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Johnson & Johnson's Recall Debacle

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JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S RECALL DEBACLE

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Nicholson School of Communication in the College of Sciences at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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ABSTRACT

Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has been viewed as a role model by many organizations for its successful handling of a 1982 crisis involving cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules that resulted in seven deaths. The public relations community applauded J&J for a swift response and for promptly implementing actions to prevent a similar crisis from occurring in the future. However more recently, J&J has become a poster child for poor crisis communications amidst a flood of recalls that started in November 2009. The present study used concepts from Coombs’ (2004) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and media framing research to develop a coding scheme for a content analysis of newspaper coverage surrounding the 1982 Tylenol recall as well as current recalls issued by J&J from November 2009 through April 2012. The samples included newspaper articles from New York Times and Chicago Tribune. Results showed that most of the stories in both samples did not evaluate J&J’s operational response or reputation overall. However, when the news coverage did evaluate J&J, coverage from the 1982 sample was positive and evenly balanced between favorable and unfavorable, compared to negative and unfavorable in the current sample. Additionally, when crisis type was mentioned in the coverage, the 1982 crisis was more likely described as a victim crisis while the current crises were more likely described as an accident or preventable crisis. When the 1982 sample was examined for mentions of previous recalls there were none compared to 80.5% of the current sample mentioning a previous recall. The results support the tenets of SCCT, information giving strategies and reputation management strategies. Additionally, the results provide valuable
information for crisis managers regarding the media’s inclusion or, lack thereof, organizations’ controlled media such as news releases.

*Keywords: Johnson & Johnson, crisis, recall, Tylenol, McNeill Consumer Healthcare*
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LIST OF ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

FDA = Federal Drug Administration
J&J = Johnson & Johnson
OCI = Office of Criminal Investigations
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Rationale for Study

Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has been viewed as a role model by many organizations for its successful response to a 1982 crisis involving cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules that resulted in seven deaths (Pauly & Hutchinson, 2005; Voreacos, Nussbaum, & Farrell, 2011; Birch, 1994). Although the tampering resulted in seven deaths, the public relations community applauded J&J for a swift crisis response that alerted the public of the possible danger. Additionally, J&J voluntarily issued a massive recall and removed all of their products from store shelves to ensure that no more people died from the tainted capsules. J&J also was lauded for providing superb communications that were timely and informative during the time of crisis.

It appears that J&J has now become a poster child for poor crisis communications amidst a flood of recalls that began in November 2009. In spite of its longstanding history and reputation for providing safe products to consumers, J&J has been cited repeatedly for unsafe products by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the FDA has even imposed a legal injunction against the organization (J&J, 2011b; U.S. Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 2011).

Media coverage of the crisis could be a good indication of whether or not J&J’s reputation is being affected by the current recalls and whether or not it still holds the same esteem that it did after its 1982 successful handling of the Tylenol tampering.
According to Bond & Kirshenbaum (1998):

A positive article in a newspaper story or prestigious magazine can often do more for a business than any ad can. (p. 146)

The newspaper or magazine article could be more valuable to an organization than advertising because a third party is speaking highly of the organization instead of the organization paying for placement of positive information in an advertisement. This consideration is important because when news coverage reports on a crisis the tone of the article could have an impact on consumers’ perceptions of the organization. Although the present study does not focus on the consumer perspective and resulting behaviors and perceptions, the findings of this study could be useful in positing possible repercussions of negative publicity and effects of positive publicity.

Research shows that news coverage is more likely to be negative. Negative publicity about companies has become prevalent in the 21st century and news outlets generally prefer to report negative news stories about companies, therefore it is more common for companies to receive negative publicity than positive publicity from the press (Dennis & Merrill, 1982; Xie & Peng, 2009). In the case of J&J, the organization’s swift response to the 1982 tampering likely garnered positive coverage. This is probably because the company initiated measures to address public safety. However, J&J’s responses to the more recent recalls pale in comparison to the lauded 1982 response and could make the company an easy target for negative publicity.

The FDA does not mandate how recalls must be communicated to the public. However, the FDA does monitor the strategies of organizations whose products are being recalled and ensures that they are using the proper tactics to inform the public. The FDA only intervenes in extreme cases where the organization does not alert the public of a health hazard in a timely fashion.
(Solomon, 2009). Although organizations provide press releases about recalls to media outlets, most recalls are never reported in the mass media. Communication research shows that news media outlets generally prefer to report negative news coverage more than positive coverage, so when product recalls are reported in the news the reports are more likely to be negative by the very nature of the news business (Dennis & Merrill, 1982; Xie & Peng, 2009).

Numerous studies show that negative press reports have long lasting impacts on the organizations or people that they are about (Kepplinger & Gabb, 2007; Tybout, Calder, & Sternthal, 1981; Wyatt & Badger, 1984). Additionally, studies have shown that negative press reports and advertisements can negatively influence the public’s perceptions of organizations (Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990). J&J’s recent series of recalls and mounting legal troubles have attracted media attention to the company.

A cursory glance at media coverage regarding J&J’s recent recalls shows mixed perceptions regarding J&J’s response to the crises and J&J’s reputation. When J&J’s 2009 recalls began, its reputation was unscathed as indicated by the comment below:

It’s {J&J} in the midst of its fourth product recall in a year and is the subject of 19 active federal or state investigations or lawsuits regarding its sales, marketing pricing or billing practices--more than three times the number of Pfizer. Yet a shiny corporate halo clings to Johnson & Johnson, established with its legendary handling of the 1982 Tylenol poisonings that has kept the company atop "most-admired" lists ever since. J&J ranked No. 4 on Fortune’s list of most-admired companies in March and, in a new survey by the Reputation Institute last month, was cited as the most-reputable company in the U.S. (Neff, 2010, p. 1)

As J&J’s recall woes continued, the same journalist acknowledged how J&J’s numerous recalls appear to be affecting the brand one year later.

The seemingly unending series of product recalls that has rocked Johnson & Johnson has cost it $1 billion in lost wholesale sales due to production shutdowns. But that’s just the beginning: it’s tipped off a cascade of consequences including sliding market share, dwindling ad budgets, lost shelf space and an incalculable blow to employee morale and
reputation as the company fell from No. 2 in the 2010 list of Fortune Most Admired Companies to No. 17 this year. (Neff, 2011, p. 1)

The fact that the same journalist wrote both of these stories illustrates why a thorough examination of news coverage is necessary to get a more accurate depiction of news coverage surrounding J&J's recalls.

Another point of interest is how J&J’s operational response to the crisis and its formal response issued to news outlets are described in the news coverage. A company’s actions following a recall of its products have significant effects on the consumers' image of the company, brand loyalty, and purchase intentions (Souiden & Pons, 2009).

Therefore, the present study employs the content analysis research method to examine news coverage from the 1982 recall and the more recent recalls to describe the following: the way that J&J's recalls are described in media coverage, whether or not the news coverage describes information giving strategies that J&J issues, whether or not the news coverage describes a reputational management strategy used in J&J’s formal response to the crisis and if so which one, and the way that the news coverage describes J&J’s overall reputation. It is crucial to evaluate media coverage because of the immense potential publicity has to impact people's perceptions. This appraisal may be even more important in times of crisis since negative coverage is more likely to be covered by the news media than positive. In the case of J&J, news coverage surrounding its recent recalls may be more likely to contain negative elements.

Theories related to crisis communication and media effects suggest that accounts in news coverage could help organizations in crisis identify key elements in the coverage and based on the observation also provide guidance on the possible impact the coverage can have on the perceptions of the organization’s publics and stakeholders.
Literature Review

Capitalism is a predominant economic system throughout the Western world and is the fundamental pillar of the economic system in the United States. The capitalistic nature of the U.S. led to the Industrial Revolution of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and although many scholars argue that it has evolved into a new form, the underlying principles still dominate today in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century (Liodakis, 2005; Langlois 2003).

The rise of capitalism also saw the introduction of the consumerism movement. According to Kotler (1972), “consumerism is a social movement seeking to augment the rights and power of buyers in relation to sellers” (p. 49). Throughout history there have been several stages of the consumerism movement that were directly related to the passage of Pure Food & Drug Act of 1906, the Meat Inspection Act of 1906, and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 (Kotler, 1972). Originally, the Pure Food & Drug Act was enforced by the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture, which became the FDA in 1930 (FDA, 2011).

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy solidified consumers’ rights further in an address to Congress where he outlined four types of consumers’ rights: consumers’ rights to safety, consumers’ rights to be informed, consumers’ rights to choose, and consumers’ rights to be heard (Kennedy, 1962). The President also provided more funding and more personnel to the FDA. The FDA was and is presently responsible for enforcing manufacturing practices that result in safe food and drugs for consumers. Since President Kennedy first introduced the consumers’ bill of rights,
several presidents have also added to the rights, but the basic fundamentals have not changed (Lampman & Douthitt, 1997).

Although these standards were instituted decades ago by the US government as the underlying principles of the FDA, it appears that there is contention among government officials, the FDA and drug manufacturers in the 21st century (FDA, 2007). Currently, manufacturers’ failure to adhere to government standards is prevalent. One of the most visible signs of these failures is in the volume of product recalls issued by the FDA. Each recall that is issued by the FDA represents an organization’s failure to meet government standards. Although there are numerous recalls posted on the FDA’s web site, the public is most likely to learn about recalls through mass media outlets. However, media outlets are not required to report on the recalls, but reserve the right to report on them as they so choose. In J&J’s case, key publications have reported on the recent recall flurry such as Bloomberg Businessweek (2011). Although this is only one example of news coverage about J&J’s recent recalls this example illustrates the massive number of consumers that one news report can reach. Businessweek has nearly one million paid subscribers and a total audience of 4.6 million (Bloomberg Media, 2011). The negative nature of this report is a stark contrast to the way J&J was lauded for its handling of a 1982 cyanide scare.

**J&J’s successful handling of the Tylenol cyanide scare**

J&J was well respected in the “public eye” for the way that it handled the Tylenol cyanide tampering in the Chicago area and the seven resulting deaths (Pauly & Hutchison, 2004). On
September 29, 1982, a 12 year old girl, Mary Kellerman died in Elk Grove, Illinois. The following timeline maps the course of events that followed Kellerman’s death (Pienciak, 1982):

**Timeline of events.**

- Kellerman complains of a sore throat and her parents give her Tylenol. Her parents found her unconscious and less than two hours later she was dead. At first the suspected cause of death is a stroke, but the autopsy reveals that she died from cyanide poisoning.

- On the same day about five miles north of Elk Grove, Adam Janus was experiencing mild chest pains, so he picked up a bottle of Extra Strength Tylenol on his way home from picking his daughter up from daycare. When Janus arrived home, he took the Tylenol and his wife was unable to wake him less than an hour later. Janus was pronounced dead a few hours later. The initial reason for Janus’ death was a blood clot, but an autopsy later revealed that he also had been poisoned with cyanide. Janus’ wife and brother were at the hospital together and returned home after the tragic event. Both of them were severely fatigued from the day’s events and took Tylenol to help. Less than two hours later paramedics had returned to work on Janus’ brother and his wife who also fell ill while the paramedics were there. Janus’ brother died the same day and his wife was later removed from life support due to complications from the cyanide-laced pills.
• About the same time that Adam Janus was dying, Mary “Lynn” Reiner took some Tylenol to help with pain and discomfort from the recent birth and delivery of her fourth child. Shortly after taking the medicine, Mrs. Reiner collapsed and later died. Authorities found several cyanide-laced pills in the bottle that Reiner had used.

• The same day, Mary S. McFarland was feeling ill at work and took some Extra Strength Tylenol. She collapsed on the job and was rushed to a local hospital where she died shortly after. Authorities also found cyanide-laced pills in McFarland’s bottle.

• Later in the evening on the same day, Paula Prince, an airline stewardess, took Extra Strength Tylenol for relief after work. Her body was discovered in her apartment a day later and the cause of death was cyanide poisoning.

Seven people died over the course of three days as a result of this tampering. The person responsible for the tampering was never found, but J&J was absolved of any wrongdoing and described as the victim of product tampering. When using a 21st century lens, it may appear that J&J did not act swiftly enough to alert the public after the first death which allowed six other people to die. However, in the 1980s there was not a 24-hour news cycle and most mass communication occurred through daily newspapers and television broadcasts, so the word about the product tampering that caused the deaths did not spread as quickly as it would now.

In the case of this crisis, J&J was a victim because the organization did not have any control over what happened to the pills once they had been distributed. Although J&J was not completely aware of the root cause of the problem, the organization immediately removed all bottles of Tylenol capsules from store shelves following the seven deaths (Mabey & Iles, 1994). More than 30 million capsules were destroyed although they were found safe. In addition to the recall, J&J also
established a 1-800 number for consumers to call with inquiries. The company eventually discovered that the capsules had been laced with cyanide by an individual, so the company was not directly at fault for the deaths. J&J united with industry representatives and the FDA to devise a plan to prevent future tampering (Hinds, 1982). Nearly two months later, Tylenol bottles returned to the market, with a brand new safety mechanism to prevent future tampering...tamper-resistant packaging, which eventually became an industry standard.

In the first days following the initial tampering deaths, Tylenol lost 87% of its market share (Barton, 2001). As a result of the massive recall, J&J’s stock value decreased by 29%, which amounted to nearly $2.3 billion (Dowdell, Govindaraj, & Jain, 1992). Although J&J’s response was costly, it was guided by its credo that emphasizes placing the needs and wellbeing of consumers first. When the initial crisis occurred, J&J claimed that the crisis had garnered the most domestic news coverage of any event since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 (Alsop, 2004). Initial media coverage of the tampering stated that it was unlikely that the cyanide was put in the capsules at J&J’s plant (“5 Die After”, 1982; “Around the World”, 1982). J&J was able to recover most of its original market share by the end of the year due to its effective management of the tampering (Lewin, 1982).

