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## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menendez de Aviles and the Spanish Conquest of 1565-1568.* By Eugene Lyon. (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1976. 253 pp. Preface, notes, epilogue, appendixes, glossary, bibliography, index. \$10.00.)

This book represents a significant turning point in colonial Florida studies. Heretofore the founding years of Spanish Florida have been described in terms of nationalism, war, and religion. One was aware that Pedro Menendez de Aviles and his successors were zealous patriots, that the adelantado slew hundreds of enemy French on the beaches south of St. Augustine, and that Spanish theology looked with special favor on the Spanish state, while the state returned the favor. Now for the first time the founding years, from 1565 to 1568, have been sketched against the background of commerce. Eugene Lyon has given us the first entrepreneurial history of Menendez and La Florida. It is a magisterial work. No one is more familiar with the Florida documents in the archives of Seville, Simancas, and Madrid than this accomplished scholar. Through careful examination and comparison of the extant manuscripts, Dr. Lyon has discovered a Menendez somewhat different from the man who previously and variously has been depicted as swashbuckler, daredevil, demagogue, and saint-fanatic. Lyon's Menendez is a businessman. Among the adelantado's many original motives for undertaking the settlement of Florida, uppermost, one would suspect from Lyon's data, was his intention to develop here a rich commercial empire based on mining and agriculture. Menendez desired to be Florida's first great land developer, industrialist, and agribusinessman. Quite the most remarkable demonstration of Menendez's primary motives for conquering Florida is Lyon's revelation that, at the time he signed the *asiento*, or contract, with the king establishing the Florida expedition, neither he nor the king was aware of the French settlement of Fort Caroline on the St. Johns. Earlier writers, the reviewer included, knowing of Phillip II's reluctance to venture further into a Florida that had vanquished

four would-be conquistadors, have assigned the reason for the king's change of mind, and for Menendez's brave words and actions, to the receipt of intelligence about Laudonniere's intimidating trespass on Spanish soil. Not so, Lyon says; Menendez and Phillip signed their agreement on March 15, 1565. First news of the French fort and settlement did not reach Seville until March 26, 1565. True enough, in view of that shocking report, royal aid in the form of troops and supplies was added to the expedition, but Florida was not conceived in the beginning as a battlefield; it was regarded as a commercial enterprise, and one whose costs would be borne principally by Menendez himself. Dr. Lyon explains the elaborate system of the adelantamiento in the Spanish Indies, and details the manner in which Menendez was required to underwrite the expense as well as the risk of conquest in exchange for his license and privileges in the Carrera de Indias. There were long negotiations involving, at various times, the Council of the Indies, the Casa de Contratacion (Board of Trade), private bankers, such as Pedro del Castillo, a relative, and with other family members. Indeed, in the end, the Florida commercial monopoly became the business of some nine major Asturian families, all of whom were closely interrelated by blood and marriage, and from whose members Menendez drew most of his chief military and civil subordinates.

The results, of course, were not what the Menendez clan expected. Although the adelantado succeeded—and better than some historians would prefer—in expelling the French interlopers, and although he did build a city that would last, and conducted valuable interior and coastal surveys, etc., the commercial goals of his venture fell far short of achievement. Lyon suggests several reasons: too large an initial investment; no discoveries of precious metals, gems, or minerals; failure to grow adequate crops in sandy soil; loss of ships; fraudulent and corrupt practices by minor officials; and general ineffectiveness of Menendez's Indian policy. In 1573, one year before his death, frustrated by attempts to deal successfully with Indians in South Florida, the adelantado asked royal permission to enslave them and be rid of them.

Ruling in a lawsuit brought by collateral heirs to obtain benefices from the adelantado's estate, the Council of the Indies concluded in 1633 that Pedro Menendez had faithfully fulfilled his part of the contract. Thus, despite broken dreams of landed

estates, pacific Indians, and prosperous merchants, the enterprise of Florida at last received the state seal of approval.

This book makes an extremely valuable contribution to our knowledge of Florida's beginnings. Although its scope is limited, and it does not treat the many other aspects of Menendez's adventure in quite the detail one might wish to see, it provides a better understanding of Menendez the entrepreneur than we have seen before or are likely to see again-given the years required to prepare it-in the foreseeable future. In this reviewer's judgment it will stand for this century as the classic of its genre.

*University of Florida*

MICHAEL V. GANNON

*Florida Politics in the Gilded Age, 1877-1893.* By Edward C. Williamson. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976. x, 234 pp. Preface, maps, conclusion, notes, bibliography, index. \$8.00.)

This is a study in depth of sixteen critical years in Florida politics. Only during the preceding era of Radical Republican Reconstruction do we find a revival with as much confusion and upheaval. In the years after 1876, the Democrats succeeded by hook or crook in eliminating the blacks, most of them ex-slaves, and the Republican party from any role of importance in state government. They put the stamp of Bourbonism on the state for a century at least, conservatism in everything-unrestricted development and management of the state's resources by private interests, low taxes, limited public services, and little interference with freedom of action by individual or corporation in the conduct of his business or personal affairs.

This process put the two-party system under a very severe strain and produced some strange political alliances. There were far more differences among Floridians than there were parties to represent them. The Democrats had the Civil War issues and white supremacy on their side, and joined by former Whigs who might otherwise have been Republicans, they stood together and triumphed, first by the use of fraud and intimidation, and finally by constitutional and legislative action.

It is not so much that any new thesis is advanced by Professor Williamson. The general features of political life in that genera-

tion are well established. What we have here is a fully documented account of how it all came about in Florida. The leadership and the techniques are identified. This study has been a long time in the making. The author published his first article in the *Florida Historical Quarterly* on a phase of it more than thirty years ago. He has continued his interest in the subject and has incorporated findings of other scholars, all of which adds breadth as well as depth to the account.

If readers are somewhat overwhelmed and sometimes confused by the weight of the data, it is but another measure of the confusion of political activity in the period. This is rightly called grass roots politics, for in the Democratic party of that day, county organizations controlled the action rather than any of the gubernatorial figures. In contrast the Republican leadership came mostly at the state level.

Partly because the blacks are central to any understanding of the politics of the period, partly because of the new interest in their history during the last three or four decades, Williamson's is the fullest account of the role of the former slaves in Florida politics after Reconstruction. Deserted by the Hayes administration, dependent upon carpetbag leadership that lacked unity and status and financial backing, and forced by circumstances to work on the land of their former owners, most of whom were Democrats, blacks had little chance of being heard.

