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WHEN DO COMPREHENSIVE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
SUCCEED? THE CASES OF THE UN OBSERVER MISSION IN EL
SALVADOR (ONUSAL) AND THE UN VERIFICATION MISSION IN
GUATEMALA (MINUGUA)

by

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B.A. University of Central Florida, 2010

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ABSTRACT

United Nations (UN) Charter Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to take military action by air, sea or land if non-armed solutions fail to restore international peace and Article 43 states that UN members will keep troops and equipment available for the use of the Security Council. However, Article 43 never went into effect, leaving the UN without an alternative to diplomatic solutions. Canada's UN representative, Lester Pearson Bowles, proposed instituting peacekeeping missions to address this handicap and Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold established a peacekeeping framework, which included: agreement from the Security Council, agreement by parties involved, readiness of UN members to support mission, and the existence of a peace agreement. However, the UN's peacekeeping framework is often violated to address complex threats to international peace. This thesis will present an analysis of the UN peacekeeping framework and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to establish how the conflict in El Salvador and Guatemala determined ONUSAL's and MINUGUA's missions and how these deviate from the UN peacekeeping framework. The purpose of this study is to establish specific modifications that must be made to the classic UN peacekeeping framework based on conflict specifics to prevent UN peacekeeping failures.

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To my family and friends, near and far, for their endless support and encouragement.

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The United Nations came to life following the devastation of World War I and World War II. To prevent the international community from ever falling into the violence and destruction witnessed during these two wars, the international community came together to establish an organization that would promote cooperation and diplomacy among states. The United Nations Charter came into existence in the San Francisco conference of 1945 under ideals of equality for all states, the universality of human rights, development, and the maintenance of peace and security. Chapter I of the United Nations Charter states that the purpose of the United Nations is:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (United Nations Charter, 1945).

To accomplish this, the Charter gives the Security Council the responsibility of recognizing any potential threats to peace and security and taking appropriate non-armed action to address potential threats. If non-armed solutions fail to prevent the threat from escalating, the Security Council has the power under the Charter's Chapter VII Article 42 to take further action by "air, sea, or land [...] to maintain or restore international peace and security" (United Nations Charter, 1945). The UN Charter gave the Security Council enough power to prevent any potential challenges to international security and stability from escalating. However, the international community never abided by Article 43 where the

Charter states that member states should have troops and equipment at the UN's disposal for use at the Security Council's discretion to address threats to international community:

All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security" (United Nations Charter, 1945; Krasno, 2004, p. 225).

As a result, the Security Council was left with the power but not the means to prevent violence from escalating and threatening international security.

To address the organization's handicap that resulted from the international community's failure to abide by Chapter VII Article 43, Canadian foreign minister and UN representative, Lester Bowles Pearson, proposed an armed UN peacekeeping force composed of voluntarily contributed forces from member states to address the crisis in the Suez Canal. The UN General Assembly approved the Canadian proposal on November 4th, 1956, and established the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), the UN's first peacekeeping mission to deploy armed forces (Krasno, 2004, p. 230). To standardize peacekeeping operations, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld established a basic peacekeeping framework. Hammarskjöld's peacekeeping guidelines included: agreement from the Security Council, agreement by parties involved, readiness of UN members to support the mission, and the existence of a peace agreement (Zacarias, 1996, p. 17). Peacekeeping represented a new form of conflict resolution in the interest of international peace and security and even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, it is understood to be legitimized by Chapters VI and VII (Wiseman, 1983, p. 19). UN peacekeeping represented a means by which the organization could remain proactively engaged in the maintenance of peace and security,

while being legitimized by the support of member states, particularly the Security Council's permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States).

The UN has deployed sixty-five peacekeeping missions around the world since its inception. Today, there are 15 active UN missions, including missions in Africa, Europe, the Caribbean and Asia (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). The demand for UN intervention in peacekeeping operations over the years has been significant, since the UN often serves as a neutral mediator and the simple presence of the international community can play a determining role in the maintenance of ceasefires and the prevention of the escalation of violence. However, while the need for peacekeeping missions continues to be imperative in addressing conflict and threats to security around the world, there is significant skepticism regarding the organization's role in peace operations because of the number of peacekeeping missions that have failed to accomplish their goals while often ignoring or even perpetuating the realities on the ground. Some of these missions include the UN's failure to prevent the violence in Rwanda from escalating to genocide and the UN mission in Yugoslavia where ethnic violence and genocide took place over a three year period with blue helmets on the ground. With the growing skepticism of the real successes of UN peacekeeping missions and the continued demand for the organization's intervention, it is imperative to understand what contributes to a successful UN peacekeeping mission that results in a successful cease-fire and transition to peace and stability.

Peacekeeping missions that have taken a more comprehensive approach to addressing the conflict at hand have historically been more successful since the UN takes an active role in peace negotiations, disarmament, transition to peace, and post-conflict peace maintenance and

reconciliation. However, small differences between missions can have determinant roles in the mission's outcome. With this in mind, this thesis will study the role of the United Nations in two comprehensive peacekeeping missions where the role of the organization was not limited to the supervision of a ceasefire; rather, it was involved in several aspects of the peace process. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) were the first missions to take a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping where the UN played a crucial role in the peace process and post-conflict peace maintenance. ONUSAL was established before a peace agreement between the Salvadoran government and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) was reached, forcing the UN to take an active role in peace negotiations, and ONUSAL was deployed prior to an agreed cease-fire (Hill & Malik, 1996, p. 71). MINUGUA, like ONUSAL, took an active role in the peace negotiations between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) and was deployed prior to a peace agreement (Rosenthal, 2001, p. 58). Thus, both UN missions comprehensively approached the peace process by brokering the peace negotiations and agreements and assisting in the transition to peace by helping build civil society institutions following devastating civil wars, while peacekeepers on the ground tried to maintain peace and stability. However, ONUSAL is considered to have been relatively successful in achieving these goals, while MINUGUA's successes are considered limited.

This research will examine the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to establish what the differences between the two missions were that led to success in El Salvador and failure in Guatemala. These two cases

were selected because the author wanted to focus their research on the Latin American region and the UN missions in El Salvador and Guatemala are the only two cases of UN intervention in the Western Hemisphere with the exception of Haiti. This research will present a qualitative, comparative analysis of the role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala, starting with a historical background of the conflict and early UN intervention, followed by the UN's role during the conflict and the role of the organization in post-conflict El Salvador and Guatemala (including UN's role in the establishment of the Truth Commission). This thesis will conclude with a comparison of ONUSAL and MINUGUA to establish what the factors were that led to success in El Salvador and failure in Guatemala to restore stability. Stability will be determined through the analysis of the following indicators:

1. Sustained ceasefire determined by the end of hostilities between warring parties.
2. The return to civilian rule determined by the holding of regular, free and fair elections,
3. The existence of political rights as determined by Freedom House's *Freedom in the World Survey*.
4. The existence of civil rights as determined by Freedom House's *Freedom in the World Survey*.
5. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita
6. Human Development Index (HDI)

Sources to be used for the development of this study include historical documents including General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, statements from the UN Secretary General and both peace agreements in combination with existing scholarly research on peacekeeping in

general and ONUSAL and MINUGUA in particular. This study will attempt to establish the differences between the two missions that led to such distinct outcomes. Such findings are likely to contribute to the better understanding of peacekeeping missions, their capabilities and limitations, and how to better devise successful, multifaceted missions that promote a successful transition from conflict to peace.

To complete this study, the author will assume that differences between the two missions resulted in the different outcomes. The author recognizes that there are other factors that could have contributed to stability in El Salvador following the work of ONUSAL and continued instability in Guatemala following the work of MINUGUA. The author recognizes that the environment in which these peacekeeping missions took place may have contributed to the different outcomes and will attempt to address contributing factors outside of the UN peacekeeping missions that could have played an important role in facilitating the success of ONUSAL and hindering the work of MINUGUA. Some intervening variables that this study will consider will include the nature of the conflict (including length and role of third parties), battle fatigue, pivotal events during the peace process, the influence of Cold War politics, the role of third parties and the public opinion of warring parties, among others.

The literature on United Nations peacekeeping identifies the origin of this type of operation out of necessity. The rise of the Suez Canal conflict led to the UN's decision to take action to maintain the peace agreement reached between the two parties involved and guarantee the stability of the region through its involvement. The first UN peacekeeping operation was devised by Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson and then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.

Michael Doyle, Robert Orr, Ramesh Thakur, A.B. Fetherston and Jean Krasno outline the general guidelines of traditional peacekeeping as established following the Suez Crisis as requiring the following conditions:

1. an agreement by the international community to establish the peacekeeping operation, specifically UN Security Council members;
2. agreement and consent from the parties involved in the conflict to allow for the UN's intervention and peacekeeping force to be established in their territory as a means to facilitate the peace process and maintenance;
3. the willingness of UN members to support the peacekeeping operation through financial, human and equipment contributions; and
4. the pre-existence of a peace agreement between the warring parties, an established peace to be maintained.

Peacekeeping operations represented the most visible representation of the UN's work around the world particularly following the end of the Cold War and attempted to contain and stabilize conflicts between and within states until lasting peace could be maintained without the UN's presence (Thakur, 2006, p. 39). However, traditional peacekeeping required very strict conditions in order to successfully maintain peace following a conflict between states, conditions that were rarely present and led to many failed peacekeeping operations.

Failed traditional peacekeeping operations led to the establishment of comprehensive peacekeeping missions, also known as third generation peacekeeping, peacemaking operations, peacebuilding missions, or multidimensional peacekeeping operations. As described by the literature, these operations still required the support of UN members in general and Security

Council members in particular as well as the willingness from the international community to provide the financial, human and material assets required to perform the mission's work. However, the scope of the missions was significantly more complex. The UN often worked as a: facilitator and mediator in the peace process, a peacebuilder between warring parties establishing disarmament programs and helping build a civil police force, and as a nation-builder supporting the political, institutional and social transformations required to establish long-lasting peace. Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr (2007), Agostinho Zacarias (1996), Stephen Hill and Shahin Malik (1996) and A.B. Fetherston (1998) describe this evolved form of peacekeeping as a more adequate form to manage international conflict and threats to international stability. Furthermore, these authors argue that this type of peacekeeping operation where the United Nations comprehensively takes part in the peace process often results in more stable post-conflict environments. One example used by the literature to represent comprehensive peacekeeping missions is the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established during the peace process led by the United Nations. Diego Arria outlines in his chapter addressing this issue the process by which the United Nations became involved in the peace negotiations, pointing out that the parties had taken other attempts at peace prior to UN involvement; however, the results had never led to peace between the Salvadorian government and the FMLN (2003, p. 65). Kimbra Fishel (1998), Michael Wesley (1997), James Dobbins (2005), and Gerardo Munck (1993) present comprehensive studies of the role of the United Nations in establishing and maintaining peace in El Salvador, describing ONUSAL as comprehensive and multidimensional,

further reinforcing the argument that this UN mission did incorporate peacemaking and peacebuilding notions to its peacekeeping mission.

The literature describing the role of the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in the Guatemalan peace process is less prominent. There is ample literature on the conflict in Guatemala, the human rights violations that took place, and the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee; however, there is an important gap regarding the work of MINUGUA. Much of the literature that does mention MINUGUA labels the mission as an observer mission that had little influence on the peace process; however, this is somewhat inaccurate since the UN mission helped broker the peace between the warring parties, helped establish civil institutions and organized and monitored the Truth and Reconciliation Committee. The role of the UN in Guatemala was beyond that of an observer. Gert Rosenthal (2001) addresses the role of third parties in peace negotiations, outlining the role the UN played. There is very limited literature addressing the role of the UN mission as a whole, and its participation in post-conflict Guatemala, an important gap in the literature that this study will attempt to address. Authors like Elizabeth Oglesby (2007) and Michele Leiby (2009) address the human rights violation in their research, however make no significant mention of the United Nations' role in dealing with these violations in post-conflict Guatemala. Susanne Jonas (1996, 2000a, 200b), Catherin Nolin Hanlon and Finola Shankar (2000) address the difficulties of institution building and reconciliation in post-conflict Guatemala, again only making limited mentions of the role of MINUGUA in this area of the peace process.

There is a significant amount of literature on the United Nations role as peacekeeper and more recently its role in comprehensive peacekeeping. The UN mission in El Salvador represents

the first manifestation of the UN's peacekeeping mission in a more comprehensive capacity and as such has been the focus of a significant volume of academic literature. The UN mission in Guatemala, on the other hand, has not been as prominent in academic literature; therefore, this thesis will attempt to contribute to the current literature on peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding by further analyzing MINUGUA as well as presenting a comparative analysis of the UN's role in El Salvador and Guatemala.

CHAPTER 2 – UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL)

Historical Background

The causes of the Salvadoran civil war can be explained by the country's socio-economic and political structures, which established predominantly exclusionary and socially divisive lines. It was these non-inclusive social, economic and political policies that led to the rise of the guerrilla movement and socialist ideas that challenged the Salvadoran government and gave way to a prolonged and violent civil war that lasted twelve years and resulted with the loss of over 75,000 Salvadoran lives, immeasurable infrastructure destruction, and a severe deterioration of the safety net holding Salvadoran society together. The civil war brought to light the need for radical changes in the economic and political realities of El Salvador in order for these to become more inclusive and encompassing and to allow for broader more universal participation in the economic and political life of the country.

Social and economic inequalities in El Salvador resulted in a skewed land tenure system that limited the livelihood possibilities for non-land tenants in the agrarian sector (Orr, 2001, pp. 155-7). Cash crops led to massive coffee cultivation for export. Policies supporting coffee cultivation led to the displacement of subsistence farmers by expropriating their lands through the passing of the Vagrancy Law of 1881 and the Agrarian Law of 1907, forcing peasants to become wage-earning farmers or seek new lands to cultivate. Expropriated lands were consolidated into large coffee plantations owned by the Salvadoran elite, leaving the majority of the country's peasants landless (Lee, 2010, p. 264). Land tenure in El Salvador was limited to a small minority, while the majority of the country's landless peasants worked for the profit of the

affluent minority (Toft, 2010, p. 72). The elitist economic structure worsened an already vulnerable peasantry. Peasants under this land arrangement struggled to sustain themselves and their families (Pearce, 1997, p. 442). The cash crop approach of the Salvadoran economy forced peasants into wage labor, which forced peasants who had once been able to provide for their families into poverty and exacerbated the country's steep inequality.