The 1982 tampering was a crisis for J&J, which can be confirmed by several communication scholars. An organizational crisis is “a specific, unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). According to Weick (1988), crises are events that are distinguished by low probability and high consequences that threaten an organization’s core. The low
probability of the occurrence requires more sensemaking on the part of the organization because the events that transpire are beyond normal interpretations. Sensemaking refers to “a developing set of ideas with explanatory possibilities, rather than a body of knowledge” (Weick, 1995, p. 245). This is a crucial point for organizations experiencing crises:

The less adequate the sensemaking process directed at a crisis, the more likely it is that the crisis will get out of control. That straightforward proposition conceals a difficult dilemma because people think by acting. To sort out a crisis as it unfolds often requires action which simultaneously generates the raw material that is used for sensemaking and affects the unfolding crisis itself. There is a delicate tradeoff between dangerous action which produces understanding and safe inaction which produces confusion. (Weick, 1988, p. 305)

In 1986, J&J faced a similar crisis involving another Tylenol tampering. From November 2009 through April 2012 J&J experienced several crises according to the definition outlined by Seeger et al. J&J’s recent slew of product recalls is definitely improbable and the sustained long duration over which its recalls have continued to occur appears to be a rare occurrence in the product recall arena. Additionally, the sensemaking that J&J leaders use during this timeframe will be crucial to weathering the recall storm and maintaining the company’s reputation.

According to Benson (1988), J&J responded quickly in the 1982 recall and used sound strategy to ensure that the organization’s messages were consistent throughout the duration of the product harm crisis. The professionalism and care for consumers shown by J&J during the 1982 crisis cultivated a positive reputation among Americans that has endured into the 21st century.

However, since December 2009, J&J has been plagued with recalls, several that even resulted in federal investigation and oversight. It is difficult to pinpoint a definitive date when J&J’s problems began, but the December 2009 voluntary recall of Tylenol Arthritis pills will be used as
the starting point for this study. In December of 2009, J&J received consumer complaints about a musty odor on some of its Tylenol pills. Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and stomach pain were the reported effects that were identified in the recall (Harrow, 2009). In January 2010, J&J expanded the recall to include several other medicines and also identified the source of the smell as a flame-retardant chemical that was used on the pallets on which the medicine was stored (Harrow, 2009). J&J appeared to handle this recall well by issuing a voluntary recall, but its ensuing headache came from a flurry of additional recalls, most of which pointed to poor manufacturing practice and a lack of oversight from leadership (Weldon, 2010).

The FDA oversees the recall process that is used as an efficient, timely and economical way to protect consumers rather than enter into costly judicial proceedings (FDA, 2011). The 1982 Tylenol recall was a voluntary recall that J&J issued without being forced to do so by the FDA. During the 1982 recall, J&J executives were so committed to providing safe products for consumers that the organization instructed the public to dispose of all Tylenol capsules until they were able to determine the cause of the deaths. Additionally, J&J and the FDA worked together harmoniously to spread the word about the tampering to public and to devise a plan to ensure that it did not recur (McFadden, 1982). However, more recently, it appears that J&J has diverted from its credo by allegedly circumventing the FDA's recall process in a phantom recall and also by providing product after product that has been determined unsafe by the FDA (Kavilanz, 2010). The number of recalls that J&J has issued since December 2009 is too numerous to list here, but a comprehensive list can be found in Appendix A. This series of crises has created a precarious situation from which J&J must recover in order to maintain its status as a trusted brand.
Recall procedures and effects

There are three types of recalls: voluntary recalls that are initiated by an organization, those that are issued at the recommendation of the FDA, and those that are mandated by the FDA. Additionally, each type of recall can be categorized as follows: Class I, Class II, and Class III. Class I recalls are placed on products that are likely to cause serious adverse health effects or death. Class II involves products that may cause temporary medical conditions that are reversible and are highly unlikely to result in an adverse health effect or death. Class III recalls are reserved for products that will not cause any adverse health effects (Solomon, 2009). If an organization does not implement the procedures and strategies necessary to rectify the issues identified in the recall(s), the FDA reserves the right to impose more stringent penalties and even take control of the organization’s operations.

In March 2011, J&J signed a consent decree with the FDA that will govern operations at three of the company’s plants for at least five years (J&J, 2011b). The consent decree of condemnation, more commonly referred to as a consent decree, is a judicial injunction that is filed in the US Department of Justice against a defendant (FDA, 2011). An injunction is a civil judicial process that aims to avert organizations from violating laws. The Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) is the FDA department that oversees the injunction process and the U.S. Attorney’s Office files the injunctions. The OCI has very specific guidelines that are followed when the process to file an injunction is initiated. According to the FDA,

An injunction may be considered for any significant out-of-compliance circumstance, but particularly when a health hazard has been identified...In considering an injunction, the agency must evaluate the seriousness of the offense, the actual or potential impact of the offense on the public, whether other possible actions could be as effective or more effective,
the need for prompt judicial action, and whether it will be able to demonstrate the likelihood of the continuance of the violation in the absence of a court order. (p. 27, 2011)

Additionally, J&J has faced allegations of executing a “phantom recall” where J&J subsidiary, McNeil Consumer Healthcare, allegedly hired contractors to go into stores and retrieve all products from shelves without alerting consumers to potential health hazards. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has held two hearings since the recalls began to investigate possible quality control issues in J&J plants as well as alleged corporate misdeeds (Weldon, 2010; Coggin, 2010).

J&J announced the signing of the consent decree, and the press release that was issued made the decree sound like recognition of the organization’s good faith effort to correct the problems that had been identified internally (J&J, 2011b). It also made the injunction appear to be a supportive gesture of the FDA to aid J&J in its correction of the problems. However, in contrast, the FDA’s announcement regarding the signing of the decree painted J&J as a negligent organization that had failed to comply with federal regulations, thus resulting in the company being under the mandate until the FDA determined that it was no longer necessary (FDA, 2011). As J&J continues to try to maintain operations, it also paints a rosy picture of the consent decree for prospective employees in company job descriptions:

McNeil-PPC, Inc. {J&J subsidiary} entered into a consent decree, or agreement, with the agency that governs certain manufacturing operations to help ensure quality and compliance. Now is an exciting time to join our business, as we focus on reaffirming the integrity of our iconic brands that are staples of households worldwide. (J&J, 2012)

Numerous business scholars have cited various short term and long term effects of product recalls. Long term effects include declining revenue, decreasing value for shareholders, and overall
reputational harm to the organization. Drug recalls affect the wealth of shareholders more than they affect the companies that bear the actual costs of issuing and conducting the recall (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985).

One might assume that the competitors of a recalled product experience significant gains in market share because their competitors are facing economic and production difficulties. However, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) found that all organizations that have products in the market category of the recalled product suffered even if they were not involved in the recalls. It has also been suggested that multiple media reports of the same recall result in diminished returns with consumers (Marsh, Schroeder, & Mintert, 2004).

**Johnson & Johnson’s legal troubles**

The consent decree that J&J entered into with the FDA was not the only legal action that has occurred since the company’s problems began in December 2009. The company has also faced several lawsuits during that time.

In January 2012, J&J agreed to pay a $158 million settlement to end a lengthy lawsuit filed by the Texas Attorney General charging the company’s subsidiary, Janssen, with illegally promoting its drug Risperdal. According to the lawsuit, J&J funded a clandestine project called the “Texas Mediation Algorithm Project” (TMAP) by illegally soliciting the help of state officials and academics to help promote the program that generated guidelines endorsing the organization’s drug. The
lawsuit also charged the company with overbilling Medicaid by more than $500 million (Silverman, 2012; Citizens Commission on Human Rights International, 2012).

In January 2012, J&J also reportedly reached a deal to pay $1 billion to end a civil investigation into its marketing and sales practices of Risperdan (Fisk, Feeley & Voreacos, 2012). Attorney generals from nearly 40 states were considering pursuing a civil investigation together alleging consumer fraud violations against J&J (Silverman, 2011).

At the same time, the health care giant {J&J} disclosed that an agreement in principle was reached to settle a misdemeanor criminal charge related to marketing its Risperdal antipsychotic, but certain undisclosed issues remain open before a settlement can be finalized, according to the SEC filing. (Silverman, 2011, “J&J to Settle Criminal Charge,” para. 3)

J&J was also ordered to pay $327 million in South Carolina for deceptive marketing practices in June 2011, and $257.7 million in Louisiana for making misleading safety claims (Silverman, 2011).

**Johnson & Johnson’s reputation**

Not only do recalls and legal proceedings of this magnitude result in financial loss, they may also be detrimental to an organization’s reputation. Although J&J has been plagued with recalls, it is still not completely clear whether or not its image and reputation have been damaged by the recalls. An examination of various Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rankings indicates that J&J has still been recognized as a good corporate citizen. J&J has been recognized as recently as 2010 and 2011 for being a good corporate citizen in spite of its recalls (Connolly, 2011; Connor. 2010). *The Corporate Citizen*, a CSR magazine published by Boston College, recognized J&J for having the
highest CSR ranking in its 2010 index. This ranking was based on a CSR index, but respondents were lay public members who gave their opinions on organizations that were considered to have good CSR. It should also be noted that J&J’s rank only fell slightly in The Corporate Citizen’s 2011 index to number 10 out of 50 companies.

Additionally, an advisory firm, Reputation Institute in partnership with Forbes Media, conducted a survey of consumers that measured their good feelings towards the largest 150 companies in the United States and J&J was among the top 10 companies (Daniels, 2011). Although respondents in these surveys only represent a small portion of US citizens, the rankings make J&J appear to be unscathed from the slew of recalls since 2009. However, in July 2011 J&J released a new CSR plan, “Healthy Future 2015” to perhaps re-position itself as a leader in CSR and to validate the recognition that it has received recently (Casey, 2011).

J&J was also ranked number 14 in a survey of 400 patient groups who identified the most reputable pharmaceutical companies (Taylor, 2012). The ranks were based on a survey of 500 influential patient groups worldwide asking them to rate pharmaceutical companies’ corporate reputations. The survey was conducted by PatientView.

Although J&J’s reputation for good CSR may appear to be intact, the organization’s “bottom line” has suffered as a result of the recalls and consent decree. Some of the negative effects cited by J&J were a projected $.12 per share decrease in value and an 8.2 percent decrease in over-the-counter drug sales in the first quarter of 2011 compared to the same time period in 2010. In addition, J&J reported that U.S. sales were down 26.8 percent (Food and Drug Letter, 2011). In stark contrast to its Top 10 finish in CSR rankings, J&J has also been recognized as one of the 10 Most Hated Companies in America (24/7 Wall St., 2012). The list was compiled based on consumer
satisfaction, customer care, product pricing, and brand impressions as well as company earnings, profit forecasts, and product development.

The jury is still out on whether or not J&J’s vitality as a company will suffer from its recall woes.

Looking long-term, I also don't believe that recent product recalls or negative legal results will significantly impair the juggernaut's prospects. J&J is trading for less than 15 times average earnings and free cash flow for the past five years and a dividend yield of 3.5%, and I continue to happily hold my shares. (Chokkavelu, 2012)

In contrast, much criticism regarding J&J's upper management and the organization's poor manufacturing practices can be found in the trade publications as well as other mass media outlets. An industry blog, FiercePharma reported the following:

Showing solidarity "across the board," a panel convened by Johnson & Johnson's board of directors finds top executives at both JJ [J&J] and its McNeil unit blameless in an embarrassing two-year stretch of product recalls. Translation: the panel threw McNeil middle management under the bus... McNeil suffered from "an adversarial relationship" between some quality-control and production staff as well as "an emphasis on production volume" over compliance [according to the committee]. The adversity may have developed during a rapid succession of McNeil leadership changes; those leaders "may not have had sufficient understanding of what was taking place at the plant level," the committee said. In addition, some equipment was outdated and insufficient. (FiercePharma, 2011)

J&J has even been ranked number one on the Flame Index which is one assessment tool that uses an algorithm that pulls in data from more than 12,000 news sources and uses the news coverage to rank companies (Flame Index, 2012).

The Flame Index can measure public perception for Brand Risk Management. The real-time data allows instant measurement of the media effect from corporate news events...Johnson & Johnson’s highest ranking was number 10 out of 50 on the Flame Index. Johnson & Johnson’s rank is based on a real-time analysis of available media and information sources. This results in a calculation of the companies most ‘on fire’ in public opinion. (Flame Index, 2012)
The statement and ranking are two examples of how the media has described J&J's recent crises, but if the news coverage surrounding J&J's crises is similar it could prove to be costly for the company. Throughout the history of mass communication research, communication scholars have differed in their thoughts regarding the degree that media affects the audience, but there is consensus that the media does have effects on the audience (Baran & Davis, 2006). Considering the effects that media has on audience perceptions, it is appropriate to examine media coverage surrounding J&J's product recalls and legal injunctions because of the suggested part that media reports play in shaping the public's perceptions.

**Effects of media coverage on public perception**

McQuail (1994) proposed that mass communication as a whole is grounded on the idea that the media have significant effects. In general, media effects research examines the ways that media messages influence the perceptions and behaviors of the public. McQuail also points out the fact that the effects are determined just as much by the receiver as the sender. For example, framing research suggests that receivers will be guided by frames in the news coverage and will also internalize the frames and use them as they assign meaning to information and events (McQuail, 1994). Scheufele (1999) suggested that framing can be used to contextualize media effects research.
Framing.

Gamson and Modigliani (1987) suggest that a media frame is an idea or story line that offers an interpretation of the meaning of events and the issues at hand. The media frame can include intentional or unconscious acts by the sender. This suggests that media frames can be purposely incorporated into media coverage by the message originator but they can also be included subconsciously when the sender does not intend to include them.

