of those 76 ROs memberships shared by the two countries for each dyad year. For instance, if the USA and Canada shared membership of 5 ROs in 2012, Joint RO was coded as 5 for this dyad in that year.

Joint MEA was obtained from the International Environmental Agreements Data Base (IEADB) (Mitchell et al 2020). Covering over 3600 multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements, this database has been one of the major resources for environmental studies (Mitchell et al. 2020). Following the same principle as in Joint RO, *Joint MEA* indicates the total number of shared members of MEA for each dyad year.

For *Joint RTA*, the data are taken from Mario Larch's Regional Trade Agreements Database (Egger and Larch 2008) which originated from the World Trade Organization (WTO) databank. The database covers more than 300 regional trade agreements signed between 1958 and 2020 and includes information on a range of topics, such as the scope of the agreement, the participating countries, and the trade liberalization measures included in the agreement.

[21] See Appendix D.

For the analysis, I applied a negative binomial regression model, which is an appropriate estimator when response variables are count and over-dispersed (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). A variance estimator was also included in the analysis to adjust for any correlation of observations within the values of groups.

Independent variable

The primary independent variable of theoretical interest is the presence of INGOs in countries. I drew upon the data from a new international NGO dataset recently introduced in the literature (Kayaalp 2023).[22] The selection criteria of these INGOs are based on the idea that INGOs with consultative status possess certain advantages that may enable them to contribute more significantly to regional cooperation compared to other NGOs without such status. For example, those INGOs have been formally recognized by regional organizations or bodies as legitimate and valuable participants in the regional cooperation process. This recognition provides them with a platform and access to engage directly with decision-makers, participate in policy discussions, and influence the regional cooperation agenda (ECOSOC 2018). In some cases, consultative status often grants INGOs access to privileged information, documents, and processes within regional organizations. This access allows them to stay informed about ongoing initiatives, policy developments, and emerging opportunities for collaboration. It enhances their ability to align their work with regional priorities and contribute more effectively to regional cooperation efforts (Willets 2011). In addition, INGOs with consultative status are typically granted the opportunity to provide expert input, recommendations, and advocacy positions

[22] The INGO dataset identifies 6,595 INGOs, defined as NGOs granted consultative status by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from 1946 to 2022.

directly to regional organizations. Their ability to influence decision-making processes and shape regional policies is strengthened by their formal recognition and established channels of communication with key stakeholders (Willets 2000, Sharfeddin 2008).

In this respect, I created the *Number of Shared INGO* variable that is the total number of shared international non-governmental organizations in a dyad in a year. For operationalization, first, I used the *Countries of Activity*[23] variable from the INGO dataset to identify all shared INGO pairings at the year of consultive status. These INGO dyadic data were then merged into the base regional dyadic data, resulting in a count for all interstate regional state pairings of the number of shared INGOs originating in each year. The theoretical expectation is that regional cooperation is more likely to happen when the Number of Shared INGO increases in dyads.

An important consideration to take into account is that the "Countries of Activity" variable in the INGOs dataset is not a time series data per se. This issue might affect the results that I obtain because the activities of INGOs may cease over time due to changing political dynamics and tensions among countries. Therefore, drawn upon COW Dyadic War dataset v5 (Palmer 2020), I created a dummy War History variable that suggests if there is war history between countries. More specifically, if a war ever occurred in a dyad it is coded as 1; otherwise, it is coded as 0. This measurement serves as a control to mitigate measurement error by accounting for the possibility of an INGO ceasing its activities or losing interest in both countries. Given that wars often lead to significant changes in the relationship between two countries, including war as a factor could potentially aid in reducing measurement error.

It should also be noted that in the INGO dataset, many INGOs' headquarters are in the higher-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries,

[23] Countries of Activity is a binary variable that suggests a member country of a given NGO.

such as the US., France, and UK. In the political economy literature, there is the idea of a critical historical juncture, which refers to periods in history where there are significant changes in economic and political institutions that can have long-lasting effects on the development of societies (Acemoglu et al. 2008). If such a critical juncture has long-lasting effects on the development of societies, this might increase unintended bias. Accordingly, in a subsequent robustness check I control for probable critical junctures by excluding all high-income founding members of the OECD, with income status determined by the World Bank (Beck et al. 2000).

Control variables

Although the analytical framework of this article assesses whether robust civil society leads states to construct formal international arrangements, it should be noted that the analysis assumes all else is equal. But in truth, not everything is equal, and some other factors may be related to the activeness of INGOs and regional cooperation. The literature yields that democracy, economic norms, and alliances among states might also account for a tendency of regional states to join together in ROs, and these factors may be related to Shared INGO.

Civil society participation has long been recognized as a catalyst for democracy in global governance (Scholte 2002). Alexis de Tocqueville, during his visit to the United States in the 19th century, observed that organizations operating independently from the government and economic spheres, which we now refer to as civil society, could serve as a main bulwark against despotism (Tocqueville 1838). As Scholte pointed out, an informed citizenry is essential for effective democracy, and civic associations can play a key role in raising public awareness and understanding of transnational laws and regulatory institutions. Therefore, it can be assumed that

there exists a preceding relationship between INGOs and democracy. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the level of democracy in bilateral relationships may impact regional cooperation and shared participation in international civil society.