By the 1970s, the reality faced by the landless peasantry gave way to the rise of protest movements and peasant revolts (Byrne, 1996, p. 17). In the late 1970s, the Salvadoran revolutionary movement developed, encompassing a broad, radical and class-based union of the disenfranchised, including: peasants, workers, students, teachers, slum dwellers, the unemployed and other often included sectors of society (Byrne, 1996, p. 41). Those who had been most severely affected by the discriminatory economic system found a common cause in their grievances and joined forces to protest the government and its economic and social policies.

As the violence escalated, the government attempted to introduce agrarian reform to mitigate the violence. The reform would attempt to reduce the economic, social and political power of the Salvadoran coffee oligarchy by changing the inequitable land-tenure system (Paris, 2002, p. 49). However, the landowning elite was unwilling to make any economic sacrifices (Byrne, 1996, p. 18). The defeat of the agrarian-reform of 1976 demonstrated the strength of the land-owning elite and their control over both the government and military (Byrne, 1996, p. 44). The elite's unwillingness to compromise was determinant in the escalation of the violence in El Salvador.

In March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero, a prominent supporter of the peasant movement, was assassinated, a crime that was traced back to the Salvadoran government and death squads (Munck, 1993, p. 76). The assassination of Archbishop Romero unified the opposition and by October of that same year, when it became evident that land and economic reform had failed, five communist groups joined forces in a new coalition under the name of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) (Paris, 2002, p. 49) and escalated the violence into a full-scale civil war between the insurgency and the government (Lee, 2010, p. 263).

On 1 January 1981, the FMLN launched its biggest offensive to date, considered the official start of the civil war. The FMLN experienced few military successes in 1981, forcing the insurgency to retreat and call for negotiations (Munck, 1993, p. 78). By the mid-1980s, unsuccessful attacks by the FMLN and failed counterinsurgency missions by the military proved that neither side was strong enough to militarily defeat the other; however, differences between both parties made moving the conflict to the negotiating table difficult. In 1989, Alfredo Felix Cristiani, became president of El Salvador. With a strong governmental and military control, Cristiani called for negotiations (Munck, 1993, p. 79). The length of the war can be attributed to the parties' unwillingness to appear weak by acceding to negotiations. However, given that just a few years into civil war both parties were unable to make major military advances, shows that the conflict could have moved to the negotiation table at an earlier point.

The social, political, and economic exclusion of the majority of the population and the unwillingness of the ruling class to take significant action to change this reality caused the

conflict in El Salvador. Violence in El Salvador was recurrent, resulting from the hardships faced by the peasant class in a system that made social mobility practically impossible. The war in El Salvador resulted in greater economic hardships during the conflict, with economic indicators including per capita income dropping to levels not seen since the 1960s. Furthermore, the conflict was the cause of the destruction of important arable land and infrastructure essential to the Salvadoran economy. Additionally, the violent nature of the conflict, the systematic violation of human rights, and extenuating length of the war had devastating effects on the Salvadoran society.

The UN and Peace Negotiations

The FMLN's call for negotiations and the election of President Cristiani helped move both parties towards a negotiated solution. The first significant round of negotiations between the FMLN and the government was in September 1989 in Mexico City with the United Nations (UN), the Catholic Church and the Organization of American States (OAS) as observers. At this meeting, the FMLN presented a proposal that would result in a cease-fire by mid-November. The next meeting in October 1989 in San Jose, Costa Rica yielded no concrete results because of disagreements between the parties (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 141). The bombing of the National Federation of Union of Salvadoran Workers on 1 November 1989 in San Salvador drove the FMLN away from the negotiating table in protest of the government's repression (Munck, 1993, p. 83). The meetings in Mexico City and San Jose yielded no concrete outcomes and led to the FMLN's largest offensive in November 1989. The FMLN offensive was a turning point because it showed the insurgency it had failed to inspire a popular insurrection and, thus, lacked the means for a military victory. For the Salvadoran army, the FMLN offensive proved that it was

unable to defeat the FMLN (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 417). During the course of the FMLN's offensive, six Jesuit priests and two witnesses were murdered, which caused international outcry and demands from the United States (US) for a criminal investigation of the events (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 417). Both events made it clear that neither party was capable of victory through military means, making negotiations the only viable option to end the war.

After the FMLN offensive, Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and his personal representative, Álvaro de Soto, encouraged both parties to return to the negotiations and meet in Geneva in April 1990 (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 418). The Secretary General and his team played an indispensable role in bringing both parties back to the peace talks. In Geneva, the FMLN and the government agreed on the agenda and schedule for the negotiation process (Munck, 1993, p. 81). This initial meeting outlined the complicated process ahead and the difficult issues that the peace process would attempt to tackle in order to reestablish peace in El Salvador and create a more stable, inclusive society. The Geneva Accords of 1990 marked the first step towards peace (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 418). In Geneva, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar committed to oversee personally the peace process (Karl, 1992, p. 152). Pérez de Cuéllar's commitment to peace in El Salvador was imperative in keeping both parties at the negotiating table and maintaining momentum in the peace process.

The next meeting took place in Caracas, Venezuela where the issues for upcoming negotiations were divided into three stages. The first stage would be the agreement on a political accord to lead to a cease-fire, the second stage would include the future of the FMLN and the reincorporation of its members into Salvadoran society, and the final stage would be the final

peace accords. During the Caracas meeting, both parties agreed that the UN would be the neutral party in charge of verifying the peace process (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 419). The agreement in Caracas proved that both parties valued and respected the contributions the UN could make to the peace process.

At the next meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, in July 1990, the FMLN and the government called for the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). In addition, this meeting demanded the immediate respect for human rights (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 419). The San Jose meeting produced the first substantive agreement in the negotiation process, making human rights the core issue of the agreement and granting ONUSAL and the UN the authority to act as guarantor and protector of human rights in El Salvador (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 142). The Secretary General's representative, Álvaro de Soto, understood the importance of keeping the momentum in the negotiations and actively campaigned for the agreement to be produced before the conclusion of negotiations (Karl, 1992, p. 156). At the meeting, both parties agreed that the UN's human rights verification work should begin following the cease-fire; however, it was later decided that verification should begin immediately since an official cease-fire was far from materializing (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 142). The UN opened its office in El Salvador in January 1991 and began operations six months later (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 419). ONUSAL was the first UN mission to begin its work on the ground without a cease-fire, thus, the role of the UN extended beyond that of a traditional peacekeeping. This new mission model was groundbreaking and unprecedented because there had been no predecessors to this type of UN mission. Moreover, the Salvadoran model presented many challenges as the UN explored its role in peace building.

Armed forces' reform caused the peace process to stagnate following the San Jose meeting. The FMLN demanded the incorporation of its combatants into the armed forces and the purging of officers guilty of human rights violations; requests the government refused. The issue of military reform was so polarizing that the negotiations deadlocked and remained so between July 1990 and April 1991 (Munck, 1993, p. 81). During this time, the role of the UN as negotiator and mediator increased. Álvaro de Soto, was key in getting both parties back to the negotiating table and was an important contributor to the terms of the peace process. At the request of FMLN leaders, de Soto drafted a proposal for armed forces reform that called for the abolition of the state security forces and the military intelligence apparatus, two of the three branches of the Salvadoran military (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 143). De Soto's work was essential in moving the peace process forward. The UN at this point was taking a more active role than that of a moderator, actively participating in the agreement-writing process. Peace talks finally resumed in Mexico City in April 1991, focusing on prospective military, judicial and legislative reform. The agreement limited the power of the army to national defense and subordinated the armed forces to presidential control. Furthermore, both parties agreed to the creation of a national police force (PNC) as a substitute for the military in civil security affairs (Munck, 1993, pp. 82-3).

In September 1991, peace talks resumed in New York City under the auspices of Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar; who personally requested the presence of President Cristiani. In addition, Pérez de Cuéllar negotiated with the US State Department to guarantee that FMLN leaders were granted entry visas to attend the meeting in New York (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 144). Both parties were willing to compromise and make concessions, demonstrating their

urgency to finalize the agreement. At the New York meeting, the FMLN abandoned its demand to incorporate its combatants into the armed forces and instead its combatants were guaranteed non-prejudicial access to join the PNC (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 420). During this meeting, both parties agreed to the creation of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), granting the new institution strong legal powers to verify all facets of the execution of the peace accords (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 145). The meeting in New York yielded the preliminary peace accord, which included: the rights of FMLN members to join the PNC, the governments guarantee to allow guerrilla families to keep occupied land, and the purge of the military's officer corps (Munck, 1993, p. 83). Still missing in the preliminary accords was an official cease-fire. After the New York meeting, the FMLN unilaterally announced that it would suspend all offensive attacks, a decision that was reciprocated by the Salvadoran government.

Both parties reconvened in New York in December 1991 to agree on a final peace accord. Since Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar was due to retire on 31 December 1991, this date served as an unofficial deadline (Juhn, 1998, p. 82). Negotiations moved at a much slower pace than expected so President Critiani flew to New York to join the peace talks and Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar delayed his departure from New York several times on 31 December hoping that his presence could guarantee a successful conclusion to the negotiations (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 146). The agreement was completed on 1 January 1992 and was signed on 16 January 1992 at the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City (Spector B. I., 2011, p. 26). The end of Pérez de Cuéllar's term caused a sense of urgency in both parties to finish the accords, which is a reflection of the role the Secretary General and his office played in the peace process.

The Chapultepec Accords presented a detailed plan for the demobilization and FMLN combatants, the legalization of opposition parties, the guarantee of free and fair elections, limited land reform, investigation of human rights abuses, the professionalization of the judiciary and police force, the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control, and the reconstruction of physical infrastructure destroyed during the war (Paris, 2002, pp. 49-50). Noticeably missing in the peace accords were social and economic issues, which were tackled extremely late in the process and were superficially addressed in the agreement because of time constraints (Orr, 2001, p. 167). Issues of wider land reform, labor rights and equity were relegated to the Socio-Economic Forum to be composed of government, business and labor representatives (Stanley, 2006, p. 109). The lack of socioeconomic reform is by far one of the most significant weaknesses of the accords, because inequitable distribution of wealth and power in El Salvador was a major contributing factor to the rise of violence before the war.

Peace negotiations lasted 21 months; the partial agreements were a result of the eagerness and strenuous work done by the UN, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar, and the Secretary General's representatives at the negotiating table. The UN had a clear interest in bringing the Salvadoran civil war to an end and it invested time and resources to guarantee peace. The UN's involvement as a mediator evolved into that of an active player, encouraging the participation of both parties, proposing solutions to particular issues when the parties were unable to agree, and taking an active role in the writing and editing of the peace accords. The role of the UN during the peace process broke away from the organization's traditional constraints in peace negotiations and was the precursor of the UN's peace building mission ONUSAL.

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established by the Security Council at the Secretary General's request following the meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica in July 1990. The San Jose accords established a multidisciplinary mission with a preeminent focus on human rights. ONUSAL was the first post-Cold War UN mission in which the organization involved itself in a wide range of activities to support El Salvador's transition to peace (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 65). ONUSAL was the result of the first UN effort to end a civil war; it was a pilot mission that did not only attempt to disarm and demobilize the military, but also to facilitate national reconciliation (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 146). ONUSAL's mission and work broke away from the traditional expectations of UN peacekeeping missions, taking a proactive role in facilitating and encouraging the Salvadoran peace process.

In September 1990, ONUSAL opened a preparatory office in San Salvador to begin the logistics of the mission prior to its official start date. ONUSAL began its work in January 1991, with four officials in the San Salvador office (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 142). ONUSAL's mandate was to observe and supervise the implementation of the peace accords. Originally, the mission was scheduled to monitor human rights after the signing of the official cease-fire, however, with the prolongation of the peace talks, both parties agreed that ONUSAL could begin monitoring human rights immediately. ONUSAL began its work in human rights work in July 1991, six months before the official peace accords were signed (Montgomery, 1995b, p. 243). Following the Chapultepec Accords, ONUSAL began to operate fully in El Salvador, focusing its work on four key areas including: the armed forces, the national civil police force, electoral reform and human rights verification (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 56).

ONUSAL's Military Division

ONUSAL's military division's work began with the signing of the cease-fire on 1 February 1992 and ended on 15 December 1992. The military division's work extended over a period of less than a year while focusing on four pivotal objectives: demobilizing and disarming FMLN combatants, reforming the armed forces including reducing its size and dismantling the security forces, reestablishing public administration of former conflict zones and assisting with mine removal (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 150). It was important that ONUSAL manage the military aspects of the peace accords rather than the Salvadoran government so that the FMLN could have security guarantees. Furthermore, ONUSAL's role as a neutral third party gave the mission the authority it needed to help the military demobilization process and avoid the resurgence of violence.

ONUSAL's FMLN demilitarization and demobilization process took place in different regions in fifteen designated and supervised concentration zones. The process consisted of former FMLN combatants reporting to the concentration zones where they turned in their arms and remained in the zone under ONUSAL supervision before being reincorporated to civilian life. The goal was to allow FMLN combatants to rejoin civilian life in batches of approximately 20 percent over five set dates. The arms collected were stored by ONUSAL and destroyed by the end of October 1992 (Munck, 1993, p. 84). The demobilization process was complicated; there were over 7,000 combatants spread throughout El Salvador. The military capacity and strength of the FMLN was a major concern because the guerrilla group had the capabilities to conduct major military operations that could derail the peace process, making this a major concern for ONUSAL (Dobbins, et al., 2005, pp. 47-8).

The peace accords established a strict schedule for the FMLN demobilization and demilitarization process, however, abiding by this schedule proved extremely difficult for ONUSAL because the schedule set forth by the parties was unrealistic. The lack of infrastructure, including a lack of housing and supplies to shelter and feed FMLN combatants in the concentration zones, set ONUSAL off to a slow start. Once the logistical and infrastructural hurdles were overcome, ONUSAL began the demobilization process in June 1992, two months behind the original schedule (Munck, 1993, p. 84). By mid-August, it was evident that the original deadline for demobilization was unattainable, therefore, both parties agreed to postpone the original deadline of 31 October to 15 December 1992 (Munck, 1993, p. 85). ONUSAL completed the demobilization and demilitarization on by the established deadline and destroyed arms collected. Although the FMLN had been officially demobilized, its reintegration into society proved much more difficult and challenging. ONUSAL was not very successful at the reintegration process. Challenges in this area included hurdles in land-transfers because of poor coordination with the Salvadoran government, legal complications over title transfers, payment delays, and the refusal of landowners to sell their land at the Salvadoran government's request. By 1994, only 40 percent of the land transfers had taken place, leaving 60 percent of FMLN combatants landless and with limited possibilities to sustain themselves and their families in post-civil war El Salvador (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 55). The failure to successfully complete the land transfers is an evident failure of ONUSAL and the peace process, one that may prove to be even more volatile than expected, especially when considering that the failure to implement agrarian reform had been an important cause that led up to the war. In addition to the failure to implement the land transfer promised in the agreement, ONUSAL did not have the adequate

personnel, tactical mobility or advanced technology to investigate FMLN claims of demilitarization and was forced to take the FMLN word as guarantee that the FMLN had indeed fully demobilized.

