

---

Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019

---

2009

## The Effects Of Suicide Terrorism In Afghanistan And Iraq On Us Policy And Military Strategy

Michelle Whalen  
*University of Central Florida*



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

Find similar works at: <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd>

University of Central Florida Libraries <http://library.ucf.edu>

This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [STARS@ucf.edu](mailto:STARS@ucf.edu).

---

### STARS Citation

Whalen, Michelle, "The Effects Of Suicide Terrorism In Afghanistan And Iraq On Us Policy And Military Strategy" (2009). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019*. 4120.

<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/4120>



THE EFFECTS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM  
IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ  
ON US POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

by

MICHELLE WHALEN  
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2005

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master in Arts  
in the Department of Political Science  
in the College of Sciences  
at the University of Central Florida  
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term 2009

## ABSTRACT

The international political landscape of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is strewn with terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as unassuming bystanders.

On September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major

reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS' main responsibility is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it materialized.

The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had before 9/11. Clear messages to terrorists were sent on October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2001, through the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the US' stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of 2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations, strategies, and policies.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .....	v
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .....	1
A Startling Awakening.....	1
Lessons Learned.....	3
Related Literature .....	5
Offering a Different Approach .....	18
Process of Examination.....	19
CHAPTER II: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .....	21
America plunged into the Global War against Terrorism: The events of 9/11.....	21
US Retaliation in Afghanistan .....	27
US Political Leaders draw the US military into the Iraqi War .....	31
Afghanistan Unraveled: US Reassessment .....	39
CHAPTER III: AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS EXPLORED .....	43
Introduction .....	43
US Military Strategies Re-evaluated .....	44
The Roadmap to Protecting the Homeland .....	47
CHAPTER IV: THE ROAD AHEAD .....	59
Introduction .....	59
The External Influences to America’s Roadmap .....	60
The National Counterterrorism Center’s Statistics Interpreted .....	65
ENDNOTES.....	74
LIST OF REFERENCES .....	82

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: 2005-2008 Suicide terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.....	67
Table 2: 2005-2008 PBIED attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.....	68
Table 3: 2005-2008 SVBIED attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.....	68

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIG- Afghan Interim Government  
AQI- Al-Qaeda in Iraq  
BUR- Bottom-Up Review  
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency  
CORM- Commissions on Roles and Missions  
CPA- Coalition Provisional Authority  
DHS- Department of Homeland Security  
DoD- Department of Defense  
FATA- Federally Administered Tribal Areas  
IED- Improvised Explosive Device  
ISI- Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency  
MTW- Major Theater War  
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NCTC- National Counterterrorism Center  
NDP- National Defense Panel  
OEF- Operation Enduring Freedom  
OIF- Operation Iraqi Freedom  
PBIED- Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device  
PRT- Provincial Reconstruction Teams  
QDR- Quadrennial Defense Review  
SVBIED- Suicide-Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device  
UN- United Nations  
US- United States  
US NSS- United States National Security Strategy  
WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction

## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

### A Startling Awakening

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact that suicide terrorism had on US National Security Strategy and US military strategy, due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. My conclusion is that suicide terrorism did impact US National Security Strategy and US military strategy, which resulted in the US government changing their policies and military strategies. The material used to support my conclusion will be drawn from an analysis of key strategic goals within the 2002 and 2006 US National Security (NSS), the goals in the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the statistics from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 2008 Report on Terrorism. The statistics focus on the trends of Person- Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) and Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)-related attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Acts of terrorism certainly aren't a new global phenomenon. Terrorism dates back to the Jewish Zealot movement of the Sicarii in A.D 66-70, as well as the Isma'ili Fedyaeen cult of "assassins," who opposed the ruler of the Fertile Crescent in A.D. 1090-1256. The French Revolution of 1793 is probably one of the most prominent historical events when we think of "Terror" and "Terrorism." The international political landscape of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is strewn with terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as unassuming bystanders.

On September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS' main responsibility is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it materialized.

The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had before 9/11. Clear messages were sent to terrorists on October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2001, through the US invasion

of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the US' stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of 2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations, strategies, and policies.

### Lessons Learned

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on October, 7 2001 and is presently an on-going campaign, was initially hailed a success. The Taliban were defeated and their influence temporarily diminished as they fled to nearby Pakistan, or went into hiding elsewhere in Afghanistan. It did not, however, take long for the Taliban to reorganize, and in 2003 militant students actively reestablished their presence and influence in Afghanistan. The various Afghan actors, responsible for rebuilding the country and providing security, had differing political agendas and military strategies, which contributed to the worsening situation in Afghanistan. The international community wanted positive change to take place, but was disappointed. Afghanistan's problems were overshadowed by the US involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in March 2003. Once OIF started, the US government was more focused on capturing al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq, and taking down Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, than on dealing with the emerging Taliban threat in Afghanistan.

Around the same time that OIF was being prosecuted, the Taliban were re-engaging n Afghan's politics. Simultaneously, the US and coalition military forces in OIF were embroiled in low-level guerrilla warfare that ultimately grew to a strong insurgency in Iraq. The US took a tough stance against the War on Terrorism and successful outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq are critical to establishing legitimacy around the world regarding this issue. Therefore, it was vital for the US government to establish hard-hitting policies and strategies that effectively and concisely articulate the measures that need to be taken to successfully meet these goals. Crucial mistakes were made regarding the policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which hampered progress within these countries. The conclusions from this study, through the analysis of the policies and strategies employed by the US to combat enemies that use suicide terrorism, could strengthen future US policies and strategies in this area.

Such policies and strategies are especially important when combating an enemy that uses PBIEDs in an unconventional type of war. Initially the US military was able to secure victories in Afghanistan and Iraq using conventional warfare. Soon, however, these conventional methods were increasingly unsuccessful when faced with an enemy that constantly changed tactics and used asymmetric strategies. The inadequacies of the US policies and strategies to effectively eradicate the insurgency led to increasing political instability and an inability to provide the necessary security to the Afghan and Iraqi population.

The theoretical importance of this study will provide a better understanding of how the US government and military assess and adapts to adverse situations. Throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq wars the US had to demonstrate flexibility, and had to adapt their available resources to sufficiently combat the unpredictable enemy. In light of the way their enemy was fighting, the US military was forced to completely rethink strategies, operations, and tactics, and match their

enemies' asymmetrical warfare with unconventional methods. As the War on Terrorism continues, this change in mindset is significant, because the current methods of fighting are presumably those of future counter-terrorist conflicts.

### Related Literature

The Afghanistan and Iraq wars are both ongoing current events, and are contentious subjects in the US and around the world. Numerous authors have researched and wrote articles and books on the myriad of issues that these wars have created. This research study focuses on literature pertaining to various theories behind what motivates suicide terrorists to give up their lives, kill innocent bystanders, and simultaneously send a message from their group. In addition, US government strategies and policies for the US military and for the counterinsurgency efforts, in Afghanistan and Iraq, will be examined in the current literature available. The insurgency movement, coupled with suicide terrorism, had a tremendous impact on the role the US military played in these countries, and how effective US strategies and policies were to attain the intended end goals. Time does not stand still and the wars continue in the Middle East, thus new information surfaces and new theories are developed. The literature review will be presented in chronological order and focuses on works written after September 11, 2001.

Joseph Nye Jr. discusses the military and national security strategies employed by the US after the Iraq War, in his 2003 article "*U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq.*" In the attempt to curb the development of nuclear weapon programs in hostile countries and to combat global terrorism, the Bush administration's national security strategy involved forming alliances with

numerous countries. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be seen as the catalyst to the implementation of a US foreign policy that creates an alliance with China. Nye regards the direction of the US' national security strategy as a reflection of the challenges dominating world politics. The author argues that US military power is crucial in regards to global stability and is an integral part to responding to global terrorism. Combating transnational issues such as terrorism requires a willingness to find solutions, and needs to be included in countries national interests. The strategies and foreign policies of the US might be accepted through multilateralism, which is a way for the US to legitimize its power. Nye stipulates that in order for the strategy to be successful, the US needs to be more mindful of soft power and multilateral cooperation than unilateralism.<sup>1</sup>

In 2003 Norman Friedman's book titled Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War, analyzes the topics of terrorism, how it relates to Afghanistan, and the new type of war America is faced with after the events of 9/11. Friedman familiarizes the reader with the events of 9/11, and introduces new information surrounding that day. Throughout several chapters the author discusses America's response to terrorism in recent history. Friedman describes how the entire national counterterrorism apparatus is affected by major problems, and particularly highlights the apparent lack of response to terrorist attacks and threats in the 1990s by the Clinton Administration. His book covers the political turmoil in Afghanistan and describes the country as a terrorist-sponsored state essentially ruled by Osama bin Laden. Friedman analyzes the significant role the large numbers of foreign terrorists had on influencing politics of Afghanistan. The author directs attention to the instrumental role al-Qaeda played in the Taliban resistance, which he believes was more active than the US was aware of. Lastly, the book introduces the topic on America's new way of war. Written before the invasion of Iraq, Friedman

compares the events in Afghanistan to the pending Iraq invasion. The author describes the significance of modern warfare in Afghanistan, which strengthens the terrorists' ability to curb power projection. On this topic he also includes the role the Northern Alliance had in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

In 2003, authors Williamson Murray and Robert Scales Jr. examine the Iraq war in a style termed "new military history," which puts military policy and strategy into the social and political context; as such events don't take place in a vacuum. Their book The Iraq War: A Military History, analyzes the Iraq war through a military perspective, and examines the day-to-day operational decision making. In addition, the authors highlight the internal debates within the US Defense Department regarding the right amount of military power to apply in each situation. Murray and Scales describe the war as a campaign and examine what the strategic military goals hoped to achieve within the different theaters of operation. Operation Iraqi Freedom was planned to cause a total collapse of Saddam's regime, through the simultaneous application of all elements of military force. This was accomplished through a military campaign of air, ground, naval, and special operations, targeted at the various arms of Saddam's power, which included the Ba'ath party, his internal security forces, and the Republican guard. The authors emphasized that the mission was the destruction of Saddam's regime, and to secure Baghdad quickly. However, once it overran Iraq, the US military had to change tactics from policing to countering guerilla operations. Murray and Scales discuss the implications of insurgency warfare, and the insurgents' perspective on what constitutes a win or a loss. The authors argue that there isn't enough military manpower to sufficiently ensure success in Iraq, and that in addition to precision targeting the ability to quickly form tactical units is paramount. Currently such considerations

are heavily weighed, and resources deployed depending on the severity of the situation. The authors reveal the new American way of war through their in-depth military analysis.<sup>3</sup>

Author Christoph Reuter examines the type of people who become suicide bombers, and how they justify their actions in his 2004 book My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. He argues against the mainstream belief that suicide bombers are crazed fanatics or simply brainwashed. Many of today's martyrs are in fact well-educated young adults who willingly decide to become human bombs. Their actions are perpetrated to seek revenge against an enemy they perceived as unjust and oppressive. Reuter states that suicide terrorists, literally, want their lives to make a difference and accept their deaths as a way to make their mark. Martyrs are mostly motivated at the thought of being heroes, as opposed to some sort of religious concept of a blissful afterlife. In the book the author investigates Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Kurdistan, the 1980s childrens' suicide brigades in the Iran-Iraq war, the activities of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the suicide activities in Israeli-occupied Palestine. Reuter describes how Western governments unintentionally helped in the creation of al-Qaeda, and thereby helped caused the globalization of suicide bombing. In his last chapter the author points out that due to a new social environment in post-Khomeini Iran, suicide terrorism is being renounced, in a country and society where it had once been enthusiastically embraced.<sup>4</sup>

In his 2004 book The War after the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, Anthony Cordesman insists that even with the losses that the US military suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is optimism for the future. However, to achieve successes the US military must apply the lessons already garnered from these two conflicts. Cordesman focuses his analysis on the time frame prior to the war and how policies could have been reshaped. Some of

the lessons learned from the two conflicts include the importance of internationalism and effectively using international organizations; the integration of diplomacy in war strategy; and the need for organizational reform. The author chronicles the military campaign up until April 2003 with a focus on the composition of forces. He explains the internal US government disagreements concerning the right approach to take (either the use of the Powell Doctrine versus the Rumsfeld Doctrine). Cordesman provides an analysis of where the military made mistakes in their attempt at decreasing the violence and nation building.<sup>5</sup>

In her book titled *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*, Mia Bloom examines how suicide bombing has been used in Asia, the Middle East, and in Europe in 2007. The author analyzes the strategies that were taken by extremists, and the failures and successes of using suicide terrorism. She assessed how effective the various governments were at responding to such attacks. Bloom's analysis begins by reviewing the history of terrorism, from Japan's use of *kamikazes* during World War II to the various forms of suicide terrorism that today's terrorist groups employ. The author describes that suicide terrorism is used because it instills fear in the public, attracts the attention of the international media, allows the terrorist group's cause to gain additional support, and can create either competition or a union between various terrorist organizations. Bloom explains how terrorist groups learn from their mistakes, as well as from one another. She illustrates how these groups respond to counterterrorist measures and where the terrorists receive their financial support. The author concludes that suicide bombers are socially and politically motivated.<sup>6</sup>

Kevin Desouza and Ting-Yen Wang discuss the tactics used by insurgents in Iraq in their 2007 article "*Impeding Insurgents Attacks: The Information Management Agenda.*" These tactics caused many problems vis a vis the economic and political reforms that the coalition

forces were trying to introduce. Desouza and Wang highlight the arsenal of strategies being employed by the insurgents, which range from suicide bombings to kidnappings. This created a tense atmosphere between the local factions and the Iraqi people, but also caused a divide between the local Iraqis and the coalition forces. The strategies employed by the insurgents gave them more power against their military targets due to the nature of their attacks, which are highly erratic and very dangerous. Unfortunately coalition forces are unable to use a full force assault, because the insurgents hide themselves amongst the populace and exploit the advantages of this guerrilla warfare tactic. The article draws attention to the informational issues that the coalition forces need to understand, so they can not only try to control the extent of insurgents' attacks but most importantly decrease the number of attacks. Desouza and Wang believe that the number one strategy against the insurgency violence is to use information effectively. The side that is better at managing and disseminating information, with the goal of using it to influence their opponent, will succeed.<sup>7</sup>

The issue that policymakers are facing when formulating counterterrorist strategies, according to author Robert Brym, is that policymakers don't seem to be on the same page as researchers investigating suicide terrorism. In his 2007 article "*Six Lessons of Suicide Bombers*," Brym wrote that over the last twenty five years researcher have come to understand more about the motivations of suicide bombers, the reason for organizations to support them, suicide bombers' methods of operation, the catalysts of suicide attacks, and how counterterrorism strategies effect insurgent behavior. In addition, Brym illustrates to the reader how traditional explanations attempt to analyze the reasons behind suicide bombings, but get it wrong.<sup>8</sup>

Attaining victory in Iraq was supposed to be easy; however Iraq entered a bloody civil war after the US "liberation." According to author Mohammed Hafez, time will only tell the

duration, scope, and magnitude of this second internal war. In his 2007 book titled Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, Hafez illustrates how once again Islamic resistance has successfully gone up against the remaining superpower and posed itself as a serious threat. The insurgents' current achievements and their prior victory against the Soviet Union in the 80s cemented the notion that Islamic resistance and martyrdom can bring down the United States. The author explains that the targets of the suicide attacks are predominantly the Shia population and Iraqi security forces, not the coalition forces.