For the dyadic formulation, I adopted the weak link approach, which assumes that the strength of the relationship depends on the country with a lower level of democracy (Granovetter 1973; Russett, Oneal and Davis 1998). I draw upon the V-Dem dataset's Electoral Democracy Index (v11.1) to gauge democracy since the conceptual scheme of this index also envisions civil society participation together with electoral democracy principles (Coppedge et al., 2021). I created the variable *Democracy*, which implies that higher coefficients of Democracy would suggest a higher democracy score for both countries in a dyad.

Another possible cause of INGOs and regional cooperation is the economic norms of countries. Economic norms theory posits that a contract intensive economy is one where most households obtain their material needs by engaging in a contract with strangers in an open marketplace, and contract intensive countries wants to cooperate with others (Mousseau 1997, 2002, 2019a). In turn, it is anticipated that INGOs may wield greater influence in encouraging states towards regional cooperation in an environment where governments facilitate extensive opportunities for their citizens because civil society is likely to have more leeway and participate in the development of efficacious regional frameworks. The data were obtained from the CINE dataset, Version April-2023 (Mousseau 2019b). The continuous measure of *CIE_extended* was applied in the dataset since some starting values of CIE extrapolated to 1816. It is operationalized with the weak link assumption as with Democracy.

Alliance theory suggests that strategic relationships between states can lead to the development of new expectations and mutual arrangements (Walt 1987; Schweller 1994; Snyder

1997). These alliances can also impact the relationships of non-state actors, such as INGOs and advocacy organizations. In countries that share similar norms and perceptions as the allied countries, these INGOs may be able to operate more freely, which can give them more opportunities to exert their influence on states. As a result, allied countries may be more likely to engage in regional cooperation than non-allied countries. I obtained all data from The Correlates of War Formal Alliance (v4.1). The dataset covers the years between 1816 and 2012.

Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression and Logit Regression Estimations of Shared INGO Model.

	(Model 1) Joint RO (1946 - 2015)	(Model 2) Joint MEA (1946 - 2022)	(Model 3) Joint RTA (1950 - 2020)
The number of Shared INGO	.09***	.14***	.18***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
	1.10^	1.16^	1.20^^
Constant	-.43***	.01***	.14***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
Ln alpha	.13***	.96***	
	(.03)	(.00)	
Observations	328,600	368,973	331,328
Pseudo R^2	.01	.02	.08

Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.005, ** p<.01, * p<.05.
^ The Incident Rate Ratio (irr). [24]
^^ The odds ratios.[25]
^^^ Ln Alpha (log of the dispersion parameter, alpha) indicates that the data are over dispersed and are better estimated using a negative binomial model than a Poisson model.

[24] Since the estimator used in this study is negative binomial regression, regression coefficients were interpreted as the difference between the log of expected counts. However, the literature suggests using incidence rate ratios (irr) to represent the estimated percentage change in the count variable for a one-unit increase in the predictor variable. For instance, an IRR of 1.5 would indicate that a one-unit increase in the predictor variable is associated with a 50% increase in the count variable. "NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION, STATA ANNOTATED OUTPUT," Retrieved from: https://stats.oarc.ucla.edu/stata/output/negative-binomial-regression/. Accessed on February 11, 2023.

[25] According to Stata Manual, the odds ratio represents the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one group (defined by a specific level of the independent variable) compared to the odds of the event occurring in a reference group (usually the baseline level of the independent variable). It quantifies the strength and direction of the relationship between the independent variable(s) and the dependent variable.

Results and Discussions

The study's results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the bivariate impact of the the number of shared INGO variable on regional cooperation, while Table 7 presents the estimated models that account for the influence of control variables. Robustness check results are presented in Table 8.

The Models 1-3 provide support for the plausibility of the regionalism hypothesis in the study. The findings of Model 1 specifically indicate that a significant and positive correlation exists between the number of shared INGOs and Joint ROs. An incidence rate ratio (irr) of 1.10 indicates that a single shared INGO increase in regional dyads is associated with a 10% increase in the number of shared ROs. This result highlights the influential role played by INGOs in promoting regional cooperation among countries and underscores the importance of civil society organizations in shaping regional arrangements. For instance, the Africa Union has implemented the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) framework, with broad participation of civil society organizations to ensure effective participation, as they are unlikely to address such issue areas without them.

The finding in Model 2 suggests that there is support for Hypothesis 2, which asserts that dyads of countries with a higher number of shared international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are more likely to have environmental agreements compared to those with fewer shared INGOs. An irr of 1.16 indicates that one shared INGO increase in regional dyads is associated with a 16% increase in Joint MEA. This evidence implies the environmental INGOs' ability to exert influence. One plausible explanation is that INGOs exert pressure on governments to effectively take action on environmental challenges. Shared norms built by transnational

environmental groups converge among actors regarding regional integration factors, as collective outcomes can be obtained through building institutional arrangements with the participation of related actors. While it is widely acknowledged that INGOs have been effective in influencing international environmental negotiations, such as the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, their impact goes beyond formal negotiations. Environmental activism, in particular, plays a crucial role in raising awareness of regional environmental issues. This, in turn, facilitates other mechanisms for dialogue, cross-border cooperation, and, in some cases, even regulation and standard-setting. By bringing attention to environmental concerns, NGOs create a platform for collaboration and engagement, leading to the development of institutional arrangements that encourage regional cooperation on environmental issues.