ONUSAL's military division was also tasked with establishing an Ad Hoc Commission to investigate the officer corps and create a list with the names of officers who had participated in human rights violations and would be purged from the armed forces. On 23 September 1992, the Ad Hoc Commission submitted their findings with a list of officer names to both President Cristiani and Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Munck, 1993, p. 85). Pressure from the armed forces high command forced President Cristiani to announce in late October 1992 that he would postpone taking action on the Commission's recommendation until the FMLN's complete demobilization. UN envoys Marrik Goulding and Álvaro de Soto attempted to mediate an agreement between the two parties. Finally, both parties agreed that the removal of these officers would be announced at the end of November and take effect by 6 January 1993. This new schedule made the purge of the officers coincide with the final phase of FMLN demobilization.

ONUSAL's military division's work proved extremely challenging particularly when dealing with the Salvadoran armed forces and having them comply with the peace accords. The lack of full support from President Cristiani proved to be a challenge, particularly when he decided without consulting ONUSAL to delay the purging of officers guilty of human rights violations. In trying to demobilize the FMLN, ONUSAL faced logistical difficulties at the beginning that were eventually overcome to allow for the process to begin. The overoptimistic schedule set forth by the Chapultepec Accords proved to be impossible given the magnitude of

the demobilization process. Eventually, the time delays were negotiated with the help of UN mediators, which allowed for full demobilization in coordination with the removal of the officers listed by the Ad Hoc Commission. In the long-run, the failure to incorporate FMLN ex-combatants into civil society is likely to prove the most dangerous to stability in El Salvador, especially when considering that land-tenure was a major factor that led up to the war in the first place.

ONUSAL's Police Division

Prior to the civil war, the armed forces had sole authority over security in El Salvador. This concentration of power gave the Salvadoran armed forces too much power that contributed to the abuses that took place in the years leading up to the civil war and during the war. With this in mind, the Chapultepec Accords outlined the need for the establishment of a national civil police force (PNC). ONUSAL's Police Division began its work on 7 February 1992, following the official cease-fire with a force of 315 police observers (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 151). ONUSAL was tasked with selecting and training of prospective police officers that could administer internal security once ONUSAL's was completed. ONUSAL faced many difficulties because of a lack of commitment from the Salvadoran government, which failed to allocate the necessary resources to guarantee the success of ONUSAL's police division (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 426). While the PNC was functioning by the end of ONUSAL's work, the weaknesses of the PNC were evident and led many to fear that the armed forces would take advantage of these weakness to regain the power it had lost as a result of the peace accords.

ONUSAL's Electoral Division

ONUSAL's mission was expanded in May 1993 to include an Electoral Division to oversee the first post-conflict election in El Salvador in March and April 1994. ONUSAL assisted and supervised the entire electoral process (Paris, 2002, p. 50). In August 1993, the first technical mission arrived and concluded that there were major problems with voter registration for ONUSAL to handle. In addition to voter registration, ONUSAL's mandate included the observation of the political campaigns leading up to the election, the supervision of the voting procedure to take place during Election Day, and the counting of ballots following the end of voting (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 154). The work of the Electoral Division was essential for El Salvador's democratic transition.

ONUSAL's Electoral Division divided its work into six stages: logistical organization at the central and regional level, verification of voter registration, observation of the electoral campaign, observation of election procedures, vote counting, and the announcement of the final results (Hampson, 1996a, p. 159). ONUSAL identified several difficulties with voter registration and the electoral rosters, which included the large number of names of expatriates or dead persons still on the rolls, the lack of sufficient controls at the national level to avoid double registration and registration fraud, the lack of consistency between the names on registration cards and electoral rolls, and the significant number of voters whose names did not appear on the rolls at all (Hampson, 1996b, pp. 88-9).

The Chapultepec Accords called for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) to depoliticize the agency in charge of elections. The TSE, tasked with establishing a new voter registration process, failed to consider the country's demographics and over 60 percent illiteracy,

and created a process that was complicated, demanding, and likely established to keep a majority of the voters from the polls. The process required immense logistical support including: registration forms, copy machines, Polaroid cameras, and laminating machines to create the registration cards, as well as vehicles to transport all of this equipment around El Salvador to make the process accessible to those living in less populated areas (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 153). ONUSAL took on the responsibilities to provide the logistical support for voter registration. For example, ONUSAL traveled around El Salvador to locate birth certificates so that individuals could register to vote, a task that was supposed to be carried out by the TSE and the different mayoral offices (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 153). ONUSAL was forced to incorporate the work of the TSE into its own mission to guarantee a smooth election process with popular participation.

On election day, ONUSAL deployed 900 observers, 2 per voting site. Observers were responsible for carrying voting materials from San Salvador to their destination, counting votes, and delivering the official results back to San Salvador (Montgomery, 1995b, p. 247). By the end of the election, ONUSAL declared that the elections had been carried out under acceptable conditions of liberty, competitiveness and security. Since the March elections did not yield a winner for the presidential campaign (with over 50% of votes), a second round was scheduled to take place on 24 April. For the second round, ONUSAL dispatched the same number of observers to all polls in El Salvador (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 155). ONUSAL served as an election supervisor to prevent any acts of corruption, ballot tampering or results falsification. The moral authority that the mission had gained over its time in El Salvador was pivotal in guaranteeing the success of the mission's Electoral Division.

ONUSAL faced many difficulties in the area of voter registration because of poor infrastructure and lack of government documentation. However, it was able to guarantee that a large majority of Salvadorans needing to be registered to vote was registered and that voters showing up on Election Day were able to cast their vote freely. There were episodes during election day where people were turned away because of faulty documentation or because their names were missing from the electoral roster; however, given the circumstances, most observers recognize that the 1994 election in El Salvador was free and fair.

ONUSAL's Human Rights Division

ONUSAL's Human Rights Division had the authority to deploy personnel to any area in the country and enter military facilities unannounced. The ability to surprise would-be human rights perpetrators served as a deterrent and served to reduce the number of human rights abuses in ONUSAL's presence (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 422). In addition to ONUSAL's monitoring capacity, the mission investigated human rights abuses and prepared periodic reports on the human rights situation in El Salvador (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 53). To accomplish these goals, ONUSAL deployed between four and eight observers to each regional office and had human rights officers around the country tasked with addressing human rights violations reports (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 148). While ONUSAL's presence had the short-term effect of dissuading would-be violators, the mission's long term goal was to build national institutions and help establish non-governmental organizations to monitor and protect human rights.

ONUSAL assisted in the creation of the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, which was charged with investigating possible human rights abuses, assisting alleged victims, and encouraging prosecution of violators. Furthermore, the Ombudsman was tasked with creating

educational programs to promote awareness and respect for human rights (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 427). ONUSAL assisted the Ombudsman Office to create curricula development and implementing various information campaigns to publicize the work of the Office. In addition, ONUSAL worked with human rights organizations to create education programs targeting the armed forces, the FMLN, and social organizations (Hampson, 1996a, p. 150). The Ombudsman Office was charged with continuing ONUSAL's work once the mission ended (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 427). ONUSAL's partnership with the Ombudsman Office created a culture of human rights respect that could be continued through the work of the Ombudsman once ONUSAL left El Salvador. Institutional development was key in this area of the mission's work, because it strived for long term successes beyond its own work.

ONUSAL helped establish the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Commission), which was responsible for investigating serious acts of violence that had taken place since the beginning of the war and that had had a significant impact on Salvadoran society as a whole, as well as investigating, documenting and making recommendations to the Salvadoran government regarding these abuses (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 59).

[Commission on the Truth for El Salvador](#)

The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Commission) was created to determine the truth about the violence that took place during the war and to make recommendations to help El Salvador prevent the repetition of these crimes (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 656). The Commission was a direct consequence of the work of the UN and its influence during peace talks (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 658). The Chapultepec Peace Accords recognized the need to investigate those acts of violence that had impacted Salvadoran society. With this in mind, the Commission investigated

serious acts of violence since 1980 and to make legal, political or administrative redress (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 658). The goal of the Commission was to end impunity, particularly in cases involving the armed forces (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 662). The goal of the Commission was to address these crimes so that justice could help bring closure to El Salvador.

The three members of the Commission appointed by the UN Secretary General were not Salvadoran nationals to avoid conflicting interests. Commission members were Belisario Betancur, former president of Colombia and president of the Commission; Reinaldo Figueredo, former foreign minister of Venezuela; and Thomas Buergenthal, professor of law and honorary president of the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights in Costa Rica (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 431). The members of the commission were chosen because of their impartiality, understanding of the region and conflict, and expertise in the area of human rights. Furthermore, their affinity with the Spanish language was an important asset that facilitated their work.

The Commission was specifically tasked with investigating severe acts of violence and acts of violence that were part of a systematic pattern of violence. The Commission focused its work on 33 out of the 22,000 reported cases, and the Commission steered clear of investigating the death squads that had terrorized Salvadoran society during the civil war (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 660). The Commission's cases were those that had created national and international outrage like the 1981 massacre at El Mozote. International forensic anthropologists conducted an investigation in the name of the Commission, exhuming nearly 1,000 bodies and finding that a majority of the skeletons were young children (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 432). The work of

the Commission was extremely limited and only investigated an extremely small number of cases.

Beyond its investigative work, the Commission also collaborated with other organizations created by the accords, including ONUSAL, the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), the National Council for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Ombudsman Office and the Ad Hoc Commission. These agencies were created to monitor and implement the transformation of Salvadoran society and national institutions in order to create a culture of human rights respect and protection (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 661). The establishment of the numerous organizations tasked with addressing human rights in El Salvador was proof of the importance placed on human rights during the negotiation process. The Commission publicly named individuals who had committed crimes according to international human rights and humanitarian law. While the Commission did not have prosecutorial powers, its report named individuals and outlined the acts that these individuals had committed and the evidence that proved their involvement, which was similar to a judicial proclamation of guilt (Ensalaco, 1994, pp. 662-3). While the Commission's report did not punish those who had committed human rights crimes during the war, the work of the Commission brought El Salvador closer to ending its culture of impunity.

The Commission found that the armed forces and paramilitary death squads had committed 95 percent of the human rights abuses since 1980, and the FMLN was found responsible for the remainder (even if they did not conduct in-depth investigations of the crimes committed by the paramilitary death squads) (Montgomery, 1995b, p. 242). The Commission

presented a list of military officers, public officials and judges found to have actively participated in the violence and recommended that they be forced to retire, disqualified from public office for at least ten years, and disqualified them permanently from holding a position related to security. Moreover, the Commission proposed a strict system of discharge for military officers found to have violated human rights, and codified the legal penalties with the hopes of preventing future abuses of power by the armed forces (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 669). Furthermore, the Commission recommended the removal of sitting Supreme Court justices to promote a new generation of justices (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 664). The Commission's recommendations showed the need to purge public institutions of human rights violators. The fact that so many military officers and members of the justice system had failed to defend human rights was alarming, and the Commission and other human rights organizations were determined to prevent such inaction from recurring.

The Commission recommended additional institutional reforms that would be conducive to an environment that safeguards human rights. The Commission recommended that suspects be guaranteed the right to defense during legal proceedings, that suspects be presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the period of maximum detention be shortened (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 667). Most of the Commission's recommendations were basic rights protected by democratic states that uphold civil and human rights in their constitutions. The Commission recommended that lower court judges be accountable to a new National Council of the Judiciary, rather than the High Court. Additionally, the Commission recommended that lower courts have greater power regarding budgetary matters, that the number of lower court judges and their salaries be

increased. All these measures were purposefully designed to prevent corruption within the judiciary system (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 668).

The Commission made important contributions to the cause of justice and the protection and promotion of human rights through its investigatory and advisory functions. The report created by the Commission served as proof of the human rights violations that had taken place during the war. Even though the work of the commission was limited, it proved imperative in guiding El Salvador towards a post-war country that recognized the importance of human rights and the necessity to establish institutions that are conducive to their respect. The fact that the Commission had no prosecutorial power did limit its accomplishments because those found to be guilty of human rights violations rarely faced significant punishment for their actions. Nevertheless, the work of the Commission was an essential aspect of the reconciliation process in El Salvador.

The Role of Third Parties

The role of the UN in the peace process and post-war peace building process in El Salvador cannot be underestimated. However, it is imperative to recognize that much of its work and success was often driven by the role third parties played during the conflict and peace negotiations. International events conditioned how third parties reacted and made decisions regarding the conflict in El Salvador and how these decisions influenced the peace process and the work of the UN in El Salvador. Key players in the Salvadoran peace process included the US, the Communist Bloc which included the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua, the Contadora Group, and the Friends of the UN Secretary General.

The United States

Historically, the US involvement in El Salvador had been limited. However, this changed in the years leading up to the civil war when the US began to play a more significant role in El Salvador's internal politics, especially through the support of the Salvadoran National Security Agency, the agency responsible for the dirty war conducted in El Salvador (Byrne, 1996, p. 47). As the situation in El Salvador deteriorated leading up to the war, the US fear of a leftist guerrilla insurgency taking control of the country led to increased support of the Salvadoran government. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter took office with human rights as a pivotal part of his agenda. As violence in El Salvador increased in 1980, the Carter administration cut military aid to the Salvadoran government (Munck, 1993, p. 77). However, this policy was short lived since President Reagan won the 1980 US election and assumed the presidency in 1981, and reversed the policy to prevent the spread of communism in the United States' sphere of influence. The Reagan administration characterized the conflict in El Salvador in geopolitical, Cold War terms, which allowed the new administration to gain support from the US Congress (Pearce, 1998, p. 587).

