On CARICOM and the Varying Levels of and Motives for Integration Among the Member States

2012

Joshua J. A. Scriven
University of Central Florida

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015

University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/1901

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM 1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact lee.dotson@ucf.edu.
ON CARICOM AND THE VARYING LEVELS OF AND MOTIVES FOR INTEGRATION AMONG THE MEMBER STATES

by

JOSHUA J. A. SCRIVEN

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science in the College of Sciences and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

Spring Term 2012

Thesis Chair: Dr. Houman A. Sadri, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT

In an era of rapid transport and communication, spectators have come to expect a bridging of the classic political, social, and economic divide between states. It is taken for granted that states have more to work together than to strive independently for. CARICOM is the Caribbean’s experiment at regional integration and it member states have pledged their ostensible support. This study is aimed at gauging the true levels of enthusiasm of the member states, which have varied among them and over time. By analysing the trade pattern of the Members with each other in comparison with the rest of the world, the commitment of the member states was ascertained. The study explores various issues and characteristics of the region that help to bolster or threaten increased cooperation among the Members. Among these, external dependency, social peculiarities, and the vulnerability of the Members makes for an interesting and uncertain prediction for the group’s future. Using various indicators and indices from such sources as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Commonwealth Secretariat the states were compared and their various situations analysed to give reason for their varied levels of commitment to regionalisation through CARICOM. Certainly possessing more in common than not, the Members prove an exception, or perhaps a refutation to the idea of international cooperation being positively affected or catalysed by commonality.
DEDICATION

For my mother, Juanita, I thank you always for love, life, and hope;

For my aunt, Carol and my uncle, Vaughn: thank you for always providing me with love and encouragement;

For my grandmother, Sylvia: thank you for your love and for your commitment to government, a constant reminder that I am able to be the change I wish to see in the world;

For my sister, Destini: for always being there to brighten my day;

For my mentors and professors too numerous to mention: thank you always for your guidance, correction, and approval;

And to Thomas Aquinas: the greatest lover of wisdom, an example that encourages me daily to search for truth.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the University of Central Florida for the symbol of unparalleled excellence and opportunity it is. In providing me with the invaluable tools needed to research, print and edit, and publish this thesis, it has created opportunities and provided development otherwise unattainable.

I wish to thank Dr. Houman Sadri, Dr. Robert Bledsoe, Dr. Vanessa Lopez-Littleton, and Dr. Rosalyn Howard for their dedication and contribution to my thesis and its development.

Lastly, I wish to thank one of my best colleagues and friend in Student Government, Sen. Amanda Palmeira, for her friendship and for helping me complete this thesis.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... IX

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ XI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... XII

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1

THEORY ............................................................................................................................... 1

SIGNIFICANCE ................................................................................................................... 3

CARICOM: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ....................................................................... 5

FIRST ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................. 11

FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................... 12

DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 17

Development .................................................................................................................... 19

THE BAHAMAS .................................................................................................................. 24

DATA ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 24

GEOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 24

REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT .............................................................................................. 26

ECONOMICS ....................................................................................................................... 27

NATURAL RESOURCES .................................................................................................... 28

POPULATION COMPOSITION & SOCIAL COHESION ....................................................... 28

POLITICAL STRUCTURE .................................................................................................... 33

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO ...................................................................................................... 35

DATA ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 35
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHY</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATURAL RESOURCES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION COMPOSITION &amp; SOCIAL COHESION</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL STRUCTURE</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARBADOS</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATA ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHY</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATURAL RESOURCES</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION COMPOSITION &amp; SOCIAL COHESION</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL STRUCTURE</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VULNERABILITY</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC SPECIALISATION AND DEPENDENCE</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERCAUSAL RELATIONSHIP: TRINIDAD &amp; TOBAGO</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WELFARE AND MIGRATION</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENSITY AND MIGRATION</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIES AND MIGRATION</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: LINE GRAPH. INTRA-CARICOM IMPORTS 2000 TO 2010 ..................................................... 13

FIGURE 2: LINE GRAPH. INTRA-CARICOM EXPORTS 2000 TO 2010 .................................................. 14

FIGURE 3: LINE GRAPH. INTRA-CARICOM TRADE 2000 TO 2010 ..................................................... 15

FIGURE 4: BAR GRAPH. TOTAL INTRA-CARICOM TRADE FOR 2000 TO 2010 TO TOTAL WORLD TRADE FOR 2000 TO 2010. ............................................................................................................ 16

FIGURE 5. BAR GRAPH. 11-YEAR AVERAGE OF ANNUAL RATION OF INTRA-CARICOM TRADE TO WORLD TRADE FOR 2000 TO 2010. ............................................................................................................. 16

FIGURE 6. HYPOTHETICAL DRAWING ILLUSTRATING RELATIONSHIP OF GEOGRAPHIC BARRIERS AND TRADE.................................................................................................................................................. 18

FIGURE 7. BAR GRAPH LISTING CARICOM COMMONWEALTH VULNERABILITY LEVELS. ........ 57

FIGURE 8: DIAGRAM WITH COMPARISON OF CARICOM VULNERABILITY LEVELS TO C-Trade VALUES .................................................................................................................................................. 60

FIGURE 9. INTERNATIONAL TOURISM RECEIPTS (% OF TOTAL EXPORTS) ................................. 66


FIGURE 11. LISTING OF PROTOCOL AREAS BY LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION. SOURCE: Compiled FROM GIRVAN (2005). WHITHER CSME ........................................................................................................ 75

FIGURE 12. LISTING OF AUTHORITIES BY PERCENTAGE OF SCHEDULED LEGAL RESTRICTION REMOVAL. SOURCE: Compiled FROM GIRVAN. WHITHER CSME (2005, P.9) ............... 75

FIGURE 13. BAR GRAPH. AVERAGE PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (% OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE) 1999 TO 2009 .............................................................................................................. 79
FIGURE 14. LINE GRAPH. NUMBER OF MIGRANTS (THOUSANDS) ......................................................... 80

FIGURE 15: BAR GRAPH. AVERAGE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH (AS % OF GDP) FOR YEARS 2005 TO 2007 ........................................................................................................... 81

FIGURE 16: BAR GRAPH. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION (% OF GDP) FOR 2000........ 81

FIGURE 17: LINE GRAPH. MEMBER STATES BY POPULATION DENSITY. ....................................... 83

FIGURE 18: MEMBER STATES BY GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (BILLIONS), 2011 ....................... 86

FIGURE 19: DIAGRAM. RELATIONSHIP OF NATURAL DISASTER VULNERABILITY TO CARICOM TRADE. .......................................................................................................................... 89

FIGURE 20. BAR GRAPH. CARICOM BY PROPORTION OF SUM OF TWO LARGEST ETHNIC GROUPS TO TOTAL POPULATION .................................................................................................. 93

FIGURE 21. BAR GRAPH LISTING MEMBER STATES BY NUMBER OF OFFICIALLY RECORDED ETHNIC GROUPS ................................................................................................................. 93

FIGURE 22: BAR GRAPH. CARICOM BY LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS VARIANCE. ............................... 98

FIGURE 23: BAR GRAPH. CARICOM BY LEVEL OF VARIANCE IN SIZE OF CHRISTIAN GROUPS. . 99
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 CARICOM Classification Based on Levels of Vulnerability ...................... 57
Table 2 CARICOM Classification Based on 11-Year C-Trade Ranking and Corresponding Level of Vulnerability ................................................................. 58
Table 3 CARICOM Levels of Natural Disaster Vulnerability ................................. 88
Table 4 Listing of Member States by Societal Homogeneity Scores .................... 94
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCP Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians
ACS Association of Caribbean States
CARICAD Caribbean Centre for Development Administration
CARICOM The Caribbean Community
CCJ Caribbean Court of Justice
CCS CARICOM Secretariat
CSME Caribbean Single Market and Economy
EU European Union
FTA Free Trade Agreement
HoG Heads of Government
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IMF International Monetary Fund
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NFP National Focal Point
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS Organisation of American States
OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
UK United Kingdom
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNWTO World Tourism Organisation
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UWI University of the West Indies
WTO World Trade Organisation
INTRODUCTION

Theory

Some of the arguments presented for increased integration are that, economically, it creates an environment conducive to price harmonization and increased productivity. In addition to the greater efficiency, increased integration would better enable states to allocate limited resources because administratively costs would be less if shared on a supranational level. Also, increased integration allows for regional competitors, previously shielded from each other by political borders and national subsidy, to challenge each other for the same customer base. As customers are able to be targeted in previously inaccessible markets, nationals of one member state would be able to invest in a product not lucrative in their home market but profitable in others. As competitors, product, and competition increases, so should technological advances and more cost-effective means of manufacture and transport. These factors would lead to a reduction in the price of common goods across the region, therefore benefitting consumers. Corollary to these would be the increase in the amount of trade among member states. As intra-regional trade and production efficiency increases, so should the amount of surplus goods, leaving greater opportunity for increased international profits.

Along with the increased diversity in and levels of production, would come an increase in jobs and the necessary movement of labour attendant to the same. Cross-migration would only serve to strengthen the integration process, as the populations of each member state become more heterogeneous and “regionalized.”
Neo-functionalism was one of the first recognized theories of integration. One of the most important concepts of the school was that of spillover, which explains how the cooperation of states in one sector eventually spread to others as the benefits are realised in each. As, a theory neo-functionalism primarily focuses on the processes by which integration occurs. The theory has been used to explain the integration that resulted in the present European Union. It has been suggested that the integration experienced with the European Union (EU) was arrived at inadvertently through spillover from the central policies of power transfer to the supranational organisation. Michelle Cini in *European Union Politics* (2003) cite Lindberg and Scheingold as asserting that states are occupied more with economic and welfare goals and see integration more as a means than as an end (p.81).

Another important aspect of neo-functionalism is the concept of elite socialisation. The theory proposes that the bureaucracy that evolves at the supranational level will develop an affinity for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) greater than that towards their home states. Luk Van Langenhove (2004) has stated, that in looking at the relations between states, trade has played a necessary and inescapable part. He further explains that this importance has resulted in trade being a common source of supranational cooperation.

A political ideology important to the topic is nationalism. Van Langenhove explains that this doctrine involves a division of the world that consists solely of nations. Pertaining to the topic at hand, nationalism results in the pre-eminence of such concepts as national sovereignty and the economic or political interests of states. Economically, when states espouse nationalism, efforts are made to support local firms while making access to foreign
alternatives more difficult through tariffs and other barriers to trade. Politically, an appeal to nationalism allows states to defend their stance against integrationist policies by claiming that such policies would intrude on their internal governance and would violate the sovereignty enjoyed by all states.

A principle standing in opposition to nationalism is internationalism. Internationalism claims that the sovereignty possessed by states is not limitless, and that in certain sectors state interests can actually be promoted through cooperation. It has been pointed out that when states encourage regional integration, they are able to maximize their profits by engaging in the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers with other states.

**Significance**

The topic of regional integration is significant in a world of increasing economic and even political integration. Going beyond simply accepting the idea, however, that this integration is inevitable and progressive at all levels of international province, this paper is aimed at providing considerable analysis of the theory and practice of economic and policy harmonisation across the Caribbean through a comparative analysis of the CARICOM spectrum. The effects of globalisation on regions and on states and the agreements that underpin them, though almost universal in scope, are varied in the policy and social outcomes that they engender. In the Caribbean region, many states and territories provide overlapping services to external markets, most noticeably in the area of tourism. If integration means standardisation of products and services within the combined market for presentation to non-member states, what does this mean for the economic security of smaller
states that must compete for tourist dollars against larger neighbouring member states? Does integration place restrictions on imports of member states from non-member states of products manufactured in other member states? Would the maintenance of protectionist policies or the denial of these restrictions translate into failure for CARICOM? These questions are more easily asked than answered, but the implications they pose for the present and the future of CARICOM and regional integration are of the greatest importance. The assumed and actual benefits of regionalisation as applied to this region of the world must also be taken into consideration.

The primary purpose of integration is to overcome those barriers to trade found in a world of sovereign states, which through protectionist trade policies impose barriers to the movement of labour, goods, services, or capital across state borders. The literature is replete with enthusiasts on one side of the aisle and sceptics on the other. Optimists look to the European Union as a model and cite the progress that CARICOM has made. Pessimists, on the other hand, bemoan the lack of effective leadership; with such central figures as the current Prime Minister of St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Dr Ralph Gonsalves’ exclaiming “we have not been having serious leadership in CARICOM” (“We May Just,” 2010). This deficiency in leadership is perpetuated by a system in which there is no accountability regarding the implementation of the product of Community agreements, and the absence of penalties as an enforcement mechanism.

Former Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Perry Christie, exquisitely summed up the hypothesis presented in this paper with his remark that “for CARICOM to succeed, our
people must see CARICOM’s success as tied to their own” (2003, p.221). Without this sense of belonging and commitment, this particular Caribbean experiment, like others in the past, such as the West Indian Federation, will fail. The seeds of non-cooperation are not only sewn over the course of time, but are in fact deeply rooted in the psyche of many in the Caribbean.

**CARICOM: Background Information**

The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas in August 1 1973. The states signatory to the treaty at inception were Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago. Six of the remaining Commonwealth Caribbean countries – Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and the British dependency of Montserrat – became members in 1974. The Bahamas was the last independent member of the Caribbean Commonwealth to accede, which it did on 4 July 1983. The most recent accessions to CARICOM were Dutch-speaking Suriname in 1995 and French-speaking Haiti in 2002. The organisation also has Associated Members, which are at present solely British dependencies: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands. CARICOM agreed to establish the single market and Economy (CSME) by 4 July 1993. Twelve member states joined the single market in July 2006 and there is a target to establish the CARICOM single Economy by 2008. The Treaty of Chaguaramas was revised to facilitate the creation of the CSME: its provisional application occurred in 2002 and entered into full force in 2006. The CSME actually comprises two distinct legal components; the single market is “the programme for achieving full freedom of
goods, services, skilled labour, capital, and business enterprise within the Community,” and the single economy refers to the “coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral polices, monetary union, and harmonisation of business and labour laws” (Girvan, 2008, p.41). Although both are collectively referred to in official statements with the CSME acronym, the Community has been more focused on single market implementation. Interestingly, CARICOM is home to the first nation with a population predominantly composed of African-origin to declare its independence (Haiti) and the of the world’s wealthiest majority African-origin nation (the Bahamas).

The purpose of the Community, as explained in its objects, is the improvement of living and working standards and productivity through economic development integration within and expansion without. Other important aspirations are the coordination of foreign policy and increase of global leverage among member states in addition to the promotion of sociocultural and technological enrichment and strengthened cooperation within the health, education, and communications sectors.