The positive and significant findings in Model 3, with a coefficient of .18, provide further support for RTA Hypothesis 3. The logistic regression result suggests that the number of INGOs between dyads is associated with a moderate increase (20%) in the odds of regional trade agreements. Specifically, regional dyads that have a higher number of shared international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are more likely to sign Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) compared to other regional dyads. This finding implies that INGOs can play a significant role in promoting economic integration and cooperation among states. One plausible explanation is that as INGOs exert more pressure on states, they become more responsive to demands and are willing to liberalize trade with neighboring countries. The result also aligns with previous research that has identified trade as one of the key drivers of economic regionalism. In close collaboration with business and trade unions, INGOs have gained access to politics and urge politicians to build formal bodies that will address their needs. While Dür and

De Bievre (2007) found NGOs to have little impact on the EU trade policy outcomes, several other scholars explained the emergence of the RTAs with the impact of non-state actors. For instance, in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) case, Duina (2016) stressed the desire of American businesses and other civil society groups to access Canadian and Mexican markets.

Overall, the statistical evidence in the parsimonious models suggests that broader participation of INGOs in the political sphere might promote building more communication and coordination channels with other actors to initiate actions and pressure governments on common regional issues, thereby driving states to establish formal regional cooperation.

The findings presented in Table 7 indicate that the number of shared INGO is anticipated to have a positive and statistically significant impact, even when controlling for all of the control variables. These results largely support the argument of the study, even when taking into consideration variables such as Democracy, Contract intensive economy, and Alliances. To begin with, democratic dyads, which have robust positive coefficients in Model 4-6, INGOs are likely to be more influential in democracies because governments are held accountable to the INGOs like citizens. As argued by Diamond (1996), in order to ensure a just and equitable society, the political system should encompass the principles of the rule of law and robustly safeguard the rights of individuals and groups to express themselves, disseminate information, gather peacefully, demonstrate, engage in advocacy, and form associations to pursue their respective interests and aspirations. Accordingly, considering that the pressure from INGOs will be higher than from other regimes where INGOs' activism is constrained, regional cooperation is more likely to occur in democracies. In addition, these results seem to align with liberal theories of international affairs like democratic peace, which imply that democracies are dyadically less

likely to wage war against each other. The pacific effect of democracy should not be limited to conflicts because democracies are also more likely to cooperate with each other, than other regimes.

Table 7 Negative Binomial Regression and Logit Regression Estimations of Shared INGO Model with Controls

	(Model 4) Joint RO (1946 - 2012)	(Model 5) Joint MEA (1946 - 2012)	(Model 6) Joint RTA (1950 - 2012)
The Number of Shared INGO	.05***	.07***	.08***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Democracy	.98***	1.54***	1.72***
	(.07)	(.05)	(.17)
Contract intensive economy	.04***	.11***	.29***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.02)
Alliance	.94***	.02	1.39***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.09)
War History	-.25	.28***	.36
	(.26)	(.07)	(.39)
Constant	-.66***	-.08***	-2.66***
	(.02)	(.01)	(.06)
Ln alpha^^	-16.66***	-.33***	
	(.20)	(.02)	
Observations	110,660	127,834	119,022
Pseudo R^2	.15	.09	.24

Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.005, ** p<.01, * p<.05
Cluster-robust standard errors are applied based on the country-year id variable.
^ Model 4 and 5 results represent incident rate ratio. Model 6 results represent odds ratio
^^ Ln Alpha (log of the dispersion parameter, alpha) indicates that the data are over dispersed and are better estimated using a negative binomial model than a Poisson model.

Table 8 Incident Rate Ratio (IRR) and Odds Ratio Estimations

	(Model 4) Joint RO (1946 - 2012)	(Model 5) Joint MEA (1946 - 2012)	(Model 6) Joint RTA (1950 - 2012)
The Number of Shared INGO	1.05	1.07	1.09
Democracy	2.68	4.66	5.58
Contract intensive economy	1.04	1.12	1.34
Alliance	2.56	1.02	4.03
War History	.77	1.33	1.43

Model 4 and 5 results represent incident rate ratio. Model 6 results represent odds ratio. The IRRs and Odds ratios reflect unit changes in dependent variables for 1 unit change in independent variables. Since the independent variables are not based on the same units, the IRRs and LRs are not immediately comparable across the independent variables.

As for CIE, as seen, it predicts all dependent variables with positive coefficients. I expect that contract intensive states might promote more regional institutional design because, in these societies, people prefer that their states reliably and impartially enforce contracts, protect individual rights, and make efforts to enhance the general welfare (Mousseau 2002, 2019). In other words, elected governments in CIEs, as representatives of societal preferences, tend to align with societal demands and promote policies that support economic growth. This often involves joining regional integration organizations or agreements that facilitate economic development. INGOs, as a reformist element in the social order, can establish coalitions with business groups or trade unions to exert power over governments. In the face of lobbying, contractualist governments are unlikely to reject market and societal demands to join international institutional bodies that offer favorable opportunities for them. Therefore, INGOs are expected to have greater influence in contract intensive economy.

The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the Alliance variable is observed in Model 4 and 6, implying that states within an alliance may be more likely to engage in cooperative endeavors at the regional level. As Schott claims, when states form alliances, they

often seek to promote economic cooperation and development among their member states. Also, if an alliance member state is part of a RO or RTA, it may encourage other like-minded states to join the same organizations to align their economic policies, regulations, and standards, which can promote greater political cohesion and cooperation among the member states. The involvement of INGOs in RO and RTA membership could be also explained by their role in monitoring and evaluating the progress and impact of regional integration efforts within alliances. INGOs can assist alliances in assessing the effectiveness of their regional integration endeavors, thereby facilitating informed decision-making for further advancement. It is worth noting that the variable representing alliances does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 5 (Joint MEA), indicating that its impact may vary depending on the specific context or model specifications.