Comprised of volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Europe, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, and North Africa, the insurgents did not have many Iraqi members. The book details the Iraqi insurgency's attempts at preventing the US from 1) stabilizing the country, 2) establishing a democratic regime in Iraq, and 3) creating a new US ally in the Middle East. Hafez writes of the importance to understanding suicide terrorism in connection with US national security, US foreign policy in the Muslim world, and the war on terrorism. The author details the Iraqi insurgency and examines the ethnic background of the movement. Additionally he explores the history of suicide bombing in Iraq and throughout other countries, the theoretical perspectives on suicide bombing, and the ideology and theology behind martyrdom supporting suicide bombers. Hafez predicts that the events in Iraq will shape and influence a third generation of transnational *jihadists*.<sup>9</sup>

In her 2007 article, "*Engaging or withdrawing, winning or losing?*," Andrea Lopez analyzes US military policies in both Afghanistan and Iraq. By comparing and contrasting the US military's policies in both of these war zones, the author illustrates how the approaches are very different in each country. In order to create a powerful presence, the US in 2003 established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout Afghanistan. Also, instead of being an active presence in Iraq, the US military withdrew from the cities, and secured themselves in

military camps. Even though the situation worsened in 2005-2006, Lopez agrees with the policy of establishing PRTs and believes that more should be created, with the military deploying the additional personnel to support such an effort. Combining this counterinsurgency theory and military doctrine will help win the support of the local population in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In Iraq, the author explains, the situation was made worse through the US military's action of consolidating their bases, which goes against counterinsurgency policies and theory. She argues this decision might keep the soldiers safer, but it creates a power vacuum allowing for potential guerrilla activity. Lopez describes the trend of US policy failures, before and after 2003, in regards to the US government's counterinsurgency approach.<sup>10</sup>

Authors Lee Hamilton, Bruce Hoffman, and Michael Jenkins analyze the US front against global terrorism. In their 2007 book State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism, they contend that the West's position against the war on terrorism is eroding instead of improving. The authors concede that the US has achieved tactical successes and ensures the continued protection of the US homeland, but say that the future is riddled with even more dangerous and unstable environments due to the increase in radicalization. The book assesses the vital necessity of counterterrorism strategies and the West's progress in this regard. It discusses the issues of balancing security, creating practical counterterrorism coalitions and strategies, and contending with the threat of terrorists acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Hamilton, Hoffman, and Jenkins illustrate the US' effective campaign in neutralizing the insurgents in Afghanistan in 2001 and the need to readdress the issue because of the return of insurgent activity. The authors turn their analysis to Iraq and explain how the country could become not only a breeding ground for terrorists, but also serve as a training base where the experienced insurgents would be dispersed throughout Europe. Additionally, the book explores

years of recent suicide terrorism activity, how influential al-Qaeda's perceived accomplishments are, and the challenges the US faces when contending with a threat that is growing faster than their ability to respond. Hamilton, Hoffman, and Jenkins emphasize the need for viable long-term policy solutions, and as they thus far have been unsuccessful, they believe solutions can be found outside of the current military strategies.<sup>11</sup>

In a 2008 interview with Craig Kennedy titled "*Iraq's Past, Present and Future*" the article candidly discusses the US military's role in Iraq's civil war with Former Iraqi minister of trade and minister of defense Ali A. Allawi. It portrays to the reader the many different actors involved in the civil war, including al-Qaeda and Iranian influence, and highlights some of the US government and US military's strategic failures in their attempt at establishing a government and security in Iraq. Additionally, the article delves into the social conditions resulting from the civil war.<sup>12</sup>

Authors Farhana Ali and Jerrold Post explore the contested concept of martyrdom, which is being pervasively used by terrorist groups in their jihadist struggle against the West and its influences. Their 2008 study "*The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts*," analyzes how the Islamic concept of martyrdom, a legitimate religious concept, is transformed into the acceptable use of suicide terrorism by terrorist groups. The authors argue that the original concept of martyrdom is being misappropriated by extremists, and is thereby violating Islamic principles. By redefining two Islamic terms, martyrdom and jihad, to fit their own agendas, extremists not only create a tension between the West and Muslims, but also damage the authenticity of the Islamic concepts. Ali and Post highlight that the global Islamic community is aware of the importance of restoring the fundamental values of classical Islam, thereby eradicating extremist

ideologies. The authors are cognizant that reversing the damages done by extremists and strengthening moderate Islam will take the commitment and coordination of many Islamic groups, communities, and countries to defeat suicide terrorism permanently.<sup>13</sup>

In 2008 Gilles Kepel describes in his book Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East, the clashing points of view emanating from the West and the Middle East that have come to a head since the events in 2001. To the neoconservatives, the threat lies in the Islamic terrorist robbing them of civilized life, and the jihadist goes after the myth of martyrdom by killing the infidels or non believers. Not only is the battle being waged on the battleground, but also through the use of a media smear campaigns. In addition, both sides continue to oppose one another, as evidenced by the deaths in London and Madrid by suicide bombers and by the American military forces killing Iraqi population. The author reveals the Bush administration's complex Middle East political agenda, through the establishment of a democratic government, appraising the significance of Iraqi oil, and securing Israel. He explores the potential of a regime change in Iran. Kepel also writes how al-Qaeda's jihad and call for martyrs has divided the Islamic world, so that it is even waging war against itself. The author raises the issue that time is of the essence for the West and the Islamic community to establish a meaningful dialog. This conversation needs to take place in order for democratic change to occur in the Middle East, as well as to unite Islam. In order for these new dialogues to be constructive, Kepel believes that the conversations should stay away from the old concepts of terrorism and martyrdom, and start afresh, perhaps in Europe which has a growing Muslim population.<sup>14</sup>

Baghdad and its neighboring provinces are experiencing a lower level of violence due to the military surge initiated by the US in the middle of 2007. Judith Yaphe explores how military strategy is not sufficient to restore stability in Iraq, in her 2008 article titled "*After the Surge:*

*The Next Steps in Iraq?*” A measure of security has been restored to Western Iraq and in Baghdad, yet more needs to be done to establish stability and to keep the country from unraveling. Even with the surge at its midpoint, the Iraqi government did not show signs of political reconciliation. In addition to the political stalemate Yaphe addresses the other challenges that lie ahead for Iraqi politics. She describes the upcoming provincial election, the contentious census, and the referendum to determine who will govern oil-rich Kirkuk, as potentially volatile situations.<sup>15</sup>

The opinions vary, according to the different authors’ perspectives, on the subjects of suicide terrorism and the US policy and military strategy concerning the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Gilles Kepel and Michael Jenkins, et al, each focus on an aspect of US political agenda on the War on Terrorism. Kepel believes that the ideologies Islam and the US have towards terrorism need to be addressed in a new perspective; this will help both sides become aware of the steps that need to take place for the US and the Middle East to accomplish their respective goals. Jenkins shares Kepel’s sentiment that the US’s current strategies on the War on Terrorism need to be revised. Both authors discuss the courses of action the Bush administration took in the Middle East, which includes establishing democratic governments and counterterrorism strategies. The authors reach a similar conclusion and offer the advice that the US needs to change tactics and try a different direction. Perhaps the solutions could be found in dialogues that take a different approach, and go beyond the established military strategies.

Authors Reuter and Bloom discuss the history of suicide terrorism in different countries around the world, and highlight the various motivations behind these nefarious actors. Reuter describes a suicide terrorist’s need to be thought of as a hero when he or she seeks revenge against their enemy. Bloom illustrates that suicide attacks are motivated to gain international

media attention, which assists in perpetuating fear in the public. The author discusses how terrorists learn from each other, and from the mistakes they make. This goes in the same vein as Reuter's thought, when he describes the globalization of suicide bombing. Both authors discuss the role the US played in suicide terrorism. Where Reuter addresses the US' hand in al-Qaeda's growth and the terrorist group's part in global suicide terrorism; Bloom examines how effectively governments respond to suicide terrorist attacks.

Whereas Reuter and Bloom focused more on the global history of suicide terrorism and the various reasons why suicide bombers are compelled to take their own lives; authors Brym, Hafez, and Ali analyzed the policies and strategies employed by the US, the insurgents, and suicide terrorists. Brym believes that policymakers need to be as knowledgeable on suicide terrorism as researchers investigating the topic. This would make a difference to how counterterrorist strategies are created by policymakers. Hafez also believes that it is important to understand suicide terrorism, and how it is relevant to US policies regarding politics in the Middle East and the War on Terrorism. The author also focuses on the role suicide terrorism plays in Iraq's civil war. Like Reuter and Bloom, he believes that history taught the insurgents the strategies they are currently employing in Iraq. The insurgents saw the success the *mujahedeen* had against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 80's. Therefore, they choose to use martyrdom as a weapon against their enemies. Like Hafez, Ali examines martyrdom and explains how suicide terrorist organizations are redefining the concept to fit their political agendas.

Authors Allawi, Yaphe, and Cordesman focus on how the US went awry with the US policies and strategies implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq. Allawi contends that US policy failures led to the failure to establish a government and security in Iraq. Yaphe too, offers a

negative assessment of the situation in Iraq. In her article she writes that the current military strategies alone won't fully restore political stability. Yaphe discusses the successes that have taken place, (as the violence decreased considerably in 2007), but something else needs to accompany the military strategies for stability to fully take hold. Cordesman offers some hope for the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He believes the US military can learn from the mistakes it made, and reshape the policies to address its deficiencies. All authors agree that change in policies or strategies are a necessary step so the US can achieve its goals.

Nye, Murray, Scales, and Lopez address the US military strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nye takes a broader perspective on the topic, and analyzes how the US policies are reflective of the tone emanating from the global political arena. The author warns the US that it needs to be more aware of using soft power, and attaining the goals within their policies through multilateral cooperation. Military experts Murray and Scales steer away from Nye's broad approach and instead focus on the daily operational decisions that were made in Iraq. They highlight how the US military needed to adapt to the tactics used by the insurgents. No longer was conventional warfare the optimal decision when encountering guerilla warfare. Murray and Scales lament that more soldiers are necessary to attain long term success in Iraq. Lopez includes both Afghanistan and Iraq in her analysis of US military policies. She believes that the military bases need not be confined to one area, which assists in keeping soldiers safer, but by doing so creates an environment where insurgents think they can influence the social environment. The authors are unanimous on the fact that the US needs to improve the policies that focus on counterinsurgency, in the global War on Terrorism.

Desouza, Wang, and Friedman review the impact of the insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. Desouza and Wang review the strategies used by the insurgents in Iraq, and how the US military

was unable to use their full might, due to the fact that the battle field is entwined with innocent civilians. The authors believe that the US can improve the strategies for collecting and disseminating information. If this is corrected, the amount of violence should decrease. Friedman also analyzes insurgency activity, but does so in Afghanistan. He discusses the role of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan's politics. However, Friedman blames the broken intelligence institutions, and past administrations' lack of attention to global terrorist issues. Desouza, Wang, and Friedman illustrate the importance of curbing the insurgencies influences on political, social, and security issues in Afghanistan and Iraq.

### Offering a Different Approach

Today's political environment has created an onslaught of literature relating to suicide terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the US global War on Terrorism. The authors showcased in this literature review offered their perspectives and the conclusions resulting from their research. Whatever their topic, the authors attempted to come up with an explanation on the motivation of suicide terrorists or why the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are taking more time than anticipated to improve. The authors offered their suggestions as to how policies and strategies could be improved, so the US can establish political stability and more adequately provide security. However, a research study has not been conducted that analyzes if the US adapted its policies and military strategies due to suicide terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. The purpose of this research study will fill that gap, and examine the impact suicide terrorism has on US policies and military strategies.

The frequency as to which terrorist groups around the world are implementing suicide terrorism in their weapons arsenal, indicates a trend that the global community needs to be aware of. By examining how the US government dealt with suicide terrorism, will hopefully strengthen our nation's ability to cope with this growing threat. The advances of technology make for a smaller world and with it the ability for more people around the world to communicate with each other. Terrorist organizations are taking the benefits of globalization to their advantage. They are redefining global boundaries and exerting their influence all over the world. The global community needs to follow course, and use the benefits of having a globalized world. Together, through dialogue and tougher policies the global community needs to take a united stance against terrorists.

### Process of Examination

This study is divided into four chapters and will provide a subject analysis. The first chapter introduces the thesis and the topic that will be analyzed. The second chapter takes a historical perspective, and examines how the US became involved in the War on Terrorism. This chapter also provides an in-depth look at the various actors currently involved in the US' campaign on the global War on Terrorism. The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks left the US wondering why al-Qaeda harbors so much hatred against the US. It is important to have a better understanding of the political ideologies that drive Osama bin Laden's agenda against the US and the West. As Afghanistan was the first battle ground on the war against terrorism, understanding the country's history, specifically the outcome of the Soviet-Afghan war, is significant. So too is some general knowledge on the Taliban, the role they play in harboring al-Qaeda, and the impact they have on

Afghanistan's politics. Not to be left out are the US decisions to go to war in Iraq, and the unforeseen impact of the insurgency on establishing a government and providing security. Lastly, this chapter brings the reader full circle, back to the unraveling situation in Afghanistan.

In chronological order the third chapter will compare key strategic goals within the US policies and military strategies, presented through the 2002 and 2006 US NSS, and the 2001 and 2006 QDR. Statistics specifically focusing on the trends of PBIED and SVBIED related attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq will be used. This data will come from the NCTC's 2008 Report on Terrorism. The last chapter will present the conclusion from the analysis of the third chapter regarding the impact suicide terrorism had on the US policies and military strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq. From the conclusion reached through the analysis, this chapter will expand on the importance of learning from the past.

## CHAPTER II: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

### America plunged into the Global War against Terrorism: The events of 9/11

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, most Americans knew little about al-Qaeda or the political events that took place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Americans lived blissfully unaware that a network of men were plotting to destroy our country's sense of freedom, and were coordinating their attacks in another country, half way around the world. 9-11, as it would later be coined, made al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden a household name, and illustrated to the United States that not everyone thinks highly of our country or agrees with our way of life. Whereas it might have been the first time most Americans heard of Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda had previous experience dealing with Americans, more specifically with the US military. Bin Laden's name was not unfamiliar to the US government either, as the US military assisted mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan in the 80's during the Soviet-Afghanistan war. Historical settings and societal factors are significant facilitators that make up the preconditions of terrorist activity that set the stage for terrorism over the long run.<sup>16</sup> In an effort to explain the hatred of radical Islamic groups, such as al-Qaeda, towards the United States and the West; it is important to understand their background. In this case we begin with the history of Osama bin Laden, because the events and people that influenced him eventually helped him create al-Qaeda, which in turn significantly impacted the US through their terrorist tactics on that fateful day in September.