Williamson has chosen the convict lease system as the measure of the Bourbon regard for human rights. The roots of this nefarious practice were in the preceding Republican era, but the Bourbons embraced it fully, and it persisted until the early 1920s. There was little but lip service to any kind of social or political reform on the part of the leadership and little demand for it on the part of the rank and file. Anything that cost the taxpayers money was eschewed by one and all. In spite of the emphasis upon issues that divided them, the whites in the Democratic party were in full agreement upon many issues. They wished economical and laissez faire government. This meant scant support for the nascent public school system, created on paper at least by the Radical Republicans. They both wanted railroads and development. They differed only in that small farmers wanted land at little or no cost and regulation of railroad rates and services rather than favors to northerners like Hamilton

Disston and the railroad companies. It should not be overlooked that Bourbons found little difficulty voting with Republicans on issues of land disposal and railroads. Small wonder that the programs of Independents and Populists had little appeal to the small farmers who probably should have opposed the Bourbons more than they did.

Students who wish to understand the roots of Florida politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, only now being changed by the growth of urbanism, industry, and the immigration of non-Southerners, have a gold mine in Williamson's book. Incidentally, Bourbonism is far from dead in 1978. If the Democrats choose too liberal candidates now as they once did with Independents and Populists, many Florida conservatives will vote Republican as they did for Claude Kirk against Robert King High in 1966.

*Springfield, Georgia*

CHARLTON W. TEBEAU

*Oglethorpe in America.* By Phinizy Spalding. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. xi, 207 pp. Preface and acknowledgments, map, epilogue, notes, bibliography, index. \$12.50.)

This study of Oglethorpe's American career is in many ways a model monograph. Lucidly written, carefully argued, and unpretentious, it displays a remarkable mastery of a rich primary and secondary literature, is effectively organized, and, most impressive of all, is laudably concise. Eschewing the temptation to present "a complete account" of the subject, a temptation that most historians seem to find irresistible, the author rigorously focuses upon the main questions and excludes all unnecessary detail. The result is as good a book as is presently available on the role of any of the main founding figures of the colonies, except perhaps for Edmund S. Morgan's excellent study of John Winthrop.

Concentrating primarily upon the question of whether Oglethorpe "was really worthy" of the extraordinary "admiration accorded him" by contemporaries and many later historians, the volume provides a careful assessment of both Oglethorpe's character and his accomplishments and failures. The portrait that emerges is of an aggressive, ambitious, self-confident man of

"astonishing energy" and "immense dedication," a bachelor who made his work his life and whose commitment to Georgia was so deep that, to meet public expenses, he unhesitatingly over the years advanced over 90,000 pounds of his personal fortune, a sum that was not finally repaid until 1792. "Spiritually fastidious" and austere in his living habits, he was animated by challenges and "thrived on the stresses of a new environment." He found it "no hardship to live as his colonists did," for which he won their almost total approval. Broadly compassionate, he had "an almost naive faith that the environment" could "make, or remake, a man." Unmethodical, vain, an easy prey to flattery, extremely sensitive to any affront to his personal or his colony's honor, he was unable either to delegate authority or always to distinguish the important from the trivial.

The American career of this "complex and many-faceted" man, the author argues, was on the whole "positive and fruitful." Oglethorpe's reluctance to share power left the colony without a secure civil structure, his inexperience contributed to the disastrous expedition against St. Augustine in 1740, and his failure to put more stress upon the development of the Indian trade and forest industries helped to insure the failure of some of the primary objectives of the Georgia experiment. Against these failures, however, the author balances a much longer list of successes: Oglethorpe's choice of superior locations for his main settlements, his scrupulously fair treatment of the Indians which left the Spaniards "with only the Yamasees as reliable allies," his vigorous and effective resistance to the Spanish invasion of Georgia in 1742, and his unflagging moral and spiritual leadership all helped to insure Georgia's "existence as a distinct and contributing province inside the [British] Empire."

Challenging the currently fashionable view that Georgians under the Trustees were, in Daniel Boorstin's words, "victims of philanthropy," the author denies that the effort, so militantly supported by Oglethorpe, to avoid some of the social mistakes of other colonies—notably South Carolina—by excluding lawyers, Roman Catholics, rum, slavery, and Africans was foredoomed to failure by "the impersonal laws of economics or by any other factor." He admits that Oglethorpe's "principles . . . were too demanding for the average man" and that the intruding presence of the economically successful slave society of South Carolina just

across the Savannah River constituted an almost irresistible model for economically ambitious Georgians. But, he suggests, it was not the utopian character of the Trustee's vision that prevented its realization but mundane factors such as the Spanish menace, which early forced Oglethorpe to subordinate social to military considerations, and the resulting neglect of the Indian trade and other economic activities that might have brought a modest prosperity without slavery. Such counterfactual arguments are always difficult to sustain, but this particular one is made with sufficient cogency to remind us once again of the dangers of assuming that what happened was inevitable.

*The Johns Hopkins University*

JACK P. GREENE

*Colonial Georgia, A History.* By Kenneth Coleman. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976. xvii, 331 pp. Editor's introduction, preface, illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. \$15.00.)

This work is one of the thirteen volumes of *A History of The American Colonies* commissioned by Charles Scribner's Sons on the eve of America's Bicentennial celebration. According to the general editors, Milton Klein and Jacob Cooke, the series "seeks to synthesize the new research, to treat social, economic, and cultural as well as political developments, and to delineate the broad outlines of each colony's history during the years before independence" (p. xii). Coleman has carried out his assignment with varying degrees of success. His synthesis of the main outlines of Georgia's colonial past encompasses in succinct and clear narrative both the old and new scholarship, yet his emphasis focuses on political and economic developments at the expense of the social and cultural. The most important contribution which this book makes is its broad overview of Georgia's colonial years. Teachers of Georgia history will welcome it as a supplement to their reading lists; students will find it a well-written, generally fast-moving introduction; and general readers will find it equally attractive.

Coleman is most successful in the first half of his book which treats the Trustee period (1733-1752). He handles well the settlement of the colony, the nature of its philanthropic background, the nature of government and economic development

under the Georgia Trust, and the impact of James Oglethorpe and George Whitefield. He goes out of his way to counter the old image of Georgia as a colony settled by debtors, a mistaken historical impression corrected by Albert Saye in *New Viewpoints in Georgia History*. Somewhat fresher is the question of Whitefield's motives in founding Bethesda orphanage. Coleman argues that Bethesda came into being less because of the need for a new institution to care for orphans and more to fill Whitefield's own desire for a base of operations outside the control of the Anglican church.