Ralph Premdas (2002) advances the position that sovereignty in the Caribbean context is farcical and that “the typical Caribbean state has been distinguished by its deep dependence in practically every sphere of its existence” (p.49). In what should be a market characterised by the elimination of trade barriers, many CARICOM members still cling to vestiges of that all-too-familiar concept referred to as protectionism, albeit under veiled pretences. For example, while Jamaica maintains an open market for goods and services from partners, several other members including Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Belize
maintain non-tariff barriers to exports as well as ambiguous value-added arrangements that allow them to circumvent origin rules (“We May Just,” 2010). Also, many if not all of the CARICOM states continue to deal with a history of colonialism and imperialism while still relying on aid from former colonial powers in addition to the United States and China. They are therefore, hesitant to proceed with full optimism or to be less dependent on external forces and more self-sufficient through each other.

Ramesh Ramsaran (2002) purports that integration, and other forms of progression are feared in the Caribbean because “Caribbean peoples do not trust themselves, either at the local level or regionally.” He brings an example of the fact that “the final court of appeal in legal matters continues to be, not surprisingly, an external one,” in reference to the British Privy Council (p.9). He goes on to further emphasise the importance of racial and class consciousness and emotionalism as determinants for public policy and governments; governments that are brought to power must present tangible set of policies to ameliorate and bring real solution to problems. It is with this mindset that Caribbean people only seek redress for short-term issues and refrain from calls for significant reform. Rhetoric is rife among public officials who lack interest in decisive action to correct known problems and implementing known solutions. Instead, it is more politically expedient to ignore the conclusions of rounds of talks and meetings at the regional level in order to secure a more status quo-enforcing platform on the national front. Tourism, although lucrative at the moment is ignored in its effects on environmental and social modification, high import needs, and competitiveness among the Caribbean states.
This study should fill an important gap in the literature. By focusing on the reality of the situation rather than glorified ideals and constant allusion to things such as the splendours of Europe unification, a more grounded framework for the future can be formulated. It is through addressing divisive issues and traits that ultimately engender non-cooperation that integration will be able to proceed. Lacking full knowledge of its consequences: both economic and social, important themes are often ignored. This paper will be able to expand on these. For instance, it is often taken as a given that integration is progressive and will positively affect all those involved, but some CARICOM states are weary of these promises. These fears are not wholly without warrant, and will be addressed in this paper as well.

In determining the efficiency of a machine, one must determine its intended purpose or end. One must then determine if the system one has set in place allows such a thing to achieve its end with as little waste as possible. The same logic can be applied to a system or instrument of regional integration known as CARICOM. Also, the level of efficiency can be used as a cost-benefit determinant for continued viability or cooperation of members in the system. The elimination of waste and the facilitation of goal realisation in regional integration apparatus is an on-going process in which policies across member states must be constantly updated so as to promote cooperation and a unified strategy. However, unreserved analogies should not be used between machines and such systems that are in fact on an elemental and deliberate path to deadlock. The balancing of the interests of the supranational treaty organisation and the sovereignty of the national units will undoubtedly prove itself a hurdle to complete efficiency. There are ways, however, in which this balancing act will not
absolutely deter the progress of integration. When states, recognising their own independence, determine goals along the path to integration, one would assume that the sovereignty obstacle has virtually been removed from the equation in regards to that phase of the process. A list of goals for integration can be found in the Grand Anse Declaration that gives a deadline of July 4 1993 for roughly 13 targets. Of those, nine have been postponed by their incorporation into the Protocols of Amendment and Revised Treaty. Also, three have been abandoned, while only one has had work initiated – technical work on the establishment of a regional Equity/Venture Capital Fund.

The removal of trade, labour, and other barriers between the member states assists in the gradual reduction of economic motives for non-cooperation in the integration process. Between the members that agreed to the CARICOM Single Market, a plan was formulated for the removal of service and capital movement restrictions and of the right of establishment to culminate in the erection of the same. The plan required that those states index their legal restrictions and that a timetable for the phasing out of those restrictions be arranged and agreed to amongst themselves. Any restrictions not provided in the index were to be considered as having been removed. The member states were then obliged to periodically report their annual progress to the CARICOM Secretariat between the years 2003 and 2005. A declaration of single market compliance was issued by six member states in January 2006, followed by that of the six O.E.C.S. states in July.

The substance of these declarations is not easily translatable into the scheduled removal process previously mentioned. This has caused doubts to be raised about the
substantive nature of the commitment process, even at the levels of the CARICOM Secretariat. In *Learning to Integrate: The Experience of Monitoring the CARICOM Single Market and Economy*, Norman Girvan refers to an analysis of the single market and single economy implementation by the CARICOM Secretariat that includes 774 actions required by the twelve states constitutionally participatory to the CSME. The analysis shows that 52% of the tasks have been completed and that the majority of these lie in the Legal & Institutional Infrastructure category, which has 86% of its required actions fulfilled. Girvan also notes that CARICOM established a CSME Unit in 2002 to catalyse the implementation process. The Unit has found four primary obstacles to expedient and efficacious implementation. The first two are 1) inadequate human resources in the Unit and in the National Focal Points (NFPs) and 2) “limited availability of relevant records at Barbados [(Unit)] office” (Girvan, 2008, p.49). The others are “weak institutional authority of NFPs within their respective states vis-à-vis the sector ministries, Cabinet, Parliament, and the Business and Labour Advisory Committees to which they relate” and “a need for the CSME implementation to be ‘mainstreamed’ into the work of sector ministries and brought within their jurisdiction” (p.49).

Girvan insists that the CCS CSME Unit has had a positive impact on CSME implementation and that it has increased the information circulation regarding implementation and technical assistance to NFPs. It has also assisted in the identification and solution-building strategy for problems encountered throughout the implementation process.

A deal that will substantially increase competition for Caribbean bananas in the EU
was finalized on February 3rd when the European parliament approved an agreement – reached in December 2009 between the EU and the US, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela – which reduces import duties on bananas produced in Latin America by 35% over six years (“Cayman Islands,” 2011). The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA, a reciprocal trade agreement compatible with the World Trade Organisation, or WTO) signed between the EU and the Cariforum (CARICOM and the Dominican Republic) in mid-2008 will have little impact on trade flows in 2011 and 2012, partly because barriers to imports will be dismantled at a slow pace and Caribbean businesses remain ill-prepared for major export initiatives (“Cayman Islands,” 2011).

**First Argument**

Although the supporters of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are quick to tout the benefits of integration and the progress made toward those ends, the members of the Community do not display the commitment and cooperation indicative of increased regional integration as the group’s official propaganda proclaims. Backed by the majority of the literature studied on the topic, which sees integration as at a standstill, the First Argument purports that in a comparison of CARICOM states, it is expected that over a period of time, there will be no increase in Community commitment, vis-à-vis, intra-regional trade. For the purpose of this paper, the definition of intra-regional trade will be limited to the export and import of goods and services between the members of CARICOM.

Intra-regional trade was measured as the amount of the total US-dollar value of a
state's trade (imports and exports) with other CARICOM members as a percentage of the US-
dollar value of that state's total trade (imports and exports) with the world. Throughout the
study, this measurement will be referred to as the CARICOM trade or C-Trade value. Data
was limited to the 11-year period from 2000 to 2010.

Findings

After compiling the data presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, it was shown that the
hypothesis was false. In fact the situation was much more complicated. Firstly, many of the
member states, such as Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, showed a steady increase throughout the
period and exited it with higher figures than those they entered with. The second
distinguishable CARICOM trade (C-Trade) pattern was that of states like Belize, Dominica,
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, which was extremely erratic and showed them exiting the
period at less or about the same levels than they had entered it. St. Lucia’s C-Trade pattern
was similarly erratic, but the country exited not only at a higher level than that at which it
had entered the period, but also higher than its highest level for the entire period. The final
distinguishable pattern was that held by the Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Suriname,
and Trinidad & Tobago. The C-Trade pattern of these states hovered around a set of values
throughout the entire period, with very little variation.
Figure 1: Line graph. Intra-CARICOM imports 2000 to 2010
Figure 2: Line graph. Intra-CARICOM exports 2000 to 2010
Figure 3: Line graph. Intra-CARICOM trade 2000 to 2010
Figure 4: Bar graph. Total intra-CARICOM trade for 2000 to 2010 to total world trade for 2000 to 2010.

States by C-Trade (2000 to 2010-Period Values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000-2010</th>
<th>2000-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas, the</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>19.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>19.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>21.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>25.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>26.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>27.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>24.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>25.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>27.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Caricom Export Ratio for 2000 to 2010
Total Caricom Import Ratio for 2000 to 2010

Figure 5: Bar graph. 11-year average of annual ration of intra-CARICOM trade to world trade for 2000 to 2010.

States by 10-Year Average of Annual CARICOM Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000-2010</th>
<th>2000-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>19.98</td>
<td>19.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas, the</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td>20.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>19.02%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>20.74%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>22.37%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>25.35%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>25.27%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>25.62%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>24.58%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>24.18%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>25.47%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>26.25%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>27.00%</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Caricom Export Ratio (10-year Average) Caricom Import Ratio (10-year Average)
Discussion

After conducting the research, it was realised that the analysis undertaken to statistically prove the existence of non-commitment to CARICOM integration, was actually limited to doing just that and cannot be used to infer the existence of commitment to CARICOM integration.

For instance, as CARICOM states possess geographical proximity, it would logically follow that the existence of trade between one member state and another would naturally be more probable than trade with states outside of the region. The only way for these preliminary findings to be used to conclusively state that integration is increasing would have been for the member states of CARICOM to have been located in a non-contiguous region.

To illustrate this, one can envision the hypothetical situation in Figure 6, where there are three states $A$, $B$, and $C$, with states $A$ and $B$ being contiguous and state $C$ being a great distance away from both $A$ and $B$. Although the existence of $x$ (trade between $A$ and $C$ or $B$ and $C$) could be used singularly as proof of the political or socioeconomic cooperation or dependence characteristic of increased integration, it is much harder to make the same case for $y$ (trade between $A$ and $B$). In line with the thinking of the First Argument, a decrease or eradication elimination of trade between $A$ and $B$ can, however, be used to prove the erection of political or socioeconomic barriers to integrative cooperation. Plainly speaking, states will trade in the absence of natural barriers unless artificial barriers are erected in their stead.
Therefore, when the economic efficiency of proximity is ignored in terms of trade between neighbouring states (A and B), this can serve as an indication of weak socioeconomic or political integration, enforced by active resistance to integrative movement. By this reasoning, because trade did in fact increase in the study, it can be accepted that: 1) there is an absence of an environment opposed to a commitment to CARICOM that occurs across all member states; 2) there is variation across the range trade patterns of member states, indicating their varying levels of investment in CARICOM; 3) and there is also variation within the particular trade pattern of each member state, indicating varying degrees of investment in CARICOM over time.

In this situation, however, intra-regional trade can be defended as the most suitable variable to measure the level of a given state’s commitment to CARICOM. It must raised that no other proposed factor came close to presenting a relative value in which all of the
states participated, and could, to some extent reflect their varying support toward or dependence on the region and CARICOM.

**Development**

Although the First Argument was not supported in the study, the findings still provided interesting topics for study. For instance, why were some states fluctuating so wildly in their CARICOM trade pattern, while others increased steadily, and yet others remained mostly static? One reason posited was that there had to be certain characteristics of the given states that predisposed them to participate in trade like they did. It was decided that to provide for valid research and testing of the number of states without falling into repetitiveness, three states would be chosen as a sample for comparison.

To properly control the comparison, choices were limited to members of the Commonwealth that are sovereign, non-continental, member states of CARICOM in or near the Caribbean Sea. As a means of measuring commitment to CARICOM integration, CARICOM trade was chosen as the independent variable. The amount of CARICOM trade for each state is equal to the combination of its CARICOM export value and its CARICOM import value for a given period of time. The CARICOM export value was obtained by finding the arithmetic mean of the US-dollar value of a state's exports to other CARICOM members as a percentage of the US-dollar value of that state's total exports for a specified period of time. Likewise, the CARICOM import value was obtained by finding the arithmetic mean of the US-dollar value of a state's imports from other CARICOM members as a percentage of the US-dollar value of that state's total imports for that same period of time. This supposes that the maximum CARICOM Trade value a state can have is 200/t. In this
instance, all of that particular state’s imports originated in CARICOM countries and all its exports were sent to CARICOM countries. This value could also be obtained if a state had absolutely no imports or exports, which would be highly unlikely. Conversely, if a state imports nothing from or exports nothing to CARICOM countries, it will have a CARICOM trade value of 0/t. The data for this measurement was obtained from the Direction of Trade (DOT) statistics listing as provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sum of the value of trade listed for each CARICOM country with every other country was calculated and used as a percentage of the Total World Trade-value listed by the IMF. This was done for each year between 2000 to 2010 for which data was available. The currency used throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, is denominated in United States dollars.

States were sorted into three categories of CARICOM trade (C-trade): high, medium, and low. For the 11-year period, there were three possible ways in which to assign the categories. Firstly, the average of the 11 annual C-Trade values for each state falling within the range of years 2000 to 2010 could have been computed. The second option, much like that used for the analysis in the First Argument, would have been to find the C-Trade value of each state using the 11-year period as the interval of time, that is, the total value of its CARICOM imports as a percentage of total imports for the range combined with the total value of its CARICOM exports as a percentage of total exports for the same range. The third option was to visually examine the trend lines established by plotting the yearly C-Trade values of each state over the course of the 11-year period.

It was decided that the third option would be more suitable for selecting the category cases because option one may have resulted in states with only few years of very high C-
Trade values being deemed *high* or those with only few instances of low C-Trade values being deemed *low*. The second option, presented an even greater problem of distinction than the first: allowing for just one anomalous year to skew a proper determination. However, it was determined that in instances of overall analysis requiring the ranking of all member states, the system supported by option two would be used.

The third option took consistency and direction into account and allowed for the discovery of a pattern within the comparative analysis, while also providing a clearer differentiation between the categories. This was seen in the graphs plotted in Figure 1 and in Figure 2. In the exports graph, three distinct clusters of trend lines were noticeable. High, therefore related well to those trend lines lying mostly above 30%, medium to those within the range of 10% and 30%, and low to those below 10%. In the imports graph, however, only two clusters were clearly distinguishable. It was decided that of those states with medium export values, the ones having the least distance from the vertical centre of the imports graph would be considered for placement in the *medium* category. Concurrently, the trend lines of those states were also compared to their relative position on the exports graph.