According to Osama bin Laden himself, he grew up with a hatred for America because it is "part of the Muslim religion to hate Americans, Christians, and Jews."<sup>17</sup> And in bin Laden's

opinion all adult Muslims feel this way.<sup>18</sup> After a youth that did not live up to pious standards, bin Laden stopped binge drinking and chasing after woman, once he entered the King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and embarked on a new path that adhered to the teachings of Islam, specifically the sect of Wahabbism. His Islamic Studies professor introduced him to the writings of Sayyid Qutb, who purportedly is the father of modern Islamic fundamentalism, which influenced bin Laden.<sup>19</sup> He also met Abdullah Azzam, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, whose idea it was to organize a central recruiting station for jihad in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, known as Mekhtab al-Khadamat “the Office of the Services.”<sup>20</sup> Azzam’s role as a mentor to bin Laden played a large part in Osama’s decision to actively take part in the situation in Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> Azzam’s political ideology influenced bin Laden to help coordinate the recruitment of thousands of young Muslims from around the world to fight in Afghanistan, but also contributed finances and assisted the recruiting office with military issues.<sup>22</sup> About 10,000 Muslims recruits from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Egypt, known as the Afghan Arabs, would later become an integral part of bin Laden’s future terrorist organization, as they were among his most loyal supporters.<sup>23</sup> In 1979 the billionaire’s son, who was himself worth roughly \$80 million through the inheritance he received from the earnings of his deceased father’s construction company, answered the call of jihad to join in liberating Muslim Afghans from the invasion of eighty-five thousand Soviet troops.<sup>24</sup> Osama bin Laden fought and led well and he earned his place among the ranks of jihadists warding off the Soviets in Afghanistan. During one battle, he was wounded by shrapnel in a battle at Jalalabad airport.<sup>25</sup> This would later enhance his image as his combat experience gave him the credibility to become “Emir of al-Qaeda.”

Osama bin Laden’s time in Afghanistan was pivotal, because through Azzam he became acquainted with Ayman al-Zawahiri, and it was during this time he came to the conclusion that

to bring the mighty western superpowers to their knees one did not need sophisticated weaponry, but faith in the jihad.<sup>26</sup> Both Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden shared the same goals for what could be accomplished through jihad, and had a more grandiose vision by expanding jihad on a global scale. They both wanted to go against “kafir countries, and against apostate Muslim leaders, such as Egypt and Lybia.”<sup>27</sup> Gradually Azzam’s leadership role of Mekhtab al-Khadamat “the Office of the Services” became obsolete and in 1989 he was killed in a mysterious car explosion.<sup>28</sup> Together bin Laden and al-Zawahiri would use the structure of Mekhtab al-Khadamat as the foundation for al-Qaeda.

A victorious Bin Laden returned home after assisting the Afghans in defeating the Soviet Union. Impressively, the rag tag army of mujahedeens and Afghan rebel fighters defeated the Red Army and the powerful Soviet Union. However, they could not have pulled off this victory without the assistance from the US. Throughout both the Carter and Reagan administration, \$700 million worth of military equipment and food supplies were delivered to those fighting in Afghanistan to stop the US’ Cold War enemy from taking over the country.<sup>29</sup> Osama was barely back from Afghanistan when Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The distressed Saudi kingdom reached out to the US government to aid them in stopping Hussein’s army from reaching their country, as well as get the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. Bin Laden pleaded with the Saudi’s royal government to let his mujahedeen warriors fight Saddam Hussein, and not allow non-Muslims to fight for them, saying the US military was unnecessary.<sup>30</sup> Bin Laden failed to see that the one hundred thousand fighters he wanted to contribute was no match in warding off the Iraqi Army, which consisted of millions of soldiers, and also had superior warfare technology.<sup>31</sup> The decision of the Saudi royal government, to enlist the help of infidels, gave him further proof that the long reaching influence of the US and the West within the Middle

East had to be stopped. Therefore, the US had to be destroyed, bringing an end to apostate leaders in the Middle East, with the end goal of creating a pan-Islamic state under shariah law.<sup>32</sup>

The condition for Osama bin Laden's decision to wage war against the United States stemmed from the US' involvement in Middle Eastern politics. Even though bin Laden didn't agree with US military presence during the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait threatened both Saudi Arabia and US national security, and their interests lay in defending Saudi Arabia's vast oil wealth from the hands of Iraq's tyrannical dictator. Al-Qaeda's leader vehemently disagrees with America's position with Israel, and feels that the Muslims in Palestine are being massacred, and that the US is the real terrorist.<sup>33</sup> The fact that the Saudi royal family-followers of Islam-were allowing the US military into the country that had two of the holiest cities to Muslims, made the Saudi kingdom an additional target for bin Laden.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the Saudi rulers felt compelled to throw him out of the country in 1992, because of his plans to overthrow the government and put in its place a true Islamic regime. Two years later Saudi Arabia revoked bin Laden's citizenship, and by that time he sought refuge in Sudan. The current Sudanese President allowed known international criminals to reside freely in the country.

Bin Laden continued to cultivate relationships in Afghanistan, all the while creating a semblance of a life in Sudan. However, this too came to an end when he was forced to leave the country due to the US pressuring the Sudanese government to expel Osama bin Laden. Through his large network, Osama made a seamless transition when he returned to Afghanistan, and he aligned himself with the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar in a cunning strategy. In exile, and still seeing little notable change in the Middle Eastern political area, the volume and hatred in bin Laden's anti-American rhetoric increased dramatically. Finding fault in the lack of action by his former Saudi rulers and other Middle Eastern Muslim governments for not making a

difference and bringing about necessary political, economic, and social changes, bin Laden issued a fatwa in line with his political and moral duty.<sup>35</sup>

In the 1998 fatwa Osama bin Laden stated it was the duty of all Muslims to kill as many Americans as possible. This fatwa was issued against the backdrop of increasing numbers of, infidels in holy Muslim territory.<sup>36</sup> Bin Laden wanted his country to have less western influence and presence and be more focused on returning to a golden age of piety.<sup>37</sup> As all concerned later painfully learned, a threat from bin Laden should not be easily dismissed, as by this time al-Qaeda had established a pattern for violence, especially toward the US. The terrorist group had already started a global terror campaign against the US which came as early as 1992 in the form of the hotel bombings in Yemen which targeted US troops; thankfully in this incident there were no fatalities. However, a year later, 18 soldiers died in another attack by al-Qaeda.<sup>38</sup> And the mastermind behind the 1995 WTC bombing was now within the folds of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda coordinated the attacks of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, through bin Laden's creation of the Internationalist Islamic Front, which consisted of a variety of smaller Islamist groups from Egypt to India that supported him.<sup>39</sup> The bombings in Africa were symbolically planned for August 7<sup>th</sup>, as this was the day Saudi King Fahd allowed the United States to help defend the kingdom of Saudi Arabia against Saddam Hussein.<sup>40</sup> Osama's message was driven home by killing 224 people and injuring over four thousand more.

Al-Qaeda took responsibility for attacking the United States' warship the *U.S.S. Cole* in 2000 while it was refueling in Aden, Yemen. The apparent reason behind the attack was for the terrorist group to test the military might of the United States. During this terrorist attack, 17 US Navy sailors died and 39 were injured.<sup>41</sup> Bin Laden supposedly stated of the attack, "the

destroyer represents the capital of the West, and the small boat represents Mohammed.”<sup>42</sup> After the attack on the naval ship, the US government’s investigation led to no concrete evidence, and there were no active attempts to punish those who committed this violent act. Unhindered by the US, al-Qaeda was free to plan their next attack on America. America failed the test and the ramifications of what this group was capable became apparent a year later.

Osama carefully planned his next attacks to aggressively hit the US’ military, economic, and political centers of gravity. By targeting the heart of the West, the attacks on the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and possibly the White House on September 11, 2001 led credence to Osama bin Laden’s hatred of Western institutions. In a letter to Americans three months after the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden explained the reasons for committing these acts of terror, and justified that it was necessary and acceptable. He stated that the West and specifically the United States was leading a crusade against Islam.<sup>43</sup> Bin Laden believed that the actions of the US’ foreign policy is one of injustice and aggression, and is directed specifically at Muslims, because to the US they are of no value.<sup>44</sup> His additional grievances include the US turning its back on Palestine, instead of helping to support oppressed Palestinian children. The letter continues that the US is not doing anything positive for Palestine, and together the American-Zionist lobby will stop at nothing to kill the Arab children.<sup>45</sup> Ultimately, bin Laden’s goals for al-Qaeda, is for the voices of Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Philippines, Kashmir, Chechnya, Somalia, Bosnia, and south Sudan to be heard.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, it is up to every Muslim man to stand up against tyrannical rulers and defend these helpless Muslims. To accomplish this goal the jihad must continue against the United States by hitting it militarily and economically until it is weak.<sup>47</sup> Upon hearing this he thought that millions of Americans would react and demonstrate in the streets against their government, resulting in Congress splintering and becoming obsolete. In bin

Laden's eyes this would create an economic collapse and with it the end of the American nation, thus fulfilling the ultimate objective of al-Qaeda.<sup>48</sup>

The US' retaliation came swiftly, as to send a concise message that this blatant act of terrorism on the homeland would be met with the full fury of the US military. In response to the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> the US unveiled a new foreign security; preemptive self-defense. This policy reserved the US the right to "strike preemptively against states only in the face of a risk that terrorists would acquire weapons of mass destruction" or in the case that America's national security is threatened.<sup>49</sup> Osama bin Laden effectively awoke the slumbering dragon, and the war against terrorism became the US government's new rally cry. The war against terrorism in Afghanistan, code named Operation Enduring Freedom, began on October 7, 2001 with the goal of capturing Osama bin Laden and ousting the Taliban regime. The new US foreign policy dictated that it had a right to go after terrorist groups and governments that harbored them.<sup>50</sup>

### US Retaliation in Afghanistan

Significant combat against terrorism began in Afghanistan because that is where the Afghan Taliban allowed al-Qaeda safe haven. More significantly the 2001 terrorist attacks were planned in Afghanistan under the watch of this religious extremist regime. Therefore, the US held both al-Qaeda and the Taliban responsible for the atrocities of September 11<sup>th</sup>. The Taliban, Afghanistan's authoritarian government, comprised of extremely religious Pashtuns from Afghanistan and western Pakistan, knowingly permitted al-Qaeda to actively pursue their anti-American activities. However, the target for the US military's reprisal against al-Qaeda might

not have been in Afghanistan if the US government had not turned a blind eye to Taliban activities during the early 90's. Additionally, the Taliban's later succession to power might have been hindered if the US had not been as generous in their financial and military support to the mujahedeen, during the Soviet-Afghan war, and had greater oversight over the recipients of the finances.<sup>51</sup>

In the height of the Cold War tensions between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were high. Leonid Brezhnev, serving as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ordered the Red Army to advance into Afghanistan in December 1979. The Russians had covertly supported a coup in 1973 that overthrew King Zahir Shah, and placed Mohammed Daoud as the head of the new Afghani Communist government.<sup>52</sup> However, only five years later the actors within Daoud's communist army, who once assisted him to achieve power, overthrew the President in a coup. They subsequently massacred Daoud, his family, and the Presidential Bodyguard.<sup>53</sup> The antagonists of the coup were deeply divided and therefore caused serious political problems. Afghans led revolts against the coup leaders because they failed to understand Afghanistan's complex society.<sup>54</sup> Consequently religious community leaders, within Afghanistan, ordered a holy war to free their country of the communist influence.<sup>55</sup> As the violence between the various actors drew to a head the Soviet Red Army invaded the country to protect their interests, and installed a new leader as President, Babrak Karmal.<sup>56</sup>

The Soviet Union had emerged from World War II a powerful political opponent. The Communist government threatened US foreign policy with Russia's growing capability to advance its sphere of influence and ideology onto neighboring countries. Therefore, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan the US government felt compelled to stop the ever-advancing Soviet

Union and the threat of Communism. Together the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) supported the recruitment of Afghan religious extremists to fight against the Soviet's Red Army in Afghanistan.<sup>57</sup> The CIA took the lead in recruiting these men from all over the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>58</sup> It was during this time period that Azzam and bin Laden were initiating their own recruitment efforts through Mekhtab al-Khadamat. Additionally, Bin Laden received the support of the Saudi royal family to fight in the resistance. In return he would play as the kingdom's mouthpiece and spread the Wahabbi ideology throughout Afghanistan's political arena.<sup>59</sup>

The aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war led to the establishment of an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in 1989. However, it started off on shaky footing amid the different political actors. Mohammed Najibullah's rule as Afghanistan's communist President ended on April 1992, when the mujahedeen effectively took over Kabul and announced that it was an Islamic state.<sup>60</sup> Najibullah would be subsequently hung in the streets of Kabul in 1996, after being tortured and killed by the Taliban.<sup>61</sup> In June 1992 Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the mujahedeen group Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) became AIG's transitional President. His rival Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the mujahedeen group Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), was assigned the role as Premier. Hekmatyar contended Rabbani's position and did not want to share power with him or the other mujahedeen leaders. In his struggle for power he assaulted Kabul for many years with rockets, which resulted in crippling Kabul.<sup>62</sup> As a result Kabul's defenses were severely weakened, making the Taliban's subsequent takeover of the city much easier.<sup>63</sup>

While the political actors in the AIG were finding it difficult to work together, and simultaneously as a mujahedeen power struggle was making the interim government ineffective, the Taliban came into the political arena. By the fall of 1995 the Taliban controlled all of

western Afghanistan.<sup>64</sup> The cities of Qandahar and Charasiab fell to the Taliban, and the Taliban were eventually successful at taking control of Kabul a year later.<sup>65</sup> On April 4, 1996 Mullah Mohammed Omar was appointed Amir ul-Momineen or Leader of the Faithful.<sup>66</sup> He used religion to legitimize his leadership, stating that he was chosen by God, and effectively established a new government authority in Afghanistan. In front of a Taliban audience he used the removal of the Cloak of the Prophet as evidence of this ordained right.<sup>67</sup> For the next several years the Afghan people were subjected to a severe form of Sharia law imposed by the Taliban. The Taliban had been formed to “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.”<sup>68</sup> The Taliban brought anything but peace, and instead subjected the Afghan population to a brutal authoritarian regime.

The Taliban’s growth had been fostered in an effort to quash the US’ Cold War rival’s expansionist goals. The US government directly but unintentionally spearheaded the creation of a future enemy by putting the financial oversight in Pakistan’s hands. Under President Carter’s administration, and the subsequent White House administrations, the ISI was responsible for the oversight and distribution of monies and weapons to the various actors fighting against the Soviet Union. Over the next ten years Pakistan’s intelligence service acted as intermediary of US funds and arms, and distributed them to the mujahedeen fighting jihad against the Russians.<sup>69</sup> The question arises as to how much funding the Taliban received from ISI. The US did not enforce any controls as to how the ISI chose to distribute money, and who received the finances. US aid was initially accepted to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. However, once the war ended it can be assumed the remaining finances were used to further political goals for the various warlords and the insurgency in Afghanistan. The Soviet-Afghan war and the US’

interests at keeping its Cold War enemy in check resulted in the emergence of the Taliban to the international political arena.