The second half of this study is devoted to the royal period of Georgia's history (1754-1782). As Coleman indicates in his brief bibliography (p. 315) the "royal period has not aroused as much interest as the Trustee period." Nor does Coleman compensate for the weakness in the secondary literature. In a work specifically spawned by the Bicentennial it seems strange to find that the prelude to Independence and the subsequent events of the Revolution should be compressed into a descriptive narrative with so little reflective analysis. Still to be answered are the important questions: who the Tories were and why Governor James Wright was unable to hold Georgia in the Loyalist column; who the Whigs were and why they split among themselves.

*University of South Carolina*

DAVID R. CHESNUTT

*The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, Volume 1, December 1766-December 1776.* Edited by Richard K. Showman, Margaret Cobb, and Robert E. McCarthy. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976. liii, 411 pp. Foreword, introduction, acknowledgments, history of Greene's papers, editorial method, glossary, chronology, notes, maps, index. \$17.95.)

Historians of the Revolutionary era, of Rhode Island, and of Georgia will be glad to see this project underway. The great majority of the Greene correspondence, some 10,000 items, which is to be published has already been assembled. About one-fourth of the documents will be printed in full; the rest will be calendared. When the series has been completed, a microfilm edition of all the documents is planned. To this reviewer, it seems that the editors have done a very thorough searching job.

In his introduction, Editor Showman sets forth the editorial aims. First is the desire to transcribe the papers as faithfully as possible. This reviewer, also engaged in editing eighteenth-century documents, knows this is not an easy job. Next the editors, through their very helpful footnotes, try to make the documents intelligible to the reader. In a sense, this puts the reader in the place of the original recipient, but it often goes beyond this. The editors also point out errors in the documents and try to provide continuity by filling gaps between the documents. All in all, the editors have done a fine job according to the canons of modern historical editing.

It is not the editing but the documents themselves which show what sort of person Nathanael Greene was. In the early 1770s Greene, in correspondence with a young friend, Samuel Ward, Jr., a student in Rhode Island College, sounds much more like a teenager than a thirty-year-old man. This shows Greene's immaturity in writing and his desire to impress young Ward, whom he undoubtedly considered his intellectual and social superior and whose formal education he probably envied. Here are the great ideals and dreams of a youth, rather than the practical knowledge of a young businessman. Other early documents concern the iron business in which the Greene family was engaged. Throughout the book there are family letters with his wife, brothers, aunts, uncles, and cousins. About one-fifth of the volume consists of documents before Greene's military career began.

By June 1775, Greene and his Rhode Island troops were in the Boston area opposing the British. In April 1776, the American army moved to the New York area anticipating the coming of the British. By early December Greene was in New Jersey. The volume ends with the capture of Trenton on Christmas Day.

Much of the army correspondence is routine and is concerned with food, supplies, discipline, and military maneuvers. There is a little discussion of long range plans and military philosophy. This correspondence reveals several things about Greene. He was concerned with military discipline and the welfare of his soldiers. He wanted to secure the independence of the United States. After his military career began, Greene showed an increasing feeling of competence, though he never claimed to be a military expert and always deferred to George Washington as a competent superior

and a man whom he admired. Greene corresponded with three members of the Continental Congress-President John Hancock, John Adams, and Rhode Island delegate Samuel Ward, Sr.-and with Governor Nicholas Cooke of Rhode Island. He wrote of his ideas about the army, the military, and the United States and its destiny, including references to the necessity of independence as early as December 1775. These letters show considerably more maturity and belief in his abilities than those written in 1770.

The editors, the Rhode Island Historical Society, and several other sponsors are to be commended for such a fine volume. We can only look forward with keen anticipation to the subsequent volumes in the series.

*University of Georgia*

KENNETH COLEMAN

*This Affair of Louisiana.* By Alexander DeConde. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976. x, 325 pp. Acknowledgment, preface, illustrations, map, notes, bibliographical essay, index. \$12.50.)

As Professor DeConde explains in his preface, this study is an interpretive synthesis which offers speculative analysis. His thesis is that an expansionist Anglo-American ethos, rooted in the colonial experience, was present in the early years of the United States. Moreover, a "pious imperialism" already existed at the time of the Louisiana Purchase. Taking issue with the traditional interpretation of the acquisition of Louisiana, which claims that it came from Europe's distress or inevitable destiny, DeConde regards it to have resulted from a conscious desire for expansion. True to his word, he maintains this thesis throughout the book. In his conclusion, "The Imperial Thrust," he calls the early desire for expansion in this country's history imperialism. This is at variance with the "conventional wisdom," which he maintains has long held that until the mid-nineteenth century Americans were a peaceful people who expanded their nation by chance, were filled with a sense of mission to extend the blessings of democracy, and sought to build an empire for liberty and not for the exploitation of others. Modern scholarship, however, has all but demolished this view.

*This Affair of Louisiana* begins with the French establishment of Louisiana, Spain's feeble hold of it in the last third of the eighteenth century, and the American penetration of the province in people and commerce. When France regained Louisiana, Americans became alarmed at the prospect of a strong nation defending it instead of a declining Spain. Already American expansionists viewed the acquisition of Louisiana as desirable. Jefferson's bid to purchase New Orleans resulted in Bonaparte's unexpected offer to sell all of Louisiana, an offer which could not be refused nor did any American want to. The expansionists next concluded that Louisiana's boundaries were virtually limitless and encompassed West Florida and Texas, although it was clear that at the time of the purchase West Florida was not a part of Louisiana and the claim to Texas tenuous. The last third of the book examines Jefferson's hawkish efforts to coerce Spain into surrendering West Florida. For their part, the Spaniards recognized the American "lust for land" as early as the American Revolution. As a waning power under Charles IV, Spain usually was no more than a pawn in the machinations of Bonaparte, but which still occasionally arched its back in defiance of its questionable French ally and asserted itself against a covetous American neighbor.

Professor DeConde has presented a well-written book filled with convincing arguments. While it is the product of secondary sources and published documents, it contains an extensive bibliographical essay which covers thirty-five pages. Although it is a good book and a welcome addition to the Louisiana Purchase literature, a few things in the mind of this reviewer could have improved it. Citation of all the material used in the text, instead of only quotations, would have made it more valuable. DeConde also displays some unfamiliarity with the French and Spanish periods of Louisiana where a number of minor errors crop up, including his reference to Manuel Gayoso de Lemos as simply Lemos despite Jack D. L. Holmes's book title to guide him. Finally, while the quotations help to enliven the narration, in some places they appear excessive.

Nevertheless, *This Affair of Louisiana* is a fascinating book which should make the defenders of the traditional interpretation of the growth of the United States, if there are any left, take notice. For those of us who have followed events from the Span-

ish side and have seen Spain's attempts to defend its borderlands against American claims, we can only applaud DeConde for "telling it like it was."

