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MISSIONS IN THE DEFENSE OF SPANISH FLORIDA, 1566-1710

by ROBERT ALLEN MATTER*

STUDENTS OF COLONIAL Latin America generally credit its Indian mission systems as effective instruments of frontier defense.¹ A study of the Spanish missions of Florida does not support this thesis. The “paper” bulwark provided by the Florida missions when challenged could represent a significant exception to the alleged importance of the defense role of the church in the Indies. Or, it could reveal that the missionaries played an ineffective part in the defense of Latin-American frontiers. Regardless, Florida’s story suggests the need for a critical re-examination of the premise that religious missions held strategic areas beyond the line of established settlements.

For about a century after the consolidation of Menéndez de Avilés’s 1565 conquest a serious external threat to the strategic colony appeared remote, and Spain seemed satisfied to concentrate on evangelizing Florida’s aborigines. Presumably, the Christian missions would secure the settlement with a minimum of Spanish military and economic assistance. Nevertheless, chronic difficulties – royal neglect, resulting in inadequate economic and military support; an unwillingness or inability to establish a sound local economy; Indian troubles; and dissension between Florida’s governors and missionaries– plagued the colony throughout its first Spanish era. The debilitating church-state feud fed the other problems, hindering the development of a sound colony.

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1. Herbert E. Bolton, *Wider Horizons of American History* (New York, 1939; facsimile edition, South Bend, Indiana, 1967), 80-84, 109-10, 115-19, 123-28, 130-31, 147; Verne E. Chatelain, *The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763* (Washington, 1941), 24-25, 35, 58, 60, 118n, 119-20n, 148; John Jay TePaske, *The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763* (Durham, 1964), 6; Kathryn Abbey Hanna, *Florida, Land of Change*, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, 1948), 56, 60.

Three general types of discord between the governors and the fathers marked the church-state bickering: a struggle for jurisdiction over the mission Indians; disputes concerning proper treatment of the aborigines; and conflicts in determining priorities between military security and the religious effort. Of these controversies, the latter most adversely influenced colonial Florida's military weakness and thus its vulnerability.

The dispute over military security began early in Florida's history. During a brief, unsuccessful Jesuit period, 1566-1572, despite Menéndez' support of their program, Father Superior Juan Bautista de Segura opposed the governor's policy of stationing troops in or near the Indian missions. Segura claimed the unchristian example set by the soldiers and their drain on Indian food supplies made the padres' challenging task of converting the natives more difficult.² Thus began an argument that continued intermittently throughout most of the mission period: were military detachments on the frontiers, supposedly hindering the evangelical program, essential for the security of the colony?

The fate of the Jesuit missions illustrates the ineffectiveness of the defense role of the church in Florida. Inadequate military garrisons in the south enabled Indian rebellions to force the abandonment of missions at Tequesta, near present-day Miami, and San Antonio on Charlotte Harbor. After further conversion attempts in the northern coastal provinces of Guale and Orista failed, the Jesuits decided to carry the faith to Ajacán on the Bay of Santa María (Chesapeake), where the Indians had not been spoiled by Spanish troops. Scorning military protection, the isolated mission collapsed in martyrdom in 1571, within months after its arrival. The tragedy ended Jesuit evangelical activity in Spanish Florida.³

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2. Woodbury Lowery, *The Spanish Settlements Within the Present Limits of the United States, Florida 1562-1574*, II (New York, 1905; facsimile edition, New York, 1959), 346-47; Clifford M. Lewis and Albert J. Loomie, comps. and eds., *The Spanish Jesuit Mission in Virginia, 1570-1572* (Chapel Hill, 1953), 26, 74, 221. See also Robert Allen Matter, "The Spanish Missions of Florida: The Friars Versus the Governors in the 'Golden Age,' 1606-1690" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), 171-72, 201-02, 308-11; "Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, LII (July 1973), 18-38.
 3. Zelia Sweett and Mary Sheppy, *The Spanish Missions of Florida* (St. Augustine, 1940), 16-18; Lowery, *Spanish Settlements*, II, 340-48; Felix Zubillaga, *La Florida, La Misión Jesuítica (1566-1572) y La Colonización Española* (Roma, 1941), 279, 371, 422-23; Bartolomé Barrientos, *Pedro*

In 1573 a small band of Franciscan friars arrived in Florida. They also objected to military garrisons near mission towns, protesting that soldiers hampered evangelism. Nevertheless, despite the support of the converted chief of Guale and the interest of other local natives in Christianity, three Indian uprisings between 1576 and 1583 forced three Spanish evacuations of their northernmost outpost at Santa Elena (Port Royal Sound). By 1588 the overtaxed Spaniards had permanently abandoned the post.⁴

The faltering missionary program began in earnest in the autumn of 1595 with the arrival of significant Franciscan reinforcements. In a rare climate of friendly relations between the fathers and soldiers, Florida yielded an estimated 1,500 Christian Indians by the end of the year.⁵ Seemingly, the zealous friars had "reduced the Gualeans to a state of docility, or acquiescence. . . . Where the soldier once dared not venture out in search of provisions, the Indian now submitted to regulatory action of the padres, and all raised their voices with the friar in the Ave María, the Pater Noster, and the Credo."⁶

The "bubble" burst in September 1597 with the martyrdom of five Franciscans by Christian and pagan natives resentful of the missionaries' ban against polygamy. It required two ruthless punitive military expeditions to subdue the rebels and restore order. Not until the end of 1601 were the Gualeans again at peace with their Spanish masters. The rebellion reportedly set back mission development twelve to fifteen years.⁷

Menéndez de Avilés, Founder of Florida, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (Gainesville, 1965), 120, 126-32; Father Juan Rogel to Menéndez de Avilés, December 9, 1570, in Eugenio Ruidíaz y Caravia, *La Florida. Su Conquista y Colonización por Pedro Menéndez de Avilés*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1893), II, 301-08; Lewis and Loomie, *Spanish Jesuit Mission*, vii, 15-24, 27-28, 38-40, 45-48, 89-93, 107-10, 118-20, 181-82, 220-24; Michael V. Gannon, *The Cross in the Sand: The Early Catholic Church in Florida, 1513-1870* (Gainesville, 1965), 33-36.