Tankard (2001) suggests that there are three metaphors that aid the understanding of framing metaphors. The first two metaphors relate framing to a picture frame. Firstly, Tankard suggests that one purpose of a frame is to isolate a portion of a picture or painting and draw attention to a certain part of it. Secondly, the picture frame can be used to influence the tone that the picture is viewed with. For example, one might view a photograph differently depending on how ornate or simplistic a frame is. These examples translate to the media’s ability to highlight certain messages or ideas and their ability to set the tone for events and stories. Lastly, Tankard’s final metaphor relates media framing to the frame of a house. In construction the frame is the basis on which the rest of the structure is built. Similarly, the news frame is the idea upon which a story's organization is built.

Along the same lines, Entman (1993) claims, “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52). Additionally, individual frames involve the internalization of ideas that individuals use to process information (Entman, 1993). While both
Entman’s and Tankard’s media framing concepts focus on the selection of certain concepts or ideas to share with the public, Entman’s perspective on media framing seems to place more emphasis on the intent and motive of the person who is sending the message while Tankard focuses completely on the medium. Entman also suggests that the receiver of the message plays an active role in the process. Both Entman and Tankard’s ideas are important to this study because of the suggested manner in which the news media’s coverage of organizations affects the public’s perception of those organizations. In the case of J&J’s recalls, media framing research would suggest that media coverage surrounding the recalls could impact: the public’s perceptions towards J&J, the amount of responsibility for the crisis that the public places with J&J, whether or not the public views the organization as guilty or innocent, and the perceived quality of the organization’s reputation.

Media framing research suggests that the valence of media coverage has the potential to affect people’s perceptions of an organization in crisis. Additionally, the public’s perceptions of an event or object can vary depending on whether or not the publicity is negative. Therefore, the following research question is posed:

Research Question 1: Was there a difference in how the media evaluated Johnson & Johnson’s operational response to the crisis and its overall reputation in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012)?

The tone of media coverage can be one indication of public perception due to its potential to impact people’s perceptions. Thus answering this research question can provide insight for crisis managers on how much attention should be directed towards media outlets and how much credence should be given to the media reports.
Publicity

Bond and Kirshenbaum (1998) suggest that the public generally associates more credibility with publicity such as news reports than with communications that are controlled by companies. Communication that is controlled by a company is referred to as controlled or paid media and includes messages that organizations have direct control over such as advertising, commercials, brochures, news releases and internal communication. On the contrary, uncontrolled media are generated by external organizations such as television, print, radio, or online publications (Owen, 1991). When uncontrolled media report negative information, consumers weigh it more heavily than positive news reports (Mizerski, 1982). Dennis and Merrill (1982) suggest that media prefer to report negative content more than positive content. As organizations plan for future crises and strategize for current crises, they must consider the pervasiveness of mass communication and the potential of the media to cause irreparable damage to their reputations.

Reputation

Coombs and Holladay (2010), drawing upon work by Rindova and Fombrun (1999) and Wartick (1992), describe reputation as “the aggregate evaluation constituents make about how well an organization is meeting constituent expectations based on its past behaviors” (pp. 168-169). Gray and Balmer (2002) suggest that an organization's success is ultimately tied to maintaining a good and recognizable corporate reputation.
A poor corporate reputation can make building a brand difficult; however a good reputation does not always equal success. Consumers care most about the fairness that is shown to them by the organization followed by the organization's success, and the quality of the organization's leadership (Page & Fearn, 2005).

Cable and Turban (2006) conducted a study of job seekers and identified their perceptions of the potential employers and examined how those perceptions affected their job searches. They found that job seekers base assumptions of job attributes on reputation. Additionally, they found that the manner in which job seekers' perceived the organizational pride of employees is related to their perceived reputation of the organization. Reputations let the public know how an organization's products, positions, and strategies compare to those of competing organizations (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).

Reputation is especially important during crises (e.g., recalls), when organizations attempt to maintain their positive reputations in the face of potentially damaging information. It is more important for organizations with an existing positive reputation to respond well to crises than for companies who do not have good reputations. If negative publicity coincides with consumers' attitudes and beliefs about an organization, then those pre-existing feelings combined with the publicity will determine the actual impact to the organization's brand and reputation (Pullig, Netemeyer & Biswas, 2006). Thus, organizations such as J&J that have solid reputations and brand images should have a greater ability to “weather” crisis storms.

Although organizations rely heavily on the media to get their messages out, they must also be cognizant of the fact that the only way to totally control such messaging is through advertising. With this in mind, one should consider how information is exchanged between the media and organizations with unpaid media. Without the guarantee of placement that comes with advertising,
organizations are left at the mercy of the media. The media have a choice whether or not to relay
the information that the organization is sharing and they also have the liberty to communicate their
ideas and opinions regardless of the reputation harm that may arise from the comments. Contrarily,
news media also rely on information generators such as public relations practitioners to supply
facts and other news content. In this way organizations act as information subsidies the media.
According to Gandy (1982) the exchange of information between the news media and organization
and mutually-beneficial relationship is described as:

   An attempt {by the media} to produce influence over the actions of others by controlling
   their access to and use of information relevant to those actions. The source {organization}
   causes it to be made available at something less than the cost a user would face in the
   absence of the subsidy. (p. 61)

Thus, the information subsidy includes news and facts that practitioners offer to help journalists
supplement their articles. Journalists find that it is cost effective to rely on organizations for
information because they were not required to spend time and effort to gather information, which
allows them to use their own resources less often and more strategically (Walters & Walters, 1992).

When unexpected issues arise within an organization, oftentimes the problems can be
resolved without them becoming a crisis. An organization must determine if an event is truly a
crisis based on factors such as effects on stakeholders, effects on the bottom line, and effects on
safety. The news media acts as an information gatekeeper by determining what information is
worthy of space in the outlet, and what the public will deem as newsworthy (Flower, Haynes, &
Crespin, 2003). Additionally, news media serve in a watchdog capacity to help keep the public
abreast of information that is deemed important. The news media have occupational parameters
that allow them to make timely decisions about what news stories to cover. According to the Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics:

Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues. (Society of Professional Journalists, 2012)

An organization in crisis must use strategic communication to protect the valuable asset of their reputation. But they also must provide the information the public needs to take action if they are affected by the crisis. Research in the area of crisis communication provides insights into factors that organizations should consider when evaluating a crisis and how the type of crisis should affect its communication efforts.

Research in crisis communication

Coombs’ (2004) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) offers systematic guidance for organizations to follow as they develop responses to crises based on the type of crisis that occurs. SCCT is grounded in attribution theory which suggests that people look for underlying reasons that events occur because they seek to maintain a sense of control over their lives (Coombs, 1995; Dean, 2004). To take this a step further, the discounting principle suggests that a causal inference will be discounted if a plausible explanation exists (Dean, 2004). For example, J&J is well known and highly regarded for its crisis response to the Tylenol tampering in the 1980s. However,
now that the government is intervening with this highly regarded company over the safety of its products, the discounting principle suggests that consumers will divert from their pre-existing perceptions of the company and hold it liable for the current safety issues. According to Coombs and Holladay (1996), “The more publics attribute crisis responsibility to an organization, the stronger the likelihood is of publics developing and acting upon negative images of the organization.”

SCCT is based on the receivers’ perceptions of the crisis and on the amount of responsibility that they attribute to the organization. Coombs and Holladay (2002) originally identified the following crisis categories: natural disaster, rumors, workplace violence, product tampering/malevolence, challenges, technical error accidents, technical error recalls, human error accidents, human error recalls, and organizational misdeeds. They later reduced the categories into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable based on similar characteristics among the original categories. The key differentiator in each category is the amount of control that the organization has over the crisis. The results of Coombs and Holladay’s study also showed that the amount of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization increased progressively from each category, with the lowest responsibility attributed to the victim cluster and the highest responsibility attributed to the preventable cluster. Here the control element is also directly tied to the level of responsibility that individuals will attribute to the organization. The less control that the organization had over the crisis, the less responsibility individuals will attribute to the organization.

The victim cluster includes crises where the organization was a victim as well as stakeholders and is not responsible for the crisis in any way. The accident cluster involves crises that were unintentional on the part of the organization such as technical failure and mechanical
breakdown leading to the creation of a defective product. The accident cluster crises are beyond the control of the organization because the breakdown was unforeseen. The preventable cluster involves organizations intentionally putting stakeholders at risk or acting inappropriately or illegally. Additionally, crises that result from human error fall in this cluster because it is possible that human error could have been prevented with proper training or other intervention.

According to these definitions, J&J’s original tampering of 1982 should be categorized in the victim cluster because J&J was the victim of a tampering and was not at fault for what occurred. In contrast, several of the J&J’s current recalls would be categorized in the preventable cluster because J&J was found to be negligent. Additionally, J&J’s apparent negligence and failure to comply with the FDA standards appears to be well within the organization’s control, so the crisis would meet the criteria for a preventable crisis according to SCCT. Therefore, the SCCT suggests that receivers would have increased attribution of responsibility for J&J concerning the current crises compared to the 1980s tampering.

According to the situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), preventable crises have the potential to damage an organization’s reputation more than victim or accident crises. Therefore the following research question is posed:

Research Question 2: Was there a difference in the crisis type that the news media described in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage (November 2009 – April 2012)?

The answer to this research question pertains to the basic premises of SCCT when combined with the results of other research questions that address the evaluation of J&J’s operational response and description of J&J as an organization. Although the results will not prove causation they will be able to suggest possible relationships to study for future research.
SCCT also suggests that past crises may be used to judge organizations’ stability based on patterns in behavior, which is referred to as crisis history (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Stability refers to an event that occurs frequently and appears to be occurring in patterns, while instability is when a crisis happens infrequently and considered to be a rare occurrence.

SCCT also proposes that individuals are more forgiving of unstable crises because the organizations involved are not “repeat offenders,” in contrast to stable crises that are viewed more harshly because they seem to identify underlying issues that are causing the situation to recur.

Additionally, SCCT identifies categories that intensify the situation and further impact how much responsibility the public will attribute to the organization for the crisis. Those categories are: the severity of the crisis and the performance history of the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Severity is represented by the actual damage done by the crisis including financial damage, environmental damage, and damage to human life. Performance history includes an organization’s response during past crises, past actions of the organization, and how the organization has treated stakeholders in the past. Coombs and Holladay (2002) suggest that “As severity increases or performance history worsens publics will attribute greater crisis responsibility to the organization” (p. 169).

The current J&J crises have not resulted in loss of life, however there have been major implications economically for the organization and its stakeholders, which appear to be compounding with each recall such as the plant closures causing major reduction in overall production, decreased products in retail outlets, and significant judicial proceedings (Silverman, 2011; 24/7 Wall Street, 2010). It is also possible that J&J's handling of the current recalls and repeated mishandling of current crises could detract from the well established reputation of the organization. Additionally, since media coverage of an organization’s history of previous crises can
make it more difficult for the organization to repair its reputation, the following research question is posed:

Research Question 3: Was there a difference in references to prior recalls in the news coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November 2009 – April 2012)?

Identifying references to previous recalls could allow the researcher to posit certain relationships between crisis history and attribution of responsibility when combined with the evaluative variables that are addressed in Research Question 1.

Organizational response to crises

According to Coombs and Holladay (2002), “An organization’s communicative response to a crisis can serve to limit and even to repair the reputational damage” (p. 166). There are numerous scholarly sources that suggest the proper organizational response to crises, but Sturges (1994) suggests that organizations employ three different crisis responses: instructing information, adjusting information and internalizing information. Internalizing information is also referred to as reputation management strategies and those strategies were refined as a part of SCCT. Instructing information tells people how to protect themselves physically and financially during a crisis. It also instructs the business community how to act regarding normal business operations. Adjusting information helps people cope psychologically with the crisis and begins to explain what is being done to rectify the situation and prevent it from recurring.
Coombs (2012) suggests that instructing and adjusting information should be at the core of any crisis response and that no reputation management concerns should be addressed before providing these information-giving strategies. These types of information are important in the direct aftermath of crises because people are in the information seeking stage and it is beneficial for the organization to provide information regarding the crisis to reassure the public that the organization is in control of the situation.

Instructing information must come first because it provides information to stakeholders about how they can protect themselves physically & financially to prevent harm (Coombs, 2007; Sturges, 1994). This information is especially important during health crises, product harm, product recalls, natural disasters, and crises threatening public safety (Kim et al., 2011). Protection is crucial to prevent reputational damage, so organizations must provide information that assures stakeholders that the appropriate course of action is being taken to ensure protection and that the organization knows what transpired and how to correct the problems. This provision of information to stakeholders helps shape their perceptions and beliefs about the organization being in control of the situation (Birch, 1994).

Adjusting information helps stakeholders cope with the psychological stress of the crisis (Coombs, 2007; Sturges, 1994). Adjusting information also communicates the corrective actions being implemented by the organization and the steps being taken to prevent a recurrence (Coombs, 2009). According to Holladay (2009) instructing and adjusting information share common goals:

The goals are to meet stakeholders' needs to understand and cope with the crisis and to demonstrate that the organization is actively involved in managing the crisis.
Therefore the following research question is posed:

Research Question 4: Was there a difference between the media’s description of Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012)?

The results of this research question could prove to be useful to communication scholars when combined with the crisis type variable to see if a certain information-giving strategy appears to be used more often with a certain type of crisis.

