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THE CALOOSAHATCHEE MASSACRE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR

by GEORGE R. ADAMS *

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP has put the Second Seminole War in its proper place as one of the most dramatic episodes in the period of Indian removal. The war was the longest, most expensive and most exhausting Indian conflict of the era. Hostilities lasted from 1835 to 1842, and cost an estimated \$40,000,000 while over 1,400 regular army troops and an indeterminable number of militiamen, civilians, and Indians lost their lives in the swamps and wilderness of Florida.¹ Guerrilla tactics, atrocities, almost continual negotiation, generally undistinguished military activity, frequent change of command, and conflict between civilian and military authorities characterized the struggle.

At one point in the war, early 1839, federal sentiment for relaxing the Seminole removal policy prompted the negotiation of an armistice allowing the Indians to remain in southern Florida. Concluded in May at Fort King in north central Florida, the agreement was not intended to be permanent, but the government hoped it would calm the Florida situation and lead to peaceful removal. Unfortunately for the federal plan, citizens of Florida rejected even the prospect of a Seminole reservation in the territory. This attitude and a lack of Indian unity helped nullify the Fort King agreement. The most important single incident in the breakdown of the temporary peace, however, was the Caloosahatchee massacre, the defeat of a detachment of dragoons on July 23, 1839, on the shore of the Caloosahatchee River. Occurring during a truce, the attack and accompanying Seminole atrocities generated new hostilities throughout Florida and increased the bitterness of the whites. As had the armistice, the massacre brought protests and resent-

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1. John K. Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842* (Gainesville, 1967), 325-26.

ment from Floridians who thought that government and regular army policies were too weak. They demanded that the military use more militiamen to remove the Seminoles, and eventually disagreement between federal and territorial officials led to the dismissal of Florida Territorial Governor Richard Keith Call.² Furthermore, the Caloosahatchee defeat and renewed fighting supplied a final impetus for a controversial experiment in the use of bloodhounds against the Indians.

While historians have recognized the interrelationship of these developments in the year 1839, they have neither appreciated the full impact of the massacre nor told the complete story of that fateful occasion. The Caloosahatchee River attack was one of the most important military engagements in the Second Seminole War because it helped prolong the conflict. In addition, the attack is interesting because the events surrounding it exemplify the characteristics of the war.

The legality of the United States' actions to remove the Seminoles rested on agreements concluded with them on May 9, 1832, in the Treaty of Payne's Landing, and on March 28, 1833, in the Treaty of Fort Gibson.³ While these treaties passed through the lengthy process of Senate ratification, the Indians reconsidered and decided that the removal provisions were unjust. Seminole chiefs balked at emigration, and late in 1835, sporadic hostilities began. Full scale war erupted on December 28 of that year when Indian bands under Chief Osceola launched two attacks fifty miles apart in central Florida. Initial army efforts to subdue the Seminoles failed, and on November 4, 1836, the war department appointed Major General Thomas S. Jesup commander of United States forces in Florida. The war had been in progress only one year, but Jesup represented the fourth attempt by the army to find a general who could defeat the Indians.

Jesup's accomplishments far outweighed those of his predecessors, for within eighteen months his troops captured almost 3,000 Seminoles.⁴ Nevertheless, by early 1838 Jesup feared that forceful removal would require years of combat, and he decided

2. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., *Richard Keith Call: Southern Unionist* (Gainesville, 1961), 114-17.


3. Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties* (Washington, 1903), II, 290-91, 293-95.

4. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 99-106, 168, 182-92, 240.

that the fighting should be stopped and the Indians allowed to retain a part of southern Florida that was unsuitable for white farmers.⁵ Brigadier General Abraham Eustis and Colonel David Twiggs, two of Jesup's subordinates, first presented him with the idea of abandoning Seminole removal, and they claimed that most of their fellow officers supported it.⁶ Unconfirmed evidence indicates that the suggestion originated with Lieutenant Colonel William S. Harney, an officer of the Second Dragoons, and that he brought it to the attention of Eustis.⁷ Whatever the case, in February 1838, Jesup recommended to Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett that emigration be halted. Poinsett rejected the proposal and replied that removal was the law of the land. Therefore, he could not "authorize any arrangement with the Seminoles, by which they will be permitted to remain" anywhere in Florida.⁸