The War history between states is only positive and significant in Model 5. The coefficient of 0.28 for the war history variable suggests a positive relationship between the presence of war history and joint membership in Multilateral Environmental Agreements. In other words, countries with a history of war are more inclined to participate in Multilateral Environmental Agreements compared to countries without such a history. It is plausible to argue that participation in multilateral environmental agreements can be seen as a way for these countries to collaborate with others and work towards shared environmental goals, potentially driven by a desire to prevent future conflicts related to environmental issues or to rebuild relationships in the aftermath of war. The shared experience of war might highlight the need for cooperation and mutual efforts to tackle environmental challenges that can have transboundary impacts. Another possible explanation might be that joining Multilateral Environmental Agreements could be seen as a way to foster peacebuilding and reconciliation between former adversaries. Environmental issues can serve as a

common ground for collaboration, helping to build trust and promote peaceful relations. Fore xample, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established to address tensions and conflicts over water resources in the Nile Basin. It fosters dialogue, cooperation, and sustainable development among countries like Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. By participating in this Multilateral Environmental Agreement, these countries collaborate to address shared environmental challenges, manage water resources, and prevent conflicts stemming from competition over water (Cascão 2019).

Even after controlling the effect of war history, the positive and significant coefficients for the number of Shared INGO suggest that the shared membership of INGOs still has an independent and positive association with all three regional cooperation types. The findings imply that INGOs continue to play an active role in promoting regional cooperation efforts despite the challenges posed by past conflicts.

Robustness Checks

To ensure the robustness of the analysis, alternative specifications were employed to test the same hypotheses in Table 8. First, I omitted high-income OECD founders from the models (7-9) because many INGOs are located in these countries. Second, I checked whether panel data contain any unobservable individual-specific characteristics that vary over time. By controlling year fixed effects, as seen, INGOs still play a role in promoting regional cooperation in regions outside of the wealthier parts of the world. I observed that positive and significant coefficients and standard errors were found to yield similar outcomes for the number of Shared INGO, Democracy, CIE, and Alliance. One notable difference is that Alliance is positive and significant in all models, implying that non-higher income countries with alliances tend to engage in

cooperation through MEAs together with ROs and RTAs. War history is also significant in all models, but it has negative coefficient in the Model 7. Overall, the utilization of alternative specifications helped to ensure the reliability and stability of the results, supporting the robustness of the findings in the analysis.

Table 9 Fixed Effect Robust Estimations with Negative Binomial Regression and Logistic Regression

	(Model 7) Joint RO (1946 - 2012)	(Model 8) Joint MEA (1946 - 2012)	(Model 9) Joint RTA (1950 - 2012)
The Number of Shared INGO	.03***	.01***	.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Democracy	.81***	2.32***	.30***
	(.02)	(.04)	(.05)
Contract intensive economy	1.63***	.34***	2.07***
	(.00)	(.01)	(.02)
Alliance	.00***	.45***	.19***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
War History	-.07***	.48***	.28***
	(.02)	(.05)	(.08)
Constant	.44***	1.19***	-3.05***
	(.00)	(.01)	(.22)
Observations	94,355	107,178	98,415

Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.005, ** p<.01, * p<.05

Conclusion

Understanding the implications of INGOs' engagement in regional cooperation is essential for comprehending the evolving dynamics of global and regional politics. As INGOs continue to play an increasingly prominent role in global and regional affairs, further research and analysis

are needed to unpack the complexities of their impact on regionalism and their potential contributions to regional policy-making processes.

This chapter has aimed to empirically assess the effect of shared international non-governmental organizations among countries on regional cooperation. The analysis shows a positive correlation between the number of shared International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and the likelihood of countries sharing common memberships in Regional Organizations, Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and Regional Trade Agreements. INGOs can unite actors from different countries and sectors, build networks and coalitions, and facilitate information sharing and learning. By doing so, INGOs can help promote regional cooperation by fostering mutual understanding, trust, and collaboration among regional actors. Overall, the empirical findings of this study confirm these theoretical assumptions and substantiate the previous new regionalism thoughts, which emphasize the multidimensionality of regionalism.

I found that the democracy and economic norms of the countries relate to the involvement of INGOs in regional cooperation, although being in the same alliance partly supported. When I control for these factors, shared INGOs still predict regional cooperation. Democracies are generally associated with a more favorable environment for INGOs to operate. This might be because democratic systems provide a greater degree of freedom of expression, association, and assembly, which are essential for the functioning of civil society organizations. Similarly, contract intensive economies tend to meet the demands of societies and markets. Therefore, governments are likely to follow pro-market and society strategies when they receive pressure from civil society and interest groups for regional issue areas.

This research has some limitations, two in particular. First, theoretical concerns arise when analyzing multilateral events using a dyadic level of countries because it may oversimplify the complexity and dynamics of interactions among multiple actors involved in the events. By focusing solely on dyadic relationships between countries, important contextual factors and nuances of multilateral cooperation may be overlooked. Although I addressed this concern by lagging independent variables 3 years behind of dependent variables, within the broader multilateral landscape, an unintended bias should be taken into consideration.