4. Maynard Geiger, *The Franciscan Conquest of Florida (1513-1618)* (Washington, 1937), 36-38; John R. Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors* (Washington, 1922), 58-59; Gregory Joseph Keegan y Leandro Tormo Sanz, *Experiencia Misionera en La Florida (Siglos XVI y XVII)* (Madrid, 1957), 259-65; John Tate Lanning, *The Spanish Missions of Georgia* (Chapel Hill, 1935), 59-64, 74.
5. Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 73; Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 58-68; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 36-39; Keegan y Tormo Sanz, *Experiencia Misionera*, 273-78.
6. Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 72.
7. Luis Gerónimo de Oré, "The Martyrs of Florida (1513-1616)," trans. and

Ignoring less-civilized southern tribes, the recuperated Franciscans steadily moved inland, reaching the Suwannee River in the province of Timucua by 1616. Unable to provide military protection, the governors for a time restrained the eager friars from pushing further westward, where one-half or more of the populous, sedentary Apalachee tribe reputedly desired to become Christians.⁸ Finally, in 1633 Governor Luis de Horruytiner blessed the expansion of the mission system into the long-coveted province of Apalachee. He believed converted Indians on his western frontier not only would be welcome additions to the ranks of Christendom, but also would serve to strengthen the colony's defenses.⁹

As in Guale a half-century earlier, the Apalachee appeared to accept docilely Spanish-Christian restraints and abuses, but the Apalachee also turned on their rulers and shepherds. In a sudden attack in 1647 a band of Apalachee killed three of the eight Franciscans and destroyed the seven principal missions in the province, suspending evangelism there. Assisted by loyal Apalachee, Spanish troops put down the revolt. Florida's royal treasury officials, reporting on the rebellion, confirmed their belief that the mission of the colony's military contingent was to support the conversion of the natives. They added that to do so effectively they needed thirty or forty more soldiers to establish

ed. Maynard Geiger, *Franciscan Studies*, 18 (July 1936), 73-96; Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 86-122, 150; Sweett and Sheppy, *Spanish Missions of Florida*, 26-30; Keegan y Tormo Sanz, *Experiencia Misionera*, 275-83.

8. Oré, "Martyrs of Florida," 112-36; Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 218, 227, 232, 239-59; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 49-55; Sweett and Sheppy, *Spanish Missions of Florida*, 4; Charlton W. Tebeau, *A History of Florida* (Coral Gables, 1971), 16-17; Governor Juan Fernández de Olivera to Crown, October 13, 1612, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, *estante* 54, *cajón* 5, *legajo* 14, *número* 72, photostat in Stetson Collection, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville. Archivo General photostats and transcripts hereinafter will be cited as AGI, followed by location and document numbers; Stetson Collection documents will be cited as ST. Olivera to Crown, October 13, 1612, AGI 54-5-10, microfilm reel 6, Woodbury Lowery Collection of Manuscripts, "The Spanish Settlements in the United States, MSS, Florida" (hereinafter cited as WL-Reel No.), translated summary in "A Calendar of Spanish Documents Pertaining to Florida, 1512-1764," William B. Griffin, comp., 1959, St. Augustine Historical Society Library (hereinafter cited as SAHS).
9. Governor Luis de Horruytiner to King, November 15, 1633, AGI 54-5-18, 15, ST.

a garrison in Apalachee, where it would complete the conquest of the heathen and maintain security in the province.¹⁰

The Apalachian revolt kept alive the issue of whether or not soldiers should be stationed in or near the Indian missions. Responding to a complaint from Fray Pedro Moreno Ponce de León, the King accused Florida's governors of using the pretext of royal service to send troops to the provinces to trade and farm for their personal profit. The soldiers, the King charged, exploited and abused the Indians, negating the magnificent efforts of the Franciscans. His Majesty's only interest in Florida was to "salvage and increase the work of holy conversions."¹¹

The dispute became particularly heated during the regime of Governor Diego de Rebolledo, 1654-1658. In 1656 an eight-month Indian rebellion in Timucua and Apalachee wracked Rebolledo's troubled administration. The governor and the friars blamed each other for the revolt. The Florida missions had reached their probable greatest numerical strength the year before. As usual in such insurrections, the missions in the area were destroyed and Spanish soldiers had to suppress it and restore control.¹²

Bitterly denouncing Governor Rebolledo, the Franciscans spelled out their objections to quartering troops among the missions. First, Rebolledo's detachment of a lieutenant and twelve soldiers could not protect any area. The soldiers' presence in the villages engendered Indian mutiny. Weak bachelors, inclined "that way," aroused jealousy among Indian braves when the whites took their women. Soldiers sometimes mistreated friars as well as Indians, reducing the padres' influence over the natives. As the troops required local support, they were not welcome, but

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10. Royal Officials of Florida to King, March 18, 1647, AGI 54-5-14, 105, ST; July 28, 1647, AGI 54-5-20, 51, ST; Petition of Fray Pedro Moreno Ponce de León, endorsed July 9, 1648, AGI 54-5-20, 54, ST; Petition of Moreno, endorsed August 3, 1648, AGI 54-5-20, 58, ST; Royal Cédula to Governor and Royal Officials of Florida, August 8, 1648, AGI 58-1-21, 5, ST; Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI 54-5-14, 110, ST; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 56-57; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 167-69; Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians*, 119; Matter, "Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions," 27-29.
 11. Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI 54-5-14, 110, ST.
 12. Father Juan Gómez to Father Francisco Martínez, March 13, 1657, AGI 54-5-10, 73, ST; April 4, 1657, AGI 54-5-10, 74, ST; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 169, 204-08; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 57-59; Matter, "Spanish Missions of Florida," 106, 262.

the Indians were afraid to complain to the governor. The priests believed a lieutenant and one soldier could perform all legitimate duties without straining Indian resources.¹³