In spite of the importance of the two information giving strategies, most of the current communication literature focuses on reputation management rather than information-giving strategies (Coombs, 2009; Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2011; Sturges, 1994). Reputation management strategies are used to maintain an organization’s reputation by initiating the appropriate response for the crisis at hand (Coombs, 2012). These strategies communicate information to stakeholders that will be used to make judgments about organization’s image and reputation (Newsom & Carrell, 1986). These strategies should be selected based on the precepts of SCCT. Although communication scholars have coined various names for reputation management strategies the basic concepts and premises are similar (Benoit & Drew, 1997). The strategies can be generally grouped into four categories of strategic responses: deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce (Coombs, 2006). The four categories represent a continuum ranging from strategies that are more defensive to those that are more accommodating. They also have varying degrees of organizational acceptance of responsibility for the crisis and also are geared to match the organization’s response to stakeholders’ degree of blame that is associated with the organization experiencing the crisis.
The following descriptions of the four categories were based on Benoit’s (1997) and Coombs’ (2006) crisis communicative strategies typology. The deny category includes statements that deny the occurrence or existence of the crisis or deny that the organization is the cause of the crisis. The diminish category includes statements that imply that although the accused organization is somewhat at fault for the crisis, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact are inappropriate. Additionally, these statements may suggest that the organization should not be held responsible for the occurrence or impact because uncontrollable factors limited the organization’s ability to control the situation. The rebuild category includes statements that outline the corrective actions being made to rectify the situation. Organizations may also accept responsibility for the crisis in these statements and apologize for it. The statements may express willingness for remediation, rectification, and proactive works. The organization may also explain how organizational policies are changing in response to the crisis. The reinforce category includes statements that try to shift attention from the crisis by reminding stakeholders of the organization’s good track record by placing the crisis in a more desirable context. These statements may also recognize stakeholders for their continued support and understanding during the crisis.

SCCT recommendations require organizations to match their crisis responses to features of the crises in order to protect them from possible reputational damage. However, this framework offers recommendations based on optimal matching principles designed to enhance the effectiveness of the response. The actual response strategies that organizations employ during crises may differ. Hence, there is a need to understand how organizations in crisis use reputation management strategies.
The four categories of strategic responses can be demonstrated through 14 specific reputation management strategies. The reputation management strategy descriptions used in the present research were based on a typology used by Benoit (1997) and Coombs (2006). The following table outlines each of the strategies:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deny</th>
<th>Attack the Accuser</th>
<th>Confronts the person or group saying there is a crisis, claiming no crisis exists.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denial</td>
<td>Asserts there is no crisis. There are two types of denial (absolute &amp; reserved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scapegoat</td>
<td>Blames some person or group outside of the org for turning this into a crisis. Organization may blame a vendor or supplier for crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suffering</td>
<td>Claims that organization is an unfair victim of crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>Minimizes the organization's responsibility by denying intent to do harm to others, create a poor product, or damage the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deny Volition</td>
<td>Minimizes the organization's responsibility by claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis or by claiming that the situation was beyond the organization's control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Minimizes the perceived damage that was caused by the crisis (i.e., “It is not as bad as it seems” or “It could have been worse”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>The organization offers money, compensation or other gifts to the victims of the crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>Indicates that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repentance</td>
<td>Asks stakeholders and victims to forgive the organization for the crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rectification</td>
<td>Says that the organization is taking corrective action to prevent future recurrence and to remedy the current problem. Such corrective action could include, but is not limited to: changes in manufacturing, procedural changes, policy changes, personnel training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bolstering</td>
<td>Reminds stakeholders of the organization’s past good works and praises actions taken in response to the crisis. May also emphasize the organization’s positive attributes or positive actions in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transcendence</td>
<td>Places crisis in a larger, more desirable context. Suggests a different frame of reference. Admits involvement in the crisis, but shows how the act advanced a greater common good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingratiation</td>
<td>Praises stakeholders by thanking them for their support. Thanks stakeholders and volunteers for assisting the organization and continue to show loyalty during the crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These 14 reputation management strategies describe the common themes that organizations experiencing crises may employ to help maintain their reputable status. The crisis communicators choose which strategy is warranted based on the specific characteristics of the crisis at hand. This examination of reputation management strategies will provide insight into the extent to which SCCT's tenets were evident in media reports of J&J's formal responses. Therefore, the following research question is posed:

Research Question 5: What reputation management strategies does the 1982 news coverage and current news coverage report that Johnson & Johnson used?

Identifying the reputation management strategies that the media reported that J&J used in 1982 and the current crises could be helpful to scholars and practitioners. By providing insight into the strategies that are reported in the news in connection with certain crisis types, scholars could begin to posit relationships between the two. Practitioners could benefit from the results of this research question by seeing an example of the reputation management strategies that were reported in an exemplary crisis response as well as a less highly regarded one. The data could also allow practitioners to weigh whether or not employing certain strategies could possibly be detrimental to depictions of their organization's reputation.

Significance of Research

Framing research suggests that media frames influence people's interpretations of current events by emphasizing certain elements while also downplaying others. This notion is extremely
important to organizations that are experiencing crises because news coverage has a large impact on the perception, management and evolution of a crisis (Ringo, 2005).

The literature on crisis communication demonstrates that the manner in which an organization handles a past crisis affects the potential for reputational harm in future crises. More specifically, this threat is more likely to arise in future crises resulting from intentional and preventable acts on the organization’s part. From this research, it appears that attribution of responsibility increases with the organization’s ability to prevent the crisis. Individuals are less willing to forgive acts that are deemed as intentional or preventable. Organizations use crisis response strategies to reduce reputation threats that arise from crises.

The data gathered from this systematic approach to analyzing newspaper coverage surrounding Johnson & Johnson’s recalls will offer valuable insight to crisis managers. It will expand the existing literature on recalls by providing an in-depth comparison of an exemplary crisis management effort that garnered positive outcomes for the organization and a different crisis where the organization seemed to falter in comparison. The analysis of media coverage of the crises enables us to examine theoretically-based concepts and advice believed to be important for effective crisis management. The present study will add to existing literature by exploring how the newspaper coverage depicts organizations that are experiencing multiple and sustained crises over extended periods of times.
Summary

This chapter has reviewed the existing literature regarding media framing and crisis communication as well as J&J's past and present experience during a crisis. This study seeks to describe media coverage surrounding J&J’s 1982 cyanide-laced Tylenol crises as well as the crises that the organization has experienced between December 2009 and March 2012. Crisis communication and media framing literature will inform the examination of the media content. The following chapter discusses the research methodology that was used to address the research questions.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODS

Introduction

Chapter one provided the background, theoretical grounding, rationale and research questions for this study. The present chapter describes the research method used to address the research questions concerning crisis type, crisis history, tone, crisis response, and reputation management strategies described in newspaper coverage.

This chapter also describes the coding instrument used to examine the newspaper coverage and the testing of the coding instrument’s reliability. Newspaper coverage of J&J’s 1982 recall as well as J&J’s recalls from November 2009 – April 2012 in New York Times and Chicago Tribune was examined. New York Times was used because it is considered to be a prestige newspaper in the United States. Chicago Tribune was used because the 1982 Tylenol tampering occurred in the Chicago area.

Content analysis method

Content analysis is a quantitative research method aimed at summarizing key elements rather than the minute details of a sample (Neuendorf, 2002). Additionally, content analyses allow researchers to make valid inferences in the data's context that can be replicated (Krippendorf,
The first content analysis was introduced in 1941 and scholars at that time focused on the analysis of manifest data (Krippendorf, 2004). Manifest data is objective and does not require the researcher to extrapolate ideas or themes; one example is simply counting words. However, as the method has evolved and gained more acceptance, many communication scholars now recognize the contribution of the researcher’s analysis of latent data as well. Latent data requires more subjective judgment and cannot be measured directly, but can be represented by one or more indicators. This distinction is especially important to ensure that the quantitative elements of the analysis are not taken out of context and can be used to make inferences about the data that is being examined (Riffe, Lacy & Ficco, 1998). The present study examined both manifest and latent data within news coverage in *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune*.

The content analysis method is also appropriate for research involving media framing because it allows a methodical description of various news coverage. The unit of analysis for this study was each newspaper article. Using the entire article for the content analysis was the best approach to ensure the most accurate description of the newspaper coverage because the research questions concern overarching descriptions of the crisis and Johnson & Johnson. Oftentimes, the crisis, organizational response, or reputation management strategy is described throughout several paragraphs. Therefore, if the unit of analysis focused on the paragraph, the researcher would run the risk of not understanding the full context of the coverage and the description that is provided.
Search strategy

*New York Times* is regarded as a prestige publication by numerous communication scholars and holds accolades such as the most Pulitzer prizes won out of all news organizations, the greatest reach among national opinion leaders, and an audience of nearly 5 million readers (New York Times, 2012; Seibel & Smith 2009; DeCicco, 1988). Therefore the current study examined articles from *New York Times* because it is widely held as an industry leader. *Chicago Tribune* was used because this publication would likely have a heavy concentration of coverage surrounding the past and current crisis since the 1982 tampering occurred in the Chicago area.

*New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* coverage from the original J&J recall was analyzed from September 1, 1982 through September 1, 1983. The date range for this article retrieval was based on the date of the first media reports of the Tylenol tampering. *New York Times* articles were compiled using the LexisNexis academic database and the search was guided by the following Boolean search: “Tylenol” AND “Johnson & Johnson”. This search process produced 89 newspaper reports from *New York Times*. *Chicago Tribune* articles were identified using the same search terms on the *Chicago Tribune* web site archival search. This search process produced 19 newspaper reports from *Chicago Tribune*.

*New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* coverage from December 1, 2009 through April 17, 2012 was also examined. The date range for the article retrieval was based on the beginning of the series of recalls for J&J that started at the end of November 2009. *New York Times* articles were identified using the LexisNexis academic database and the search was guided by the following Boolean search: “Johnson & Johnson” OR “DePuy Orthopaedics” OR “McNeil Consumer Healthcare” OR ”Tylenol” AND “recall”. This search process produced 84 *New York Times* newspaper reports.
Chicago Tribune articles were identified using the same search terms on the Chicago Tribune web site archival search. The search process produced 32 Chicago Tribune newspaper reports.

The researcher applied inclusion and exclusion criteria to the 224 articles that were identified during the searches to ensure relevance to the research questions posed. The researcher excluded any articles related to J&J’s financial reports, or executive departures and appointments, and duplicate articles. The final sample combined New York Times and Chicago Tribune articles and consisted of 28 articles from the 1982 coverage and 41 articles from the current coverage, making a total of 69 reports for analysis.

Coding scheme

The coding scheme pertained to variables identified in the research questions. The researcher drew upon the work of Benoit (1997), Coombs (2006), and Sturges (1994) to develop a coding scheme to examine the newspaper coverage. Appendix B reports the coding scheme.

The coding scheme provided instructions to record the publication date and author for each article. The past recalls variable was recorded as “yes” or “no” based on whether or not the coverage made a reference to past recalls from J&J or its subsidiaries. A list of J&J’s subsidiaries can be found in Appendix C. There was also a question that was used only for the current (November 2009 – April 2012) sample regarding whether or not the coverage referred to the 1982 Tylenol tampering specifically. According to SSCT, media coverage of an organization’s history of previous crises can make it more difficult for the organization to repair its reputation. Therefore this
category was used to identify whether or not crisis history was referred to in the newspaper coverage.

**Crisis type variable**

The coding scheme provided instructions to examine the news coverage to determine if a specific crisis type was described. The identification was based on Coombs and Holladay's (2002) crisis type categorizations: victim, accident, and preventable. Media reports that described the crisis as the victim type were identified by reviewing the coverage to see if J&J was called a victim, if the coverage described a tampering, sabotage or workplace violence; or if responsibility was attributed outside of the J&J family of companies. The accident frame was identified by any mention of technical breakdown, mechanical failure, or undetectable problems. The preventable frame was identified if the news coverage stated that J&J intentionally and knowingly put stakeholders at risk, violated the law, or if human error was the cause and could have been prevented with more thorough training. The coder also indicated if there was no reference to crisis type.
**Evaluation of J&J's operational response variable**

The way in which the media described J&J’s handling of recalls was identified by examining the tone that the news coverage used to describe J&J’s operational response to the crisis. Operational responses include: the corrective actions taken in response to the crisis (i.e., procedural changes, additional employee training; or instituting new quality control measures). This category contained four possible types of tone: positive, negative, both positive and negative, or neutral reference. The intent of this category was for the coder to identify the tone of the descriptions of J&J’s actions in response to the recalls.

The positive reference was identified by any mention similar to J&J making necessary improvements, ensuring that products were safe, crediting J&J with making sure that stakeholders were aware of dangers, and J&J responding adequately and in a timely fashion. The negative reference was identified if the news coverage described J&J’s response negatively, accused J&J of poor response to the issue, described J&J’s actions as negligible, or criticized J&J’s response. The both positive and negative reference was used when the news coverage provided both positive and negative information regarding J&J’s operational handling and response to the recall. The neutral reference was identified by coverage that objectively reported actions or details regarding what measures J&J was taking to handle the recall and did not include an evaluation of the response. The coder also indicated if there was no description of J&J’s operational response. All of the attributes within the positive, negative, and both positive and negative categories that were listed in the coding scheme did not have to be described in the news coverage for a category to be recorded.
Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation variable

The overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation category sought to describe the tone used in news coverage to evaluated J&J as a company overall. The coding scheme provided examples of terms that could possibly be found in the coverage and deemed as favorable or unfavorable. The coder also indicated if the news coverage did not describe J&J’s reputation. The coding scheme instructed the coder to identify which category was dominant in the article. The favorable tone was identified by looking for terms of admiration, honor, validation, and praise in regards to J&J’s reputation. The unfavorable tone was identified by news coverage that was critical of J&J, mentioned poor quality control, or described the problem as a pattern of continued issues.

Information giving was identified based on any description of a formal organizational response in the news coverage. For the purposes of this study, any reference to a formal response to the crisis was assumed to have originated with the organization unless it was attributed to a third party such as first responders, government officials or industry experts. The categories were based on Sturges’ (1994) two categories of information giving which are instructing information and adjusting information.

