Crimean Rhetorical Sovereignty: Resisting A Deportation Of Identity

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CRIMEAN RHETORICAL SOVEREIGNTY: RESISTING A DEPORTATION OF IDENTITY

by

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ABSTRACT

On a small contested part of the world, the peninsula of Crimea, once a part of the former Soviet Union, lives a people who have endured genocide and who have struggled to etch out an identity in a land once their own. They are the Crimean Tatar. Even their name, an exonym promoting the Crimeans’ “peripheral status” (Powell) and their ensuing “cultural schizophrenia” (Vizenor), bears witness to the otherization they have withstood throughout centuries. However, despite attempts to relegate them to the history books, Crimeans are alive and well in the “motherland,” but not without some difficulty. Having been forced to reframe their identities because of numerous imperialistic, colonialist, and soviet behavior and policies, there have been many who have resisted, first and foremost through rhetorical sovereignty, the ability to reframe Crimean Tatar identity through Crimean Tatar rhetoric. This negotiation of identity through rhetoric has included a fierce defense of their language and culture in what Malea Powell calls a “war with homogeneity,” a struggle for identification based on resistance. This thesis seeks to understand the rhetorical function of naming practices as acts that inscribe material meaning and perform marginalization or resistance within the context of Crimea-L, a Yahoo! Group listserv as well as immediate and remote Crimean history. To analyze the rhetoric of marginalization and resistance in naming practices, I use the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) within recently archived discourses. Ruth Wodak’s DHA strategies will be reappropriated as Naming Practice Strategies, depicting efforts in otherization or rhetorical sovereignty.
I lovingly dedicate this to my wife, Elvira, a Crimean Tatar, who supported me each step of the way, and to my children, Leo, Levi, Lily, Landen, and Leila, who patiently waited for dad as he spent countless hours studying and writing.

Omuriniz Krimda Parlak Olsun.

Isa Kolay Ketersin.
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INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines a framework for understanding rhetorical productions in discourses surrounding people on the periphery of local dominant societies. I first build context by describing how rhetorical theory engages marginalizing rhetoric and its resistance among American Indians (Gerald Vizenor) and the Orient (Edward Said), and then stipulate how naming practices are key to understanding both rhetorics. I especially look to frame marginalization and resistance as efforts in otherization or rhetorical sovereignty (Scott Lyons) strategies respectively.

Dominance and Marginalization

With territorial subjugations comes what Walter Mignolo calls “colonial discourse” in which not only land, but indigenous language, memory, and space are colonized as well (Mignolo 823). Cultures in the midst of struggle instantiate rhetorical productions through sustained and evolving discursive practices, creating entire discursive “realities”1 that favor their own identity constructions no matter which side of a particular conquest they find themselves. Therefore, as Mignolo points out, colonization “places colonial discursive production in a context of conflictive interactions, of appropriations and resistances, of power and domination” (824). The consequences of colonization, whether by design or accident or both are created narratives of dominance and marginalization of indigenous cultures: a “cognitive imperialism” (Roth 5). Indeed, Europe would not have been able to galvanize the legitimacy of its claims to

---

1 Gerald Vizenor prefers the term “simulations.”
the Americas nor would Russia have been able to claim the status of a Western-style empire in its newly found Orient, Crimea without each of their power-seeking narratives (Dickinson 3).

During colonialism, a rhetorical strategy of colonization often implemented is that of “otherization,” what Sara Dickinson describes as “the production and circulation of images and stereotypes that expressed the region’s ‘otherness’ or ontological difference from the norms of the dominant culture” (4). Scott Lyons points out that “other” is a convenient way for dominant cultures to name and misrepresent appropriated indigenous cultures in order to create simulations of “real” and hide any native reality that may exist (461), thereby strengthening the dominant culture’s claim to seized land and sovereignty. These “other” stereotypes and images give the narratives in which they are found power over the subjects they (re)present (Charland 140) because the “real” can be created to suit the purposes of the colonizing powers.

A prime example of “colonial discourse” can be found in the annals of Native Americans. Gerald Vizenor, a prolific Native American writer describes this type of “otherizing” among Native American peoples’ history. For example, he points to the connection between alcohol, savagery, and Indians inherent in stereotypes and images that embody “otherization”:

Manifest manners, however, have never understated the racialism of alcohol, or the savage simulations that the tribal other had the real burden, a genetic weakness to alcohol and civilization. Indians are the wild alcoholics in the literature of dominance (italics mine). (29)

But what Vizenor and others don’t show is that even though narratives of “real” are the paths to otherization, naming practices are their vehicles.
However, we can look to postcolonial theory for one foundation for theorizing naming practices. A type of otherization narrative that Edward Said uncovered was what he termed Orientalism (3). For him, Orientalism is a world of discursive realities brought about by political forces to show that the Orient is ontologically different: alien and in many ways inferior to the West. As Said states, “the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and a vocabulary that have given it reality and presence…” (5; also 73). To develop his point further, Said quotes Nietzsche to describe otherization as a dialectic of reinforcement (94):

...a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people.

(203)

What Said calls the “vocabulary” of Orientalism is what I identify as naming practices produced in discourse. This mobile army of naming practices function as rhetorical strategies, either in efforts to construct otherizing identities or defend rhetorically sovereign ones. And in both cases, they require the use of naming practices, words that limit and delimit national identities.

**Naming Practices as Polemics**

Any construction of Said’s Orientalism requires “representations of the world” (Martha Cheng 427, commenting on a speech by Colin Powell), ones that favor the people from which the rhetorical productions originate. Often times, and in the case of colonization, these representations are designed to “mask significant social contradictions, marginalize other voices and repress skepticism through the promotion of unity at the expense of radically honest social...
“critique” (adapted from Lane Bruner 327). This promotion of “unity” becomes the goal of hegemonic rhetoric and marginalization because in order for those in power to succeed, all peoples must assimilate into the image of these representations, and essential to these representations are naming practices, which set the terms of the unification.

This is what Scott Lyons calls rhetorical imperialism (452), a country’s efforts in extending its power and influence through rhetoric. Within this rhetorical context, it is my contention that naming practices become polemics—deep rhetorical arguments full of emotional, ethical, and logical appeals, creating conflict wherever dominant powers try to exert control over “others.” Naming practices in otherization are forms of polemic rhetoric, which demand “linguistic and political conformity” and “that unselfconsciously praise the hegemony” (Halasek 5). They confer “strengths and limitations, and more importantly, an (im)mutable identity” to those who would wield them (Ruiz and Bataller 175).

Consequently naming practices “facilitated and legitimized” European colonization of the Americas and fostered projects of state-making and the Russian “self” among Crimeans and other indigenous groups within the Russian empire for more than the two centuries following Catherine (Dickinson 82).

Otherization and Russian Colonialism

Not a lot of work has been done to investigate rhetorical imperialism among indigenous peoples of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Neither are many in the West familiar with the “Cowboy and Indian” stories of this northern Eurasian expanse; less are familiar with
the otherizing naming practices employed since Russia’s days of colonization on the ethnic groups found within its borders (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1 - Russia’s Ethnic Republics (1994)**

Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/russia_ethnic94.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/russia_ethnic94.jpg)

The particular “Cowboy and Indian” narratives I am interested in are the “Cossack and Tatar” ones of Ukraine (not pictured in Figure 1), a country with one of the largest landmasses (see Figure 2) and populations within Europe, second only to the Russian Federation (Central Intelligence Agency). Other narratives similar to those of Crimean Tatar can be found among the Chechens and Ingush (shown in Figure 1) with whom Crimean Tatars have much in common (note there are still major ideological differences). All three people groups are majority Muslim,
wish to be repatriated back to their homeland, and were accused of treason and “deported” out of their homeland.

Figure 2 - Map of Europe, Ukraine shown in different shade

Source: CIA – The World Factbook

Colonial discourse helped the Russian Empire gain and maintain power of Crimea (1783-1917), Soviet discourse helped reshape its geography (1922-1991), and now Ukraine’s rhetoric is helping its government keep control of its ethnic tension (1991-today). Crimea has been at the heart of many conflicts, and therefore, the site of much marginalizing rhetoric. It has changed hands many times throughout its history, sometimes by annexation, other times, by war. It was annexed by Catherine the Great in 1783, becoming a part of the New Russia, and many Crimean Tatars fled during the Crimean War (1853-1856) when the French, British, and Ottoman Empires
(along with the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Duchy of Nassau) joined forces against the Russian Empire (Encyclopedia Britannica). Crimea was also the place where the White Army made its last stand against the Bolsheviks in 1920, after which Crimean Tatars declared their short-lived Independence. Crimea was yet again annexed by the stroke of Lenin’s pen when he signed the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into existence on October 18, 1921 (Pohl, Timeline: Deportation of Crimean Tatars and their National Struggle under Soviet Rule). Crimea was also where Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin met in 1945 to decide the fate of post World War II Germany and other war-torn countries at what is known as the Yalta Conference (Encyclopedia Britannica).

Figure 3 – Map of Ukraine, showing some of the major cities on the Crimean Peninsula

Source: CIA – The World Factbook
Naming Practices as Rhetorical Sovereignty

There are limitations at using the North American analogy to analyze what has occurred throughout Crimea’s history. However, whether in the Americas, the Soviet Union, or any other colonized land, naming practices promoted by hegemonic cultures in conquered lands usurp what Lyons calls indigenous cultures’ “rhetorical sovereignty,” or “the inherent right and ability of peoples to determine their own communicative needs and desires” (Lyons 449). At the very heart of rhetorical sovereignty is the attempt for the “others” to frame and negotiate their own identity through a fierce defense of their language and culture in what Hoxie reminds is a “war with homogeneity” (qtd. in Powell 427) in order “to decide for themselves the goals, modes, styles, and languages of [their own] public discourses” (Lyons 449). Therefore, regaining rhetorical sovereignty is achieved by self-framing. It not includes enacting a war of words and narratives (Bruner; Wolfe; Powell; Lyons), that is, using Crimean Tatar naming practices in discourses and exchanges against surrounding hegemonic, otherizing referents, stereotypes, and images. Self-framing also includes efforts in reappropriating existing otherizing naming practices, stereotypes, and images as well. “The work of self-framing can even at times look assimilationist from the outside. Choosing how to frame one’s culture may not always look like choosing the “most authentic” option. Even though a marginalized people chooses to use the same naming practice “given” them by hegemonic cultures, it does not make the naming practice any less “real.”

Further research is needed to localize the framework of rhetorical sovereignty within Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar rhetorical frameworks. To give some direction to
potential areas of research, I provide the following examples of naming practices that produced “otherization” throughout the Crimean Tatars’ history.

“Aliens”

As Catherine’s colonization grew so did the demise of the “other’s” rhetorical sovereignty. The demise came first and foremost through a system of naming practices that the tsarist administration fostered in an effort to govern nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples throughout the Great Steppe of Russia and gradually incorporate them into the Russian empire (1822-1917, Slocum 173). In statistics assembled by a Kazan chamber of the MGI2 the population was broken down into “three categories that were presumably designed to be mutually exclusive: Russians, novokreshcheny3, and inorodtsy4” (Werth 129). Those who were considered more russified (obrusenie5) (130; Weeks 471) by adopting the Russian Orthodox faith were baptized and were deemed and counted as novokreshcheny6 (Werth 130). The unbaptized became known as inorodtsy (130) who, formally, as Slocum explains, were:

...a clearly enumerated and delimited set of peoples not subject to the general laws of the (Russian) empire, who preserved their local customs and traditional leadership and enjoyed certain other privileges, most notably exemption from military conscription.

(173)

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2 MGI stands for the Ministry of State Domains in Kazan province.
3 Novokreshcheny means “newly baptized ones.”
4 Inorodtsy means “aliens” (Slocum 173).
5 Obrusenie means “russification.”
6 They eventually became known as “baptized inorodtsy” (130).
Informally, however, both the *novokreshcheny* and *inorodtsy* “were discursively situated at the margins of the Russian Orthodox world” (Werth 131). Eventually, *novokreshcheny* would be dropped in favor of the single naming practice, *inorodtsy*, because formally and informally all the empire’s non-Russian ethnicities would be assimilated and incorporated “beyond the realm of religious confession alone” (131). To achieve such ends, naming practices were central to otherization.

“*Special Settlers*”

With each new version of Russian governance came new naming practices. The Crimean Tatars were *inorodtsy*, but after the Bolshevik revolution and well into Soviet times new names for them would have to be established. After the so-called “liberation” by the Russian partisans of Crimea from the Nazis during WWII, and upon the recommendation of the head of the secret police, Lavrentiy Beria, the Crimeans’ fate was sealed (Pohl) in Stalin’s executive order. The Kremlin State Defense Committee Decree No. 5859ss, May 11, 1944, states that, “All Tatars are to be banished from the territory of the Crimea and resettled permanently as *special settlers* (italics mine) in the regions of the Uzbek SSR” (Crimean Tatars). A new naming practice had been born out of Stalin’s and the Soviet Socialist Republic’s continuing marginalizing ideology, coining a new term by combining the prefix спец – “spets” for “special” and поселенцев – “поселентцев” meaning “settlers.” Crimeans were no longer only *inorodtsy* (aliens) in their own land. These “special settlers,” (*спец-поселенцев*) were all found guilty of trumped up narratives.

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7 So on May 18th, 1944, every single Crimean, mostly women, children, and the elderly (because the men were fighting at the front), was loaded onto freshly defecated-upon cattle wagons, aboard trains, without food and drink, and with barely any possessions, in order to survive an almost month long train ride to Uzbekistan in Central Asia and the subsequent harsh living conditions.
of treason and were now being “deported” and referred to as “special settlers” in order to sugar coat what many claim as systematic genocide (Pohl). There is no more poignant moment than when “otherization” hid the Crimean Tatars’ native reality in favor of a Soviet representation of the world made possible by reanimating naming practices already in existence as well as conjuring new ones in light of an immediate need.

“Minority” versus “Indigenous”

Today, since repatriating back to Crimea, the Mejlis (the official Crimean Tatar governmental body) has been fighting “word wars.” While Article 11 of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution introduces the term “indigenous peoples,” it does so without defining what it means by the phrase (van Dijk and Trajkovska 3). Moreover, the contexts in which “indigenous peoples” is found in the article make it such that the implied definitions do not follow international standards (4) but rather create an understanding that “indigenous peoples” are “national minorities.” And because Crimean Tatars are considered minorities, they are not afforded indigenous land rights.

Consequently, the Council of Europe has asked the Ukrainian government to adopt the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention’s no. 169 definition of “indigenous people” which states that “indigenous peoples” are “original inhabitants of the land on which they have lived from time immemorial or (italics mine) at least from before the arrival of later settlers” (van Dijk and Trajkovska 5). Treated as a minority, Crimean Tatars have no special claims (nor rights) to land or sovereignty. Even with the correct name, “indigenous,” the practice of treating Crimean Tatars as such, officially or otherwise, is not “real.”
What is more striking is that the ILO Convention no. 169 promotes the understanding of “indigenous” as a designation with which a people self-identify (4). The Crimean Mejlis claim indigenous status for Crimean “Tatars,” but the Ukrainian government continues to (re)contextualize “indigenous” more as “minority,” because, as the ILO Convention no. 169 states, true “indigenous” status would afford Crimeans property rights to their traditional lands as well as the use and management of their natural resources—an understanding that the Ukrainian government is obliged to follow because of the ratification by the Bishkek protocol of 1993 (United Nations) (Shevel).