### US Political Leaders draw the US military into the Iraqi War

Osama bin Laden was still on the run, despite the US military's efforts to locate him. To the US, the blow that had been inflicted by the terrorist attacks on 9/11 was still a gaping wound. It served to illustrate that the invincible America did have its share of vulnerabilities. The Bush Doctrine demonstrated US fear that it might one day become a target again. To prevent becoming a target once more, the Bush Doctrine prescribed the use of a preemptive defense strategy that allowed the US to take down a perceived threat before the threat could inflict harm on the US. The US leadership resolved that never again would the US be so blatantly attacked. Therefore, when the Bush Administration received information, albeit incorrect, that al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were working together, this was perceived as a threat to US national security. Under the new criteria that asserted preemptive self defense, the US government would not allow these two individuals to have the opportunity to hatch any plans against the US. The fear of a partnership between these two actors was the knowledge that al-Qaeda had been busy trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Saddam Hussein reportedly had in huge stockpiles around Iraq. In order to protect US national security the US government eliminated Saddam Hussein as a threat in the subsequent invasion of Iraq titled Operation Iraqi Freedom, which started on March 20, 2003.

By the time the US went to war in Iraq most Americans believed the pronouncements from the Bush administration regarding Iraq.<sup>70</sup> However, there was some validity to President Bush's reasons for invading Iraq, which was that the Iraqi people would be better off without the tyrannical ruler. Saddam Hussein was a brutal leader and had a known history of human rights abuses against his own people. In speeches to justify going to war President Bush highlighted how Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds.<sup>71</sup> However, the President failed to mention that under Reagan and his father's administration the US pointedly ignored Saddam's actions because the US was trying to foster a better relationship with the dictator in its balance of power against Iran.<sup>72</sup> The real message the Bush administration was emphatically trying to establish with the American public was that the Iraqi ruler had a connection to al-Qaeda.<sup>73</sup> With this information the White House allowed the public to assume that perhaps the dictator was also responsible in some way for 9/11. Saddam Hussein was put in America's crosshairs soon after 9/11 and President Bush reached out for congressional authorization to go to war in September 2002, which was quickly endorsed only a month later.<sup>74</sup> In light of the events of 9/11, President Bush was counting on the public having strong feelings about removing Saddam Hussein from power. In reality there was only the smallest tangible thread connecting Saddam to 9/11, despite the appearance of an Iraqi partnership with Osama bin Laden.<sup>75</sup>

With the full support of the American public the US President sent the troops into Iraq, in March 2003, to destroy the "Axis of Evil." Most Americans fully backed the war, due to the high emotional toll the terrorist attacks had on peoples' lives. However, the Bush Administration made that decision to go to war without ever actually having seen any evidence that truly linked Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden or having an accurate number of WMDs the Iraqi ruler reportedly had.<sup>76</sup> Apparently the Bush Administration was basing its intent to go to war with

Iraq on the old evidence that the Iraqi dictator never adhered to fully disarming, as stipulated in a UN resolution.<sup>77</sup> Additionally, no one raised the argument that Saddam Hussein would not give al-Qaeda WMD, as he represented a secular Islamic regime which the terrorist group had sworn to destroy.<sup>78</sup> President Bush did not agree with this argument and vehemently believed that given the opportunity Saddam Hussein would give WMDs to a terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda, so that Iraq's enemies would be harmed.<sup>79</sup>

If the truth for going to war didn't rest in the fact that Saddam Hussein supported al-Qaeda, then what remains in the equation is the possibility that Saddam might have had WMDs. Perhaps the Bush administration realized that America would not agree to spend money on a war when they lacked tangible evidence, Saddam's vast array of WMD, to present to the public. The US was fairly quick to dismiss the UN weapon inspectors, which Saddam had personally invited on September 16, 2002, and assert that a much faster time table was necessary.<sup>80</sup> Tensions were heightened regarding nuclear weapons during this time period as the US was also dealing with the threat of North Korea continuing its nuclear research program.<sup>81</sup> No matter what the Bush administration's real intention for invading Iraq, six years later the US military continues the bloody fight in Iraq, which according to then Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was to have been an assuredly easy victory.

The US military choose an effects-based warfare of Shock and Awe that would quickly oust Saddam Hussein and put Iraq in American control, so a new government could be elected and established.<sup>82</sup> Apparently senior military officials were of the mindset that Iraq was going to be a quick victory, requiring only a small amount of soldiers to overthrow Saddam Hussein and establish the new government.<sup>83</sup> The military strategy of Shock and Awe can be explained as the shock of the campaign coming from the might of US military capabilities, which results in the

population being awed at the power of the American military, thus quickly surrendering.<sup>84</sup> The Pentagon was truly surprised when the quick win in Iraq did not occur. Instead the US military was presented with the unique challenge of combating insurgents. Six years later the US continues to assess the progress in Iraq in hopes that the Iraqi people can soon take full responsibility of governing and providing security for their people.

Within the first year the US military was entangled in a guerrilla style war that it had not reckoned with.<sup>85</sup> At that time the US did not realize that this guerrilla style of warfare would dominate the battlefield over the next six years. As in most guerrilla conflicts, and to make the situation even more challenging the soldiers could not easily identify their enemy. The US military was being targeted by insurgents who blended into the local population, as they dressed like civilians or even woman.<sup>86</sup> Eventually the Pentagon came to understand that they were dealing with multiple actors, each with their own agenda. They were not fighting the remains of Saddam's former intelligence and Republican Guard officers as they had assumed in the beginning of insurgent initiated violence.<sup>87</sup> Instead they were up against individuals and groups such as Muhammad's Army or the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, who joined in the fighting to avenge the death of a family member or to rid Iraq of American presence.<sup>88</sup> Mostly, however, the angered Iraqi Sunnis were the catalyst to the insurgency movement.

The insurgency violence stoked up a civil war when the US tried to establish an Iraqi government. This required the continued presence of the US military to try and maintain a modicum of safety for the Iraqi population. The US is known for eagerly instilling its form of democracy around the world; and no different was its plan in Iraq.<sup>89</sup> However, America's style of government would not necessarily work well in a country with a variety of ethnic groups all vying for a share of the power, and the largest group continually dominating the voting bloc.<sup>90</sup>

Shia Iraqis make up about 60% of the Iraqi population. During Saddam Hussein's reign as President of Iraq the Shia were mistreated and discriminated against. Therefore, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraq's transitional government, initiated the process to create a new government the Shia clamored to have just representation.

The CPA unwisely allowed elections to take place in January 2005 when Iraq's Sunni population boycotted the elections because they saw American favoring a Shia majority within the new government.<sup>91</sup> The Sunnis were already upset for being marginalized by the CPA, at the beginning of the US invasion of Iraq, through US efforts of de-Ba'athification. Saddam Hussein was Sunni and therefore favored Sunnis through employment and top government positions. The CPA removed Sunnis from thousands of important professional jobs to eliminate the influences of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.<sup>92</sup> In the end the US, and other members of the Multinational Forces, allowed the elections to take place. The Shiite were quick to urge for a fast timetable to establish a government that favored their majority.<sup>93</sup> Thus Iraq's new government and constitution was missing vital Sunni participation and influence, which only added to the already tense political atmosphere in Iraq.<sup>94</sup> Except for in Iran, the Shia has never led a modern Arab government, so they would not easily relinquish their new position of power.<sup>95</sup> The power struggle between the Sunnis and the Shiite escalated into a civil war. The situation was made even more volatile with al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, who were doing their best to hamper US efforts to establish a new Iraqi government and bring peace to the country.<sup>96</sup>

The inauguration of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on May 28, 2006 demonstrated to the Sunni population that this new Iraqi government was not one of national reconciliation.<sup>97</sup> In order for this sectarian violence to stop between the Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds, a compromise would need to be made on how to share and use political and military power, as well as

economic resources.<sup>98</sup> However, the Sunnis did not feel they would get adequate representation within the new government. They also believed that the new Shia dominated government would write policies in favor of the Shia political agenda.<sup>99</sup> Thus the Sunni insurgency began directing their anger at US troops. They were inspired by the actions of al-Qaeda and redirected their attacks to include the Shia. Al-Qaeda had been targeting the Shia through suicide bombings.<sup>100</sup> Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) successfully pitted the Sunnis and the Shiites against one another, especially after they bombed the Askariya Shrine on February 22, 2006, which had great religious significance to the Twelfth Shiite Imam.<sup>101</sup> General Petraeus, the US Army's top military leader in Iraq, stated that AQI's bombing of the mosque successfully destabilized the fragile Iraqi political system.<sup>102</sup>

AQI, an offshoot of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist group, focused on instigating as much violence and instability as they could in Iraq. Initially the group was founded and led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in June 2006, when Abu Ayyab al-Masri succeeded him.<sup>103</sup> According to a US National Intelligence Estimate, AQI is considered to be a very powerful extension of bin Laden's group, and wields a great deal of influence in Iraq.<sup>104</sup> AQI introduced the use of Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) in the insurgency movement and set the precedence for using suicide terrorists to make the deployment of IEDs more effective. The use of IEDs became the number one weapon of choice among insurgents because it made them a stronger contender against the US military and coalition forces. An IED is very precise as the insurgent can detonate the device by a remote trigger or uses a suicide operative.<sup>105</sup> The unpredictability of an IED's location or when one might explode gives the insurgents the upper hand. Through this weapon the insurgency is able to wield power over the US military, which greatly outnumbers the insurgents. A single insurgent can cause sufficient damage to a large

military fleet without giving away their location, being injured or killed in the process.<sup>106</sup>

Developing countermeasures for IEDs has proven to be challenging for the US military, as the culprits responsible for these devices are unknown, and when insurgents become aware of an IED countermeasure they quickly find many other ways to avoid detection.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, the IED will continue to be a popular insurgent weapon against the US military and whoever else they target as their enemy.

The insurgents' strategy of using IEDs boded well for furthering their agenda. AQI's goal for instigating a civil war was to hamper the US and coalition forces efforts in establishing peace in Iraq.<sup>108</sup> The group fulfilled this goal through their continued acts of violence, which not only killed the enemy but also received media attention. The attacks themselves caused the desired devastation, and the media presence portrayed the chaos and loss of life. This worked in the insurgency's advantage, because the graphic images sent a clear message, to a global audience, that Iraq was not a secure or stable environment. By continually playing provocateur in Iraq, AQI was using violence to undermine any progress the US and Iraqis made. The insurgents also wanted the local population to doubt that the US military and coalition forces could protect them against the violence. If the local population believed that the situation was proving too difficult for the US to control, the Iraqi's might also have doubts in the US' commitment in quashing the insurgency movement.<sup>109</sup> Lastly, the effectiveness of IEDs spurred the insurgency movement to not give up and continue fighting.<sup>110</sup> The US military was able to overcome the challenges AQI and the insurgents put before them through a surge of troops. By 2007 the violence decreased dramatically, which helped quell al-Qaeda's influence.<sup>111</sup>

In a step that demonstrated the political necessity of Sunni inclusion, the Sons of Iraq, a Sunni insurgency group, were given the responsibility of providing security. The program was

initiated on October 1, 2008 and Iraqi Shiite government paid the Sons of Iraq a monthly salary of \$300 to act as security in Iraq neighborhoods.<sup>112</sup> This relieves some of the burden from the US military, and allows US soldiers to concentrate on fighting al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups. This US act was in recognition of the real situation, as the Sons of Iraq were already actively providing security in the capital area before they were officially paid for this duty.<sup>113</sup> General Petraeus gave the group credit for the service they are providing, but disapproves of the way the Shia government has begrudgingly handled the situation.<sup>114</sup>

The situation in Iraq is at the center of debate among US military and political officials. Many feel that the US should pullout of Iraq, but there are those that strongly urge the US government not to withdraw from Iraq because of the negative consequences. In 2008 Senator McCain was emphatic in his proclamation that if the US military withdrew al-Qaeda would take over the country. Iraq would then serve as a base for terrorists to train and seek refuge.<sup>115</sup> Hillary Clinton also attested that if the US wasn't successful in stabilizing Iraq it would turn into "a Petri dish for insurgents and al-Qaeda."<sup>116</sup> As the pressure mounts against al-Qaeda in Iraq, a senior intelligence officer for General Petraeus believes that AQI is shifting their attention back to Afghanistan and looking for new locations around world. According to the military official AQI's resources would more effective in these locations, because of a lack in US military presence.<sup>117</sup>

The US' success in Iraq is overlooked by the fact that the US military must now go back to Afghanistan. The battle will be fought in a more severe landscape and in a different political environment, and here too the US military will be faced with insurgents using IEDs against them. The US cannot allow al-Qaeda continued safe haven in Afghanistan, and it must once again rid the country of the Taliban's reemerging presence. The US government must also

refocus their efforts on stopping the activity that is occurring in western Pakistan, as the Afghan government up to late had apparently turned a blind eye towards al-Qaeda and Taliban presence in that region. The US military faces some tough challenges in the years ahead, as the situation in Iraq seems fickle in nature, and may push itself back to the forefront as the situation in Afghanistan is currently doing. In the meantime the US military stands its ground while facing political and security obstacles in Iraq on a daily basis. The US continues to assist the fledgling Iraqi state in providing security to the Iraqi people until the new government is able to stand alone and do this for themselves.

### Afghanistan Unraveled: US Reassessment

Seven years later the US military officials are struggling to prove that Afghanistan must receive just as much attention as Iraq in terms of resources and manpower. The Bush administration made Iraq its priority, and those currently fighting in Afghanistan must wait for additional assistance while President Obama figures out his strategy in Afghanistan. Now the Obama administration must listen to top military commanders who insist on more troops. General Stanley McChrystal, President Obama's top commander in Afghanistan, conveys the urgency of this request in his strategic assessment of Afghanistan, which was leaked to the press on September 21, 2009. The General predicts that if 30,000-40,000 additional troops are not deployed to Afghanistan within the next 12 months irreparable damage will be done.<sup>118</sup> McChrystal believes that if this counterinsurgency strategy does not unfold soon, defeating the insurgents for good in Afghanistan will most likely never occur.<sup>119</sup> President Obama needs to correct the

previous White House administration's mistakes, and finally give Afghanistan the attention it should have received from the start. Had the US military received the necessary resources in 2001, it may have already ensured the complete demise of the Taliban and possibly even al-Qaeda.

Similar to Iraq the US also failed at nation building in Afghanistan. This crucial mistake, in combination with an inadequacy of military presence, allowed the Taliban to reemerge. Due to the lack of political stability, al-Qaeda and forces in Pakistan assisted this radical group in regaining their foothold in Afghanistan.<sup>120</sup> The Taliban also used Afghanistan's opium industry as a source of income to bolster their movement.<sup>121</sup> As early as 2003, the US military acknowledged hundreds of Taliban arriving back to the Helmand province of Afghanistan from Quetta, Pakistan to operate in the drug industry.<sup>122</sup> In retrospect the US government needed to be more firm with Pakistan, as the Pakistanis allowed the Taliban fleeing from Afghanistan safe haven. Over the next five years ex-premier Musharraf's government did not give up a single Taliban militant to the US, even though they were aware of Taliban's presence.<sup>123</sup> The political climate certainly didn't bode well for Pakistan's cooperation in voluntarily handing over the echelon of Taliban leaders. US actions in Afghanistan had illustrated to all actors involved that US' top priority lie in Iraq, and Pakistan was interested in self-preservation.