Inclusion of instructing information variable & inclusion of adjusting information variable

Instructing information was identified by information that outlined how people could protect themselves physically and financially from the crisis. This strategy also could instruct the
business community on whether employees should report to work or how business operations were being affected. The adjusting information strategy was identified in the news coverage by information that was geared toward helping people cope psychologically with the crisis and explain what was being done to prevent a recurrence.

Inclusion of a reputation management strategy variable

The reputation management strategy category enabled the coder to identify whether or not the news coverage described a reputation management strategy that J&J used. The coding scheme instructed the coder to consider the macro-level categories of strategic responses to help narrow down what reputation management strategies were being described if any. The macro-level strategic response categories were: deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce. These categories were not recorded, but were used as a guide to help the coder identify any micro-level reputation management strategies. Then the coding scheme provided instructions to record which of the 14 reputation management strategies were used. The strategy descriptions were based on Coombs’ (2012) typology. The coding scheme gave instructions to record the most dominant strategy first followed by the other strategies in descending order of dominance because multiple reputation management strategies might have been present in an article. The coder also indicated if no reputation management strategy was presented in the article.
Intercoder reliability

In order to assess the reliability of the coding scheme, two coders were used to establish the coding reliability prior to coding the actual data set. The researcher conducted a training session with two coders to explain and demonstrate use of the coding scheme. The coders were blind to the specific research questions guiding the investigation. They were given a sample of crisis news reports unrelated to J&J to code to test their understanding of and ability to use the coding scheme. After the initial coding, the researcher and coders discussed discrepancies in coding and identified ways to refine the instrument. The researcher made minor adjustments to the coding scheme based on the coders’ recommendations. After the coding scheme was modified, the coders examined a subset of J&J news coverage from The Washington Post and USA Today to validate the coding scheme.

The coders recorded data on a spreadsheet created by the researcher. Both coders reviewed a sub-sample of 20 articles from publications other than New York Times and Chicago Tribune, which represented nearly 30% of the total number of articles in the actual sample. Each coder’s responses were compared to ensure that the data was recorded in the same order. The intercoder reliabilities for each variable were computed using Cohen’s kappa coefficient. The assessment of the level of agreement was based on Landis’ and Koch’s (1977) agreement classifications: 0 - .20 = slight agreement, .21 – .40 = fair agreement, .41 – .60 = moderate agreement, .61 – .80 = substantial agreement, and .81 – 1.00 = almost perfect agreement. Table 2 reports the coding reliabilities and the interpretations of the reliability coefficients. It should be noted that the results of the reputation management strategy variables were collapsed into the four primary strategic response categories to see if the reliability of the first, second and third most dominant reputation management strategy variables would improve.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Cohen’s Kappa</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mention of the 1982 recall</td>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of previous recalls</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis type</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of J&amp;J’s response to the crisis</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall evaluation of J&amp;J’s reputation</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td>Almost Perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response – instructing information</td>
<td>.604</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response – adjusting information</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most dominant strategic response category</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd most dominant strategic response category</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd most dominant strategic response category</td>
<td>-.0219</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy</td>
<td>.486</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy</td>
<td>-.0219</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although Cohen’s kappa for mention of the 1982 recall was undefined, it should be noted that the coders had 100% agreement, which is the likely explanation for the undefined kappa. The relatively low coding reliabilities could have resulted from the coders’ examination of latent content rather than manifest content. As previously discussed, latent content requires the coder to make more subjective interpretations of the data. Lower than expected intercoder reliabilities may have resulted from the difficulty of the coding tasks (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).

Due to the difficulty that was encountered in establishing the reliability of the coding scheme and the complexity of the coding tasks, the final coding decisions were made by the researcher. The researcher’s familiarity with the J&J cases and concepts represented in the coding scheme was considered when the decision was made to allow the researcher to code the actual data set. The final data set consisted of a total of 69 newspaper articles, 28 from 1982 and 41 from November 2009 – April 2012. Each newspaper article was analyzed using the coding scheme.

Summary

This chapter described the research method employed for this study, described the way the sample was collected, outlined the operational definitions used to examine the newspaper coverage, and described the coding scheme and coding process. Chapter three presents the results of the statistical analyses that were used to address the research questions.
CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS

Chapter two explained the methods used to gather the data, described the coding scheme and explained the coding process that was used to describe the news coverage. This chapter presents the results of the analyses used to examine the research questions. Frequencies for each variable were computed to observe the data distributions.

Test of Research Questions

Evaluation of J&J’s operational response variable

Research Question 1 inquired if there was a difference in how the media described Johnson & Johnson’s operational response to the crisis and its overall reputation in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 1, the frequencies for two variables were compared for the 1982 media reports and the current media reports: how the news articles evaluated J&J’s operational response to the crisis and how the news coverage evaluated J&J's overall reputation.

First, the evaluation of J&J’s response referred to how the news coverage described J&J’s operational/physical response to the crisis. It could be categorized as positive, negative, both positive and negative, or no evaluation. The distribution for this variable is shown in Figure 1. Of the 28 articles from the 1982 news coverage, the evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis were described as follows: 3.6% (n=1) positive; 0% negative; 0% both positive and negative; and 96.4% (n=27) no evaluation. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 4.9%...
(n=2) described a positive response; 24.4% (n=10) described a negative response; 0% described both a positive and negative response; and 70.7% (n=29) did not evaluate J&J’s response. A visual inspection of the data distributions suggests that majority of the stories in both samples contained no evaluations of J&J’s operational response. The number of occurrences in the “both” category were negligible.

![Figure 1 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Operational Response](image)

Figure 1 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Operational Response

Although a crosstabs analysis is appropriate for nominal data, the low number of occurrences for most categories presented a challenge for statistical analysis. With this consideration, the chi-square statistic was not a suitable measure to use with this variable.

The proportions of actual occurrences in each sample were computed where the “no evaluation” was excluded. The 1982 sample contained 100% (n=1) positive evaluation compared to 16.7% (n=2) positive evaluations and 83.3% (n=10) negative evaluations in the current sample.

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The frequencies suggest that when the current news coverage did evaluate J&J’s operational response it was overwhelmingly negative.

_Other evaluation of J&J’s reputation variable_

The second variable that was used to examine Research Question 1 was the overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation which referred to how the news coverage described J&J as an organization. The coverage could be identified as favorable, unfavorable or no mention. The distribution is shown in Figure 2. Of 28 articles from the 1982 news coverage the overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation was categorized as follows: 3.5% \( (n=1) \) favorable; 3.5% \( (n=1) \) unfavorable; and 93% \( (n=26) \) no mention. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 0% described J&J’s reputation favorably; 17% \( (n=7) \) described J&J’s reputation unfavorably; and 83% \( (n=34) \) did not mention J&J’s reputation.

A visual inspection of the data showed that majority of the news coverage in both samples did not provide an overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation. Therefore, the “no evaluation” category was dropped to permit an examination of only those instances where evaluations were provided. Frequencies were inspected after dropping the low frequency category. Of the 1982 news coverage, 50% \( (n=1) \) described J&J’s reputation favorably and 50% \( (n=1) \) described it unfavorably. In comparison, 100% \( (n=7) \) of the occurrences in the current sample described J&J’s reputation unfavorably. The data distribution for this variable showed that the media coverage in both samples tended not to evaluate J&J’s overall reputation. Therefore, a cross tabs analysis is
unsuitable for this variable due to the low occurrences of favorable and unfavorable responses. However, a visual inspection of the frequency distributions for the data reveals that when an evaluation appeared in the 1982 sample, there was an even balance of favorable and unfavorable descriptions. In contrast, in the current sample, all of the evaluations that did occur were unfavorable.

![Bar chart showing evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Overall Reputation](image)

**Figure 2 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Overall Reputation**

*Crisis type variable*

Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in the crisis type that the news media described in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage (November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 2, the frequencies for the crisis type variable were compared. Crisis type
referred to whether the news coverage described the crisis as a victim crisis, accident crisis, preventable crisis, or if no crisis type was described. The distribution for the crisis type variable is shown in Figure 3.

Of 28 articles from the 1982 sample there were 35.7% (n=10) victim; 0% accident; 0% preventable; and 64.3% (n=18) no crisis type. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 0% described a victim crisis; 24% (n=10) described an accident crisis; 22% (n=9) described a preventable crisis; and 54% (n=22) did not describe a crisis type. The no crisis type category occurred most frequently in both samples. However, when a crisis type was mentioned in 1982, 100% (n=10) of the articles described the victim crisis type. In contrast, when a crisis type was mentioned in the current sample, 52.6% (n=10) of the mentions were described as accident crises and 47.4% (n=9) were described as a preventable crisis. The data distributions showed that the media coverage in both samples tended to not identify the recall as a specific crisis type. However when a crisis type was described, the 1982 sample described a victim crisis in all instances, while the current coverage only described the crisis as accident or preventable.
A crosstabs analysis was performed to compare the descriptions of crisis types from the samples. The analysis indicated that there was a significant difference in the media coverage of the Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 data and the current data, $\chi^2(3)=27.943$, $p<.001$, $V=.636$. The statistical significance and a large effect size (Cohen, 1988) indicate the difference between the two samples was meaningful. However, these results are not reliable due to three cells having expected counts less than five.

Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the news coverage of the Johnson & Johnson 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 3, the frequencies for two variables were used: 1) the mention of a previous recall and 2) the mention of the 1982 recall in the current sample only. The mention of a previous recall variable referred to whether or not the news coverage referred to a prior recall that occurred in the current timeframe and could be answered either yes or no. Of 28
articles from the 1982 news coverage, none referred to a previous recall. In contrast, the current sample contained had 19.5% \((n=8)\) articles that did not refer to a previous recall and 80.5% \((n=33)\) that did refer to a previous recall that occurred in the current timeframe. The examination of frequencies demonstrated that there were no references to a previous recall in 1982. The lack of publicity of large scale recalls in 1982 is a possible explanation for the lack of mentions of previous recalls. However, the large number of recalls that occurred in the current time frame is perhaps the reason that the current sample mentioned previous recalls more often. The distributions are shown in Figure 4.

![Figure 4 References to a Previous Recall within the Current Timeframe of the Article](image)

J&J’s management of the 1982 recall has often been regarded as exemplary; therefore the current data set was also examined for mentions of the 1982 recall specifically. Media coverage from the current data set was used to examine how often the news coverage referred to the 1982 recall specifically. According to the current data set, 7.3% \((n=3)\) referred to the 1982 recall and 92.7% \((n=38)\) of the articles did not mention the 1982 recall. No statistical analyses were
performed for Research Question 3 regarding mentions of previous recalls or mentions of the 1982 recall in the current sample due to the fact that no articles from the 1982 sample mentioned a previous recall and because of the large number of current articles that did not refer to the 1982 recall.

Inclusion of instructing information variable & inclusion of adjusting information variable

Research Question 4 inquired if there was a difference between the media’s reports of Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 4, the frequencies for reports of instructing information and adjusting information were examined separately. Instructing information was identified by formal responses from J&J that helped people cope physically and financially with the crisis. The distributions for instructing information are shown in Figure 5. Of the 28 articles from 1982, 32.1% (n=9) provided instructing information while 67.9% (n=19) did not. In comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 51.2% (n=21) provided instructing information and 48.8% (n=20) did not.
A crosstabs analysis was performed to compare the inclusion of instructing information reported in the 1982 sample and the current sample. The crosstabs analysis indicated that there was not a significant difference in the inclusion of instructing information in the 1982 data and the current data, $\chi^2(1)=2.464$, $p=.143$, $\Phi=.189$. The effect size was small (Cohen, 1988). These results indicate the difference between the two samples was not meaningful.

The second variable used to answer Research Question 4 was adjusting information which referred to information that was designed to help people cope psychologically with the crisis. The distributions for adjusting information are shown in Figure 6. Of the 28 articles from 1982, 60.7% ($n=17$) provided adjusting information while 39.3% ($n=11$) did not. In comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 61% ($n=25$) provided adjusting information and 39% ($n=16$) did not.
A visual examination of the data shows there should be no difference between the inclusion of adjusting information in both samples. The crosstabs analysis confirmed that there was not a significant difference in the media inclusions of adjusting information for the 1982 data and the current data, $\chi^2(1)=.000$, $p=1.000$, $\Phi=.0003$. The lack of statistical significance and the small effect size (Cohen, 1988) indicate the difference between the samples was not meaningful.

![Figure 6 Inclusion of Adjusting Information](image)
Inclusion of a reputation management strategy variable

Research Question 5 asked which reputation management strategy (or strategies) was reported in the 1982 and current news coverage. To be included in the reputation management category, the strategy described had to be directly attributed to J&J versus a third party like the FDA. To address Research Question 5, the frequencies for the reputation management strategy variable were used. The 1982 sample contained 14 articles that did not describe a reputation management strategy used by J&J compared to 12 articles from the current sample that did not describe a reputation management strategy.

Although the coder was instructed to list the most dominant reputation management strategy followed by the 2nd most dominant and third most dominant, those responses were all combined for the analysis because it was more important to identify any reputation management strategies that were used regardless of dominance. Thus, excluding the articles that did not mention a reputation management strategy that was used, the frequencies were computed based on the total number of times that the coder recorded a reputation management strategy instead of the total number of articles in each sample. The total number of instances for the 1982 sample was 18 and there were 48 for the current sample.