All these misrepresentations made possible by naming practices produced “otherization” throughout the Crimean Tatars’ history: inorodtsy (инородцы) made Crimean Tatars “aliens” in their own land; spets-poselentsev (спецпоселенцев), designated Crimean Tatars as “special settlers” upon their “deportation,” hiding their claims to Crimea as their homeland; and menshenstvo (меньшинство) meaning “minority,” affording Crimean Tatars little to no rights as an indigenous people of Crimea. Each naming practice hid the Crimean Tatars’ native reality in favor of a Soviet representation of the Crimean Tatars made possible by reanimating Soviet conjured “realities.”

Ultimately, naming is more than representation, more than labeling; naming practices do far more by reconstituting the material world in their image (see Charland’s narratives 143); consequently, Russian naming practices reconstitute the Russian world and try to legitimize Russian ideology. So when Crimean Tatars use Russian naming practices for everything and anything Crimean, they reconstitute their Crimean self in the Russian image of Crimean Tatar,
feeding on past and current Russian discourses (see Jäger’s discourses 36). And furthermore, because Russian discourses foster the Russian “self” above and over and against all “others” (and so it should), these Russian images constituted by Russian naming are not Crimean at all.

“Tatar”

For Crimeans, some naming practices have become so commonplace and ingrained into Crimean rhetoric that they are no longer deemed pejorative and have perhaps become reappropriated. The prime example is to what I have been alluding throughout this essay, with the use of the word “Crimean,” because everyone calls these Crimeans “Tatars” or “Crimean Tatars” and have done so for centuries. For Crimeans, it is in this “Tatar” essence that most, if not all, pejorative naming practices exist/begin. In the minds of Russians, Eastern Europeans, even Hollywood (please see The 13th Warrior starring Antonio Banderas) and even most Crimeans themselves, the word “Tatar” conjures up images of marauding nomadic bands of savages who descend from Genghis Khan himself. Therefore, as Charland puts it, the “trick” of “Tatar” is that it presents that which is “most rhetorical… as extrarhetorical” (Charland 137) about a people. “Tatar” constitutes Crimeans. Even in Stalin’s executive order, he referred to the trumped up stories of treason as “savage” reprisals – an intentional double entendre of the word “savage” that would have resonated with his audience.

The narrative starts to differ when each ethnicity starts to call the other “other.” For Russians, Tatars were and still are outsiders. As Fedor Dostoevskii once wrote, “In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, but in Asia we are masters. In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia we, too, are Europeans” (qtd. in Russia’s Orient, Russia’s West). That is, as Tatars were
outsiders in Russia, so were Russians in Europe. In fact, in a recent post on Crimea-L, a Yahoo Group for Crimean scholars and supporters, a graduate student working in Georgia (Caucasus) was recently informed that Georgians will use the word “Tatar” as a racial slur against Azeris (cite). Such racist musings are not new to Crimeans; in the same 1944 top secret decree, Crimean Tatars were not even referred to as “Crimean Tatars,” but rather just, “Tatars from the Autonomous Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic” (SSR) which in effect, makes the Crimeans’ origin sound as if it was somewhere other than Crimea, or worse still, Crimeans never had a homeland because they were nomadic. It is an example of what Lyons would call “a rhetorically imperialist use of writing by white powers” (453). Purposeful choice of words was not lost on the Kremlin, which knew the value of hegemonic omastic rhetoric. It even renamed the whole toponymic system of Crimea after the Crimeans were exiled – every town, street, river, even the fish. Kimberly Blaeser makes a profound statement regarding the Native American Indian stereotype that continues today in America, which can be just as easily applied to the naming practice of Tatar, “the enshrined Indian Tatar stereotype dictates a static identity that precludes growth, change, and adaptation, as well as individual tribal indigenous characteristics” (Blaeser 41). Stalin’s choice of polemic omastic rhetoric was a conscious effort at stripping Crimeans of any sovereign claims to Crimea because he knew that the loss of sovereignty begins with the loss of indigenous naming practices, and for a sovereign nation to be without land as well, is to be without true culture, true power, and true identity (Lyons 457). In 1857, a historian called Stepan

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8 Even though this is said tongue-in-cheek, in an article by Joerg Freyhof and Alexander Naseka, they renamed a newly discovered fish after Crimean Tatars by just calling it Tartaricus (2007), Ichthyological Explorations. Freshwaters. Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 324-334.
Eshevskii concluded that “each step forward of the Russian *narodnost*\(^9\) at the expense of other tribes is a victory for Europe” (Eshevskii qtd. in Werth 137). With the indigenous at the periphery of Russian society, the dominant ethnicity could claim ownership of land, language, culture, and even history.

The centuries old notion of “Tatar” of Rus’ anthroponymic history has left lasting, pejorative imagery on Crimean identity, and it’s not just Crimean; there are the Volga Tatar, Lipka Tatar, Kazan Tatar, Siberian Tatar, Chinese Tatar, Astrakhan Tatar, Lithuanian Tatar, Belarusian Tatar, Polish Tatar, Dobruja Tatar, and the list goes on. And although a few academicians have considered adopting the sole autonym of “Crimean” (Aydin),\(^{10}\) Crimeans still continue to adopt their Russian marginalizing naming practice of “Crimean Tatar,” and it is a major cause for what Malea Powell calls “cultural schizophrenia” which sole value is to promote Crimeans’ peripheral status in Ukrainian society (Powell 3).

In this chapter, I have shown that without rhetorical sovereignty for any culture in general and for Crimean Tatars specifically, otherization will dominate discourse. Rhetorical sovereignty begins by resisting marginalizing narratives set by dominant groups and begins by taking back control of the naming of anything and everything in one’s discourses. These acts of resistance begin by reconstituting naming practices in the image of the Crimean, who, like all other cultures, actively practice setting the terms of the debate. It is in naming practices that Crimeans can begin to realize sovereignty. So in the following chapter, I describe how I enacted this research framework in order to theorize otherization and rhetorical sovereignty practices in an

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\(^9\) *Narodnost* means “nationality.”

\(^{10}\) See the end of “The 1990s: Transnationalism” where different names for Crimean Turks are given, one of which only really works in Crimean Tatar, “kirimli.”
online listserv called Crimea-L. In it I argue for a Critical Discourse Analysis approach to uncover rhetorical production practices among Crimean Tatar elite and their benefactors.
CHAPTER TWO: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND NAMING PRACTICES IN CRIMEA-L

In this chapter, I argue in favor of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a generative rhetorical method for examining naming practices used as forms of otherization and rhetorical sovereignty in immediate, remote, and historical contexts. CDA tries to both describe and explain discourse “in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure” (Dijk 353). In its most general sense, discourse occurs when one human being responds to another to enact change (mental, physical, or in any other way) in a particular setting, at a particular time in history. And because discourse assumes a plurality of rhetors, actions become interaction, not in a void, but in a cosmos of already established relationships, what Dijk calls “structures.” As Johnstone explains, CDA can speak more to the “interactional, dialogical nature of meaning-making, meant for the analysis of two-way or multi-way discourse and attentive to the ways in which meaning is shaped by audience’s uptake” (Johnstone 141). It is in these interactions that naming practices become rhetorical arguments designed to promote particular ideologies, and CDA, to borrow Dijk’s phrase, reveals the “discursive power” wielded by “various institutions of power, the internal power structures of these institutions, power relations between different social groups, and the scope of domain of the exercise of power by (members of) these institutions or groups” (Dijk 29). Not all approaches in CDA are the same, however. In the following paragraphs, I give a brief overview of a few more established approaches to CDA, which inform my analysis, and defend my choice of approach. I also establish the research question, site, and procedures for analyzing contemporary naming practices not only in their
immediate discursive and historical contexts, but also in light of the long history of colonization connected to their origins and use.

**Critical Discourse Analysis and Naming Practices**

The research in this thesis focuses on the rhetorical function of naming practices that act as metaphorical devices “providing conceptual casing summarizing complex sociohistorical circumstances” (Edelman, Lakoff and Johnson qtd. in Chang and Holt 397). While many methodological approaches employ a close attention to language use, not all take the same approach or consider context in the same way. Systematic Functional Linguistics (SFL), for example, might claim to be more “neutral” because it works by analyzing language on four different levels: context, semantics, lexico-grammar, and phonology-graphology (Information on Systemic Functional Linguistics (ISFLA)). CDA, by contrast, admits to an ideological premise of civic engagement because its aim is to “intervene discursively in given social and political practices” (Wodak 8), and to “uncover how power circulates, usually invisibly, in discourse” (9).

This gives CDA a distinct advantage over SFL for the purposes of my project. If naming practices work as a casing for historical circumstances, SFL cannot pry open the casing because it does not take into account the discursive nature of communicative events, which constitute sociohistorical circumstances. As Asif Agha notes, data from studies in discourse “plucked from their isolable moments invariably point to lived moments that lie beyond them” (1).

We know that anyone who effectively engages in a given discursive encounter has participated in others before it and thus brings to the current encounter a biographically specific discursive history that, in many respects, shapes the individual’s socialized
ability to use and construe utterances (as well as footings, stances, identities, and relationships mediated by utterances) within the current encounter; and if the current encounter has any enduring consequences for the individual, these are manifest in (and therefore identifiable only by considering) future encounters in which that individual plays a part. (1)

But what exactly constitutes a sociohistorical encounter in text? Zane Goebel, Senior Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at La Trobe University, Australia, follows traditional qualitative research methods by re-interpreting historical accounts, reviews of census practices, accounts of schooling practices, language policy documents, and work on mass-mediated representations of personhood and language, and calls each text a “semiotic encounter” (Goebel 198). These texts represent sociohistorical circumstances, displaying whole ecologies of identity, agency, and context working intertextually. And today, the same holds true for visual and digital cultures (Säckel, Göbel and Hamdy 8) in which also can be seen the production, distribution, and consumption of text interdiscursively (Fairclough 9).

As Norman Fairclough points out, at any given moment discourse is assumed to be (1) a language text (spoken, written, or any other medium) to be (2) interpreted, understood as (3) a social practice (9). Accordingly, CDA describes the language text as “the interpretation of the

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1 Zane Goebel is part of the faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.
11 The exhaustive nature of Goebel’s approach is too large a scope for this thesis; however, his approach would have found a welcome audience in Vizenor, who himself begins his seminal work on survivance rhetoric, Manifest Manners, with a description of census practices among Native Americans conducted by the United States government (14).
13 Quinn and Holland provide an alternative model to semantics as a part of semiotics, namely pragmatics through the cultural model (Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn 3). They borrow extensively from discourse analysis models in which ‘explanatory systems’ are identified through common cultural themes. The question is what common Crimean cultural themes might provide an explanatory system?
relationship between the discursive processes and the text, and the explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes” (97). How a text is produced or interpreted, therefore, mediates the interplay between sociocultural practice and text, a sociohistorical circumstance (97).

This research conceives of computer mediated communication (CMC) as sociohistorical semiotic encounters in which naming practices play an integral role and contribute to the “political activity of legitimation, or the discursive representation and reification of institutional power and its exercise” (Eisenhart and Johnstone 14). To do so, I will show how naming practices are textual carriers of identity (Doherty 3), and how naming practices become cohesive devices in delimiting online discourse.

**Different Approaches within CDA**

Different approaches within CDA have different insights to offer when it comes to analyzing naming practices within text. For example, in order to begin choosing a rhetorical space to help answer questions of the relationship between social interaction and structures in discourse, Siegfried Jäger’s CDA approach called Dispositive Analysis (DA) recommends locating the manifestation of the ideology (Goebel’s semiotic encounter) (Wodak 25). The ideology of racism, for example, is located around intertextual “discourse strands” on immigrants and refugees. So if I’m looking for forms of otherization and rhetorical sovereignty, I need to find discourse strands that address some type of conflict and prejudice about Crimean Tatars.

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14 Some even have claimed that, “it is nearly impossible to understand national identities adequately without investigating how communication technologies serve as catalysts for their (re)construction” (Morley qtd in Sheyholislami 290).
Norman Fairclough’s approach is named the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA) in which he interprets Jäger’s discourse strands as “linguistic manifestations” of social conflict:

Productive activity, the means of production, social relations, social identities, cultural values, consciousness and semiosis are dialectically related elements of social practice… CDA should pursue emancipatory objectives, and should be focused upon the problems confronting what can loosely be referred to as the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social life. (27)

A Dialectical-Relational Approach is useful for a rhetorical analysis of naming practices because we can begin to theorize particular marginalizing strategies, taxonomizing these concepts into categories to form the basis of rhetorical agency theories at play among Crimeans. But what exactly do naming practices look like under DA and DRA? What constitutes a name, a nameable, or a naming practice? Farzad Sharifian, professor at Monash University, Australia, recommends identifying 1) unfamiliar vocabulary items, 2) distinctive patterns of association, and, 3) a distinctive frequency of usage of both vocabulary and patterns.

But neither CDA approach specifically accounts for how instances of language in action are “embedded within and shaping history” (Chang and Holt 397). Therefore, the approach within CDA that can also take into account the sociohistorical aspect of naming is the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). In fact, DHA was born out of the desire to “trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotyped image… as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986

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15 I adapt Wodak’s taxonomy later on in this chapter.
16 This also raises methodological questions for scholars of rhetoric. Sharifian’s approach here helps rhetoricians investigate efforts of rhetorical agency in whose cultures they only have an etic perspective, or at the very least a limited emic perspective to speak authoritatively.
Austrian presidential campaign” (Wodak, The discourse-historical approach 70). To do so, Wodak and the team of scholars analyzed the “linguistic manifestations of prejudice in discourse” by interpreting them as embedded, first, in the immediate linguistic and social context, second, as embedded in a larger remote body of related linguistic and social contexts at that moment in time\(^\text{17}\) and third, as embedded in history’s linguistic and social contexts (70). They did so because they did not want to rely on the ‘meta-data’ alone (70).

Below is a table showing specific strategies with their corresponding objectives and devices adapted from Wodak et al.’s DHA case-study on “Austria first” in 1992-3 (73). Subsequent to each objective, Wodak provides a description of what sorts of discourse features are present in text when such strategies are implemented. I used the table as a foundation to analyze and code naming practices on the Crimea-L listserv. However, I modified each discursive strategy to relate to naming practices in particular. Each strategy’s objective was further adapted to reflect the nature of the naming practice (i.e., either the naming practice reflects a type of otherization, or it reflects an effort in resistance). However, it is reasonable to expect that a single nominalization might reflect both otherization and resistance.