Second, this research tests the hypothesis of new regionalism theories, and applied INGOs which has consultative status because this status provides them recognition, access, influence, networking, and resources, accordingly, I assume that they tend to enhance their ability to contribute more significantly to regional cooperation efforts. However, the level of influence that an INGO has on its respective government and its ability to lead governments to cooperation varies greatly and depends on multiple factors. For example, INGOs like Amnesty International are influential in advocating for human rights reforms and challenging governments worldwide, or Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) provides emergency medical aid in crisis situations. Their work often requires cooperation with governments to access affected areas and provide assistance. At the same time, some INGOs may have limited influence, both due internal factors that stem from INGO itself such as lack of resources, and external factors such as political opposition or national sovereignty concerns which prevent fostering dialogue, raising awareness, building networks, and promoting people-to-people connections at the regional level.

It is also possible that some INGOs may have reservations or concerns regarding specific regional cooperation initiatives. An INGO may prioritize different objectives or approaches than

those emphasized by a particular regional cooperation initiative. If the goals or strategies of the initiative do not align with the NGO's mission or principles, they may voice opposition or concerns. NGOs often advocate for inclusivity and the meaningful participation of various stakeholders. If they perceive that a regional cooperation initiative lacks transparency, excludes certain groups, or fails to involve civil society organizations, they may criticize or oppose it. For example, throughout the negotiation process of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), various INGOs raised concerns about the lack of transparency and limited stakeholder engagement. INGOs, particularly those focusing on labor rights, environmental protection, and access to medicine, criticized the TPP negotiations for their secretive nature. They argued that the closed-door negotiations excluded civil society organizations and the general public from meaningful participation and limited their ability to provide input on important policy decisions. Although the findings of this study supported the theoretical expectations with robust statistical applications, I should acknowledge that not all NGOs can possess the same level of influence or unilaterally, lead governments to cooperation or at certain extent, they might have objections to ineffective interstate cooperation.

In retrospect, it seems clear that Rosenau's depiction of *turbulence* where traditional state-centric approaches to governance are insufficient to address global challenges might be able to be overcome with the greater participation of civil society organizations in the context of regional politics (Rosenau 1990). Therefore, policymakers and international organizations should recognize the vital role of INGOs in promoting regionalism and consider ways to support and encourage their activities in the region.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In recent decades, global politics and international relations have witnessed the growing significance of regional cooperation as a pivotal force in shaping these domains. In order to better understand the complexities of regional interactions, power dynamics, and cooperation mechanisms among countries in a particular region, there is a need to promote further research on regional dynamics. A more comprehensive understanding of the complexities of regional cooperation can inform policy decisions and strategies related to regional issues, including regional conflicts, security challenges, and economic integration efforts. In this context, the present dissertation sought to explore the complex dynamics of regional cooperation, involving states and international civil society actors. The results of this exploration of regional dynamics, undertaken based on the analysis of two newly constructed new datasets containing information about INGOs, provide several key insights into regional interstate cooperation.

In Chapter 2, I presented two new large-scale datasets on UN-accredited INGOs worldwide. The motivation to construct these two datasets was two-fold. First, considering the lack of readily accessible resources on INGOs, the proposed two datasets contribute to the literature and can be used by other researchers to explore a broad range of research questions. Second, using the two datasets, I empirically tested the hypotheses put forward by new regionalism theories and reported the results in Chapter 4.

In Chapter 3, I presented the results of a large-scale quantitative study of the conditions under which regional countries engage in cooperation. This analysis included memberships in 76 regional organizations for the time period from 1945 to 2012. A major contribution of this part of this research is the identification of several factors that emerged in the analysis as significant

drivers of regional cooperation. These factors include joint democracy, contract-intensive economies, and equal material capability.

Based on the findings reported in Chapter 3, several recommendations for policymakers and scholars interested in regional cooperation can be formulated. First, from the applied perspective, policymakers should be made aware of the important impact on regional cooperation of factors such as capital distance, joint democracy, language, trade interdependence, and religion. All these factors, as suggested by the empirical results, should be taken into account in regional cooperation initiatives and policies. Second, from the theoretical perspective, the results highlight the need for further academic research on the role of economic norms and domestic economic processes on regional cooperation dynamics. Likewise, beyond the research on formal regional organizations, the finding reported in Chapter 3 also highlights the need for further research on the informal mechanisms and contextual factors that impact regional cooperation.

Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I examined the dynamics between INGOs and regional cooperation using the two newly constructed datasets. The results revealed a strong correlation between the number of shared INGOs and the likelihood of countries sharing common memberships in Regional Organizations, Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and Regional Trade Agreements. Even with the introduced controls, the results robustly predicted regional cooperation among regional states in three types of membership. Taken together, the results reported in Chapter 4 highlight that the presence of INGOs can lead to increased formal cooperation among countries in common regions. Based on this evidence, it can be concluded that INGOs may serve as pressure groups prompting governments to address trans-border issues and thereby positively affecting the dynamics of regional cooperation efforts. In further research,

it would be necessary to additionally investigate potential mechanisms through which INGOs can influence regional cooperation, such as lobbying, advocacy, and coalition-building strategies. Furthermore, subsequent comparative studies across different regions and countries could shed more light on the contextual factors shaping the impact of INGOs on regional governance. Finally, considering that, in the present dissertation, only the quantitative approach was used, a more in-depth understanding of the role played by INGOs in regional politics can be derived from further studies that would leverage qualitative methods and conduct case studies.