The 1982 news coverage reflected the following frequencies of the reputation management strategy category: 0% attack the accuser, 0% denial, 0% scapegoat, 28% (n=5) suffering, 0% excuse, 0% deny volition, 6% (n=1) justification, 39% (n=7) compensation, 0% apology, 6% (n=1) repentance, 22% (n=4) rectification, 0% bolstering, 0% transcendence, and 0% ingratiation. The current news coverage had the following number of mentions: 0% attack the accuser, 10.4% (n=5) denial, 6.3% (n=3) scapegoat, 0% suffering, 6.3% (n=3) excuse, 0% deny volition, 27.1% (n=13)
justification, 12.5% (n=6) compensation, 6.3% (n=3) apology, 0% repentance, 25% (n=12) rectification, 6.3% (n=3) bolstering, 0% transcendence, and 0% ingratiation. A visual examination of the data indicated that several categories within the variable were not present in either sample and in most instances there was not a reputation management strategy described. The combined frequencies for this variable are displayed in Figure 7.

Figure 7 Reputation Management Strategies Combined
Due to the small frequencies for most of the categories within the 14 micro-level reputation management strategies, the reputation management strategies were collapsed into the four macro-level strategic response categories for further analysis. The macro-level strategic response categories were deny, diminish, rebuild, reinforce, and no mention. The attack the accuser, denial, scapegoat, and suffering strategies were combined into the deny category. The excuse, deny volition, and justification strategies were combined into the diminish category. The compensation, apology, repentance, and rectification strategies were combined into the rebuild category. The bolstering, transcendence, and ingratiation strategies were combined into the reinforce category. The no mention category was used for news coverage that did not provide a description. The 1982 sample contained 14 articles that did not describe a reputation management strategy used by J&J compared to 12 articles from the current sample that did not describe a reputation management strategy.

These frequencies were also computed based on the total number of times that the coder recorded a reputation management strategy instead of the total number of articles in each sample. The total number of instances for the 1982 sample was 18 and there were 48 for the current sample. When all instances of the strategic response categories were combined, without consideration for dominance, the 1982 sample contained the following: 27.8% (n=5) deny, 5.6% (n=1) diminish, 66.7% (n=12) rebuild, and 0% reinforce. The current sample had: 17% (n=8) deny, 33% (n=16) diminish, 43.8% (n=21) rebuild, and 6.3% (n=3) reinforce. The distribution is shown in Figure 8.

A visual examination of the data shows that majority of the articles in both samples did not describe a strategic response category that was employed by J&J. One point of interest is that only 1.2% of the 1982 coverage described the diminish category. In comparison, the current sample
described the diminish category in 13% of the articles. A point of interest may also lie in the fact that when the news coverage did describe a strategic response category, both the 1982 and current sample used the rebuild strategy the most.

![Figure 8 Strategic Response Categories Combined](image)

**Figure 8 Strategic Response Categories Combined**

**Summary**

This section described the frequencies that were computed for each variable. A complete list of the data frequencies appears in Appendix D. Research Question 1 asked if there was a difference between the way that the news coverage described J&J’s handling of the response in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage. Research Question 1 did not include a statistical analysis due to the large number of articles that did not provide an evaluation. However, when considering the articles that did provide evaluations, the frequency distributions did indicate that the 1982
sample contained 100% \((n=1)\) positive evaluation compared to 16.7% \((n=2)\) positive evaluations and 83.3% \((n=10)\) negative evaluations in the current sample.

In addition, the second variable used to answer Research Question 1 indicated that of the 1982 news coverage, 50% \((n=1)\) described J&J's reputation favorably and 50% \((n=1)\) described it unfavorably. In comparison, 100% \((n=7)\) of the occurrences in the current sample described J&J's reputation unfavorably.

The answer to Research Question 2 was that there was a very meaningful difference in how the news media described the Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 sample and the current sample. However, the reliability of the statistical significance was questionable due to the number of cells with expected counts less than five. The frequency distributions suggested that the no crisis type category occurred most frequently in both samples. However, when crisis type was mentioned, it was always described as a victim crisis in the 1982 sample and either described as an accident or preventable crisis in the current sample.

No statistical analyses were performed for Research Question 3 that asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the news coverage of Johnson & Johnson's 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November 2009 – April 2012) due to the fact that none of the 1982 articles mentioned a previous recall. Thus a crosstabs analysis was not conducted to compare it to the current sample. However, the frequency distribution did show that 80% of the current sample referred to a previous recall. The second variable used to answer Research Question 3, was regarding mentions of the 1982 recall in the current sample. The frequency distribution showed that more than 90% of the current news coverage did not mention the 1982 recall specifically.
The answer to Research Question 4 was that there was not a meaningful difference between the news coverage's description of Johnson & Johnson's use of instructing and adjusting information in the 1982 sample or the current recall. The frequency distributions showed that 32.1% of the 1982 sample described instructing information while 51.2% of the current sample described it. The frequency distributions showed that there was not a large difference between the inclusion of instructing or adjusting information in the samples, and the indication was confirmed by the crosstabs analyses. The frequency distributions for adjusting information showed that 60.7% \((n=17)\) of the 1982 sample provided adjusting information while 39.3% \((n=11)\) did not. In comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 61% \((n=25)\) provided adjusting information and 39% \((n=16)\) did not.

Research Question 5 asked which reputation management strategies were included in the media coverage. The 1982 news coverage showed that J&J used the deny, diminish and rebuild strategic responses. The current news coverage reported that J&J used the deny, diminish, reinforce, and rebuild strategic responses. Both samples indicated that the media reported the rebuild strategy most often.

This chapter described the results of the analyses performed to answer the research questions. The next chapter will provide an interpretation of the results and a discussion of the study's strengths and limitations. In addition, the chapter will discuss directions for future research and practical and theoretical implications of the work.
CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The previous chapter presented the results of the analyses employed to answer the research questions. This chapter provides a discussion of the results and addresses some of the study’s limitations. Theoretical and practical implications of the present study are presented and directions for future research are offered.

The purpose of this study was to examine news coverage from the 1982 J&J Tylenol recall and compare it to current news coverage of J&J’s recalls to understand how media coverage of the recalls may have differed. The study used J&J as a case study to see if news coverage surrounding each crisis supported the central claims of media framing research, crisis communication research, and reputation management research. Previous research suggests the 1982 Tylenol recall would be defined as a victim crisis whereas the current series of recalls would be classified as either accident or preventable crises (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). The 1982 product tampering crisis resulted in several deaths. However, the current recalls have not resulted in a loss of life or any serious bodily harm. Nevertheless, J&J’s poor responses to the current recalls have forced the FDA to intervene and seize control of operations in several of J&J’s plants.

J&J’s superb crisis management during the 1982 Tylenol recall garnered extensive recognition and has become an exemplary case from which other organizations can learn. As J&J has faced less severe crises than the 1982 recall since November 2009, the organization seems to be failing to uphold the precedent that was set nearly 30 years ago. This stark contrast is surprising to those who are familiar with both cases. Comparisons can be made between how the 1982 coverage described the 1982 recall and how the current coverage described J&J’s current crises. The content analysis method is an appropriate tool for this examination.
The media determine what is newsworthy and decide how to frame the information they present about the organization and the crisis. Organizations like J&J can provide information to journalists in an effort to provide clarity to the situation and to minimize reputational damage during crises like the recalls. However, the media are not required to use the information and they ultimately decide what information is shared with the public via the news coverage. Thus, the media coverage is selective and may not include all information provided by J&J.

Information that is relayed in news coverage may have significant impacts on public perceptions and attitudes. Media framing research suggests that people’s perceptions are influenced by news coverage. In addition, communication research suggests that news coverage is more likely to be negative than positive. Organizations should be concerned about media representations because of the potential that news coverage has to affect the way people view issues and events. The current systematic analysis of media coverage of J&J’s recall crises contributes to our understanding of the specific contents of media coverage, including what is reported as well as evaluations of the organization that is being reported about.

The content categories used to examine the research questions and compare the 1982 recall and the current recalls were developed based on media framing research, tenets of the Coombs’ (1995) SCCT, and Sturges’ (1994) information giving strategies, and were as follows: mention of 1982 recalls, mention of previous recalls, crisis type, evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis, overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation, inclusion of instructing information, inclusion of adjusting information, and description of reputation management strategies.
These categories were selected based on their relevance to the public’s understanding of the recalls and their potential evaluation of J&J and its actions. Although the present study did not focus on the public perspective and resulting behaviors, the descriptions can offer insights into possible impacts of news coverage. More importantly, the results hold implications for organizations seeking to recover from negative events such as crises.

**Significance of the Results**

Research Question 1 asked if there was a difference in how the media described Johnson & Johnson’s handling of the crisis in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012). A comparison of the frequency distributions of the samples did show that 96.4% of the 1982 sample and 70.7% of the current articles did not evaluate J&J’s operational response. However, when considering only instances where evaluations of J&J’s operational responses were offered, the media was more likely to provide positive evaluations of the 1982 recall.

According to SCCT, the 1982 crisis would be categorized as a victim crisis, while the current recalls would be defined as accident or preventable crises, which was illustrated through the crisis type variable (RQ2). A central idea underlying SCCT suggests that more responsibility is attributed to the organization during accident and preventable crises than in victim crises. There was a small number of occurrences in the samples: 1982 sample: (n=1) positive and current sample (n=2) positive and (n=10) negative evaluations. However, the negative evaluations of the current crises support the basic idea of SCCT regarding attribution of responsibility and crisis type. In contrast, in
the 1982 recall J&J was the victim of product tampering and J&J’s operational response was described in a positive light, which also is consistent with assumptions underlying SCCT.

The fact that there was such a small number of evaluations possibly suggests that although the news coverage describes a crisis type with high attributions of responsibility, it does not guarantee that the same article will also describe the organization's operational response negatively.

A second variable, overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation, also was used to address Research Question 1. No statistical analyses were conducted due to the low occurrence of reputational evaluations. However, this is also an important finding for the overall reputation variable. The data indicates that the media coverage rarely included reputational evaluations. In 93% and 83% of the articles, respectively, journalists did not offer an assessment of J&J’s reputation. When this finding is considered with the crisis type variable (RQ2), it suggests that journalists may be reluctant to offer blatant evaluations of organizations in spite of the type of crisis that is being reported on.

Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in how the news media described the Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 and the current recalls (November 2009 – April 2012). The analysis focused on the crisis type variable. As was the case with the overall reputation variable, the frequencies indicated that most articles did not identify a crisis type. However, when considering only those articles where a crisis type was identified, all 10 of the articles in the 1982 sample described the crisis as a victim crisis while 52.6% (n=10) of the current sample described it as an accident crisis and 47.4% (n=9) described it as a preventable crisis. These results confirm the expectation that the 1982 recall would be described differently than the current recalls based on Coombs’ (1995) crisis type categorizations. This confirmation is valuable because it can also help
support the results for other research questions that suggest different categorizations of the crises may have an impact on other descriptions and evaluations within the news coverage.

Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the news coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall and the current recalls. The 1982 sample did not include any references to a previous recall. In contrast, about 80% of the current sample referred to previous recalls. One possible explanation for the absence of references to recalls in the 1982 sample was that J&J may not have experienced any noteworthy recalls prior to the Tylenol tampering. Another explanation for the 1982 coverage not referring to previous recalls is that since the 1982 tampering involved deaths, perhaps the journalists were careful to not include information on less significant events while reporting on deaths.

SCCT suggests that past crises may be used to judge organizations’ stability based on patterns in behavior, which is referred to as crisis history (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). An event that occurs frequently and appears to be happening in patterns refers to a stable event while an event that happens rarely is referred to as an unstable event. Additionally SCCT suggests that individuals are more forgiving of unstable crises in contrast to stable crises that are viewed more harshly because they seem to identify underlying issues that are causing the situation to recur. Therefore, one would assume that news coverage that mentions previous recalls would also likely be more negative than coverage that did not.

The fact that the majority of the current sample referred to a previous recall could support the SCCT concept of crisis history when consideration is also given to the depiction and evaluation of J&J in that news coverage. Findings from Research Question 1 illustrated that when an evaluation was included, the current news coverage was more negative in its evaluation of J&J’s operational response. All of the occurrences of an evaluation of J&J’s reputation were unfavorable in the current
sample also. The fact that most of the current articles mentioned a previous recall and were also critical of J&J supports the crisis history idea that more attribution of responsibility is associated with stable events.

While the present results cannot reveal a causal relationship between references to past recalls and the evaluation of the organization in crisis, they do suggest that there was a difference in the news coverage surrounding the 1982 recall and the current crises. The present data showed that J&J’s 1982 crisis would likely be described as a victim crisis, which absolves the organization of all responsibility. Therefore, one could assume that news coverage would also be less likely to mention previous problems if any existed. The data described the current crises as either accident or preventable crises according to Coombs’ (1995) crisis type categorizations, therefore one would expect the coverage to attribute more responsibility to J&J based on the concepts of SCCT. With this consideration, one could also assume that the coverage may be more likely to mention past recalls in the current coverage to show a pattern. The fact that there was a difference in the frequencies of previous recalls between the two samples could possibly support this assumption. Another possible consideration to support the SCCT crisis history concept is that J&J’s previous management may have set high standards for the way that J&J would respond to crises. Therefore, current journalists may be less forgiving of J&J’s current recall woes and view them more egregiously due to the positive history established by J&J’s efforts in 1982.

The current sample was also examined for references to the 1982 recall specifically. The frequency distribution showed that there were no mentions of the 1982 recall in the current coverage. The reason to identify such mentions was to see if a reference to J&J’s handling of the 1982 recall, which was likely to be positive, would contrast with a negative tone in the current news coverage, since the current recalls were accident and preventable crises. About 97% of the
current articles did not mention the 1982 recall. This was surprising because of the widespread attention received by the crisis during the time it occurred and the use of the 1982 case as an exemplary model of crisis communication efforts.

One possible explanation for this result is that communication scholars may be more aware of J&J’s highly-regarded response to the 1982 crisis because of its status as a role model of effective communication in communication literature. Another possible explanation is that journalists may not view the 1982 recall as relevant to the current recalls since the 1982 recall was categorized as a victim crisis with deaths associated with it whereas the current recalls are seen as accident or preventable crises. It is possible that the journalists would consider it crass to compare or contrast the two. This data also suggests that crisis type may influence how journalists elect to frame a crisis. An alternative explanation is that journalists may assume that most people know about the original tampering case and therefore it is not necessary for them to mention it in the article. Since nearly 30 years have passed since the 1982 tampering, there is also the possibility that the journalists are unfamiliar with the case and therefore exclude it.