Two months later, in April 1838, the war department accepted Jesup's request for a change of assignment, and the next month he turned over his command to Brigadier General Zachary Taylor.⁹ During the next year, Taylor instituted two new military policies. First, in compliance with a war department order designed to cut expenses, he disbanded most of the Florida militia units which had participated in the campaigning. Then he divided the territory north of the Withlacoochee River into twenty mile square sectors and placed a twenty-man garrison of regular army troops in each. When Indian depredations continued, Florida citizens and officials alike complained that Taylor's actions had failed. In particular, Floridians considered the reduction of militia forces an explanation for continued Indian attacks. Perhaps the citizens' attitude also stemmed from the usual frontiersmen's anti-Indian prejudice and from a desire to remain on the federal payroll. Certainly the civilian suppliers and others who had profited economically

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5. Thomas S. Jesup to Joel R. Poinsett, February 11, 1838, in John T. Sprague, *The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War* (New York, 1848; facsimile reprint, Gainesville, 1964), 199-201.
 6. Jesup to Poinsett, July 6, 1838, in Sprague, *Florida War*, 184-97.
 7. L. U. Reavis, *The Life and Military Services of General William Selby Harney* (St. Louis, 1878), 124-26.
 8. Jesup to Poinsett, February 11, 1838, and Poinsett to Jesup, March 1, 1838, in Sprague, *Florida War*, 199-202.
 9. Jesup to Poinsett, July 25, 1837, in Sprague, *Florida War*, 180-81.



from the war detested the economy measures imposed by Taylor's quartermaster.¹⁰

Conditions changed little during Taylor's first year in command, and therefore, by March 1839, Secretary of War Poinsett decided to postpone removal in an effort to reduce or end hostilities. To accomplish this he sent Alexander Macomb, commanding general of the army, to Florida and directed him to do what he thought necessary to stop the fighting and to

10. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 247, 249-54.

protect the citizens. Poinsett informed General Macomb that Congress had appropriated funds for reopening negotiations with the Seminoles, and he ordered him to arrange a truce. Once the Indians agreed to talk, Macomb was to convince them to occupy a part of southwestern Florida until removal could be completed under terms of the Treaty of Payne's Landing.¹¹

On April 5, 1839, General Macomb arrived at Garey's Ferry on Black Creek southwest of Jacksonville. There he conferred with General Taylor, who now also believed that the Indians could be pacified only if they were allowed to remain in Florida. The following day Macomb wrote Colonel Harney at Fort Mellon, about 100 miles south at Lake Monroe, to communicate with the Seminoles and request a meeting at Fort King. Harney talked with Chief Chitto Tustenuggee (Snake Warrior) and persuaded him to go to Fort King where another chief, Halleck Tustenuggee (Potato Warrior), joined him. On May 18 General Macomb held a council with the chiefs and arranged an unwritten peace agreement. This required the Indians to remain in an area below Pease Creek, roughly the southwestern quarter of the peninsula.¹² In the negotiations Macomb did not mention emigration to the Seminoles because he wanted to leave that subject open to any future stipulations the government might wish to make. He promised only that fighting would stop if the Indians would withdraw to the prescribed area and that they could remain there in safety "until further arrangements could be made." Whether the Seminoles interpreted the agreement as permanent or as temporary cannot be determined, but those present at the council expressed satisfaction with the armistice.¹³ Unfortunately, at least four bands of hostiles did not participate in the Fort King talks. Nevertheless, on May 20, Macomb proclaimed a cessation of hostilities and outlined the boundaries of the Seminole territory.¹⁴

11. Poinsett to Alexander Macomb, March 18, 1839, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers of the United States: Florida Territory*, 26 vols. (Washington, 1956-1962) XXV, 597-99.

12. Entries April 5, April 6, May 17, May 18, and May 22, 1839, in John T. Sprague, "Macomb's Mission to the Seminoles: John T. Sprague's Journal Kept During April and May, 1839," edited by Frank F. White, Jr., *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXXV (October 1956), 144-46, 176-81, 183-87.