The Reagan administration provided US\$6 billion in economic and military assistance to the Salvadoran government during the course of the war (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 45). Although President Reagan was determined to provide full support for the Salvadoran government, the administration faced challenges in the US Congress (Munck, 1993, pp. 77-8). The Reagan administration was committed to a military victory in El Salvador (Munck, 1993, p. 75). Indeed, President Reagan's stance on the conflict in El Salvador perpetuated the violence and the war. Even when both parties were willing to negotiate, the Reagan administration strongly opposed a

solution to the civil war short of the Salvadoran government's military victory. By pressuring the Salvadoran government and threatening to cut all military and economic aid to the country, the Reagan administration kept the Salvadoran government away from the negotiating table.

The election of President George H.W. Bush was key in moving both parties towards the negotiation table. The Bush administration proved to be more open to a negotiated solution (Munck, 1993, p. 75). The turning point in US policy towards El Salvador was the murder of the Jesuit priests by members of the US-trained Atlacatl Brigade of the army (Karl, 1992, p. 154). The images caused outrage in the US and forced the Bush administration to actively promote a negotiated solution. Once the Bush administration expressed its approval for a negotiated peace, both parties willingly took part in peace talks. In conclusion, the US military and economic support for the Salvadoran government was pivotal in preventing a military victory by the FMLN and the military stagnation of the conflict until the Bush administration finally agreed to a negotiated solution.

The Communist Bloc

The FMLN received varying levels of military support from the communist bloc, which included the Soviet Union, Sandinista Nicaragua, and Cuba. However, as the Cold War began to wind down, and the Sandinistas were ousted in national elections in Nicaragua, the number of FMLN external supporters became extremely limited (Hampson, 1996a, pp. 135-6). In 1988, the USSR officially withdrew its support for revolutionary movements in Central America (Karl, 1992, p. 151). It is important to note that despite proof that the FMLN received limited support from the Soviet Union, political relations between the Soviets and the FMLN were extremely limited during civil war. There is a clear difference between the support the FMLN received

from the Soviet Union and other communist countries in the region and the support received by the Salvadoran government from the United States. The FMLN refused to be influenced by outside parties and, therefore, limited the aid it received from the communist bloc in order to maintain its autonomy and freedom from outside influence (Hampson, 1996a, p. 136). Thus, the charges that the FMLN was a tool of extra-hemispheric interests, especially Soviet, would prove to be false.

The Contadora Group

The Contadora Group was organized by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama in January 1983 as a reaction to the overwhelming influence and involvement of the US in the region. Contadora proclaimed that it would work to find a diplomatic alternative to the armed conflicts plaguing the Central American region (Lee, 2010, p. 272). Contadora produced proposals that encouraged demilitarization, the end of foreign intervention in the region and the importance of dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the conflicts in the region. These proposals included the Cancun Declaration of 1983 and the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America of 1984. These proposals encouraged national governments to address some of the problems facing the region and set the peace processes in Central America in motion; however, they failed to directly establish peace in El Salvador (Lee, 2010, p. 272). The Contadora Group approach was quite ambitious in that it attempted to tackle the region as a whole. However, the conflicts in the region were too complex to be addressed collectively and needed individualized negotiations with the different insurgent forces. Furthermore, Contadora attempted to exclude the US from the peace process, which was unrealistic when considering the monetary and military support that the US gave to different groups in the region to promote its

interests (Whitfield, 1999, pp. 260-1). Contadora's attempt to find a regional solution to a national problem failed to produce tangible results in El Salvador, and despite the group's efforts to push the FMLN and the Salvadoran government towards the negotiating table, it failed to do so. However, Contadora's work did create an environment in the region where peace negotiations were encouraged as stepping stone that facilitated eventual peace processes.

The Friends of the UN Secretary General

Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Spain comprised the Friends of the UN Secretary General (the Friends), which was created in 1989 at the request of Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar. The Friends worked as lobbyists in the peace process, helping promote the goals of the UN with both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. Also, the Friends used the cultural, linguistic and political affinities to encourage both parties to remain at the negotiating table. Furthermore, the Friends provided logistical support for the negotiators including transportation, accommodation and security to guarantee that both parties attended the meetings. It is important to note that the Friends did not act independently; rather, they worked as an extension of the Secretary General's group of negotiators and mediators (Lee, 2010, p. 273). The Friends provided important support to Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar and the UN team during the 21-month peace process; however, most of the accomplishments during the peace process can be attributed to the Secretary General's direct team of advisors rather than the Friends.


Post ONUSAL El Salvador

ONUSAL was a pivotal player in the peace building process in El Salvador, a product of the work of the UN at the negotiating table, ONUSAL tackled post-war El Salvador by working in different areas that included the work of its political division, electoral division, military

division and human rights division. These different areas of work in El Salvador yielded different levels of success that translated into decisive issues that have been shaping El Salvador's future since the end of ONUSAL's work in 1995. ONUSAL has been deemed successful in its work and is often cited as the example of a successful peace building mission where the UN has taken the lead not only in negotiating peace but also in peace building. In the case of El Salvador, the roots of the civil war lay in the political and economic structures that led to a system that perpetuated inequality by favoring the ruling elite. The work of ONUSAL addressed the institutional failures of El Salvador and sought to create a more inclusive political system that limited the power of the military and opened the playing field to opposition parties. However, ONUSAL did not take part in the economic restructuring of the country, which was one of the major problems that led to the creation of the FMLN.


The work of ONUSAL's Electoral Division facilitated the transition to peace and allowed for democratic processes to take place with the presence of opposition groups in the electoral contest without fear of prosecution. The FMLN transitioned from a guerrilla group into a political party and became an active player in post-war Salvadoran politics. There is an evident commitment from opposition groups and the government to reach peaceful solutions to the problems facing El Salvador today, a result of the peace building process that helped create democratic institutions that opened the political process to opposition parties. The 1994 elections that were supervised by ONUSAL were deemed free and fair by the international community. In addition, the legislative elections of 1997 and presidential election of 1999 were also accepted as free and fair and recognized as legitimate by local parties (Paris, 2002, p. 51).

Since the end of the civil war, El Salvador has held four free and fair presidential elections (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) and six free and fair legislative elections (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009). The country has been able to maintain a stable democracy since the signing of the peace agreement. According to data from Freedom House's Freedom in the World Survey, which measures both political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world on a scale of 1-7 (1 being the highest degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest), El Salvador's post-civil war levels of political rights and civil liberties have returned to pre-war levels. El Salvador saw a decline in political rights in the years leading up to and during the war and witnessed significant improvement in the last years of the war and years following the war. By 1996, El Salvador finally reached its best political rights rating since 1975, being granted a score of 2, which it has maintained ever since, as seen in Figure 1. The trend has been similar in civil liberties, with a significant decline in civil liberties in the years leading up to the civil war and during the war and witnessing an improvement in 1991 when it finally reached its pre-war 1976 ranking of 3, which it has maintained ever since, as seen in Figure 2.



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011

Figure 1: Political Rights in El Salvador



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011

Figure 2: Civil Liberties in El Salvador


As seen in both Figure 1 and Figure 2, political rights and civil liberties did return to pre-civil war values; however, they did not improve beyond that. According to Freedom House, these pre and post-civil war values deem El Salvador as “free” both in political rights and civil liberties, while the values seen during the civil war were deemed “partially free.” The data in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the peace process helped return the political process to its pre-civil war years; however, it does not show improvement from the values prior to 1975, the period which led up to the increased violence and the eruption of the civil war. Therefore, the above data can be interpreted as showing that the peace process helped in the transition from civil war to peace and from limited political rights and civil liberties to increased political rights and civil liberties. With this in mind, this data shows that the work of ONUSAL’s Electoral Division accomplished its goal of guaranteeing free and fair democratic processes in El Salvador and that ONUSAL’s Military Division’s work in demilitarizing and reforming the army led to an increase in civil liberties since the end of the war.

The cost and impact that twelve years of civil war have on a country’s economy are difficult to estimate. In the case of El Salvador, the country’s economic situation prior to the start of the civil war was already dire, with rampant poverty and vast inequality, both of which contributed to the rise of the insurgency and a civil war driven by class-struggle. The damage to the Salvadoran infrastructure has been estimated at more than US\$ 1 billion in addition to the human costs of 75,000 casualties, 20,000 wounded veterans, 1,000 orphaned children and one million internally displaced (Munck, 1993, p. 87). The Chapultepec Accords failed to recognize the importance of the country’s economic situation in the peace and reconstruction process and the accords failed to outline an economic plan that would result in a more inclusive economic

system. Therefore, ONUSAL did not include an Economic Division to address the causal issues of the civil war (Toft, 2010, p. 90). As a result, ONUSAL was left out of the economic recovery plan in El Salvador, economic and structural reforms were left at the hands of the Salvadoran government and other international organizations including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).


The economic plans for the World Bank and IMF were to deliver economic adjustment, stabilization and economic growth to El Salvador. The structural adjustments encouraged by financial international organizations resulted in a significant cut in social spending and public investment, which scholars attribute to some of the difficulties faced in other areas of the peace process that suffered because of a lack of resources (Pearce, 1998, p. 601). The economic liberalization implemented by these organizations hindered the recovery process and exacerbated some of the socioeconomic issues that had led to the civil war in the first place (Paris, 2002, p. 51). The economic recovery process was extremely slow, which many feared would result in a return to violence in El Salvador. The gross national income (GNI) per capita had reached its highest point in pre-civil war El Salvador in 1978 with a GNI per capita in 2000 constant US dollars of \$2,238.77 as seen in Figure 3. We also find in Figure 3 that pre-war GNI levels were finally equaled and surpassed in 2003 when the GNI per capita in 2000 constant US dollars reached \$2,303.58, eleven years after the signing of the Chapultepec Accords. Evidently, there has been recovery since the end of the civil war in economic terms. However, this recovery has been extremely slow and many argue that much of the growth has benefited a small section of the Salvadoran society, mirroring the economic structure that predated the civil war. The Human Development Index, developed by the UN Development Programs, which measures a long

healthy life, access to education and a decent standard of living, has been on the rise in El Salvador. The first HDI measurement in El Salvador dates back to 1980 and was 0.466 as seen in Figure 4. Also, Figure 4 shows that El Salvador’s HDI was 0.524 in 1990 and that even during the war years the country’s HDI had continued to improve and by 2000 was 0.61 and has continued to steadily increase. The HDI is supposed to measure the population’s standard of living, which, according to this data, has continued to improve in El Salvador in post-war years. Although the recovery in El Salvador has been slow, the data shows that there indeed have been signs of economic growth and development. However, the country continues to face economic inequality and a lack of social mobility as it did prior to the civil war, which scholars argue has resulted in the alarming levels of violence that exist in El Salvador today.



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

Figure 3: GNI per Capita in El Salvador



Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Human Development Indicators.

Figure 4: Human Development Index in El Salvador

ONUSAL's military division was tasked with disarming the FMLN and the reincorporation of former combatants to civil society. The process was hindered by a lack of resources and a lack of cooperation by the Salvadoran government but by the end of 1992 the guerrilla groups were officially disbanded. However, the disarming process was done with little verification, with ONUSAL lacking the means to control whether the FMLN had completely disarmed. Furthermore, land transfers that were supposed to help in the reintegration process of FMLN combatants were extremely slow and only about 40 percent of these were actually completed. All of these factors have contributed to the violence that has plagued El Salvador in post-war years. This violence has often been attributed to former guerrilla fighters who were unable to find employment, did not receive pensions from the Salvadoran government, and had limited skills that would allow them to successfully reintegrate into society without assistance

from the government (Paris, 2002, pp. 52-3). Many of these combatants have turned to organized criminal activity that has given way to the rise of the Salvadoran “maras” or gangs, which are responsible for much of the insecurity that faces El Salvador (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 55). Another alarming development in El Salvador is the role the army has continued to play in dealing with the violence. Driven by the desperation of Salvadorans for more security, the government has relied on the army’s assistance to help curb the maras. According to the Chapultepec Accords, the army’s role is limited to national security and it should have no role in the country’s domestic security issues. However, this has not been the case when dealing with the upsurge of criminal violence. The PNC was created to deal with internal security issues; however, the PNC’s development has been slow and the alarming levels of violence have pushed the Salvadoran government to reach for further assistance, resulting in a more active role the armed forces in El Salvador’s internal security affairs.

Conclusion

The role of the UN in bringing peace to El Salvador and helping in the post-conflict process was extremely important. The UN was a driving force in the negotiation process thanks to the dedication of Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar and his advisors. The UN arranged for the meetings and played an active role in making sure that the process ran smoothly, when specific issues threatened the talks, UN advisors negotiated with both parties to ensure an agreement. It is important to recognize that moving towards a negotiated solution to the war in El Salvador was also influenced by world events and changes in major powers’ attitudes. The end of the Cold War removed the conflict from the traditional East vs. West perspective. Furthermore, the change in administration in the US from President Reagan to President Bush was decisive in

the move towards negotiations. Following the peace accords, ONUSAL was charged not only with the traditional peacekeeping task of supervising the cease-fire, but also with helping in the peace building process which included work through the specialized missions of Military, Electoral, Police and Human Rights Divisions. All of these tasks were beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping missions and it was the first time a UN mission took on such extended responsibilities in a post conflict environment. Both ONUSAL's Military and Police Divisions yielded relative successes in assisting in the demilitarization of the FMLN, the armed forces reform and the establishment of a civilian police force. However, the lack of economic opportunities for former FMLN combatants has caused the violence witnessed during the civil war to resurface via different channels, including organized criminal activity and maras. ONUSAL's electoral division was pivotal in El Salvador's return to democratic rule and the country has since returned to its democratic status. Elections that have taken place since the end of the war have been deemed free and fair by various international organizations and the political process has become more open and fair allowing for the participation of opposition parties. In the area of human rights, ONUSAL played a fundamental role in promoting reconciliation in post-war El Salvador and in uncovering the crimes committed during the civil war years. El Salvador developed greater respect for human rights and the necessary institutions remain in place to guarantee the protection of human rights. In addition, civil liberties have been deemed free and have returned to pre-war standards, a step in the right direction for human rights in El Salvador.

In conclusion, the work of ONUSAL has yielded important successes in post-war El Salvador, with important long lasting accomplishments by the missions of the Military, Police, Electoral and Human Rights Divisions. Many of the challenges faced by El Salvador today are

linked to the lack of economic restructuring following the end of the war that would allow for a more inclusive and equitable system that could facilitate social mobility. However, it is important to note that economic restructuring was not at the hands of ONUSAL. Instead it was managed by the Salvadoran government, the IMF and the World Bank. There was a failure in the lack of coordination between these international financial institutions and ONUSAL's work, which in retrospect could have helped prevent economic restructuring that hindered the peace building process. Furthermore, it is essential to note that despite little experience in peace building and nation building, the UN's role in the case of El Salvador is characterized as an important success in post-conflict environments. Thus, ONUSAL's work is deemed to have contributed to the maintenance of peace, stability, democracy and growth in El Salvador.