An important conclusion that can be derived from the findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4 is that the arguments put forward by the old and new regionalism theories may not be mutually exclusive but are rather mutually complementary. The analysis of dyadic characteristics among countries reveals that although regional cooperation may exhibit a state-centric outcome, the Chapter 4 results confirm that the involvement of civil society organizations in regional cooperative efforts may introduce additional complexity or influence the relationship being studied. Regions that possess mostly democracies with an active civil society are more likely to engage in regional cooperation because INGOs can serve as a catalyst of a greater cooperation among civil society organizations, which will eventually lead to more effective advocacy and stronger pressure on regional governments. For example, the involvement of civil society organizations in EU regional cooperation can also extend to interacting with EU institutions and participating in decision-making processes. Through consultations, public hearings, and involvement in EU-funded projects, civil society organizations have opportunities to contribute their perspectives and expertise, influencing the development and implementation of EU policies. On the other hand, in non-democratic regions with a more restricted or less developed civil society, INGOs might come to play a more direct role in promoting regional cooperation.

Specifically, in such contexts, INGOs might provide a platform for civil society actors to collaborate and engage with regional governments, thereby strengthening their influence and impact.

To ensure the incorporation of the interests of marginalized groups, effective trade unions can advocate for economic policies that promote fair and sustainable trade practices. One relevant example to be mentioned here is the important role of civil society organizations in shaping the labor and environmental protections of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Based on this evidence, it can be expected that trade unions—which advocate for workers' rights and interests and ensure equitable sharing of economic growth benefits--will continue to play an essential role in regional integration initiatives.

Furthermore, as demonstrated by the results reported in Chapter 3, cultural similarities arising from the shared historical experience make normative convergence among regional countries. For example, the Middle East is characterized by a significant degree of societal interaction, as evidenced by the widespread presence of extended family ties across borders and the existence of transnational networks comprising political and economic actors, such as Islamists, migrants, and business communities. In such contexts, it can reasonably be expected that, by facilitating dialogue, promoting people-to-people exchanges, and advocating for policies that prioritize regional cooperation, international civil society can leverage their networks and expertise to promote a greater cooperation between countries.

Taken together, the results reported in this dissertation expand and deepen our current understanding of regionalism theories and regional cooperation by illuminating the intricacies of regional interactions, power dynamics, and cooperation mechanisms among countries within a particular region. Furthermore, as evidenced by the proliferation of regional cooperation, as well

as the expansion and intensification of established regionalism frameworks, the present findings also provide compelling evidence of the theoretical and empirical strength of regionalism.

Having said, the results reported in this dissertation also raise an important question about the role of state and civil society actors. Here, it should also be acknowledged that business factors and trade unions can also be key drivers of regionalism. Considering that globalization and technological advances create new opportunities and challenges for businesses, regional cooperation initiatives and policies will be increasingly compelled to promote trade and investment, reduce barriers to market access, and harmonize regulations. At the same time, within the future regional integration initiatives, an important role will be assigned to trade unions that will advocate for workers' rights and interests so that to ensure a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth. This warrants further research on the role of trade unions in regional cooperation.

APPENDIX A

CORRELATION MATRIX, SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND VARIABLE TABLE - CHAPTER 3

Table 10 Descriptive Statistics – Chapter 3

	N	Mean	Variance	Std.D	Median	Skewness	min	max
Joint RO	745,617	.33	.66	.81	0	3.14	0	10
Trade Interdependence	825,374	-7.11	67.03	8.18	-4.77	-.79	28.30	0
Democracy	726,818	.26	.04	.21	.18	1.27	.008	.91
Controlled Democratic ROs	825,375	.04	.04	.20	0	4.55	0	1
Power Asymmetry	613,514	9.21	.91	.95	9.27	-.27	6.06	11.95
Contract Intensive Economies	443,012	.85	2.91	1.70	0	2.19	0	9.25
Joint Language	571,535	.05	.05	.22	0	3.99	0	1
Joint Religion	571,535	.88	.10	.31	1	-2.43	0	1
Contiguity	825,375	.03	.03	.18	0	4.95	0	1
Capital Distance	824,016	8.24	.61	.78	8.42	-1.3	1.60	9.42
Peace Years	825,374	30.15	876.99	29.61	22	2.02	0	196

Table 11 Pairwise Correlations of Independent Variables – Chapter 3

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) Joint RO	1.00										
(2) Trade Interdependence	0.10	1.00									
(3) Controlled Democratic ROs	0.56	0.05	1.00								
(4) Democracy	0.19	0.24	0.18	1.00							
(5) Power Asymmetry	-0.00	0.33	0.06	0.34	1.00						
(6) Contract Intensive Economies	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.66	0.45	1.00					
(7) Joint Language	0.27	0.01	0.35	0.02	0.00	-0.003	1.00				
(8) Joint Religion	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.06	1.00			
(9) Contiguity	0.33	0.06	0.15	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.13	0.04	1.00		
(10) Capital Distance	-0.50	-0.07	-0.25	-0.03	0.01	-0.06	-0.12	-0.04	-0.30	1.00	
(11) Peace Years	0.10	0.18	0.17	0.25	0.24	0.34	0.11	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	1.00