13. Macomb to Poinsett, May 22, 1839, in Sprague, *Florida War*, 229-32.

14. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 258; Macomb Order, May 18, 1839, in Sprague, *Florida War*, 228-29.

Then the general returned to Washington, thinking that he had made a significant contribution toward a peaceful settlement of the Seminole problem. The *Washington Globe* announced that the Indians had been pacified and no more blood would be spilled in Florida.¹⁵ There were two factors, however, which Macomb and the *Globe* had not considered: public opinion in Florida and the disunity of the Seminoles. These negated Macomb's accomplishments.

The Fort King agreement enraged Floridians who feared it was permanent. People in Florida, the *St. Augustine News* insisted, should unite to protest the agreement. The paper castigated the federal government for stooping to the role of "supplicants for peace" and insisted that the Treaty of Payne's Landing be enforced.¹⁶ The Tallahassee *Floridian* denounced the armistice as insane and called on the people to shoot Indians on sight.¹⁷ Tallahassee citizens held a public meeting, adopted resolutions of remonstrance, and sent copies to various officials, including the President and the secretary of war. On June 22, 1839, however, the *Floridian* dispelled much of this fear and anger by printing an extract of a letter from Secretary of War Poinsett to a local citizen. The secretary's official position thus became public record. He expected Macomb's arrangement to lead to pacification of the territory and enable the removal of the Seminoles sooner than if force was used.¹⁶

It is impossible to determine the exact effect of this news on the Indians, but prior to the time that they learned the contents of Poinsett's letter, most of them tried to avoid clashes with the troops.¹⁹ This seems to indicate that at least some of the Seminoles thought that the Fort King agreement was permanent. Of course, sporadic fighting continued with Indian bands which had not participated in the negotiations. Whatever the Indians believed they had been promised by General Macomb at Fort King, once Secretary Poinsett's letter appeared in the *Floridian* there could be no further question. Removal was inevitable. Even though lack of evidence and the division among the Seminoles prevent placing blame for the renewed hostilities

15. *Washington Globe*, May 30, 1839.

16. *St. Augustine News*, May 25, June 1, 1839.

17. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 257.

18. *Niles' National Register*, June 22, July 6, 1839.

19. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 258-61.

squarely on the publication of the letter, it must have been partly responsible. Depredations occurred on July 17 when Indians murdered three members of the Chaires family near Tallahassee, and ten days later when they ambushed a small army wagon train traveling to Fort Andrews in central Florida.²⁰ Such acts of violence undermined chances for peace, but no event had a more damaging effect than the Caloosahatchee massacre.

The Fort King agreement provided that a trading house be established for Indian use on the Caloosahatchee near the center of the reservation. Macomb ordered Colonel Harney, who had participated in the negotiations at Fort King and had a good reputation as an Indian fighter, to build the post.²¹ Macomb instructed him to proceed to Tampa Bay and call on General Taylor for support troops. Enroute by steamboat to Taylor's headquarters, Harney made a side trip up the Caloosahatchee to select a site for the trading house. There, about fifteen miles up river on the north shore, he left his detachment of twenty-eight dismounted dragoons under the command of Sergeant John Bigelow and continued on to Tampa Bay alone. Harney asked Taylor for two companies of men for guard duty, but much to his chagrin, the general asserted that he had no troops available for such duty. In fact, he refused to provide any officers or men.²² Taylor's claim may have been valid, but nevertheless his refusal to enlarge Harney's command meant that the small work detail remained an inviting target for Indian attack. Certainly, had Harney's detail been reinforced as he requested, the warriors who later attacked his camp might well have been afraid to engage the troops there.²³

While at Tampa Bay, Harney chose James B. Dallam, a soldier interested in performing a "handsome" service, as trader for the new post. The two departed for the Caloosahatchee on June 19 and upon arrival decided to erect the trading house

20. *Niles' National Register*, August 10, 1839.

21. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 261-62.

22. William S. Harney to Francis L. Dancy, August 1, 1839, in Theophilus Rodenbough, *From Everglade to Canon with the Second Dragoons* (New York, 1875), 38-39; Reavis, *Harney*, 134; William C. Sturtevant, "Chakaika and the 'Spanish Indians': Documentary Sources Compared with Seminole Tradition," *Tequesta*, No. 13 (1953), 46.

23. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 262.

about 400 yards from the dragoons' bivouac.²⁴ During the next month, Harney spent most of his time on trips to Tampa Bay and Cape Florida, his own base, while nearby Indians made frequent visits to Dallam's trading post. They traded, seemed friendly to the troops, and voiced satisfaction with the truce. No definite motive can be ascertained for the Indians' apparent change of mind and subsequent attack on the post, but it is possible that the Poinsett letter published on June 22 sparked feelings of bitterness and a desire to seek revenge for the Fort King negotiations. News of the letter arrived in the Tampa Bay area two days before the massacre, and within that time Indian runners could have spread the message throughout their camps in southwest Florida. The band which committed the offense had not participated in the Fort King council, but they profited from the agreement. Because Harney had persuaded Chitto Tustenuggee to attend the talks at Fort King, he was a logical target for their vengeance, and if Sampson, one of two Negro interpreters at the trading post, may be believed, the Indians planned to kill Harney. Moreover, the attackers spared Sampson's life, but they burned the other Negro, Sandy, who had been an interpreter at the Fort King meeting, at the stake.²⁵

Harney left Tampa Bay only hours before news of the Poinsett letter arrived. Thus he was unaware of the changed situation when he reached the trading post on the evening of July 21, 1839, and he made no special plans for its defense. The next morning the steamboat which had brought him from Tampa Bay departed for Cape Florida, and the colonel rode it to the mouth of the river where he spent all day hunting wild hogs for the soldiers' mess. It was ten o'clock at night when the exhausted officer returned to camp. The usually dependable Sergeant Bigelow had been left in charge again, and Harney, having faith in Bigelow's judgment, decided to rest before

24. James B. Dallam to Francis J. Dallam, June 18, 1839, in William D. Hoyt, Jr., ed., "A Soldier's View of the Seminole War: Three Letters of James B. Dallam," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXV (April 1947), 360-61.

25. Harney to Dancy, August 1, 1839, in Rodenbough, *Second Dragoons*, 38-39; Reavis, *Harney*, 134-37; Sturtevant, "Chakaika," 46-47; "Sampson's Recollection" in Sprague, *Florida War*, 316-19. Sampson presented his recollection of the massacre after he escaped from two years of captivity, and some of his story contradicts other accounts. He stated, for instance, that the trading post was established in December 1839.

checking the sentinels. He removed his coat, boots, and pants, and fell asleep unintentionally.²⁶

About daylight, rifle shots and yelling Indians suddenly awakened Harney. When the commander bounded out of his tent, he saw a scene of disaster. A force of approximately 160 Indians led principally by Chakaika, chief of the so-called Spanish Indians, had attacked the camp and store, and amid shouts of "run to the water," the troops fled to the river. There they presented poor targets to the attackers, but they could not escape by swimming across the Caloosahatchee because Indians lined both banks. Wisely disregarding his lack of clothes, the colonel started for the river to join his men. Then at the water's edge he saw that the soldiers were unarmed. Corporal Haywood, a survivor of the massacre, later reported that a non-commissioned officer [probably Bigelow] had neglected to pass out ammunition for the dragoons' new Colt rifles. Thus when the attack began, the soldiers had simply thrown the weapons aside. Realizing that he could be of no use to two dozen unarmed men against scores of Indians, Harney decided to save himself and ran downstream along the shore. After proceeding about a quarter of a mile, he entered the river. A few paces down he went ashore again and, in an attempt to cover his trail, walked out of the water backward.