\(^{17}\) Wodak separates these in future publications (Wodak, Critical Discourse Analysis: Some important concepts and considerations).
Table 1 – Discursive Naming Practice Strategies
(adapted from Wodak, The discourse-historical approach 73)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naming Practice Strategy</th>
<th>Naming Practice Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Referential/nomination   | Otherization – construction of out-groups  
Rhetorical Sovereignty – construction of in-groups | Membership categorization  
• Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies  
• Synecdoches (pars pro tot, totum pro pars) |
| Predication               | Otherization – labeling social actors more or less negatively or deprecatorily  
Rhetorical Sovereignty – labeling social actors positively or appreciatively | Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits  
• Implicit and explicit predicates |
| Argumentation             | Otherization – Justification of negative attributions  
Rhetorical Sovereignty – justification of positive attributions | Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment |
| Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation | Expressing involvement  
Otherization – Positioning speaker’s non-Crimean Tatar point of view  
Rhetorical Sovereignty – Positioning speaker’s Crimean Tatar point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances |
| Intensification, mitigation | Otherization – Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition against Crimean Tatars  
Rhetorical Sovereignty – Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition in favor of Crimean Tatars | Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances |

To theorize and illustrate the rhetorical function of naming practices, we can look to naming practices already mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis. We could begin by explaining these otherizing naming practice strategies implemented by dominant groups to create discriminatory stereotypes of Crimeans. For example, “spetsposelentsev” could be argued to be a form of referential/nomination strategy categorizing Crimeans to be an “out-group,” which is a form of otherization. “Inorodtsy” could be a naming practice implementing topoi of law and
culture to justify exclusion, discrimination, and partiality toward Crimeans and other indigenous groups, which again could be classified as otherization. “Tatar” could be said to be a form of predication in that the label conjures stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative traits, once again a form of otherization.

Any approach within Critical Discourse Analysis begins to show how rhetoricians can theorize rhetorical practices by grounding conclusions in data-driven research. The data acquired through DHA’s reliance on historical, socio-political, and linguistic discursivity, what Wodak et al. term the principle of “triangulagion” (9), will help to examine “…a series of normative associations, motives and characteristics” (Bhatia 5) that are attached to names (Chang and Holt 397) in order to achieve a “systematic and in depth-analysis of collective identities” (Krzyżanowski 142-43).18 However, as Agha, again, observes, “the social values of particular speech forms… change over time” (1). Therefore, any associations, motives, and characteristics I give to naming practices in one thread within the site may not be the same in another. Therefore, I also assume that naming practices attached to different sociohistorical encounters carry different meanings and value. This means that the same nominalization may be used in different ways at different points in history, allowing naming practices to have a multitude of different meanings from which “a member of a nation selects more or less voluntarily, depending on the context and situation, and thus ‘composes’ her or his (multiple) identity” (Wodak, de Cillia and Reisigl 16-17).

18 See Scollon and Scollon for discussion on why future contexts also need to be considered.
Naming Practices are Semiotic Encounters

And so names do more than summarize sociohistorical circumstances; they are sites for semiotic encounters, reshuffling “power through ideological and political configurations” (Bakhtin & Bhatia qtd. in Chang and Holt 397). They reshuffle power because people can pick naming practices to suit their agendas and “mobilize action yet resisted and contested” (Bakhtin & Bhatia qtd. in Chang and Holt 397). And it is on this edge of resistance and contestation that naming is intimately involved with the discursive construction of identity construction where Crimean Tatar identity ingredients can be witnessed (Sheyholislami’s “national ingredients” 299). These “ingredients” are things such as “origin, continuity/tradition, transformation, (essentialist) timelessness and anticipation… spatial, territorial, and local dimensions (expanse, borders, nature, landscape, physical artefacts and intervention in ‘natural space’)” (Wodak, de Cillia and Reisigl 26).

Naming practices within collective identities also discursively reproduce socially shared beliefs through what Bernstein calls “recontextualization” processes. That is, “recontextualization looks for the ways in which a text is transformed, reimagined, and even disfigured when it is brought into a new context” (Huckin, Andrus and Clary-Lemon 121). Naming practices do the work of recontextualization. According to Habermas’s “views of the colonization of the lifeworld… recontextualization is reconceived as a colonization/appropriation dialectic” (Fairclough 65). Therefore, this research examines the context of communicative events to analyze how naming practices play a role in recontextualizing particular ideologies and

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19 For the purposes of this paper, this will be the closest that the research gets to genre theory. Suffice it to say that I agree with Bakhtin in that “the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language” are genres (qtd. in (Fairclough 189).
narratives as attempts at marginalization or resistance that might be described as acts of otherization or rhetorical sovereignty. In other words, naming practices mark how Crimean discourse “expresses and reproduces underlying social representations of themselves as Others” positively, negatively, or neutrally (Dijk 361).

Crimea-L: The Site

Chapter 1 suggested that many examples of rhetorical naming practice exist throughout Crimean history. The preceding paragraphs, here in Chapter 2, further built foundation for using DHA to understand the rhetorical function of naming practices as acts that inscribe material meaning and perform resistance within the context of Crimean history. However, questions remain when we consider the contemporary discourse of Crimean identity construction: are naming practices still being used to otherize Crimean Tatars and are Crimean Tatars, in turn, using naming practices today as strategies of renewal and resistance to become rhetorically sovereign?

To find answers to such questions, I chose the Crimea-L Yahoo Group as a site for analysis because it is an example of a public discursive site in which might be found evidence of discursive struggle. The International Committee for Crimea (ICC) on November 24th, 1998 designed the site where Crimeans and their allies might associate and “discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment about them” (Lyons 425). It is a site that fosters a digital version of what Eisenhart and Johnstone refer to as mundane public spaces from which rhetoricians elicit and examine discourse for “substantive engagement with significant and controversial public topics” (16). Crimea-L can be described as a listserv, which
operates as individual users with access to email accounts write and exchange email messages, which are delivered to the entire population of subscribers who can read and then reply back to the original post.

Typically, the participants’ discussions coincide with local historical events. For example, the emails during November of 2007 revolve around the very significant events that were occurring in Balaklava and Ai Petri in which Crimean Tatars fought with the age-old enemy, the Cossacks (in this case, hired thugs from Russia). Furthermore, this CMC is the type of discursive space in which “relevant actors” try to not only “influence policy outcomes but to transform the terms and nature of the debate” (Keck and Sikkink qtd. in Riba section 3). Thus, Crimea-L fits rhetoric studies well. Has not the rhetoricians’ attention widened from “public to private spheres, from official to vernacular rhetoric, from oratory to written and multimedia discourse, from the carefully crafted to spontaneous discourse emerging from fleeting everyday rhetorical situations” (Eisenhart and Johnstone “mundane spaces” 4)? And because CDA is interested in the “power and dominance of the symbolic elites, those who have special access to public discourse” (van Dijk 88), Crimea-L provides one such avenue to public discourse in which those advocating for Crimean sovereignty can explore Crimean rhetorical sovereignty.

Site Sample

While I have discussed how particular terms might operate with respect to Wodak’s scheme, the study analyzes naming practices in context. Thus, it is important to take into account their specific email thread, where the naming practices are used in not only current discourses, but also within a historical backdrop of usage, so we can properly theorize claims concerning self
(re)presentation (Wodak, The discourse-historical approach 73) as a means to (re)capture rhetorical sovereignty. To work with these elements of context, it is necessary to reduce the amount of data analyzed. Crimea-L has had significant participation since June 2000 and became an archive during 2012. The matrix in Table 3 shows the amount of emails/posts per month, per year.

Table 2 – Matrix Displaying Emails/Month Per Year

Source - (International Committee for Crimea (ICC))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Crimea-L has a total of 6,429 posts up through December 2012. Picking a good sample size in qualitative research studies is unresolved. In fact, recently, Grabill and Pigg conducted a qualitative research analysis and had to determine what sample size justifications were present in rhetoric studies and none were found (106). The only expert opinion they found was a rule that stated a good sample size in coding is one that gives a good representation of the participants through data saturation and doesn’t create informational redundancy (106). For Grabill and Pigg that meant “20% of posts with more than fifteen comments and three unique responders” (106).

Applying similar methods to Crimea-L, it can be noted that there are a total of 107 months when the listserv was active. Out of those 107 months the median amount of emails per month is 24. 35 of those months have 24 emails or more. 20% of those 40 months is 7 months. The 7 highest trafficked months have 47 email posts or more (they are highlighted in Table 3, and two are tied for 47 emails each, making 8 months altogether). The months to be analyzed in a full rhetorical analysis of the site for naming practices are shown in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month &amp; Year</th>
<th># of posts</th>
<th>15 comments &amp; 3 unique respondents</th>
<th>Highest thread count &amp; respondents</th>
<th>Thread Subject Line</th>
<th>Thread Identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 comments 3 respondents</td>
<td>Anti Crimean Tatar propaganda lives on</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Of note in Table 2 is the drop off of emails at the beginning of 2004. During that year, Crimea-L was strictly intended to be used for communication in English. In order not to skew the results, I will only pick emails from February 2004 onward. That being said, the reverse might be even better. That is, it would be better to analyze discussion threads purely written in the non-English listserv. However, through a pilot analysis, comparing the two, this author has concluded that Crimean naming practices are even more poignant in the English forum because of the need to make intentional choices for rhetorical sovereignty through translation.
Within those 8 months are a total of 430 emails. Out of these 430 emails, the largest thread exceeds the 15 comments minimum count, one of Grabill and Pigg’s criteria. So, instead, the average thread length for these 10 months in Crimea-L is 10 comments with an average participation of 6 respondents. So, in a full analysis of the site, I would analyze these threads, removing all identifiers to protect the identity of the community.

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21 Their criteria were contextualized to their particular study, because of their phenomena of interest.
Study Site Procedures and the Need for a Case Study

A full rhetorical analysis of the website would analyze threads 1 through 8 by coding the discourse for anything nameable, people, places, events, etc. present within the discourse, using my adaptation of Wodak’s discursive strategies and list of devices, as well as inductively, allowing the text to dictate the need for more codes. Table 2 shows the initial codes to be used to analyze the text:

Table 4 – Naming Practice Strategy Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical Strategy</th>
<th>Otherization</th>
<th>Rhetorical Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referential</td>
<td>ro</td>
<td>rts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predication</td>
<td>po</td>
<td>prs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>ao</td>
<td>ars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation/Framing</td>
<td>fpo</td>
<td>fprs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification/Mitigation</td>
<td>imo</td>
<td>imrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What I have outlined are procedures for a full analysis of the Crimea-L Yahoo group listserv. However, this thesis project is not of scope to complete such an ambitious study. Thus, in the thesis I present case study examples of two analytical moves that come from the discussion above. I also have not fully realized a DHA approach because the amount of historical research required to fully carry out this method is limited by the scope of my thesis.

Consequently, my thesis presents one example of looking across threads for how naming practices work across them in Chapter 3, as well as the analysis of one thread in particular that
focuses on how naming practices function within this thread’s particular rhetorical context in
Chapter 4. In Chapters 3 and 4, I show the results of having: 1) located naming practices which
include people, places, and events, 2) coded the naming practices showing the relevant rhetorical
devices, 3) connected the naming practices to the discursive strategy being employed, to show,
first, 4) what forms of otherization are inherent in Crimean Tatar rhetoric, and second, 5) the
rhetorical sovereignty strategies being implemented by Crimean Tatar elites.
CHAPTER THREE: OF EMAILS, THREADS, AND NAMING PRACTICES ACROSS CRIMEA-L

In Chapter 2, I argued for DHA as the CDA approach to use to examine naming practices within the Crimea-L context. I also used the framework of semiotic encounters in text as a way to think through sociohistorical circumstances, concluding that naming practices are themselves semiotic encounters. Furthermore, I argued for naming practices as: central to making online discourse “cohesive”; being textual carriers of identity; and, legitimizing and reifying institutional power. Names are always going to be present in prejudicial discourses, sites where CDA seeks to intervene civically. I ended that chapter by focusing on a strategy for analyzing naming practices in multiple layers of context.

In this chapter, I offer a conceptual discussion drawing from my research that argues for the ways in which naming practices can be seen as anchors for discourse. In order to develop this discussion, it is necessary for me to define terms and articulate relationships that might seem self-evident in this kind of research, but which I will argue are quite complex. Thus, in Chapter 3, I draw on my coding to define relationships between naming practices and discourses, as well as threads, conceptual metaphors, and indexes. Moreover, I use the refined concepts to argue for best practices of thread reassembly and to argue for a concept that I call inter-threaduality, which adapts the rhetorical concepts of intertextuality to the context of the listserv thread in order to describe how developing discourses in two or more threads not only borrow from one another conceptually and lexically through discourse strands but also emulsify into their own thread.

When describing discourse features, a discourse must first be identified, and one organizational structure that constitutes a discourse in a listserv is what is commonly referred to
as “threads.” Threads, according to Yeh and Harnly, are “hierarchical referential relationships among emails” (1). Not only can email be written medium of “asynchronous multi-party communication” (Rambow, Shrestha and Chen), email at times, in the context of a listserv, can originate from multiple people replying simultaneously to a message, “leading to a thread structure, which is a tree, rather than a sequence” (Cohen, Carvalho and Mitchell 314).

Sequential moments occur on Crimea-L, but most thread structure is “tree-like.”

Throughout Crimea-L, typically speaking, sequential threads are easy to identify because the subject line contains the original subject heading with the addition of “re:”, signifying something like “regarding.” However, there are times when members within the same listserv click reply to a message and forget to change the subject heading, writing something that has nothing to do with the subject heading itself, and, therefore, the thread. Alternatively, members reply to the original message, staying on topic, but with the use of different subject headings. Furthermore there are times within the listserv when members start a new thread with an already existing subject heading and without the use of “re:”. In this chapter, I argue that naming practices and the conceptual metaphors that ground them can be understood as an alternative way of identifying and describing a discourse thread. In other words, naming practices constitute, or bind together sub-discourses.

**Understanding and Assembling Discourses of Naming**

As I have begun to describe, formal technological attributes like email subject headers frequently misrepresent the extent to which individual emails in a listserv are connected. Understanding threads within Crimea-L, then, requires more than just observing identical subject
headings in order to reconstruct the “tree.” As Gaston Cangiano describes, “With the increasing frequencies and flexibility of the daily interactions comes an increased “fragmentation” of the context of each… thread” (11). That is, a reply’s subject heading is revised to fit the sender’s immediate communicative needs, and if it means losing commonality (to varying degrees) to the originating sender’s email’s subject heading, so be it. Therefore, if “email thread reassembly is the task of relating messages by parent-child relationships, grouping messages together based on which messages are replies to which others” (Yeh and Harnly 1), and the subject headings are an unreliable source in determining parent-child relationship, other textual markers must be used to understand how a local discursive context is constituted.

Understanding naming practices thus depends on thread reassembly because the thread reassembly provides the context for interpretation, the first layer of Wodak’s DHA model. Understanding how discourse is actually made, at least my contention, involves tracing closely which emails are actually related to one another by means other than the subject line. This requires an act of discourse reassembly in which naming practices can act as textual markers.