To control the comparison as much as possible, three states possessing the established limiting criteria were then chosen, one from each C-trade category. CARICOM has 15 members states: Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago. Of these states, Montserrat and Antigua & Barbuda were removed from the initial statistics collection process due to a lack of sufficient comparable trade data. For many of the comparisons in this paper, either of these political
units may have data only on one variable in the comparison, in such cases, they may be
listed, but they will not be considered in the results and conclusions of those comparisons.
Additionally, Montserrat was not considered for comparison because of its status as a
dependency of the United Kingdom (sovereignty criterion). Haiti and Suriname both lacked
the historical or present British and Commonwealth political association, did not fulfil the
Commonwealth criterion. Also, Belize, Guyana and Suriname were removed from further
consideration because of their location on the Central and the South American continental
landmass (non-continental criterion). Barbados, the Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica,
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and Trinidad & Tobago each
possess the established criteria.

Of these remaining states, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and St. Kitts were each below 10%
on the exports graph, placing them tentatively into the low category. St. Vincent & the
Grenadines and Trinidad & Tobago, with trend lines both falling mainly within the range of
10% to 30%, were preliminarily designated as medium. Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and
St. Lucia each had trend lines that placed them into the high category. On the imports graph,
the Bahamas, with a trend line lying wholly within the lower extremities of the low-
percentage cluster, was confirmed as the logical low category case of the C-trade variable. St.
Vincent & the Grenadines’ trade pattern was too inconsistent for consideration for the
medium category. Therefore, Trinidad & Tobago, fulfilling the criteria for deciding on the
medium category variable, was chosen. Of the high exporting value states, Barbados was
chosen as the most consistent and conservative representation for the high category.

In order to confirm that the three cases chosen were as representative of their category
as possible, a more inclusive view of the situation was needed. It was at this point that the graph in Figure 3 was plotted using the comprehensive (combined exports and imports) C-Trade values for each CARICOM member for each year from 2000 to 2010. After cross-referencing the three chosen cases with their locations on the comprehensive graph, their validity was substantiated for each of their chosen categories.
THE BAHAMAS

Data Analysis

In analysing the volume of exports and imports between each of the CARICOM member states and the world, in proportion to its total amount of trade, the Bahamas was shown to have one of the lowest CARICOM-bound export and CARICOM originating-import values for each of the years between and including 2000 and 2010. In terms of exports, the Bahamas has an average CARICOM trade value of 0.55%. From 2000, there was a dramatic increase in 2001 of almost 2% followed by a similarly dramatic decrease of just over 2% in 2002. After a slight 0.30% increase in 2003, CARICOM-bound exports levelled off at 0.4% of total exports for the succeeding years within the set. In terms of imports, the Bahamas has an average CARICOM trade value of 0.7%. Over the period, its CARICOM-bound export ratio fluctuates between the highest point of 0.88% in 2004 and the lowest of 0.54% in 2002. After 2008, trade levelled off at 0.69% for the remainder of the period.

Overall, the CARICOM-related trade data shows that the Bahamas exports very little of its products to CARICOM states in relation to the amount it sends to non-CARICOM states. In addition to this, very little of its imports originate in CARICOM states. Features peculiar to the country were discussed in this chapter.

Geography

The Commonwealth of the Bahamas is an archipelagic state boasting over 3,542 km of coastline and consisting of over 700 islands and cays located in the Atlantic Ocean immediately southeast of the Florida Keys and northeast of Cuba and encompasses a total of
13,880 square kilometres in land (10,010 sq. km) and water (3,870 sq. km) territory. A former British colony, it gained independence from Britain in 1973, while the other island groups within the Lucayan Archipelago, the Turks and Caicos Islands, remained subject to the UK as a British Overseas Territory. Extending 950 km SE-NW and 298 km NE-SW between southeast Florida and northern Hispaniola, none of its territory lies within the geographical extent of the Caribbean Sea, due to its common heritage of British colonial expansion with most of those states that do lie within the Caribbean Sea, it is regarded as a Caribbean country in an historical and sociocultural aspect. The capital, Nassau, is situated on the centrally-located island of New Providence.

Formed by the deposition and calcification of limestone by the wind and waves across the Bahama banks, the islands, located where the banks break the water’s surface, are barely above sea level and are prone to flooding during the hurricane season. Unlike many other CARICOM states, there are no mountains, rivers, or true lakes throughout the islands. The highest point is 63m on Mt. Alvernia, Cat Island.

Geographical isolation from the rest of the CARICOM community may well be a factor in explaining why the Bahamas’ participation in the same has proceeded so poorly. Its closest adjacent states beside the American hegemon to the northwest are Communist Cuba to the south and CARICOM outsider, the Dominican Republic to the southwest. Sandwiched between these two, is Haiti, the site of immense economic turmoil and social upheaval overflowing with an impoverished people seeking the Bahamas as a pristine destination or transit point in their exodus towards boundless liberation. With neighbours like these, it is not extremely difficult to imagine why the country’s citizens may be apprehensive in signing
off on a programme that would signal an end to their protected employment status and perhaps open the floodgates for mass immigration and usurpation of the dominant nation-group. Notably, Guyana is the only other CARICOM state that does not possess a territorial boundary that is contiguous with the Caribbean Sea.

**Regional Involvement**

The Bahamas joined the CARICOM Caribbean Community by ratifying the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1983, choosing however not to be a part of the Caribbean Common Market. It is listed by the treaty as one of the developed countries (MDCs) in CARICOM; the other five being Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago. With the creation of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) in 2001, the Bahamas remains the only member state besides Haiti to have not ratified it. The country has expressed grave concerns about the free movement of labour in the CSME and cites large “opposition at home to participating in a market dominated by nations perceived to be poorer than the Bahamas” (Wilkinson, 2005). Therefore, the Bahamas retains many of its own trading arrangements such as a tariff regime that remains outside of the Common External Tariff (CET). Within CARICOM, it holds the quasi-cabinet portfolio for Tourism.

Former Prime Minister Perry Christie (2003) explained in his speech to the 23rd Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Georgetown, Guyana in 2003 that “the process of consultation with civil society” that is required for ratification of the Revised Treaty in a democratic society such as the Bahamas is still in progress (p.221). This may be contrasted with the oft-perceived elitist approach
Economics

The gross domestic product of states are valued differently by various organizations. However, both the International Monetary Fund in its April 2011 World Economic Outlook Database and the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s *The World Factbook* lists the Bahamas as having the highest GDP per capita based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) of the CARICOM member states and has one of the highest in the world. Based on *The World Factbook* statistics 2010 estimates, the GDP per capita (PPP) of the Bahamas is currently $28,700, or 16% of CARICOM’s total $182,100. The CIA estimates the country’s unemployment rate at 7.6% as of 2006. Its principal source of national revenue and employment is derived from the tourism industry, which accounts for about 60% of GDP (Central Intelligence, 2009a). Hence, attractions that cater to tourists such as hotels, casinos, restaurants, and sports fishing are common.

Its second most lucrative industry is banking and finance, which is supported by the near nonexistence of many forms of taxation, such as income or corporate taxes. The Bahamian dollar, consisting of 100 cents, has been in use since 1966. In 1972, the Bahamian Dollar delinked its association with Pound Sterling and now shares parity with the United States Dollar (Central Bank of the Bahamas, 2007).

The Bahamas’ unwillingness to enter into greater integration with CARICOM, such as in the CSME, is encouraged by an “opposition at home to participating in a market dominated by nations perceived to be poorer than the Bahamas” (Wilkinson, 2005). As seen through such economic indicators as GDP per capita, the Bahamas’ relative wealth
substantially surpasses those of its CARICOM partners, its apprehension to greater integration may be sustained by the fear that it would possibly become a sort of economic host on which lesser economically developed countries could exploit with parasitic unscrupulousness.

**Natural Resources**

Because the soil of the Bahamas’ islands is so high in weathered limestone, it is thin, sandy, and unfertile, making farming very difficult. Most consumer goods are therefore imported, with farming occurring mainly on subsistence levels on family island settlements. There are but a few oil refineries and small factories accounting for the commonwealth’s manufacturing industry. Agriculture created $56.44 million for the Bahamas in 1997, centred mainly on government-leased land on the islands of Abaco, Andros, Grand Bahama, and Eleuthera, of which 95% of exports are bound for the United States (Buchan, 2000). The commercial fisheries industry does provide some revenue, with most catch being frozen and packaged for export. Noteworthy exports are pharmaceuticals, rum, crawfish, and cement components (LaFlamme, 2001). The commonwealth’s major trading partners are the United States, and Canada. Also, because the Bahamas produces very little at commercial levels, it is almost entirely dependent on imports for its consumption needs.

**Population Composition & Social Cohesion**

The Bahamas is one of the few Caribbean countries in which the entire indigenous population, a group of Taino Arawak Indians known as the Lucayans, was entirely wiped out
and the local population being exclusively transplanted from European settlements from the UK and what were then the thirteen American colonies along with their slaves. Columbus is recorded to have made his first landfall in the New World on one of the Bahamian islands in 1492, whereafter the Lucayans were rapidly hunted to extinction through forced migration by the Spanish in their quests for slave labour and unfamiliar European diseases such as smallpox. The Spanish never officially occupied the islands and European settlement was thinly dispersed over the centuries by those seeking asylum in the colonies from the religious persecution in Great Britain. No large-scale immigration occurred until the end of the American Revolution with the relocation of many of those Americans who had not supported revolution and remained loyal to the British Crown. Many of these loyalists, travelling from such places as Virginia and the Carolinas, were given land grants and established large plantations worked by vast numbers of slaves, which resulted in an exponential increase in the size of the black population on the islands. Today, 85% of the population is of African descent with approximately two-thirds living on New Providence Island, which hosts the seat of government, Nassau. Such a large amount of people living in such a small area makes for a people perhaps more highly cognisant of the value of land than those in more capacious terrain.

Within the country, there is a noticeable distinction between the Nassau and New Providence and the other islands, previously known as “Out Islands” and officially designated today as the “Family Islands.” With a population of approximately 313,312 as of July 2011, the Bahamas is the sixth largest member of CARICOM based on number of inhabitants (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009a). Of those numbers, almost as much as 25%
are in fact illegal Haitian economic refugees, a staggering amount suggested by LaFlamme suggests. Over 85% of Bahamians trace their ancestry to African groups, with most of the other 15% to Europeans and a very small minority of Asians (LaFlamme, 2001). With this national composition, English is by far the most dominant language, and is currently the official language of the country with varying degrees of standard pronunciation and vocabulary across economic strata and from island to island.

In the Bahamas, as in other former West Indian colonies, there was and possibly still is a social structure that values Eurocentric ideas and even racial superiority above those of the majority of the population, which is of African descent. This resulted in a system of corrupt minority governance by white politicians involving the gerrymandering of districts. Up until 1953, when the Bahamas was still a colony, there were in fact no political parties and control lay in the hands of a group of white businessmen known as “The Bay Street Boys.” Located in the heart of Nassau, Bay Street is a major hub for tourism, boasting about five of the largest nine hotels on the island, home one of the most-visited cruise ship docks and container ports in the region, the seat of parliament in Rawson Square, and central station for public transportation on the island. This oligopoly officially ended politically with the election of 10 January 1967 ending in majority rule. There exists, however, an upper class comprising prominent state officials, affluent business owners, and professionals. In the past, this class was made up of white and light-skinned Bahamians, Britons, and a few Americans and Canadians who mostly sought to immerse themselves in British manner and custom. Today, there is less attraction in imitating the ancien régime and there are noticeably more persons of African descent. The middle class consists primarily of locals of African
ancestry and some of European or Asian origin. It is occupied by civil servants, lower-ranking corporate managers, small business owners, and some professionals. The largest of the classes is the lower class, which is virtually entirely populated by those of African descent, includes fishermen, farmers, skilled tradesmen, and labourers. Haitian refugees and chronically unemployed form the basis of a Bahamian underclass, mostly in slum areas dispersed throughout urban areas in Nassau, with large settlements in Abaco. In early 2010, about 1,500 Haitians have illegally settled in Pigeon Pea, Abaco and an estimated 2,000 more of them live on government-owned land in The Mud, Abaco (Reynolds, 2010).

Today, Bahamians generally have negative views toward Haitians. They are often illustrated as a primary factor of violent and criminal elements in Bahamian society and blamed for the country’s economic losses and/or costs due to their largely undocumented status compounded by their consumption of social resources, such as health services and education. In the eyes of Bahamians, descendants of British Empire and Protestant migrants the French Creole and voodoo practiced by the Haitian immigrants may well add nothing positive to Bahamian perceptions of them. What is emphasized by this is the “otherness” of a trespasser-people engaged in sorcery that converse in an unknown tongue and therefore do not seek assimilation or submission, but secretly scheme national usurpation. These notions, no matter how unfounded, are further exacerbated by the high birth rate within the Haitian population and expected strain on resources.

In its religious composition, the population of the Bahamas is once again virtually homogenous with over 92% of ascribing to Christianity and the remainder being divided among those with a different faith, an unspecified one, or none at all (Central Intelligence
The Bahamas celebrates ten national holidays, with five of them being related to the Christian calendar and events. Emancipation Day, honouring the abolition of slavery, is currently the only holiday linked to an ethnicity. There are no holidays commemorating other religious groups and some of the first mosques for example have been built within the last five years under great public outcry.

Because the Bahamas is almost homogenous in its societal composition, it’s aversion to the “other” is perhaps more pronounced, and possibly more concerted in its political effects. In other words, Bahamians are conceivably more united in their distrust and disassociation with those from other CARICOM states simply because they lack the influence of plurality that others in the Community possess. In plurality, there would possibly be more accepting of others from differing backgrounds and possess a greater acceptance of communality and even altruism.

A study commissioned by the CARICOM Secretariat found that the Bahamas receives more workers from other CARICOM countries than any other CARICOM member (Christie, 2003). There are three large hospitals in the Bahamas, with two of them being owned and operated by the government, Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH) in Nassau, New Providence, and Rand Memorial Hospital in Free Port, Grand Bahama. A large private hospital, Doctor’s Hospital, operates in Nassau quite near to PMH. There is one major facility for psychiatric, geriatric, and substance abuse services, Sandilands Rehabilitation Centre, which is located on New Providence. Hundreds of small public clinics are scattered throughout the islands.

The Ministry of Education is charged with Bahamian education. There were 49 independent and 161 government-owned pre-tertiary institutions in the Bahamas in 1997,
with 31 and 37, respectively, located on New Providence. With the Bahamas having a 95.6% literacy rate, it counts among the world’s highest (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009a).

**Political Structure**

Its independence, gained on 10 July 1973, made the Commonwealth of the Bahamas the 5th country to be formed from the former British colonial possessions in West Indies and the only CARICOM member to gain sovereignty in the same year that the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed. Like most former British colonies, it is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, and like most of its CARICOM partners, it retains the Monarch of the United Kingdom as its head of state. Its form of government is therefore a constitutional monarchy with the present Governor-General, H.E. Sir Arthur A. Foulkes, representing H.M. Queen Elizabeth the Second in her absence.