Meanwhile the Seminoles tried to entice the dragoons out of the river. One warrior who could speak English called to Sergeant Bigelow to bring his men ashore and promised that they would not be harmed. But when Bigelow and eight others consequently surrendered, the Indians murdered and disemboweled most of them and held the others captive. Seven or eight men who had remained in the water swam downstream and, after rounding a point, boarded a fishing sloop anchored there. At least three other soldiers, including Corporal Haywood, hid in the swamp and woods until the raid ended. Haywood then made his way to the coast, but the other two remained hidden until a burial detail rescued them several days later. Trader Dallam and his assistant, Mr. Morgan, were not so fortunate. They died in their bunks, victims of Indians who

26. "Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army," *Senate Documents*, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, p. 58; Harney to Dancy, August 1, 1839, in Rodenbough, *Second Dragoons*, 38-39; Reavis, *Harney*, 137.

looted the store. The attackers took Sergeant Simmons, the two Negro interpreters, and a post carpenter prisoners and tortured all of them, except Sampson, to death.²⁷ Thirteen soldiers and three civilians died.²⁸

The confusion of the onslaught and the Indians' pre-occupation with plundering and with the troops in the water gave Harney time to escape. Leaving the river, he set out for the coast armed merely with a pocket knife and wearing only his shirt, underwear, and socks. He had gone but a short distance when he met Private Britton, a dragoon who presumably fled when the attack began. The two men resumed their trek together, and after periodic reconnaissance of the Caloosahatchee shore, they found Harney's canoe which had drifted downstream. The fugitives used the boat to reach the mouth of the river where they met the sloop in which several men had escaped the attack on the trading post. With the vessel was another sloop, the *Jane*, which had come down the coast from Tampa Bay.

Reunited with some of his dragoons, Harney acted on his first impulse to return to the scene of the disaster. At the camp he found only mangled corpses, for the two men hiding in the brush feared an Indian trick and remained hidden. Lacking necessary force to pursue the Indians and afraid to remain long in that vicinity in the middle of the night, the outraged colonel dispatched one sloop to Tampa Bay and proceeded in the other to his Cape Florida headquarters.²⁹ The burial party which

27. "Sergeant Haywood's Recollection," in Rodenbough, *Second Dragoons*, 504-05; "Sampson's Recollection" in Sprague, *Florida War*, 316-19; *Niles' National Register*, August 24, 1839.

28. Rodenbough, *Second Dragoons*, 431; Sturtevant, "Chakaika," 46-47. There is some confusion about the number of men killed. Sturtevant (p. 46) states that thirteen were killed and six captured, three of the latter being murdered while in captivity, thus making a total of sixteen deaths. Reavis (p. 146) notes thirteen killed in the fighting. A report in *Niles' National Register* on August 10, 1839, also states that thirteen were killed, including two sutlers. On the other hand, Rodenbough (p. 431) cites eleven soldiers killed. As for the number of soldiers who died, these latter two sources agree. A *Niles' National Register* report on August 24, 1839, however, states that eleven bodies were found mutilated, but it does not note whether this was the total number of deaths. Therefore, if the executed prisoners are counted along with those killed in the fighting, most evidence supports the conclusion that sixteen died as an immediate result of the attack.

29. Anonymous Letter, July 22, 1839, in Rodenbough, *Second Dragoons*, 37. (Although dated July 22, 1839, this letter apparently was written on the evening of July 23 on board the *Jane*.) See also Reavis, *Harney*, 139-41.

arrived at the massacre site two weeks later discovered the two men who were hiding and Romeo, a dog which had belonged to James Dallam. Originally the property of Harney, the dog must have stood guard over Dallam's corpse, for it was the only one untouched by wolves or vultures.³⁰

The Caloosahatchee massacre wrecked the uneasy truce. Within days of the event bloody hostilities recommenced, and all hope for a conclusion of the war in 1839 collapsed. When news of the defeat reached Fort Mellon on July 31, Lieutenant W. E. Hanson seized forty-six Seminoles who were there procuring supplies. These Indians knew about the massacre but thought that the soldiers did not. Two of the group tried to escape, and the troops killed both.³¹ On August 3 headlines in the *St. Augustine News* proclaimed the war reopened, and on August 10 *Niles' National Register* pleaded for the government to "take some decided measures to expel the savage murderers."³² Later in the same month the war department requested General Taylor to authorize the governor of Florida to raise 300 militiamen, but these few additional men did not significantly aid efforts to defeat the Seminoles.³³ In October, military efforts were accelerated after General Macomb urged that all available forces be employed in the war.³⁴