Naming practices as textual markers may occur in the subject heading, but, in tree structures, they most commonly occur in the textual portions of emails. Naming practices promote what Charles Bazerman calls “intra-file intertextuality” (88). Bazerman states, “Interesting questions rely on the way texts within a file or other collection pull together to make a representation of a case or subject--we might call such a phenomenon the intertextual collection” (88). Naming practices are one such method to creating intertextual collections.
Thread-Indexing

The way in which naming practices function as textual markers can be shown to achieve thread reassembly through what I will call “thread-indexing,” borrowing from computer science, through which programmers at Microsoft enable Outlook to uncover true and meaningful threads in emails (Yeh and Harnly 1),\textsuperscript{22} relying less on subject headings and more on content.

Within the context of Crimea-L, my analysis has shown that thread-indexes can be traced and comprised of the naming practices established within email headers and textual portions, typically found within one or two month intervals on Crimea-L. Naming practices become the glue through which the discourse is reassembled and understood. Furthermore, Crimea-L shows that within any discourse (constituted by a thread)\textsuperscript{23}, there are potentially multiple sub-discourses at work. These sub-discourses, therefore, are also “indexed” by the immediate pattern of association being accessed by the rhetor, as well as the frequency of the naming practice at play in the discourse. The indexes continue to expand as subsequent listserv months are analyzed for naming practices.

The Simeiz example in Table 5 identifies and categorizes all the naming practices within 64 emails found in the month of March 2004 (see Table 3 in Chapter 2) into an index. This table also identifies the clusters of naming practices that constitute patterns of association relating to either the events in Simeiz, the Human Rights issues stemming from the Simeiz incident, or issues of region destabilization also due to the incidences in Simeiz and other areas in Crimea. From these clusters we can begin to create the Simeiz thread-index, which in turn helps us see

\textsuperscript{22} Microsoft is keeping such programming secrets to itself; however, an explanation of threads may be found here (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms684841%28v=vs.85%29.aspx).

\textsuperscript{23} Or multiple threads, as will be shown later.
how naming practices anchor emails to threads, and how a thread-index can provide an understanding of how Crimean Tatars identity is embodied or constituted in the particular local context of the Simeiz thread in Crimea-L. Table 5, shown below, presents my index of the Simeiz thread.

**Table 5 – Simeiz Thread-Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thread-Index – Simeiz</th>
<th>Sub-Index Human Rights</th>
<th>Sub-Index – Destabilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attack, raid, destroy, clash, brawl, fight, tension, conflict, protest, unrest, gripes, sharp, provocation, troops, Cossacks, attacker, skinheads, fascists, Simeiz, armed, forcibly, stroke, avenge, stabbed, dead, massacre, violent</td>
<td>criminal, human rights, suffer, suffering, international, letters, budget, social tension, oppression, struggle (lack of objectivity)</td>
<td>destabilize, disfigured, skinhead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following section, I provide an example of how I have located one “thread” of Crimea-L that I refer to as the “Simeiz” and describe sub-discourses of naming in this thread. I also draw on Sharifian’s heuristic from Chapter 2 to establish thread-indexing in rhetoric studies as a way to frame clusters of words because of their unfamiliarity, their distinctive patterns of association, and their frequency.

**Example Thread Reassembly**

Appendix B represents one attempt at assembling a discourse thread based on a broad analysis of the circulation and responses to one email across the entire Crimea-L site. In this table, I have reassembled emails that contain the following subject headings in order to show how they constitute one thread: “from a girl of Crimean descent,” “additional information about Simeiz,” “continuation,” “to (name intentionally omitted),” “news from Crimea,” “Golos Crimea
silenced,” “an appeal to the world,” “a Crimean Tatar boy was found dead,” “provocative actions.” I make the claim that these subject headings were created in response to an original post entitled “Ethnic tension in Crimea” (email 1409502). If one were to have used the standard concepts of thread reassembly solely based on message ID’s, references, and the use of “re:” plus original subject heading (n.), whole discourses and sub-discourses would be lost. However, by using Sharifian’s heuristic, a list of widely different subject headings now constitute a single thread within Crimea-L.

In my analysis, I refer to this particular thread as “Simeiz” because for the Crimean Tatar, Simeiz represents a significant place of conflict, getting at the very heart of what constitutes actual sovereignty for Crimean Tatars, that is, land ownership. It is also a good site for DHA because discourses of contestation are abundant.

To provide broader historical and geographical context, Crimean Tatars claim that the whole of Crimea once belonged to Crimean Tatars, including and especially the southern coast. This area is prime real estate today because of its coastal scenery and was also prime real estate before Stalin’s soviet regime sent the Crimean Tatars into exile following World War II. Simeiz (if not all southern coastal properties) embodies a fight for sovereignty and for Crimean Tatars’ own homeland, which is highly contentious because of its value to not only Crimean Tatars historically but also to non-Crimean Tatar developers. As one contributor to Crimea-L describes, …it is the southern coastline which the authorities declared off limits to Crimean Tatars from the very beginning where Crimean Tatars intensified their actions in demanding their rights and challenging the authorities more aggressively. For Crimean Tatars every

24 A reference to the beginning of Crimean Tatar repatriation to the Crimea.
inch (or centimeter) of Crimean soil is their homeland whether it is a resort area or desert.

(Email # 1409012)

The Simeiz thread-index depicts the struggle of Crimean Tatars, against, on the surface, local and national authorities. As stated in an email from 2004:

If the events in Simeiz is an indication of how Crimean Tatars are going to be treated by the Crimean and Ukrainian authorities every time they insist on demanding their national and human rights, I am afraid the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of SURGUN,25 their mass deportation by the Soviet regime on May 18, 1944, is not going to be peaceful as the previous commemorations!... DON’T LET CRIMEA BECOME ANOTHER CHECHNYA! (Email 1409542)

However, more realistically, and one would think under the surface (in fact, it is quite open), rich land owners (oligarchs) hire Cossacks and local authorities to protect their interests. Even the mayor of Yalta believed he was powerless to intervene:

At the same time Mr. Brayko, the Major of Yalta, who had told that he couldn't influence local authorities and that on the territory of Yalta there is no Cossacks called a meeting of law enforcement agencies and finally managed to stop the actions of Cossacks and law enforcement officials (prior stating that he didn't have anything common with the Cossacks). (Email 1409902)

A foreign observer depicted the scene in Simeiz as follows:

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25 “Surgun” is Crimean Tatar for “exile,” a reference to what is commonly known as the “deportation.”
… a little later small groups of young men stand around, eyeing other similar groups. Some are wearing T-shirts proclaiming "Russia" or "Ukraine". A few insults are thrown, but little else happens even if the atmosphere is tense. Someone is wearing what looks like an old-fashioned military officer's uniform, with large peaked Russian-style cap, tunic and trousers, with a wide red stripe tucked into boots. Beside him is another soldier-like figure, wearing a beret. Both are armed with long whips. They provide security, we are told. But who are they? Cossacks, is the answer. A walk around the town shows the "Cossacks" are providing security everywhere. Crimea never had Cossacks. They were in other parts of Ukraine, and the country is quite proud of its Cossack connection. One of the best Ukrainian vodkas, Hetman, is named after the title of a Cossack commander.

One would think that such a description was occurring in Simeiz during our March 2004 threads. However, it is not. It is an account from November 2006, over two and a half years after the situation in Simeiz. So some thread-indexes must be constructed from emails that are bound to one thread because of its temporal proximity to the thread. However, there are other discursively related emails across the timespan of the listserv that spans years, as well as emails that participate in multiple discourse threads.

**Inter-threaduality**

As I looked for naming practices that fit the Simeiz thread-index, some emails were included, which, at least initially, could have constituted their own separate threads. The most obvious example is the parent email “News from Crimea – URGENT” (email 1409742, #19 in Appendix C). An excerpt of the table is provided here:
Table 6 – Subject Headings and Naming Practices Comparison Excerpt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># email in thread</th>
<th>Simeiz Thread-index</th>
<th>Simeiz Naming Practices</th>
<th>Sub-index Destablization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>News from Crimea – URGENT (email 1409742)</td>
<td>“Crimean Tatars fought in Simferopol to avenge beaten compatriot,”</td>
<td>“…somebody is trying to destabilize the situation in Crimea before the Deportation Day,” “To investigate about skinheads,” “The Chairman of the Council of ministers of ARC Sergei Kunitsin is sure that certain forces “outside Crimea and Ukraine” are interested in destabilization of socio-political situation in Crimea,”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neither the email’s subject heading nor its body text had to do with the conflict in Simeiz (nor any other Southern coastal dwelling). In fact, the incident occurred in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea located in a valley in the middle of Crimea. The focus of this email was the deliberate destabilization of Crimea by outside forces who had something to gain. The first response was not until two and a half days later. First, the response had a different subject heading entitled “An Appeal to the World” (email 1409552). Second, the body of the text combines both the Simeiz and Simferopol discourses into one:

Reporting this incident, the Itar-Tass correspondent mentions the incident in Simeiz near Yalta where Crimean Tatars are trying to protect their lives and homes against the organized attacks by the "Cossack" paramilitary group,” “On March 23, 2004 a group of skinheads attacked and stabbed a 20 year old Crimean Tatar in Simferopol, Crimea (Ukraine), an incident that turned into a larger ethnic fight between the fascist skinheads and the Crimean Tatars. (Email # 1409552)
This is what I would like to term inter-threaduality, two discourses occurring separately in two separate threads, becoming one thread because of the naming practices employed therein by members of Crimea-L.

Inter-threaduality reflects what happens in face-to-face discourse. Imagine a room in which all have gathered to discuss the Crimean Tatar situation in Crimea. Imagine, then, that as discussion groups begin, each discussion group begins to go off on a tangent all of its own, only to bring it back into line with the overall conversation being had. Or imagine a family get-together in which members of the family with different interests interject, wherein others see a connection between the two discussions, making them one. Or moreover, imagine bringing the Crimean Tatar situation up with a friend, who had heard about the skinheads’ attack and how their appearance in Crimea was no accident. Inter-threaduality is the equivalent of such instances on a listserv, and it is key to understanding how discourses develop, evolve, and subsume each other.

Even though Wodak says that most CDA approaches do not promote any particular sampling procedures (27), should not naming practices be integral to many online CDA projects? As Wodak reminds, the analysis is “a matter of finding indicators for particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, on the basis of these results, collecting further data (theoretical sampling)” (27). What Chapter 3 begins to show and what Chapter 4 builds on is that naming practices are always indicators of what actually constitutes a discourse in asynchronous multi-party communication, that is, in email, especially within the listserv context.
CHAPTER FOUR: NAMING PRACTICES IN DETAIL

In Chapter 3, I argued that naming practices act as textual markers delineating discourses. Furthermore, I constructed thread-indexes in order to demonstrate what emails belong to a thread and those that do not. In addition, I discussed the need to understand the role of inter-threaduality in the construction of discourse in order to help frame thread mergers. In this chapter, I extend on the theoretical building in the previous chapter, demonstrating an otherizing dialectic of reinforcement (Said) as well as a rhetorically sovereign dialectic of resistance through specific naming practices found on Crimea-L.

Understanding specific naming practices requires understanding the transnational etic perspectives of most Crimea-L rhetors. For instance, at one point a member of the group calls Crimean Tatars a “minority.” From an etic perspective, most would agree. But emically, “minority” causes substantial problems for Crimean Tatars. Therefore, knowing that members of Crimea-L are from many different locations around the world helps readers understand why Crimean Tatar supporters make otherizing choices. They simply don’t realize that naming practices marginalize those whom they seek to benefit.

These transnational “voices” on Crimea-L lay hold to many different agendas, with many different ties to Crimean Tatars. There are those who desire a Tatarstan, echoing Crimean Tatars’ literary father Ismail Bey Gaspirali’s (1851-1914) intention to unite all Muslim “minorities” in the Russian Empire via language. As Mustafa Ö zgür Tuna states, “Gaspirali saw the Muslims of Russia as a united group that professed the same faith, spoke dialects of the same language, and had the same social characteristics and traditions” (271). Just within the Simeiz Thread alone, this solidarity is shown among deported peoples. For example, there is support
given for Chechens (“deported” from Chechnya for supposed collaboration with the German Wehrmacht during World War II ((Williams 104), emails 1409642, 1409212), Ingush (“deported” for the same reasons as the Chechens, email 1409212), and Meskhetian Turks (“deported” from Georgia for supposed pro-Turkish sentiments (email 1409522)).

Other voices include Crimean Tatar benefactors who show support for Crimean Tatar issues through research activities and financial support. Email 1409802 mentions a Romanian Crimean Tatar Cultural Evening being hosted in New York; email 1409522 promotes a lecture on The Meskhetian Turks, entitled “Of Pipelines and Homelands”; and email 1409342 is a Call For Papers for the 2004 Middle East & Central Asia Politics, Economics, and Society Conference. There are also many of Crimean Tatar descent, expressing solidarity from places such as Turkey and the USA (email 1409702). There are many Crimean Tatars who have immigrated to other parts of the world, mostly the USA, who hold positions in Crimean Tatar ex-pat organizations, trying to bring Crimean Tatar issues to the global community. The most recent example can be seen in email 2306054, in which the president of one such organization links to a recent article about the Crimean Tatar commemoration of “the deportation,” found in the Knoxville News Sentinel (Seidov). And finally, the remainder and majority of contributors to the listserv are Crimean Tatars, mostly an educated elite, with varying, and often times, conflicting and political opinions, having long histories of striving for Crimean Tatar rights.

The listserv is now mostly conducted in English, but it was once conducted in multiple languages, e.g., Turkish (Turkish diaspora and benefactors), Crimean Tatar, Russian (Uzbek diaspora, Crimean nationals, and benefactors), and English (UK/American diaspora and

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26 Email 1701132 is a prime example.
benefactors). However, in 2004, a separate listserv was begun for Turkish speakers called KIRIM.\textsuperscript{27} This listserv was not researched for naming practices, but the results of such an investigation could yield more results in favor of Rhetorical Sovereignty than Crimea-L because of the greater use of Crimean Tatar and the related language of Turkish. As outlined in Chapter 1, mother tongue referents should portray the indigenous worldview more closely than languages of wider communication (LWC) such as Russian, Turkish, and English. Adversely, Crimea-L, reserved for English as the LWC, should yield more forms of otherization.

I now turn to the thread within Crimea-L that has the most activity, at least 10 respondents with 22 comments (please refer to Table 3 in Chapter 2). It is the Balaklava Street Ay-Petri Thread. For the rest of Chapter 4, I will, first, give the reassembled thread narrative. Second, I will make claims regarding naming practice shifts within threads, and third, I detail how otherization and rhetorical sovereignty strategies are embodied in naming practices found within The November Crisis Thread.