Due to its long history of British rule, the Bahamas is a parliamentary democracy with a Westminster system of government very similar to that of the United Kingdom. The executive is vested in a prime minister with legislative powers belonging to Parliament. Parliament is composed of an elected lower house of 41 seats, the House of Assembly, and an upper house, the Senate, whose 16 members are appointed by the Governor-General in consultation with the prime minister and the leader of the Opposition. The Members of Parliament, though elected from single-member districts throughout the islands, need not be resident on their constituency and legislate from the capital in Nassau. The state is highly unitary with local governments exercising very limited powers and possessing scarce resources. Currently, there is primarily a two-party system in the Bahamas, with the Free National Movement forming the Government, and Rt. Hon. Hubert A. Ingraham as leader
(and Prime Minister). The current opposition party is the Progressive Liberal Party, with former Prime Minister Rt. Hon. Perry G. Christie as its leader.

The Bahamas does not maintain military forces, but law enforcement is administered by the Royal Bahamas Police Force and border protection and maritime patrol is maintained by the Royal Bahamas Defence Force.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO

Data Analysis

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago was shown to have one of the higher CARICOM-bound export and CARICOM originating-import values for each of the years between and including 2000 and 2010. In terms of exports, Trinidad and Tobago has an average CARICOM trade value of 16.46%. From a high of 24.54% in 2000, there was a sharp decrease to 15.60% in 2003 and a more gradual decline in the following years leading up to 2006, with 13.82% in that year. There has been a resurgence since 2006, with only a slight decrease of 0.48% from 2007 to 2008, to the 2010 level of 17.61%. In terms of imports, Trinidad and Tobago has an average CARICOM trade value of 2.95%. Over the period, its CARICOM-bound export ratio fluctuates between the highest point of 3.79% in 2000 and the lowest of 2.38% in 2004. There was abrupt decline in trade of 1.28% from 2000 to 2002, the steepest for the period. Imports rebounded in 2003, however, to 2.88% only to trail off again in 2004 to 2.38%. A more sustained growth was seen onward from 2004, reaching a high of 3.05% in 2007. Again, however, trade values plummeted 0.44 percentage points to 2.61% in 2008. The forecast for higher trade values looks better since 2008, with a steady increase to 3.49% in 2010, the highest second only to the initial value for the period of 2.79%. Possible reasons for the data with reference to features peculiar to the country were discussed in this chapter.

Geography

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is an archipelagic state consisting of two main
islands, Trinidad (4,828 sq. km) and Tobago (300 sq. km) and other small outlying islands (Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011). The country’s nearest neighbours are Venezuela, about 11 kilometres to the southwest, and Grenada to the north. The country also hosts a combined coastline of 362 km. With Trinidad representing over 94% of the country’s 5,128 square kilometres of land territory, it is currently home to the capital city of Port of Spain and about 96% of the nation’s 1,227,505 inhabitants (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009c). Trinidad & Tobago’s proximity to the South American continent serves as no impediment to the Community’s recognition of its West Indian commonality bolstered by a decidedly historical and cultural Anglophone heritage. The country, unlike most of its CARICOM partners, is able to avoid the annual period of trepidation brought on by the destructive course of hurricanes careening their way along an arch immediately to its north, drawn from the western coast of Africa in the southeast to the North American continent in the northwest.

**Regional Involvement**

Trinidad and Tobago is one of the founding members of CARICOM, having signed the Treaty of Chaguaramas 11 years after its independence from Britain. It should be noted that although it plays host to the headquarters of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), it is not one of the two states that has transferred final Appellate Court jurisdiction to the CCJ from the Privy Council in London. Much is to be noticed about Trinidad and Tobago’s CARICOM involvement, by which is intended, the treaties and other legal obligations along with Community Organs of which it is a member. It is both founder and host, an example of economic abundance, yet seems to lack the underlying spirit that should transform the
rhetorical adherence to existing legal obligations into practical stratagem for the future. While it accepts the temporal presence of the CCJ within its territory, it in effect renders this closeness mute as it declines to accept the CCJ’s juridical authority.

Trinidad is currently one of only seven countries in CARICOM to have ratified the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enact it into domestic law. Meanwhile Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minster Kamla Persad Bissessar says her country can no longer continue with the level of support it has provided CARICOM through its Petroleum Fund sponsorship. She says Trinidadian funding assistance for CARICOM will not be maintained to match past levels. The Prime Minister announced at a CARICOM heads of government summit in Jamaica that Trinidad and Tobago had its own fiscal challenges and had to take them into consideration before deciding to continue providing financial assistance to CARICOM.

Natural Resources

In contrast to the overwhelming majority of CARICOM’s members, Trinidad and Tobago has heavily invested in its industrial sector. It produced 147,000 barrels per day (bbl./d) of oil, with 100,000 bbl./d of crude oil with the remainder being primarily attributable to natural gas liquids (NGLs) (United States Energy Information Administration, 2009). The state plays a major role in this process, through one of its corporations, Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago, or Petrotrin. Trinidad and Tobago’s large hydrocarbon resources may in fact give it a unique commercial or economic advantage above the other CARICOM countries, which perhaps holds its economy impervious to the vicissitudes brought on by hurricanes that ravage the tourist product of many CARICOM partners; these resources also provide a buffer to counter tourists’ decline in travel provoked by such events
as the terrorist attacks on September 11th. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, for example, in 2009 while the global economy was experiencing a recession. Trinidad and Tobago production rates changed little from 2008 to 2010, with an export about 110,000 bbl./d of oil for 2009 most of which was bound for the United States. Its findings also conclude that Trinidad and Tobago is in fact the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas to the United States in addition to being the fifth largest supplier in the world (United States Energy Information Administration, 2009). The Republic is a regional manufacturing superpower of sorts and, as former prime minister, Patrick Manning, states, has become the world’s largest exporter of ammonia and methanol and its fifth largest direct-reduced iron (DRI) trader: it also has plans to create the countries first aluminium smelter. The country is home to the world’s largest natural asphalt reserves, found at Pitch Lake located on its south-western coast (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009c). Agriculture also plays a significant role in Trinidad and Tobago with sugar, cocoa, coffee, citrus, and flowers being primary crops.

Due to Trinidad and Tobago’s vast and precious resource supplies, the country is likely to act more independently of foreign powers and should be expected to be a leader in regional policies. With assets such as petroleum as a bargaining chip, there should be less fear of external reprisal from countries like the United States with which it has a more symbiotic than dependent relationship than the majority of other CARICOM states. If CARICOM were styled along similar guidelines as the EU, it would have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $15B, which is dominated to a large extent by the regional economic behemoth, oil and gas rich Trinidad, the world's leading natural gas exporter to the
United States (Wilkinson, 2005). Trinidad and Tobago should also be able to provide itself as an alternative source of aid to dissuade states from siding with players such as the United States against regional interests. Also, in the spirit of trade, Trinidad and Tobago is able to provide real meat for the discussion, as it actually has resources that the other states need and do not have. Few, if any of the other CARICOM states, with their reliance on things such as tourism and banking and finance, can boast of such demand.

**Economics**

Such manufactures of steel, petrochemicals, and liquefied natural gas have played a pivotal force in maintaining Trinidad and Tobago’s position as a leader in economic performance measured by growth. Compared to the region’s 3.7% average economic growth for the 2000-2007 period, Trinidad and Tobago’s 8% expansion within the same timeframe serves as a testament to this, along with a 2% increase noted from 2009 to 2010 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009c). Its economy has doubled in size from $55 billion in 2001 to $114 billion at the end of 2006. Regarding unemployment in the country, rates fell to 5% in 2006 from 11.5% in 2001 according to Patrick Manning, leader of the People’s National Movement and former prime minister of the republic. He further states, that the country accounts for about 80% of trade within the CARICOM Single Market (CSM), which is CARICOM’s trade bloc and first phase of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). The energy sector accounts for about 40% of GDP, 53% of government revenue, and 80% of exports. Tourism, though a burgeoning sector in Trinidad and Tobago’s economy, is not as important in comparison to the proportion it exerts in other CARICOM states. These growths are not without their limits, as exhibited by the 3.5% contraction in
growth noticed in 2009 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). The Trinidad and Tobago Dollar (TTD) is equal to approximately $6.33 USD.

**Population Composition & Social Cohesion**

Both islands were originally inhabited by the South American Amerindians, with Trinidad being identified as one of the first inhabited places in the Caribbean. When Christopher Columbus and other Europeans first made contact with islands, Trinidad had been settled by numerous Arawak and Carib-speaking groups, with Tobago being largely populated by the Caribs (Yelvington, 2001). With Christopher Columbus’ landing in 1498 came the Europeans and the mysterious and deadly diseases they brought with them. For most of the Amerindians that were able to stave off death-by-infection, there was secured a life of forced labour in the mines on the mainland. Yelvington explains that the French and African populations were first introduced to Trinidad by way of the Spanish Cedula de Población, which in 1783 aimed to transform the island into a plantation colony. With the immigration of French planters and their African slaves for cocoa and sugar cultivation, the French came to dominate the culture and communication on the island.

The island of Trinidad was claimed by Spain until it was officially awarded to the British, who had actually captured the island from 1792, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. This same treaty settled the island of Tobago on Britain as well; its ownership having been passed through a varied miscellany of foreign empires ranging from the Dutch and French, to the Spanish and also the peculiar case of the Courlanders, settlers from what was then a duchy located in the Baltics. With this conveyance came the multiplicity of British stakeholders and dependants, such as colony
administrators, planters, and their slaves.

After the passage Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 by which slavery was fully abolished throughout the Empire, Trinidad was faced with a serious complications on its sugarcane plantations, in which a shortage of labour threatened their continued existence (Williams, 1962). This was solved by the British indenture system, “under which a person agreed to work for a set period for a landowner in a British colony in exchange for passage to the colony” (Indenture, 2011). Of the several nationalities contracted, Indians formed a sizeable majority with more than 147,000 of them being introduced to the colony over a period spanning more than seven decades from 1845 to 1917 (Dean, 1994). This has resulted in Indian, or South Asian, ethnic groups representing 40%, almost one half of the country’s total population according to the Central Intelligence Agency (2009c). However, it is not to be assumed that Indians were the only indentured workers brought in droves. The influx of Chinese and African indentured labourers along with Portuguese immigrants has considerably influenced the cultural and ethnic composition of modern-day Trinidad and Tobago. This is present in the statistics, with the Central Intelligence Agency also noting that the population is additionally composed 37.5% of African ethnic groups and 20.5% of others of mixed descent. This heterogeneity does not, however, extend to Tobago, which is virtually populated entirely by people of African descent, resulting in Tobagonians considering themselves culturally distinct from Trinidadian. On the island of Trinidad, Indo-Trinidadians primarily live in the central and southern part of the island, with Afro-Trinidadians and others occupying the urban areas and the North (Yelvington, 2001).

Like the majority of the other CARICOM countries, the official language of Trinidad
and Tobago is English. However, unlike most of the others, the country is largely multilingual, with substantial populations of language groups, ranging from standard and non-standard forms of English to Spanish, French-based creole to Bhojpuri and Urdu. With the tremendous amount Indian immigrants previously mentioned, came a large Hindu majority, with a significant Muslim minority. Hence, the cultural mix at work results in the significant employment of language for religious purposes, such as Arabic or Yoruba. While well or lesser known Western or Christian-related holidays are included in the national register, such as Good Friday, Corpus Christi, Christmas, and Boxing Day, others in commemoration of Muslim and Hindu groups, such as Diwali and Eid al Fitr, are observed. Against the argument that because these holidays are religious, their sensitive nature warrants such official recognition, there are such holidays as Emancipation Day and Indian Arrival Day that give public recognition to the country’s African and Indian populations that originated from slavery and the indenture system. This theme of not only acceptance of its heterogeneity, but thanksgiving and realisation of the benefits of the same are wrapped up in the motto of the Republic, "Together We Aspire, Together We Achieve."

Due to Trinidad and Tobago’s highly multicultural atmosphere, the population should be somewhat more open to migration to and from other parts of the region. The fear of the “other” should not be as prevalent as in more homogenous societies like the Bahamas, for example. They are able to encounter and learn to deal with individuals from different cultures and belief systems on a daily basis, and should be more open to accepting other peoples as equals. This acceptance is seen dynamically in the inclusion of holidays in the national calendar that take into account the religious plurality and ethnic variety and related
contributions. The differences in language that permeate the isles may also result in various understanding of things like CARICOM and increased integration, basically leaving the governing elite free to chose a course of action that would not have been popularly supported under a people more unified in language (thought processes) and common prejudices or animosity. For instance, Indo-Trinidadians may not like Guyanese nationals, but the Afro-Trinidadians or significant Chinese populations might. This division in “national voice” translates into compromise on policies that affect the country’s relationship with the region and at international levels that may well be beneficial in the cause for greater Caribbean integration.

Political Structure

The islands of Trinidad and Tobago were combined economically and politically into a single British territory in 1888 (United States Department of State, 2011). Trinidad and Tobago, which was granted independence from the British Empire in 1962, is of those atypical cases in the Caribbean Commonwealth in which a realm has opted to become a republic. By refusing to exist as a Commonwealth Realm and employing a person of its own choosing as head of state, Trinidad may have effectively detached itself from the historic socio-political traditions of the British monarch and all her realms and territories, vis-à-vis CARICOM.

Although Trinidad and Tobago is a republic, its deviation from the norm within the CARICOM member governance spectrum is recognizably muted by the many other common characteristics it shares with its CARICOM partners. Having a Westminster system parliamentary style of government, the country has a bicameral legislature with an appointed
31-member Senate and an elected 41-member House of Representatives with one of their number chosen as prime minister and head of government. Additionally, the island of Tobago hosts a separate House of Assembly, which implements national parliamentary policies and provides local government for the island. However, noticeable differences do exist, such as the fact that the President, the head of state, is elected by a vote of both houses of parliament to renewable 5-year terms. Being based in the urban areas, Afro-Trinidadians have historically maintained a stronghold within government, with Indo-Trinidadians confined to agriculture and lower-level state positions. Trinidad and Tobago scores relatively well in many of the 10 economic freedoms.
BARBADOS

Data Analysis and Summary

Barbados was shown to have one of the highest CARICOM-bound export and CARICOM originating-import values for each of the years between and including 2000 and 2010. In terms of exports, Barbados has an average CARICOM trade value of 50.40%. From the lowest instance of the period of 26.49% in 2000, there was a steady increase 43.09% in 2001, 44.59% in 2002, and 53.62% in 2003. There was a slight fluctuation between 2004 with 52.48% and 2005 with 55.84%, followed by a more dramatic decline in 2006 to 48.73%. A steady increase followed for the years 2007, 2008, and 2009 with 55.72%, 58.44%, and 57.26% respectively. In 2010, the value once again fell, by 6.66% to 50.60%. In terms of imports, Barbados has an average CARICOM trade value of 27.50%. Over the period, its CARICOM-bound export ratio steadily increases from the lowest point at 19.87% in 2000 to the highest of 37.66% in 2010. There was one anomaly to the pattern when the value dropped by a slight 1.72% to 29.70% in 2008.