CHAPTER 3 – UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION MISSION IN GUATEMALA (MINUGUA)

Historical Background

Guatemala's civil war lasted thirty-six years with varying levels of intensity and was the deadliest in the Central American region, claiming the lives of up to 200,000 civilians (Jonas, 1996, p. 146). The Guatemalan socioeconomic system created deep divides that led to institutionalized inequality and discrimination. As described by Guatemala's Commission for Historical Clarification, the country's declaration of independence created "an authoritarian state which excluded the majority of the population, was racist..., and served to protect the economic interests of the privileged minority" (Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999). Historically, the dominant land-owning class controlled the country's agricultural sectors. This economic system was further reinforced in the early 1900 with coffee growing estates, when the cash crop represented 85 percent of Guatemala's exports. The increase in coffee production led to the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a limited group and forced the country's peasants from subsistence farming to wage-labor. The landowning elite also dominated national politics through a series of authoritarian regimes backed by the armed forces (Paris, 2002, p. 55). The state protected the interests of this small but powerful minority by excluding the majority of the population. Guatemala's political and economic systems of inequality were crucial factors that contributed to the start of the civil war (Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999).

While the causes of the war were rooted in Guatemala's institutionalized inequality, the failed attempt at land reform by the administration of Jacobo Arbenz followed by the coup backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also helped trigger the civil war. The 1944

Guatemalan election brought Arbenz to power with an ambitious reform agenda, including the creation of farming cooperatives, social security, rural education, a labor code, and the confiscation and redistribution of farmland to 100,000 landless peasants (Paris, 2002, p. 56). In 1950, the Arbenz administration introduced the Agrarian Reform Law, which mandated the redistribution of unused lands in excess of 223 acres, compensating landowners for the expropriated land in the form of 25 year bonds with 3 percent interest paid at the declared tax value of the land (Trefzger, 2001, p. 81). The debate over this redistributive law led to violence between the landowning elite and local peasants. Among those opposing the Agrarian Reform Law was US-based United Fruit Company (UFCO) (Paris, 2002, p. 56). UFCO was Guatemala's largest single landowner and the company had undervalued its land in tax declarations, making the government's compensation lower than what the company expected. As a result, UFCO requested the US government to intervene. The State Department and Central Intelligence Agency recruited a proxy army to forcefully remove Arbenz from power. The proxy army, however, was no match for the Guatemalan army, leading to the initiation of a psychological war on Arbenz (Trefzger, 2001, p. 82). The Arbenz government was finally overthrown and replaced by a succession of civilian and military right-wing governments. These governments forcefully took action against the rural based insurgencies that had been gaining varying levels of support from urban dissidents and rural supporters (Paris, 2002, p. 56). In the years following the CIA-backed coup, the alliance between Guatemala's military, the nation's economic elite, and the US strengthened, allowing the authoritarian state to suppress popular demands for social and economic change (Ruhl, 2005, p. 56).

The civil war officially began in 1960 and by 1961 the Movimiento Rebelde 13 de Noviembre (MR-13) was formed. MR-13 lacked any ideological backing but by 1962, it had joined forces with the Guatemalan Communist Party, resulting in the creation of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) (Trefzger, 2001, p. 86). The first phase of the war was limited to the country's eastern region (Jonas, 2000a, p. 11). In 1966, the FAR intensified its insurgency operations, triggering a strong response by the Guatemalan army and leading to the army's first counterinsurgency campaign. The army launched a preemptive attack on the guerrillas, targeting anyone suspected of supporting the insurgency (Trefzger, 2001, p. 89). The military offensive between 1966 and 1970 resulted in the death of 8,000 people, most of them civilian peasants (Sieder, 2001, p. 187). The devastating military counteroffensive forced the guerrilla group to retreat and remain dormant for the next 2 years (Jonas, 2000a, p. 11).

The second phase of the war took place in Guatemala's highland region where the insurgency had the indigenous communities' support. The army carried out a brutal campaign that resulted in the death of 100,000 to 150,000 between 1981 and 1983. The army launched attacks against the indigenous community, committing a wide range of human rights violations, including direct and deliberate violence against women and children and the systematic use of torture, rape, and forced displacement as a weapon of war (Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999). In addition, the army created forced installation camps and mandatory army-controlled paramilitary "civilian self-defense patrols" (PACs) (Jonas, 1996, p. 148). To counter the army's offensive, the FAR joined forces with two other insurgency groups: the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) and the Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), establishing the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in

1982 (Montobio, 1997, p. 100). By the late 1980s, the URNG was no match for the Guatemalan armed forces, which was motivated to strive for a military victory (Burgerman, 2000, p. 74). However, by 1990 domestic and international pressure for a negotiated solution had built up, forcing the army and the government to negotiate with the URNG.

The UN and Peace Negotiations

In 1989, the Catholic Church held a National Dialogue, which the army, government, and private sector boycotted. The Dialogue, beyond the official meetings, allowed for the open discussion of issues that had been banned from the public sphere since the beginning of the war. The outcome of the dialogue demonstrated a public consensus on a negotiated settlement (Jonas, 1996, p. 150). In January 1991, President Jorge Serrano assumed the presidency and called for a meeting with the URNG, which resulted in the first accord between the two parties and divided the peace process into two stages. The first stage included a series of meetings between the URNG, the government, and civil society and the second stage included the official dialogue between the URNG and the government (Montobio, 1997, p. 102). The United Nations (UN) played the role of observer during the negotiations at the request of both parties (Burgerman, 2000, p. 75).

In April 1991, both parties met in Mexico City and signed the “Agreement on Procedures in Search of Peace through Political Means,” which established the basic agenda for the negotiations. The agreement outlined the issues to be discussed during the negotiations, including: democratization, human rights, the role of the army, indigenous rights, socio-economic and agrarian reform, resettlement of internally displaced populations, constitutional

reform, a cease-fire, and the reincorporation of URNG combatants into civil society (Arnson, 1997, p. 259). In July 1991, both parties met in Mexico City and produced the Queretaro Accord, which further detailed the negotiations schedule (Montobio, 1997, p. 102). Following the Queretaro Accord, there was little progress made until 1994. One of the principal reasons why the peace process stagnated was President Serrano's auto-coup in May 1993, when he attempted to dissolve Guatemala's legislature and Supreme Court and suspend constitutional rights. Serrano's failed attempt to increase the presidential powers led to his resignation (Arnson, 1997, p. 260). Serrano's auto coup kept the URNG away from the negotiating table for the remainder of 1993, further complicating an already difficult peace process.

Peace talks resumed in January 1994. The URNG and the government met in Mexico City and signed a new agreement, which maintained the schedule outlined in the 1991 Mexico Accords. Furthermore, both parties agreed to extend the role of the UN to mediator with the capacity of proposing measures and initiatives during the negotiations (Montobio, 1997, p. 106). The January 1994 "Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process" established the general agenda and called for civil society to play a crucial role in the peace process by establishing the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) (Spector B. I., 2011, p. 36). The ASC was comprised of all organized sectors of civil society and major political parties and was tasked with providing non-binding proposals to be considered by the parties during the negotiations (Jonas, 2000a, p. 13). The following meeting between the URNG and the government was in March 1994, where both parties signed an accord on human rights and requested the UN Secretary General to establish a human rights verification mission (Burgerman, 2000, p. 76). The "Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights" outlined the parties'

commitment to strengthening human rights institutions and to end impunity (Spector B. I., 2011, p. 36).

In June 1994, the parties signed two new accords. The first established the relocation process for internally displaced persons and the second established a Truth Commission to investigate the human rights crimes that had taken place during the war (Montobio, 1997, p. 106). The Commission was a watered-down version compared to other truth commissions in the region, tasked with uncovering the most significant cases of human rights violations but abstaining from naming individuals responsible for these violations (Jonas, 2000a, p. 13). The Guatemalan government was particularly criticized because during this time human rights violations worsened, raising questions about the government's true commitment to the peace process (Jonas, 1996, p. 152).

The next accord in the peace process was signed in March 1995 addressing the "Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (Jonas, 2000a, p. 13). This accord was extremely important considering the violence targeting the Mayan community during the war. In May 1996, the URNG and the government agreed on the accord addressing socio-economic and agrarian issues. The agreement on these issues was made in coordination with the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, which pushed for liberalization and macroeconomic stability but also demanded that the Guatemalan government provide social safety nets to protect the most vulnerable sectors of the population (Paris, 2002, p. 57). The socio-economic accord called for an important increase in taxes as well as government spending on health, education, and housing

(Arnson, 1997, p. 261). The socio-economic accord attempted to tackle the institutionalized inequality that led to the civil war in the first place.

In September 1996, the parties signed the “Accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society,” addressing the demilitarization process and mandating constitutional reforms limiting the role of the armed forces. The armed forces were subordinated to civilian control and their role limited to national security. Furthermore, the accord established a new civilian police force to address domestic security issues (Jonas, 2000a, p. 14). The final accords were signed in Guatemala’s National Palace on 29 December 1996. The accords addressed fundamental issues for establishing long lasting peace, calling for: the disbanding of rural forces under military control; the creation of a new national civilian police force under the supervision of the Public Ministry; increasing the number of police officers to guarantee domestic security; arm control laws; and the creation of a system for the administration of justice (Kincaid, 2000, p. 48). The peace accords marked the beginning of the post-war process that would bring democracy to Guatemala and begin the reconciliation process.

[The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala \(MINUGUA\)](#)

The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established by the General Assembly’s resolution 48/267 in September 1994 following the Security Council’s failure to establish the mission (Res 48/27). MINUGUA was the first international presence in Guatemala in decades, a reflection of the international community’s interest in the Guatemalan peace process (Jonas, 2000b, p. 48). However, it is important to note that even if the mission was openly supported by the international community, the UN still faced many difficulties in carrying

out its mission in Guatemala. The UN faced political and financial attacks during the Guatemalan peace process, particularly from the United States (US), which severely hindered the resources allocated to MINUGUA (Jonas, 2000b, p. 58). Originally, MINUGUA was scheduled to end in 2000 but it received several extensions, allowing the mission to remain in Guatemala through 2004 to assist with that year's elections. MINUGUA's work spanned through four civilian administrations and was present through three national elections and the implementation of the peace accords (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746).

Originally, MINUGUA was established to carry out human rights verification beginning in November 1994, two years before the final peace accords were signed. The mission faced many difficulties starting with the lack of Security Council support and a delayed deployment because of difficulties within the UN system. Following the signing of the peace accords, the Security Council approved an extension to the original MINUGUA mandate, allowing for a military unit to be annexed to the mission to assist with demilitarization. MINUGUA's mission was divided into four primary tasks, including: verification both in human rights and demilitarization; technical assistance and advisory services; the Secretary General's good offices; and public information (Whitfield, 1999, p. 284).

MINUGUA faced overt attacks on its offices and harassment and threats against its personnel (Jonas, 2000b, p. 49). The mission operated in a hostile environment because there were sectors of Guatemalan society which opposed its presence. In addition, the Guatemalan government engaged in a campaign to undermine the work of MINUGUA, attempting to limit the mission's work. Furthermore, the armed forces expressed important resistance to

MINUGUA's presence, launching a campaign against the mission hoping to undermine its effectiveness and credibility (Jonas, 2000b, p. 50). MINUGUA's work was extremely challenging because of the lack of support from the government and the armed forces.

MINUGUA's Verification Division

MINUGUA's Verification Division's original mandate was human rights verification but was later extended to include the verification and supervision of all aspects of the peace accords, including the demobilization of URNG combatants, weapons confiscation, and assisting in the creation of the new civilian police force (Paris, 2002, p. 57). MINUGUA's human rights verification work began amid a polarized political environment that complicated the mission's work in verifying the parties' compliance with the "Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights" (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). Parallel to its verification work, MINUGUA created human rights reports on the human rights situation in Guatemala. These reports show the challenges that the mission faced because of the deeply rooted culture of impunity (Jonas, 2000b, p. 48). While the presence of MINUGUA was not enough to prevent human rights violations, it helped to slowly mitigate the number of human rights abuses. The mission's human rights verification was systematic, receiving and investigating human rights complaints through its nationwide network. MINUGUA's work in human rights verification was the mission's signature activity and helped uncover human rights violations that took place in post civil war Guatemala.

Following the final peace accords, the Security Council adopted resolution 1094 on 20 January 1997 authorizing the addition of a 155 military observer group for a three month period starting on 3 March 1997. MINUGUA's mandate was extended to include the verification of the

ceasefire agreement (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations). Of the 155 authorized personnel, 132 were military observers from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the US, Uruguay, and Venezuela and 13 were medical personnel from Austria, Germany, and Singapore (Report of the Secretary General S/1997/432). The new Security Council supported mission was stronger than its predecessor. The military observer group was tasked with assisting the Guatemalan government with the URNG demobilization scheduled to begin following the final peace accords.

URNG combatants were concentrated in eight assembly points around the country to begin the demobilization process. MINUGUA established secure routes for combatants to reach the concentration points without risks. To guarantee the security of combatants in the respective concentration points, MINUGUA military observers established eight teams of 15 observers along with another 32 observers who were distributed throughout the eight concentration points for command and control. UN military personnel administered and supervised the concentration points where combatants were held (Report of the Secretary General S/1996/1045). The Guatemalan army was not allowed to enter the 6 kilometer area surrounding the assembly points to protect URNG combatants and encourage full demobilization. URNG combatants were issued provisional identification cards to facilitate their reintegration into civil life. MINUGUA was tasked with creating and issuing the identification cards for 2,928 URNG members concentrated in the assembly points. Furthermore, MINUGUA created identification cards for an additional 1,258 URNG members who under the provisions of the agreement were not required to be concentrated (Report of the Secretary General S/1997/432).

As combatants reached the assembly points, they registered and surrendered their weapons to UN military observers who kept a detailed inventory of the number of weapons, explosives, and mines surrendered. The weapons were securely stored under MINUGUA's supervision and were later transferred to Guatemalan authorities following the completion of the demobilization process. As a whole, 535,102 weapons and rounds of ammunition were surrendered to MINUGUA during the demobilization process (McNeish & Lopez Rivera, 2012, p. 297). In addition to the surrendering of their weapons, URNG combatants provided the location of landmines placed during the war. MINUGUA helped to identify and clear these landmines with the assistance of the Guatemalan government. Upon the completion, 378 mines and explosive devices were removed and destroyed (Report of the Secretary General S/1997/432). MINUGUA's personnel did not have the capacity to singlehandedly remove the landmines; however, with the cooperation of the URNG and the Guatemalan government the mission was able to carry out the additional task and successfully demine the areas outlined by the URNG.