\textbf{The Reassembled November Crisis}

The Balaklava Street email subject headings used naming practices which were easily recognizable and easily compiled into The Balaklava Thread (Appendix D). Some of those email subject headings included the following: “additional information about attack against Crimean Tatars at Balaklava,” “attack against Crimean Tatar settlement in Simferopol,” “Re: additional information about attack against Crimean Tatars at Balaklava,” “clash at Balaklava Str.,” “Re: additional information about attack against Crimean Tatars at Balaklava Str.,” “Photos about

\textsuperscript{27} Please see Chapter 2, Table 3 for more details.
Balaklava,” “BALAKLAVA,” and “Attack at Balaklava Street.” The email subject headings were also readily identifiable for the Ay-Petri Thread. Some of those headings included the following: “pogrom on Ay-Petri plateau,” “photos from Ay-Petri, Urgent!” “Ay-Petri events November,” and “Video record of Ay-Petri events.”

There was only one exception in each thread: the email heading of “NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES” (email 1701322) and “Let’s find an Austrian firm which Crimean Tatars were victimized!” As I describe in Chapter 3, by using a thread-index, we can justify their inclusion into the respective Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri Threads as sub-indexes. That is, the emails were as much about the events at Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri as they were about sub-discourses of politics.

Consequently, naming practices within a thread shift over time to become their own separate discourse, as topics of concern shift locally within the listserv. Naming practices started to veer away from the Balaklava Street discourse when a listserv member responded to the “NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES” email, passionately disagreeing with the initial post (email 1701822), which claimed that the Diaspora were not positioning themselves to help. She responded saying that, as part of the Diaspora, she can belong to two countries. Someone thanked her (email 1701922). Another disagreed with her in turn, and the thread became about what constitutes nationalism (email 1701302). And no more mention was made of the Balaklava Street discourse. The same was true in the Political Spat Thread discourse when a member of Crimea-L began to admonish another to have his/her political party condemn the actions of the local authorities.
While the dominant naming practices began by invoking the Balaklava Street Thread and then the Ay-Petri Thread, political naming practices such as “electoral list,” “block,” “parliamentarian elections,” “Crimean and Ukrainian National Governments,” “dissident,” “Iron Curtain,” “civil disobedience,” and “Human Rights” became more and more prevalent and the Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri naming practices fewer and fewer (see Appendix C and Table 8).

Table 7 – Graph Showing Discourse Shifts

What initially were the Political Spat and Diaspora Sub-Indexes quickly each became its own thread.

While they disappeared initially, the Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri events and naming practices were used later in the Politics Thread emails (see Appendix C), which meant that the Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri discourses became sub-discourses of this newly-formed Politics
thread (emails 1701432, 1701532, 1701042, 1701242). But they only became sub-discourses of the Politics thread once they had already *interthreaded* to become one thread (see Table 9).  

Table 8 – Graph Showing Discourse Subsuming Other Discourses

Naming practices show rhetoricians how discourse participants pick and choose from different levels of meaning in naming practices to suit their agendas. Only by analyzing the pattern of associations and frequencies of naming practices can we delineate these subtle transitions in online discourse. That is, naming practices give us a way to track threads combining into other threads, which then morph into sub-threads. These dynamics only further

28 There were also a few email subject headings containing references to both the Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri conflicts, e.g., “Re: Balaklava Street and Ai-Petri events” (email # 1701532).
confirm how threads mirror face-to-face discourse where conversations may begin on one topic and end up, at least in part, discussing something else or a number of different things depending on the number of participants in the group.

**The November Crisis Interthread**

The November Crisis emails constitute the inter-threaduality of not only the 2007 conflicts on Balaklava Street (The Balaklava Street thread-index) and Ay-Petri (The Ay-Petri thread-index), but also the Simeiz conflict of 2004 (The Simeiz thread-index).

The weakness of relying solely on subject headings to reconstruct related online listserv discourse can be seen clearly in email 1701312. Here the contributor says, “The ‘Cossacks’ and ‘Berkut’ once again staged an attack on Crimean Tatar settlement in Akmescit (Simferopol) beating up innocent Crimean Tatar women and children as they did before in Simeiz, Yalta.” Email texts are more deliberate than subject headings in helping us reassemble threads, for this case demonstrates that in the minds of Crimean Tatars, the Simeiz conflict thread of 2004 is connected with the Balaklava Street conflict thread of 2007 which in turn is connected to the Ay-Petri conflict thread of 2007 as well.

Through a close analysis of this discourse, it becomes clear that the Simeiz Thread is related to the Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri Threads because of the direct inclusion made by a Crimea-L contributor. We can also observe this relation across naming practices in emails from all three threads. The November Crisis Thread, then, becomes an interthread; in other words, the Balaklava Street, Ay-Petri, and Simeiz threads constitute the November Crisis Thread because of the similarities in naming practices as seen in Table 9.
Table 9 – Naming Practices Comparison in the November Crisis Interthread

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simeiz Thread</th>
<th>Balaklava Street Thread</th>
<th>Ay-Petri Thread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed special troops</td>
<td>Berkut</td>
<td>Berkut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>Militiaman</td>
<td>Special militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack/raid</td>
<td>Attacked/counter-attacked</td>
<td>Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroy</td>
<td>Destroy</td>
<td>Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash/brawl</td>
<td>Clashes</td>
<td>Mass clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocked</td>
<td>Strong resistance</td>
<td>Blockade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaten</td>
<td>Beat</td>
<td>Beaten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>Sevastopol Cossack Brigade/Paramilitary Organization</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured/stabbed</td>
<td>Injured/wounded</td>
<td>Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>Guns/stone throwing/dogs/snipers</td>
<td>Truncheons/shots/clubs/rubber bullets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>Detained</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The story that emerges from the November Crisis Interthread can be described in the following narrative, in which I have drawn on the language of listserv participants to reconstruct events in their words. After garnering the support of Crimean Tatars and upon Yushenko’s Orange Revolution that lasted from November 22nd, 2004 until January 23rd, 2005, and after the events of March 2004 in Simeiz (Yalta), then President Yushenko was on a visit to the Yalta Zoo in Crimea in May 2005. In email 1507636, a contributor had copied an Action Ukraine Report in which the reporter stated that Yushenko wanted to assure all the people of Crimea that he would do everything he could to return “all the land which was stolen from them.” Yushenko, in response to questions about “illegal land grabs in Crimea” stated, “When I see the beautiful Crimean nature, I feel very happy as a human being, but as a president I remember of all the violations that were going on here… all the questions about illegal land grabs in Crimea will be dealt with soon.” “Soon” came two years later in 2007. Two significant events transpired. First, in January 2007, President Yushenko signed an amendment to the Criminal Code, establishing
the criminal prosecution of “illegal occupation of land” (Email 1701012). Then in September 2007, Ukraine’s interior minister held a meeting in Sudak for Crimean militia officials and stated that the time had come to evict all Crimean Tatar “squatters” from occupied land (Email 1701012).

So first came the November 1st “attack.” As the listserv contributors in emails 1701312, 1701902, 1701012, 1701112, 1701212, 1701312, 1701412, 1701512, 1701612, 1701712, 1701812, 1701912 reported, on Thursday, November 1st 2007, Crimean Tatars, Russian Cossacks, and the Ukrainian Police had their first scuffle on Balaklava Street, Simferopol. During this “attack,” the Ataman (Cossack leader) lead the Cossack Brigade into the Crimean Tatar “settlement” and “beat” and “displaced” 30 Crimean Tatar women and children, “destroying” homes as they went. 300 more “bandits” (Russian Cossacks) arrived as Crimean Tatar numbers began to swell. 200 special police troops called “Berkut” or “MVD” also arrived. The Cossacks and MVD fended off Crimean Tatars as a wall around the “settlement” began to be built. Finally, 200 Crimean Tatars amassed and successfully “counterattacked” to win back the land… but only until the following day. On Tuesday, November 2nd, 2007, a larger contingency of “Berkut” and “Russian Cossacks” arrived at the “settlement” with “truncheons” and “rubber bullets.” This time, 28 Crimean Tatars were arrested.

Then came the arrests at Ay-Petri, approximately 40 miles due south on November 6th. Piecing the events together from different emails (e.g., 1701642 and 1701832), 1000 “MVD” came to Ay-Petri to forcibly remove Crimean Tatar businesses from the land, which by some accounts had been promised to an Austrian firm willing to invest 5 million dollars (email

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29 A more probable number is 600 MVD and 60 Crimean Tatars as reported in email 1701132.
1701622). 500 “Tatars” tried to prevent the demolitions and evictions, actually lying down in the snow in front of the bulldozers. 28 people were detained for a period of 3 to 13 days, 4 ended up in the hospital.

Two days later, on Thursday, November 8th 2007, Crimean Tatars encamped in the center of Crimea’s capital, Simferopol, in Lenin’s square, creating a “tent town” (email 1701832 says 2 army tents with more coming), demanding the removal of Anatoliy Mogilev, the chief of the MVD of the Ukraine and Crimea.

**Otherization and Rhetorical Sovereignty in the Interthread**

During the writing of the different emails that together comprise the November Crisis Interthread, English, Crimean Tatar, and Russian were employed throughout—even though the listserv was intended to be used by those wishing to communicate in English. Many instances of language use within this thread evidence otherization and resistance via naming practices. Thus, having reassembled the November Crisis Interthread and having accounted for the discourse shifts within the Interthread, the following section interprets English, Russian, and Crimean Tatar naming practices, employing Wodak’s three-fold contextual approach. The three contexts are 1) the immediate linguistic and social contexts, namely the Balaklava Street Thread from November 2007 and other related Crimea-L threads, 2) the related linguistic and social contexts during or close to November 2007 found from different online sources, and 3) different historical contexts prior to 2007. I subsequently make inferences as to what Otherization or Rhetorical Sovereignty strategies are being employed using the Discursive Naming Practice Strategies.

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30 I make every effort to correct the contributor’s spelling, punctuation, and grammar to report findings here in this thesis, trying not to betray the intended meaning.
Table 1 found in Chapter 2. I have chosen several naming practices to illustrate each strategy among Wodak’s adapted set of strategies.

As I described in Chapter 2, these strategies are: **predication**, which labels the marginalized positively or negatively; **intensification/mitigation**, which modifies the epistemic status of propositions for or against the marginalized; **perspectivation/framing**, which positions speakers from a hegemonic or marginalized point of view; **referential/nomination**, which is the creation of out- and in-groups; and finally, **argumentation**, which aims to justify positive or negative attributes of the marginalized.

**Strategy of Predication**

To begin, the discursive strategy of predication is about labels. Actors are labeled positively or negatively; therefore, naming practices are often evaluative and stereotypical.

**Samozaxvat**

One example of the strategy of predication can be seen in email 1701212, in which the Crimea-L writer provides a link to a report given on “Censor.net” (Цензор.нет), an online Ukrainian news forum. The article written in Russian, the LWC, uses the word “Samozaxvachennoi,” which means something like “squatted” and is an adjective form of the verb “to squat.” In other emails, it is translated as “illegal land grab” (email 1507636). It is a form of otherization because it is a Russian naming practice used to represent the Russian interpretation of the events transpiring in Crimea. “Squatters” is a deprecatory way to describe the Crimean Tatars. In other immediate online literary contexts, Crimean Tatars are constantly called Tatar squatters (татары-самозахватчики), which has the connotation of a Tatar land-
Consequently, pro-Russian sites and blogs, especially ones with political ties such as The Russian Community of Crimea (Русская Община Крыма) report how the “illegal squatting” by Crimean Tatars leaves a negative opinion among the local Crimean population (Русское Единство). The fact that Crimean Tatars are taking land does not “sit” well with the local population because they are not afforded the same right. Even Yushchenko’s comments on his trip to Yalta used naming practices like “stolen,” “illegal,” and “land grab.” For many Ukrainians, “squatting” is equivalent to “stealing.”

Within the November Crisis Interthread, however, Crimean Tatars do not call themselves samozaxvatchiki (самозахватчики). In email 1701021, for example, a Crimean Tatar describes “squatters” as “a small Crimean Tatar group of inhabitants,” preserving their “rights to receive land plots,” by “taking land for the construction of houses.” “Squatters” is never mentioned. The act of squatting is not mentioned either. Whereas, numerous online sources talk about “Самозахчатченной Татары Местности” (самозахватченной татары территории), which means "squatted territory by Tatars," Crimean Tatars time and again used the word “poselenie” (поселение) which means “settlement” (e.g., email 1701112). This can be understood as a form of rhetorical sovereignty. “Poselenie” also confirms the strategy of predication because it is an act of “labeling social actors positively.”

However, during my stay in Crimea (2001-2006), many Crimean Tatars used derivative forms of “samozaxvat” (самозахват) all the time when referring to themselves or their actions. At times it was used as a reference to the location of a person. At other times, it was used to refer to the action. In either case it was done with a type of pride, as if to say, “we're taking back our

31 “Samozaxvat” literally means “self-grabbing,” a not too flattering description.
It is my contention that Crimean Tatars were resisting marginalization with the use of "samozaxvat." "Samozaxvat." had been reappropriated and recontextualized to embody Crimean Tatar pride and identity. And as such, "samozaxvat" becomes a rhetorically sovereign naming practice.

**Strategy of Intensification/Mitigation**

A second strategy I will now focus on is that of intensification/mitigation. This strategy is designed to intensify or soften the illocutionary force a given naming practice. A number of different naming practices fall underneath this category. A Stalinist tactic that was adopted from the Tsars in order to continue to marginalize indigenous peoples during the Russian empire and early Soviet era was changing indigenous orthographies in order to make it difficult for indigenous peoples to retain their language. By creating many different scripts, literacy in one's mother-tongue was made more difficult to foster. Eventually, Crimean Tatars from different regions in the Soviet Union and world would not be able to communicate because they could not read each other's script. Indeed, Crimean Tatar scholars have long oscillated between Latin and Cyrillic scripts (Arabic in the past as well). Even as recently as February 2010, there were factions between Cyrillic and Latin script users (Radio Free Europe).

**Qirim**

The promotion of differing scripts is an otherizing strategy because the spelling in favor of Russian naming practices intensifies the illocutionary force of Russian rhetoric and thus mitigates the same for Crimean Tatar. This issue crops up from time to time in the listserv, and it comes through the act of transliterating. For example, in email 1701822, the name of the largest
Crimean Tatar newspaper is spelled “Golos Qirima” (meaning “Voice of Crimea”). “Qirima”\textsuperscript{32} is the transliterated Crimean Tatar version of Crimea while “Krima” (used in other emails on the listserv) is the Russian version. The most accepted Crimean Tatar alphabet is the Russian Cyrillic one in which an additional four letters have been added. They are “гъ,” “къ,” “нъ,” and “дж,” and each one is a combination of two letters to make a different sound, much like the English “th,” “ch,” or “sh.” The “гъ” and “къ” are designed to account for Crimean Tatar’s guttural sounds “gh” and “q” and are pronounced harshly.

“Qirima,” therefore, is an act of rhetorical sovereignty because, first, the transliteration most closely resembles the Crimean Tatar version of Crimea, “Qirim” (Кърым) in which “Qi” signifies the original guttural onset “Къ.” Secondly, whether or not the Crimea-L contributor knew that the Crimean Tatar paper is actually written in Russian and uses the Russian “Krim” instead of “Qirim,” the fact that it was purposely written “Qirim,” shows an intensification of the illocutionary force of “Krim.”