Fort Lewis College

GILBERT C. DIN

*The Diary of Edmund Ruffin, Volume II, The Years of Hope, April, 1861-June, 1863.* Edited by William Kauffman Scarborough, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976. xxxv, 706 pp. Introduction, genealogy, chronology, maps, notes, illustrations, index. \$35.00.)

For Edmund Ruffin the supreme tragedy of his life was that the dissolution of the Union, toward which he had devoted his entire adult career, came too late for him to play an active role in the affairs of the new nation. Physical infirmities and advanced age not only incapacitated the South's most fervent secessionist from serving the Confederacy in a political or military position, but also prevented him from employing his talents as a propagandist in the cause of southern independence. Consequently, the wartime entries in Ruffin's *Diary* are inherently less valuable than those written during the active period of his life. Nevertheless, the record of his observations and reflections written during this critical period is full of human interest, and not entirely without value to Civil War historians.

Perhaps Ruffin's most valuable historical contributions in Volume II of his *Diary* are concerned with his experiences as a planter of northern Virginia. Although he earlier had turned his plantations and slaves over to his sons, Ruffin continued to take an intense personal interest in the operation of these landholdings. Visiting them frequently, and sometimes taking charge of their management temporarily, Ruffin himself experienced and recorded the tribulations of planters caught in an active theater of military operations. When trusted slaves defected to the Federals, virtually ending cultivation of the Ruffin lands, he concluded, earlier than most observers, that economic collapse was a greater danger for the Confederacy than military defeat.

In addition to first-hand accounts of the affairs of his family, Ruffin recorded his own experiences and observations related directly to the war in Virginia. Being passionately interested in the

South's military efforts, Ruffin used his fame as a southern Founding Father to gain admission to military units and installations which normally would have been barred to a civilian. He was present, nominally as a volunteer private of Virginia militia but actually as an honored V.I.P., at the first Battle of Manassas, where he observed the fighting from a strategic height overlooking the battlefield, and he was allowed to accompany the South Carolina Palmetto Guards when they marched after the retreating Union army. He also was an observer at the critical Battle of Seven Pines, where he narrowly escaped injury when a shell burst nearby. Having the means and leisure to travel, Ruffin visited a wide variety of fortifications, arsenals, and other military establishments, but having no eye for detail he did not leave much of interest to historians.

Most of Ruffin's *Diary* in the 1862-1863 period is composed of entries giving his reactions to news of military events reaching him second or third hand by way of newspapers and conversations with supposedly informed individuals. These entries are so numerous that they could be used to test the reliability of information reaching Richmond civilians. Similarly, the *Diary* reflected the rise and fall of civilian morale with the ebb and flow of the Confederate war effort.

Professor Scarborough has edited the second volume of Ruffin's *Diary* with the same thoroughness that characterized the initial volume. As a result, non-professional readers interested in the history of the Civil War will find themselves infected by the excitement of the time even as Ruffin was himself.

*Florida State University*

JOHN HEBRON MOORE

*A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedmen's Rights, 1861 to 1866.* By Herman Belz. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976. xv, 199 pp. Preface, introduction, notes, bibliography, index. \$16.95.)

Many years ago, the late Allan Nevins reminded us of the duality of the problem besetting Americans in the 1850s and 1860s. Not only slavery, Nevins argued, but the concomitant problem of race adjustment, lay at the root of the Civil War. Now, in *A New Birth of Freedom*, Herman Belz has traced the

tortuous path by which American politicians came to grips with slavery and the problem of race adjustment between 1861 and 1866; or, as he himself puts it, "how emancipation that was undertaken for military reasons gave rise to federal policies protecting the liberty and rights of freed slaves and how these policies eventually led to the civil rights settlement of 1866." The focus is on the Congress and on the federal government in general-for Belz correctly argues that the major outcome of the debates over the blacks' status and rights was the emergence of new concepts of citizenship and civil liberties and federal authority to prevent infringement in these areas.

The path he traces begins with the Confiscation Acts of 1861-1862. Initially, he argues, emancipation had a pragmatic aim-the elimination of slaves as rebel property and the denial to southern forces of the considerable manpower represented by the slave population. The Second Confiscation Act of 1862 provided, for example, for the emancipation of certain slaves, but it made no provision for guaranteeing the liberty or rights of these blacks. Those who recognized the need for permanent safeguards to freedmen's liberties were content to shelve the problems involved until military events forced the issue.

The use of blacks in the Union forces pushed Republicans further along the road to grappling with the issue of what freedom meant and what safeguards might be erected to bolster black liberties after the conflict. By tradition, military service had carried with it the connotation of citizenship, and citizenship, in turn, presupposed the guarantee of certain rights. Yet blacks had been excluded from full citizenship by the implications of the Taney opinion in the Dred Scott case. Did military service grant citizenship? Were blacks full citizens? Did citizenship bring with it political equality, or were the rights it conferred more restricted? The conscription measures enacted in 1863 and 1864 stopped short of declaring blacks citizens, but they explicitly recognized them as subject to national law, as full persons within the constitutional meaning of that term. Citizenship now came to embrace all persons born or naturalized within the United States, whatever their color. It did not convey equality in the twentieth-century sense of that term-but it did impart certain crucial rights, which Republican congressmen now argued were automatically extended to blacks: free speech, freedom of the press,

free exercise of religion, the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. But citizenship stopped short of guaranteeing full participation in the political process.

Most important for the future, Belz argues, was the doctrine emerging by 1863-1864 that no state law could deny any person the rights of national citizenship. Republicans would never deny state citizenship, but they were increasingly convinced that states could and must be prevented from treading on the rights of national citizens as they had done in the case of blacks before the war. Initially, the concern was more pragmatic than humanitarian-and throughout the conflict it grew as much out of internal struggles for control among Republicans as out of concern for the welfare of blacks. But as northern troops advanced further into the South, this concern became the linchpin around which turned the controversy over Reconstruction. How could the liberties of blacks best be protected? What modifications would be necessary in the federal system and within the southern states? And what intervention would be necessary on the part of the North? By 1864, events in Louisiana had convinced at least some Republicans that protection of freedmen's liberties could not safely be left to southern Unionists. Though the Wade-Davis bill never became law, Belz argues, it was of the utmost significance. It marked a new departure in northern approaches to guaranteeing the liberties of citizens. Though it left enforcement responsibility with the states, it guaranteed blacks the right to sue for their freedom through writ of habeas corpus. And, for the first time, it legislated at the national level the principle of intra-state equality for blacks. The importance of this new approach for subsequent legislation was great. If the debates over the Freedman's Bureau underscored the limited and tentative nature of northern commitment to intervention in the South, and the preference for a laissez-faire approach with minimal outside intervention and guarantees against "reverse discrimination" vis-a-vis the blacks, the outlines of policies to be laid down in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were nonetheless emerging by 1864.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment were, Belz believes, the culmination of wartime thinking on blacks, citizenship, and the rights of the freedmen. The Thirteenth Amendment had abolished slavery and had stripped from

the states the right to reimpose it. But Republicans had not seen this measure as altering fundamentally state-federal relations. By 1865-1866, Belz argues, the Republicans' anger over treatment of blacks in the South had advanced the argument further. The real issue now became not whether blacks would be granted certain rights, but whether state or federal governments would have the authority to legislate in this area. Also at issue was the nature of citizenship; Republicans now argued that citizenship was dual, that it was "coterminous and cooperative rather than bifurcated and conflicting." The legislation of 1866 did not tell the states what rights to confer on their citizens; rather, it said that any rights conferred must be conferred equally on all. And, since blacks were citizens, the choice left the states was to strip whites of their rights or extend them to blacks.