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists took advantage of the lack of Pakistan or US military presence along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Over the years the Taliban acquired and adapted the specialized skill of suicide terrorism through the terrorist network it had protected and continues to support. The Taliban, and eventually the Pakistani Taliban, were using IEDs produced and manufactured along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border under the tutelage of al-Qaeda.<sup>124</sup> Taliban suicide attacks were becoming more frequent, and were highly

organized and well thought-out. To the Afghan people suicide terrorism was a completely new form of warfare, as they did not have to endure it through the Soviet-Afghan war.<sup>125</sup> The first recorded suicide terrorist attack was in 1992 in Afghanistan's Kunar province.<sup>126</sup> Also, hundreds of mobilized Afghan Taliban attacked US and NATO troops with IEDs.<sup>127</sup> And the summer months of 2008 IEDs accounted for the highest death toll of US military, Afghan police and army since 2001.<sup>128</sup>

Afghanistan's problems stemmed from the presence of terrorists hiding along the Afghan-Pakistan border in North-West Frontier Province in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Among the terrorists that were holed up in this region were al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and other militants recruited from all over the world. The Pashtun tribesmen that lived in this area were compensated to assist al-Qaeda and the Taliban attain safe haven, and they would eventually become known as the Pakistani Taliban.<sup>129</sup> There was simply too much organized terrorist activity taking place, especially in South Waziristan (FATA), to ignore. In 2006 the US demanded Pakistan's cooperation or threatened to reduce military aid.<sup>130</sup> This had the necessary effect and 2006-2007 saw an increased activity on Pakistan's part to do something about the Taliban. It resulted in the death of the Taliban's second in command Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Usmani.<sup>131</sup>

However, by 2008 the relationship between the US and Pakistan was once again strained. The severity of the situation was highlighted when the CIA stopped sharing its intelligence with Pakistan's ISI.<sup>132</sup> Incredibly Pakistan continued to turn a blind eye toward the Taliban activity in Quetta, even while the Taliban's allies in FATA were actively involved in fighting Pakistan's army in Bajaur.<sup>133</sup> The end of 2008 would bring the largest number of dead for Western troops. There were more deaths in Afghanistan that year and for the first time the statistics surpassed the

number of deaths in Iraq.<sup>134</sup> These statistics are grim and illustrate the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that the victory so easily attained by the US in 2001 unraveled so quickly in later years.

## CHAPTER III: AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS EXPLORED

### Introduction

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact that suicide terrorism had on the US policy and military strategy, due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US military had to deal with many challenges over the course of both wars. However, suicide terrorism was certainly the most perplexing enemy tactic. By analyzing the goals within the US NSS and the QDRs, I will conclude that suicide terrorism was a significant factor that caused the US government to change its wartime strategy. Suicide terrorism poses a serious threat to our US military and to our citizens living in the US and abroad. However, efforts to eradicate suicide terrorism seem almost futile. The resources to construct an IED or body bomb are available to anyone who is determined enough to build one, and sophisticated bombs that can be detonated from afar only require simple devices like a cell phone or an electronic key fob.<sup>135</sup> Additionally, insurgents are capable of adapting quickly to IED countermeasures due to the increasing availability of commercial electronic products.<sup>136</sup> This is an advantage to the terrorist organization, as they elude the military's countermeasures by purchasing a product that can defeat an IED countermeasure. The US military struggles to keep their IED countermeasures current; modern technologies such as cell phone jammers and microwaves have been used in the IED fight. Despite the challenges presented by this cat and mouse game of countermeasure and counter-countermeasure, it is important the US military continue their efforts. It would be

disastrous to the US' image in the world if it was forced to withdraw from a fight it considered crucial to the global war on terror due to IEDs and suicide bombers.

My conclusion is that suicide terrorism resulted in the US government changing military strategies so it could attain its goals in Afghanistan and Iraq. The material used to support my conclusion will be drawn from an analysis of key strategic goals within the US National Security Strategy from 2002 and 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Reviews from 2001 and 2006, and statistics from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 2008 Report on Terrorism, specifically focusing on the trends of Person- Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) and Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED)-related attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is important to note that both the analysis and conclusion in this study were attained only through unclassified documents available only through open sources.

### US Military Strategies Re-evaluated

The end of the Cold War brought about a significant change for the US military. Just as the Soviet Union suddenly fell, so too did the rise of new threats in the global environment. These changes impacted the US military doctrine. Thereby, new strategies were implemented to adapt to the post Cold War environment, and be in a better position to contend with the new security threats. The previous US military strategies focused on containing the Soviet Union. During this period the US military maintained a large army and kept a nuclear weapons stockpile, in case an all-out confrontation ensued. This strategy became outdated and was no longer the best way for America to defend its national interests.<sup>137</sup> The US role in the Balkans,

which centered on Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic's persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during the 90's, was the presumed catalyst that forced the US military to seriously reevaluate and update the US military doctrine.<sup>138</sup> A new military doctrine would help the US military define their position in the post Cold War environment.

The DoD's acknowledged the importance of adapting and updating US military doctrine during the 90's, especially with the boding threat of religious extremists. The 1993 Bottom-up Review (BUR) focused on creating a smaller and more mobile military that could easily respond to situations occurring simultaneously throughout the world.<sup>139</sup> In 1996 Congress mandated that DoD undertake a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The purpose of the QDR was for DoD to review current strategies, resources, and programs. The QDR's main goal was to establish a national defense strategy derived from the most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS). The review was meant to define a defense strategy that successfully leveraged US military's assets to achieve US NSS' goals. The QDR was implemented due to the BUR's criticism of current strategies. Additionally, in 1994 Congress mandated the Commissions on Roles and Missions (CORM) through the National Defense Act, because many thought that the BUR inadequately addressed the new threats in the global environment. The CORM too failed to gather many supporters because it adhered to the two major theater war (MTW) scenario prescribed in the BUR. However, the CORM mandated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a clear vision for future joint operations through a major quadrennial strategy review.<sup>140</sup>

The US Congress took the CORM's recommendation and mandated that the DoD undertake the 1997 QDR, as "a method to conduct a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs."<sup>141</sup> The first QDR was criticized for being a budget driven assessment. The independent National Defense Panel (NDP) that reviewed the 1997

QDR, also found fault that the two-MTW scenario was presented as a viable strategy within the QDR. The NDP believed the two-MTW would impede the military's ability to successfully implement strategies that would prepare them for future threats.<sup>142</sup> The second QDR, released on September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2001 presented a military strategy that adequately met future challenges and addressed how it would protect US interests.

The DoD must now conduct a QDR every four years, as it was enacted into law by the 106<sup>th</sup> Congress. Under United States Code, Chapter 2 of title 10 Section 118 reads:

“... [every four years the Secretary of Defense will] conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view towards determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.”<sup>143</sup>

The QDR follows the release of the NSS, and is due “no later than September 30 of the year in which the review is conducted.”<sup>144</sup> However, DoD may allow for more time to update the framework of the QDR if the previous NSS significantly changes the security strategy.<sup>145</sup> The 2001 QDR was completed prior to the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, when the Bush Doctrine of preemptive self-defense had yet to be evoked. Terrorist threats had a major impact on the 2006 QDR. It also addressed how the DoD planned to meet its national security objectives with the new challenges that were posed in the international political arena. The military roadmap, defined in the QDR, established definitive military strategies that the US Armed Forces could use to implement the national security strategies.

## The Roadmap to Protecting the Homeland

The 2001 QDR clearly stated the overall US national security goals: to keep America safe and to honor America's commitments worldwide. A consensus was reached among the highest government officials that the US could afford to acquire whatever resources necessary to protect the US population from threats that loomed on the horizon. The QDR was completed after much deliberation over many months by the President and military leadership in the DoD. The 2001 QDR provided the framework for our national defense strategy and our military strategy. The review outlined the four key goals that made up the foundation for these strategies. These goals, as stated in the 2001 QDR, are:

- Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of purpose and its capabilities to fulfill its security commitments;
- Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of our allies and friends;
- Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks, and imposing severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and
- Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.<sup>146</sup>

To achieve these goals the US government used a capabilities- based model that focused on how the enemy would wage war against the US versus who the threat could be, or where a war might take place. The move away from the threat based model allowed the US to

concentrate on identifying how to overcome an enemy that depends on asymmetric warfare to achieve its goals. This different approach acknowledges the importance of planning for asymmetric war, in addition to the conventional wars. Additionally the review mentions that transforming the military to adapt to this new approach will require time. It is not enough that the military doctrine adapt to the strategy of the adversary, but military capabilities must also adjust accordingly so the military objectives can be successfully achieved.

Homeland security remained our government's top priority in the 2002 NSS. Like the 2001 QDR, the somber tone in the 2002 NSS, noted how the enemy's tactics have changed. Our adversaries employ new strategies to put the US and US interests in harm's way. No longer is the threat tied to simply one nation state, but adversaries are bound together through the technological advantages in this globalized world. If rogue terrorists attack the US, this means that our military cannot focus on defeating the military of one nation, and therefore must employ other strategies to defeat this new kind of enemy. The US will not allow attacks from various terrorist organizations, or any other enemy, to negatively affect the obligations the US has throughout the international community. The US takes these responsibilities seriously, as the NSS states that the US gladly takes the lead to thwart those that infringe on peoples' basic civil liberty: freedom.

President Bush's administration laid out the goals in the 2002 NSS in order to successfully lead this endeavor. The scope of this mission also included stopping threats emanating from failing states, where radical extremists focused on acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to use against the US or its allies and inflict great harm. The three goals presented in the 2002 NSS:

- Political and economic freedom
- Peaceful relations with other states
- Respect for human dignity<sup>147</sup>

The goals are meant to reflect American internationalism and the 2002 NSS strategy aimed at making the world not only safer, but better. The 2002 NSS described eight objectives that guided the US to achieve the three goals listed above. The first objective supported mankind's desire for dignity. The second objective was to strengthen the US' global partnerships to stop terrorism from occurring against our country, and that of our allies'. Through these relationships, the third objective is to foster a sense of collaboration to work together to subdue regional conflicts. The fourth objective stated that a strong sense of unity and teamwork will go a long way and work to hinder an enemy from threatening the US or its allies with WMDs. The fifth objective aimed to stimulate the global economy through growth in the free market and trade. Additionally, economic expansion would increase development by establishing the foundations of democracy, and opening societies to reap the benefits of a free market economy, which is the sixth objective. The seventh objective stated in the 2002 NSS described "developing agendas for cooperative action with other main center of global power."<sup>148</sup> Lastly, in order to achieve the three main goals, the US government's national security institutions needed to be transformed to be able to stand up against its adversaries and defend our national interests in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The 2002 NSS continued with the tenets established in the framework of the 2001 QDR. The palpable threat of radical extremists was addressed, as the one year anniversary of the September 11 atrocities had already passed by when the 2002 NSS was made public. OEF in Afghanistan visibly demonstrated the US military's commitment to ensure the success of the US government's main national security goal: keeping America safe. OEF embodied the four key

goals established in the 2001 QDR. As the US government had been unable to prevent the 9/11 attacks, the swift military campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban were justified because our nation was provoked to defend itself, and ultimately protect the America people. Through this no- nonsense approach the US military successfully demonstrated its conventional capability and defeated the adversaries in Afghanistan. The quick win in Afghanistan sent a clear message to any foe of the US. America would unleash its full potential to protect its interests. US actions during this scenario also ensured their allies, friends, and the global community that the US was sincere in its international commitment to protect political and economic liberty.

The 2006 US NSS was released in March 2006. In the 2006 US NSS introduction, President Bush described how easily the US could retreat toward the strategy of isolationism. However, the President brushed this notion aside and instead encouraged the chosen option of acting preemptively against threats to protect the US. Protectionism, President Bush argued, would have resulted in the loss of momentum and missed opportunities. (Perhaps he was referring to President Clinton's missed opportunity to arrest and or kill Osama bin Laden while al-Qaeda's leader was still residing in Sudan.) Due to bin Laden's horrific plot on that fateful September day, the US was forced to acknowledge the stark reality of the new international security environment, and more importantly the need to take swift action.

The overarching goal of the 2006 US NSS goal was to protect all Americans. This goal is supported by two pillars: the first stating:

- Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity-working to end tyranny
- Promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies.

The second pillar of the 2006 NSS:

- Confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.<sup>149</sup>

Democratic values play a significant role in the fabric of American society and politics. The thought behind instilling democratic values, in contentious nations and elsewhere around the world, is the belief that this will ultimately help stop the influence of radical extremists and other adversaries. The US believes that democracies tend to act more responsibly in the international political arena. Therefore, promoting democracy around the world is the “most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability,” and the amount of freedom a nation gives its citizens is the measuring device.<sup>150</sup> The first goal described how nations need to work together to end tyrannical rulers. People living under these leaders are robbed of certain freedoms, thus these despotic systems are responsible for curtailing the spread of democracy. Stopping tyrannies does not end there. The second goal promotes assisting new free nations to establish effective democracies. This included illustrating how important democratic values, rights, and institutions all have an interconnected part in creating a political and social environment where citizens have access to all freedoms. The third goal aimed at advancing freedom around the world, simultaneously fulfills our national security interests back home. The last goal presented in the 2006 US NSS reaffirms that this goal ultimately supports the US government’s end goal, which is the security and safety of the American people.

US leaders did not forget that the American people once struggled to attain certain rights and freedoms. The US government’s vision of an entire global community that shares our democratic values, will take time to foster. The goal is simply aimed at promoting a world where

people can live without fear, and an international community that encourages their citizens to act with humanity's best interests in mind. The 2006 US NSS focused on accomplishing nine tasks that support these goals. The first task aimed to advocate mankind's desire for dignity. The next one describes the need to strengthen America's global partnerships to stop terrorism from occurring against our country, or that of our allies'. The third task stated the importance to foster relationships. By working together, the global community can cool down political hot spots. A strong sense of unity and teamwork will go a long way and work to hinder an enemy from threatening the US or its allies with WMDs. The fifth task mentioned a global economy experiencing growth through free market and trade. Increasing economic prosperity would expand the democratic framework around the world. The Bush administration's seventh task stated a need to "develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power."<sup>151</sup> An important goal that was laid out as the eighth task was the vital transformation of US' national security institutions. This task must be successfully completed, especially in light of the type of adversaries our country is up against. Lastly, the American government needs to use aspects of globalization to their advantage, while also tackling the challenges this can present.