In the meantime, Taylor captured approximately 200 Indians and offered to release them if their chiefs would surrender the band responsible for the Caloosahatchee River attack. The already agitated Florida citizens, supported by the *Tallahassee Floridian*, decried this policy as soft; the *Floridian* claimed that Taylor was incompetent.³⁵ Then Governor Call demanded that he be entrusted with the conduct of the war, and this intensified the already "unfriendly feelings" between regular troops and civilian authorities. The cooperation necessary for

30. Rodenbough, *Second Dragoons*, 39; *St. Augustine News*, August 30, 1839.

31. George H. Griffen to W. E. Hanson, July 29, 1839, in *Niles' National Register*, August 10, 1839; Reavis, *Harney*, 142-43; *Savannah Weekly Georgian*, August 17, 1839.

32. *St. Augustine News*, August 3, 1839; *Niles' National Register*, August 10, 1839.

33. Samuel Cooper to Zachary Taylor, August 30, 1839, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, XXV, 634.

34. Macomb to Taylor, October 17, 1839, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, XXV, 643; "Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army," 59.

35. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 263-64.

increased military operations seemed impossible to obtain. Secretary of War Poinsett blamed Call for the difficulties, and in a November letter to President Van Buren the secretary predicted that Call's desire to have the whole command and his insistence on raising a militia under territorial authority would result in much expense for the federal government and reduce the efficiency of the war effort. Poinsett requested that Call be removed as governor, and Van Buren agreed. The President endorsed Poinsett's letter with a note stating that Judge Robert Raymond Reid of St. Augustine should supersede Call.³⁶

While officials in Washington considered Call's dismissal, he set in motion another series of events which produced more controversy. Under authority of the Florida legislature, Call sent militia Colonel Richard Fitzpatrick to Cuba late in 1839 to purchase a number of bloodhounds to use against the Seminoles. The possibility of using these animals had long been discussed because the authorities knew that over the past 150 years Jamaican officials had utilized Cuban bloodhounds during slave revolts to track Negroes.³⁷ In the summer of 1837 General Jesup had argued unconvincingly that the army needed bloodhounds to facilitate removal, and in the summer of 1838 General Taylor made a similar plea.³⁸ Nevertheless, only after the Caloosahatchee massacre and the resumption of full scale war did anyone in authority take steps to procure the hounds. When Fitzpatrick returned with thirty-three dogs, Taylor and the Floridians finally had something about which they could agree. Congress and the northern press, however, felt that use of the vicious dogs would be inhumane. Secretary Poinsett refused to yield to popular pressure to ban experiments with the bloodhounds, but he did direct Taylor to order his officers to keep the dogs muzzled and leashed in the field and use them only for tracking. The controversy ended in the spring of 1840 because

36. Poinsett to Martin Van Buren, November 29, 1839, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, XXV, 656-57. There seems to be some question in Carter concerning the spelling of Reid or Reid, but the latter is correct.

37. Arthur L. Magenis to Poinsett, February 8, 1840, *Senate Documents*, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 187, pp. 2-3; James W. Covington, "Cuban Bloodhounds and the Seminoles," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXXIII (October 1954), 112.

38. Jesup to Poinsett, June 16, 1837, *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, VII, 876; Taylor to Roger Jones, July 28, 1839, *Senate Documents*, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 187, p. 3.

for unknown reasons, the canines' handlers could not induce them to follow the Seminoles' scent.³⁹

On April 21, 1840, Taylor received permission to give up the Florida command to Brigadier General Walker K. Armistead but he, too, failed to stop the depredations. Bringing the war to a close required an additional two and one-half years of fighting and negotiating, more expenditures of lives and dollars, and still another change of command.⁴⁰ These additional months of hostilities would not have been necessary if the arrangements Macomb made at Fort King had succeeded. For a brief period in 1839 there had been a hope, even a possibility, that tempers would cool and the government would find a peaceful means of ending the war, but the Caloosahatchee massacre destroyed that hope by breaking the truce and producing new fighting.

39. Covington, "Cuban Bloodhounds," 112-19; Poinsett to Taylor, January 26, 1840, *Senate Documents*, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 187, p. 5.

40. Mahon, *Second Seminole War*, 274, 294, 314-18.