Geography

Barbados is an island state comprising about 431 sq. km (about 23 km in width and 34 km in length) and boasts a coastline of over 97 km (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009b). Like many of the Caribbean islands, the flat, low-lying island was formed through the same process of limestone deposition and eventual lowering of sea level as the Bahama Islands.

It is one of the largest in the island group referred to as the Windward Islands. This grouping is a subgroup located in the southern portion of the Lesser Antilles group of
islands. Using Google Maps the country is approximately 360 km northeast of Venezuela and its nearest neighbours are St. Lucia, 88 km northwest, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 160 km to the West. According to the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and its 2011 estimates, the island is home to population of over 273,331 people. Belonging to the Lesser Antilles group of islands, it is located on the eastern fringe of the Caribbean Sea and is the easternmost country within CARICOM. It lies within the hurricane belt, but is less prone to associated disasters than other CARICOM states. The island’s rock stratum is mainly comprised of limestone capped with coral. The highest point is Mount Hillaby, which rises at 340 m above sea level.

With an estimated 635.65 persons for every square km, Barbados has by far the greatest population density within CARICOM, and by some measurements numbers within the top ten most dense in the world.

**Regional Involvement**

On 1 August 1973, Barbados, along with Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago became the founders of the Caribbean Community and Common Market. Barbados is vested with responsibility for the Single Market and Economy (including Monetary Union) on CARICOM’s quasi-cabinet, which serves as the vanguard for those sectors it has deemed pivotal to regional integration. It has thus, been one of the strongest supporters of the CARICOM as single market and economy as opposed to simply a common one. Its territory is home to a number of CARICOM organisations, such as the Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ), Caribbean Disaster Emergency
First sighted by Spanish explorers, the island lay unclaimed by Spain and was most likely first visited by the Portuguese in 1536. The English were the first to erect permanent settlement on the island in 1627 and it remained a British colony until 1966, when it gained its independence. During the early colonial period, the original inhabitants, the Arawak Indians, were decimated by their incorporation into the slave trade, being transported to other Caribbean islands for labour on plantations. The British colonizers and the Dutch established sugar plantations in the 1640s. As this plantation-based economy matured, the consolidation of land followed, and thousands of the non-white landless Barbadians emigrated to North American or other Caribbean territories. Coupled with the extermination of the original populations, what resulted was a vast labour deficiency. Subsequently, the importation of thousands of African followed throughout the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Barbados was inhabited by approximately 5,580 blacks in 1645, and 40,000 by 1667. Even at the end of the slave trade and with emancipation, indentured servants were not as sensible in Barbados because of the abundant labour the trade had created. In 1804 the West African-Caribbean slave trade was ended, and in 1834, slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire. However, the newly liberated majority was not fully enfranchised until universal adult suffrage was allowed in 1951.

One of Barbados’ first stints as a member of an international grouping began in the 1830s, during which time the Windward Islands (Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Grenada) were under the jurisdiction of the British colonial governor of
Barbados. The governor had sought to form a Windward Islands confederation, but faced strong opposition from the Barbadian planters, who dreaded a diminution in their politico-economic autonomy. The country abandoned a part in the government of the Windward Islands in 1885.

Barbados had been a member of the West Indies Federation, which lasted from 1958 to 1962. In its short-lived history, the only person to be elected to head of the federation was Barbadian, Grantley Adams. Self-nationalistic ambitions in Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica resulted in the ultimate dissolution of the ten-member grouping aimed at forming a unified post-colonial state. The country was instead individually awarded self-government by the British in October of 1961. Full self-rule was achieved at independence in November of 1966 at which point the state was accepted as member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Meyerson, Hornbeck, and Haggerty (1987) explain that as with the transition to fully sovereign entities after independence, the cause for political association lost much of its attractiveness. Economic cooperation, however, remained strong due to the vulnerable economic status of the small new states. It was for this reason that the establishment of Carifta was supported by such figures as Barrow as a way to encourage the economic viability of the region. It was also devised as a way to sustain the integration movement. At least, the principle of coordination of foreign policy by the Commonwealth member states, as put forth by Barrow, was realised in theory with the emergence of CARICOM.

As of 1972, the country has established diplomatic relations with the communist Caribbean country of Cuba. It is, however, supportive of United States alignment and was also in support of the United States invasion of Grenada in 1083. The country is currently a
member of organisations such as the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Group of 77 (G-77), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and Organisation of American States (OAS). As of 10 December 2002 Barbados had acceded to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and in 1 August 1980, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (with reservation). It became a member of the UN in 1966. The city of Wildey, St. Michael, Barbados is home to the only existing offices of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB).

Barbados, one of the few Caribbean counties to that maintains standing military forces, is also home to the headquarters of the Regional Security System. The Regional Security System, as explained on its website, was created by a Memorandum of Understanding between Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines (OECS members) and Barbados. After independence, both St. Kitts & Nevis and Grenada joined the system, which was updated by treaty formation in 1996. The system involves the cross-border coordination of military and police personnel from its member states in aid of the others. It partnered with the United States and Jamaica in the military overthrew of the short-lived Marxist regime in Grenada in 1983.

Barbados currently maintains the use of the Death penalty. In 2005, the country accepted the appellate jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). It is one of only three countries (the others being Guyana and Belize) that have replaced the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) with the CCJ as its final appellate court for both civil and criminal cases. There is approximately one doctor for every 835 people in the country. As of 1962, education, through predominantly state-operated facilities, was free for
all nationals. In 1984, for example, religious institutions administered only 4% of pre-tertiary education.

**Economics**

The national currency is denominated in Barbadian dollars (BBD), which are equal to US$1 per BB$2. According to the 2010 estimates compiled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s *The World Factbook*, Barbados has a GDP of $6.227 billion and placed 155th in the global ranking based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP). The GDP per capita PPP of the country is estimated by the same source as being $21,800 and is ranked 59th globally. By these standards, Barbados ranks second in CARICOM with GDP per capita and fifth with GDP as purchasing power parity. According the same source, its unemployment rate as of 2003 was 10.7%: ranking 115th globally (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009b).

Tourism forms an integral part of the Barbadian economy, accounting for its greatest source of foreign exchange as of 1985 (Meyerson et al, 1987). According to World Tourism Organization 2006 data, Barbados had over 548,000 international tourists arrivals in 2005 and had receipts of over $765 million.

**Natural Resources**

Barbados’ mineral resources primarily subsist in oil and natural gas, which is not refined domestically. The product is transported to Trinidad & Tobago for refinement before being applied in domestic use.

Financial Times lists information processing and offshore banking financial services as important sectors in Barbados. The Financial Times has also pointed to the country’s economic weaknesses as existing in a poorly performing sugar industry and relatively high
manufacturing costs coupled with a deficiency in labour supply based on low population growth (Barbados, 2011). According to the same source, 15% of its exports are destined for Trinidad and Tobago followed closely with Jamaica with 14%. Of its remaining export base, about 27% is evenly split between its next highest partners: UK, the United States, and Brazil. Regarding imports, the United States and Trinidad & Tobago are listed as its highest volume partners, possessing 35% and 20% of its export market, respectively.

**Population Composition & Social Cohesion**

Barbados is touted as the “Little England” of the Caribbean because it remained firmly within the possession of the British from their landfall in 1625 until the grant of independence in 1966. British dominance did not oscillate between the conquering and reconquering of the possession, as was the case in most other parts of the Caribbean. This was facilitated by the difficulty involved with sailing to the island due to its location along the wind currents. The official language of the country is English. The majority of the population are descendants of Africans brought to the area primarily during the 16th to 19th century. Because of this, as of the 2000 census, blacks make up 93%, with white (3.2%), mixed (2.6%), and East Indian (1%) groups comprising the remainder, of the population. Being 63.4% Protestant, 4.2% Roman Catholic, and 7% non-denominational Christian, the country’s clearly dominant religion is Christianity.

Its major religious holidays include Good Friday, Easter Monday, Whit Monday, and Christmas Day. Other holidays, such as National Heroes Day, Errol Barrow Day, and Independence Day are related to historic events or personalities in the country’s history, while Boxing Day and May Day are a relic of its British heritage. As listed on
Barbados’ Kadooment Day is the only national holiday whose focus is of African origin.

Historically, the Barbadian population has been stabilized particularly through emigration. The unemployed were absorbed abroad during the period between World War II and the 1970s. From 1946 until 1980, one-third of the population immigrated to Britain. During the 1960s, however, the British government established restrictions on immigration from the West Indies, with the United States acquiring the role of greatest emigrant recipient. Nevertheless, in years like 1970, a net inflow of workers still occurred due to a large influx from the Eastern Caribbean states.

**Political Structure**

Barbados is a constitutional democracy and has a Westminster system style of government with H.M. Queen Elizabeth II as head of state, represented by a governor general. Centred on the capital in Bridgetown, its parliamentary government is comprised of a bicameral legislature, a prime minister and cabinet representing the executive, and the opposition. The lower house of the legislature, the House of Assembly consists of 30 seats, while the upper house, the Senate, consists of 21 seats. The members of the House, Members of Parliament (MP) are elected through majorities in electoral districts. On the other hand, of the senators, 7 are appointed by the Governor-General, 12 by the Prime Minister, and 2 by the Leader of the Opposition.

Barbados has developed a strong two-party system, with third parties remaining essentially irrelevant. Crown colony government, in which the crown has full exercise of legislative and administrative faculties, as opposed from one possessing a constitution and
representative government was established in all the other British Caribbean territories except in Barbados, the inhabitants of which heavily petitioned against such intrusive administration. Formed in 1639, the Barbados House of Assembly follows only the Virginia House of Burgesses and the legislature of Bermuda as most ancient in the Western Hemisphere (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009b).
VULNERABILITY

When the Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Rex Nettleford, addressed the University of Guyana in March of 2003, his tone was one of optimism for CARICOM. However, in his address, one CARICOM’s greatest flaws can be gleaned. He quotes Jacques Delors speech to the 1992 Rio de Janeiro UN Conference on the Environment in saying:

If one house catches fire, the roofs over all heads are immediately at risk. If anyone of us tries to start rebuilding, his efforts will be purely symbolic. Solidarity has to be the order of the day: each of us must bear his own share of the general responsibility (Nettleford, 2003).

The one-house or community phenomena referred to is impressive in its potential attribution to attacks or weaknesses of many kinds (environmental, economic, social, etc.). However, the possibility does exist that states may see themselves as having greater advantage outside of the confines the community than within. It may be accepted that the benefit in a shared approach is undeniable, but what about when the costs or risks of such an approach are perceived as outweighing consideration?

Measuring the degree to which a state perceives itself as either being strong enough to stand alone or at least not weak enough to demand solidarity is difficult. However, because this is largely subjective, one measurement, vulnerability, comes close to obtaining an alternative more objective measurement of a parallel reality. In A Commonwealth
Vulnerability Index for Developing Countries: The Position of Small States, Johnathan Atkins, Sonia Mazzi, and Christopher Easter (2000) agree with the 1997 report by the Commonwealth Secretariat, A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, that “vulnerability is the consequence of two sets of factors: 1) the incidence and intensity of risk and threat [(impact)] and 2) the ability to withstand risks and threats (resistance) and to ‘bounce back’ from their consequences (resilience)” (p. 3). Atkins et al reduces the sources of such threats to proneness to natural disasters, and economic exposure, remoteness and insularity.

Atkins et al created the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index (CVI) by combining a number of distinct variables into a one indicator that focused on impact factors as well as factors of resilience. One of the components of the CVI was the vulnerability impact index, which formed from the collection of vulnerability impact scores. The formula for these scores relied largely on the notion of income volatility in relation to specific environmental and economic producers of vulnerability such as international market dependence. The other component, the resilience indicator, was tied to factors that allowed an economy to recover from the shock of impacts, such as the strength of a state’s economy or resource base.

Based on the CVI scores, Atkins et al created a classification for 111 developing countries based on four levels of vulnerability: high, higher medium, lower medium, and low. Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Suriname were each classified as having high vulnerability. Conversely, Barbados, Haiti, and Jamaica were assigned to the higher medium
category, with Trinidad & Tobago being the lone lower medium CARICOM state. The study concludes that larger states (those with populations of more than 1.5 million), such as Haiti and Jamaica, are less vulnerable than smaller states, i.e., all the other CARICOM member states. This was generally supported by the evidence, with Trinidad and Tobago being a notable exception.

It can be reasoned that those member states that perceive themselves as either being strong enough to stand alone or at least not weak enough to demand solidarity will not as fervently invest in CARICOM as the other members. That is, in a comparison of CARICOM states, those having higher intensity of risk and threat and lower resistance (vulnerability) will be more likely to have higher C-Trade values than those with lower intensity of risk and threat and higher resistance.

Figure 7 was made using data from the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index in Table A3.3 from Atkins et al (2000, p. 52). From this scale the member states of CARICOM were classified into three groups denoting their relative levels of vulnerability within CARICOM as highest, moderate, and lowest in Table 1. It was decided that the previously mentioned system of classification created by Atkins could not be used to sufficiently denote the comparative level of vulnerability between the member states. The criteria and the system’s global focus obscured the variation between the member states of CARICOM at the regional level and, for the most part, lumped those states together under the globally valid high level of vulnerability. Using the C-Trade ranking established previously in Figure 4, the member
states were listed in Table 2 with the corresponding values of vulnerability designated from Table 1.

![Figure 7. Bar graph listing CARICOM Commonwealth vulnerability levels.](image)


### Table 1
**CARICOM Classification Based on Levels of Vulnerability.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2  
CARICOM Classification Based on 11-Year C-Trade Ranking and Corresponding Level of Vulnerability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Vulnerability</th>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>C-Trade Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The hypothesis was confirmed in the results. As the vulnerability level decreased across the comparison of states, the C-trade levels showed a corresponding increase. One of two outliers was Barbados, which exhibited one of the lowest levels of vulnerability, but ranked 2nd in C-Trade value among the member states. The other was St. Kitts & Nevis, which fell within the highest vulnerability range, yet displayed a mid-level C-Trade value rank.

When reducing the comparison to the three case countries, however, the determination was less conclusive. In the order of lowest vulnerability to highest vulnerability were Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados, and the Bahamas, but in terms of C-Trade values from lowest to highest, the ranking was: the Bahamas, Trinidad & Tobago, and then Barbados.