The 2006 QDR came five years after the US became intensely embroiled with the War against Terrorism. The document notes that if radical extremists equip themselves with WMDs, then what is to stop them from targeting all free people? In 2006 the US was ardently focused on the wars occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this doesn't imply that the US won't stop planning for or be prepared to defend the homeland or US interests in the years to come. The 2006 review clarified assumptions that this new QDR would assert "new beginnings" for the US DoD. And according to the document, the US government recognized the change in the international security arena and initiated a transformation of government institutions. This would

allow the US to be better positioned in the post-Cold War environment. This policy, in addition to other government policies and strategies, are examples of how resolute the US government is at doing everything in their power to protect the US. Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld summarized the goal for the strategic framework established in the 2006 QDR was to provide “change, leading to victory.”<sup>152</sup>

History can be evaluated to provide ideas and strategies from similar scenarios of the past to assist in adapting current policies and strategies to attain victory. In this case, history is able to provide lessons learned to our military because they have been fighting against global extremists for many years. A theme that continued throughout the 2006 QDR was transforming DoD to meet the challenges presented through both asymmetric and conventional warfare. Therefore, military leadership analyzed the results from the 2001 QDR when creating the new roadmap for DoD. The policy also warned that the focus is currently on combating the threats in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in the years to come our government must be prepared to simultaneously fight in many locations around the world. The two goals presented in this QDR describe achievements that need to be fulfilled over the next few generations. DoD recommends that:

- Continuing to reorient the DoD’s capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges, and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years.
- Implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes and procedures effectively support its strategic direction.<sup>153</sup>

The 2006 QDR goals reflect the intense focus the government has on providing directions through strategies to better prepare for adversaries that attack American with irregular warfare. This intense focus is also directed at creating a stronger military and intelligence community, so that our country might never have to face another 9/11.

The 2006 QDR was built on the framework established in the March 2005 National Defense Strategy, which addressed DoD's need to meet the challenges presented in the form of irregular warfare. The review also wanted to give the President more military options, which would bolster US strategy when going up against asymmetric threats. In order to successfully win the War against Terror, and any other future conflicts, military leadership listed key strategic changes that illustrated just how DoD planned on transforming. Some of these shifts in strategy, included on the list, depicted how our military is conducting combat in countries we are not at war with. This describes the safe havens our adversaries find around the world. The shift in strategy takes the focus away from only conducting war against nations. As rogue nations and terrorist organizations act with no reservation or without regard to international laws, their actions can be unpredictable. Therefore, the US military must adapt from a bygone era of reasonableness and predictability to today's political environment of surprise and uncertainty.<sup>154</sup>

Together the 2006 US NSS and the 2006 QDR provide the roadmap for US actions in the new international security environment. The White House established the US' direction in the 2006 US NSS. It also set the foundation for how DoD will meet these requirements. This underscores the importance of aligning the 2006 QDR to the tenets within the 2006 US NSS. The goals defined in the 2006 QDR intertwine with the results expected for the 2006 US NSS goals. The 2006 US NSS focuses on ending and stopping terrorism from occurring in our country or anywhere in the world. Therefore the 2006 QDR envisioned DoD transforming the military to become more agile. The military can no longer think only in terms of waging war in the conventional sense.

The other 2006 US NSS goals promoted democracy through open and competitive markets, and through abolishing the hindrances that impede democracies from growing

throughout the global community. The 2006 QDR DoD highlighted a visible shift in US strategic thinking. In order to remove the impediments that challenge democratic expansion, DoD identified four priorities that will operationalize the strategy established in the 2006 review. The first priority is to defeat terrorist networks. September 11<sup>th</sup> and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated to us that defeating these radical extremist groups is crucial to our national security. DoD must go beyond protecting America only from terrorists by defending the homeland in depth. The second priority identified that threats to our national security could come in forms other than hijacked airliners, and can be through weaponized biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. The third priority goes hand in hand with the second priority, and stated that the US needs to prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.<sup>155</sup> This DoD priority addresses one of the nine tasks discussed in the 2006 US NSS. The American government also needs to tackle the challenges presented by globalization. Our globalized world, and modern technology, has allowed individuals and groups to become empowered. They will use these unconventional ways to threaten our country, because they know the US cannot use normal military force to stop them. These actors claim no affiliation to a single country. Consequently nothing inhibits them from breaking international law, as they don't have anything to lose in the conventional sense of government infrastructure, financial systems, or energy networks. The US military can't retaliate against them in a conventional sense, because that would cause unwarranted harm to innocent actors within that country. This of course doesn't apply to nations that allow individuals or terrorist groups a safe haven. A globalized world can work in our favor of our security if we strengthen our global relationships, and work together to curb the influences and actions of these adversaries.

The last of the four priorities also worked in favor of the goals set out in the 2006 US NSS. DoD recommended to assist countries that are at important junctures in that nation's political or social history. This support would ensure the right decisions would be made, which could greatly affect their future. This not only plays into the important goal of promoting effective democracies, but also illustrates how America is taking their role seriously of leading democratic growth throughout the international arena. The comparable difference between the 2002 US NSS and the 2006 US NSS is that the US garnered much experience between the publication of the two documents. In 2002 the country was still reeling from the aftershocks of the 9/11 attacks. The 2001 QDR correctly foreshadowed the need to transform the military to successfully handle the changes in the national security environment; that of irregular warfare. The 2002 US NSS goals illustrated the political climate of that time period. The terrorist attacks struck at the core of our democratic values. The terror that they imparted onto our country on September 11<sup>th</sup> deprived Americans of a sense of freedom which took a long time to rebuild. Al-Qaeda targeted the World Trade Center because it was a significant financial symbol in the democratic nation. This was another attack at our democratic value, which allowed for the expansion of economic growth through free market competition. Therefore, the 2002 sustainable model for national success in the 2002 US NSS makes sense: democracy, freedom, and free enterprise.<sup>156</sup>

As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had been well under way for many years, the 2006 US NSS unequivocally stated that the US government's intention is to protect the security of the American people. The 2002 US NSS set the foundation for why we needed to fight and defend our freedoms. In the 2006 US NSS the government had a better understanding of the terrorists and insurgents who we were contending with. However, even after four years of unconventional

warfare, the 2006 US NSS high-level goals were kept pretty much the same. The 2002 US NSS goals were “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and a respect for human dignity.”<sup>157</sup> The 2006 US NSS promoted “freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny; promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies;” and lastly to “confront the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.”<sup>158</sup> The Bush administration even kept the various tasks the same that were meant to accomplish the overall goals in the 2002 and 2006 US NSS. The 2002 US NSS instructed that the government would achieve eight objectives, and the results would support the accomplishment of the model for national success. The nine tasks in the 2006 US NSS differed only slightly and that was due to the addition of the ninth task. A globalized world represented a smaller world in which nations, groups, and individuals use technology to advance their own agendas. Some of this technology is used and acquired to threaten American interests. Therefore, the task that was added in the 2006 US NSS addressed how the American government needed to use aspects of our globalized world to the US’ advantage, but also tackle the challenges this can present.

The Bush administration viewed the progress in Afghanistan and Iraq as successfully achieving the objectives stated in the 2002 US NSS. The people in Afghanistan and Iraq were given back access to all freedoms, which would otherwise be granted in democracies. The removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein gave way to the possibility for these countries to experience freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. Even though these objectives were viewed as successful, they were repeated again in the 2006 US NSS, because our world is still not completely void of oppressive regimes. There are many countries in their infancy of democratic development, and require the support from other democratic nations so they will permanently

integrate the principles of democracy into the fabric of their society. Other global citizens are not given access to economic prosperity due to anti-free market authoritarianism.<sup>159</sup> Whereas some countries might once have enjoyed democratic freedoms, these freedoms are being taken away from their citizens. The advancement of democratic values will not only assist the global community, but will ultimately protect our own national interests. The roadmaps portrayed in the 2002 and 2006 US NSS, as well as in the 2001 and 2006 QDR discussed how America aims to confront the challenges in this post Cold War security environment. The documents, detailed in the pages above, have discussed how the seeds of transformation are taking place within our military, so that the US is unrivaled in their ability to match the threats from asymmetric strategies. However, our government leadership warns us not to forget other types of adversaries, as we must be ready on all fronts. The next chapter will provide a conclusion as to whether the suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq were significant enough to facilitate the US government to change their strategies listed in the 2002 and 2006 US NSS, and in the 2001 and 2006 QDR.

## CHAPTER IV: THE ROAD AHEAD

### Introduction

The previous chapters illustrated how quickly the landscape within the international political security environment can change. For many years the US concentrated on keeping their prime adversary at bay during the Cold War, which was how the US was drawn into assisting the mujahedeen fight the Soviets. During this time period US political and military policies and strategies reflected how significantly threatened the US felt toward the Russia's influence around the world. When the Soviet Union collapsed and their power lie in ruins along with their economy, the US acknowledged that the US' current policies and strategies were as obsolete as Russia's power. The Cold War did not involve the US with any direct military confrontation with their Cold War opponent. However, US actions during this time illustrated the competition between the two countries. Among the US strategy to keep Russia in check, the US engaged in a nuclear arms race and technology competition. This resulted in the Space Race to see who could out do one another's space technology. The policies and strategies the US had in place, to deter their Cold War adversary, would not have passed the muster when confronted by the new enemy that loomed in the horizon.

Al-Qaeda, like the Soviet Union, was primed for a war of ideologies with the US. However, unlike Russia, these radical extremists purposefully provoked the US to actively go to war with them. Al-Qaeda willing sacrificed the lives of members of their organization to kill innocent people around the world through suicide attacks. This strategy is vastly different from how Russia acted towards the US throughout the Cold War. The title given to this period sums

up how it was a cold war. The only “fighting” that took place was through the various competitions, including military buildup and industrial development. The policy of containment, established in the Truman Doctrine, would not have effectively fought this type of enemy if US strategy had not changed. The War on Terrorism is far from a cold war, as reflected by the body count left in the wake of al-Qaeda’s global terrorist attacks. Together the US military and Congress had the foresight to acknowledge that the US needed to be prepared to fight a different adversary.

### The External Influences to America’s Roadmap

The conclusion presented in this chapter will illustrate how suicide terrorism was a significant factor to elicit the US government to change their strategy and policy. The government strategy and policy that were analyzed in this study served to forever freeze a moment in history. By comparing and contrasting the goals in the previous US NSS and the QDRs, it is apparent that the suicide attacks occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq had an impact on US NSS and military strategy. The 2001 QDR took a snapshot of the US military’s roadmap prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The review was mainly completed before al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden became a household name. The stark difference between the 2006 QDR and the 2001 QDR is that the 2006 QDR was completed when the US was very aware of their adversary. The 2001 QDR had been initiated so that the US would be prepared for whatever threat would fill the void left by their Cold War enemy. Therefore comparing the goals of the 2001 QDR to the goals of the 2006 QDR indicated how external influences elicited a change in military strategy, through the goals established in the US NSS.

The void left by the USSR was not kept open for long, and the US was introduced to a new adversary on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The new enemy employed an irregular warfare campaign that was built on surprise and deception. From this day on the US would have to confront the dangers brought on by asymmetric warfare, and a clear vision of combat was vital. The US military faced the perils of their unconventional methods through the suicide terrorism attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was a popular tactic dictated through the terrorists' irregular warfare strategy. NCTC collected data on how often suicide attacks occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2005-2008. These statistics were compared to the goals of the 2001 QDR and the 2002 US NSS and the goals of the 2006 US NSS and the 2006 QDR. By analyzing the number of suicide attacks to the comparison of how the goals were written for each year, a conclusion was drawn to how much of an impact suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq had on the US NSS and QDR. Even though the NCTC data is available only from 2005-2008 the 2002 US NSS goals provided the framework for government policy and strategy for four years. Where the 2002 US NSS leaves off the 2006 US NSS establishes the framework for the military roadmap until 2010. The 2002 US NSS goals will be applied to analyze the NCTC statistics for 2005. The statistics from 2006-2008 will be analyzed using the 2006 US NSS. Therefore, a complete analysis can be done using the NCTC statistics, as the differences in how the goals changed will be analyzed using these numbers.

The 2001 QDR could not predict, with a hundred percent accuracy, which actors or nations would threaten US security or our interests. The policy did identify that the US could be threatened from a variety of capabilities, including asymmetric warfare or with enemies wielding WMDs. The 2001 QDR recognized that even though the enemies' identity might be vague, the military could still plan on discouraging actors, which could potentially cause harm to the US or

US interests harm, by stopping programs or operations that threaten the US in any way. Even though the 2001 QDR mentioned the potential of being attacked by adversaries using asymmetric warfare, the goals do not specifically include this in the wording. The 2006 QDR goals however, specifically include tackling this issue. Also, one of the 2002 US NSS objectives that are aligned with achieving the 2002 US NSS goals, mention stopping terrorism with the assistance of global partners. Additionally, the document stresses the importance of bolstering US national security institutions. The 2001 QDR elaborately lays out how the military will operationalize its goals.

From the goals the military plans are derived to successfully achieve defending the US. DoD established strategic tenets that comprised the US defense strategy from the 2001 QDR goals. Additionally, the military took a different approach in how they planned their operations. This supported the defense strategy through new models of thinking. And given the new security environment the transformation of the US military included changing its global military posture, as well as ensuring that the US military has all the required capabilities to defeat any adversary. Together these elements constituted the US military's position in the post Cold War environment.

The strategic tenets from the 2001 QDR include managing risks, a capabilities- based approach, defending the US and projecting US military power, strengthening alliances and partnerships, maintaining favorable regional balances, developing a broad base portfolio of military capabilities, and transforming defense.<sup>160</sup> In times of war the US military often has the hard task of making decisions because of budget restrictions. Therefore, the US military has to find the delicate balance of preparing for the right risk. Concurrently, the military must be ready for future threats, and also be prepared for battle at any given moment. The capabilities-based

approach enables the US to anticipate how an adversary might threaten the US. In this section the review mentions adversaries willing to use asymmetric warfare strategies against the US. The US is then able to focus on developing their capabilities to be able to defend the US and US interests against specific tactics from the asymmetric strategy arsenal.

Projecting our military power leverages the military's ability to defend the US. First and foremost, the US military must be able to protect the homeland. The US was so focused on creating a strong presence abroad that unintentionally left our own country vulnerable to attacks. The US military believes that our adversaries are targeting military vulnerabilities in our homeland. In the 2001 QDR DoD planned to concentrate on projecting a strong military presence at home and at long range to deter threats against the US. A strong military presence can be fostered by strengthening US global relationships. Not only does this positively impact the US' security interests, these relationships help create political stability. Countries working together will need to engage in training and joint operations to better establish these mutually reinforcing security relationships.<sup>161</sup>

Just as critically important as maintaining relationships throughout the world there is a continued need for US presence in specific countries. Some areas of the world are especially prone to the activities of our adversaries. However, if the US is present our enemy has to at least weigh the consequences of their actions, and if it is worth their efforts. There would be no benefits to the US maintaining relationships and their presence throughout the world if they are unable to acquire the best current military capabilities. The strategic tenet of how the US plans on developing their military capabilities, acknowledges that the US arsenal must be able to go up against current and future threats. More importantly is the US' plans to develop new weapons technologies to give the US the upper hand against their enemy on any battlefield. Lastly, DoD is

aware that a new era is afoot. If the military did not transform itself meet the challenges in the new environment, the homeland would suffer the consequences. The elements describe above however, illustrate a clear picture as to how DoD will not allow that to happen.