MINUGUA'S work in the demobilization of URNG combatants was pivotal in guaranteeing the security of URNG members. The process was successful in providing a transition phase for URNG combatants from the battlefield to civil life. Furthermore, the demobilization process succeeded in collecting an important number of illegal arms that were in possession of URNG members as well as in demining areas that would have otherwise remained a threat to Guatemala's civilian population. After MINUGUA's human rights work, the mission's demobilization process was the most successful aspect of the mission.

MINUGUA's Good Offices Division

The work of MINUGUA's good offices was somewhat limited in comparison to the mission's verification division. The good offices served as mediator in national debates. One of the good offices first accomplishments was helping the URNG and government work out their differences pertaining to the implementation of the peace accords (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). The role of the good offices in this matter was similar to the role the UN played during the peace negotiations, serving as mediator and guarantor. The good offices worked in the interest of the peace accords and coordinated and worked with both parties to prevent disagreements that could have hindered the implementation process. In addition to its role as mediator between the URNG and the government, MINUGUA's good offices served a similar role in disputes between the indigenous Mayan communities and the public sector (Krujit, 2000, p. 26). In this role, MINUGUA promoted national dialogue between social forces by establishing community level negotiations to prevent violent confrontations between the parties involved (Burgerman, 2000, p. 78). In addition, MINUGUA's good offices assisted in the negotiation process between the government and human rights organizations that resulted in the 2003 agreement on the design of a national reparations program for victims of human rights violations (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). The hostile environment in Guatemala following the civil war made the presence of MINUGUA's good offices indispensable for national dialogue.

MINUGUA's Technical Assistance Division

MINUGUA's technical assistance division provided technical assistance in different sectors pertaining to the implementation of the peace accords. Through the use of formal and

informal assistance at different levels from government to civil society, the division provided expertise in different areas to facilitate the peace process. In addition, the division provided funds to facilitate the implementation of programs and initiatives that helped the peace process. MINUGUA was comprised of experts in the areas of indigenous affairs, macroeconomic and fiscal policy, labor issues, land rights and agrarian policy, military and public security, and gender issues, among others (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). The technical assistance division served as an advisory board that assisted the government and civil society in implementing the peace accords. The diversity of the division's expertise was a reflection of the intricate peace accords that encompassed a diverse number of issues.

MINUGUA's Public Information Division

MINUGUA's public information division helped raise awareness about the peace process and the peace accords and how these benefited Guatemalan society. The public information division educated the public on the post-civil war environment and raised awareness about human rights and civil rights. To carry out its work, MINUGUA held informative talks and workshops in communities around the country. To bridge the cultural gaps and to incorporate the Mayan community into the public debate, MINUGUA translated the peace accords into the most commonly spoken indigenous languages (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). MINUGUA's public information division's goals were to enhance public education and establish alternative channels of communication by strengthening the role of NGOs and increase the participation of indigenous communities (Burgerman, 2000, p. 78). In a country characterized by deeply rooted cleavages that marginalized large sectors of the population from political and economic life, using public information to bridge these cleavages was an enormous task. The

lack of support from the Guatemalan government made the work of the public information division more challenging; however, its work succeeded in reaching some of Guatemala's most marginalized populations.

MINUGUA's role in post conflict Guatemala facilitated the peace process and helped implement the peace accords. Particularly important was the role of the mission's verification division and its work in human rights verification and URNG demobilization. In the area of human rights, the presence of the mission contributed to a reduction in human rights violations in the last years of the conflict and following the signing of the peace accords. However, the hostile environment in which the mission worked limited its accomplishments. In the area of demobilization, the work of MINUGUA facilitated the process and guaranteed that the demobilization of the URNG took place in a secure and peaceful environment, a guarantee that would have otherwise been impossible without the presence of a neutral force. The disarmament process was also significant in removing unregistered and illegal weapons from the public sphere. Furthermore, the demining process was an important step to protect civilians from the long lasting threat.

The mission's good offices, technical assistance and public information divisions' work was important in facilitating the peace process. However, it is important to note that the accomplishments of these divisions were limited in comparison to the verification division. The work of these three divisions was somewhat superficial, because their work was limited to their advisory role rather than a hands-on, proactive, and involved role as was the case of the verification division. The limited role of these three divisions is a reflection of the international

community's changing attitudes towards UN involvements. UN mission fatigue was evident when MINUGUA was created and, therefore, the mission's work was limited. In addition, the lack of support from the government and the armed forces made further involvement by MINUGUA difficult. In all, the mission accomplished its goals, however limited these might have been.

Commission for Historical Clarification

The Guatemalan government and the URNG created the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) to uncover the causes of the war and the atrocities that took place during the conflict. The CEH was supported domestically by civil society, the private sector, and media organizations and internationally by the UN, the European Union, the international media and international NGOs (Eckhardt, 2006, p. 30). The CEH's goal was to clarify the human rights violations and violent acts that were committed during the war (Tomuschat, 2001, p. 233). The CEH investigated human rights violations to bring closure to three decades of violence. However, the CEH was prohibited from assigning individual responsibilities to the parties involved in the violations (Tomuschat, 2001, p. 243). This led to criticism from the international community, which saw the CEH's inability to assign guilt as a continuation of Guatemala's culture of impunity.

The CEH investigated human rights violations connected to the armed conflict, drafted a report containing the results of the CEH's investigation, offered an objective assessment of what had occurred during the conflict, and formulated recommendations to help cultivate a culture of human rights respect (Crandall, 2004, p. 5). The CEH was composed of Christian Tomuschat, a

German academic, Otilia Lux de Coti, a Guatemalan indigenous pedagogue, and Alfredo Balsells, a Guatemalan lawyer (Crandall, 2004, p. 4). The CEH's work began in April 1997. However, the first three months the CEH's work focused on raising the funds necessary to carry out its mandate efficiently. The CEH's actual investigative work began in September 1997 after staff members had completed an introductory course training them to carry out the investigative tasks necessary. The investigative phase of the mission concluded in April 1998. At this time, the commission focused exclusively on producing its final report (Tomuschat, 2001, p. 242).

The CEH's report titled "Guatemala: Memory of Silence" was a 12-volume report released in February 1999 (Holiday, 2000, p. 80). The CEH concluded that more than 200,000 persons had died or disappeared during the armed conflict, of whom 80 percent were Mayan, and 95 percent of these cases were carried out by the armed forces. Additionally, the CEH concluded that the period of the war between 1981 and 1983 resulted in genocide against the highland Mayan communities carried out by the state in the context of counterinsurgency operations. The report contained 84 recommendations, a majority of which were for the Guatemalan government, including reparations for victims, fostering a culture of respect and observance of human rights, and strengthening the democratic process (MINUGUA, 2002). The CEH's recommendations were not well received by the Guatemalan government, which argued that many of the recommendations had already been implemented and that others were already underway, which was in most cases untrue. The government's attitude towards the CEH's report inspired little confidence in the government's will to deal with the aftermath of the civil war (Holiday, 2000, p. 80).

Role of Third Parties

Third parties played a pivotal role in the Guatemalan conflict and peace process. During the conflict, US support contributed immensely to the strength of the Guatemalan army and its ability to suppress popular uprisings, while the communist bloc's role was practically nonexistent. During the peace process, the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) immensely contributed to the peace agreement by providing civil society's stance on the different matters that the negotiating parties discussed. The ASC provided a different outlook to the peace talks and allowed Guatemalan society to have a voice in the peace process shaping the future of the country. The Friends of the UN Secretary General also facilitated the peace negotiations in a much more limited way than did the Assembly. In all, these three third parties played important roles in shaping the conflict and peace process.

The United States

The US role in the conflict in Guatemala was most noticeable in its role in supporting the CIA-backed coup that removed Jacobo Arbenz from power. The coup was a reaction to the reforms that the Arbenz government attempted to implement, many of which would have addressed some of the sources of inequality and disenfranchisement existent in Guatemala. What followed the US-backed removal of Arbenz was an intricate system of US support for the government and armed forces justified by the US to prevent Guatemala from becoming another Cuba. The US poured endless resources to training and reorganizing the Guatemalan army so that it could better suppress the insurgency, transforming the Guatemalan army into an unmatched counterinsurgency force (Jonas, 1996, p. 148). However, the atrocities carried out

by the Guatemalan army made overt US support impossible, especially during the armed forces' scorched-earth campaign between 1978 and 1983 (Sieder, 2001, p. 187).

The US overt support for the Guatemalan government was suspended as a reaction to the human rights violations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There is still limited information on the covert support the Guatemalan government and armed forces received from the US to continue their counterinsurgency operations. In 1995, reports emerged that linked a high ranking Guatemalan military officer to the murder of an American citizen, Michael DeVine, and a guerrilla commander, Efraim Bamaca, who was married to American lawyer Jennifer Harbury. Colonel Julio Alpirez was not only a member of the Guatemalan armed forces but was also on the CIA payroll. The Harbury case signaled that the extent to which the US was involved in the Guatemalan civil war remains unknown. The CIA's failure to declassify additional files pertaining to its work during the Guatemalan conflict leads to the assumption that the Harbury case was only the tip of the iceberg (Jonas, 2000b, p. 124). In 1999, President Clinton publicly apologized for the role the US played supporting the military forces and intelligence units that carried out the violence and repression in Guatemala. While President Clinton's apology served as the US's recognition of its involvement in the Guatemalan conflict, the extent of this involvement is still unknown.

US interference during the peace process further complicated the peace transition in Guatemala. The peace process in Guatemala took place at a time of anti-UN sentiments in the US, when the US Congress had suspended its payment of UN dues and the US government was in the midst of a campaign to remove Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. The anti-UN climate

resulted in limited support for any UN involvement, including the Guatemalan mission, which as a result was poorly funded and was only able to begin its work through the approval of the General Assembly, since the Security Council failed to approve the mission (Jonas, 2000b, p. 66). It is evident that MINUGUA's timing proved to be an important handicap particularly in regards to the support it received from the US.

The Communist Bloc

According to the CIA report titled "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions in Latin America" published on 14 November 1950, the Soviet Union utilized its connection with local communist parties to promote its interests and reduce solidarity between Latin American states and the US. The report states that in the case of Guatemala, the Soviet influence caused conflict between political factions leading to political instability. Moreover, the report argues that Guatemalan communists supported the President Juan Jose Arevalo (previous administration to that of Arbenz) to ensure that the next administration would embrace their communist ideals. In addition, the influence Communists had in the education system in Guatemala, presented a threat to regional stability because it developed student or youth movements that were susceptible to Soviet influence (Central Intelligence Agency, 1950). Furthermore, a memorandum sent to the Director of Intelligence on 22 December 1953 titled "Subject Information on Guatemala" states that top Guatemalan Communists were trained in the Soviet Union. According to this memorandum, Communists had significant influence on the Arbenz administration, which utilized the influence of the Communist Party "to put into effect what he labels his 'social reform'" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953). Even though these are the official statements made by the CIA regarding Soviet influence in Guatemala, there is limited scholarly reference to

the Soviet involvement in the country. The majority of the literature regarding the years leading up to the civil war and the war itself do not mention the Soviet Union as an influential player in the conflict. Even though US policy used the threat of Soviet influence as justification for their involvement in Guatemala at the time, there was no evidence of Soviet involvement in the country (Cohen, 1993, p. 104).

Assembly of Civil Society

The Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) was established during the peace process as a body to represent the interests of civil society during the peace negotiations under the January 1994 Framework Accord. The ASC represented all organized sectors of civil society, including women's organizations for the first time. The ASC's legitimacy resulted from its diversity and plurality of political ideologies represented within the organization (Krznaric, 1999, p. 1). The ASC produced recommendations that it submitted to the negotiating parties on the different issues to be addressed. Also, the ASC evaluated the signed accords on the different issues to facilitate their future implementation. The ASC was the only party to produce its working papers on schedule and in many respects the final peace accords are a close reflection of many of the proposals introduced by the ASC over the peace process (Burgerman, 2000, p. 76). The ASC's role during the peace process was extremely important and its non-exclusionary nature allowed for the popular participation of Guatemalan society, integrating sectors of society that historically had limited access to the political process.

Friends of the UN Secretary General

Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the US and Venezuela comprised the Friends of the UN Secretary General, a group of countries that assisted the UN and the Secretary General in

facilitating the peace process between the Guatemalan government and the URNG. Their role in the Guatemalan peace process was limited to logistical issues including hosting the peace talks and assisting with the travel arrangements for the negotiating parties. While their assistance helped the peace process run more smoothly, their contributions to the peace process as a whole were limited.

Post MINUGUA Guatemala


MINUGUA's role in the Guatemalan peace process was restricted because of limited support from the international community, the Guatemalan government and armed forces. MINUGUA was created in an international environment that discouraged UN intervention. The mission was established in a country that despite experiencing a devastating conflict, failed to whole heartedly embrace the peace process and the changes necessary to build sustainable peace. MINUGUA's work was divided into four distinct divisions that tackled different areas of the peace process, including: verification, good offices, technical assistance and public information. Of the four divisions, only the verification division had an active role in assisting and facilitating the peace process, while the remaining three served minor advisory roles. The work of MINUGUA was limited, making the mission more similar to a traditional peacekeeping mission than a peace building mission. The role of the mission was limited to verifying the implementation of the peace accords and minor tasks that helped with the execution. However, as successful as MINUGUA might have been in its limited role in Guatemala, the leading causes that resulted in the 36 years civil war were not necessarily addressed by the UN mission, making the underlying causes of the war a major concern for the sustainability of peace and democracy in Guatemala.

MINUGUA successfully supervised the demilitarization of the URNG and the collection of the weapons utilized by the insurgent group during the war. While the demobilization process was deemed a success, the resurgence of violence in the country is alarming. The prevalence of organized crime in Guatemala, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, and car theft, often through the use of high-powered arms has been especially disturbing. Furthermore, the rise of youth gangs in rural and urban areas is cause for great concern (Kincaid, 2000, p. 49). The heightened crime rate has strained the peace process as the Guatemalan government searches for adequate measures that might mitigate the country's violent streak. The government's reaction may lead to greater concerns, since the remilitarization of the police force as a source of security may return Guatemala to the repression that was experienced in the years leading up to and during the war.