The wartime debates and the extension of the definition of citizenship and the authority of the federal government in the "settlement" of 1866, Belz argues, set the stage for subsequent efforts on behalf of the freedmen. Never mind, he suggests, that the commitment to black rights was limited in scope, or that Republicans often seemed as motivated by their desire to protect white refugees in the South as to aid the freedmen. Never mind that the extension of rights in theory did not guarantee the existence of those rights in practice, or that enforcement proved defective and the northern presence in the South was temporary. C. Vann Woodward reminded us years ago that Reconstruction, as twentieth-century civil libertarians would have had it work, would have been impossible for nineteenth-century politicians; the conception of federal power was simply too restrictive, and the machinery for enforcing what legislation was enacted and what guarantees were made was defective. The significance, Belz argues, lies not in the failure, but in the positive accomplishment: the extension of definitions of citizenship and federal power which have formed the basis for the twentieth-century revolution in civil rights and set the stage for federal excursions into social planning and welfare.

In all of this, Belz has made a major contribution. His view of the debates—restricted as it is largely to the Congress and the public press—tends to be narrow, and many will judge that he underplays the humanitarian concern for blacks shared by a substantial group of Republican congressmen. Others will argue that his

preoccupation with events in the South neglects the complicating factor for northern congressmen of black rights in the North and the limits they were pressured by their constituents to set to those rights. But this remains a substantial book, which provides welcome elucidation of points central to the nature of wartime and early post-war civil rights measures and to the nature of federal-state relations.

*Duke University*

ELIZABETH STUDLEY NATHANS

*Joseph E. Brown of Georgia.* By Joseph H. Parks. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. x, 612 pp. Acknowledgments, notes, illustrations, bibliographical essay, index. \$35.00.)

When in 1857 Joseph Emerson Brown was chosen as the Democratic nominee for governor of Georgia, Robert Toombs inquired: "And who in the Devil is Joe Brown?" The nominee, a north Georgian of humble origins, was not as well known as Toombs, Cobb, Alexander Stephens, and other prominent contemporaries, but his successful campaign for governor in 1857 marked the beginning of an upward course that made him for many years the most influential man in Georgia. He also became the most controversial Georgian of his time. As governor during the Civil War he was involved in a conflict with the Confederate administration that greatly impaired southern morale and gave much aid and comfort to the Union. After the war he aligned himself with Republicans in support of Congressional Reconstruction. With the decline of Republican rule he switched back to the Democrats and later spent ten years in the United States Senate. During every stage of his public life he made money from sound investments and shrewd management, and eventually he became a wealthy man.

Joseph H. Parks, in this volume published by the Louisiana State University Press in its distinguished Southern Biography Series, treats the enigmatic and turbulent Georgian with admirable balance and skill. He faults Brown for provincialism, shiftiness, stubbornness, opportunism, and excessive concern for power. But he credits him with intelligence, energy, initiative, courage, determination, and a sincere interest in the welfare of the masses.

In his treatment of Brown as war governor, Professor Parks commends him for his enthusiasm in raising and equipping troops at the beginning of the conflict and for his effort throughout the war to meet the needs of the common soldiers and their families. He is strongly critical of the extremes to which Brown went in resisting conscription, impressment, and the suspension of the habeas corpus. Referring to Brown's message to the Georgia legislature of March 10, 1864, Parks states: "He openly opposed every major piece of legislation passed during the recent session of Congress. . . . Brown's charge of conspiracy on the part of the Confederate Congress and the president to deprive the states and their people of their rights was false and he knew it. . . . The governor himself was power hungry and he resented any encroachment upon his realm. . . . Had he himself been president, his dictatorial actions would have dwarfed those of Davis."

However, Professor Parks points out that Brown's condemnation of the Confederate government was based in large part on a genuine lack of confidence in the president's leadership and a sincere belief that Jefferson Davis was much more concerned about the safety of Virginia than about the security of Georgia. The author sums up Brown's role as war governor with the comment: "There could be no doubt but that Joe Brown was eager to promote what he considered the best interests of the people and state of Georgia. His honesty and integrity were beyond question. The degree to which he was loyal and patriotic depended upon one's definition of those terms." This seems to be a fair conclusion.

Concerning Brown's postwar career, which he treats as fully as his earlier life, Parks states: "Those less successful often accused him of being unscrupulous and dishonest, yet no action of his was ever proved illegal. He took advantage of opportunities. . . . When the path turned, he turned. In his late years he became something of a patriarch. . . . Enemies were fewer . . . and he was content with his accomplishments and contributions."

Doubtless some readers will consider the author overly generous in his estimate of Brown. But they can hardly question his effort to be fair in his judgment, and they will find much to commend in his thoroughness of research, his clarity of style, and the completeness of his portraiture.

*Vendetta: A True Story of the Worst Lynching in America, the Mass Murder of Italian-Americans in New Orleans in 1891, the Vicious Motivations Behind It, and the Tragic Repercussions That Linger to This Day.* By Richard Gambino. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977. xi, 198 pp. Preface, illustrations, appendixes, bibliography. \$7.95.)

Professor Richard Gambino has turned his formidable writing talents to the tragic story of the 1891 lynching of eleven Italians in New Orleans. In doing so he brings together a great deal of material from scattered accounts that have existed for years and adds several intriguing insights of his own. The result is a comprehensive, readable-though highly sensationalized-chronicle of the New Orleans affair.

The standard interpretation of the 1891 tragedy has pictured a relatively simple chain of events. The lynchings occurred essentially as a result of the alleged Mafia assassination of New Orleans police chief David Hennessy. When a jury failed to return guilty verdicts against a group of arrested Italians, citizen outrage spontaneously escalated into mob fury. After breaking into Parish Prison, some of New Orleans's best citizens answered the "higher call of justice" and murdered eleven of the accused assassins.