\textit{Strategy of Perspectivation/Framing}

A third strategy used quite often is the discursive strategy of Perspectivation/Framing, in which speakers position themselves with or against a Crimean Tatar’s point of view. The speaker can be of any ethnicity.

\textit{Minority}

In email 170812, a listserv member, supporting Crimean Tatars, bemoans the lack of attention the global media is giving the Balaklava Street and Ay-Petri events. In it, he frames

\textsuperscript{32} When “Qirim” is attached to “Golos,” which means “voice,” an ‘a’ is added to it. “Qirima” is in the genitive case, giving it the meaning “of Crimea.”
Crimean Tatars (and other ethnic groups) as minorities, which is a non-Crimean Tatar point of view because as Chapter 1 of this thesis presents, the term “minorities” hides the indigenous reality that is Crimean Tatars’. “Minority” was used in the following contexts within the November Crisis interthread:

- “minorities were the most suffering people among humanity all over the world”
- “EU countries minorities”
- “Muslim minorities”
- “Balaklava is just one reflection of such global anti-minority policies”

The “Crimean Tatars-as-minority” narratives allow the speakers to frame themselves as “the majority.” Crimean Tatars are not only put on par with all other local minorities, but such positioning does not afford them any special rights or benefits. In email 1701542, for example, Inna Bogoslovskaya, a political candidate in the Ukrainian Party of Regions was quoted as stating in response to the conflict in Ay-Petri:

> We must conduct a census on the Tatar population and radical Crimeans during the last period - there are Russians, and Ukrainians, and Greeks, all nationalities are represented in the peninsula. In its opinion, Ukraine must stop the repatriation of Tatars into the Crimea until those living in the peninsula are afforded a normal existence.33

In this related linguistic and social context, conceptualization of “minority” in “all nationalities” allows for Bogoslovskaya’s interpretation of nationalities to put Russians, Ukrainians, and Greeks on equal footing to claims of land in Crimea as that of their indigenous neighbors’. This

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33 Original text reads, “to the period when with the one with already living in the peninsula, will be provide ford normal stay.”
is a form of otherization because it is an effort by a member of a dominant group to promote her own “non-indigenous” rhetorical sovereignty at the expense of a marginalized group’s rhetorical sovereignty. Could she have claimed those three nationalities as indigenous? She had the opportunity, but she didn’t, and with good reason. We can contrast this with what I would characterize as a move that promotes sovereignty, by highlighting indigenous status rhetorically. For example, in email 1701812, a listserv member asks global media to “inform the world public of how the indigenous people of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, are treated by Ukraine and ethnic Russians in Crimea.” The rhetorical naming choice of Crimean Tatars is indigenous, not minority. Rhetorical sovereignty enables Crimean Tatars to choose their own discursive strategy. Indigenous is the Crimean Tatar perspective. Indigenous allows claims to land ownership; minority does not. Crimean Tatars are first in line as a people still in existence to claim to be original inhabitants of Crimea since time immemorial.

Aq-Mescit

There was a tendency of one particular contributor to constantly sign off using the Crimean Tatar word for Simferopol, which is “Aq-Mescit.” This is a Crimean Tatar referent, which makes it a good naming practice for illustrating rhetorical sovereignty. It is a naming practice of resistance and shows a strategy of Perspectivation because Aq-Mescit embodies Crimean Tatar identity and not “Simferopol.” “Aq-Mescit” in Crimean Tatar means “white mosque/temple.”

Stalin’s regime, soon after the “deportation” and the end of World War II, renamed the whole of Crimea in what many believe to be a move to obliterate any memory of Crimean Tatars. Email 1606140 recounts how upon returning to Crimea, Crimean Tatars:
…found their native places renamed, their lands cultivated by new owners, and many of
their holy places desecrated. The latter happened also to an ancient cemetery in the old
capital of the Crimean khans -- Bakhchysaray -- which had become a street market.
Crimean Tatar demands for the market to be removed have been ignored by local
authorities for years.

Crimean Tatars are not only attempting to take back their land; they are also trying to
take back their rhetorical sovereignty through the discursive strategy of perspectivation.

Cossacks

The discourse of the interthread uses the word “bandits” quite often. In email 1701902
for example, a group of unofficial thugs are called “Russian bandits.” This is a reference to the
“Sevastopol Cossack Brigade.”

Cossacks play an important role in the history of Crimean Tatars. They have been, since
centuries past, the sworn enemy to Crimean Tatars. Today, any time the official MVD confronts
Crimean Tatars, the self-proclaimed unofficial Cossacks are the first to attack and intimidate.
Because they are an unofficial group, their actions become actions of vigilantes at best if not
terrorists at worst (see email 1701422). Their leader is called an Ataman, who acts as the
commander. Cossacks embody otherization because the name Cossack legitimizes their anti-
Crimean actions among the Russian/Ukrainian public as well as the MVD. President
Dzhemiloglu explains that Cossacks are not really Cossacks at all:

Most of them [Cossacks] are from Russia -- from Rostov, Krasnodar, there are some from
Donetsk and Zaporizhya (in eastern Ukraine). There are different types of Cossacks,

Dzhemilev said. "There are Ukrainian Cossacks, with whom we have good relations, and
there are Russian Cossacks. But I must say that Cossacks in Crimea are clearly a provocation because there were never Cossacks here -- they are yesterday's Komsomol members [Communist youth organization] who have no links to real Cossacks.

(Krushelnycky)

Crimean Tatars in emails 1701112 and 1701312, however, call the Cossacks “Russian bandits.” This is a discursive naming practice strategy of Perspectivation used by Crimean Tatars because the naming practice reframes these “Cossacks” as mere “bandits” from another country.

Strategy of Referential/Nomination

Returning to Inna Bogoslovskaya’s rhetoric allows for a twist on yet another discursive naming practice strategy, that of nomination. The initial definition I gave this strategy was the construction of out groups by the “in” dominant group. However, Bogoslovskaya was attempting to make Crimean Tatars part of the “in” group, along with Russians, Ukrainians, and Greeks. Within this particular context, however, becoming an “out-group” is an act of rhetorical sovereignty. This raises a question for how I initially categorized the referential Naming Practice Objectives for referential/nominalization strategies, which might be modified as I have shown in Table 10.

Table 10 – Modified Referential/Nomination Discursive Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naming Practice Strategy</th>
<th>Naming Practice Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referential/nomination</td>
<td>Otherization – construction of out-groups in-groups</td>
<td>• Membership categorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhetorical Sovereignty – construction of in-groups out-groups</td>
<td>• Biological, naturalizing and de-personalizing metaphors and metonymies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Synecdoches (pars pro tot, totum pro pars)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For example, the naming practice of “indigenous” allows Crimean Tatars to be part of the “out-group,” contrary to what the politicians desire. They desire assimilation. They desire no out-groups: “Orange” President of Ukraine, Mr. Yushenko, very fashionably, on a few occasions, declared his intention to “assimilate Crimean Tatars” (email 1701022).

However, if we recall the Crimean Tatars becoming a part of an out-group called the *spetsposelemtsev*, we see that naming practices forming out-groups is also a form of otherization. Therefore, the discursive strategies of nomination can work both ways.

- ev, -ov, etc.

Dominant groups have long cultural histories of control. Besides toponymic naming practices, Chapter 1 of this thesis describes Stalin and the Soviet Union’s attempts to assimilate indigenous peoples via personal naming practices. Many times in Crimea-L there is resistance to Russian naming practices when it comes to people’s actual names. For example, most Russian surnames end with –ev, –ov, etc. Crimean Tatars were forced to assimilate into Russian culture, which meant that they had to follow similar Russian naming practices in their local passports/id’s, birth certificates, etc. Again, after the “deportation,” Crimean Tatar religious sites were destroyed, including mosques where birth certificates were kept (Gomart 305).

Children’s surnames were created from their father’s first name. If my father’s name was Khaybula, and I was his son, my name would be Christian “Khaybula–oglu.” If I was his daughter, my name would be Christian “Khaybula–kizi.” My son would be named Landen Christian–oglu, and my daughter Leila Christian–kizi. Surnames are dynamic and constantly change from one generation to the next. With the onset of Russification, surnames became static and each generation’s surname became their Crimean Tatar ancestor’s name who lived/died.
through the deportation. In the newly-formed Soviet Union, my name would become Christian “Khaybula–ev” if I were a boy and “Khabula–eva” if I were a girl.

In an act of rhetorical sovereignty, one contributor to the November Crisis thread constantly leaves off the Russian ending to his name. For example, he calls himself the equivalent of Christian “Khaybula.” But in his case, he leaves off “–oglu,” meaning “son of.” He probably does so because “Khaybula” was not his father’s name, but rather, his grandfather’s name. This is an act of rhetorical sovereignty that positions him outside Russian or Russified culture.

Many Crimean Tatars have started using the Crimean equivalent “–oglu,” meaning “son of.” In fact, the President of the Crimean Tatars often calls himself or is called Mustafa “Qirimoglu” instead of Mustafa “Jemilev,” where “Qirimoglu” means “son of Crimea.”

aga, -cigim, bey

In contrast, there are times when a listserv member uses Russian personal name endings on purpose. For example, in email 1701822, the writer introduces her Crimean peer saying Mr. X Y–ov, where X stands for his first name and Y for his last name. Yet in other emails such as email 1701432, she uses just his first name or his first name with the Crimean Tatar word “aga,” meaning “brother/Mr.,” or the dual suffices of “-cig” (meaning “dear”) and “-im” (meaning “my”), i.e., “X-cigim” is “my dear X.” Why?

The answer lies in the use of register. Apparently, the use of the Russian name ending such as –ev/-ov has a “higher” register than it’s Crimean Tatar counterpart. That is, a Crimean Tatar is privileging a Russian register as the more official register. It is a rhetorical choice. But what is the reason? Do Russian names have more prestige? Is there a silent pressure to sound
“Russian” when trying to use a formal tone? If it were merely code-switching, why not use the Crimean Tatar official equivalent register of “sir,” which is “bey”? Instead, Russian is adopted to sound official. This is no longer a nomination issue; this becomes an inadvertent, otherizing Perspectivation strategy, where the Crimean Tatar is positioned outside an official context by choice to use Russian instead of Crimean Tatar.

That being said, other acts of resistance often arise from rhetorically sovereign moments of naming practices. In email 1701432, for example, “X-cigim,” “X aga,” and “X” are used in favor of “X-ov.” In like manner, the next person to reply to the thread (email 1701632) used the Crimean Tatar formal “bey” meaning “Mr./Sir.” It shows that the more resistant naming practices are used, the more they become the norm in conversation. Again, –bey (“sir”), –cigim (“my dear”), hanum (“lady”), aga (“brother,” “Mr.”), or without the –ev, –eva endings are all efforts of creating an out-group, which is a nomination naming practice of resistance (of Crimean Tatar)

Within the November Crisis thread, those who practice rhetorical sovereignty with their own name also often practiced rhetorical sovereignty in email salutations and valedictions. Typically, both were done using Arabic: salutations were typically “Selam Aleykum” (“Peace be upon you”), and the second was “Allah Akbar” (“God is great”) (email 1701022).

Strategy of Argumentation

The strategy of argumentation intends to justify negative or positive attributes as reasons for political inclusion or exclusion.
Chapter 1 of this thesis described how the naming practice of “Tatar” is used pejoratively among dominant groups, not just in Crimea but also around the Russian Federation. “Tatar,” in this case, can be viewed as instantiating the *strategy of intensification* in favor of the dominant epistemic view of “Tatar.” If “Tatar” is a naming practice that portrays a negative stereotypical image of “Crimean Tatars,” it can be used to further promote negative “Tatarness.” In fact, if Russians use “Crimean Tatar,” Crimeans become a sub-group of all the Tatars, thereby making Tatars as much outsiders as they are indigenous, and all claims to land and special rights disappear with history. But many Crimeans reappropriate the name “Crimean Tatar.” It is said to point to their Crimean as well as Tatar ancestry. It references those who were there before the “Tatars” and to outside invaders.

In email 1409032, the Romanian Cultural Institute hosted a celebration for Crimean Tatar culture. In it, a Mr. Halim Saylik recited a poem called, “My Tatarness,” an obvious claim to “Tatar” as a positive attribute, and therefore to recontextualization, which I identify as an act of rhetorical sovereignty.

One would think that adopting the sole name “Crimean” would be a logical choice of resistance in as much as the Chechens or Ingush don’t have any further self-imposed marginalizing autonyms. And whether or not “Crimeans” can agree to the best autonym, the three autonyms that are used in the following email point to Powell’s cultural schizophrenia. The “Tatar” name creates a more complex rhetorical negotiation, given the history I have discussed.

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34 Edward Allworth states this is the Crimean Tatars’ unofficial anthem after “I Pledge” became too dangerous to recite.
Do Crimeans themselves reappropriate and invoke a positive, appreciated, image of “Tatar,” making “Tatar” a trope of resistance to support their claim to rhetorical sovereignty?

In email 1701722, the writer uses three separate autonyms for “Crimeans.” Those autonyms are “Tartars,” “Tatars,” and “Crimean Tatars,” all of which refer to the same people. And this writer is not alone. This happens everywhere in Crimean Tatar literature, even in this thesis. If Crimean Tatars decide to call themselves just Crimeans, it would be a strategy of referential/nomination on their terms. Crimeans could set the terms of the debate (a la Lyons). I think Crimean Tatars should pay more attention to what they do in their mother tongue and apply it to their adopted tongue. When Crimeans use their mother tongue, they often refer to themselves as Qirimli, simply “Crimeans,”[35] but I have rarely heard Crimean Tatars call themselves “Krimchanin,” which is the Russian version of simply “Crimeans.” “Krimchanin” is a Russian referent, often reserved for the inhabitants of Crimea, interestingly enough, not Crimean Tatar. Not choosing to call themselves “Krimchanin” is also a decision for rhetorical sovereignty.

Deportation

Finally, email 1701022 uses the words “deportation” and “deported” to describe the events that occurred during World War 2, which Crimean Tatars commemorate every year. This type of thinking employs an argumentation strategy because the naming practice of “deportation” tries to justify the negative attributes of what happened in 1944. In addition, the rhetorical sovereignty equivalent is the Crimean Tatar “Surgun,” (exile) (see emails 1409032 and 1701012).

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[35] This would be something to look for in the KIRIM Yahoo! Group.
While in Crimea, I had the opportunity to pursue this idea with a Crimean Tatar elder while transporting him to a Duwa (Muslim prayer service) in which he was going to bless our children through Arabic recited prayers. I asked him what the difference was between the Russian words “deportatsiya” (депортация or deportation) and “viselenie” (выселение or exile). He said that foreigners were deported. I asked him what seemed an obvious question: why would Crimean Tatars choose to call themselves “foreigners” every year when they commemorate the “deportation”? I asked him why they don’t commemorate the “viselenie” instead because the “deportation” is always referred to as “surgun” (exile) while speaking Crimean Tatar. Some members of the Crimea-L understand and acknowledge the difference. Others have yet to do so.