In addition to an alarming rise in violence, Guatemala's human rights record has been dubious. Human rights groups have raised concerns on the status of human rights in Guatemala, particularly in reference to the treatment of journalists and activists. Furthermore, there have been reports of death squads continuing to operate in rural areas (Paris, 2002, p. 57). In 1998, the Roman Catholic Church published a four volume study titled "Guatemala: Never Again," which detailed the impact of the violence of the war on Guatemalan society. Following the release of the report, Juan Gerardi, the bishop tasked with overseeing the project, was brutally assassinated in his Guatemala City residence (Holiday, 2000, p. 80). The Gerardi assassination is an example of the violence that continues to exist in Guatemala. In addition, the accords have failed to address the deeply institutionalized racism that plagues Guatemala, an essential step for true reconciliation. Guatemala's population is comprised of 60 percent of indigenous groups that


must be incorporated into social, economic and political life to begin to address some of the underlying causes that led to the conflict in the first place.

Since the end of the civil war, Guatemala has held four free and fair general elections. The country has been able to maintain a stable democracy since the signing of the peace agreement. According to data from Freedom House's Freedom in the World Survey, which measures both political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world on a scale of 1-7 (1 being the highest degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest), Guatemala's civil liberties have remained constant at 4, deemed by the survey as partially free, since the end of the civil war. Political rights have fluctuated since the end of the war, seeing partial improvement during the five years following the signing of the peace accords and deteriorating in the early 2000s and again in 2009. Unfortunately, the data is not available to compare the post war levels of political rights and civil liberties to those prior to the war in the 1950s. Freedom House only began collecting data for this survey in the 1970s, ten years after the start of the war. However, it is important to note that during the early 1970s, Guatemala's indicators were at a score of 2, the highest level of freedom reached since that time. The higher levels of freedom present after a decade of war have not been achieved in post-war Guatemala. Furthermore, it is important to note that these positive levels in the 1970s were prior to the scorched earth war carried out by the Guatemalan army in the late 1970s and early 1980s, reflected in the graph by a significant drop in both political rights and civil liberties to the lowest level of freedom recorded in Guatemala's history since data was first collected.



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011

Figure 5: Political Rights in Guatemala




Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011

Figure 6: Civil Liberties in Guatemala


The peace accords included a socio-economic accord that outlined measures to reduce social and economic inequalities with the aid of international financial institutions. The

Guatemalan government has implemented its responsibilities as outlined in the accords sporadically and over longer periods of time than expected. Furthermore, the interest of conservative business in Guatemala has influenced the government, which has delayed the implementation process (Paris, 2002, p. 58). While the data on Guatemala's GNI per capita shows that there has been some improvement since the signing of the peace accords, the rise in this economic indicator has been moderate to say the least, which is far from sufficient in a country plagued with poverty and inequality. Furthermore, in a country with such institutionalized inequality as that of Guatemala, modest GNI per capita increases are insignificant when addressing the economic reality of the majority of the population. Failure to successfully address inequality can result in recurring social unrest as has often been the case in Guatemala. Additionally, it is important to note that the Human Development Index, developed by the UN Development Programs, which measures a long healthy life, access to education and a decent standard of living, has increased insignificantly since the end of the war, a reflection of the continued difficulties faced by the population in post-civil war Guatemala as seen in Figure 8. The majority of Guatemalans have not seen improvement in their standard of living as is reflected in Figure 7 and 8, a reality that is of particular concern considering that the country's deeply rooted inequality has led to social unrest and increased violence in the past.



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

Figure 7: GNI per Capita in Guatemala



Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Human Development Indicators.

Figure 8: Human Development Index in Guatemala

Conclusion

Guatemala's post conflict environment shows mixed results. While the country has sustained peace and has refrained from returning to the violence experienced during the civil war, this peace has been shadowed by increasing levels of violence. Rising levels of violence have led to a governmental reaction that has called on security forces to better implement their security agenda, a request that may result in the resurgence of the oppression experienced during the civil war. Furthermore, the government's inability or unwillingness to tackle the country's inequality has remained a major concern that may lead to an outbreak of violence as previously seen in Guatemala's history. The recurring violence and sustained lack of equitable economic growth have remained the major concerns in post-civil war Guatemala and the major issues that may threaten the sustained peace in the country.

MINUGUA's role in verification provided the means to disarm the URNG and assist in their reintegration to society. The disarmament of the insurgent group was done mostly at face value, without the means to further investigate whether or not the URNG had indeed fully disarmed. Furthermore, combatants have not been able to fully integrate into civil society because of the dire economic situation, making them part of an already vulnerable population. Experts have argued that it is this lack of economic opportunities that has forced ex-URNG combatants into organized crime, which could serve as an explanation for the increased levels of violence witnessed in Guatemala in recent times. The violence has yielded a strong reaction from the government, which threatens to return the country to repression and oppression by military forces. In the case of Guatemala, it appears that the causes that led to the civil war are viciously

interconnected and their escalation in recent times may result in a resurgence of violence more than fifteen years after the signing of the peace accords.

CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION

Differences between the Salvadoran and the Guatemalan Conflicts

The civil war in El Salvador lasted 12 years and resulted in the death of 75,000 Salvadorans, while the conflict in Guatemala lasted three times as long and the death toll was 2.5 times that of the Salvadoran conflict. The conflict in El Salvador was shorter but maintained a higher level of intensity, whereas the conflict in Guatemala extended over three decades, with varying levels of intensity over the years. There is an important difference between the length and intensity of both conflicts; however, the results in both El Salvador and Guatemala included the vast destruction of infrastructure, massive loss of life, the suppression of political and civil rights, and significant violations of human rights.

Some of the conflicts' contributing factors included social, economic and political systems that instigated inequality caused by a small, landowning elites that dominated the economic and political systems. These powerful minorities in El Salvador and Guatemala benefited from a closed economic system, while the majority of the population lived in poverty and struggled to survive. In both countries, inequality was exacerbated by the establishment of large coffee plantations, which expropriated land from subsistence farmers and accumulated it in the hands of the already powerful landed elite. In the years prior to the start of the conflict, both El Salvador and Guatemala attempted to implement agrarian reforms to tackle the vast inequality in the country by buying land from large landowners and granting these lands to landless peasants. These reforms were opposed by the landowning elite in both countries, who saw their economic interests threatened by these measures. These failed agrarian reforms led to

confrontation between the elite and the peasantry, leading to an increase in violence and the establishment of insurgency groups with popular support. In Guatemala, the attempt at agrarian reform resulted in the CIA-backed coup that removed President Arbenz from power and resulted in a series of military backed administrations. In El Salvador, the surge in violence had forced the government to attempt agrarian reform, but when the reform failed, violence and popular uprisings increased; however, the US did not intervene. US interests in Guatemala at the time of the agrarian reform were more significant than those in El Salvador. American based UFCO would have suffered important reductions in its land and was to receive a smaller remuneration than it had expected, which resulted in the US intervention to protect the interests of the company.

The FMLN in El Salvador was stronger and better organized, presenting a real challenge to the state's monopoly of violence. The FMLN was able to stand its ground over the years, presenting a legitimate threat to the power of the Salvadoran army and the government's stability. The URNG, however, never presented a legitimate threat to the Guatemalan army. Another difference in the intensity of the conflict was the power of the armed forces. The Salvadoran army was well-organized and well-funded but it was still unable to defeat the FMLN militarily. The balance of power between the FMLN and the Salvadoran armed forces was somewhat equitable. The Guatemalan armed forces were strong, well-trained, and well-organized with important financial backing from the Guatemalan and US governments. The Guatemalan army was one of the best trained and most efficient in the region. The URNG did not present a legitimate threat to the Guatemalan armed forces, making the conflict in Guatemala significantly more asymmetrical than that in El Salvador.

Either conflict resulted in a military victory by neither of the parties involved. However, the conflict in El Salvador did reach a point of stagnation when both parties recognized their inability to accomplish a military victory, forcing both parties to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and changes in the international arena facilitated the decision to negotiate, especially on the part of the Salvadoran government. In the case of Guatemala, domestic and international pressure led both parties to the negotiating table. The Guatemalan army refused to negotiate, recognizing its implicit superiority in force opposite to the URNG. When the Guatemalan government finally acceded to negotiations, the power asymmetry that existed during the conflict translated to the negotiating table. As a result, the URNG's influence during the negotiations was limited.

Differences between the Salvadoran and the Guatemalan peace negotiations

The negotiations leading up to the peace agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala differed in the existing power dynamics between the negotiating parties. In the case of El Salvador, the FMLN and the government viewed each other as equals. In the case of Guatemala, the URNG was much weaker than its Salvadoran counterpart, which limited its influence during negotiations. The timing of the two negotiations also varied significantly. El Salvador's conflict reached the stage of negotiations almost in concordance with the end of the Cold War, which resulted in strong support for a negotiated solution from pivotal international players including the US and the UN. In the case of Guatemala, the parties reached the negotiating table at a time where international involvement in civil conflicts was discouraged, which limited the support and involvement of international players during the negotiations.

Another difference between the two negotiation processes was the role played by the UN and the Secretary General. In the case of El Salvador, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar was fully committed and dedicated to the peace process, taking a personal interest in the negotiations and committing to the peaceful resolution to the conflict. Pérez de Cuéllar facilitated the peace process personally and through his good offices, playing a pivotal and influential role when negotiations reached standstills. In the case of Guatemala, the role of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was extremely limited. There is no evidence that the Secretary General took a personal interest in the Guatemalan peace process as did Pérez de Cuéllar in El Salvador. Furthermore, during the peace negotiations in Guatemala, Boutros-Ghali was in the midst of an aggressive campaign against him by the US government, focusing his attention on defending his position as Secretary General rather than facilitating the peace process in Guatemala.

The difference in the UN involvement in both cases is also evident in the role the organization played during the negotiations. In the case of El Salvador, the UN served as mediator and negotiator. Álvaro de Soto, as representative of the Secretary General, played a pivotal role in making proposals to the negotiating parties and even writing sections of the accords. In the case of Guatemala, the UN served as mediator and its role was limited in scope, especially when compared to the organization's role in El Salvador. Even though both the URNG and the Guatemalan government agreed to allow the UN to propose measures and initiatives during the negotiations, the contributions made by the UN were limited beyond the role of mediator and neutral third party.

In the case of Guatemala, the ASC played a crucial role during negotiations as the representative of civil society. The ASC provided the input from civil organizations from Guatemala, providing written proposals for each of the accords leading up to the final peace agreement. The ASC played a critical role in the negotiations and gave a voice to a large number of civil groups who would have otherwise had no input in the final peace agreement. Even though the role of the ASC was important in Guatemala, it was different in scope from the supportive role played by the UN in El Salvador. The power of the UN, backed by the support of the international community in the Salvadoran peace process, was central in reaching a peace agreement.

The peace accords reached during the negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala were very different in nature. To begin with, the FMLN was a stronger negotiator, which allowed it to take a harder stance on issues to accomplish its goals. The URNG on the other hand, did not have the strength of the FMLN, which made its position extremely weak. In addition, the Guatemalan peace agreement included economic accords to deal with the inequality and poverty in the country as well as establishing a new development model to lift the country out of poverty. The agreement was reached with the help of international financial organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank. In the case of El Salvador, the economic agreement was not addressed until the last days of negotiations, which yielded a basic agreement that called for the establishment of a committee to deal with the economic issues later. Additionally, the Guatemalan peace accords included an agreement on indigenous rights as a result of the deep racial divide that plagued the country and the violence towards the Mayan communities during the war. In the case of El Salvador, the violence during the war had not targeted the indigenous communities. It is

important to note that the demographics of both countries regarding their indigenous populations is extremely different. Whereas in El Salvador 1 percent of the population is indigenous, 9 percent European and 90 percent mestizo, in Guatemala, 40 percent of the population is indigenous, while 60 percent in mestizo or European. Evidently, the racial and ethnic divides in Guatemala were more significant than in El Salvador. In comparison, the Guatemalan peace accord was more complex in that it included an economic plan for the country and addressed issues regarding the country's ethnic populations, however, these additions to the accords did not result in greater economic development or stability for Guatemala because most of the economic provisions provided for a liberal market economy that failed to protect the most vulnerable sectors of the population and most provisions addressing ethnic populations failed to be implemented.

Differences between ONUSAL and MINUGUA

The differences between ONUSAL and MINUGUA contributed to the different results the UN had in both El Salvador and Guatemala. From the beginning, the support the missions received from the international community was extremely different. El Salvador's mission was approved by the Security Council at Pérez de Cuéllar's request. ONUSAL was established during a time of renewed faith in the work of the UN and openness to international intervention. MINUGUA failed to receive support from the Security Council. The General Assembly was forced to approve the mandate of MINUGUA, which made the mission weaker than its Salvadoran counterpart and broke with one of the guidelines of traditional peacekeeping, which requires Security Council approval. MINUGUA was established following the UN's failed interventions in Rwanda, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. At the time of the Guatemalan peace process,

the international community was skeptical of the role the UN could play in internal conflicts, which is reflected in the lack of support for MINUGUA.

Both ONUSAL and MINUGUA began their work prior to the final agreement and cease-fire, both differing from the traditional peacekeeping framework that requires an established cease fire. ONUSAL began its work in human rights verification six months prior to the final peace agreement, while MINUGUA started working in Guatemala two years prior to the final accords. Both missions began their work on the ground at the negotiating parties' request. ONUSAL received the support of the Salvadoran government and the FMLN and even though the mission faced some logistical difficulties during its early stages it was openly welcomed by Salvadoran society. MINUGUA faced a more hostile environment on the ground, with attacks on the mission and its headquarters. In addition, the Guatemalan government and armed forces did not facilitate MINUGUA's work. The UN missions in El Salvador and Guatemala were divided into four divisions. These divisions specialized on different areas of the peace accords to facilitate their implementations. ONUSAL included a military, police, electoral, and human rights division. MINUGUA included a verification, good offices, technical assistance, and public information division.