Gambino counters this explanation by suggesting a much more complex web of motives. At the heart of his case is the claim that Mayor Joseph Shakespeare and a Committee of Fifty, representing the city's economic and political elite, manufactured a bogus "Mafia scare" to mask other designs. They used the scare and the convenient murder of Hennessy as a "cover" to crush the rising economic power and social threat of the Italian community. As Gambino points out, Italian immigrants had been making remarkable progress in farming and land ownership, and within the city itself "they monopolize the fruit, oyster and fish trades and are nearly all peddlers, tinkers or cobblers." By mixing openly with blacks, Italians also often failed to share the racial biases of many New Orleans residents. On both accounts they threatened the established order.

The author marshals a convincing array of evidence to sup-

port his interpretation. Hennessy, it seems, had a very checkered past which included part ownership in a whorehouse, participation in various shootings, and a deep involvement in the morass of New Orleans political in-fighting. Any of these connections could have provided reasons for the assassination, but the official investigation failed to explore these possibilities. The prosecution case suffered similar weaknesses. Many witnesses placed the accused individuals away from the scene of the crime, and the prosecution relied on the flimsiest of hearsay evidence. Shortly after the lynching, the city passed an ordinance giving control of all dock work in New Orleans to the just-formed Louisiana Construction and Improvement Corporation, a business headed by prominent lynch mob leaders. This action effectively froze out Italian businessmen and workers from the multi-million dollar dock trades. Numerous other revelations either refute accepted beliefs or offer plausible alternatives.

Presumably for its shock effect, Gambino frequently lapses into hyperbole. The very title of the book is indicative of this tendency, and the use of highly-charged words abounds in the volume. To those who might argue that emotional subjects call for emotional treatments, there are examples of similar events which have been handled with balance and objectivity. William Ivy Hair's examination of the New Orleans Race Riot of 1900 and William M. Tuttle's study of the Chicago Race Riot of 1919 are two in point. The sensationalized approach that Gambino has selected may well attract a wide readership, but in the end it converts it into a lawyer's brief, albeit a good one.

To borrow from the courtroom, he has established more than a "reasonable doubt" about the standard interpretation. Some readers will undoubtedly be disappointed with the rhetoric and the tendency to editorialize, but on balance this volume has rendered a service in bringing together the full story of an important event in southern and immigration history.

*University of Florida*

GEORGE E. POZZETTA

*American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900.* By Francis Paul Prucha. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976. xii, 456 pp. Preface, notes, illustrations, epilogue, bibliography, index. \$15.00.)

Professor Prucha is undoubtedly one of the most significant, albeit controversial, scholars writing in the field of Indian history at the present time. Even his most severe critics, however, will have difficulty faulting Prucha's latest work, an impeccably documented and evenly presented treatise, if they carefully observe his prefatory disclaimer: "I do not pretend that this book is 'Indian history.' The native Americans enter into the narrative, to be sure, but they are not the subject of my story. I am writing about the white humanitarians, about the sincere religious-minded men and women who believed intensely that only one solution was possible for the problem they saw facing the United States in its relations with the Indians-complete Americanization." It is the story of this interlocking directorate of humanitarian reformers and their allies in the federal bureaucracy which Prucha explores with precision and understanding.

Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century the inexorable process of assimilating the Indian passed through various stages. At the conclusion of the major Indian wars in the 1870s there was a great outpouring of sympathy for the plight of the tribes, and various reform societies were organized in the East both to protect their rights and to assist in a "civilizing" process. The Grant administration inaugurated a "peace policy" whereby the tribes were placed on reservations. There, under the influence and tutelage of the Christian reform groups and government agents, they were to be transformed into yeoman farmers and herdsmen, accept Christianity, and become law-abiding citizens. As Prucha saw it "The 'Peace Policy' might just as properly have been labeled the 'religious policy,' " so close was the cooperation between the government and mission groups in formulating and carrying out Indian policy. Although there were various attempts to place Indian affairs in the hands of the military, the reform adherents in Congress successfully beat back every challenge to civilian control, arguing that the military could not bring to bear the civilizing influence needed by the "savages." Only in the

1880s, with the institution of a secular educational system on the reservations, as well as off-reservation residential schools such as Carlisle, was the religious domination in Indian affairs successfully challenged.

In that same decade it became obvious that the reservation system had failed to erode tribalism to the extent expected by the reformers, and there were calls to break up the huge reservations and force Indians to become individual freeholders. This was accomplished through the twin expedients of dissolving Indian political independence in their own territories and allotting the land in severality through the Dawes Act of 1887 and the later Dawes Commission of 1893. This process held an added national appeal in that it also opened up several millions of acres for settlement by non-Indians. By 1900 most of the policy goals of the reformers appeared to have been realized, and yet some 250,000 Indians remained an unassimilated, impoverished segment of the society. In summarizing this half-century effort Prucha holds that "The Christian reformers faced the crisis in American Indian policy with honesty and the best of intentions. With singleminded devotion to their cause, they brought forth their panaceas-land in severality, law, education, and efficient administration-and by united effort triumphantly won their way in Congress. With typical reformers' zeal they swept criticism and opposition aside, for they knew that they were supremely right. So much more tragic, then, was their ultimate failure."

Florida readers will search in vain for any mention of the Seminole remnant in this state which was late in attracting the attention of the reformers. It was not until 1891 that the Womens National Indian Association purchased land for a mission station at Immokalee. This mission was assumed by the Episcopal Church two years later, and it operated until 1914. However, the real work of Christianizing the Florida Indians was performed by native Baptist missionaries from Oklahoma who began coming in 1907, and had a congregation established by the 1930s. Although these later reform efforts in Florida are not mentioned, there are excellent sketches of the Womens National Indian Association and its leader Amelia Quinton, of Captain R. H. Pratt, the Indian educator whose report on the Florida Seminole in 1879 brought their presence to national notice, and of the Indian

Rights Association which played a significant role in the struggle to secure lands for the Seminoles early in this century.

Prucha's work succeeds in placing the effort to assimilate the Indian in the context of a middle-class, Protestant, Christian ethos which prevailed in American society until World War I. It is must reading for the historian who would understand the interplay of local Indian defense societies, such as those operating in Florida, with the national movement which spawned them. The general reader will find the book devoid of the polemics which pervade most contemporary works dealing with past American Indian policy, and thus may come to comprehend, though not accept, the motives of the reformers which fostered this tragic episode.

*Florida Atlantic University*

HARRY A. KERSEY, JR.