Transforming the military to adapt to the 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges also requires the model of thinking within the military to change as well. The main goal of the US military is to defend the US, and the new model is emphatic that this strategic focus is key. In order to achieve this, the US military needs to have enough forces to protect the homeland and US interests. Specifically, the 2001 QDR notes that the US must be prepared to react to international terrorism attacks, if the aggressors targeted US territory or US interests. US military forces would be tailored to meet the unique challenges within a specific region. This presence would work to prevent attacks in these regions against the US, our military, or on our allies. Through this new model, military leadership hoped that in the future the US military could work together with their allies in these regions to quickly defeat any encroaching threat. Additionally, the US could call on forces from one region to assist in other region. Ultimately, the 2001 QDR planned that the US military should be able to effectively engage in major combat operations occurring in different regions at the same time.

DoD's new paradigm shift recommended that the US military keep enough forces at hand for small scale operations. The reason behind this approach illustrated that the US military would be prepared when a spontaneous event occurred, without having to worry about how long the battle would last, the frequency of the events, or whether there were enough soldiers. In the review military leadership noted that DoD would make sure that when forces were involved in such operations, there would be enough specialized military personnel and weaponry to support the small scale operation. DoD must also re-adjust where they select to place their forces in the

specific regions around the world. No longer do all of the strategic US military bases placed around the world benefit the US, as these once did during the Cold War. According to the 2001 QDR, this reorganization is necessary in order to reorient the US military's global posture.

It is crucial that our troops be placed in the most logical regions throughout the world, as to better face the challenges of today's security environment. In addition to readjusting US military bases, DoD found that asserting our global stance included developing the best offensive and defensive capabilities. This would serve many purposes, and not only protect the US, US interests, or their allies against their adversaries' military strategies. US capabilities needed to include "missile defenses, defensive information operations, and counter-terrorist operations" to protect and defend against conventional and asymmetric weapons.<sup>162</sup> As shown by the statistics provided by NCTC, the US military would put these strategies to the test as their adversaries in Afghanistan, and especially in Iraq were prone to use the tactics of asymmetric warfare.

#### The National Counterterrorism Center's Statistics Interpreted

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) produced the 2008 Report on Terrorism on April 30, 2009. To clearly comprehend NCTC's statistics, it is important to know how the government organization defined terrorism. NCTC established the definition in 2005. According to NCTC their definition of terrorism is described as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant target by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."<sup>163</sup> The statistics gathered in the 2008 Report on Terrorism were subject to the accuracy of terrorist attacks being reported through public media. Collecting this type of data can be

increasingly challenging when attacks occur in remote areas around the world, or if they happen to affect only a small group of people.

The reason the 2008 Report on Terrorism statistics begin in 2005 is due to NCTC's changing their methodology; the information collected across different years became incompatible because in 2004 NCTC used the international terrorism definition as the basis for their methodology, which the report notes limited their scope of work. When collecting statistics on suicide related attacks, the perpetrator had to have died as a result, in order for NCTC to count it as a suicide related attack. The concept of a PBIED is explained as a human having an IED on their persons, thus becoming part of the bomb. An explanation of what constitutes a SVBIED is when a suicide bomber includes a vehicle as part of their suicide attack. This information is relevant because this study specifically analyzes the trends of PBIED and SVBIED relating to suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The NCTC statistics illustrate that the PBIED and SVBIED attacks in Afghanistan are very low in 2005. The intelligence gathering institution recorded only 7 PBIEDs and 8 SVBIEDs for that year. The situation in Iraq, on the other hand, was quite different. In 2005 there were 71 PBIED attacks and 274 SVBIED attacks. The information provided above, supported the roadmap for the military through the goals established in the 2001 QDR. The plans described in the strategic tenets, the US military's operational paradigm shift, and the reorienting of the US military global posture all aimed at providing the US military with an advantage to any future adversary. Highlighted within this document was preparing the military for the possibility of an enemy that used irregular warfare. However, according to the NCTC's 2008 Report on Terrorism, the US military's enemies were already using this strategy.

The methods employed by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq to curb the insurgency, al-Qaeda, and other actors from using suicide terrorism seem ineffective when comparing the PBIED and SVBIED statistics in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2005 to 2006. In Afghanistan the PBIED and SVBIED attacks rose dramatically, occurring 39 and 51 times respectively. In Iraq the PBIED attacks were down from 71 to 59 attacks. Almost hundred less SVBIED attacks occurred in Iraq that year, which brought the total to 175 for 2006. Like the 2001 QDR the 2006 QDR explains how the military will operationalize the goals provided within that review. The security environment changed considerably from the release of the 2001 QDR to the release of the 2006 QDR. The military roadmap defined in this review supports the national security goals the White House had for 2006. As suicide terrorism was occurring with increasing frequency, it should become apparent through the comparison of the 2006 QDR to the 2001 QDR, if this activity elicited the US military to change their strategy.

Table 1: 2005-2008 Suicide terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq

	Afghanistan		Iraq	
	PBIED	SVBIED	PBIED	SVBIED
2005	7	8	71	274
2006	39	51	59	175
2007	75	38	92	271
2008	57	47	100	117

Source: Statistics taken from NCTC's 2008 Report on Terrorism

Table 2: 2005-2008 PBIED attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq





Table 3: 2005-2008 SVBIED attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq



The differences between the 2001 and 2006 QDR are immediately noticeable. As mentioned above the 2001 QDR was compiled before the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks took place, and the US could not identify with certainty what actors were targeting to harm the US. Therefore the US military leadership was trying to prepare military capabilities to face any tactic of war. The 2006 QDR specifically stated that since 9/11 the US is engaged on the War against Terrorism, and our adversaries are global terrorist networks.<sup>164</sup> This enemy employs irregular warfare strategies that not only include suicide terrorism, but more significantly DoD fears that these groups will acquire and use WMDs to kill Americans and other people around the world.

Suicide terrorist attacks continued to occur with relatively higher frequency in Iraq than in Afghanistan, which is illustrated by the NCTC's statistics until 2008. By 2008 PBIED attacks were reportedly the highest since 2005, occurring 100 times. The reverse is said for SVBIED attacks, and by 2008 suicide attacks with vehicles was at its lowest point with 117 attacks accounted for. Afghanistan's statistics didn't stay as constant as Iraq's suicide attacks, and from 2006 to 2008 the numbers continued to volley up and down. Compared to the previous year, 2007 PBIED statistics increased to 75. And in 2008 these numbers dropped to 57, but 2005 could still claim to have seen the least amount of violence. SVBIED attacks dropped to 38 from 2006, and then rose again to 47 in 2008. Information in the 2006 QDR provides an explanation as why the suicide attacks occur in less abundantly in Afghanistan than they do in Iraq.

As detailed in previous chapters of this study al-Qaeda is active in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, Iraq holds a greater significance to al-Qaeda in terms of how America's War on Terrorism will play out. The terrorist organization has verbalized how they cannot allow the US to gain a strategic win in Iraq. One of Al-Qaeda's leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri, stated before he was killed in US attacks that the US won't win in Iraq unless they occupy the country. His next

words imply that America won't successfully gain control over Iraq, because "the Islamic movement needs an Islamic base in the heart of an Arab region."<sup>165</sup> Therefore, military leadership reached the conclusion that al-Qaeda would be even more tenacious in their attacks in Iraq. Additionally, DoD believed that the radical extremists' message, when delivered in Iraq, was a stark contrast to the historical beginning of democracy that came from the country.<sup>166</sup> AQI meddled in Iraqi politics and purposefully instigated violence to undo progress that had been made by coalition forces in Iraq. In 2001 DoD accurately set the foundation for the military to have the capability to face any challenge. The 2006 QDR worked from this foundation, and with the adversary in their crosshairs they built a military roadmap that successfully defined their role in the new security environment.

In the four years after the 2001 QDR goals were written, DoD set to accomplish these goals. Through the implementation of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) the US military touched on one of the major items in the 2001 QDR, which was to reform their global military posture around the world. The BRAC assessment allowed the US military to close military installations that were no longer necessary, and to open US bases that were crucial to winning the long war of global terrorism as well as any other future foe. The 2006 QDR continued this theme of reorienting the US military to adapt to the new security environment. Therefore, the 2006 QDR goals support this model of change and reassessment. DoD's emphasis on focusing on a model of continuous change for the US military's strategy and operational planning, illustrates how the US is highly adaptive, like their current adversary. This is crucial to win any battle and stay in control within the security environment, and not only to win in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In order to be successful in the short and long term, military leaders recognized in the 2006 QDR that our military strategy requires both the use of conventional and unconventional methods. In order to achieve the QDR's goals, DoD wanted to strengthen their position in additional areas. These areas support the military preparation to confront the wider asymmetric challenges, and the new strategic direction works in tandem with these objectives. The additional roadmaps include department institutional reform and governance, irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communication, and intelligence. The challenges of the security environment are also addressed through four priorities established by government and military leaders to operationalize the strategy, which are "defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD."<sup>167</sup> In combination these areas of focus work to improve the US military.

The 2001 QDR came at a crucial time for US government and military leadership to define America's role in the post Cold War environment. During the 90's al-Qaeda and other terrorists were attacking US through our interests in other countries, but in 2001 they changed their modus of operandi and targeted our homeland. Defeating terrorist networks took on a new meaning when this attack occurred in the US, and caused indescribable damage. In this global age it is imperative that the US come together with their international partners and create an environment that is intolerant of terrorist organizations. This is has been an ongoing goal could not have been more called for, and is has been present throughout the US NSS in 2002 and 2006. Terrorist organizations need to understand that the US and its allies are working together to increase the pressure so terrorists will find it difficult to organize further attacks. The US will use indirect approaches with their global partners to make it harder for radical extremists to find safe

havens around the world. Terrorist activity will be stopped through surveillance, intelligence, sustained unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency capabilities.<sup>168</sup> More importantly the QDR hails that this ideological battle will be successfully won through moderate Muslim nations speaking out against these groups and their actions.<sup>169</sup>

Defending the homeland is the top priority of the US government. With the onset of a globalized world the US faces considerable benefits, but also dangers are presented through these phenomena. As seen by 9/11 our country's geographic location no longer offers us additional protection. Besides terrorists using airplanes as missiles within our country, there is still the threat our adversaries will use long range missiles and WMDs to penetrate our defenses. Unfortunately, the globalized world means that countries are not the only actors who can acquire these weapons, but also individuals and terrorist organizations. DoD is looking at every possible angle an enemy might try to attack our country with a missile or WMD, even scrutinizing shipping vessels as a means for which our foe might think to smuggle a WMD into our nation. Our military and intelligence community are actively trying to locate and prevent would be assailants or attacks on America. Our military has the capability and the justification to disrupt and intercept an enemy from encroaching on our national security. DoD's goal for reasserting US presence around the world will send the message that the US is prepared to strike if attacked. The US will not hesitate to attack, and therefore it is in the best interest of would be assailants not to think about provoking the US into such an engagement.

The War on Terror is not only a US concern. There are many countries that find themselves at strategic crossroads, and the 2006 QDR went into some detail illustrating where potential actors could affect the US and US interests and those of its friends. As the War on Terrorism is an active part of the US' mission, countries in the Middle East are essential in

fighting this battle of ideologies. Through these actions the US wants to establish that all actors in the international political arena benefit from a cooperative environment. The goal is to ensure that not one actor has total control over regional security. The fear of WMDs falling into the wrong hands is as great a threat as the current War on Terrorism. The 2006 QDR acknowledges that the US needs to actively work on preventing actors or nations from using or acquiring WMDs. The US military needs to accurately collect intelligence on WMD programs worldwide. This intelligence information will assist the US in locating, tagging, and tracking WMD materials, which will work to deter a WMD attack. Additionally, the US should concentrate on the removal of WMD materials when appropriate. Terrorists and hostile nations can acquire WMDs from other hostile actors who are willing to sell their technology or weapons. The US military is also aware that some nations do not have an adequate means of safely controlling and protecting access to WMDs. Politically unstable nations that have WMDs also pose a threat, as these weapons can go to the wrong actors. Ultimately, it is in the US' interest to stop terrorist actors from attaining WMDs. The events of 9/11 demonstrated that one can never be too prepared. As the world gets smaller, with the onset of even greater and faster technologies, the US needs to be vigilant and stand firmly behind the values we instill. The US is well on its way, due to the detailed roadmap created through the goals of the US NSS and the QDR.

## ENDNOTES

- 
- <sup>1</sup> Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (2003). U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82 Issue 4, 60-73.
- <sup>2</sup> Freedman, Lawrence. (2004). Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War/The Iraq War: A Military History/The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Book). *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 Issue 1, 170.
- <sup>3</sup> Scales Jr., Robert H., & Williamson, Murray. (2003). *The Iraq War: A Military History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- <sup>4</sup> Reuter, Christoph. (2004). *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- <sup>5</sup> Cordesman, Anthony. (2004). *The War after the War (Significant Issues Series): Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*. Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- <sup>6</sup> Bloom, Mia. (2007). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- <sup>7</sup> Desouza, Kevin, & Ting-Yen, Wang. (2007). Impeding insurgent attacks: The information management agenda. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 74(2), 211-229.
- <sup>8</sup> Brym, Robert J. (2009). Six Lessons of Suicide Bombers. *Contexts*, 6 (4), 40-45.
- <sup>9</sup> Hafez, Mohammed. (2007). *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- <sup>10</sup> Lopez, Andrea M. (2007). Engaging or withdrawing, winning or losing? The contradictions of counterinsurgency policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (2), 245-260.
- <sup>11</sup> Hamilton, L., Hoffman, B., & Jenkins, Michael. (2006). *State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism*. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press.
- <sup>12</sup> Allawi, Ali. (2009). Iraq's Past, Present, and Future. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 14 (2), 265-271.
- <sup>13</sup> Ali, Farhana, & Post, Jerrold. (2008). The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts. *Social Research*, 75(2), 615-654.
- <sup>14</sup> Kepel, Gilles. (2008). *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- <sup>15</sup> Yaphe, Judith S. (2008). After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq? *Strategic Forum*, February 2008 (230), 1-6.
- <sup>16</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399, p 381
- <sup>17</sup> Williams, Paul. (2004). *Osama's Revenge: The Next 9/11-What The Media and The Government Haven't Told You*. New York: Prometheus Books, p 31.
- <sup>18</sup> Williams, ibd pg. 31

- 
- <sup>19</sup> Williams, ibd pg. 34
- <sup>20</sup> Williams, ibd pg. 35
- <sup>21</sup> Post, Jerrold. (2002). *Killing in the Name of God: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda*. (Counterproliferation Paper No. 18), p 12.
- <sup>22</sup> Williams, ibd pg. 35
- <sup>23</sup> Post, ibd pg. 12
- <sup>24</sup> Williams, ibd pg. 34
- <sup>25</sup> Williams, ibd pg.29
- <sup>26</sup> Williams, Paul. (2005). *The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the Coming Apocalypse*. New York: Prometheus Books, p 38.
- <sup>27</sup> Williams, (2005) ibd pg. 37
- <sup>28</sup> Williams, (2005) ibd pg. 37
- <sup>29</sup> Williams, (2005) ibd pg. 35
- <sup>30</sup> Wright, Lawrence. (2006). *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Random House, p 179.
- <sup>31</sup> Wright, ibd p.179
- <sup>32</sup> Williams, (2005) ibd pg. 37
- <sup>33</sup> Williams, (2005) ibd pg.10
- <sup>34</sup> Williams, (2005) ibd pg. 43
- <sup>35</sup> Crenshaw, ibd p. 385
- <sup>36</sup> Friedman, Norman. (2003). *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War*. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, p 15.
- <sup>37</sup> Friedman, ibd pg.45
- <sup>38</sup> Friedman, ibd pg.12
- <sup>39</sup> Kepel, Gilles. (2004). *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam*. Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p 319.
- <sup>40</sup> Kepel (2004), ibd pg.320
- <sup>41</sup> Phares, Walid. (2005). *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p 160.
- <sup>42</sup> Wright, ibd pg.361
- <sup>43</sup> Greenberg, Karen. (2005). *Al-Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists*. Cambridge University Press, p 207.