Because of the two outliers and the incongruence of the hypothesis at the level of case comparison, an addition was made to the hypothesis. It was suggested that states with high vulnerability, would by their nature are more participatory in intra-regional trade. Their proclivity may not be a factor of their cooperative spirit, but a characteristic of necessity. That is, because vulnerability takes trade dependence and resource scarcity into consideration, the states that exhibit more vulnerability may also need more trade. From this, one could infer that those states with the lowest vulnerability would have an option (a real choice) to participate or to not participate in intra-regional trade. This could account for why Barbados, for example, with its low vulnerability, is still one of the highest intra-regional trade participants. This would also explain why, in the case of the 3-country case
comparison, the member state’s position to each other in the C-Trade level ranking did not correspond to that of the CVI ranking.

In order to test this, the states with highest and moderate vulnerability scores (as designated in Table 1) were listed as in Figure 8 in order from highest to lowest CVI score in the left column and then listing the same member states in the column on the right, in order of highest C-Trade value to lowest C-Trade value.

![Figure 8: Diagram with comparison of CARICOM vulnerability levels to C-Trade values](image)

The comparison showed that, out of the 13 member states of CARICOM for which data existed across all elements, those eight member states (pictured) with higher vulnerability than the five least vulnerable share a position on a scale of CARICOM
commitment generally relative to their positions in a scale of their level of vulnerability. Two noticeable exceptions to this trend were St. Kitts & Nevis and St. Lucia, both which may have some connection to their having the most erratic fluctuations of the C-Trade value patterns.

This part of the study affirmed the fact that some member states are not as willing as others to sacrifice self-interest or autonomy in order to achieve cooperative gains, such as stability or the strengthened economies that greater integration in CARICOM purports to provide. A member state’s economic and infrastructural weakness play a direct part in persuading it to more fully turn to integration and regional cooperation for such reasons as increased economic resiliency or infrastructural repair. When a certain level of perceived security is reached, the notion of Caribbean integration seem less appealing to some states, while other states like Barbados see greater advantage even with their higher levels of security. This part of the study reveals, therefore, that a single factor such as perception of security, may not serve as the primary determinant for the position of the member states across a given comparison. It also brings to light the complexity of the CVI as a composite measurement and vulnerability itself, consisting of various related and perhaps unrelated phenomenon.

In the study, it was first assumed that more vulnerable states would turn to CARICOM as a safety mechanism ensuring defence. However, the CVI scores use calculations based on economic exposure, such as dependence on external markets or non-production sectors such as tourism. It also involves such considerations as access to
sufficient domestic sources of important commodities such as oil. This translates into the possibility that states with higher vulnerability are not simply searching for more safety from vulnerability, but are perhaps simply more reliant upon trade. Subsequently, the relation of external market dependence to the CARICOM commitment of the member states was considered in the following chapter.
ECONOMIC SPECIALISATION AND DEPENDENCE

Closely related to the resilience component of the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index, is the economic strength of state. States with higher GDP for instance, should be able to better cope with economic failure, such as a recession. However, some questioning of the sources of GDP of various member states would be helpful to understanding their varying levels of CARICOM commitment.

An oft-touted fact about the CARICOM member states is that they have many characteristics in common. They may in many instances be a good argument for the cause of increased integration between the member states. However, in many ways, this may prove to its detriment. Emil Pantojas García (2008) agrees that “one of the most important and difficult problems that confronts any regional cooperation and integration project is the similarity of the Caribbean Basin economies” (p. 63). He notes agricultural and tourism products in addition to export-destined assembly manufacturing as the staples of the Member State economies. García highlights the problem with an entire region specialising in only a few key products. He cites the negative impact of NAFTA on the insular Caribbean’s apparel industry when in its first two years of inception the free trade agreement shifted exports to the United States away from the Caribbean and to Mexico. Specifically, Mexican export growth two years before was 70% and after was 123%, while Jamaica’s fell from 54% to 11% for the same period. In the region’s so-called “banana wars” García explains that the preferential treatment accorded CARICOM member state’s banana exports by the European Union came under attack at the WTO by North American fruit companies represented by nearby Caribbean states such as Guatemala and Honduras.
García further asserts that it is bilateralism and not regional integration or cooperation that provides the most benefit in this era of economic globalisation. He explains that states having natural resources in common must compete to attract investment from multinational corporations, which are increasingly becoming more important than states in international economics. This competition does little to encourage integration among the CARICOM member states.

Not only is the competition harmful to the integration process, but, as David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage explains: states gain mutual benefit by specialising in different goods and trading those goods with each other (Ruffin, 2002). The cost of producing a product in one member state is different from the cost of production in others, so if each member state produced a different product, the costs and benefits of increased production would be shared by all. So, by all the member states, producing similar products they inflict the double harm of reducing trade among themselves, while perpetuating inefficiency in aggregate production.

This competition among the member states for trade with external markets, as Norman Girvan points in out, is on the rise as the majority of the member states exhibit high levels of service-based export specialisation. He explains that this shift over time has resulted in the increased reliance of the member states on extra-regional trading partners, especially in Europe and North America, in the form of tourism-revenue related dependence (Girvan, 2005). Girvan further explains that “although Barbados and the OECS countries have a higher share of their merchandise exports oriented to the regional market than Trinidad and Tobago, their effective reliance is [sic] on the region is relatively
small” (p. 13). This is because the extra-regional focus of their service exports greatly exceeds their merchandise exports.

There has also been a decrease in specialisation of products among the member states. Not only have they historically produced the same goods, but now member states are increasingly relying on one particular type of product: service exports. Two of the major service exports within the region are tourism and offshore banking, the shift to which has been most noticeable among the smallest CARICOM economies (Girvan, 2005, p.13). For the period lasting from 2000 to 2008, revenue from tourism forms the majority of the member state exports as seen in Figure 9. As this reliance on tourism increases, so does the reliance on extra-regional states like the United States and Canada, where residents of those countries are targeted for “vacations in paradise” by many of the CARICOM member states. The chart depicts funds collected in the CARICOM member states from expenditure by international visitors to those states, including payments to national carriers for international transport with data retrieved from the World Bank online database of economic indicators.

In Figure 10, along the middle column the member states are arranged by C-Trade values from lowest to highest. The figure, the third column, also lists member states selected by the Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean arranged from highest to lowest using data showing the change in the ratio of service exports to goods exports from 1980 to 2000. The figure shows that those member states that had the greatest shift towards service exports during the 1980 to 2000 period exhibited lesser C-Trade values in the following 2000 to 2010 period. With the exception of
St. Lucia and Suriname, an observation of the 10 member states bolsters the claim that as states shift to more service-based (external market-driven) economies, their economic commitment to CARICOM falters.

Along its left-most column, Figure 10 also lists the 13 member states with C-Trade values from highest to lowest by the degree of their investment in tourism as the value of average international tourism receipts in current United States dollars for the years 2000 to 2008 from data from The World Bank Indicators Database. The majority of states in the upper portion of the first (tourism exports) column correspond to the majority of states in the upper portion of the C-Trade column. This indicates that across the array of states, those with greater amounts of money at stake tend to choose those economic considerations (external trade) over their commitment to integration.

![Figure 9. International tourism receipts (% of total Exports)](image-url)
### Figure 10: Comparison of C-Trade Levels and Shift to Service Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbados</strong></td>
<td><strong>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</strong></td>
<td><strong>Guyana</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Lucia</strong></td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Guyana</strong></td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</strong></td>
<td><strong>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</strong></td>
<td>Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grenada</strong></td>
<td><strong>St. Lucia</strong></td>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td><strong>Dominica</strong></td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suriname</strong></td>
<td><strong>Barbados</strong></td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**States with high tourism exports generally tended to have low C-Trade values. Also, those states with high shifts to service exports in the 1980 to 2000 period tended to have lower C-Trade values in the 2000 to 2010 period.**
Intercausal Relationship: Trinidad & Tobago

According to Nevin Zhang and David Poole (1994), “intercausal independence refers to situations where the mechanism by which a cause influences a variable is independent of the mechanisms by which other causes influence that variable” (p.606). As previously stated, the causes for observed CARICOM trade are diverse. However, many of these causes, are dependent or closely related to others. One of these is the existence of products eligible for trading (necessary or desirable) and the abundance or the scarcity of said products as distributed among the states. Looking at the composition of intra-CARICOM trade, Girvan (2005) observed that Trinidad & Tobago was responsible for nearly all growth in exports in the years leading up to 2001 (82% of total in 2001). He attributes this primarily to Trinidadian petroleum and energy-based commodities.

Because Trinidad has a product, petroleum, that is highly desirable to some of its non-CARICOM trade partners like the United States, the percentage of its total exports sent to CARICOM is more constrained in relation to the exports of other CARICOM states. Girvan also noted that in the years for which he compiled data, states like Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines had higher merchandise exports to CARICOM as a proportion of their total exports than Trinidad & Tobago. Speaking on the complexity of the situation however, he indicated that the actual export reliance of the former states on the region was comparatively small as a result of their service exports exceeding the value of the merchandise exports, and the predominantly extra-regional focus of those service exports.

Trinidad & Tobago is responsible for most of all of the modern intra-CARICOM
export growth. Girvan (2005) explains that this member state was responsible for 82% of the 2001 exports and was a result of energy-related products and petroleum (p.11). He cites the not-so-positive participation in intra-CARICOM trade of the 1990s as damaging to integration motives. With only a slight increase in Barbados’ exports and a sharp decline in Jamaica’s, there was a slight decline in those of the OECS members.

This means that although Trinidad & Tobago invests fewer resources (exports/imports) into CARICOM trade as a proportion of total trade, the case could be made that the state is more committed to CARICOM by other measurement standards. Because Trinidad & Tobago has a product that is universally in demand that the other member states are not able to offer in anywhere near comparative quantities, the country understandably is able to earn more export dollars than the other member states. Also, because the petroleum products need to be refined with technology that the other member states do not possess, Trinidad naturally, sells more of those products to non-CARICOM states. This in turn lowers the comparative value of its intra-CARICOM trade (at least in terms of exports) as a percentage of total trade. This deflation of its CARICOM commitment score is justified however, because for the sake of comparison, the same valuation of trade must be applied to each state. Also, because reliance on the particular unit of integration is a motive for increased integration, the measurement remains valid in determining each state’s dependence or reliance on CARICOM in comparison it its reliance on the rest of world.
LEGAL ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTATION

When discerning the level of political integration of the CARICOM member states, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as an institutional manifestation of the spirit of integration, in addition to the provisions afforded by the legal environments of the member states, immediately come to mind.

The Caribbean Court of Justice, established on 14 February 2001, was founded as a regional court possessing a dual function. First, is in the capacity of its original jurisdiction, it acts as sole arbiter between states regarding the CSME and the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. It was also meant to serve as the civil, criminal, and constitutional final court of appeal for those states that enacted its authority domestically. In order for this to occur, the majority of member states would have to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as the final court of appeal as written within each of their constitutions. Of the member states, the Bahamas, St. Kitts & Nevis, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Trinidad & Tobago each still retains the JCPC as their final court. Neither Suriname nor Haiti received independence from the UK, and were never party to the jurisdiction of the British Monarch or the JCPC. Only three member states, Barbados, Belize, and Guyana, have amended their constitutions and acceded the jurisdiction of Caribbean Court of Justice.

With all of the member states having been former colonies and having had experience with judicial power being exercised by extra-territorial entities, one is left to wonder why all have not been so accepting of the CCJ. It is also interesting to note that two of the founding members of CARICOM, Barbados and Guyana, were the only states that had acceded to the
jurisdiction of the CCJ for the greater part of its short history. The other two founding states (Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago) have not, for one reason or the other, been found able to accede, even though the headquarters of the Court is located in Trinidad & Tobago.

As long as the CCJ remains unempowered within the member states, their claims of sovereignty through domestic law will inevitably take precedence over the demands of the Community. Because the member states are sovereign parties to the treaties that bind them, when there is no supra-national interpretation of that treaty, each member is left to its own caprice. Perhaps this is intentional on the parts of the majority of states, as they possess a choice that those that have already acceded no longer possess.

Greatly important to the question of increased integration within the context of CARICOM will be the costs that each member state must bear in pursuance of that goal. Diversion of scarce funds from sectors such as social services, for example, to administrative and personnel costs of implementation, along with the cost of losing revenue from the removal of tariffs or taxes related to protectionism will inevitably remain at the political and economic fore. Making the decision even more complex is the fact that the proposed benefits of integration will profit CARICOM as a unit, and will be felt by the member states as varying levels. This truth is especially powerful in relation to the smallest states, with higher proportionate burden and perhaps less direct benefits.

Girvan notes that although within the states that support the CSME, the majority of legal obstructions to freedom of movement for skilled labour have been eradicated, there has been little effort in actually promoting the said movement. For instance, much work has to be done to create a system that registers equivalency of certifications or the portability of social
security benefits that would reduce the factors against long-term migration away from one’s primary residence. He notes that in some areas, the member states have been more willing to provide legal implementation of CARICOM’s aspirations for integration, but in others, the right of establishment and free movement of capital have not fared so well.

The CARICOM Secretariat has categorized specific actions that need to be taken by the member states to fully enact the CSME. Using these actions and classifying them under each of the 12 Protocols for the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and the establishment of CSME, Girvan was able to observe the amount of action elements implements out of the total needed to finalize the CSME. Using this data the graph in Figure 11 was created to compare the level of protocol implementation. According to the data, areas of treaty revision and national administration, with over 90% implementation are markedly less contentious or practical than law harmonisation or common external policy. One of the qualifications to these measurements that must be pointed out is that some of the action elements were required of competent agents and not solely the member states, thus the data must be seen as a reflection of the CSME as a whole, not merely as a reading of the member states’ ambivalence or support. Therefore, although the treaty revision category is rated at 86.7%, the majority of member states have yet enacted the Revised Treaty into their domestic law. Another fact to point out is that the listing excludes the three non-CSME signatory states.

Protocol II of the Revised Treaty is centred on the movement of capital, services, and

---

1 The 12 Protocols are: I Organs and Institutions of Governance, II Provision of services, rights of establishment and movement of capital, III Industrial Policy, IV Trade Policy, V Agricultural Policy, VI Disadvantaged Countries, Regions and Sectors, VII Transportation Policy, VIII Competition policy, IX Disputes settlement.
rights of establishment. Among the CSME member states, a list of restrictions existing in law was created and a plan for the elimination of the restrictions for each state under a schedule agreed upon by both the states and the Community was formulated. Figure 12 lists the member states that have completed their lists and have had schedules approved by the percentage of total restriction removals that they had scheduled for the 2003 to 2005 period. Girvan (2005) points out that although Suriname and St. Lucia had about half of the restrictions scheduled for removal, the overall proportion within CARICOM was only 27%. This means that even if every member state fulfils its obligated removals by the deadlines, only a small amount of the total restrictions would be lifted (p.10).