*Indian-White Relations: A Persistent Paradox.* Edited by Jane F. Smith and Robert M. Kvasnicka. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1976. xx, 278 pp. Foreword, preface, introduction, notes, illustrations, commentary, discussion note, biographical sketches, appendix, index. \$15.00.)

This book, volume ten in the National Archives Conferences series, contains the papers and proceedings of the National Archives Conference on research in the history of Indian-white relations. As a rule, most of us can think of no duller reading than the proceedings of a conference. This book, however, is a credit to the authors and editors because it presents materials valuable for both the student and the professional historian.

I would suggest that the reader leave the foreword, preface, introduction, and Prucha's small article, "Doing Indian History," to the last, and begin with the six topical sections of the book. The first discusses resources related to American Indian history held by the National Archives and Records Service. The section provides a realistic background for people who are not already familiar with the organization and holdings of that vast institution. The second section deals with American Indian assimilation in the nineteenth century. The excellent articles by Herman J. Viola and Henry E. Fritz contribute a number of new and welcome insights.

Section three surveys Indian collections outside the National Archives and Records Service. C. Gregory Crampton and Angie Debo give reportorial surveys of Indian collections in the Duke Project and of major Indian record collections in Oklahoma. John C. Ewers, in a more interpretive essay, discusses "Artifacts and Pictures as Documents in the History of the Indian-White Relations." More historians who attempt to write American Indian history should heed the important contributions of this anthropologist. The fourth section, called "The Role of the Military," contains an essay by Robert M. Utley who discusses "The Frontier Army: John Ford or Arthur Penn?" His is the mature evaluation of a man who has long studied the subject.

The fifth section deals with recent research on Indian reservation policy. The papers by William T. Hagan and Kenneth R. Philp show good research, careful craftsmanship, and mature judgment. One of the greatest strengths of this section is the quality of the commentaries done by Roy W. Meyer, Mary E. Young, and W. David Baird. The last section includes material on recent policy, including the statement of Louis R. Bruce, former Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on the policy of the Bureau as of 1972. An essay by Lawrence C. Kelly entitled "John Collier and the Indian New Deal: An Assessment" makes a truly important contribution to the study of contemporary events. In addition to the topical section, the book contains a preface, introduction, a small article on doing Indian History, six printed introductions (of which at least three are superfluous), six discussion notes (well worth reading), biographical sketches, and an appendix.

This diverse material makes the book fragmented. However, the editors come off credibly. Serious scholars of American history will find the volume a research tool worthy of their attention.

*University of Utah*

FLOYD A. O'NEIL

*The Natural Superiority of Southern Politicians: A Revisionist History.* By David Leon Chandler. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977. 394 pp. Acknowledgments, introduction, notes, illustrations, index. \$10.00.)

My life is surfeited with the agony of reading books that I

wish I had written. This is one. The only relief from the pain comes in the knowledge that I would not have done it half so well, so that I can salve my wounds with the unguent of awareness that a good idea has been handled by a fine writer and an incisive thinker. In short, the book is both fascinating and suggestive. I suspect it will be referred to for years and that its title will become a cliché. If the book were more ponderous and less readable, even professional historians would hail it, but some may back away because it does excite the reader into turning the next page. Historians unfortunately are suspicious of most authors who can write a graceful sentence.

Thinking about *The Natural Superiority*, I can't help comparing its theme with the situation prevailing on the military field in the Civil War. The Union had every advantage except leadership, but the South held on and even threatened for four bitter years for little other reason than the fact that it had a stubborn, unyielding, adaptive officer corps that somehow blunted the implications of defeat, oftentimes forced Union troops to fight on southern terms, and generally neutralized northern assets.

So with politics. Since the middle of the nineteenth century the South should have been overwhelmed in Washintgon, but the miracle is that the South has so frequently set the political climate for the nation. By what right, in a government of the majority, has the comparative handful of southern politicians managed to prevail, to determine what issues shall be faced, what issues shall be delayed, what issues shall be ignored altogether? The remainder of the nation has had the votes; the South has called the shots. When the South has retreated, it has nevertheless fashioned a magnificent delaying action, looked at in the light of a contest of wills. And it has won at delay because it had leaders who knew how to make unlikely alliances (some would say "unholy"), who knew how to take advantage of the terrain (translate as "parliamentary rules"), and who fought always on guerilla terms, never as mass against mass.

The United States Senate provides an excellent example. Exclusive by its very constitutional arrangement, it has brought forth some enormously attractive members who became national figures but never became powerful senators. No, because they never were admitted to the Senate Club, that small core group that places loyalty to the Senate ahead even of politics and per-

sonal careers. As examples, Chandler, the author, points out Eugene McCarthy and Birch Bayh in modern times-men who "can conduct themselves with intelligence and courtesy and decorum"-as men who have never made it into the Club, while Russell Long "can pad around the Senate floor in his stockinged feet, half-crazed with drink, and remain not only accepted by but a ranking member of the Club" (page 254).

Why? Long belongs. He belongs because southern senators pretty well control membership of the inner group. Through a happy circumstance I once had the privilege of a couple of hours alone with Senator Hubert Humphrey, who told me that one reason he was so devoted to Lyndon B. Johnson, even to the point of damaging his own chances to become president, was that Johnson had brought him into the Club. They had come into the Senate together, more or less equal in rank and seniority. Johnson then made the Club because Senator Richard Russell of Georgia thought he belonged and Humphrey did not because he was from some far-off place called Minnesota. But Johnson reached out that long arm of his and guaranteed the Club that Humphrey was all right, and the result had considerable influence in the history of numerous political battlefields. If Humphrey had not joined the Club, he possibly would have developed into a solitary figure like the late Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, much admired nationally, much quoted by the press, but ineffectual in getting his views accepted.

The same thing held true in modern times with Sam Rayburn and his Board of Education. After work, Rayburn's clique would hold their board meetings in the speaker's offices to discuss everything from pending legislation to committee assignments. Here the decisions were made. Who belonged to the board? Only those who were sponsored by someone who could vouch for their soundness. Usually the sponsor was some Southerner. Harry Truman was sitting in a board meeting when he was notified that Franklin D. Roosevelt was dead and he was president.

What all this boils down to is that the nation's capital has been run like society in a small southern town. I can move into town as a legitimate intellectual, with a string of accomplishments a block long, and with all the money and good ideas that one person could possibly utilize in a lifetime. But I still cannot get accepted into the local country club, I still do not get invited

to advise with the town fathers, I am admired but shunned until some local leader of impeccable social credentials makes me his latest protege-says that I am all right. On my own I never would have become a factor in the town's society. So with the nation's political leadership. The remainder of the nation has owned the money, has frequently shown leadership in business and industry, has held prime administrative positions, and has issued national ukases. But the South has determined the force of the fiats, has quietly (sometimes) sabotaged those programs it does not like, and has exerted influence and strength far beyond its numbers.