- 
- <sup>44</sup> Greenberg, ibd pg. 210
- <sup>45</sup> Greenberg, ibd, pg. 209
- <sup>46</sup> Greenberg, ibd pg.214
- <sup>47</sup> Greenberg, ibd pg.216
- <sup>48</sup> Phares, ibd pg. 167
- <sup>49</sup> Reisman, W. Michael. (2006). The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense. *The American Journal of International Law*, 100(3), 525-550, p 547.
- <sup>50</sup> Cooper, Mary. (2002). New Defense Priorities: Should the US launch pre-emptive strikes? *The CQ Researcher*, 12 (31), 721-744, p 726
- <sup>51</sup> Griffin, Michael. (2003). *Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa'ida and the Holy War*. Virginia: Pluto Press, p xiv.
- <sup>52</sup> Griffin, ibd pg. 16
- <sup>53</sup> Rashid, Ahmed. (2000). *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene. pg. 13
- <sup>54</sup> Rashid (2000), ifbd, pg. 13
- <sup>55</sup> Rashid (2000), ibd, pg. 13
- <sup>56</sup> Rashid (2000), ibd, pg. 13
- <sup>57</sup> Rashid, Ahmed. (2009). *Decent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Penguin Books, pg.80
- <sup>58</sup> Rashid (2009), pg. 81
- <sup>59</sup> Rashid (2009), pg. 81
- <sup>60</sup> Gohari, M.J. (1999). *The Taliban Ascent to Power*. Oxford: University Press, p 9.
- <sup>61</sup> Griffin, ibd, pg. 1
- <sup>62</sup> Gohari, ibd pg. 19
- <sup>63</sup> Gohari, ibd pg. 19
- <sup>64</sup> Rashid (2000), ibd, pg. 40
- <sup>65</sup> Gohari, ibd pg. 9
- <sup>66</sup> Griffin, ibd pg. 59
- <sup>67</sup> Rashid (2000), ibd, pg. 20

- 
- <sup>68</sup> Rashid (2000), ibd, pg. 22
- <sup>69</sup> Griffin, ibd pg. 18
- <sup>70</sup> Calabresi, Massimo, & Weiskopf, Michael. (2009, July 24). Inside Bush and Cheney's Final Days. *Time Magazine*.
- <sup>71</sup> Lynch, Marc. (2002.) Using and Abusing the UN. *Middle East Report*, No. 225(Winter, 2002), 8-13, p 10.
- <sup>72</sup> Lynch, ibd pg. 10
- <sup>73</sup> Althaus, Scott, & Largio, Devon. When Osama Became Saddam: Origins and Consequences of the Change in America's Public Enemy #1. *Political Science and Politics*, 37, (4), 795-799, p 798.
- <sup>74</sup> Althaus, ibd pg. 795
- <sup>75</sup> Althaus, ibd pg. 799
- <sup>76</sup> Wesley, Clark. (2004). *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*. New York: Public Affairs, p 119.
- <sup>77</sup> Burger, Timothy, et al. (2003, February, 10). Dissecting the Case. *Time Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004194-6,00.html>
- <sup>78</sup> Lynch, ibd pg. 10
- <sup>79</sup> Burger, ibd
- <sup>80</sup> Lynch, ibd pg. 8
- <sup>81</sup> Lynch, ibd pg. 11
- <sup>82</sup> Taylor, Diana. (2003). *Bush's Happy Performative*. *TDR*, 47(3), 5-8, p 6.
- <sup>83</sup> Bauman, Robert, & Rasor, Dina. (2007). *Betraying Our Troops: The Destructive Results of Privatizing War*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p 4.
- <sup>84</sup> Taylor, ibd pg. 6
- <sup>85</sup> Negus, Steve. (2004). The Insurgency Intensifies. *Middle East Report*, VOL # (232), 22-27, p 22.
- <sup>86</sup> Taylor, ibd pg. 6
- <sup>87</sup> Negus, ibd pg. 23
- <sup>88</sup> Negus, ibd pg. 23
- <sup>89</sup> Robinson, Linda. (2008). *Tell Me How this Ends: General Petraeus and The Search for A Way Out of Iraq*. New York: Public Affairs, p 5.

---

<sup>90</sup> Byman, Daniel. (2003). Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities. *International Security*, 28 (1), 47-78, p 52.

<sup>91</sup> Robinson, ibd pg. 4

<sup>92</sup> Robinson, ibd pg. 3

<sup>93</sup> Shuster, Mike. (2007). *Iraq War Deeping the Sunni-Shia Divide*. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7439998&ft=1&f=7346199>

<sup>94</sup> Robinson, ibd pg. 4

<sup>95</sup> Shuster, ibd

<sup>96</sup> Shuster, ibd

<sup>97</sup> Robinson, ibd pg. 17

<sup>98</sup> Robinson, ibd pg. 12

<sup>99</sup> Robinson, ibd pg. 17

<sup>100</sup> Shuster, ibd

<sup>101</sup> Shuster, ibd

<sup>102</sup> Carter, Sarah A. Petraeus Blames al-Qaeda. *The Washington Times*. 9/13/07

<sup>103</sup> Paley, Amit. (2008, July 31). Al-Qaeda Leader May be in Afghanistan. *The Washington Post*, p. A01.

<sup>104</sup> Cooper, Michael ibd

<sup>105</sup> Moulton, John. (2009). Rethinking IED Strategies: From Iraq to Afghanistan. *Military Review*, July-August 2009, 26-32, p 27

<sup>106</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 28

<sup>107</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 27

<sup>108</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 29

<sup>109</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 29

<sup>110</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 29

<sup>111</sup> Carter, ibd

<sup>112</sup> Levinson, Charles. (2008, October 10). Iraqi Army Prepares to Pay Sunni fighters: Seamless transition key to stability. *USA Today*, p. 4A.

<sup>113</sup> Levinson, ibd

---

<sup>114</sup> Cooper, ibd

<sup>115</sup> Cooper, ibd

<sup>116</sup> Cooper, ibd

<sup>117</sup> Paley, ibd

<sup>118</sup> CNN. (2009). *US General Calls for more troops in Afghanistan*. Accessed 9.21.09 from <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/21/afghanistan.mcchystal/index.html>

<sup>119</sup> CNN. (2009). *US General Calls for more troops in Afghanistan*. Accessed 9.21.09 from <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/21/afghanistan.mcchystal/index.html>

<sup>120</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. xxxviii

<sup>121</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. xxxviii

<sup>122</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 247

<sup>123</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 241

<sup>124</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 361

<sup>125</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 366

<sup>126</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 366

<sup>127</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 410

<sup>128</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 411

<sup>129</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 268

<sup>130</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 370

<sup>131</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 370

<sup>132</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 406

<sup>133</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 410

<sup>134</sup> Rashid (2009), ibd pg. 411

<sup>135</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 27

<sup>136</sup> Moulton, ibd pg. 27

<sup>137</sup> Cooper, Mary. (1999). Defense Priorities. *Congressional Quarterly*, 9(28), 641-644, p 643.

<sup>138</sup> Cooper (1999), ibd pg. 655

---

<sup>139</sup> Brake, Jeffrey. (2001). Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues (CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS20771). *Congressional Research Service*, June 21, 2001, p 1.

<sup>140</sup> Brake, ibd pg. 2

<sup>141</sup> Brake, ibd pg. 2

<sup>142</sup> Brake, ibd pg. 3

<sup>143</sup> Brake, ibd pg. 3

<sup>144</sup> Brake, ibd pg. 4

<sup>145</sup> Brake, ibd pg. 4

<sup>146</sup> Department of Defense. (2001). Quadrennial Defense Review Report September 30, 2001, p. iii

<sup>147</sup> 2002 US National Security Strategy p. 1

<sup>148</sup> 2002 US National Security Strategy p. 2

<sup>149</sup> 2006 US National Security Strategy, p. ii

<sup>150</sup> 2006 US National Security Strategy, p. 3

<sup>151</sup> 2006 US National Security Strategy, p. 1

<sup>152</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. iii

<sup>153</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 1

<sup>154</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. vi

<sup>155</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 3

<sup>156</sup> 2002 US National Security Strategy p. iv

<sup>157</sup> 2002 US National Security Strategy p. 1

<sup>158</sup> 2006 US National Security Strategy, p. 2

<sup>159</sup> 2006 US National Security Strategy, p. 3

<sup>160</sup> 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 13

<sup>161</sup> 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 15

<sup>162</sup> 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 25

<sup>163</sup> NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism, p. 1

<sup>164</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 1

---

<sup>165</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 10

<sup>166</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 10

<sup>167</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 3

<sup>168</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 23

<sup>169</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 22

## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Ali, Farhana, & Post, Jerrold. (2008). The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts. *Social Research*, 75(2), 615-654.
- Allawi, Ali. (2009). Iraq's Past, Present, and Future. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 14 (2), 265-271.
- Althaus, Scott, & Largio, Devon. When Osama Became Saddam: Origins and Consequences of the Change in America's Public Enemy #1. *Political Science and Politics*, 37, (4), 795-799.
- Bauman, Robert, & Rasor, Dina. (2007). *Betraying Our Troops: The Destructive Results of Privatizing War*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bloom, Mia. (2007). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brake, Jeffrey. (2001). Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues (CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS20771). *Congressional Research Service*, June 21, 2001, p. 1.
- Brym, Robert J. (2009). Six Lessons of Suicide Bombers. *Contexts*, 6 (4), 40-45.
- Burger, Timothy, et al. (2003, February, 10). Dissecting the Case. *Time Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004194-6,00.html>
- Byman, Daniel. (2003). Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities. *International Security*, 28 (1), 47-78
- Calabresi, Massimo, & Weisskopf, Michael. (2009, July 24). Inside Bush and Cheney's Final Days. *Time Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1912297,00.html>
- Carter, Sarah A. (2007). Petraeus Blames al-Qaeda. *The Washington Times*. 9/13/07
- CNN. (2009). *US General Calls for more troops in Afghanistan*. Accessed 9.21.09 from <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/21/afghanistan.mcchystal/index.html>

- Cooper, Mary. (1999). Defense Priorities. *Congressional Quarterly*, 9(28), 641-644
- Cooper, Mary. (2002). New Defense Priorities: Should the US launch pre-emptive strikes? *The CQ Researcher*, 12 (31), 721-744
- Cooper, Michael, & Rohter, Larry. (2008, April 19). McCain, Iraq War and the Threat of 'Al-Qaeda.' *The New York Times*, p. A01.
- Cordesman, Anthony. (2004). *The War after the War (Significant Issues Series): Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*. Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- Crenshaw, Martha. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399
- Department of Defense. (2001). *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C.
- Department of Defense. (2001). Quadrennial Defense Review Report September 30, 2001, p. iii
- Department of Defense. (2006). *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C.
- Desouza, Kevin, & Ting-Yen, Wang. (2007). Impeding insurgent attacks: The information management agenda. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 74(2), 211-229.
- Freedman, Lawrence. (2004). Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War/The Iraq War: A Military History/The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Book). *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 Issue 1, 170.
- Friedman, Norman. (2003). *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War*. Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
- Gohari, M.J. (1999). *The Taliban Ascent to Power*. Oxford: University Press.
- Greenberg, Karen. (2005). *Al-Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists*. Cambridge University Press.

- Griffin, Michael. (2003). *Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa'ida and the Holy War*. Virginia: Pluto Press.
- Hafez, Mohammed. (2007). *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hamilton, L., Hoffman, B., & Jenkins, Michael. (2006). *State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism*. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press.
- Kepel, Gilles. (2004). *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam*. Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Kepel, Gilles. (2008). *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Levinson, Charles. (2008, October 10). Iraqi Army Prepares to Pay Sunni fighters: Seamless transition key to stability. *USA Today*, p. 4A.
- Lopez, Andrea M. (2007). Engaging or withdrawing, winning or losing? The contradictions of counterinsurgency policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (2), 245-260.
- Lynch, Marc. (2002.) Using and Abusing the UN. *Middle East Report*, No. 225(Winter, 2002), 8-13.
- Moulton, John. (2009). Rethinking IED Strategies: From Iraq to Afghanistan. *Military Review*, July-August 2009, 26-32
- Negus, Steve. (2004). The Insurgency Intensifies. *Middle East Report*, VOL # (232), 22-27
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (2003). U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82 Issue 4, 60-73.
- Paley, Amit. (2008, July 31). Al-Qaeda Leader May be in Afghanistan. *The Washington Post*, p. A01.

- Phares, Walid. (2005). *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Post, Jerrold. (2002). Killing in the Name of God: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. (Counterproliferation Paper No. 18) Available from USAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base. Retrieved from <http://www.au.af.mil.au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm>
- Rashid, Ahmed. (2009). *Decent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Rashid, Ahmed. (2000). *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene.
- Reisman, W. Michael. (2006). The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense. *The American Journal of International Law*, 100(3), 525-550.
- Reuter, Christoph. (2004). *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Robinson, Linda. (2008). *Tell Me How this Ends: General Petraeus and The Search for A Way Out of Iraq*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Scales Jr., Robert H., & Williamson, Murray. (2003). *The Iraq War: A Military History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Shuster, Mike. (2007). *Iraq War Deeping the Sunni-Shia Divide*. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7439998&ft=1&f=7346199>
- Taylor, Diana. (2003). *Bush's Happy Performative*. *TDR*, 47(3), 5-8.

The White House. (2002). *2002 US National Security Strategy*, Washington, D.C.

The White House. (2006). *2006 US National Security Strategy*, Washington, D.C.

The National Counterterrorism Center. (2008.) *2008 Report on Terrorism*, Washington, D.C.

Wesley, Clark. (2004). *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*. New York: Public Affairs.

Williams, Paul. (2004). *Osama's Revenge: The Next 9/11-What The Media and The Government Haven't Told You*. New York: Prometheus Books.

Williams, Paul. (2005). *The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the Coming Apocalypse*. New York: Prometheus Books.

Wright, Lawrence. (2006). *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Random House.

Yaphe, Judith S. (2008). After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq? *Strategic Forum*, February 2008 (230), 1-6.