Girvan further notes that only three member states were compliant with the Single Market objectives. Also, based upon limited records, several member states had missed their targets for 2003 and 2004, although all are still expected by the Community to be fully compliant by the end of 2005. This also highlights the issue with collective action: if some states are greatly participatory in the integration process and some are not, the existence of non-cooperation (even in a few) will spell failure for the entire system or process. Of those scheduled for removal, only a few have been reported on as finalized.

Havelock Brewster (2003) explains that one of the major hurdles for legal integration and the removal of barriers to immigration, capital, and services exists because of the system he refers to as “discretionary intergovernmental cooperation.” He sees this system as resulting not only in the failure of addressing these challenges, but also on its encouragement for promises without action on important topics such as fiscal and monetary integration. He references the antecedent to the European Union, the European Community, as a figure of
CARICOM. He cites its protracted approach to reducing non-tariff measures and the extremely limited liberalization of the goods and labour markets. He quotes the European Parliament as stating that the “stagnation in the achievement of the common market was largely attributed to the choice of detailed legislative harmonisation as the method of removing the obstacles of national technical regulations, when harmonisation was in fact very difficult to achieve” (Brewster, 2005). Brewster sees the expectation of maximum sovereignty by the member states, while simultaneously hoping to implement a Single Market and Economy as counterproductive and impossible.

Instead of the unanimity demanded by the CARICOM member states, majority decisions being held authoritative and binding on all member states would be more effective in achieving progress, Girvan points out. A higher degree of supranationality within the Community like that of the EU in which member states are required by law to domestically enact the European Directives formulated by the authoritative majority, would be more effective. Girvan (2005) quotes Prime Minister Arthur, with portfolio responsibility for the Caribbean Single Market and Economy, as stating that “the single market and economy in the Caribbean cannot truly become a reality unless we create the political power structures to make a reality” (p.17). The Prime Minister is further quoted to reflect on the fact that the sovereignty of the Caribbean states is relatively young in contrast to many other states and that their societies may perceive the creation of supranational structures as the loss of a precious quality they have only just begun to enjoy.
Figure 11. Listing of protocol areas by level of implementation.
Source: Compiled from Girvan (2005). Whither CSME

Figure 12. Listing of Authorities by percentage of scheduled legal restriction removal.
Source: Compiled from Girvan. Whither CSME (2005, p.9)
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Nikola Mirilovic, an assistant professor at the University of Central Florida explains, “cross-national opinion polls have shown that people are less supportive of removing immigration restrictions than of removing trade restrictions” (2011). Being involved in an international relations field, a light reading of history, or keeping abreast of international news, one is able to see that agreements on bilateral migration are much less common than bilateral trade deals. However, because a willingness on the part of a state to integrate entails the willingness to open its borders for regional workers, residency, and optimally citizenship, this Chapter provides a brief examination of the relationship of migration with other variables in regard to the member states of CARICOM.

Welfare and Migration

Closely related to the economic strength of a state is the economic cost that increased regional integration places on the state. Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) contends that although on an individual level there may be a decrease in income from the lower wages created by liberalisation, the overall impact that the foreign investment promotes is able to trickle down. He explains that the “loser” states, though less benefited that the “winner” ones, are still subsequently better off from absolute standpoint. These macro and long-term gains, however, are not what generally motivates citizens, who are more attracted to the benefits of the here and now. What does affect public sentiment, however, is the perceived notion that their rights or the benefits to which they have become accustomed are being diminished in right of non-citizens. Gary Freeman (1986) contends that by their nature, national welfare states are necessarily closed systems (p.52). The community promoted its restrictive nature by limiting
distribution of its goods to those that have established some form of kinship (citizenship). He goes on to explain that it inward looking at maintains the care of its own as its primary focus. In opposition to this sheltering and isolationist approach, the movement toward eco-political integration greatly encroaches on the assumed logic of the shielded welfare state. Although the member states of CARICOM are capitalistic, Freeman asserts that states will seek to prevent overpopulating the labour pool by limiting entry and other restraints, such as legal restraints like those binding the right of residence to possession of employment. More appealing to the state is temporary migration, which he claims eases the burden of the state’s welfare budget. Freeman (1986) does insist, however, that welfare state has developed within two realms of thought. The first is a “distributive logic of closure—mutual aid is undertaken by members of a community according to socially defined conceptions of need” the second is the “distributive logic of openness—treatment according to one’s performance in the marketplace without regard to membership status or need” (p.52).

Freeman explains that the welfare state “is part of the package of compensation that exerts an attractive pull on workers in less prosperous societies drawing them to the rich countries in anticipation of better lives” (1986, p.55). Because, as Freeman points out, people would rather migrate to states with greater welfare expenditure than those lacking such programs, an analysis of the Member States of CARICOM should show that those states with greater amounts of public expenditure are more likely to those states to have larger amounts of migration that those having less welfare expenditure.

To test this, available data for two of the most important components of the welfare state, healthcare and education, was compiled for the member states. Public expenditure on
health as a percentage of total government expenditure for the years 1999 to 2009 is shown in Figure 13. This shows that for the period, the government of the Bahamas spent proportionately more of its resources on health than any of the other states. In Figure 14, the number of migrants to each state is shown for the years 1985, 1995, and 2010 as obtained from the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. A comparison of the number of migrants to each member state and the percentage of government expenditure dedicated to public health affirmed the hypothesis. States like Dominica, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines exhibited low levels of public health expenditure and low levels of migrant populations. States like Suriname, Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda, and the Bahamas exhibited high levels of both public health expenditure and numbers of migrants. In the comparison, only three states did not fit the pattern, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, and Belize.

Because, as Freeman (1986) attests, “national welfare states cannot coexist with the free movement of labor,” (p.51) the increasing presence of migrants may prove threatening to the continued existence of the welfare state, at least at the level the current beneficiaries are accustomed to. The threat the migration provides to the welfare state, may therefore, be a major deterrent for decreased migration restrictions within the member states. However, when discussing migrants and the cost they incur for the immigration state, two classes, temporary workers and permanent workers, should be discerned. As Freeman explains, temporary migrant workers tend to be young, employed, and relatively healthy, while permanent migrants are able to bring dependents and reap the benefit of entitlement programs for their entire households. For example, member states provide free public
education for primary and secondary levels. As enrolment among the states is required for children below a certain age and no residency identification is legally needed in the majority of member states, the children of illegal migrants receive free education, increasing state costs, while their parents (illegally resident), are practically exempt from paying for the public services provided. As permanent workers will be allowed to retire in the country, their healthcare costs in comparison to their education costs, extend even beyond their formative years. Subsequently, temporary workers pay taxes, but do not receive pensions, subsidized education and health, and unemployment pay, making them more profitable to state than permanent ones. Based on this, member states may not be opposed to the notion of labour per se, but the permanence indicative of Caribbean migration puts any idea of “temporary relocation” a great distance away.

Figure 13. Bar graph. Average public health expenditure (% of government expenditure) 1999-2009

Figure 14. Line graph. Number of migrants (thousands)


80
Figure 15: Bar graph. Average public expenditure on health (as % of GDP) for years 2005 to 2007


Figure 16: Bar graph. Public expenditure on education (% of GDP) for 2000.

Density and Migration

Another possible affecting migration may be the availability of space in the countries of emigration. The availability of land for cultivation or settlement, legal or otherwise, may provide great appeal to the inhabitants of states whose city centres have become comparatively overcrowded or whose farmland ownership has been entirely allocated. The density of states was calculated as the amount of people per square kilometre using data compiled from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. In Figure 17, the member states with available data were listed in order from lowest density to highest density.

When compared to the migration statistics of the member states, it was observed that those with higher densities all had lower levels of immigration than those with lower density. Also, those states with lower densities tended to have higher levels of immigration than those with higher density. The majority of member states followed this pattern except for Guyana, Dominica, St. Kitts & Nevis, and Antigua & Barbuda, which all had lower densities but lower levels of immigration. Because all of the states with high immigration levels were of lower density, the hypothesis was confirmed and the density of states can be said to have an effect on the levels of migration within CARICOM.
Figure 17: Line graph. Member States by population density.

Economies and Migration

From the level of the state, a comparison was made of the average amount of public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP for the years 2005 through 2007 in Figure 15 and the amount of public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP for 2000 in Figure 16. There was considerably less data for education expenditure for many of the CARICOM member states. Values were therefore limited to the year, 2000, for which there was the greatest number of state records. Even within that year, however, only nine of the states have released comparable data.

An observation of the levels of public expenditure on important welfare elements as education and health indicated that when the welfare expenditure of a state was compared to the value of its GDP, those states with lower proportionate welfare expenditure tended to have higher migration levels than those states with higher proportionate welfare expenditure. At first, this information seemed a contradiction of the previous evidence that states with bigger welfare states will tend to have more migration. However, upon closer examination it was realised that the intensity of the welfare state did not have to be a factor of wealth available to that state (GDP). Poor states as well as wealthy ones are just as free to provide the same levels of welfare to their subjects. However, it was noticed that wealth, observed alone, was a factor that exhibited a relationship with migration. Girvan notes that economic differentiation is increasing among the CARICOM member states. With the sharp division between service-based and goods-producing economies, is also the large inequality in income between the member states. When Haiti and Suriname, two comparatively low-income states, recently joined the Community, the income gap between the Bahamas
(richest) and Haiti (poorest) member state rose to 38 to 1 (Girvan, 13.). He explains that this stark imbalance reasonably provides a point of contention for such integrational elements as the free movement of persons. Girvan does not substantiate the source of his income gap ratio, but in the April 2011 report by the University of the West Indies (UWI) Institute of International Relations, Caribbean Regional Integration, the degree of economic differentiation is recorded at 29:1, with the Bahamas having GDP per capita of $20,889 and Haiti, $711. This was compared to that of the quintessential example of integration, the European Union, which had a gap of only 17:1.

Using GDP data from the CIA World Factbook, Figure 18 was compiled to compare the economic strength or general economic environment of the member states. This information was then compared to the levels of emigration to the member states. This comparison indicated that across a comparison of the member states, those with better economic environments (higher GDP) tended to have higher levels of immigration than those with weaker economic environments (lower GDP). The results therewith confirmed the hypothesis.

The economic inequality between states provides excellent motive for migration independent of claims to common regional heritage or welfare benefits. Paul Demeney (2002) provides war and natural disasters as causes for migration, but also points out that economic reasons are undeniably linked to motivation for migration. Individuals do not simply leave the security and stability of their homes, families and friends, to encumber themselves with travel expenses while investing the large amount of time and lost wages needed for social adaptation, and researching the place of intended immigration. However,
with the difference in wages is so great, the cost of migration to a wealthier economy may be profitable. If some member states, such as the Bahamas, are more prone to receive migratory groups than others, such as St. Vincent, they realise the net gain in population that would result from the unwillingness of the present population to emigrate from there, and the thousands that want to immigrate to there. Demeney points out that restrictions are supported in wealthier countries to prevent unbounded emigration from poor ones not only because of an increased economic burden, but the fear of losing social cohesion or a profound alteration of the country’s ethnicity, culture, or religious composition. This is discussed further in a later chapter.

**Figure 18: Member States by gross domestic product (billions), 2011**

Source: Central Intelligence Agency from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

One of the factors related to the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index is the amount of susceptibility to environmental events and hazards that a state bears. Lasting from 1 June to 30 November, the Atlantic hurricane season annual invites the possibility of great catastrophe for the member states. Hurricanes bring flooding, storms, and mudslides; leaving food shortages, deforestation, and massive infrastructural damage to roads, buildings and communication lines in their wake. Table 3 was constructed with data from the work of Atkins et al (2000) on the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index. It lists the CARICOM member states by their level of Natural Disaster Vulnerability (NDV) from highest to lowest. They were sorted into values of highest, low high, high medium, low medium, high low, and lowest. The values were defined with a change of at least 20 points dividing one grouping from the other when arranged from highest to lowest. When this table was first compared with the ranking established in Figure 1, no discernable pattern was observed. However, upon closer inspection it was seen that the ranking of those states having high low and low medium NDV levels generally corresponds to the ranking of those same states by their C-Trade values. That is, moving across the listing of St. Lucia, Guyana, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Belize, and St. Kitts & Nevis there is a simultaneous decrease in the amount of exposure to natural disasters as well as C-Trade values of the states. Similarly, the low high states, Dominica and Grenada, had higher C-Trade values higher than the greater majority of those states over which they also had a higher NDV score. Also, Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname, both in the low low category, had lower C-Trade values than the greater majority of those states for which they had lower NDV scores. Jamaica, Haiti, Barbados, and the
Bahamas were all exceptions to this general pattern. This can be more clearly seen in Figure 19.

Overall, this showed that the exposure to disasters may form an integral part of a member state’s resolve to CARICOM commitment. However, as noticed with previous tests, a few states more than the others have exhibited an exception to the generally followed pattern of the others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Disaster Vulnerability Level</th>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Natural Disaster Vulnerability Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High High</td>
<td>Bahamas, the</td>
<td>491.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>430.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low High</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>261.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>228.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Medium</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>130.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>114.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Medium</td>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>92.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>86.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Low</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>28.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>21.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Low</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Relationship of Natural Disaster Vulnerability and CARICOM Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High NDV</th>
<th>High C-Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas, the</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>Belize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Bahamas, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low NDV</th>
<th>Low C-Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19: Diagram. Relationship of natural disaster Vulnerability to CARICOM trade.
SOCIAL ISSUES

García (2008) notes that issues such as trade, economy, politics, and geography are all discussed when speaking about integration, while cultural and ideological factors are not infrequently shoved to the background as irrelevant to the feasibility of regional integration. He asserts that the concept of shared identity within the Caribbean is relegated to the notion of the geographical proximity of states within or bordering the Caribbean Sea in addition to “economic exchanges and shared history” (p.55). He makes the interesting proposition that the geopolitical system imagined after World War II included the subdivision of the world based on “the new imaginary of the ‘regional sciences’ focused on geography and economic, demographic, political and institutional linkages and interactions defining the makeup of the region” (p.55). He contends that the contents of the global regions of Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia were assumed to possess an historical, ideological, and cultural association, and were further divided into sub-regions like Central America or the Caribbean. García notes that the arguments for cooperation and competition produce a hodgepodge of mistrust, rivalry, and synergy. He stresses that the functioning of such regional trade agreements as MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and CSME exists primarily because of pressure from the WTO and the Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative.

He puts forth an interesting argument that the definition of “Caribbean identity,” touted as an objective reality grounded in the shared experience of the plantation and slavery among the member states is debatable. He notes that cuisine, art, and a common understanding of such social concepts as the family are also brought as justification for the
claims of collective identity. He points out that there are in fact many identities within the Caribbean region and that only together (not by reduction) may the idea of Caribbean identity be understood.