Research Question 4 inquired if there was a difference between Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012). Instructing and adjusting information are two information-giving strategies that are viewed as central to crisis communication. The results indicated that there was no difference in J&J’s use of instructing or adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises. In addition, both samples included adjusting information more often than instructing information. These results were not surprising since Sturges (1994) and Coombs (2012) both suggest that it is important to provide both instructing and adjusting information during crises of any type.
Coombs (2006) also suggests that different types of crises warrant different reputation management strategies. A basic idea underlying SCCT is that crisis management strategies should be matched to crisis type. Based on that idea, Research Question 5 asks which reputation management strategies the news coverage reported that J&J used in the 1982 sample and the current sample. The results showed that the media reported that J&J used deny, diminish, and rebuild strategic response categories in the 1982 news coverage. The results indicated that the deny, diminish, reinforce and rebuild strategic response categories were reported in the current news coverage. The largest difference between the samples appeared in the diminish category. The diminish category includes statements that imply that although the accused organization is somewhat at fault for the crisis, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact are inappropriate. Additionally, these statements may suggest that the organization should not be held responsible for the occurrence or impact because uncontrollable factors limited the organization’s ability to control the situation. In the 1982 sample, 1.2% of the articles contained diminish responses compared to 13% in the current sample. This is not surprising due to the nature of each recall crisis. It has been previously established that the 1982 recall was categorized as a victim crisis, which would lessen the need for J&J to use the diminish response since no responsibility was attributed to the organization.

The data also suggests that the same three types of reputation management strategies were used most often in both samples in spite of each sample describing the recalls as different types of crises. One possible explanation for the same reputation management strategies being used despite the varying crisis types is that the organization’s culture may encourage certain types of responses more than others. This would not be surprising in organizations like J&J that have longstanding and established cultures and procedures that support the use of particular reputation management
strategies. It also is possible that the journalists only included certain types of responses that came from J&J directly.

**Research Limitations**

Although the content analysis method was most appropriate for this study because the research focused on how media frames could convey information to the public, it also presented a challenge for developing and validating the coding scheme. It is likely that the variable reliabilities would have been enhanced if coders were not required to analyze latent data using a complex coding scheme. However, much media framing research does require the analysis of latent data rather than manifest content. It would have been difficult to identify certain variables like overall evaluation of J&J and the evaluation of J&J’s reputation by using only manifest content data because such data would not have allowed coders to rely on nuances to signal those descriptions either. Because perceptions are central to conceptualizations of the media framing process, it is logical that coders would need to rely on inferences in identifying ideas.

Some of the variables, namely the reputation management strategy, posed a coding challenge for the study. The sub-categories within this variable required the coder to choose between many strategies based on only a few sentences. The complexity of this task led to the decision to collapse the data into the four categories of deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce. Although this limited the exploration of the subcategories, it probably increased the accuracy of the coding by reducing coding errors that could result from the need to make fine-grained distinctions.
The sample size and the associated frequency distributions of variables also posed limitations to this research. There were only 69 articles in the analysis, 28 articles from the 1982 sample and 41 from the current sample. The only possible way to increase the size would have been to include a wider variety of media publications such as other prestige publications that would be likely to cover the recalls. If there was more time and resources, the study may have also been strengthened by using cluster samples to describe the coverage from various regions throughout the U.S.

Another limitation of this research was its reliance on traditional media outlets. Specifically, the sample did not include social media outlets that could report on the current crises. The inclusion of information provided through various social media outlets could have produced a very different data set by possibly evaluating J&J in a different light and reporting different types of information that may not have appeared in the traditional newspaper format.

Lastly, the current study provides descriptions of news coverage. Thus it is sender-focused because it investigates messages that were generated by journalists. While media framing research suggests that the media strongly impacts public perception, the present study cannot describe public perceptions because it did not evaluate the actual perceptions of people who read the news coverage that was analyzed.
Theoretical and Practical Implications

The results of this study contribute to scholarly literature by further supporting the basic premises of SCCT using J&J’s 1982 crisis and current crises as case studies. The data supported the possible relationship between attribution of responsibility and crisis type by showing that evaluations of J&J were more critical regarding the preventable and accident crises than the victim crisis. Additionally, the data supported the SCCT idea of performance history by showing that the news coverage that did mention a previous recall had more negative evaluations and depictions than the coverage that did not mention a previous recall.

The current sample also illustrated that the news coverage contained instructing and adjusting information more often than it described a reputation management strategy. This could suggest that the journalists are more concerned with communicating pertinent information to help people cope and know how to behave during a crisis than with serving the organization’s interest that might be addressed through conveying a reputation management strategy used by J&J. It is also noteworthy that 61% of the coverage did not describe a reputation management strategy, which might suggest that the journalists were more apt to include less biased information from third parties like the FDA who are likely to be seen as representing the interests of the public.

The present study has also presented data surrounding what could be considered an extended crisis with the current data set from November 2009 – April 2012. Variables such as the evaluation of J&J’s operational response, the description of J&J’s reputation, and the use of reputation management strategies could be examined with consideration to the time that the recall occurred to see if there was a point in the coverage where the depictions may have changed. Although many crises are rather short-term events, like the 1982 recall, some crises like the current
J&J recalls and the BP oil spill are noteworthy for the extended time in which they are in the media spotlight. Future studies should consider extended crises with consideration for time, to possibly suggest a turning point in the news coverage of events. Also, theories and research methods should be developed to more comprehensively investigate these extended crises.

The data gathered from this study surrounding J&J’s recalls will also offer valuable insight to crisis managers who must respond to these exigencies. The present research expands the existing literature by providing an in-depth comparison of media coverage of an exemplary crisis management effort that garnered positive outcomes for the organization and a different crisis where the same organization seems to falter in comparison. Crisis managers may also benefit from knowing that the media was not likely to provide an evaluation of J&J’s operational response or reputation in either sample. This suggests that it may be possible for organizations to experience crises of higher attribution, and still avoid a negative evaluation of their operational response or unfavorable mention regarding their reputation.

Additionally, crisis managers should consider the possibility that journalists will be less inclined to report information that appears to serve organizational interests; and more apt to include information that serves the public’s interest. With this consideration, reputation management strategies may be employed by the organization, but may not necessarily reach their intended publics through newspaper coverage. News releases are a common channel for the dissemination of reputation management strategies and they should continue to be used to convey information to journalists and the public. However, crisis managers must recognize that the media are not obligated to use them as a basis for their coverage of a crisis.
Future Research

Future research should devote more attention to several examples of sustained crises that occur over an extended period of time as shown by J&J's current set of recalls. The 1982 recall pertained to a fairly restricted situation in contrast to the current crises that are highlighting a multitude of problems. An extended view of the crisis management process might add insights into variables that hold additional explanatory value. In addition, comparisons could be offered between crisis management strategies used in extended versus more restricted crises.

Additionally, future research on the J&J case could focus more on the timing of the current recalls to see if there was a turning point where the news coverage surrounding J&J's recalls went from favorable to unfavorable. This could further support the SSCT premise of performance history by showing if repeated coverage regarding J&J's recalls could have possibly led to less favorable news coverage depictions. Timing could also be used to examine whether or not the use of certain reputation management strategies changes as time progressed in both the current sample and the 1982 coverage. If a study could establish a timeframe that certain reputation management strategies were employed, the results might provide an indication of how organizations act and respond during various stages of crises.

Further examination of J&J's current crises could also group similar crises together to see if there are differences in the reputation management strategies used as well as information-giving strategies. This consideration should be made because the nature of J&J's current crises covers a broad spectrum of issues such as moldy odors, faulty hip devices, pills that do not dissolve correctly.
and inaccurate labels on products to name a few. This study grouped these problems together rather than treating them separately. It is possible that a more fine-grained analysis would reveal differences in the coverage of the different types of products recalled by J&J.

The inclusion of trade publications could also add an interesting perspective on how attribution of responsibility may be reported differently to the industry versus the general public. It seems likely that crises within a particular industry might be reported differently to a more “sympathetic” audience than to the general public.

The present study used media framing as a basis for research, so it was appropriate to examine news coverage. However, future research could also examine the formal responses that are issued directly from the organization to compare whether or not the news coverage is reporting the organizational response and stance accurately. This research could involve comparing the content of news releases to the content of media coverage of organizational responses.

Lastly, the data suggested that newspaper coverage is less likely to include reputation management strategies than information giving strategies, which might indicate that they are more receptive to information from third parties. Thus future research could examine how third party organizations like the FDA express support or fail to support the organization that is experiencing the crisis. This research could see if journalists report information from third parties, and if so, whether this information seems to support the organization in crisis or vilify it. These issues all provide useful considerations for future research investigations.
Conclusion

The results of this study have further supported several of the basic premises of SCCT, namely the relationship between crisis type and attribution of responsibility and crisis history. The information gleaned from this research can inform crisis managers and possibly help them weather crisis storms and reduce reputational harm to their organizations. These results could also be a basis for communication scholars to address gaps in the literature that do not speak to crises that have occurred over extended periods of time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Brand Name</th>
<th>Product Description</th>
<th>Reason/Problem</th>
<th>Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/18/2009</td>
<td>Tylenol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare, Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/09/2010</td>
<td>Rolaids72</td>
<td>Rolaids Soft Chews</td>
<td>Foreign materials, including metal and wood particles</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare, Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/15/2010</td>
<td>Benadryl, Motrin117</td>
<td>Children's Benadryl, Children's Motrin</td>
<td>Insufficiencies in the development of the manufacturing process</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/15/2010</td>
<td>Rolaids120</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uncharacteristic consistency or texture</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/18/2010</td>
<td>Tylenol</td>
<td>Over the counter (OTC) products, 8 Hour Caplets</td>
<td>Uncharacteristic smell</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/08/2010</td>
<td>Benadryl; Tylenol; Motrin</td>
<td>Over the counter (OTC) products</td>
<td>Uncharacteristic smell</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/15/2010</td>
<td>Benadryl; Tylenol</td>
<td>Over the counter (OTC) products</td>
<td>Uncharacteristic smell</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/15/2010</td>
<td>Motrin, Tylenol, Benedryl, more</td>
<td>Drug Products</td>
<td>Off-odor</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/21/2011</td>
<td>Motrin</td>
<td>Motrin IB Coated Tablets and Motrin IB Coated Caplets</td>
<td>May not dissolve as quickly as intended</td>
<td>McNeil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/28/2011</td>
<td>Tylenol</td>
<td>TYLENOL, Extra Strength Caplets, 225 count</td>
<td>Uncharacteristic odor</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/17/2011</td>
<td>Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Patriot Pharmaceuticals, LLC</td>
<td>RISPERDAL, 3mg tablets and risperidone, 2mg tablets</td>
<td>Uncharacteristic odor</td>
<td>Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Brand</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/14/2011</td>
<td>TOPAMAX*</td>
<td>TOPAMAX® (topiramate) 100mg Tablets</td>
<td>Uncharacteristic Odor</td>
<td>Ortho-McNeil Neurologics Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/14/2011</td>
<td>TYLENOL, BENADRYL, SUDAFED PE</td>
<td>TYLENOL® 8 Hour, TYLENOL® Arthritis Pain, and TYLENOL® upper respiratory products, and certain lots of BENADRYL®, SUDAFED PE®, and SINUTAB®</td>
<td>Production records found instances where equipment cleaning procedures were insufficient or that cleaning was not adequately documented.</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/17/2012</td>
<td>TYLENOL</td>
<td>Infants TYLENOL Oral Suspension, 1 oz. Grape</td>
<td>difficulty using the Infants TYLENOL SimpleMeasure dosing system</td>
<td>McNeil Consumer Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/27/2012</td>
<td>AVEENO® BABY CALMING COMFORT*</td>
<td>Lotion</td>
<td>The lot exceeded bacterial specifications.</td>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/24/2011</td>
<td>ASR FEMORAL IMPLANT SIZE 55, DEPUY ASR RESURFACING FEMORAL HEADS,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This list was compiled using a variety of searches on the FDA’s web site. Thus it may not include every recall issued during the specified time period.*
APPENDIX B: CODING SCHEME
Johnson & Johnson Coding Instructions

Publication date (MM/DD/YYYY)

Author(s)

Past Recalls
PRec1: Does the current story mention the 1982 recall that involved the tampering of Tylenol? 1 - Yes 2 - No
(***Only code this question for the current sample of news coverage from Dec. 2005 – Feb. 2012)**

PRec2: Does the current story mention any previous recalls issued from before by J&J or its subsidiaries?
(exclude 1982 recall) 1 - Yes 2 - No

Crisis Type
CTyp1: Which type of crisis is described in the coverage regarding the crisis that is focused on in the current story?
(If there is more than one, use the one that stands out the most) Be sure that the reporter is describing the crisis and **NOT** the organization or 3rd party (like the FDA).

1 – Victim Crisis: Was the organization described as a victim of unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances? Was it determined that the organization was not responsible for the crisis? Was the organization or its product a victim of sabotage, tampering, vendor/supplier errors? Was the crisis a result of an event that the organization did not have control over such as workplace violence or a natural disaster (i.e., earthquake or tsunami)?

Ex: “Quick Mart was not responsible for the patron’s illness after drinking a soda from the store. Video surveillance shows that an unidentified person contaminated the fountain soddas with an unknown substance.”

2 – Accident Crisis: Was the crisis unintentional on the part of the organization? Was it due to processing, mechanical, manufacturing, or technical error that could not be prevented, thus creating an accident or defective, contaminated or tainted product? Was the crisis beyond the control of the organization because the mechanical or technical failure could not be detected?