Table 12 The Nature of the Variables- Chapter 3

Variables	Level of measurement	Operationalization	Data Sources	Coverage years
Joint RO (Regional Organizations)	Discrete	The number of shared memberships of ROs between dyads	ROCO III dataset (Panke and Starkman, 2020)	1945 - 2015
Controlled Democratic ROs	Binary	Dyads that are member of ROs whose average Polity score <7	- ROCO III dataset (Panke and Starkman, 2020) - Polity5 (Marshall and Gurr, 2018	1945 - 2015
Trade Interdependence	Continuous	Lower Trade value between dyads	Expanded Trade and Data (Gleditsch, 2002)	1948 - 2002
Democracy	Continuous	Lower democracy score between dyads	V-dem dataset v11.1 Coppedge et al., 2021)	1789 - 2022
Power asymmetry	Continuous	GDPmax/ GDPmax + GDPmin	Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020)	1820 - 2018
CIE (Contract Intensive Economies)	Continuous	Lower CIE score between dyads	CINE dataset (Mousseau 2019, version April 2023).	1816 - 2019
Joint language	Dichotomous	Shared language = 1, else = 0	CIA, the world factbook	1945 - 2015
Joint Religion	Dichotomous	Shared religion = 1, else = 0	The World Religion dataset (Maoz and Henderson, 2013)	1945 - 2015
Contiguity	Discrete	Land border or separated by 400 miles of water or less =1, else= 0	COW Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, and Gochman, 2002)	1816 - 2016
Capital distance	Discrete	The distance between the capital of dyads	The inter-capital distance , (K. S. Gleditsch and Ward, 2001)	1945 - 2015
Peace years	Discrete	Maximum peace years between dyads	COW Militarized interstate disputes v5 (Dyadic) (Palmer et al. 2020)	1816 - 2014

APPENDIX B

CORRELATION MATRIX, SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND VARIABLE TABLE - CHAPTER 4

Table 13 Descriptive Statistics - Chapter 4

Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	p1	p99	Skew.	Kurt.
Joint RO	399,573	.64	1.13	0	10	0	5	2.17	8.39
Joint MEA	444,641	1.66	2.86	0	68	0	12	2.69	17.55
Joint RTA	401,237	.15	.36	0	1	0	1	1.92	4.71
The number of shared INGO	452,056	2.52	4.15	0	48	0	18	2.31	9.46
Democracy	307,435	.24	.22	.007	.923	.009	.874	1.33	3.89
CIE	138,934	1.19	2.06	0	9.02	0	7.91	1.74	5.03
Alliance	452,059	.11	.32	0	1	0	1	2.37	6.62
War History	452,059	.005	.07	0	1	0	0	13.91	194.63
Year	452,059	1984	22.13	1946	2022	1946	2022	-.03	1.80

Table 14 Pairwise Correlations of Independent Variables - Chapter 4

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) The number of shared INGO	1.00				
(2) Democracy	0.32	1.00			
(3) CIE	0.36	0.76	1.00		
(4) Alliance	-0.04	0.13	0.04	1.00	
(5) War History	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	1.00

Table 15 The Nature of the Variables- Chapter 4

Variables	Level of measurement	Operationalization	Data Sources	Coverage years
Joint RO (Regional Organizations)	Discrete	The number of shared memberships of ROs between dyads	ROCO III dataset (Panke and Starkman 2020)	1945 - 2015
Joint MEA (Multilateral Environmental Agreements)	Discrete	The number of shared memberships of MEA between dyads	International Environemntal Agreements Database (IEADB) (Mitchell et al. 2002)	1946 - 2022
Joint RTA (Regional Trade Agreements)	Binary	The existence of RTA between dyads in that year	Regional Trade Agreements Database (Larch 2008)	1950- 2022
The number of shared INGO (International Non-Governmental Organizations)	Discrete	The number of shared memberships of INGO between dyads	International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) Datasets. (Kayaalp 2023)	1816 - 2022
Democracy	Continuous	Lower democracy score between dyads	V-dem dataset v11.1 Coppedge et al., 2021)	1789 - 2022
CIE (Contract Intensive Economies)	Continuous	Lower CIE score between dyads	CINE dataset (Mousseau 2019, version April 2023).	1816 - 2019
Alliance	Binary	The existence of alliance between dyads in that year	The Correlates of War Formal Alliance (v4.1).: 1945-2012	1945 - 2012
War History	Binary	If a war ever occurred in a dyad, it is coded as 1; otherwise, it is coded as 0	COW Militarized interstate disputes v5 (Dyadic) (Palmer et al. 2020)	1816 - 2014

APPENDIX C

THE LIST OF 76 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE OPERATIONALIZED FOR JOINT MEMBERSHIP OF ROs (1945–2015)[26]

[26] Retrieved from ROCO Dataset (Panke 2019).

Table 16 The List of Regional Organizations Operationalized for Joint Membership RO Variable.