The Land of Crimea

I put the discussion concerning land possession at the conclusion of this chapter because not only is it most closely associated with sovereignty, but it has embodied a large part of Crimean Tatar identity since the exile. Moreover, it shows how the use of Russian naming practices causes a cultural schizophrenia Crimean Tatars can ill-afford if they are in search of rhetorical sovereignty.

Even though there are many ways to refer to “homeland” in Russian and English, there are not many ways in Crimean Tatar. Whereas Russians can refer to “homeland” with, for example, the use of “rodina” (родина), “otechestvo” (отечество) and “zemlya moih predkov” (земля моих предков), Crimean Tatars use “vatan” for all three.
Vatan as Motherland

First, there is an appeal to Crimea as “motherland.” This word is typically used as a naming practice for the “Soviet motherland” (email 2307444). In Beria’s fabricated report, he stated that about 20,000 Crimean Tatar deserters were helping the Nazis. He stated, “From sections of the Red Army in 1944 deserted more than twenty thousand Tatars who betrayed the Motherland, and went over to serve the Germans with arms in their hands and fought against the Red Army” (email 1902257). Edward Allworth notes of special importance that the term “motherland” (rodina) had never been defined in writing until the 1950’s, when the Great Soviet Encyclopedia introduced the term “rodina” as a term used to refer to a country of birth and one’s place of citizenship (262). This subtle subversion was not lost on Crimean Tatars and other indigenous groups, who had only been sent into exile less than 10 years prior. One’s place of birth is one’s “motherland.” And even though the first generation Crimean Tatars were the only ones born in Crimea, they knew their children and children’s children would be born in “Mother Russia.” In fact, the Presidium of the Soviet Supreme Council ordered Crimean Tatars (as well as the Chechens and Ingush) to never return to their “прежним местам жительства” (“former places of residence”) (182). Why didn’t they just say “rodina”? It is obvious. There could only be one “mother,” and she was Russia.

When in conversation with Crimean Tatars during the summer of 2012, I asked them to tell me what was their “rodina.” A very big discussion ensued with much disagreement. What they agreed on was the Encyclopedic definition. “Rodina” by many of the younger generation—that is 3rd generation Crimean Tatars since the forced exile—was defined as their place of birth, which meant that Crimea for them was not “rodina.” Uzbekistan was “rodina.” 2nd generation
Crimean Tatars, who were born in exile typically called “Russia” their “rodina,” the former Soviet Union. Crimea was not their “rodina” either.

However, both generations said that the first generation Crimean Tatars, those who were in their 20’s when they were forcibly removed from Crimea, repeatedly told them that Crimea is their “rodina.” In email 2009339, “motherland” is used to refer to Crimea: “Many thanks to members who inform and acknowledge each other and the international groups like the UN and the EU about our problems and struggle in motherland.” There is a switch to “Crimea as motherland” because Crimean Tatars have been repatriated to a far enough extent to be able to talk about Crimea, once more, in terms of Motherland. Therefore, what once was a form of otherization becomes a form of rhetorical sovereignty where Crimean Tatars have reappropriated the “rodina” phrase.

Lilia Bujurova, a famous Crimean Tatar writer and reporter, wrote a poem in 1989 entitled, “What is the Homeland’s Scent?” in which a Crimean Tatar in exile (Uzbekistan) asked his father to talk about the house where he, his son, was born so that he could pass it on to his son. In the first line, she used the Russian “rodina”: “Как пахнет Родина?” meaning “of what does the Homeland smell?” The last line ended: “…пахнет моя Родина надеждой,” which means, “my Homeland smells of hope” (adapted from Williams 457). It embodies the mixed memories of those Crimean Tatars who remember the “deportation” with those who were born in their father’s homeland and second generation’s children’s repatriation to Crimea hopefully becoming realized. Crimea as “motherland” is a transgenerational representation fostered by epigenetic memory, fostered through the use the “rodina” naming practice (adapted from Lim 36)

36 In email 1902157, Philip P. Pan reported that 74% of Crimean residents now consider Ukraine their motherland.
and Brunet). And as such, Crimea as “Motherland” in email 1701022 is an appeal to perspectivation where Crimea as “rodina/motherland” is now a Crimean Tatar point of view.

_Vatan as Homeland_

Crimean Tatars may have many motherlands, yet in email 1701312 the writer says, “Still trying to settle in the only homeland they have!” The default Russian word for homeland, again, is “rodina.” In this case, there is a second usage of “rodina.” “Rodina” as “homeland” is more of a place of sacredness, familiarity, ease, and security (251), “attaching ethnic group to territory” (262). This “intangibility of homeland” has provided Crimean Tatars “immaterial power” (270). And as Allworth points out, since the Crimean Tatar’s second Qurultay (congress), their purpose has been to return “to their own historic Homeland – Crimea – and the restoration of the national statehood that existed prior to the deportation of 1944” (259). “Homeland,” with this type of description, is Crimea.

So, in English, “homeland,” especially in combination with “only” signifies a strategy of intensification in favor of Crimean Tatars and therefore a form of rhetorical sovereignty. However, if “homeland” is to be understood as “rodina,” for second and third generation Crimean Tatars, it acts as a form of otherization against Crimean Tatars, who, by definition, are forced to call a land other than Crimea their place of birth or “rodina.”

_Vatan as Fatherland_

Moreover, “rodina” as “Motherland” is contrasted to the Russian word “Otechestvo” (fatherland), a term that by Allworth’s estimation created “a profound ambivalence toward identification with the primary homeland” (270). As an illustration, he writes about how on
January 19th, 1854 at the outbreak of the Crimean War (under unknown pressure), the recognized and czarist appointed Crimean Tatar leader (Seyyid Jelil Efendi) wrote:

And all of us Muslims, small and large, must be sincerely loyal to the Czar and to the Homeland [Otechestvo] and begrudge neither life nor blood for them if it is demanded of us for their defense; also [we] must not say and think reprehensibly and adversely [toward] the Russian homeland. (261-62)

In addition, in “Crimean Tatars: Past and Present (the 50th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people),” we are reminded of a newspaper issue published in “Vatan Xadimi,” translated “Servant of the Fatherland” (Djemileva et al.).

What once was Russia, now many believe is Ukraine, but that number is continuing to fall. “In 2006, about 74 percent of Crimean residents regarded Ukraine as their motherland, but by 2008-2009, that figure had fallen to 40 percent” (Pan). What was even more striking was that one in four believed Crimea was both Ukraine and Russia (National Security and Defence).

During the same summer I mentioned earlier, I spoke to many Crimean Tatars about Ukraine’s chances in the Olympics. Some were very patriotic toward Ukraine, but there were many who fondly remembered the USSR’s dominance. This is not uncommon among all nationalities of the former Soviet Union. Many still say that despite all the freedoms they now have, things were still better back then in light of the corruption, hyperinflation, and hardships they have had to face during the past 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2011, the Pew Research Center published a report in which they state that there are more reservations now, and that 45% of Ukrainians favor strong-handed (‘Putin-like’) leaders than a free market economy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). This nostalgia for the former Soviet
Union as “otechestvo” exacerbates the cultural schizophrenia that Crimean Tatars already face: Russia as father, Crimea as mother.

*Vatan as Ancestral Land*

Fourth, an appeal to the Crimean Tatar’s “ancestral land” occurs over 100 times in the listserv, which is significant. With one’s “rodina” referring to Uzbekistan, Russia, and/or Crimea, what exactly is Crimea?

The naming practice many have chosen on the listserv is “zemlya moix predkov” (земля моих предков), “the land of my ancestors.” This naming practice leaves no ambivalence and works well at delivering illocutionary force in favor of Crimean Tatar, thereby embodying a form of the strategy of intensification that I identify as rhetorical sovereignty.

*Just... Vatan*

Russian “rodina” has brought confusion to Crimean Tatars because it has partially diffused the potential attachment Crimean Tatars may have had with Crimea. Therefore, “rodina” became reappropriated. However, the confusion is diffused in Crimean Tatar because “vatan” is always used. In excerpts from a poem promoted by the Mejlis to honor Mustafa Djemeloglu, Aqqi Xalil writes:

… Осюп кельди Мустафа ант этти озъ халкъына ешль ада Ватан(vatan)ымызгъа авдет ёлун ачъмагъа …Ватан (vatan) ичюн курешке яш ве къартны котерды … Он секиз йыл апсханеде Ватан (vatan) ичюн отура … Ватан(vatan)гъа къайтаджагъымызын ишандыра о халкъкъа.

Translated it means:
... Brother Mustafa grew up to give his word to his nation... to open the way to our motherland, the Green Valley. To fight for the motherland, he raised young ones and old ones... He spent 18 years in prison for the motherland... He is convincing people that we’re going to return to the motherland. (translated by Elvira Berry)

"Vatan" is Crimean Tatar for “homeland,” “motherland,” “fatherland,” and “ancestral land.” It is the naming practice of choice because it is in the language of Crimean Tatar and is tied closely to resistance. In the same newspaper publication entitled “Vatan Xadimi,” (again translated as “Servant of the Fatherland”) an article describes a Turkish underground youth organization named “Vatan,” which kept in touch with their Crimean Tatar “compatriots” and disseminated illegal monarchical literature (Djemileva et al.). “Vatan” helps describe all the discursive strategies that I have discussed in this chapter. “Vatan” is a form of predication because it labels the Crimean Tatar homeland positively; it is a form of intensification because it replaces “rodina” and modifies the epistemic status in favor of Crimean Tatars; it is a form of perspectivation because it positions the speaker using it from the Crimean Tatar perspective; it is a form of nomination because it creates a people of the “vatan”; and it is a form of argumentation because it justifies the positive relationship Crimea has with Crimean Tatars.

The naming practices I have covered in this chapter are samozaxvat, aq-meqsit, qirim, Cossacks, homeland, deportation, surgun, vatan, minority, and -ev –ov and -oglu –kizim endings. All of these naming practices strive to either otherize and/or form some type of resistance or have been reappropriated to signify rhetorical sovereignty. They were interpreted employing Wodak’s three-fold contextual approach to varying degrees. A fuller study would include a deeper historical analysis, which was outside of the scope of this thesis). It also would
look to theoretical groundwork that has emerged from the contexts of colonization closer to the geographic location that is the subject of study.

Epilogue

Naming practices are at the heart of rhetorical sovereignty because they are also at the heart of identity. I am Christian. My name helps form my identity as I so choose. Peter Kreeft in lecturing about the language of beauty, reminds the audience of what Tolkien once said in one of his letters:

the meaning of… words cannot be made 'obvious', least of all to adults, who have stopped listening to the sound because they think they know the meaning… They think the word *argent* 'means' *silver*. [The dictionary says so.] It does not. It and silver have a reference to x, or the chemical Ag, but in each case x is clothed in a totally different phonetic incarnation, x + y or x + z; and these do not have the same meaning, not only because they sound different and so arouse different emotional responses, but also because they are not in fact used … in the same way. (Language of Beauty – part 1: Glory and Splendor)

“Crimean Tatar” is not the same as “Crimean.” “Exile” is not the same as “deportation.” “Khaybula-ev” is not the same as “Khaybula-oglu.” “Minority” is not the same as “indigenous.” Moreoever, each naming practice arouses an emotional response and mental picture that is unique to the individual who uses and/or hears it. “Tatar” is used differently by Crimean Tatars and Russians because it provokes different emotional responses. When President Yushchenko ran for office, his opponents used the following slogan: “Yushchenko will give the Crimea to the
Tatars,” but it is noteworthy that the slogan did not say give Crimea “back” to the Tatars (Klimenko). “Back,” as Allworth reminds, “implies sameness” (267). Many began to identify the “Orange” party with “Tatars.” In fact the idea was “Kiev = Ukrainian nationalists = Crimean Tatars” (Klimenko). Everyone who voted for Yushchenko, by default, also voted for Crimean Tatar sovereignty. To harness that support is to harness emotional support. Crimean Tatars must continue to take control of not only their self-determination but also their rhetorical representations.

Furthermore, for different Crimean Tatars themselves, “Crimean Tatar” has different identities with many different layers. So even though “Tatar” for Russian speakers might be intended as a form of otherization, for Crimeans, it is a form of rhetorical sovereignty. For example, in one of my first encounters with a Crimean in his home, a colleague of mine and I sat on his couch as we waited contentedly for him to bring the customary coffee, tea, and snacks for visitors (he was unmarried and living with his father and brother). As he began to talk to us about his Crimean heritage, he said that he was from the northern dialect of “Crimean Tatar,” called Nogai. He said that his particular heritage came from Mongol invaders dating back all the way to Genghis Khan. When he got to this point in his narrative, all of a sudden, he reached for the couch between my colleague and me, pulled out a jeweled dagger from under the cushion, unsheathed it, held it above his head, and proclaimed that they (Nogai) were the true Tatars! After the initial shock, I realized that this was an excellent example of efforts in Crimean rhetorical sovereignty, which in this case was an effort in making sure Crimean Tatars maintain some semblance of “Tatarness.” It is an effort in making sure that “Tatar” doesn’t board the deportation train of identity. Like this thesis has already shown, there are some “Crimeans” who
do not adopt the “Tatar” designation. This is much an effort in Crimean rhetorical sovereignty as those who would never deny their “Tatarness.”

In some ways, the existence of otherization shapes the ways in Crimeans frame their marginalization and to admonish the government for indigenous status and rights. In an email thread from June of 2012, a Crimean Tatar Representative to the United Nations Indigenous Peoples Forum said:

I would like to make one correction on this documentary film pertaining to the "incorrect" introduction of Chairman of Mustafa Cemiloglu as the "President of the Crimean Tatar Association". Taking note that, Chairman Mustafa Cemiloglu is not a president of a non-profit organization, he is the Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis of Crimea, Ukraine (a self-governing body) and, Mustafa Cemiloglu is the People's Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, which is the Ukrainian Parliament of Crimea, Ukraine. (Email #2206593)

In it, she rejects the labeling of Mustafa Cemilev as “President of the Crimean Tatar Association” in favor of a rhetorically sovereign naming practice of Mustafa Cemiloglu as “Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis of Crimea, Ukraine”. Her version is rhetorically sovereign simply because she saw the marginalizing effects of the other, and chose for herself a Crimean alternative.