In rebuttal, Rebolledo cited repeated royal orders charging him with the defense of Florida, whose coasts were infested with enemy vessels. The governor pointed out that soldier abuses of the Indians could be corrected or tempered, giving the friars a chance to function, whereas an enemy occupation of an inadequately-defended province would prevent Spanish evangelism there. The small force he had sent to Apalachee was to be reinforced, for he planned to establish a Spanish fort and settlement there. According to Rebolledo, the *caciques* (chiefs) claimed their people were well-treated by the soldiers, whom they welcomed.¹⁴

Though Rebolledo's small detachment remained in Apalachee, his recommendation to reduce the number of Franciscans in Florida was ignored; nor could he convince the Crown of the need for greater military protection for the missions. Instead, the Council of the Indies, charged with the administrative supervision of Spanish America, recommended to the King an increase of thirty Franciscans in Florida. Emphasizing that the principal obligation of the Crown was the conversion of the Indians, it declared it was proper for His Majesty to support the poor padres who would serve like soldiers defending the frontiers.¹⁵

Despite continuing Franciscan opposition, the Crown, in the face of reports of English overtures to Florida's Indians, dared not withdraw the infantry from Apalachee. Complying with new royal orders, Rebolledo's successors maintained a small force there consistent with inadequate total military strength and needs elsewhere. Like their predecessors they reasoned that the safety of the missions depended upon effective local military de-

13. Franciscans of Florida to King, September 10, 1657, AGI 54-5-20, 72, WL-7, trans. by E. W. Lawson, SAHS.

14. *Ibid.*: "Testimony of Governor Diego de Rebolledo's *Visita* of Apalachee and Timucua," January-September 1657, AI Escribania de Cámara, *legajo* 155, no. 18, ST; Rebolledo to Crown, October 18, 1657, AGI 58-1-26, 4, ST.

15. Rebolledo to Crown, October 18, 1657, AGI 58-1-26, 4, ST; Council of the Indies to King, March 23, 1658, AGI 53-1-6, 71, ST. Four years later the Franciscans complained that their current governor still had not withdrawn the soldiers from Apalachee, thus failing to comply with a royal *cédula* of March 29, 1659. See Franciscans of Florida to Crown, December 21, 1662, AGI 54-5-20, ST.

tachments.¹⁶ Reinforcing their belief, in 1661, as always, it required a military expedition from the capital to arrest frequent heathen-Indian raids which had forced the displacement of the most important mission in Guale, Tolomato, to a location only about eight miles north of St. Augustine.¹⁷ When Governor Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes reported that the Indians had ravaged Guale and that foreign whites were constructing a fort near the northern frontier, the safety of Spanish fleets in the Bahama Channel again became an important matter for consideration in Madrid.¹⁸ Regardless, in 1664 the persistent Franciscans, echoing their previous objections, again requested the King to order the withdrawal of the infantry from Apalachee and "from wherever else they might be." The Crown, however, manifested its growing awareness of Florida's vulnerability and importance in a firm response referring to recent instructions for the governor to fortify Apalachee.¹⁹

A surprise sacking of St. Augustine by the English "pirate," Robert Searles, in May 1668, reinforced Madrid's shifting emphasis to military affairs in Florida. Among other measures Mariana, the Queen Regent during the minority of Charles II, 1665-1675, directed the construction of a stone fortress at St. Augustine.²⁰

To counteract the growing English threat, Governor Manuel de Cendoya in 1671 stationed twenty-five soldiers at Santa Catalina, then the colony's northernmost post. He maintained his Apalachian garrison also at twenty-five. To alleviate his military

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16. Governor Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes to King, January 5, 1659, AGI 58-2-2, 3, ST; November 9, 1659, AGI 58-1-26, 5, ST; Ad-interim Governor Nicolás Ponce de León II to King, February 19, 1664, AGI 54-5-10, 95, ST.
 17. Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 209-10.
 18. Aranguiz y Cotes to King, September 8, 1662, AGI 54-5-10, 94, ST; Junta de Guerra de Indias to Council of the Indies, October 10, 1662, AGI 58-2-2, 9, ST.
 19. Franciscans of Florida to King, June 16, 1664, AGI 54-5-18, 64, ST.
 20. Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega to Queen, August 8, 1668, AGI 54-5-10, 106 1/2, ST; Junta de Guerra to Queen, January 22, 1669, AGI 58-2-2, 11, ST, trans. by North Carolina Works Project Administration and North Carolina Historical Commission; Junta de Guerra to Queen, March 8, 1669, AGI 58-2-2, 12, ST; Royal Cédula to Viceroy of New Spain, March 11, 1669, AGI 2-4-1/19, 2, ST. Queen Mariana's regency is cited from Lucy L. Wenhold, trans. and ed., "A 17th Century Letter of Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, Bishop of Cuba, Describing the Indians and Indian Missions of Florida," *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections*, vol. 95, no. 16, publication 3398 (Washington, 1936), 6.

weakness Cendoya would try to form a company of cavalry and one of militia, but he pointed out the lack of colonists for such an enterprise.²¹ Preoccupied with critical military problems, Governor Cendoya still hoped to further the evangelical effort, but under a protective military umbrella. In December 1672, the governor stated he needed 100 infantry to fortify and defend adequately the fertile province of Apalachee. Only nineteen soldiers were stationed there at the time; thirteen were in Guale.²² By May 1675, the strength of the Guale garrison had fallen to nine.²³

While Florida's military posture was deteriorating, its evangelical program, favored by the Crown, overcoming great obstacles, expanded considerably. In 1655 it claimed an unlikely 26,000 Indian converts in about forty principal missions, served by possibly seventy friars. By 1675, the mission system had reached its greatest extent and influence.²⁴ As seen, during such relatively prosperous times the missions, when tested, were ineffective instruments of frontier defense. In the late 1660s, the Crown, reversing its policy, began to favor the governors in the church-state dispute over colonial security. Partly as a result, the friars eventually lost much of their zeal, and the missions began to decay.²⁵ During the decline in strength and vitality of the mission system after 1675, it failed to meet even greater challenges to its defense role than it previously unsuccessfully had faced.