RO acronym	RO Full Name	Founding Year	Dissolution Year
AC	Arctic Council	1996	
ACC	Arab Cooperation Council	1989	1990
ACD	Asia Cooperation Dialogue	2001	
ACS	Association of Caribbean States	1994	
ACTO	Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization	1995	
AL	League of Arab States	1945	
ALADI	Latin American Integration Association	1960	
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas	2004	
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	1989	
ANDEAN	Andean Community	1969	
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	1989	
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	1967	
AU	African Union	1963	
BEU	Benelux Economic Union	1958	
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation	1997	
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation	1992	
CACM	Central American Common Market	1960	
CAEU	Council of Arab Economic Unity	1964	
CALC	Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development	2008	2010
CAREC	Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation	1997	
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	1965	
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States	1992	
CCTS	Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States	2009	
CE	Conseil de l'Entente	1959	
CEEAC	Communauté Economique des États de l'Afrique Centrale	1983	
CEFTA	Cental European Free Trade Agreement	1992	
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States	2011	
CEMAC	Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale	1991	
CENSAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States	1998	
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries	1976	

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	1991	
CoE	Council of Europe	1949	
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	1993	
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty (Organization)	1992	
EAC	East African Community	1999	
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union	2000	
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization	1985	
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	1975	
EEA	European Economic Area	1992	
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	1960	
EU	European Union	1951	
G5S	G5 du Sahel	2014	
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	1981	
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission	2001	
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development	1997	
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region	2004	
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	1986	
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission	1984	
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association	1997	
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission	1964	
MERCOSUR	Mercado Commun del Sur	1994	
MGC	Mekong-Ganga Cooperation	2000	
MRC	Mekong River Commission	1995	
MRU	Manu River Union	1973	
MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group	2007	
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Organization	1994	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1949	
NC	Nordic Council	1952	
OAS	Organization of American States	1948	
ODECA	Organization of Central American States	1951	1973
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States	1981	
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe	1975	
PA	Pacific Alliance	2012	
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum	1971	
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	1985	
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	1945	
SADC	Southern African Development Community	1980	

SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2001	
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	1954	1977
SELA	Latin American Economic System	1975	
SICA	Central American Integration System	1991	
SPC	Pacific Community	1947	
SPECA	UN Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia	1998	
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union	1994	
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations	2008	
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization	1955	1991

APPENDIX D
THE LIST OF MULTI-REGIONAL COUNTRIES

Table 17 The List of Multi-regional Countries

Regions	Countries
Europe-Asia- Pacific rims	Russia
Europe-Asia	Georgia
Europe-Asia	Armenia
Europe-Asia	Azerbaijan
Europe-Middle East	Greece
Europe-Middle East	Turkey
Europe-Middle East	Cyprus
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Iran
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Iraq
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Saudi Arabia
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Syria
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Jordan
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Yemen
Middle East - Asia - Africa	United Arab Emirates
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Israel
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Lebanon
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Oman
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Kuwait
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Qatar
Middle East - Asia - Africa	Bahrain
Middle East - Africa	Egypt
Middle East - Africa	Libya
Middle East - Africa	Tunisia
Middle East - Africa	Algeria
Middle East - Africa	Morocco
Pacific Rim	Australia
Pacific Rim	Papua New Guinea
Pacific Rim	New Zealand
Pacific Rim	Fiji
Pacific Rim	Solomon Islands
Pacific Rim	Micronesia
Pacific Rim	Vanuatu
Pacific Rim	Samoa

APPENDIX E
WEB-SCRABING CODES FOR FETCHING INGOs FROM ICSO DATABASE

```
import requests
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
import pandas as pd

# URL to scrape
url =
"https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?method=list&show=12661&from
=list&col=&order=&searchType=advSearch&index=525"

# Send a GET request to the URL
response = requests.get(url)

# Create BeautifulSoup object from the response content
soup = BeautifulSoup(response.content, "html.parser")

# Find all the links on the page
links = soup.find_all("a", class_="contactName")

# Initialize lists to store organization data
mdg_goals = []
organization_names = []
addresses = []
year_established = []
consultative_status = []
regions = []
geographic_scopes = []
countries_of_activity = []
year_registration = []

# Visit each link and fetch organization data for link in links:
# Extract the href attribute value from the link
    href = link.get("href")

# Construct the URL for the individual organization's page
    org_url = f"https://esango.un.org{href}"

# Send a GET request to the organization's page
    org_response = requests.get(org_url)

# Create BeautifulSoup object from the organization's page content
    org_soup = BeautifulSoup(org_response.content, "html.parser")

# Find the Millennium Development Goals, organization's name, address, year established, consultative
status,
# region, geographic scope, country of activity, and year of registration
```

```
    org_mdg_goals = org_soup.find("td", string="Millennium Development
Goals").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()
    org_name = org_soup.find("div", class_="contactName").text.strip()
    org_address = org_soup.find("div", class_="contactAddress").text.strip()
    org_year_established = org_soup.find("td", string="Year
established").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()
    org_consultative_status = org_soup.find("td", string="Consultative
Status").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()
    org_region = org_soup.find("td", string="Region").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()
    org_geographic_scope = org_soup.find("td", string="Geographic
Scope").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()
    org_country_of_activity = org_soup.find("td", string="Country of
activity").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()
    org_year_registration = org_soup.find("td", string="Year of
registration").find_next_sibling("td").text.strip()

# Append the data to the respective lists
    mdg_goals.append(org_mdg_goals)
    organization_names.append(org_name)
    addresses.append(org_address)
    year_established.append(org_year_established)
    consultative_status.append(org_consultative_status)
    regions.append(org_region)
    geographic_scopes.append(org_geographic_scope)
    countries_of_activity.append(org_country_of_activity)
    year_registration.append(org_year_registration)

# Create a Pandas DataFrame from the collected data
data = {
    "Millennium Development Goals": mdg_goals,
    "Organization's Name": organization_names,
    "Address": addresses,
    "Year Established": year_established,
    "Consultative Status": consultative_status,
    "Region": regions,

df = pd.DataFrame(data)
```

APPENDIX F
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