ONUSAL's military and human rights divisions were charged with similar work to that of MINUGUA's verification division. ONUSAL's military division was tasked with demilitarizing the FMLN and its human rights division was tasked with human rights verification prior to and following the peace accords. MINUGUA's verification division was charged with these same mandates. ONUSAL's military division was composed of 4,948 military observers while

MINUGUA's verification mission was composed of 155 military observers. There is a significant difference in the number of observers, which made the similar tasks carried out by both divisions significantly more challenging for MINUGUA. ONUSAL's demilitarization process included approximately 7,000 FMLN combatants, while MINUGUA's demilitarization process included under 3,000 URNG combatants. ONUSAL's demilitarization process counted 1 UN staffer for every 1.5 FMLN insurgent, whereas MINUGUA's demilitarization process counted 1 UN staffer for every 20 URNG insurgents. ONUSAL faced some logistical and scheduling challenges during the demilitarization process; however, through active UN mediation between the FMLN and the government, the mission was able to overcome these difficulties to successfully accomplish its mandate. MINUGUA's demobilization process included the removal of landmines that had been placed over the course of the war. The UN mission in Guatemala was not equipped or manned to deal with the demining process, so it needed the help of both the URNG and the government. Both ONUSAL and MINUGUA were successful in demobilizing the insurgent groups, however, both missions lacked the resources necessary to guarantee that both the FMLN and URNG had demobilized completely.

ONUSAL and MINUGUA's human rights verification began prior to the final peace accords. ONUSAL's presence in El Salvador helped decrease the number of human rights violations. Additionally, ONUSAL helped establish institutions, like the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, that would promote human rights after the end of the mission's mandate. In addition, ONUSAL worked with civil organizations to create programs that educated the public on human rights. MINUGUA's work in Guatemala began in a more challenging environment than that faced by its Salvadoran counterpart. The mission was not well-received by

the armed forces, sectors of the government, and sectors of the elite, which made the work of MINUGUA more difficult. The UN mission in Guatemala focused on verifying human rights on the ground and investigating human rights complaints. In addition, MINUGUA produced a series of reports documenting the human rights reality in Guatemala. Both ONUSAL and MINUGUA played an important role in decreasing human rights violations on the ground. Both missions' presences ameliorated the human rights realities following the civil war. In the long term, however, ONUSAL's institution building work contributed to a decrease in human rights violation in El Salvador when compared to Guatemala.

ONUSAL's police and electoral divisions' mandate included hands-on work that facilitated the electoral process and the creation of the PNC. Both these divisions played crucial roles in post-war El Salvador. The electoral division's work guaranteed that the post-war elections in El Salvador were inclusive, free and fair. This division's work went beyond its original mandate of supervision and took on tasks that included voter registration, campaign supervision, election supervision and vote counting. The police division helped establish and train the civilian police force tasked with domestic security in El Salvador. The PNC was essential in reducing the role of the armed forces, and ONUSAL's police division assisted with the transition towards a civilian police force. In the case of Guatemala, post-war elections and the establishment of a civilian police force were imperative issues that would determine the peaceful transition to democracy following the civil war. However, MINUGUA did not supervise these matters as ONUSAL did in El Salvador. The Guatemalan government was tasked with carrying out the electoral process and establishing the new civilian police force.

MINUGUA's division of good offices, technical assistance and public information served advisory roles during the post-war period. These offices were composed of experts in the respective areas to facilitate the transition to peace and democracy. These divisions' work, while important, did not take an active role in the peace process. MINUGUA's work was more superficial than ONUSAL's. The hostilities the mission faced on the ground resulted with the limited work these divisions carried out in Guatemala. Additionally, MINUGUA faced difficulties from the international community's changing attitude towards UN involvement, which resulted in the limited scope of its mandate in comparison to ONUSAL.

ONUSAL and MINUGUA started working on the ground prior to the signing of the final peace accords and establishment of an official cease fire. Both missions were charged with facilitating the demobilization process of the insurgency groups and verifying human rights. However, the remainder of the work carried out by ONUSAL and MINUGUA was extremely different. ONUSAL carried out tangible tasks that facilitated the peace process, including the establishment of human rights institutions, the creation and training of a civilian police force and the supervision of the electoral process. MINUGUA's role in post-war Guatemala was limited to an advisory position outside of its verification division. The technical assistance, good offices and public information divisions served mostly as mediators and advisors, opposite to the active role played by the electoral and police divisions in El Salvador.

[Differences between the El Salvador and the Guatemala Truth Commissions](#)

Both peace accords agreed on the creation of truth commissions to conduct formal investigations of the violence and human rights violations committed during the conflict. The goal of both Commissions was to shed light on the crimes committed during the war to begin the

reconciliation process. The Salvadoran Commission was composed of three foreign nationals to avoid conflicting interests during the investigation and report period. In the case of Guatemala, the Commission was composed of one foreign national and two Guatemalan nationals. Both Commissions were tasked with investigating crimes that were part of a systematic pattern of violence. An important difference between the two Commissions was that the Commission in El Salvador was tasked with investigating and naming those responsible for these violent crimes. The Salvadoran Commission did not have prosecutorial powers, but its ability to identify those guilty of human rights violations almost served as a judicial proclamation of guilt. The Guatemalan Commission investigated violent and systematic crimes that took place during the civil war. However, the Guatemalan Commission was not allowed to name those responsible for these crimes. The Commission's inability to name those who had perpetuated the violence and human rights violations during the war perpetuated the country's culture of impunity.

Both Commissions drafted reports that described their findings and included recommendations to be implemented by the national governments and armed forces. Both Commissions reported that 95 percent of the violent crimes had been committed by the armed forces and only 5 percent were carried out by the insurgency groups. Additionally, the Guatemalan Commission found that between 1981 and 1983, the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Guatemalan government had systematically targeted the highland Mayan communities, resulting in the mass murder of the indigenous population and genocide (80 percent of those murdered were of indigenous descent). While the levels of violence were alarming in both civil wars, the Guatemalan civil war included ethnic cleansing that perpetuated the established ethnic cleavages in the country.

Both Commissions made recommendations to be implemented by the governments to prevent such violence from recurring. These recommendations were not immediately embraced by the governments. The Salvadoran government took action regarding the reform of the judicial system and implemented basic democratic rights. However, it delayed the recommendations that called for the removal of an important number of officials from the armed forces' officer corps. In the case of Guatemala, the government argued that most of the recommendations made by the Commission had already been implemented and the rest of the recommendations were in the process of being implemented. The Guatemalan government's reaction to the Commission's recommendations made the international community further question the government's commitment to the peace process.

Differences in the role of third parties in El Salvador and Guatemala

Third parties played important roles in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In both cases, the United States played a critical role in the development, maintenance and ending of the conflicts. At the same time, the role of the Communist bloc was more prominent in El Salvador, where reports of the bloc's involvement in Guatemala are limited to reports by the US government. The Contadora Group set the groundwork for the negotiations in El Salvador, while in the case of Guatemala the role of the Assembly of Civil Society was prominent during negotiations. Finally, the Friends of the UN Secretary General helped facilitate the peace process by providing assistance to the UN during this particular period of time.

In the Salvadoran and Guatemalan conflicts, the US supported financially and militarily the governments in power. However, in the case of Guatemala the role of the US was much more intricate and involved. The US took part in the removal of democratically elected president

Jacobo Arbenz, trained the Guatemalan armed forces in counter-insurgency operations, and provided covert support for the government and armed forces. To date, there is still limited information on how intricate and far-reaching the role of the US was during the Guatemalan conflict. Evidently, in both cases the role of the US helped prolong the conflict because of the indisputable support the American government provided to the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments. However, in the case of Guatemala, US involvement was much more intricate, far-reaching and sustained.

The role the communist bloc played in both conflicts was limited. In the case of El Salvador, there is evidence that the FMLN received support from the communist bloc, including the USSR and Nicaragua's Sandinistas. In the case of Guatemala, the role of the communist bloc is more limited, since evidence of its involvement is limited to documents and reports by US intelligence. There is limited information on the role of the different communist parties in the Guatemalan conflict in academic papers or historical records. Evidently, the levels of involvement of the US and the communist bloc in both conflicts helped create a more symmetrical conflict in the case of El Salvador, while the different levels of support received by the Guatemalan government from the US and lack of support for the URNG by the communist bloc created a more asymmetrical conflict that led to alarmingly higher levels of violence when compared to the Salvadoran conflict.

In the case of the Contadora Group in El Salvador, it facilitated the transition to the negotiating table by helping establish the necessary conditions that would lead to negotiations. The Contadora's success, however, was limited because of its regional approach, which failed to

target each of the parties involved in the Central American conflicts independently and not just collectively. While the group's work did not conclude in the regional peace agreements that it expected, it did pave the way to peace in the region through its diplomatic work with the parties involved. The role of the Assembly of Civil Society was significant once negotiations in Guatemala were underway. The ACS represented the different civil groups during the negotiation process. The ACS was an important contributor to the final peace agreement, giving civil society a stronger voice in the peace process that was the case in El Salvador.

The Friends of the UN Secretary General served in both El Salvador and Guatemala as an extension of the work of the UN and the good offices of the Secretary General. States that were part of this group facilitated the negotiation process by arranging travel and security for the negotiating parties, helping the peace process run more smoothly. In the case of El Salvador, with Pérez de Cuéllar playing a more prominent role in the peace process, the Friends were more involved during negotiations. The Friends not only helped with the logistical aspects of the peace process but also met with the negotiating parties to discuss their grievances and concerns. In the case of Guatemala, even if the number of states that made up the Friends was more significant, their role was limited to facilitating the logistical aspects of the negotiations rather than a more active role as was the case of the Friends in El Salvador.

Differences in post ONUSAL El Salvador and post MINUGUA Guatemala

El Salvador and Guatemala have both returned to civilian rule through the democratic election of their officials. Both countries have continued to hold free and fair elections that have maintained democratic rule. In the case of political rights, the reality in El Salvador and Guatemala has differed. In El Salvador, political rights have returned to pre-civil war levels and

have been maintained at the same levels since the mid-1990s as seen in Figure 1. El Salvador's political rights' ranking is deemed free by Freedom House. In Guatemala, political rights have failed to remain stable. The level of political rights has fluctuated between levels 3 and 4 as seen in Figure 5, deemed partially free by Freedom House. El Salvador has reached an important level of stability and freedom in the area of political rights in the two decades following the end of the war. Guatemala has struggled to guarantee the political rights of its citizens following the end of the civil war. With regards to civil liberties, El Salvador, as seen in Figure 2, reached a level 3 in this area deemed free by Freedom House. This level mirrors that of civil liberties in the country prior to the civil war. In the case of Guatemala, civil liberties saw some improvement in comparison to the last five years of the war, however, they have failed to return to the higher levels that it had reached even during the war. At a level 4, civil liberties in Guatemala are deemed partially free by Freedom House.

In the case of economic indicators, both countries have maintained an upward trend in GNI per capita. The increase in El Salvador has been more significant than the increase in Guatemala. In El Salvador, GNI per capita in constant 2000 US dollars has increased from \$1500 at the end of the war to \$2500 in 2010, a two thirds increase in almost two decades. In Guatemala, the increase in GNI per capita has been more modest, increasing from \$1400 constant 2000 US dollars in 1995 to \$1800 in 2010, a one third increase. While the increase in GNI per capita shows economic growth in both countries, the Human Development Index in both countries show that the improvement in quality of life in both El Salvador and Guatemala has been extremely modest. In these countries, where the levels of poverty and inequality have traditionally been extremely high, economic development alone will fail to provide for the

poorest sections of the population. Redistributive measures through government spending are necessary to reach higher levels of equality. In the case of El Salvador, the HDI has improved from .5 to .7 since the end of the war. In Guatemala, the improvement in HDI has been more limited, from .5 to .6 since the end of the war. Evidently, the improved economic conditions in El Salvador are reflected in the improvement in HDI, whereas in Guatemala, the improvement has been more limited. Additionally, it is important to note that Guatemala faced additional challenges in post-civil war years regarding the marginalization of large sectors of the population, which is likely to have played a role in the limited HDI improvement.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the differences in the role played by the UN in post-civil war El Salvador and Guatemala were more significant than the author had expected at the start of this research project. Furthermore, the role of external factors had a much more significant impact on the role the UN played in both peace processes than what the author had anticipated. In the case of El Salvador, the work of the UN benefited from ideal timing when the end of the Cold War promoted greater UN involvement and an end to conflicts that reflected Cold War politics. The mission in El Salvador was the first mission to include a variety of peacebuilding strategies to facilitate the post-civil war reconstruction. The UN took a leading role in bringing both parties to the negotiating table, facilitating the peace talks, and working on the ground in a variety of areas from disarmament to electoral processes to guarantee that El Salvador had a successful return to peace, stability and democracy. The involvement of the UN in El Salvador was intricate and far-reaching. ONUSAL was supported not only by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN, but also by the international community including the United States and UN as a whole. ONUSAL

was created at a time of renewed interest in UN international involvement following the stagnation the organization experienced during the Cold War years, ideal timing for a mission charged with implementing a diverse number of tasks to facilitate the peace process.

The case of Guatemala, on the other hand, was very different. To begin with, the conflict in Guatemala had lasted three times as much as that in El Salvador and had yielded higher levels of violence. The Guatemalan civil war was also more asymmetrical in force, with stronger armed forces that carried out genocide and crimes against humanity during certain periods of the conflict. By the time the Guatemalan conflict moved to the negotiating table, the international community's commitment to international involvement had dwindled. Following the failures in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, UN involvement was no longer supported by the international community. MINUGUA faced challenges from the start, failing to gain Security Council support and resorting to General Assembly approval instead. This change in tides is exemplified by the role MINUGUA played in the Guatemalan peace process; the mission's divisions were less involved and limited to advisory and supervisory roles. With the exception of MINUGUA's verification division, the remainder of the mission served an extremely limited role in post-civil war Guatemala. Another difference worth noting was the different leadership at the UN at the time of the peace processes. In the case of El Salvador, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar worked tirelessly to guarantee that the Salvadoran conflict was resolved before the end of his tenure. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali never showed the commitment to the Guatemalan peace process that his predecessor did to the Salvadoran peace process.

Finally, the author concludes from this research that the differences between ONUSAL and MINUGUA in the peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala were very significant and could serve to explain the different realities facing both countries today. However, it is important to note that it was impossible to remove the missions from the context in which they took place and the factors that facilitated or hindered their work as the author had originally planned. In the case of El Salvador, the ideal timing of the peace process played an imperative role in facilitating the work of the UN and guaranteeing a smoother transition to peace. Contrary, in the case of Guatemala, the changing reality within the international community regarding UN involvement hindered MINUGUA and its work. MINUGUA was limited in scope when compared to its Salvadoran counterpart, which in combination with the different attitudes towards UN involvement and different levels of support for the peace process produced a less successful outcome in Guatemala than ONUSAL's work did in El Salvador.

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