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21. Governor Manuel de Cendoya to Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 13 A-B, ST; November 6, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 14, ST.
 22. Cendoya to Queen, November 6, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 14, ST; February 3, 1672, AGI 58-1-35, 8, ST; December 15, 1672, AGI 58-1-26, 21, ST; December 20, 1672, AGI 54-2-3, 7, ST.
 23. Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar to Queen, June 15, 1675, AGI 32-4-29/35, 2, ST.
 24. Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 57, 64-67; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 166-69, 213; Matter, "Spanish Missions of Florida," 88-89, 102-03, 106, 111-17, 339-40n, 340-41n, 345n, 349; Matter, "Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions," 18-19; Mark F. Boyd, "Spanish Mission Sites in Florida," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XVII (April 1939), 255-80; Maynard Geiger, "Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans in Spanish Florida and Cuba (1528-1841)," *Franciscan Studies*, XXI (1940), 1-9, 119-31.
 25. Visitador Father Juan Machado to King, August 8, 1688, AGI 54-5-12, 69, ST; Fray Manuel Mendoza to Governor of Florida, September 10, 1687, enclosure to Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada to the Crown, May 20, 1691, AGI 54-5-13/21, ST, translated summary in "Religious Index of Persons, Places, and Things," Catholic Historical Survey of Florida, St. Augustine Foundation, 1963-1965 (hereinafter cited as RI), P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida; Quiroga y Losada to Crown, August 31, 1690, AGI 54-5-13, 13-13², microfilm

In 1674 and 1675, at the zenith of its mission era, Florida enjoyed the second episcopal visitation of its long-neglected existence. During his ten strenuous months in the colony Don Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, bishop of Santiago de Cuba, visited all thirty-six principal missions and confirmed 13,152 Christian Indians. Travelling more than forty leagues north from St. Augustine to Santa Catalina and over 100 leagues west as far as the Chattahoochee River in Apalachicola, Calderón reported two to twenty leagues separated the missions. Protecting this impressive religious empire, the bishop described, in addition to the *castillo* at the capital, an infantry garrison with cannon at the large Apalachian mission of San Luis de Talimali (on the western edge of current Tallahassee) and "an officer with a good garrison of infantry at Santa Catalina." During this period of prime religious activity Calderón found it prudent to maintain at his own expense a company of Spanish infantry from St. Augustine and two companies of Indian arquebusiers and archers to escort him safely through the frontier areas flanked by the "barbarous and warlike heathen" Chiscas and Chichimecos.²⁶

Assuming a five-year gubernatorial term in 1675, Pablo de Hita Salazar also experienced an Indian uprising which demonstrated again the impracticality of the Franciscan agitation to remove Spanish soldiers from the Florida frontiers. This time, in mid-1675, the Chacatos in Apalachicola revolted. They were new converts who had been helped into the fold by Bishop Calderón. When a small military relief column proved to be inadequate, the two resident priests retired with the soldiers to fortified San Luis de Talimali. By October a stronger Spanish force had restored order in Apalachicola.²⁷ The governor urged the Crown to

reel 8, Spanish Records of North Carolina Historical Commission (hereinafter cited as NC-Reel No.), P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History; Quiroga y Losada to King, November 28, 1692, AGI 54-5-13, 148, ST, RI; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 69-74; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 199-200; Matter, "Spanish Missions of Florida," 116-22, 189-91, 309-17; Mark F. Boyd, Hale G. Smith, and John W. Griffin, *Here They Once Stood: The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions* (Gainesville, 1951), x, 6, 8; Geiger, "Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans," 9, 127-40.

26. Wenhold, "17th Century Letter," 2-12; Bishop of Cuba to Queen, November 20, 1675, ACI 54-3-2, 1, ST. A "Calderón league" equals approximately 2.6 English miles. Boyd, "Spanish Mission Sites," 275. Griffin, in *Here They Once Stood*, 139, gives the 1675 population of San Luis as 1,400. Matter, "Spanish Missions of Florida," 349n, 353n; Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Ann Arbor, 1929), 9.

27. De Hita Salazar to Queen, August 9, 1675, AI Escribanía de Cámara,

send 100 more soldiers and 100 families previously requested—the minimum needed to secure the colony. The royal response the next year authorized de Hita Salazar to build the most economical fort to protect the port of Apalachee and to report his needs.²⁸

In a 1676 petition requesting new missionaries, Fray Alonso del Moral referred to a royal *cédula* which cited the “poor religious that go not only to convert Indians so ferocious as those of Florida, but also to defend like soldiers those frontiers.”²⁹ The story of the Chacato revolt and accounts of earlier and later Indian uprisings, reveal some exaggeration in such a contention.

The ejection of the friars from Apalachicola in 1675 and their inability to re-establish themselves there later, despite military support which they had requested, perhaps caused the Franciscans to reflect on their claim of defending the frontiers.³⁰ At any rate, the Florida church-state controversy over military security subsided near the end of the seventeenth century, while those concerned with jurisdiction and treatment of the Indians continued unabated, or even increased.

Interwoven with the dispute about the deployment of the colony's military contingent was a running feud over the ratio of friars to soldiers in the *dotación*, as Florida's manpower allotment was called. A corollary to this argument was the debate over the portion of the *situado*, or supporting royal subsidy from New Spain, which should go to the missions. The governors, invariably military men, charged with the security of Florida, frequently disagreed with the churchmen and the Crown on the matter. Although most governors encouraged and supported a vigorous religious campaign, they deplored the inclusion of the Franciscans in their manning table. Almost with one voice they urged the Crown to establish a separate religious personnel pol-

legajo 156, ZZ Coyer, page folios 119-42, ST. Calderón claimed that those Indians had eagerly awaited conversion for many years. Wenhold, “17th Century Letter,” 9.

28. De Hita Salazar to Queen, August 24, 1675, AGI 32-4-29/35, 5, ST; Royal Cédula to de Hita Salazar, June 20, 1676, AGI 34-4-29/35, ST.