37 The member’s introduction states, “Al-Jazeera's publication on the production by Ahmet Seven, who is a filmmaker and journalist, did a documentary film on the Crimean Tatars deportation on May 18, 1944 consists of three parts: "Deportation", "Arabat" and "Return". The film has been effectively produced in communicating an excellent account of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars on May 18, 1944.”
This example is important because the naming practice noted by the Crimea-L member came from a non-Crimean Tatar, and one who was not pro-Russian nor necessarily pro-Ukrainian. In fact, he is a documentarian from Turkey and directed a film produced by Al-Jazeera, and, therefore, probably has more solidarity with Crimean Tatars than most Russian and Ukrainian media channels. In fact, the documentary was done to highlight the plight of the Crimean Tatars to a global audience. Because of such, other members, who are Crimean Tatars themselves, came to the documentarian’s defense, noting such an otherizing description was a “minor oversight” (email # 2206793). So, it is not the demographic that helps determine the voice’s marginalizing efforts. It is the naming practices employed by any demographic that makes “the voice” an otherizing or rhetorically sovereign one. Such “accidental” acts of otherization today create opportunities for rhetorical sovereignty to be highlighted and admonished among those within the Crimean Tatar body. As in this case, every instance gives significant emotional collateral to pursue Crimean Tatar identity.

Because I am a member of the Crimea-L group, I posted a comment in this thread, which was quoted by the United Nations representative in response to the “minor oversight” response. In it I say,

Naming practices are at the heart of marginalization of all indigenous peoples. If Crimeans (I use this naming practice on purpose) are not willing to take an active role in creating and forming their own naming practices, other cultures/nations will do it for them, affecting Crimean identity for the worse unfortunately. (email # 2206593)
Rhetorical sovereignty requires *self*-framing. Others follow the naming practices then instituted, or purposely counter or modify them in a way that promotes a differing ideology that fits their identity better.

Whereas rhetorical theory has identified narratives as efforts in rhetorical sovereignty, I have taken the theory one step further. Naming practices make possible narratives that marginalize and resist. Not only can investigation into naming practices be made via different data-driven Critical Discourse Analysis approaches, but rhetoric studies can also make claims about dialectics of reinforcement and resistance by identifying naming practices that engage in otherizing and rhetorical sovereign strategies. And finally, Critical Discourse Analysis approaches in online environments can begin to use naming practice as indicators of discourse delimitations in computer mediated communication.
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER
Approval of Exempt Human Research

From: UCF Institutional Review Board #1
FWA00000351, IRB00001138

To: Christian Carlos Berry

Date: April 08, 2013

Dear Researcher:

On 4/8/2013, the IRB approved the following activity as human participant research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review: Exempt Determination
Project Title: Crimean Rhetorical Sovereignty
Investigator: Christian Carlos Berry
IRB Number: SBE-13-09252
Funding Agency: Grant
Title:
Research ID: N/A

This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made and there are questions about whether these changes affect the exempt status of the human research, please contact the IRB. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request in iRIS so that IRB records will be accurate.

In the conduct of this research, you are responsible to follow the requirements of the Investigator Manual.

On behalf of Sophia Dziegielewski, Ph.D., L.C.S.W., UCF IRB Chair, this letter is signed by:

Signature applied by Patria Davis on 04/08/2013 10:53:25 AM EDT

IRB Coordinator
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email Subject Heading</th>
<th>Naming practices which fit the Thread-index of the “Simeiz discourse”</th>
<th>Varying sub-indexes of sub discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Re: Ethnic tension in Crimea (email 1409602)</td>
<td>tension, sharpness, tense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 From a girl of Crimean descent (email 1409702)</td>
<td>gripes, issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Violations against Crimean Tatars (email 1409902)</td>
<td>raid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Re: Violations against Crimean Tatars (email 1409112)</td>
<td>Tension, challenge, demand</td>
<td>suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Additional information about Simeiz (email 1409312)</td>
<td>“prevent by all means,” protect, blocked, occupied, destroy</td>
<td>“if Crimean Tatars won’t intervene, nobody will suffer”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 There is the beginning the clash and bloodship against Crimean Tatars (email 1409412)</td>
<td>Clash, “bloodship,”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Continuation… (email 1409612)</td>
<td>“5 more trucks with armed special troops”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Violations against Crimean Tatars (2nd repeat) (email 1409912)</td>
<td>“protest camp,” “Cossacks destroyed two dwellings,” “Crimean Tatars began to fight with Cossacks in order to stop the massacre,” “the Cossacks were forced to leave the territory of the protest camp,” “violent actions,” “destroying the houses,” “the conflict”</td>
<td>“criminal actions of the Simeiz authorities and the Cossacks’ raid,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Re: Violations against Crimean Tatars (email # 1409022)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Re: Violations against Crimean Tatars (email # 1409122)</td>
<td></td>
<td>International campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Re: Violations against Crimean Tatars (email # 1402122)</td>
<td>“***Simeiz events,” “two-three days of conflict,”</td>
<td>“issue a call to the international community”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 To (intentionally omitted) will not hurt, but specific? (email 1409622)</td>
<td>Interference, conflict</td>
<td>International actions, letters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 To (intentionally omitted – different name than above) (email 1409632)</td>
<td>Protest camps</td>
<td>“they have some responsibility to respond to people’s letters”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 News from Crimea: The Golos Kryma newspaper is cut off from budget funding (email 1409432)</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Crimean Tatar “Golos Kryma” (The Voice of Crimea) newspaper does not have budget funding anymore”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Golos Crimea silenced (email 1409632)</td>
<td></td>
<td>“ceasing… of Golos Kryma… due to “funding reasons” at a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Email Subject Heading</td>
<td>Naming practices which fit the Thread-index of the “Simeiz discourse”</td>
<td>Varying sub-indexes of sub discourses</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Ongoing events in Simiez (email 1409932)</td>
<td>“Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Mr. Djemilev held a meeting with the Prosecutor of the Crimea Mr. Galtsov. The issue regarding <strong>provocation</strong> inspired by the <strong>Cossacks at Simeiz</strong> who were called on by the member of the Crimean Parliament Mr. Yanaki to <strong>forcibly</strong> insist on his land interests on the South Coast of the Crimea,” “<strong>provoked conflict,</strong>” “methods of settling down the <strong>conflict</strong> and interethnic <strong>tension</strong> in the Crimea”</td>
<td><strong>time when social tension echoing sharp land issues between</strong> regional and local political authorities and Crimean Tatar people in southern coastal regions of Crimea”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 RE: [Crimea-L] From a girl of Crimean descendent (email 1409042)</td>
<td>“<strong>Cossacks</strong>” and the militia are allowed to <strong>attack</strong> the Crimean Tatars’ tentative homes,” “blatantly violated,” “they choose to stand strong against their armed <strong>attacker</strong>”</td>
<td>“<strong>demand for the European Commission,</strong>” “including possible pressure against other state <strong>oppressions</strong> (Russia, Ukr., Mid-Asia ...)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Simiez incident! WARNING! This is a large file with 4 photographs!!! (email 1409542)</td>
<td>“Crimean Tatars <strong>fought</strong> in Simferopol to <strong>avenge</strong> beaten compatriot,”</td>
<td><strong>OPRESSION OF CRIMEAN TATARS CONTINUES AS THEY PREPARE TO COMMEMORATE THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF SURGUN!”</strong> “The peaceful <strong>struggle</strong> of the Crimean Tatar people against, first the Soviet and now Russian-Ukrainian oppression intensified in southern shores of Crimea,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 News from Crimea – URGENT (email 1409742)</td>
<td></td>
<td>“…somebody is trying to <strong>destabilize</strong> the situation in Crimea before the Deportation Day,” “To investigate about <strong>skinheads,</strong>” “The Chairman of the Council of ministers of ARC Sergei Kunitsin is sure that certain forces “outside Crimea and Ukraine” are interested in <strong>destabilization</strong> of socio-political situation in Crimea,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 News: Skinheads stroke with knife into Crimean Tatar’s back (Qurultay.org) (email</td>
<td>“<strong>Skinheads stroke</strong> with knife into Crimean Tatar's back,”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email Subject Heading</td>
<td>Naming practices which fit the Thread-index of the “Simeiz discourse”</td>
<td>Varying sub-indexes of sub discourses</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 1409152) An Appeal to the World (email 1409552)</td>
<td>“Reporting this incident, the Itar-Tass correspondent mentions the incident in Simeiz near Yalta where Crimean Tatars are trying to protect their lives and homes against the organized attacks by the &quot;Cossack&quot; paramilitary group.” “On March 23, 2004 a group of skinheads attacked and stabbed a 20 year old Crimean Tatar in Simferopol, Crimea (Ukraine), an incident that turned into a larger ethnic fight between the fascist skinheads and the Crimean Tatars.”</td>
<td>“Instead of reporting the incident objectively how the &quot;Cossacks attacked and destroyed two tentative Crimean Tatar homes, the Inter-Tass correspondent only reports that ‘...group of Crimean Tatars have recently turned up with posts and metallic rods…they beat up television operators…in the village of Simeiz in early March.’”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Crimean Tatars worried over Fascist Groups in Crimea [Glavred.info] (email 1409752)</td>
<td>“The Majlis also reported an attack on two Crimean Tatars by a group of skinheads to the police on March 2,” “Earlier, up to nine people were injured in a fight between Crimean Tatars and Russians in a Simferopol bar on March 23.”</td>
<td>“the Majlis drew police attention to the skinhead movement in November 2003, when a memorial plaque installed at the Salhyrka Park in commemoration of the 50-th anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars was disfigured.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 A Crimean Tatar boy was found dead (email # 1409852)</td>
<td>“the 17 year old Crimean Tatar boy Vadzhapov Riza was found dead in Sudak”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Provocative Actions</td>
<td>“Protest camp of the Crimean Tatars at Simeiz,” “The persons observing the aquapark surroundings walked around area between camp and aquapark. Having assured that they turned attention of the Crimean Tatars they immediately left. According to eye-witnesses, the aforementioned car went to &quot;Blue Bay&quot; villa situated to the south-east of aquapark. Approximately at 9 p.m. the Crimean Tatars being at their houses heard shouts of ***ZIT HEIL.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 [Fwd: Crimean Assembly subjected to arson attack]</td>
<td>“Inter-ethnic relations in the region have been described by several sources as &quot;tense&quot;, “recent unrest that included a brawl between Crimean Tatars and Slavs in a Simferopol bar on 23 March.”</td>
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APPENDIX C: NOVEMBER CRISIS INTERTHREAD PROGRESSION
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Email #</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>additional information about attack against Crimean Tatars at Balaklavska Str. in Simferopol</td>
<td>1701221</td>
<td>poprom on Ay-Petri plateau</td>
<td>1701422</td>
<td>Siv Window on Eurasia: Ukrainian Militia, Russian Cossacks Join Force</td>
<td>1701322</td>
<td>NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES</td>
<td>1701322</td>
<td>Re: (Crimea-L) poprom on Ay-Petri plateau</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>attack against Crimean Tatar settlement in Simferopol</td>
<td>1701322</td>
<td>fotos from Ay-Petri Urgent</td>
<td>1701822</td>
<td>Balaklava Street and Ai-Petri events</td>
<td>1701722</td>
<td>Re: NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES</td>
<td>1701322</td>
<td>Dear Kema</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Re: (Crimea-L) additional information about attack against Crimean Tatars at Balaklavska Str. in Simferopol</td>
<td>1701522</td>
<td>Let's find an Austrian firm which Crimean Tatars were victimized!</td>
<td>1701922</td>
<td>Re: NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES</td>
<td>1701432</td>
<td>Re: Re: (Crimea-L) poprom on Ay-Petri plateau</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>clash at Balaklavska Str</td>
<td>1701832</td>
<td>Ay-Petri events November 9, 08:30</td>
<td>1701032</td>
<td>Re: (Crimea-L) Re: NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES</td>
<td>1701532</td>
<td>Re: (Crimea-L) Balaklava Street and Ai-Petri events</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Re: (Crimea-L) additional information about attack against Crimean Tatars at Balaklavska Str. in Simferopol</td>
<td>1701142</td>
<td>AY-PETRI forolan/photos from Ai-Petri events</td>
<td>1701932</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar Survival Games v. 1.6 (USA edition)</td>
<td>1701732</td>
<td>Re: (Crimea-L) Balaklava Street and Ai-Petri events</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fotos of anti-Crimean Tatars attack at Balaklavska Str. yesterday</td>
<td>1701342</td>
<td>Video record of Ay-Petri events</td>
<td>1701042</td>
<td>Re: NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>fotos about Balaklavska Str. 1</td>
<td>1701242</td>
<td>Re: NO ONE CAN BELONG TO TWO COUNTRIES</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Attack at Balaklavska Street</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar's struggle for survival and our diaspora's behaviour</td>
<td>1701022</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Crimean Tatars: Internet reference and recent bibliographic reference</td>
<td>1701122</td>
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APPENDIX D: BALAKLAVA STREET THREAD-INDEX
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index Balaklava Street Thread-Index</th>
<th>Sub-Index/Own Thread=Index Politics</th>
<th>Sub-Index Squatting</th>
<th>Sub-Index/Own Thread-Index Diaspora</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandits, brigade, clubs, beat, destroy, policeman (militia man), troops, Berkut, counterattacked, fightings, stone throwing, armored vehicles, shooting, wounded, clashes, Russian racist paramilitary organization, band of Russians, attacked, strong resistance, Sevastopol Cossack Brigade, hard protection uniform, guns and dogs, snipers, flank, neutral position, direct violent contact, injured, suffer, conflicts, brutal violence, Cossacks, ethnic Russians in Crimea, detained, Electoral list, block, political party, Ukrainian establishment, anti-Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian State, parlimaneterian elections, session of High Commanders, severe chauvinistic anti-Crimean Tatar moods, Soviet mis-information, propaganda, corrupt government system, fragile CT image, Crimean and Ukrainian National Governments remain idle, minorities, dissident, political leverage, Iron Curtain, global anti-minority policies, protest action, civil disobedience, self-defense, Human Rights, “orange” President Yushenko, criminal code, criminal prosecution, “illegal occupation of land”, colonial policies, Tartars - EVIDENCE OF SUB INDEX BECOMING IT’S OWN THREAD – EMAIL 1701132 – POLITICAL SPAT – LET US NOT POINT FINGERS TO ONE ANOTHER email 1701432; “economic law court”</td>
<td>“Took the land for the construction of houses”, “rights to receive land plots”, “small Crimean Tatar group of inhabitants”, “squatters of land”, land settlement, land “grabs”, resettle, diaspora sleep quietly, no one can belong to two countries, Motherland, Diaspora nationalism, ancestral Homeland, “depriving them of their identity”, nationalism, patriotism, Crimean Communists, nationalistic-oligarchical regime,</td>
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**Key**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Sub-Index</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Rhetoric used by Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Rhetoric used by Americans</td>
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<td>Blue</td>
<td>Rhetoric used by Europeans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E: AY-PETRI THREAD-INDEX
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Thread-Index</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ay-Petri</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Squatting</td>
<td>Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Berkut”, special militia (SWAT), troops, attack, destruction, mass clash, rubber bullets, blockade, clubs, disarmed, beaten, injured, shots, arrested, truncheons,</td>
<td>Tatar activists, “a recent court decision ordering them to vacate a portion of their ancestral lands”, anti-Crimean Tatar Russians, vigilante actions by this group of Russians or others, “the only group that might gain would be those in the Russian community who believe that instability there could force Moscow to act”,</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar “squatters”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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