Ex.: “Toyota said it received its first reports of the problem in 2007 and suspected the cause to be a machine malfunction that caused an inadequate use of adhesive on the crankshaft pulley, in spite of the proper amount being specified for the machine to dispense.”

Ex.: “The thermometers malfunctioned during pasteurization allowing the milk to be bottled before it reached the temperature necessary to eliminate microbial bacteria.”

3 – Preventable Crisis: Did management intentionally act inappropriately or was there organizational misconduct involved (could include illegal actions)? Did the organization intentionally put stakeholders at risk? Was the product defective or potentially harmful because of human error? Did the organization knowingly put customers and employees at risk? Were the company’s organizational misdeeds and misconduct exposed for putting stakeholders at risk and/or violating the law? Was the crisis attributed to human error that could have been prevented with proper training?

Ex.: “Melamine, used in the making of plastics and fertilizer, was found to have been added to watered-down milk to falsely raise its protein count content on tests.”

Ex: “Although management was aware that the machines probably dispensed more of the active ingredient than approved by the FDA, they allowed distribution of the product to continue.”

Ex: “Although management was aware that it was likely that at least 20% of the products were defective the shipment was still sent to retail distributors.”

4 – No Crisis Type Mentioned
Evaluation of J&J’s Response to this Crisis

J1: How does the coverage evaluate the organization’s response to the crisis that is focused on in the current story? Including the organization’s actions to fix the problem or prevent future crises? (includes corrective actions such as instituting new quality control measures, retraining personnel, or servicing machines, etc.)

1 – Positive: Does the coverage praise and credit the organization with making necessary improvements to ensure safe products? Does the coverage acknowledge that the organization made consumers and employees aware of dangers and took appropriate actions in an adequate and timely fashion?

2 – Negative: Does the coverage criticize the organization? Does it evaluate the organization negatively? Does the coverage discredit the organization’s response to rectify the crisis situation? Does it accuse organization of a poor response or claim that organization offered a slow or negligible response to the crisis?

3 – Both Positive and Negative: Is there an even balance of positive and negative evaluations of the organizational response to the crisis?

4 – No Evaluation: The coverage does not evaluate an operational response.

Overall Evaluation of J&J’s Reputation

Rep1: Overall, how does the coverage depict the organization’s current reputation? (If there is more than one, then use the one that stands out the most) The evaluation DOES NOT have to be explicit.

1 – Favorable: Is there a positive evaluation of the organization? Does the coverage praise the organization or show admiration or honor for the company? Does it validate the company or recognize it as an industry leader or role model of excellence?

2 – Unfavorable: Is there a negative evaluation of the organization? Does the coverage criticize or chastise organizational leadership and the organization as a whole? Does it mention poor oversight and supervision or say that the organization is failing consumers/stakeholders? Does the coverage say that organization is not living up to its credo (mission)?

3 – No Mention: The coverage does not depict the organization’s reputation.
Crisis Response

Does the coverage describe the organization’s formal response as instructing or adjusting information? This information should be directly from the organization and **NOT** from first responders such as (medical personnel, government officials, etc.). There may be cases where a statement includes both instructing and adjusting information, so you may code “yes” for CResp Ins and CResp Adj.

Answer Yes (1) or No (2) for each of the following

**CResp Ins.**

**Instructing Information** *(ACTION focused)* Does the coverage do **any** of the following? Tell people what to do to **protect themselves physically and financially** (evacuate or shelter in place)? Does it include information for business community also *(informs if employees should report to work or how work will be affected; explains what the organization is doing to maintain operations)*? Must tell people how to act in response to the **current** crisis.

(1 or 2)

Ex.: “Consumers are warned not to use the product even if it does not look or smell spoiled. Consumers should dispose of this product in a sealed container and place it in a trash receptacle for non-recyclable trash outside of the home in a manner that ensures people and animals, including wild animals, cannot get to it.”

Ex: “People should check their medicine bottles to see if they have lot numbers 3411-4500 and if their bottles have any of those lot numbers they should be discarded immediately.”

Ex: “People should discontinue use of the skin cream if a rash develops and seek medical attention as soon as possible.”

**CResp Adj.**

**Adjusting Information** Does the coverage do **any** of the following to help reduce uncertainty? Could simply state **who, what, where, or when** about the crisis *(in the journalistic sense)*. Could explain details to help people cope **psychologically**? Does it explain what is being done to prevent a recurrence? Does it show compassion; or express regret over situation.

(1 or 2)

Ex: “A company spokesperson said they believe the first, most powerful explosion happened near a furnace that was used to melt aluminum.”

Ex: “Company owner Robert Brown said that there was a three person crew and a security guard working at the plant when the explosion occurred.”

Ex: “A company spokesperson said, “In the case of an emergency, a fire crew stands by 24/7 and they are the ones that initially responded to the blast and got it under control.”

Ex: “Plant employees go through rigorous training so they can handle these sorts of situations.”

Ex: “Barclay said, “In this case the plant’s redundant safety features worked as designed to provide protection for the workers.”

Ex: “We are deeply saddened by the loss of our three workers who were trapped in the plant. Our thoughts go out to their families and friends at this sad time.”
**CResp2:** Which Reputation Management Strategy is *dominantly* described in the coverage? **Only** code strategies that are related to the crisis that is the **focus of the current story**? **DO NOT** code strategies that are mentioned about previous crises. (If there is more than one strategy used, code the one that stands out the most first.) If no reputation management strategy is described, code it as “15”. The reputation management strategies can be grouped into four categories. The four categories are described below and can serve as a starting place to help narrow down the strategy that is being used.

1. **Deny:** Statements that deny the occurrence/existence of the questionable event, or deny that the org. is the cause of the event.
2. **Diminish:** Statements that imply that even though the accused organization is somewhat at fault for the questionable event, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact of the event are inappropriate. Statements that suggest that the accused organization should not be held responsible for the occurrence or impact because certain factors limited the organization’s control over the situation.
3. **Rebuild:** Statements that outline corrective actions being made to rectify the situation, and agree that the organization is responsible for the questionable event that occurred. The organization may apologize and express willingness for remediation, rectification, and proactive works. The organization may also explain how policy is changing.
4. **Reinforce:** Statements that try to shift attention from the crisis by reminding the public of organization’s good track record, by placing the crisis in a more desired context, and by recognizing stakeholders.

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1. **Attack the Accuser:** Confronts the person or group saying there is a crisis, claiming no crisis exists.
   - *Ex:* “The claims of ATEP are completely false and unsubstantiated. Our employees are treated humanely in our domestic and international facilities. We pride ourselves on creating a friendly atmosphere or our employees.”
   - *Ex:* “Any suggestion that we don’t care about our supply chain is false and offensive to us.”
   - *Ex:* “No smear campaign was ever authorized or intended by this office. Instead we wanted third parties to verify that people did not approve of our competitor’s practices.”

2. **Denial:** Asserts there is no crisis. There are two types of denial (absolute & reserved), which are illustrated below.
   - *Ex 1:* “Our test proctoring and submission protocol is used to prevent cheating. Teachers and administrators adhere to the protocol to ensure the integrity of our students’ test scores. There is no way that test scores can be tampered with in this county,” said Joe Smith, Superintendent of Sunshine School District.
   - *Ex 2:* “Our test proctoring and submission protocol is used to prevent cheating. We hope that our teachers and administrators adhere to the protocol to ensure the integrity of our students’ test scores. If the federal investigation identifies any flaws in our protocol, we will correct them and any employees implicated will face disciplinary actions,” said Joe Smith, Superintendent of Sunshine School District.

3. **Scapegoat:** Blames some person or group outside of the org for turning this into a crisis. Organization may blame a vendor or supplier for crisis.
   - *Ex:* “BP’s report blames a handful of key players for the accident: Transocean (owner of the ill-fated rig), Halliburton (the company that cemented the well) and itself.

4. **Suffering:** Claims that org is an unfair victim of crisis
   - *Ex:* “The unfortunate thing was that Wendy’s and its franchises have been a victim of this situation,” said Bertini. “And our employees are suffering because of it.”
   - *Ex:* “Any accident is deeply troubling and any issue with working conditions at our facilities is a cause for concern.”
   - *Ex:* “If it is a small or large spill, we’re concerned about any incident and take it very seriously because it may hurt our own people.”
5 **Excuse:** Minimizes responsibility by denying intent to do harm to others or create a poor product or damage the environment.

   Ex: “Work of Art paint aims to help people paint the canvas of life easy and carefree. It is unfortunate that our product was abused resulting in a young woman’s death. This unintended use has shed light on the possible dangers of human inhalation of our product.”

   Ex: “Initial tests of this drug did not show adverse side effects. Thus the company believed that it was safe for children.”

   Ex: “This product is safe for children to use. However, this unexpected death occurred when the product was used outside of its original intent.”

6 **Deny Volition:** Minimizes responsibility by claiming inability to control events that triggered crisis; claims the situation was “beyond our control”.

   Ex: “BP’s report identifies four critical factors that triggered the disaster, none of which should be too surprising to anyone who watched the oil spill unfold. BP notes that well integrity was not established, hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and well control was lost, hydrocarbons ignited on Deepwater Horizon, and the blowout preventer failed to seal the well.”

7 **Justification:** Minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis (i.e., “It isn’t that bad...”)

   Ex: “Multiple lines of evidence demonstrate that, to the extent that portions of the Gulf economy were impacted by the spill, recovery had occurred by the end of 2010, and that positive economic performance continues into 2011, with 2011 economic metrics exceeding pre-spill performance,” the BP document said.

   Ex: “Now it may be that some voters, especially those in Republican primaries, take a different view, reasoning that there’s a link between private conduct and policy outcomes, but frankly they’re wrong. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Martin Luther King, to name two, were unfaithful and still managed to be two of this nation’s more important leaders.”

8 **Compensation:** Org. offers money, compensation, or other gifts to victims

   Ex: “Bertini said Wendy’s will reach out to customers in the 50 San Francisco stores beginning Saturday, offering free Junior Frosties and coupons.”

   Ex: “KATS bus system is offering free medical treatment to any passengers who are feeling the effects from the exhaust fumes.”

9 **Apology:** Indicates the org. takes full responsibility for the crisis and accepts guilt/blame for the crisis. Org. is culpable.

   Ex: “We sincerely apologize for our banking errors that caused our customers to receive erroneous overdraft fees. Our haste in alerting customers about the problem was reprehensible and outside of our guiding principles. Our error and oversight has caused us to receive much criticism, which we regretfully agree is justified.”

   Ex: “Whatever the rationale for our action, this was not at all standard operating procedure and is against our policies, and the assignment on those terms should have been declined. When talking to the media we need to adhere to strict standards of transparency about clients, and this incident underscores the absolute importance of that principle.”

10 **Repentance:** Asks for forgiveness

   Ex: “Bank of the World asks for our customers’ forgiveness. We value your business and ask that you pardon our oversight in this matter.”

11 **Rectification:** Says the org. is taking corrective action to prevent future recurrence; taking corrective action to remedy the problem; corrective action to avoid having this occur in the future; will make changes to the manufacturing process to ensure this never happens again. Organization may say that it is changing procedures, policies, etc.

   Ex: “We have engaged outside legal counsel to review our admission-related data processes and are committed to strengthening them to ensure that this type of conduct will not occur in the future,” the college said in a statement.”
12 **Bolstering:** Tells stakeholders about past good works of the organization. Praises actions taken; emphasizes the organization’s positive attributes or positive past actions.

*Ex.: “We have proudly served the greater Orlando area for more than 100 years and have always been committed to providing quality healthcare for our community. We take this incident very seriously and can assure you that medical errors rarely occur in our facilities, which has been indicated in numerous visits by our regulatory body, the Joint Commission,” said Jane Moore, Chief Nursing Officer, at CH Hospital said on Monday.*

*Ex: “Our teachers have dedicated their lives to molding the leaders of tomorrow, none of them would attempt to alter standardized test scores.”*

13 **Transcendence:** Places crisis in a larger, more desirable context; suggests a different frame of reference. Admits involvement; but tries to show how the act advanced a greater common good.

*Ex.: “Pentagon officials said that the civilian deaths that occurred in Iraq were unfortunate, but unavoidable due to Saddam Hussein’s tactics to hide weapons in civilian areas.”*

14 **Ingratiation:** Praises stakeholders, thanking them for their help. Thanks stakeholders for assisting the organization, and continuing to support the organization. Thanks supporters and volunteers for their help/assistance.

*Ex.: “Chili Peppers has the best customers on the planet. Thank you for your support and continued patronage during this difficult time.”*  

*Ex: “Our clients have continued to support us by remaining patient as we work through this difficult time.”*

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15. **No reputation management strategy**

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**Last updated on May 1, 2012**
Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries

**Please note that this list is not comprehensive, but includes most of the subsidiaries involved in recalls since December 2009.**

- Advanced Sterilization Products
- Animas Corporation
- Cordis Corporation
- DePuy, Inc.
- DePuy Orthopaedics
- Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
- Ethicon, Inc.
- Janssen
- Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc.
- LifeScan, Inc.
- McNeil Consumer Healthcare
- McNeil, PPC, Inc.
- Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
- Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.
- Virco BVBA
APPENDIX D: TABLE OF DATA FREQUENCIES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1982 Coverage</th>
<th>Current Coverage</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>Unfavorable</td>
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<td>Preventable</td>
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<td>Mention of 1982 Recall</td>
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<td>Reinforce</td>
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<td>6.3% (n=3)</td>
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REFERENCES


96


Firemen discovered first link between cyanide deaths and Tylenol. (1982, October 1). The Associated Press


Pienciak, R. T. (1982, October 2). All 7 victims took fatal dose on Wednesday. *The Associated Press*