García insists that although cultural elements such as food or religion contain similar ingredients across the region, they are noticeably distinct across the spectrum of states. Although his argument may be valid for looking at the Caribbean as a whole, it fails to maintain its validity when the scope is narrowed to that of the CARICOM member states. In the case of religion, for instance, 13 out of the 14 states for which there was information in the latest census recorded a majority Christian population. In terms of a common linguistic, legal, political, and social heritage, 13 out of the 15 member states are British dependencies or received their independence as British colonies. Of the 15 member states, 12 are Westminster style democracies and retain the British Monarch as head of state. This would indicate that the member states of CARICOM, at least more than the Caribbean as a whole, do share a cohesive or substantial identity. García does note that the English-speaking Caribbean has made more strides in areas of integration than other Caribbean states, citing such instances as CARIFTA, the CSME, and the collaborative UWI (University of the West Indies).

**Societal Homogeneity**

When looking at how the member states interact within the real or imaginary concept of Caribbean identity, it is important to examine the levels of cultural diversity within each state. The first element examined was the homogeneity of each member state in terms of its ethnic composition. To accomplish this, census statistics were gathered from the websites of
the U.S. Department of State, the CIA *World Factbook*, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It was determined that the degree of societal homogeneity would have to take into account the size and the quantity of distinct ethnic populations. Therefore, a state with the highest possible level of societal homogeneity would have one ethnic group comprising 100% of the total population. Because this situation is non-existent in the Caribbean, it was decided that the combination of two indices would be used to compute the value of each member state’s societal homogeneity. First, as show in Figure 20, populations of the two largest ethnic groupings in each state were recorded and the member states were listed in relation to the proportion of that combined population to the total population for each state. According to U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s data, the two largest ethnic groups in Haiti, for instance, comprise 100% of the population. In Suriname, however, the two largest ethnic groups only comprise 68% of the total population. The second component took into account the quantity of distinct ethnic groups as specified by the census data of each state. The census data for each state contained a category labelled *unspecified*. This was not counted as a distinct ethnic group. The combination of distinct ethnic groups into an *other* category by the data emphasises either the marginalisation of those groups or their insignificant size. Subsequently, when the data contained a category labelled *other*, it was counted as a distinct ethnic group for the purposes of this analysis. The member states were placed along a scale from highest number of ethnic groups to lowest number of ethnic groups in Figure 21. In Table 4, the position of the member states in both scales were used to divide them into three common groupings of societal homogeneity, *high*, *medium*, and *low*. 
Figure 20. Bar graph. CARICOM by proportion of sum of two largest ethnic groups to total population

Figure 21. Bar graph listing member states by number of officially recorded ethnic groups

93
Table 4  
Listing of Member States by Societal Homogeneity Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Societal Homogeneity</th>
<th>Member State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data used in Table 4 was compared with the CARICOM Trade values for the 2000 to 2010 period. Using the scale for full spectrum comparison provided in Figure 4, the level societal homogeneity was compared with the level of CARICOM commitment for the member states. An interesting relationship was observed. Those states with the levels of high societal homogeneity were all near that end of trade scale showing the least CARICOM commitment, while those states with medium levels of societal homogeneity placed near the high commitment end of that scale. Those states with the low levels of homogeneity generally exhibited medium levels of CARICOM commitment, with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, both located on the low commitment end of the scale.

The observed relationship indicated that in a comparison of CARICOM member
states, those with the highest levels of societal homogeneity will be more likely to exhibit the lowest levels of CARICOM commitment. This confirms an earlier assumption that those member states with ethnic groups that exercised a virtual monopoly over society would be less open to the prospect of integration with other states. Those societies where multiplicity of ethnicity exists would naturally be more open to idea of a more globalized or regionalized state. Essentially, the concept of the Other (or them) as foreign culture: a force to be opposed and the societal self (or the us) as the only reality breaks down when the line between both is blurred. Jan Pieterse (2004) refers to this process where distinct cultures are subsumed into a new culture as cultural hybridization. He explains that there are two extremities on a “continuum of hybridities.” On one end is assimilation, whereby one culture “adopts the canon and mimics hegemony” (p.79). He explains that the other end is the hybridity of destabilisation “that blurs the canon...subverts the center” (p.79).

A theory of international relations, sociological liberalism, argues that the interaction of various (groups of) peoples creates international links that increase the knowledge of others: their principles, practices, and problems. This increased interaction sustains a symbiotic exchange between cultures: minimizing misunderstanding and lessening instances of conflict. This mode of theory would best fall onto the destabilisation end of Pieterse’s continuum, without destabilising the state; instead only prevents the establishment of hegemony for a dominant culture. In those states with high societal homogeneity, the assimilation end of the continuum would receive the most support. The fears of destabilisation, the loss of cherished power or status by elites, and the loss of identity are all factors that may prevent any open question of a particular ethnic group’s social dominance.
What the data does not seem to conclusively support however, is the inverse hypothesis, “that those states with the least homogenous societies should display the highest levels of CARICOM commitment.” Even more intriguing was the fact that Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname (both having low societal homogeneity scores) were located not within the middle, but at the low region of the CARICOM commitment scale. In terms of ethnic composition, these two states had many similarities, such as majority non-Black populations, but Guyana shares this same characteristic, yet was located at the centre of the commitment scale with the other low societal homogeneity states.

**Religion**

Another factor that defines societies almost as much as ethnicity is religion. Religion has been the real or blamed cause for a very large portion of societal conflicts throughout human history. Compiling data from the CIA *World Fact Book*, the religious composition of the Member State populations was recorded and the percentage of the total population provided was sorted into *Christian* and *Non-Christian*. The *Christian* grouping included any religious sect that had or claimed an historical Christian heritage, such as *Roman Catholic*, *Anglican*, *other Christian*, and *other Protestant*. The *Non-Christian* grouping included adherents of other religions, such as *Muslim* and *Hindu* and of those designated as *other*, *unspecified*, or *none*. The member states were then listed according to the level of variance between both religious groupings in Figure 22. Both Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago were near the top of this list, which was expected along with Guyana, as they each, in addition to Belize, had two large ethnic groups (with blacks being historically Christian in the region, with Asians usually professing the faith brought over by their indentured forbearers) that
comprised almost equally, over 65% of their respective total populations. On further examination of these religious affiliations, an important observation was made. In Figure 23, the religious affiliations were grouped into three categories: Roman Catholic,\(^2\) Christian (Non-Roman Catholic)\(^3\), and Non-Christian. Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago have the lowest levels of variance between their Christian populations and are also the only member states in which the religious non-Christian population outnumbers both Roman Catholics and Christian non-Roman Catholic populations. In Jamaica’s case, the Non-Christian population is shown out-numbering the Christian groups because Jamaica recorded a 20.9% of its population as none, indicating an atheistic or agnostic population unusually high for the region.

If the interplay of cultures brings about less conflict, as affirmed through the ethnicity study, why does it result in the opposite for culture defined along religious lines? Perhaps society is more accepting of race than religion. Cultures developing in different geographic and temporal locations are taken for granted to have different customs or values: they are accepted as points in an infinite continuum of local practices. On the other hand, religions, especially monotheistic ones, tend to seek a universalistic approach to reality. Conflict arises between them based on what the religion teaches: their beliefs. The Muslim view of an Islamist-state government and the Western Christian idea of separate spheres for the church and the state is an example. Conflict also arises because of what the (monotheistic) religions

\(^2\) The data provided by the CIA specifically lists Roman Catholic, it is unknown whether this refers to exclusively Latin Rite Catholics (and not to Ambrosian, Eastern, etc) or more generally to members of the Catholic Church

\(^3\) Historically, Christian sects have been classified into Catholic and Protestant, however, the data provided in ambiguous in its use of other Protestant or non-Catholic faiths as distinct from protestant ones.
are: logically intolerant systems of absolute truth. This is not to say that the societies of Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname are overflowing with violent conflict, but that the presence of greater religious variance in comparison to other member states perhaps results in a diminution of the level of commitment to regionalisation that would otherwise have existed. What this information indicates is that the social composition of states does play a pivotal role in the determination of CARICOM member states’ decision to integrate or pace of integration. Ethnicity seems to be the strongest determinant of cultural preferences, with religion playing a likewise important, but secondary role in those states where the greatest ethnic diversity is present.

![CARICOM by Level of Religious Variance](figure22)

**Figure 22: Bar graph. CARICOM by level of religious variance.**
Figure 23: Bar graph. CARICOM by level of variance in size of Christian groups.
CONCLUSION

Seeing that the founding members of CARICOM were Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, one would have expected the largest amount of integration to be seen through their actions. This has evidently not been the case and throughout the research some possible reasons were touched upon.

One of the major problems as noted by the Prime Minister of St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Dr Hon. Ralph E. Gonsalves, is the fact that regional integration has often focused on merging state systems while ignoring greater emphasis on peoples and civilization. He notes that although regional transport technology has advanced, immigration barriers have been instituted that exceed those that existed during the colonial period. He also notes in addition to the legally erected barriers, societal ones have come to play no small part. He asserts that North Americans tend be more welcome among the CARICOM states than do immigrants from each other. Generalisations and stereotypes present themselves as efficient menace to acceptance and understanding: both key elements of cooperation. He does indicate that some exceptions to these prejudices can be found among university graduates and a few groups of professional occupations. This, however, has only served to further distance the average Caribbean citizen from the elitist concern that is integration. By limiting intra-regional travel and residency, political union or integration remains a debate far separated from the practical concerns of the general population.

A social argument hoisted as a barrier to increased integration is the fear that openness of borders and increased immigration will allow a proliferation of criminals and
perhaps an evolution in their networks. Closely related to this argument is the one that increased immigration will result in an influx by the unemployed, which threatens the job security of the domestic labour force.

Another factor promoting a decentralised, nationalistic predilection for the member states is that, as Cedric Grant (2003) observes, “CARICOM has traditionally stood aloof from the internal affairs of the member states” (p.18). He explains that policies perceived to be erosive of national sovereignty would probably not be received well by the states and their populations, possibly resulting in the Community following the way of the failed West Indian Federation. This has led the community’s support of unanimity and consensus in decision-making processes, while maintaining a low profile in terms of formal community institutions. What has resulted is the perpetual extension of deadlines and debate as states are allowed endless waiting periods in which to weigh their perception of national interests against those of the Community. Grant’s (2003) description of CARICOM by William Demas, a former Caribbean Community Secretary General to the discussion of integration, is perhaps a most fitting description:

With no Organs or Institutions with supranational powers and with no sanctions either on member states or legal or natural persons for not implementing the Treaty of Chaguaramas or decisions of the Community’s Organs or Institutions (p.19).

Richard Cooper (1968) maintains that states are free to “abandon the tacit international code of good behaviour only if it is prepared to accept the adverse reaction of other countries” (p.4). The members of CARICOM need not fear any useful economic
sanctions, or military response (there is very little military presence, as explained earlier). They are in fact free to cooperate with any of the more powerful neighbouring states of North, Central, or South America. Without strong governance, effected through authoritative and punitive measures, the interests of the Community cannot be maintained in any real sense against the volatile nature of the modern self-interested Caribbean state. As long as the Caribbean populations are not confronted with CARICOM’s power as tangible and protruding in the domestic and everyday preserve.

This combination of resolute distance and reluctance to intervene may have given rise to a perception of CARICOM as meaningless to the average citizen. Even in defence of commonly held principles such as democracy or human rights, the Community has been lacking in the realm of enforcement. The responsibility for this can be partially attributed to the 1979 resolution of the Organisation of American States promoting ideological pluralism that CARICOM has advocated. Therefore, CARICOM has remained largely withdrawn from issuing value judgements on the types of government of its members settle on, declining from officially endorsing such systems as parliamentary democracy. The military coup d’état in Grenada and the Guyanese electoral discrepancies of the 1970s and 1980s both received no official response from the Community.

Suggestions have been made to improve the effectiveness of the Community. The West Indian Commission gave a recommendation that a financially autonomous Caribbean Commission be established as an enforcement mechanism to improve CARICOM decision
implementation. The move was repudiated by the Head’s of Government decision to establish a Bureau of Heads with rotating membership.

Van Langenhove (2004) quotes the European Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, as stating that there are two basic models of regionalism today. Lamy explains that the “good neighbours’ model” (p.99) is concerned with the eradication of barriers in an effort to reduce transaction cost. It is limited in scope with rules aimed at the maintenance of a level footing for inter-member trade. The member states in this model are allowed to operate independently in terms of development, while seeking cooperation only on mutually interested subject with mutually acceptable policies. The second model, the “happy family” model, encompasses a system in which states share a desire to pool sovereignty founded on communal convictions and commitment. States in this scenario will possess the political resolve to effectively implement common markets, legal harmonisation, and Community-wide social benefits.

In order for CARICOM to achieve a level of integration worthy of the “happy family” model, diversification of their export products remains a must. By producing different products, they will increase trade and self-sufficiency. The member states must accept the necessity of supranational governance for the effectiveness and efficiency of the CARICOM integration experiment. This solidification of political institutionalism must be promoted and supported at all levels of society, that efforts at unity may not be in name alone, but resonate within the hearts of the millions that call the Caribbean their home. That home, and the attendant identity must be open to an evolution of such concepts as social class, autonomy,
and common heritage. As long as the member states are divided, their goal of unity, by definition, will remain unattainable. The pride or fear that nurtures an unwillingness to transfer sovereignty to a more effective apparatus than the unyielding mini states that comprise CARICOM will forever serve as a detriment to Caribbean unity and may well ensure the farcical sovereignty that Premdas references. The willingness of the states to pursue integration will become more and more irrelevant in the face of their perpetuation of vulnerability, ignorance of communal self-sufficiency, and dependence on external markets instead of on each other.
REFERENCES


http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/csme_politicalunity_brewster.jsp


Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. (2011, June 3). Background Note: Trinidad and Tobago. Retrieved July 29, 2011 from U.S. Department of State:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35638.htm

Caribbean Development Bank. (n.d.). About the Caribbean Development Bank Accessed at http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/e9f00d4a47929ecc87256b0a005c4e8b/a541525e64242be7872572bf007aecac!OpenDocument


General Information. (2011). Retrieved July 29, 2011 from Government of Trinidad and Tobago Portal:


Trinidad and Tobago Analysis. (2011, March). Retrieved July 29, 2011 from The U.S.
Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TD


Yelvington, K. A. (2001). Trinidad and Tobago. In C. R. Ember, & M. Ember (Eds.),
*Countries and Their Cultures* (Vol. 4, pp. 2238-2247). New York: Macmillan
Reference USA.

In R. López de Mántaras, D. Poole (Eds.) UAI 94: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, July 29-31, 1994, Seattle,
Washington, USA. 606-614.