29. Royal Cédula to Casa de Contratación, March 29, 1658, enclosure to Petition of Fray Alonso del Moral, endorsed September 24, 1676, AGI 54-5-20, 103, ST.

30. Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera to King, December 8, 1680, AGI 54-5-11, Woodbury Lowery Manuscripts, “. . . MSS, Florida,” vol. IX, Library of Congress; Royal Cédula to Cabrera, November 10, 1682, AGI 58-1-21, 352, NC-5, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.

icy and to support the missionaries from sources other than Florida's subsidy, which invariably arrived late and short of the prescribed amount. In their view, the greater the number of friars in the *dotación*, the fewer the number of soldiers, and thus the weaker the defenses. This local secular concern for the military strength of the colony rebutted the premise of the Spanish government, the Franciscans, and modern scholars that the mission system, as an agent of the Church and the state, teamed with the presidio to hold conquered districts and defend endangered frontiers. The royal concept of the missions as instruments of defense in the Indies was illustrated by the practice of charging their expenses, as well as those of the presidios, to the war ministry.³¹

By 1595, after Florida appeared secure, the Crown gradually had reduced the authorized personnel strength to a stabilized figure of 300. Although soldiers comprised the bulk of the garrison, the *dotación* usually also included, from 1615, forty-three Franciscans. At times widows, retired soldiers, and other militarily ineffectives also made up a part of the garrison's roster. The missionaries, who comprised the biggest block of non-military personnel, were considered to be occupying soldier spaces in the manning table and were supposed to receive soldier pay and support from the elusive *situado*. As the amount of the subsidy depended upon the size of the garrison, supposedly limited by the 300-man *dotación*, including the friars, military strength and support theoretically varied inversely as that of the padres.³²

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31. Matter, "Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions," 20, 22-24, 26, 31, 33-38; Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 24-25, 30, 35, 61, 118n, 119-20n; Sweett and Sheppy, *Spanish Missions of Florida*, 24; Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 67, 248-49; Bolton, *Wider Horizons*, 80-84, 109, 115, 124-25, 147. In a seeming exception to, or contradiction of, the premise that mission expenses were charged to the military budget, the King in 1651 wrote, perhaps rhetorically, that he maintained the presidio and soldiers in Florida to employ churchmen and augment the faith there, thereby including defense costs in an evangelical budget. Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI 54-5-14, 110, ST; Matter, "Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-century Florida Missions," 35-36.
32. Governor Juan de Salinas to King, November 20, 1618, AGI 54-5-10, 7, ST; Governor Luis de Rojas y Borja to Crown, February 11, 1624, AGI 53-2-11, ST; Horruytiner to King, November 15, 1633, AGI 54-5-10, 35, ST; Petition of Fray Juan Moreno, endorsed April 22, 1673, AGI 54-5-20, 99, ST; de Hita Salazar to Queen, June 15, 1675, AGI 32-4-29/35, 2, ST; Matter, "Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions," 35-38; Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 24-25, 133n; Matter, "Span-

A rare display of Franciscan agreement with gubernatorial defense requirements occurred in late 1606, when Philip III ordered Governor Pedro de Ibarra to eliminate the presidio at St. Augustine and reduce the number of Florida's soldiers to 150. The friars, fearing that pagan Indians would wipe out the missions if Spanish military strength were diminished so drastically, unconditionally backed the governor's protest, and the King withdrew the order.³³ However, until late in the seventeenth century, the usual Franciscan attitude toward the military, and the churchmen's concept of the broad scope of their work, were more aptly expressed by Father Francisco Pareja to Visitor General Fray Luís Gerónimo de Oré in 1614: "It seems to them [government officials] that the soldiers are the necessary ones . . . and that we are of no use, but we are the ones who bear the burden and heats, and who are the ones who are subduing and conquering the land."³⁴

The issue of military-religious strength priorities remained prominent during the next forty years of Crown-supported mission expansion, coupled with neglect of the military. For example, Governor Juan de Treviño Guillamas (1613-1618) complained about the excessive number of missionaries allotted to Florida and the resulting paucity of soldiers. He thought eight or ten religious, rather than the forty-three then assigned, would suffice, and he advocated reducing their number to augment his military strength.³⁵ Further, in 1621 Governor Juan de Salinas reported the actual strength of the Florida garrison as 250, including thirty-five Franciscans. He recommended it be increased to the authorized strength of 300, excluding the religious.³⁶ Meanwhile, the Franciscans asked the Crown for an increase of

ish Missions of Florida," 417-22; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 210-13; Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 5-6; Sweett and Sheppy, *Spanish Missions of Florida*, 22, 24; TePaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 6.

33. Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 208-12; Sweett and Sheppy, *Spanish Missions of Florida*, 39.

34. Oré, "Martyrs of Florida," 107. The Franciscans felt "with some justification that their work and their success in controlling the Indians made them . . . indispensable. . . ." At times they considered themselves a superior instrument of frontier defense than the military. During the first century of colonial Florida's existence, the Crown appeared to back the missionaries' contention. See Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 24-25.

35. Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 246-49.

36. Salinas to King, May 15, 1621, AGI 54-5-10, 11, ST.

thirty missionaries to a total of sixty-five to serve the growing number of Indian converts.³⁷

Again, reporting on the Apalachian rebellion of 1647, Florida's royal officials claimed there would be enough soldiers in the colony if the forty-three priests assigned were not included in the 300-man *dotación*.³⁸ Reacting to the revolt and influenced by the religious, the Crown in July 1648, raised the number of authorized Franciscans in Florida to seventy. However, in keeping with a 1646 royal decree the number of friars would not detract from a 300-man military *dotación*.³⁹ Nevertheless, subsequent reports continued to show forty-three Franciscans occupying spaces in the manning table.