This book will be read by professional Southerners with great glee. I just hope it will be read by non-Southerners who want to understand what has happened to them and by critical Southerners as a guide to stabilizing and continuing their power in more positive directions than has sometimes been the case in the past.

*University of Texas at Austin*

JOE B. FRANTZ

*The Future Of History: Essays in the Vanderbilt University Centennial Symposium.* Edited by Charles F. Delzell. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1977. xi, 263 pp. Preface, notes, notes on the contributors, index, \$13.95.)

As an observance of its centennial in 1975, Vanderbilt University held a symposium on the future of historical research and writing. It invited leading practitioners of various specialties within the discipline to present papers on the status and probable future of their specialties. These papers comprise this impressive volume. They deal with the interaction of history and the social sciences, intellectual history, southern history, Latin American history, Japanese history, the Renaissance and Reformation as examples of the problem of periodization, contemporary history, and American foreign policy. Taken together, they compare most favorably with *Historical Studies Today*, the volume of essays published in 1972, based on the series in *Daedalus*. Like those earlier essays, these reflect the strong influence of the French *Annales* school on many phases of historical writing. Lawrence Stone's perceptive comments in the present volume deal directly with this influence.

These essays, ably edited by Charles Delzell, demonstrate

mature judgments and sophisticated analyzes of the problems related to specialized fields. For those outside the specialties, the papers offer expert introductions to the problems and challenges inherent in each. For instance, Woodrow Borah informs us that growing professional maturity among scholars in Latin America has engendered in many a distaste for "exploitation" of their subjects by North American practitioners. The situation has parallels in this country among those black scholars who think that whites are trespassing when they write black history. A similar contribution comes from John W. Hall when he explains that the writing of Japanese history has emerged beyond the descriptive phase that makes Oriental institutions plausible to Occidentals. It now creates "contexts of comparability" that enable cross-cultural analysis and permits Japanese history to be studied as the basis for alternative modes of expression and behavior, as in literary, dramatic, and musical areas.

As revealing as are the essays dealing with non-American history, readers of this *Quarterly* will likely find most stimulating C. Vann Woodward's consideration of "The Future of Southern History." In offering perspective on its future, Woodward noted that in the last two decades, the writing on this topic has increased tremendously. His *Origins of the New South* contained a sixteen-page bibliography of secondary sources when it appeared in 1951. When a second edition was published in 1971, the comparable bibliogaphy had expanded to 112 pages. This vast increase of attention to southern history does not reflect merely a quickening of interest on the part of Southerners, but rather the sudden emergence of the field into "a position of central importance in national history" (p. 138) and that the field has attracted a disproportionate amount of first-rate talent. Woodward sees the increased interest in the field being generated from two sources, those fortuitous and inherent. In the former category were the civil rights movement and the migration of blacks from the South to northern cities. The culmination of these socially explosive forces served to heighten interest in their origins, which led directly to the aspects of southern history dealing with slavery, abolition, reconstruction, and race relations. Among the inherent sources of interest in southern history was the impulse to compare the plantation economy and slavery with those institutions as they existed elsewhere, such as in Brazil and the Caribbean. Given

the richness of the themes of southern history, it has attracted platoons of quantifiers who have brought their equipment, some highly analytical and some highly flawed, to bear on central problems. For all the flaws in recent quantified work, some of it "brushing aside the legitimacy of the document," it has contributed to the immense vitality of this phase of American history.

*University of Maryland*

WALTER RUNDELL, JR.

*Biocultural Adaptation in Prehistoric America.* Edited by Robert L. Blakely. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1977. 144 pp. Preface, introduction, notes, references, illustrations, tables, contributors. \$4.50.)

The book is a collection of papers by eight authors. Its primary objective is to discuss biocultural adaptations in prehistoric America; humans survive, not through culture or biological adaptation, but through *biocultural* adaptation. Since human adaptation takes place within the interface of biology, culture, and environment, there is collective strength in a synthetic approach to anthropological theory. In the six papers that follow, the goals are met successfully, the reader learns how the biological anthropologist can contribute significantly to archeological interpretation. For example, a skeleton might reveal a particular condition, but what was it about the culture and the environment that may have caused the condition? How is an individual likely to be affected in his or her ability to function in society as a result of the condition? The physical anthropologist might be able to supply important information about nutrition, diet, paleopathologies, dentition, aging, status, infanticide (perhaps even abortion), sexual dimorphism (that might disclose similarities or differences in the division of labor), burial practices, demography, population movement (e.g., immigration), and miscegenation.

Peeples points out in his article that biological anthropologists should be included when a research design is constructed and when it is executed in the field because through careful excavation, recovery, and analysis a human burial contains more anthropological information per cubic meter of deposit than any other type of archeological feature. Peeples also points out the

importance of asking new questions or making old inquiries in new ways.

Eliot Chapple, in the concluding article, cautions us about many statements made throughout the book: the papers have all relied heavily for their interpretation on a knowledge of the accounts available in historic records. Alternate possibilities should be considered because one cannot be sure of the continuities between history and prehistory. For example, he warns that high status does not always mean better nutrition nor do many grave goods always indicate high status. In defense of the other authors, however, Louise Robbins cautioned about attributing tooth wear to abrasive diet because chewing tobacco causes similar attrition in present-day societies. Blakely writing about demography stresses that alternative explanation should be considered and that societies cannot always be fitted to already existing models. Anthony Perzigian states that there is nothing magical about any of the techniques; what it boils down to is much hard work with no guarantees of the results. Many of the authors, including Robert Gilbert in his discussion of trace element analysis, warn that in most cases standards have not been established, and thus it is impossible to discern if prehistoric skeletal remains deviate from the norm. The archeologist might be guilty of using methods before the methods are ready to use.

Chapple's article should be studied by all archeologists. He emphasizes his apprehensions about the value of hypotheses that are generated with little raw data: "It is common place in statistics to emphasize that the place to begin is with the raw frequency distributions . . . it is a rule that is usually ignored." A comparison of the distributions themselves is probably more significant than "the blind use of cookbook statistics."

I do not agree with Chapple that the emphasis of interpretation should be on individuals. The value of interpretation to social scientists will depend upon the degree to which we can state that individuals form a pattern and not an idiosyncratic occurrence. Nor do I agree with Chapple's statement that he finds no "justification for the popular stereotype that only the human species has culture." No one has demonstrated conclusively to me that other animals communicate symbolically or accumulate knowledge that is passed on from generation to generation and are able to build complex systems we call culture.