Despite a flood of royal orders to strengthen Florida's defenses during the period 1668-1671, Governor Cendoya frequently complained of a shortage of infantry and reiterated the favorite reason of the governors for Florida's military weakness: "The 300 infantry spaces for the presidio included forty-three missionaries" and various other ineffective types. Cendoya requested that a reported 300-man *dotación* be confirmed and filled with effective military personnel, specifically excluding the Franciscans.⁴⁰ English depredations and Governor Cendoya's estimate of less than eighty effective soldiers among the 280 names on his roster as late as March 1672 provided the inspiration for his many requests for military reinforcements.⁴¹ A responding 1673 royal *cédula* ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to increase Florida's annual subsidy to support a total of 393 men, including the religious.⁴²

While the Florida missions were attaining their zenith, the concurrent short-sighted military policies led Spain to lose the first round in the struggle with England for the area now comprising the southeastern United States. Spain managed to do this without striking an effective blow. In 1670, reacting quickly to

37. Franciscans of Florida to King, September 1, 1621, AGI 53-2-11, ST.

38. Royal Officials of Florida to King, March 18, 1647, AGI 54-5-14, 105, ST.

39. Royal Cédula to Governor and Royal Officials of Florida, July 26, 1648, AGI 58-1-21.4, ST.

40. Cendoya to Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 13 A-B, ST.

41. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1671, AGI 58-2-3, 3, ST; March 24, 1672, AGI 58-1-25, 16 A-Abis.B., ST; December 20, 1672, AGI 54-2-3, 7 and 8, ST.

42. Royal Cédula to Viceroy of New Spain, February 28, 1673, AGI 58-1-21, 81, ST; Royal Cédula to Cendoya, February 28, 1673, AGI 58-1-21, 76, ST.

the founding of English Fort St. George just north of Santa Elena, Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega sent a small naval expedition against the intruders. A sudden storm dispersed his fleet, aborting the attack. Spanish failure to reinforce Florida prevented the governor from trying again, thus losing perhaps the best chance to stop the English advance.⁴³

In 1680 England's first major attack on Spanish Florida failed to take the mission of Santiago de Ocone on Jekyll Island in Guale, about thirty leagues north of St. Augustine.⁴⁴ But it soon resumed the offensive, this time successfully. A spirited defense by Captain Francisco de Fuentes, commanding five Spanish soldiers and forty Christian Indians, could not save Santa Catalina from a well-armed, English-led force of 300.⁴⁵ The Spaniards retreated southward, partly because of Indian desertions to the English who lured them with clothing and firearms.⁴⁶ English raids, aided by former Spanish-mission Indians, practically finished the missions north of the St. Marys River in 1683. Offering amazingly-little resistance, by 1686 Spain had lost all of Guale in an impotent six-year campaign.⁴⁷

Rising England did not stop its advance in Florida on declining Spain with the conquest of Guale. English-Indian attacks on mission towns in Timucua and Apalachee, beginning in earnest in 1685, resulted in the loss of those provinces too. Carolinian traders spearheaded the English penetration into the lightly-held interior.⁴⁸ During the period 1689-1691 a small Spanish block-

43. Cendoya to Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 13, ST; Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 65; Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 10.

44. Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 216.

45. Captain Francisco de Fuentes to Governor Cabrera, February 7, 1681, ACI 54-5-11, WL-9, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 216; Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 78. Fuentes had equipped sixteen Indians with firearms, and Salazar backed him in that rare Spanish act of issuing guns to Indian warriors. See also Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 19.

46. Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 24-26; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 216-20. An attempt by Cabrera to relocate Christian Gualeans to safer areas to the south also caused Indian desertions. Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 71-73.

47. Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 78; Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 25-31.

48. Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 177-84, 220-23; Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 6, 7, 34-36; Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 8-9, 11. Despite the loyalty and assistance rendered the Spaniards by some Christian Indians, the impact of the Carolinian traders on the frontier natives and the desertion of many Indians to the English invaders lend little support from colonial Florida to the

house in Apalachicola failed to regain a foothold in that western province. Most of the Lower Creek Indians there migrated eastward, closer to the English settlements in Carolina. From their new homeland the Creeks raided Spanish missions in Timucua and Apalachee, enriching Carolinian slave traders.⁴⁹ But in April 1696, Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala reported that the often-discussed fort at San Marcos de Apalachee was practically completed.⁵⁰ It proved to be poorly located to meet Carolinian attacks that came overland from the north and east rather than from the sea to the south.

Another Spanish effort at this time to strengthen their weakening hold on Florida ended in failure. Making the only major Franciscan attempt to convert South Florida, early in 1696 twenty friars from Spain, reportedly at the request of the natives, tried, without military support, to extend their mission field into the peninsula. An Indian revolt in October forced their withdrawal. Another abortive attempt in Calusa by six missionaries the following year ended Franciscan designs on South Florida.⁵¹

In 1701 the War of the Spanish Succession broke an uneasy peace between England and Spain. In America the conflict, known as Queen Anne's War, practically eliminated Spain's missions in Florida and reduced her rarely secure grip on the colony to St. Augustine and vicinity. That Spain was able to retain the capital, of course, was due in part to the Castillo de San Marcos and its outlying auxiliary defense lines, which by then

thesis that "missionaries counteracted foreign influence among their neophytes, deterred them from molesting the interior settlements, and secured their aid in holding back more distant tribes." Bolton, *Wider Horizons*, 125. See Chatelaine, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 24-25, 30, 58. Rather, it was the apparent military, economic, and demographic weakness of Spanish Florida's outlying regions that invited English-Indian attacks on the missions.

49. Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 35-37; Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 8-9; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 182-84.
50. Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala to King, April 15, 1696, in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 21. All subsequent documents cited from this source were translated by Boyd.
51. Crown to Franciscan Provincial and Definitorio of Florida, January 24, 1696, AGI 58-1-22, 355, ST, RI; Torres y Ayala to Crown, February 3, 1697, AGI 54-5-13, 101, ST, RI; Don Martín de Sierralta to Fray Francisco Herrero, June 5, 1698, AGI 58-1-22, 463, ST, RI; Torres y Ayala to Crown, September 19, 1699, AGI 54-5-13, 154, ST, RI.

had become one of the most formidable Spanish military installations in the Indies.⁵²

Queen Anne's War began in Florida in May 1702, when a band of Apalachicola Indians, reputedly led by an Englishman, burned the important Timucuan town of Santa Fé Governor José de Zúñiga y Cerda's punitive expedition of 800 Indian and Spanish soldiers was ambushed and decisively defeated by an English-led Creek army. As usual throughout the conflict, the bows and arrows of the Spanish Indians proved to be no match for the enemy-Indian firearms.⁵³

In the fall of 1702 Governor James Moore of South Carolina failed to take St. Augustine's *castillo*, and his siege of nearly two months was broken by a Spanish relief armada from Cuba. However, during the campaign Moore's land column wiped out the few remaining missions north of the St. Johns River, leveled St. Augustine, and ravaged the countryside.⁵⁴

Colonel Moore, replaced as governor by Sir Nathaniel Johnson, in January 1704, with fifty whites and 1,000 Indians, captured Nuestra Señora de la Purísima Concepción de Ayubale, one of the largest mission towns in Apalachee, after a stout defense by Indian converts under Fray Angel de Miranda. The next day Moore's army routed a rescue column of about thirty Spanish soldiers and 400 Apalachee Indians from San Luis de Talimali. The English commander then by-passed fortified San Luis but marched on other Apalachian towns.⁵⁵ A few months later Moore informed his governor that "Apalatchee [*sic*] is now reduced."⁵⁶ In a second report Moore boasted: "I . . . have killed, and taken as slaves 325 men, and have taken slaves 4,000 women and children. . . . All . . . with the loss of 4 whites and 15 Indians."⁵⁷

52. Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 71, 81; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 76; Chatelain, *Defenses of Spanish Florida*, 59, 75, 79, 82-84; Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 10, 16, 19.

53. Governor José de Zúñiga y Cerda to King, September 30, 1702, in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 36-38; Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 74; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 184-85.

54. Mark F. Boyd, trans., "The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXVI (April 1948), 346-52; Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 76-77; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 227-28.

55. Zúñiga y Cerda to King (extract), March 30, 1704; Colonel James Moore to Governor Sir Nathaniel Johnson, April 16, 1704 [?]; Moore to Lords Proprietors (extract), April 16, 1704, in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 49, 91-95.

56. Moore to Johnson, April 16, 1704 [?], *ibid.*, 93.

57. Moore to Lords Proprietors, April 16, 1704, *ibid.*, 94-95.

Fearing to leave St. Augustine defenseless, Governor Zúñiga did not send a relief column to Apalachee. His account of the battles and those of Spanish eyewitnesses contained incidents not reported by Moore: Many Spaniards and Christian Indians were tortured, mutilated, and burned at the stake. The raiders slashed the bodies of some captives and stuck burning splinters in the wounds. Spaniards charged that Catholic captives were skinned alive. Moore's alleged response to charges of inhumanity was that, as he had only eighty Englishmen and 1,500 Indians in his army, he could not prevent the atrocities.⁵⁸ Many of the remaining Christian Indians in Apalachee declared they were tired of waiting for Spanish aid that never came; they did not want to remain with the Spaniards and die. Further wholesale Spanish-Indian desertions followed.⁵⁹

In repeated raids in Apalachee in the years 1701-1704 the estimated number of Spanish Indians killed exceeded 3,000. By the end of that period the Apalachian population allegedly had shrunk from some 8,000 in fourteen villages to approximately 200 scattered in four locations. Governor Zúñiga ordered remaining Spaniards evacuated to St. Augustine. Indians who desired to leave would be welcome in the east. Only the village of Ivitachuco chose to seek Spanish protection.⁶⁰ Apalachee, the province of the Franciscans' greatest success in Florida, temporarily became a wilderness. Reportedly, within a year from the evacuation of the region, there were no traces of people, cattle, trails, or villages in that once-flourishing mission field.⁶¹

The province of Timucua, harrassed by the English since 1685, also suffered the fate of Guale and Apalachee. English-Indian allies devastated the remaining Timucuan missions in 1706. An unknown Carolinian wrote in 1710: "there remains not now, so much as one Village with ten Houses in it, in all Florida, that is subject to the Spaniards; nor have they any Houses or Cattle left, but such as they can protect by the Guns of their Castle of St. Augustine, that alone being now in their Hands,

58. Zúñiga y Cerda to King, February 3, 1704; March 30, 1704 (extract); Manuel Solana, Deputy of Apalachee, to Zúñiga, July 8, 1704; Extracts from the auto of an inquiry into the details of the Fathers in Apalachee, June 1705, *ibid.*, 48-54, 74-82.

59. Solana to Zúñiga y Cerda, July 8, 1704, *ibid.*, 54.

60. "[Record of] Council of War, San Agustín, July 13, 1704," *ibid.*, 56-58.

61. Admiral Landeche to Viceroy, August 11, 1705, *ibid.*, 82-84.

and which is continually infested by the perpetual Incursions of the Indians, subject to this Province."⁶²

Florida Governor Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, successor to Zúñiga, in 1706 or 1707 organized a company of cavalry to protect Spanish work details outside St. Augustine and the 300 Christian Indians camped nearby from English-led raids. Córcoles estimated from 10,000 to 20,000 Indians had been carried into slavery by the English by 1708.⁶³ The ruthless Carolinian neighbors and their Indian allies had dealt a mortal blow to the Spanish missions of Florida, indeed to the entire colony. Even the skeleton of their once-impressive mission chain— a few tiny Indian settlements in the shadow of San Marcos at St. Augustine — would be ravaged and vanish before little more than fifty years would pass.⁶⁴

Spanish inability to match English trade goods nullified most of the former's attempts to gain new Indian allies. Despite Indian requests for aid and protection against the English, the Spaniards could not deliver promised firearms and food, and thus they lost their opportunities for alliances which could have helped to restore Spanish Florida. Also, at a time when the distraught colony needed soldiers more than missionaries, the Crown continued abortive efforts to strengthen Florida by trying to rebuild the frontier mission system with insufficient military protection.⁶⁵

In 1762 Spain sided with France and Austria against England and Prussia in the Seven Years' War which had erupted in 1756. A heavily-reinforced bastion at St. Augustine, and a seemingly firm new alliance with former Indian antagonists, had brought Spanish Florida to a new pinnacle of military power. Ironically, at this time Spain handed the colony to England without a contest. The English had captured Havana in 1762, and Charles III

62. Crane, *Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 81.

63. Governor Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez to King, January 14, 1708, in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, *Here They Once Stood*, 90. See also Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 76.

64. Geiger, "Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans," 9; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 76-83.

65. TePaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 198-226; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 81-82; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 198-200, 231-34; Mark F. Boyd, "Diego Peña's Expedition to Apalachee and Apalachicola in 1716," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXVIII (July 1949), 1-27; "Documents Describing the Second and Third Expedition of Lieutenant Diego Peña to Apalachee and Apalachicola in 1717 and 1718," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXXI (October 1952), 109-39.

by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 ceded Florida to England in exchange for the Cuban port.⁶⁶

After strategic Florida seemed secure from foreign encroachment, conversion of the Indians overshadowed hard military realities. Although the missions helped to stabilize areas in which they were located, and seemed to be a relatively easy and inexpensive way to extend and maintain Spanish influence and authority over the frontier, they failed every major challenge to their rule. They neither prevented nor quelled numerous Indian rebellions nor attacks by neighboring pagans. Spanish soldiers, sometimes, aided by allied Indians, had to put down revolts and restore order to enable the friars to resume mission operations disrupted by the conflicts. The Indian uprisings reinforced the governors' contention that colonial security and sustained progress of the evangelical program depended upon sufficient military power. Above all, the mission system proved to be of no help in meeting the supreme test of the English conquest of the three main provinces of Florida.

The Spanish fantasy of considering the missionaries to be serving as soldiers defending the frontiers, in the face of contrary evidence, led to the ineffective substitution of Franciscan missions for properly-manned-and-located military garrisons. Spain's seeming reliance on the missions to control and defend the frontiers of Florida surely helped to divert it from establishing realistic defenses in the strategic colony.

Even when the Crown tardily realized the seriousness of the English designs and began to temper religious priorities with military considerations, it concentrated on that never-conquered, but immobile stone bastion, the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine, neglecting and fatally weakening the frontier provinces. The *castillo*, of course, protected nothing but its own garrison and the townspeople sheltered within its walls. For example, it did not prevent the sack of St. Augustine by Moore in 1702, nor did it prevent the English conquest of far-away Guale and Apalachee and nearby Timucua. Even the concept of its own impregnability did not stand up. Moore's siege of the bastion, for instance, was lifted by the timely arrival of a relief expedition

66. Matter, "Spanish Missions of Florida," 305-07; TePaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 154-57, 223-35; Gannon, *Cross in the Sand*, 82-83; Sweett and Sheppy, *Spanish Missions of Florida*, 47.

from Cuba, averting the starvation of the defending, or entrapped, garrison. However, the fortress did enable the Spaniards to retain a foothold in Florida by providing them a strong refuge until help arrived.

Despite Franciscan protests, an adequate defense of Florida depended upon strong, properly-deployed-and-supported mobile Spanish military contingents and armed, trained Indian allies. If Spain was unable or unwilling to provide such forces to relatively-unimportant Florida on the edge of its empire, it should have carried out at least one of the numerous plans for colonizing the region if it desired to hold it. Settlement of the colony could have provided a significant, largely self-sufficient militia to reinforce their small nuclei of professional soldiers and Indian allies—the military policy successfully employed by their victorious English opponents. The Spanish failure to settle and develop Florida was the major contribution to their inability to contain or defeat the English aggression.

Effective Franciscan opposition to adequate military security and to the settlement of Florida significantly fostered the colony's fatal military and economic weakness.⁶⁷ Preoccupied with their evangelical work, the friars shortsightedly obstructed the development of a strong colony. The Franciscan position, echoed by a vacillating Crown, led to the downfall of their own mission sys-

67. Though some of the early Franciscans, and at least one late in the seventeenth century, evidenced interest in Spanish colonists settling Florida, the opposition of many friars to the establishment of Spanish agricultural enterprises in the colony counters Bolton's contention that missions and presidios were "nuclei around which ranchers settled." Neither did effective Franciscan opposition to an adequate military posture in Florida firmly support Bolton's premise that "to afford protection for missionaries and mission Indians, as well as to hold the frontier against savages and foreigners, presidios, or garrisons, were established near by [the missions]" or that generally the friars demanded military aid and objected only to "unsuitable soldiers." Nor did the Florida story confirm the thesis that missions "served also as a means of defense of the king's domains" or that they "designedly or incidentally" promoted frontier occupation. See Bolton, *Wider Horizons*, 82-83, 119, 124, 130-31, 147. See also Geiger, *Franciscan Conquest of Florida*, 146, 151-53, 244-46; Lanning, *Spanish Missions of Georgia*, 174-75, 219; Franciscans of Florida to King, September 10, 1657, AGI 54-5-20, 72, WL-7, trans. by Lawson, SAHS; June 16, 1664, AGI 54-5-18, 64, ST; Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI 54-5-14, 110, ST; "Residencia by Governor Rebolledo of Governor Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla, and other officials," 1656, AI Escribania de Cámara, *legajo* 155, no. 11 (new *legajo* division 155B), ST; Governor Rebolledo to King, October 18, 1657, AGI 54-5-18, 52, ST; October 18, 1657, AGI 58-1-26, 4, ST.

tem and the loss of Florida. Unable to prevent or defeat periodic Indian uprisings, and helpless against savage English-Indian incursions, the Florida missions failed to support the thesis that missions were an effective instrument of frontier defense.⁶⁸ Did unprotected, militarily-challenged mission systems elsewhere fare any better?

68. Bolton, *Wider Horizons*, 80-84, 109-10, 115-19, 123-28, 130-31, 147.